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VIVARIUM
editors
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published
AN INTERNATIONAL
JOURNALFOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUALLIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
vivarium
is devotedin particular
to theprofane
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lifeoftheMiddleAgesand
Renaissance.
- H.A.G. Braakhuis,
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Kneepkens,
(Groningen)
(Madison)
oftheEditorial
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,
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(Cologne)
Murdoch,
MA).
(Cambridge,
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Brill,
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Twiceyearly.
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INTHENETHERLANDS
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CONTENTS
Russell E. Friedman
& Lauge O. Nielsen
William Duba
Lauge O. Nielsen
Alessandro D.
Conti
Chris Schabel
Charles Bolyard
Russell L. Friedman
Antonie Vos
Antonie Vos
Henri Veldhuis
Eef Dekker
Nico den Bok
St. Kirschner
Reviews
Books Received
OF VOLUME
XXXVIII
(2000)
Introduction
5
35
99
117
162
177
Singulars
Scotus on Freedom and the Foundation
of Ethics.An UtrechtContribution
195
The Scotian Notion of Natural Law
197
Ordained and AbsolutePower in Scotus'
I 44
Ordinatio
222
The Theoryof Divine PermissionAccordI 47
231
ing to Scotus' Ordinatio
Freedomin Regard to Opposite Acts and
Objects in Scotus' LecturaI 39, 45-54 243
Oresme on Intension and Remission of
Qualitiesin His Commentaryon Aristotle's
255
Physics
JacquelineLeclercq-Marx,La sirnedans
la pense et dans l'art de l'Antiquitet du
Moyen Age. Du mythepaen au symbole
chrtien[rev.byHarryTummers)
275
WilliamJ. Courtenay,ParisianScholarsin
the Early FourteenthCentury.A Social
Portrait{rev.byStenEbbesen
277
)
281
18:22:15 PM
PeterAuriol:Introduction
Vivarium
, 38,1
18:22:30 PM
INTRODUCTION
18:22:30 PM
INTRODUCTION
18:22:30 PM
INTRODUCTION
18:22:30 PM
in theWorksof PeterAuriol
The Immaculate
Conception
WILLIAMDUBA*
Vivarium,
38,1
18:22:37 PM
WILLIAM
DUBA
N
-
S
-
X
-
C
-
dd. 1-4,6-22
dd. 1-4,
9(part)-22
copiedas
d. 23
dd. 1-22,but
shorter
qq. 47-72as
dd.27-40
qq. 42-72(one
not
sextern,
N)
d. 5, 3question
appendix
qq. 47-72
Additional
notes:
Gd. sem.,46/85contains
witness
to LPT; I havenot
another
(1) Presumably,
Pelplin,
auRpertoire
this.cf.Z. Wiodek,
Commentaires
surlesSentences.
beenabletoconfirm
Supplment
deF. Stegmller
lesmssdela Bibliothque
duGrand
dePelplin,
Seminaire
, in:Mediaevalia
d'aprs
8 (1961),33-8.
Polonorum,
Philosophica
ofCardinal
Torri
dueinparttotheefforts
Costanzo
(2) X is the1605Romeedition,
auRpertoire
deM. F. Stegmller
ofSarnano.
V. Doucet,Commentaires
surlesSentences.
,
Supplment
Florence
thatS is without
doubtthebasisofX. Anexamina1954,67,n. 661,declares
tionofthetexts
confirms
ofthelatter
thepart
this;a comparison
partofthemanuscript,
shared
withLNPT,showsthatS is veryunreliable,
withmanyvariant
Forthe
readings.
mostpart,X sharesS's variants;
thesamevariant
as S, itusuwhenX doesnotreport
ofa marginally
successful
at correction.
Moreover,
manyof
allyshowsevidence
attempt
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CONCEPTION
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CONCEPTION
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10
WILLIAM
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CONCEPTION
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18:22:37 PM
14
WILLIAM
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and contraction,
theirvarioussenses,and the indicationof whichsense
is primary
3. theoretical
framework:
divinepower,and thepossibility
of theImmaculate
Conception
4. exegeticalmodel: argumentsfromauthority
in favorof the Immaculate
Conception
5. A. opinability:the conceptionof the Virginis a matteron which theological opinion is licit
B. exegeticalmodel: the typesof responsesto be given to the authorities cited to the contrary
6. responsesto specificobjectionsraised in chapter1, on the basis of 5B.
Attachedto the end of chapter 6 is a briefquestion on whetherthe
feastof the Conception of the Virginshould be celebrated.
The Repercussorium
is composedin responseto a critic,and largelyaddresses
the theoreticalunderpinnings
of AurioPsposition.It is dividedinto eight
conclusiones.
The firstsix deal withdifferent
aspectsof AurioPsdoctrineof
the
seventh
defends
Original Sin;
corporeal formation('animal conception') as a significateof conception; and the eighth contains AurioPs
defenseof virtuallyeveryotherpositionhe holds in the firsttreatise.
Aurioldiscussesthe Immaculate
commentaries,
Turningto the Sentences
in
book
d.
the
locus
classicus
for the debate concernIII,
3,
Conception
of theImmaculateConception
ing theconceptionofMary.These treatments
to
a
set
different
of
obviouslyrespond
very
requirements.Being part of
a much largerwork,the author does not need to elaborate his position
on relateddoctrines,such as OriginalSin and Divine Power.At the same
is at least in part dictated
time,the structureof AurioPs argumentation
whereasAuriolconcentrates
commentaries;
by the conventionsof Sentences
on his own thesisin the treatises,in the commentarieshe also evaluates
othertheoriesconcerningthe conceptionof the Virgin.
The treatments
of the ImmaculateConceptionfoundin the two Sentences
also varyconsiderablyamong themselves.
commentaries
The textreported
is
SX
several
times
than
in
that
found
thus
LPT;
by
longer
any arguments
fromomissionin LPT will have to be viewedwithparticularskepticism,
as such omissionscould verywell be due to thisstylistic
distinction.
thefollowing
Thus, in the SX versionof book III, d. 3, Auriolarticulates
structure
forthe relevantarticlesin the firstquestion,concerningthe issue
of Mary's sanctification
when she was conceived(conceptio
passiva):
1. presentation
and resolutionof authorities
the Immaculate
proand contra
Conception
18:22:37 PM
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
15
2. one impossibleway in which Mary was initiallysanctified,that associated withHenry of Ghent,namelyin the same instantin whichshe
was conceivedin Original Sin
3. threepossibleways in which Mary was initiallysanctified
A. she was in Original Sin for the firstinstant,and sanctifiedin the
time contiguouswith that instant
B. she was conceivedimmaculately
C. she was conceived in Original Sin, and was sanctifiedsome time
thereafter
4. determination
of which of the threepositionsshould be held, namely
Immaculate
the
B.,
Conception,and how, namelyas opinion,not with
certitude
5. whetherthe feastof the Conception of Mary should be celebrated.
LPT's treatmentof the ImmaculateConception questionis similarto
SX, inasmuchas the two treatpossible and impossibleways of understandingthe conceptionof Mary. Yet, in LPT the ImmaculateConception
is treated in a separate question that unites the arguments for the
position'spossibility,its authoritativesupport,and the declarationthat
it is actuallythe case; the remainingpossible and impossibleways that
interestAuriolare discussedin the followingquestion,producingthe followingstructure:
Question 1: whetherthe Blessed Virginwas conceivedin Original Sin
I. authorities
pro and contra
II. response:
A. rule: since we read very littleabout Mary in Scripture,to her
should be attributedwhateveris worthyof her loftystate
B. God was capable of preservingMary
C. Mary was, in fact,preservedfromthe stain of Original Sin
D. the feastof the Conception of Mary can be celebrated
III. resolutionof the authoritycontra
.
Question II: whether,if Mary were conceivedin Original Sin, she could
be sanctifiedin the same instant
I. argumentspro and contra.
II. response:
A. as formulated,
thispositionis impossible,(cf. Article2 of SX)
B. it is possiblethatMary was conceivedin OriginalSin and sanctified
in time contiguouswith that instant(cf. 3a of SX above).
III. Resolutionof the argumentcontra
.
18:22:37 PM
16
WILLIAM
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CONCEPTION
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18
WILLIAM
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CONCEPTION
19
18:22:37 PM
20
WILLIAM
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carnem
et tarnen
nonfuitinfecta
et sicnon
habuit,
peraliquammorbidam
qualitatem,
actio,ex quo agensnonestqui maculet.
sequeretur
cumdebito
Si autem
estcarentia
iustitiae
dico
ponisquodoriginale
peccatum
originalis
cumimpuetiam
tollere
debitum
Similiter
de illaobliquitate
etdimittere.
quodDeuspotuit
in primoinstanti
nonimputare,
et illaqualitas,
adhucDeuspotuit
tatione,
quaeestlex
etitapotuit
esseistemodus
etfacere
membrorum,
quod
potuit
suspendi,
quodnoninesset;
in instanti
suaeconceptionis
nonhabuit
peccatum
originale."
18:22:37 PM
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
21
ofOriginal
Sinthere
is only(B) concupisto theformula
Further,
(ratio)
pertaining
ofOriginal
which
cenceseededin theflesh
or(C) privation
to
Righteousness
ought
or (A)theoffense
to Godfounded
on both.ButGodcouldremove
all
be present
ofhercreation:
theBlessed
at theinstant
from
thesefrom
her
Virgin
concupiscence
fromtheprivation
ofrighteousness
and thatrequirement
and
flesh,
[ofpresence]
he wasableto remove
Therefore
from
boththeoffense.
completely
original
guilt.24
As we have seen, theDe conceptione
prefacesthisdiscussionwitha determinationof the natureof OriginalSin, and thispassage seems to assume
itsconclusions,withone significant
difference:
whereasAuriolconsistently
maintainsthe materialelementof Original Sin to be, under its positive
aspect,rebellionor concupiscenceand, underits negativeaspect,the privation of Original Righteousness,in this passage he insertsthe words
debitae
inesse
, "whichoughtto be present",intothe descriptionof the negathathe suggestsGod can remove.
tiveaspect. Moreover,it is thisdebitum
Yet, Auriol's understandingof the materialelementof Original Sin as
elaboratedin the previouschapterand made explicitin his Repercussorium
allows it to be merelythe contraryof Original Righteousness,and not
to contain an obligationto possess it. Indeed, Auriol attacksthe comhabendi
as partof Original
petingopinionthatpositspreciselysuch a debitum
Sin.25One could, of course,suggestthat,here as well, Auriol is arguing
dialectically,
assumingthe positionof his opponents,but then one would
be at a loss to explain how, in the same sentence,Auriol makes the
offenseto God- what he understandsas the formalelementin Original
Sin- inherein both the privationof Original Sin and concupiscenceas
in its materialelement,an inherencethat reflectsAuriol's own view of
what Original Sin is. In short,Auriol seems to conflatehis opinion on
OriginalSin with those of his adversaries.26
24De conceptione
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
deImmac.
B.M.V.,ed.
, in: Fr.Gulielmi
Concept.
1904(op.cit
de ratione
., above,n. 10),at 52,"Amplius,
[Lemmen]
originalis
peccatinon
estnisivelconcupiscentia
in carneseminata
velprivatio
debitae
iustitiae
inesse
originalis
veloffensa
Deisuper
sedhaecomniaDeuspotuit
a beataVirgine
tollere
fundata;
utrumque
ininstanti
suaecreationis,
eta carneconcupiscentiam,
eta privatione
iustitiae
obligationem
etab utroque
offensam:
tollere
totaliter
ipsam,
ergo
potuit
culpam
originalem."
25Repercussorium,
in: Fr.Gulielmi
Guarrae...
deImmac.
B.M.V.
, ed.
Qg.Disput,
Concept.
1904(op.cit.,
above,n. 10),at 106-7.Rosato1959(op.cit.,
above,n. 4), 21,
[Lemmen]
describes
theopinion
thatholdsOriginal
Sintobe theprivation
ofOriginal
Sinwiththe
"debitum
earn"as the"communior"
habendi
associated
withHervaeus
Natalis.
position
26A further
is thatAuriol's
definition
ofcontrahere
theentire
series
, andindeed,
problem
ofdefinitions
inthepreceding
thereader
fora position
ontheImmaculate
prepare
chapter,
thatsaysthatMarydidnotdefacto
haveOriginal
Sin,butdeiure
did,since
Conception
allhumans
haveconcupiscence.
Yethere,andinwhatfollows,
Auriol
isunequivocal:
Mary
contracted
neither
theformal
northematerial
Sin.But,ifcontraction
aspectofOriginal
deiure
is founded
on possessing
ofconcupiscence,
thequality
howcanwe say,as Auriol
in thisway?
does,thatshecontracted
18:22:37 PM
22
WILLIAM
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THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
23
18:22:37 PM
24
WILLIAM
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18:22:37 PM
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
25
in thefifth
context.In the course
chapter,but he does so in an interesting
of arguingthatthe ImmaculateConceptionis a theologicalissue on which
opinion may be had, he considersthe objection that conciliarapproval
makes them a valid basis on which to argue that
of the dictasanctorum
the ImmaculateConception is erroneousand contraryto the faith.To
thisAuriol respondsthat:
are not declarationsof orthodoxfaith.
(A) the dictasanctorum
foreitherside of theImmaculateConception.
(B) thereare dictasanctorum
saints
sustainMary'sconceptionin OriginalSin,
where
the
(C)
apparently
in
either
, about all humans, but
general, de iure
(1)
they speak
, was excepted,or
Mary, defacto
(2), iftheyspeak about Mary in particular,theyrefernot to human
conception,but to seminadconception,that is, to the maritalact,
which,on AurioPsview, can be called OriginellSin insofaras it
is its cause.29
The reference(C) to the equivocityof termsas a means to resolve
authoritative
out of place. Withthe firsttwo claims,
opinionsseemsslightly
Auriol sustainsthat the authorityof the saints does not, neither(A) in
general nor (B) in this particularcase, exclude any position from the
realm of doctrineson which opinion is possible.30Argument(C), on the
otherhand,ignoresopinabilityand insteadelaborateshow to resolvecontraryauthorities.
The degreeof affinity
betweenthispassage and SX is evident.Whereas
maintainthatthe ImmaculateConception
both SX and the De concepitone
is a doctrineon whichopinionmay be had, here (A) pointsout the necessaryantecedentthat the declarationsof the Saints are not ipsofacto
Church doctrine.This fusionof positionsmeans that here, AurioPsdeclaration(B)- thatthereare authorities
bothforand againstthe Immaculate
- is not
(as it is in SX) the declarationof a problem to be
Conception
of theinconclusiveness
of such authorsolved,but ratherthedemonstration
ities.Nevertheless,(C) purportsto provide an exegeticalmodel capable
of resolving
all authoritative
either,in a manner
argumentsto the contrary,
29Deconceptione
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
deImmac.
ed.[Lemmen]
, Fr.Gulielmi
B.M.V.,
Concept.
1904(<
., above,n. 10),at 74-8.
op.cit
rora discussion
o theweight
withparbyscholastic
giventoauctontates
theologians,
ticular
reference
to Scotus,
see R.L. Friedman,
Inprincipio
eratVerbum:
TheIncorporation
of
intoTrinitarian
1250-1325
Ph.D.Dissertation,
Philosophical
Psychology
Theology,
Unpublished
ofIowa(1997),201-28.
University
18:22:37 PM
26
WILLIAM
DUBA
18:22:37 PM
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
27
afterseminal conception.The most common use of the word 'conception',on the otherhand, is forseminalconception.32
Additionally,Auriol elaborates his position on the uses of "Original
Sin" to referto the cause, the materialelement,and the formalelement,
as noted above. Auriol then definesthe senses of the term"to contract"
). Auriol discernstwo relevantmeanings,which he then applies
(icontrahere
to the model of Original Sin outlinedby the previousdefinition.These
. In sense (A) everydescendentof
meaningsare (A) de iureand (B) defacto
Adam contractsOriginalSin, since each one is born withconcupiscence,
which God decreed to be imputedto guilt.In sense (B) only those who
actuallyincur Gos offensecontractOriginal Sin. So it is possible that
someone contractde iure
, but not defacto.
As shouldbe clear,(C)(1) resolvescontraryauthoritiesby claimingthey
use the term"to contract"in a secondarymanner,that is, for contraction de iure
, while (C)(2) makes referenceto a secondary
, and not defacto
use of "conception",thatis, in referenceto the conceivingact insteadof
human conception.
In LPT, Auriol discussesthe same multiplemeaningsof key termsas
in the De concepitone
, but he firstdiscussesthemin the contextof respondto
to
ing objections his position.Moreover,he onlymentionsthosemeaningsessentialto his claim thatapparendycontraryopinionsare usingthe
can be summarizedwitha table:
These differences
keytermsequivocally.33
De conceptione
, chapter2
I. Conception
A. Seminal
B. Animal
C. Human
II. Original Sin
A. Cause
B. Material element
C. Formal element
III. To contract
A. de iure
B. defacto
LPT
I. Conception
A. Seminal
B. Human
II. Original Sin
A. Cause
B. Material element
III. To contract
A. de iure
B. defacto
32De conceptione
deImmac.
. . . Qg.Disput,
Guarrae
B.M.V, ed.
, in: Fr. Gulielmi
Concept.
1904(op.tabove,n. 10),at 35-6.
[Lemmen]
33Buytaert
1955(op.t.,
above,n. 1),167-8.
18:22:37 PM
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WILLIAM
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18:22:37 PM
CONCEPTION
THE IMMACULATE
29
18:22:37 PM
30
WILLIAM
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18:22:37 PM
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
31
18:22:37 PM
32
DUBA
WILLIAM
18:22:37 PM
THE IMMACULATE
CONCEPTION
33
. . . ThusGodonlyso lovessomeone
in
whoparticipates
theconnection
ofvirtues.
to Him.Andthushe is dform
sucha wayin thosevirtues,
bywhichhe conforms
inthosevirtues;
itis impossible
therefore
thatsomeone
be lovedby
byparticipation
ofvirtues,
forwhite
toexist
withGodwithout
thisconnection
justas itis impossible
...
sincehe is formally
outwhiteness,
gracedandaccepted
byGodbythevirtues
andthisrequires
all thevirtues,
so thathe be wellgraced,
justas a manis called
in whichthereis neither
ifhe haswell-disposed
nor
bodyparts,
ugliness
"graced"
is called"Grace",
ifthatisposited,
allthevirtues
defect.
because,
Therefore,
charity
Gracehasthisformal
tomakesomeone
areposited.
Therefore,
effect,
namely
graced
therewasGrace,as shewasgracedand
Virgin
byGod,andthusin theblessed
thatGodlovedbefore
andafterwards
lovedbyGod.Nordo I imagine
gaveGrace;
thatbywhich
Godfirst
lovesman,is Grace,whichis onlyconsequent
in
therefore
as I said.41
thesenseofcommunicating,
Here, he describesGrace as the entiretyof the virtues,and employsthe
analogyofphysicalappearance.Could thisbe the passage to whichAuriol
is referring?
An additionaladvantageof assumingthe versionof book III recorded
in LPT to be the laterone is thatthiswould explainwhy,in the famous
tabulaquaestionis
appended to T, the compilerincludedthe questionsfrom
this collectionas representative
of book III, where for the otherbooks,
he citesversionsthat have 1316 as theirterminus
; if LPT conpostquern
tainsAurioPslatestknowntreatmentof book III, it mostlikesdates from
his Parisianperiod,and, SX, on the otherhand, does not need an explanationforits absence fromthe list in T.42
41S: f.25"**^,
X: 384a"Sedestdubium,
an iliagratia
earninesseaccepto
conposuit
utquiafuitaccepta,
deditgratiam;
velprincipaliter
etmediative,
utquiaddit
sequenter,
fuit
itaquodsitaliquaforma,
sicutalbedoalbum;
gratiam
accepta,
quaedetesseacceptum,
et istamvococonnexionem
sicaliquem
virtutum.
... Ita Deusnondiligit
nisiiliumqui
sicvirtutes,
etitadiligit
Ei. Et sic
sicparticipante
<m>, <quo> sicconformatur
participt
illedeiformis
illarum
virtutum
estaliquem
Dei; ideoimpossibile
perparticipationem
diligi
a Deo sineillaconnexione
sicutimpossibile
essealbumsinealbedine,
virtutum,
quiaper
sitformaliter
virtutes
et acceptus
Deo-non
dicatunumsubstratum
nec
gratus
quodgratia
suaqualitate
virtute-et
hocrequirit
omnesvirtutes,
ut sitbenegratus,
sicutdicitur
'gratus'homohabensomniamembra
in quibusnonsitturpitudo
benedisposita,
necdefectus.Igitur
Charitas
vocatur
omnesponuntur;
'gratia',
quia illaposita,
igitur
gratiahabet
formalem
effectum
facere
fuitgratia,
hune,scilicet
Deo, et itain beataVirgine
gratum
Necimaginor
id
quodfuitgrataet dilecta.
quodpriusdiligat,
posteadetgratum;
igitur
Deushominem
estgratia,
nisicommunicans,
quoprimo
diligit,
quaenonestconsequens
utdixi."A passage
in d. 13 ofthesametext,
occurs
butlacksthecomparquitesimilar
isontophysical
usedhere.
appearance
T: ff.124r-127v.
cf.Brown1995(op.at.,
ofT is
above,n. 6), 204-6.The testimony
becausethetexts
theversions
ofbookIII andbookIV,
there,
particularly
strong
namely
anda tabula
forallfourbooks,
areindicated
as beingcopiedinMarch,1323.
quaestionum
To beprecise,
therubric
thatestablishes
thisdateisthehighly
effaced
forthetabula
explicit
Onecannevertheless
makeoutthefollowing
lines:"Explicit
quaestionis.
rep
m(agist)ri
ordinis
li/bros
editum
a
petriaure/oli
fr(atru)m
minor(um)
superquatuor
sententiar(um)
Bernardo
de Pi/reto
eiusdem
ordinis
..
p(er)man(um)
scriptum
18:22:37 PM
34
WILLIAM
DUBA
18:22:37 PM
PeterAurioland ThomasWylton
The Debatebetween
on Theology
and Virtue
LAUGE O. NIELSEN*
In 1926 Konstanty
Michalskidrewattention
to a debatebetweenThomas
Wyltonand PeterAuriolwhichhe had discoveredin the manuscriptno.
63 in the libraryof Balliol College, Oxford.In view of the factthatoral
discussionwas one of the primaryvehiclesof teachingin medieval universitiesand an invaluable part of university
life,and that remarkably
few recordsof such debates have been preserved,Michalskiwas understandablyenthusiasticabout his find.1Though two of the more prominentstudentsof Aurioland his contemporaries
recognisedthe importance
of the recordspreservedin the Balliol manuscriptand signalledthem,2
hardlyany subsequentscholarshave paid attentionto the manuscriptor
its contents.3
This situationis, however,much to be regretted,
since it is,
as Michalski realised,an extraordinary
valuable source of information
withrespectto the intellectualcurrentsin the timeof Aurioland Wylton.
* In preparing
I haveincurred
thisarticle
several
I amparticularly
debtsofgratitude.
to AllanTadielloandtheothermembers
ofthestaff
in BalliolCollegeLibrary
grateful
fortheir
andforproviding
suchagreeable
toDr.Cecilia
conditions;
great
patience
working
AllSoul'sCollege,
forallowing
meto usehertranscription
ofWylton's
Oxford,
Trifogli,
L. Friedman
toDr.Russell
forhiscareful
ofthemanuscript;
quodlibetal
questions;
reading
andto Prof.FritzS. Pedersen,
ofOdense,forhisjudicious
comments
on the
University
in theappendices.
editions
included
Travelgrants
fromtheTheological
the
Faculty,
ofCopenhagen,
enabled
metowork
with
theoriginal
inBalliol
University
manuscript
College.
1 Michalski
didnotanalyse
thepertinent
texts
butventured
theguess
1926,2. Michalski
thatthedebatehadtakenplacein Oxford
at somepointwhenbothcombatants
were
oftheology
there.
SinceAuriolis known
notto havebeenactivein Oxford,
professors
Michalski's
neednotdetainus.
hypothesis
Withregard
toAuriol's
nameI follow
Valois1906,479sqq.,andadopttheverfamily
nacular
"Auriol".
His Latinnamewillappearas "Aureolus"
sincethisis wellspelling
in themedieval
documented
cf.Teetaert
sources;
1935,col. 1811.
Itwasmentioned
whoalsoprovided
a valu1935,col.1840;andPelster,
byTeetaert
abledescription
oftheBalliolmanuscript;
seePelster
1954,398sqq.
3 Thisis trueof,e.g.,A. Maier,eventhough
muchofherresearch
the
concerning
ofAuriol's
transmission
commentaries
onPeter
Lombard's
Sentences
wasbasedonan analysisoftherelationship
between
andAuriol;
seeMaier1964,280sqq.W. Senkois
Wylton
a noticeable
inasmuch
as he usedthemanuscript
forhisedition
of one of
exception
note6.
seebelow,
Wylton's
questions;
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
Vivarium
, 38,1
18:22:46 PM
36
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
18:22:46 PM
ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON
37
18:22:46 PM
38
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
18:22:46 PM
ANDVIRTUE
AURI
OL ANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
39
17Wylton,
. . sec.3.2.2.
habitus
"Utrum
theologicus
18Auriol,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.2.1.3and2.5.1.
practicus
19HereThomasWylton
see Auriol,
appearsunderthenameof ThomasAnglicus;
Quodlibet
, q. 15 (Auriol
1605,col. 138a),whichis unanimously
bythemanusupported
tradition.
script
20Thereis a question
ofspeculative
on thenature
andpractical
sciences
in
byWylton
inTortosa;
themanuscript
no.88 intheCathedral
seeEtzkorn
andAndrews
1994,
library
61. I havenothadan opportunity
to examine
thismanuscript.
18:22:46 PM
40
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
Account
3. Wylton's
ofAuriol'sViewof Theolog))
Wylton'saccount of Auriol's views is remarkablyfull.Moreover,it is
accurate in the sense that it is, in the main, substantiatedby
strikingly
Auriol's own works. Accordingly,this part of Wylton'squestion might
seem to indicatethatthe authorwas familiarwithat leastsome of Auriol's
writings.Since Auriol treatedof the key issues raised by the nature of
theologyin severalpassagesof his works,thereare severalpossiblesources
for Wylton'sexposition.In the firstplace, Auriol devoted the prologue
on the firstbook of the Sentences
of his earlyand voluminouscommentary
,
Primum
the so-calledScriptum
Sententiarum
, to thistopic.21Secondly,in
super
the conclusionto thiscommentaryAuriolreturnedto the questionof the
natureof theology,and while outliningthe salientfeaturesof his stance
he dealt a vehementblow not only to the Dominicans' view of the matA thirdtreatment
terbut also to what he called the "opinio communis".22
of the nature of the habit of theologyAuriol provided in the prologue
to his shorterand stillunpublishedcommentaryon the firstbook of the
.23
Sententiarum
Sentences
, which was writtenafterthe Scriptum
superPrimum
with
in
habitus
Auriol
the
issue
at
hand
the
"Utrum
dealt
question
Finally,
question15 of his Quodpracticus. . in Balliol 63 and the corresponding
Auriol'sreply
libet.
Since thislatterexpositioncontains,as alreadymentioned,
to Wylton'sargumentsin the questionfoundin Balliol 63, it cannot,however,have servedas a sourceforWylton'ssummaryof Auriol'sposition.24
A comparisonbetweenWylton'saccountof Auriol'sviewsand the pertinentpassages in Auriol'sliteraryremainsyieldsa farfromsimpleresult.
Not surprisingly,
several parts of Wylton'sexpositioncould echo either
Auriol's
of
prologuesto the two commentarieson the firstbook of the
21The dateofthisworkis relatively
a copyofthework
securesinceAuriol
donated
in Mayof 1317;seeMaier1964,65,
to PopeJohnXXII,andthiscopywascompleted
note60; andBuytaert
1952,XII sqq.
22Thisconclusion
on theverylast
to thecommentary
is appended
as a third
article
Primum
Sententiarum
distinction
oftheLombard's
text;Auriol,
, d. 48, a. 3
Scriptum
super
1596,cols.1120sqq.)
(Auriol
23In themanuscripts
thiswork
is termed
a "reportatio",
andthisis anaccurate
descriphalf
inParisheldinthefirst
is basedonAuriol's
lectures
tioninsofar
as thiscommentary
notbe takento imply
thatthis
Thisshould,
oftheacademic
however,
year1316-1317.
that
ofunedited
or "raw"reports;
therearequiteclearindications
consists
commentary
thework;
effort
intoediting
cf.Maier1964,285sqq.;andNielsen
Auriol
putconsiderable
in
In thefollowing
thisworkwillbe referred
to as theCommentarius
Breuior
(forthcoming).
Sententiarum.
Primum
24ForAuriol's
seeBrown1998andNielsen
1999as well
as a science,
viewoftheology
citedthere.
as theliterature
18:22:46 PM
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
41
Sentences
, and the reason for this is quite simplythat in these passages
In one instance,however,
AurioPstwo commentariesagree veryclosely.25
it seemsthatWylton'sexpositionreflectsa line of reasoningthatis found
In
Sententiarum.26
superPrimum
solelyin the prologue to AurioPs Scriptum
another case it appears that the only possible writtencounterpartto
and phrasingof AurioPs thoughtis a passage in
Wylton'sidentification
Sententiarum
the conclusionto AurioPsScriptum
, i.e., the third
superPrimum
27
articlein Distinction48. Finally,severalpartsof Wylton'sexpositionof
AurioPsstand could only reflectwhat Auriol presentedin his later and
,28In one
on the firstbook of the Lombard's Sentences
shortercommentary
25Thisholdsgoodforsec. 3.1 in Wylton's
"Utrum
habitus
. . ." which
theologicus
either
Primum
Sententiarum
sec.3, a. 2,
reflect
Auriol's
, Prooemium,
super
Scriptum
might
inPrimum
Brevior
Sententiarum
21 (Auriol
1952,241),or hisCommentarius
, Prologus,
pars3,
"Utrum
habitus
. sec.4.2,
theologicus.
q. 3, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.llrb).Wylton's
Primum
derive
from
either
Auriol's
Sententiarum
sec. 1,a.
, Prooemium,
Scriptum
super
might
hisCommentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
1952,153),orfrom
1, 73 (Auriol
, Prologus,
Sec. 4.3 in Wylton's
pars2, q. 1, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.7vb).
question
agreeswith
Primum
bothAuriol's
Sententiarum
sec.1,a. 2, 80 (Auriol
, Prooemium,
1952,
super
Scriptum
andhisCommentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
, Prologus,
155-6),
pars2, q. 2, a. 3 (Vat.
sec.4.4 in Wylton's
"Utrum
habitus
. . ." could
Borgh.123,fol.9va).Finally,
theologicus
Primum
1 (Auriol
buildon either
Auriol's
Sententiarum
, d. 48,a. 3, conclusio
Scriptum
super
inPrimum
Brevior
Sententiarum.
1596,col.1123a),orhisCommentarius
, Prologus,
pars3, q. 4,
a. 1 (Vat.Boreh.123,fol.llvb).
26Thisisdefinitely
hasa closeparallel
intheScriptum
trueofsec.1.2,which
Primum
super
est
sec.3, a. 3, 82a (Auriol
Sententiarum,
Prooemium,
1952,243):"Illenamquehabitus
a sciente
etper
excellentioribus
purepracticus,
quiestde obiecto
attingibili
operationibus
Hoc etenim
nobiliores
tumquiataleobiectum
actus,quamsitactusilliushabitus.
patet,
ad scientem
nonutspeculabile
sedutoperabile,
hocestoperationibus
tantum,
comparatur
tumquia medicina
et omnesscientiae
ex hocpracticae
sunt,quia
attingibile;
practicae
earumestab homine
et nobiliori
modoattingibile
obiectum
operabile
quampersolum
melius
estenimhomini
habere
sanitatem
etessesanum
etesse
scire;
quamsciresanitatem
etmelius
esthabere
virtutes
secundum
quamscirequidestvirtus,
aegrotum;
Philosophum,
habetproobiecto
2. Ethicorum.
Sed,habitus
Deum,quodesta nobisattintheologicus
excellentioribus
creditiva
intelactus,
operationibus,
quamsitintelligere
gibile
pernobiliores
lectione
ex purisnaturalibus
habitain hac via; nobilius
enimattingitur
Deus,si sibi
etineumassurgatur
adhaereatur
etsi eius
perfidem
perspem,etdiligatur
percaritatem,
oboediatur
consiliis
etpraeceptis,
credibilia
quamsi hocmodonubilose
exponuntur.
Ergo
istehabitus
eritpracticus
pure".
27Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec.4.1,patendy
to Auriol's
theologicus...",
corresponds
Primum
Sententiarum
, d. 48, a. 3 (Auriol1596,col. 1121
Scriptum
super
b): "Et confirmatur,
sua principia,
contranegantes
ut patet1. Physicorum
et 1.
quianullusartifex
disputt
etpraecedentium
Posteriorum.
Constat
conatus
sanctorum
autem,
quodtotus
theologorum
fuitad disputandum
contra
et ad convincendum
artculos
haereticos.
Undeet
negantes
fidessaluberrima
defenditur
dicit,ibidem,
Augustinus
quodperhancscientiam
gignitur,
etroboratur."
Forthisparticular
from
seebelow,note29.
quotation
Augustine,
28Thussec.1.1inWylton's
Commentarius
toAuriol's
question
corresponds
quiteclosely
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
, Prologus,
pars3, q. 4, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.llvb):"Sed
estpractica
egodico,quod(seil.,
theologia)
accipiendo
practicam
simpliciter
proactiva,
18:22:46 PM
42
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
instancetheagreement
betweenWylton'sexposition
and AurioPsCcmmientaus
Brevior
in Primm
is quite telling,and thisconcernsAurioPsuse
Sententiarum
of a textofAugustine's.One ofAurioPsfavourite
passagesfromAugustine's
De Trinitate
is the one in which Augustinestatesthat the science of the
divineis truewisdom by which salvatoryfaithis strengthened,
and that
fewbelieversare proficient
in thissciencethoughtheyare strongin faith.29
Auriol derivedtwo points of principalsignificancefromthispassage. In
the firstplace, he used the passage to prove thatthe properaim of theological science is to defend the Creed or the articlesof faith.Wylton
was in no doubt about AurioPs point of view or his basing it on this
authoritativetext,as transpiresfromhis expositionof AurioPs stance.30
The second lesson Auriol learned fromthispassage was that,according
to Augustine,thereis a fundamentaldifference
betweenthe habit of faith
and the habit of theology,and that theologyis not a kind of superior
faith.Again, Wyltonwas accurate in his descriptionof AurioPspoint of
view and its foundationin Augustine'ssaying.31
Moreover,Wyltoncould
not have learned of this second point that Auriol derived from this
Sententiarum.
Augustininpassage by readingAurioPsScriptum
superPrimum
In thisearlierworkof AurioPsthe verysame passage was used to prove
that the habit of theologybestowsa deeper understandingof the mysteriesof faith.32
nonprooperationali.
Et ad hocadducotalemrationem,
actus,quinonsolumconsidrt
veritates
circasubiectum
sedagiteas,illeestactivus.
Sedtheologicus
esthuiusmodi,
suum,
nonenimsolumconsidrt
defensiones
etdeclarationes
circaactum
sustentationem,
fidei,
sedagiteas ad modum,
nonsolumconsidrt
circaorationem
persuasivam
quo rhetor
sed agitearn.Sic etiamdialecticus.
conditiones
et proprietates,
Propter
quodponuntur
disactivi.
istehabitus
eritpracticus
siveactivus.
Undesicutdialecticus
esthabitus
Igitur
sictheoet defensivus
et declarativus
scientiarum
ad opinionem,
putativus
principiorum
et defensivus
habitus
fideipropter
adhaerere
logicusestdeclarativus
per
principiorum
Thesameis trueofsec. 1.4in Wylton's
which
fidem".
is closely
matched
bythe
report
Commentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum,
pars3, q. 4, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,fol.12ra).
29Augustine,
De Trinitate
424 (CCSL,vol.50).
, lib.XIV,I, 3, ed. Mountain,
30Wvlton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . sec.4.1:cf.above,note27.
theoloeicus
31Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec. 1.5,whichis matched
byAuriol's
theologicus...",
Commentarius
Brevior
inPrimum
Sententiarum
, Prologus,
pars2, q. 1, a. 2 (Vat.Borgh.123,
. . . Sed
foi.8ra),:"Dicunt
enimquidam,
viatoris
estquaedamfides
extensa
quodtheologia
contra
hocestAugustinus
XIV de Trinitate,
ubidicit,
capitulo
primo,
quodfidepollent
fideles
Hac scientia
nonpollent
fideles.
plurimi.
Ergoetc."
32See
Primum
Auriol's
Sententiarum
sec.1,a. 3, 127(Aunol
, Prooemium,
super
Scriptum
theemphasis
ofhisexposi1952,169).It wouldseemthaton thispointAuriol
changed
tionon thenature
oftheology
between
thetwocommentaries,
andthattheimmediate
forthisshift
washisvehement
occasion
to so-called
"deductive"
opposition
theology.
18:22:46 PM
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
43
18:22:46 PM
44
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
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ON THEOLOGY
45
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18:22:46 PM
48
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
.55Moreover,
on thefourthbook of theSentences
questionin the commentary
in Distinction13 of his commentaryon the fourthbook of the Sentences
Auriolrepliedto the- oftenquite fierce
objectionsthathad been brought
againsthis expositionin the openingquestion.In thisconnectionAuriol
addressed the objectionsput forthby Wylton,and he even quoted one
of Wylton'smore teasingcounter-arguments.56
The firstpart of Wylton'sBordeaux determinationis, admittedly,a
rathermixed bag insofaras it includesan expositionof Wylton'sproper
of propositionsthatare "per se"57as well as a long digresunderstanding
sion on the natureof similarity,58
whichrefersto a debate thatis reflected
in more than one place in Auriol'sshortercommentaryon the firstbook
.59The lattertopicis resumedin the secondpartof Wylton's
of the Sentences
Bordeaux determination,
of the
which treatsof the properunderstanding
nature of relations.In this connectionthe kindsof relationssingledout
fordebateare the relationships
thatexistbetweenGod as Creatorand creation, between formand matteras principlesof metaphysics,and, lastly,
betweengoals and theirmeans in finalcausality.60
In Wylton'sBordeaux determination
it is clearlyimpliedthatAuriol's
of
on
the
of
the
nature of relationsantedated
topic
challenging Wylton
it is made
the occasion on whichWyltonobjectedto Auriol.Furthermore,
clear by Wylton'sexpositionthat thisdebate disclosedfunincontestably
damentaldifferences
of opinion betweenthe two authorsconcerningthe
and
natureof relations.Auriol'sobjectionswere of principalsignificance,
the subsequentdebate involvedthe major typesof relations,whereasthe
relationshipof divine knowledgeto creationand that of practicadhabits
to theirproduce were mentionedonly in passing.61
A simplecomparisonbetween,on the one hand, the discussionof the
in Wylton'sBordeaux determination
nature of relationsas transmitted
55Auriol,
a. 2 (Auriol
Commentarius
inQuartum
Sententiarum
1605,
, Quaestio
prooemialis,
col.6a).
56Auriol,
Sententiarum
Commentarius
in Quartum
, d. 13,q. 1, a. 3 (Auriol
1605,col. 123
ofWylton,
see Auriol,
in Quartum
Sententiarum
Commentarius
, d.
quoting
sqq.)ForAuriol's
13,q. 1,a. 3 (Auriol
1605,col. 124b);cf.Nielsen
(forthcoming).
57Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,212-3.
58Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,211-2.
59Thisdebateanditscourse
is echoedinDistinctions
3, 30 and31 oftheCommentarius
the
Bremm
inPrimum
Sententiarum.
thattheargument
Thereis thepossibility
concerning
in Auriol's
form
ofwhiteness
andtherelationship
ofsimilitude
"Utrum
virtus
..." initiatedthisdebate.
60Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,213 sqq.
61Wylton,
ed. Del Punta-Luna
1987,218;cf.Henninger
1990,480 sqq.
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OL ANDWYLTON
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
53
to the debate in
Auriol includedexpanded versionsof his contributions
a
mere
baccalarius
sententiarius
his
as
Auriol
would not
;
precisely Quodlibet
have been entitledto determinequestions,since this was the exclusive
prerogativeof regentmasters.On the otherhand, in view of the nature
of Wylton'sand AurioPsconfrontation
the latter's"Utrumhabituspracticus . . and "Utrum virtus. .
cannot be construedas anythingbut
determinations.73
They are builton and explicitlyreferto disputationsin
whichthe principalopponentwas easilyidentifiable.
Consequently,there
would seem to be strongevidence in favourof maintainingthat these
questionsderivefromAuriol'speriod of magisterialregency.
There is no denyingthat AurioPs "Utrum habituspracticus. . ." and
"Utrumvirtus..." bear some of the distinguishing
marksof a determination of a disputation.74
Equally, it is evidentthat as a bachelor of the
Sentences
Auriol would not have been allowed to publish these determinations.But thisis by no means tantamountto sayingthatWylton'sand
AurioPsquestionsbelong to a time afterthe latter'sinceptionor promotionto the professorship.
The factis thatseveralof the questionsthat
went into AurioPs Quodlibet
directlyreflectdisputationsthat had taken
AurioPs
This is true of,
place during
period as lectureron the Sentences.
to his
e.g., the secondquestion,on action,whichis AurioPsdetermination
protracteddebate withHervaeus Natalis on the natureof action and passion, and whichis attestedto in AurioPscommentarieson both the first
and the fourthbook of the Sentences
as well as by Hervaeus Natalis' fourth
.75
This
is
of
the
true
Quodlibet
third,fourth,and fifthof AurioPs
equally
quodlibetal questions which reflecthis discussionwith, among others,
Hervaeus Natalis and Wyltonon the nature of the divine Trinityand
the notions of unityand plurality.76
Moreover, the eighth,ninth,and
tenthquestionsin AurioPs Quodlibet
containAurioPsfinalword on some
of the most difficult
problemsraised by his epistemologyand concern
thosepoint on which he had been attackedalready duringhis lecturing
73The twoversions
areso clearly
related
thattheycannotbutderive
from
thesame
occasion.
thiswasa contributing
factor
behind
thedating
inpreviPresumably
suggested
ousscholarship;
cf.above,note46.
74Thisis alsotrueofthe
version
ofthequestions
whicharefoundin the
expanded
Quodlibet.
As Hervaeus
leftParisbefore
Auriol
oftheology
as projoinedtheParisian
faculty
fessor
wouldhavebeenno possibility
forthemto opposeeach
(cf.above,note64),there
otheras ordinary
oftheology.
Forthedebatebetween
Hervaeus
Natalisand
professors
seeNielsen
Auriol,
(forthcoming).
76Thisdebatestarted
soonafter
AurioPs
first
debateand appearsto have
pnpium
himfora considerable
Foran outline
time.
ofthevery
redactional
issues
engaged
complex
raisedbythispartofAuriol's
seeNielsen
literary
legacy,
(forthcoming).
18:22:46 PM
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
57
the fundamentallaw of thoughtthat the conclusionof a syllogismcannot be more certainthan its weaker premise.This means that a syllogism of which one of the premisesis groundedon faithalone, does not
yield a conclusionwhich is of higherevidentialvalue.93To Auriol the
veryidea of viewingtheologyalong the lines of deductivescience is a
to elicitfurther
knowlInstead of attempting
completemisunderstanding.
articles
of
is
from
the
of
the
divine
faith,theology primarilyconedge
cerned with defendingthe articlesof faith.For this reason theologyis,
accordingto Auriol, a practicalscience inasmuch as it teaches how to
defendthe Creed.94
How thispoint of view agrees with Auriol's claim that theologygoverns the theologicalvirtuesof faith,hope, and charity,is not explained
in Wylton
's question against Auriol,just as Auriol did not address this
in
question his "Utrum habitus practicus. . ." Moreover, the reader of
's questionis givenno clue as to whyAuriol maintainedthattheWylton
the firmness
of belief,or how thisagrees
does
nothingto strengthen
ology
with his view that theologydirectsthe theologicalvirtues.The consisand, in
tencyof theseclaimsis, however,establishedin Auriol'swritings,
Pmum
Sententiarum
is
thisrespect,Auriol'sconclusionto the Scriptum
super
particularly
explicit.95
To Auriolit is apparentthat the articlesof faithare far fromevident
to naturalreason, and that theyare in conflictwith the dictatesof natural reason. Consequently,the faithfuls'
adheringto the Creed is based
not on intellectualpersuasionbut on an act of the will. Furthermore,
since the intellecthas a verytenuousgrasp of the articlesof faithand is
with the counter-rational
characterof religiousbeliefit
oftenconfronted
is incumbenton the will to constandykeep the intellectin tightreins.
Sometimesthe will is simplynot strongenough to performthistask sucand this resultsin man's becomingtroubledby doubt. In this
cessfully,
connectiontheologyfindsits proper place. One of the prime objectives
of theology96
is to demonstratethat the impossibilitiesimplied by the
. . sec.5.6-9.In thisrespect
ofAuriol's
habitus
Wylton's
critique
conception
theologicus
oftheology
thatofWilliam
cf.Nielsen1999,note42.
resembles
Ockham;
93Auriol's
in Wylton,
is presented
"Utrum
habitus
. . .",
lineofreasoning
theologicus
in Auriol's
seeabove,note25.
sec.4.3;fortheparallel
ownworks,
passages
94Thisis aptlystatedin Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
sec.4.1 and 4.4.
theologicus...",
to thehabitoflogicis thatofexemplar
The 'activity'
whichAuriolascribes
causality,
shouldalsobe trueoftheology.
which,
by
implication,
95Gf.Auriol,
Primum
Sententiarum
, d. 48,a. 3 (Auriol
1596,cols.1120bsqq.).
Scriptum
super
96Ofcourse,
suchas interin Auriol's
alsoserves
otherfunctions
conception
theology
newarticles
offaith.
and,morerarely,
deducing
preting
Scripture
18:22:46 PM
58
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
18:22:46 PM
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
59
18:22:46 PM
60
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
species of quality.Seen in itself,the absolutequalityfostersa simpleconcept, which is properlyplaced in the thirdspecies of quality.103
between"relativasecundum
Wylton's appeal to the currentdistinction
esse" and "relativasecundumdici" also failsto impressAuriol. To him
betweenvarithis distinctiondoes not signal any ontologicaldifference
ous kinds of relativeentities.That some relativesare characterisedas
thattheyare relativein the ontobeing "secundumesse" does not signify
is merely
logicalsensethatWyltonintends.The importof thisclassification
that some relativeconceptsalwaysimplytheircorrelatives.Equally, that
some relativesare only "secundumdici" merelysignifiesthat theymay
In his questionsin
be conceived in isolation fromtheir correlatives.104
of the distincBalliol 63 Auriol does not elaborate on his understanding
tionbetweenrelativesthatare "secundumesse" and thosethatare "secundum dici". However, in his two commentarieson the firstbook of the
he explainsthisdistinction
Sentences
accordingto thevariouswaysin which
the human mindsformsconceptsinvolvingmore thanone singleobject.105
Auriol's steadfastpersuasion that there are no relativeaccidents or
featuresof his thought,and it
qualitiesis one of the most characteristic
voiced in his Balliol 63 questionson the natureof
is certainlyforcefully
theologyand virtue. On the other hand, Auriol's ulteriormotivesfor
adoptingthisstance do not surfacein thesepartsof his literaryremains.
Withoutpretendingto supplymore than a fewpointersforfutureexplorationof thispart of Auriol'sthought,one may say, though,thatAuriol's
originalview of complex entitiessuch as relativeswas motivatedby two
major concerns.In the firstplace, it is obvious thatAuriol'sreductionof
ontological pluralityto conceptual pluralityformspart of his general
assaulton the realistontologiesof,e.g., Thomas Aquinas and John Duns
Scotus.In the second place, Auriol'sinsistenceon the non-complexnature
of virtueas an entitywas motivatedby purelytheologicalconsiderations.
justificationand salvationare inextricaAccordingto his understanding,
whichare bestowedon the electdirectly
the
virtues
tied
to
theological
bly
or wholly
through
by God, and whichcannotbe acquired eitherpartially
on the part of man. As activeprincipleswhichestablisha comany effort
103See Auriol,
"Utrum
. . sec.3.2.2.1-4;
habitus
"Utrum
3.2.3;andAuriol,
practicus
1997.
See alsoFriedman
virtus...",sec. 1.3.2.2-3.
104
sec.2.1.9,
habitus
"Utrum
Auriol,
virtus...",sec.2.3.7.In "Utrum
theologicus",
thatare
relatives
between
a linguistic
rulefordistinguishing
toestablish
attempted
Wylton
as completely
dici".ThisAuriol
"secundum
esse"andthosethatare"secundum
rejected
virtus
. . .", sec.2.3.9.
"Utrum
seeAuriol,
inapposite;
105In theseworks
ct.Henninger
thistopicis treated
ofm greatdepth;
1989,150sqq.
18:22:46 PM
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
61
munityof love betweenGod and man, the theologicalvirtues and primarilythehabitof love shouldbe seen as absolutequalitieswhichdefine
in virtueswould
the human person. Allowingof ontologicalmultiplicity
of
virtues
their
the
invariablydeprive
uniquityand integrity
theological
and, consequently,
jeopardise theirrole in the order of salvation.106
it
is
true
to say that the confrontation
betweenWyltonand
Though
Auriolas documentedin the Balliol 63 questionsdid not probe the ultiit is, nonetheless,
mategroundsfortheirdisagreements
of more thanpasswhichAuriol'soppoing interest.Besidesrevealingthe obviousdifficulties
nentsexperiencedwhen confronting
his quite novel approach to current
it providesan insightinto the
philosophicaland theologicalproblems,107
mannerand styleof debates in the university
of Paris in the earlyyears
of the fourteenth
century.In additionto this,one may hope that it will
prove to be of serviceto the ongoingattemptsto establishthe chronological order of parts of Auriol's literaryremainsas well as to identify
some of Wylton'swidelyscatteredquestions.108
Copenhagen
of Copenhagen
University
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Unprinted
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virtues
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1934,43 sqq.
107Evensomebody
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JohnBaconthorpe,
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complicated
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Peter
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Valens1969
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Diskussionen
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Unendliche
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& pp.317-37[reprinted
in:Maier1964,
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41-851
1958
des14.Jahrhunderts
Sentenzenkommentaren
Maier,Anneliese
, in:
Zu einigen
Archivm
Franciscanum
51 (1958),369Historicum,
409 [reprinted
in:Maier1964,264-3051
1964
Mittelalter.
Gesammelte
zurGeistesgeMaier,Anneliese
Ausgehendes
Aufstze
des14.Jahrhunderts,
schichte
Rome1964(Bd.1.Storia
e
letteratura,
97)
ed. 1998
Vol.III. Medieval
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,
John,
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History
Philosophy
London1998
ed. 1997
Verba.
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Vestigia,
Imagines,
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Turnhout
1997
Theological
andCognitive
Studies,
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etle scepticisme
dansla philosophie
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sicle
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Classed'histoire
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Anne
in: Michalski
1925,Cracovie1926,1-81[reprinted
1969,67-1491
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La Philosophie
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Herausgegeben
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zurPhilosophie
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Oxford
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Mynors,
ofthe
Catalogue
Manuscripts
ofBalliol
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Dictates
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e studisullatradizione
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TheSacraments
as Signs
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likeness,
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Durand
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TheIntelligibility
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onPeter
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of
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onPeter
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Lombard's
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F. 1954
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Petrus
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3deThomas
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La quaestio
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64
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
Foietthobgie
deFontaines,
Paris1966(Museum
selon
Lessianum,
Godefroid
section
tholorique,
61)
dela France
Pierre
littraire
mineur
, tom.33,479Auriol,
, in:Histoire
Valois,N. 1906
frre
528
etprdestination
P. 1934 Justification
auXIVesicle
, Paris1934
Vignaux,
imMittelalter.
undihre
Miscellanea
IhreUrsprung
P.,ed. 1963 DieMetaphysik
Bedeutung.
Wilpert,
Bd. 2., Berlin1963
Mediaevalia,
Tihon,P. 1966
18:22:46 PM
AURIOLANDWYLTON
ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
APPENDIX
65
<Articulusprimus>
18:22:46 PM
66
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
<1.1.3> Tertio supponitur,quod impossibileest, quod 'virtus'dicat aliex absolutoet respectu,quia sic perireitotaprimaspecies
quid constitutum
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
qualitatis.
<1.1 .4> Ex his tribussuppositiseliciturquartum,videlicetquod virtusin
recto nihil includitnisi qualitatempraedicationedicente "hoc est hoc",
et in obliquo solum includitrespectumcongruentiaenon praedicatione
dicente"hoc est hoc", sed "hoc est ad hoc" vel "hoc est huiusmodi"vel
"huic" vel quomodolibetaliter.
multae et non modicae.
<1.2> Sed istissic positisoccurruntdifficultates
<1.2.1> Primo videtur,quod ex istis sequitur,quod virtussit ens per
sive
accidens, quia quicquid includitres diversorumpraedicamentorum,
in rectosive in obliquo, est ens per accidens.Si in recto,non est dubium.
Si in obliquo, etiam sequituridem, quia magis deficitab unitate,quod
includeretaliquid in obliquo, quam quod includeretillud in recto,et per
consequensmagisvideturad ens per accidensaccedere.Quocumque modo
igiturponaturvirtusincludereduo, sequitur,quod sit ens per accidens.
<1.2.2.1> Item, essentia virtutisaut consistitin absoluto praecise, aut
ultra absolutumhabet respectumpartem sui. Primumnon potest dari,
cum albedo secundum
quia si sic, prima species et tertianon differrent,
totumillud, quod est in ea absolutum,sit in tertiaspecie qualitatis.
<1.2.2.2> Item sequitur,quod virtuset vitiumnon differrent;
quod idem
absolutum,quod in uno est vitium,in alio sitvirtus,sicutalbedo in dente
et in oculo.
<1.2.2.3> Si secundumdetur,habereturpropositum,quod virtussit ens
per accidens.
<1.2.3> Item, illud,quod clauditin se duo, quorum unum acciditalteri,
est ens per accidens. Sed huiusmodiest virtus,quia tu dicis,quod virtus
est qualitas, ut fundat.Sed istud accidit absoluto,quia potest adesse et
abesse etc. Igituretc.
<1.2.4.1> Item, respectusiste congruentiaeaut est propriapassio aut est
formalis.Non est propriapassio,quia sic essetin secundomodo,
differentia
et posset Deus illum separare manentevirtute.Si sit differentia
formalis,
habeturpropositum.
<1.2.4.2> Et confirmatur,
quia subiectumpotest intelliginon intellecta
propriapassione, quod negas de virtuteet respectuisto.
B' 19
includeret
11 quia]iter.
B' 13 quod]om.B' 14 quam]om.B' 16 includere]
add.etdel.B' 22 albedo]
sisecundum
detur
B' 20 illud]id B' 20 qualitatis]
albedo]ar00
B'
g
secundum
ardo
secundo]
. . 10.2.1-3
"Utrum
habitus
9 Gf.ThomaeWylton,
theologicus
18:22:46 PM
ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON
67
18:22:46 PM
68
10
15
20
25
30
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
ibidemCommentator.Accidentiumvero copulatorumquaedam suntcopulata determinatissubiectissicut simitas;quaedam sunt copulata determinateshabitudinibussicutvirtus.Unde sicutsimitasnon obstante,quod
non sic sit simplex,sed copulata, est ens per se et per se in genere,sic
virtuseritens non per accidens,sed per se non obstantetali copulatione.
et ideo illa
<1.3.1.2> Sed dices, primamcopulationemponit Aristoteles,
rationabilisest; sed secunda est de tuo, ut videtur.
<1.3.1.3> Item,prima est rationabilis,quia aliquod essentialiter
dependet
a subiecto,et ideo non definirinec intelligipotestsine eo. Sed non estsic
de ista habitudine,quia ipsa magisdependetab absolutoquam econverso.
<1.3.1.4> Respondeo, immo expressevult hoc Aristoteles,quia secundum primamdefinitionem
relativorumnecesse est ponere aliqua relativa
ut manus et caput. Unde dicit
secundumdici, sicutpartessubstantiarum
sunt
relativa
secundum dici, quod relativa
Simplicius exponens, quae
secundumdici sunt,secundumquod subiectumabundanthabitudine.
<1.3.1.5> Et cum dicitur,quod habitudo "magis dependet etc.", dico,
quod non est inconveniensidem esse priuset posteriusalio in alio et alio
genere.Pro quo sciendumest,quod naturaingeniavitipsas qualitatesnon
Et ideo simulstat,quod
propterse, sed propternaturam,quam perficiunt.
in genere esse materialissubiectumsit prius habitudine,sed in genere
finishabitudocongruentiaeest priorquam subiectum,in quantumhabitudo ilia tenetse a parte naturae et quasi ligat unum cum alio.
<1.3.1.6> Et si dubites,quare aliae species qualitatisnon sunt sic copulatae, dico, quod causa est, quia natura non omnes sic ingeniavit,non
enim ingeniavitnatura albedinemad hoc, ut faceretme similemtibi.
<1.3.2> Per hoc ad rationes.
<1.3.2.1.1> Ad primum,quando dicitur"quandocumque aliquid includit
plura etc.", dicendum,quod includerealiquando est per modum tertii
constitutiex hoc et hoc, | aliquando includereplura,quia includitunum
copulatum alteri. Primus modus arguit ens per accidens sicut patet de
albo; secundusmodus non, sicut patet de simitate.
29 B', fol.19rb
B' 29 aliquando]
abndat
B' 9 potest]
om.B' 15 abundant]
4 sit]iter.
aliquidB' 31
B'
incerta
albo]delectio
14Simplicius,
InAristot.
1 Averroes,
VIII,f.166va-vb).
, lib.7,t.4 (ed.Iuntina,
Metapkysicam
inAristotelem
latinm
commentariorum
InAristot.
, vol.V, p. 241,
Praedicamentia,
graecorum
Corpus
11.78 sqq.(Louvain,
1971).
16 ad 1.3.1.3 27 ad 1.2.1
18:22:46 PM
ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON
69
18:22:46 PM
70
10
15
20
25
30
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
Et ad probationem,cum dicitur"iustitia
huiusmodi",per interemptionem.
est
ad
alterum",
dico, quod iustitiaest virtusnon solum
illud, quod est,
sed ad alterumordinans.Ad differentiam
hominemin se ipso perficiens,
hominemin se
quae solumperficiunt
igituraliarumquarundamvirtutum,
ipso, dicitur,quod iustitia"illud,quod est,est ad alterum",istudnon est
secundumesse. Unde aequivocaturde esse ad
esse ad aliquid relativorum
alterum.
<1.3.2.7> Ad septimum,cum dicitur,quod album non includitduo in
rectoet tamenest ens per accidens,igitursic virtus,dicendum,quod aliud
reformat
quod
pactum,quia album includitduo per modumconstitutionis,
non facitvirtusnec etiamsimitas.Sed certesimileest quantumad hoc de
albo et simo, utrumqueenim est ens per accidens proptercausam tacex hoc et hoc,
tam, quod utrumquesignificat
per modum tertiiconstituti
licet non importetutrumquein recto.
<1.3.2.8> Ad octavum de ilio duplo et dimidio dicendum,quod virtus
importtrespectumnec per modum dupli nec per modum dupli dimidii,
sed magis per modum duplicitatis.
dicendumest,
<1.3.2.9> Ad nonum de albedine fundantesimilitudinem
modus
variatur
intrinsece
et
qualificandi,
quod quia per copulali non-copulari
unde ad quaestionemfactamper "quale" convenienterrespondeturper
per "album"
"pulchrum"et per "album", si albedo copulaturcongruitati;
ut actu funnon.
Ideo
sive
sive
albedini,
etiam,
copulaturcongruentiae
sui ipsius
dat congruentiam,imponiturnomen speciale ad differentiam
vel
non-fundare
actu non
non-copulatae.Sed quia fundaresimilitudinem
variatmodumqualis intrinsece unde ad quaestionemfactamper "quale"
- ideo albedini,ut
non proprie respondeturper "simile" vel "dissimile"
non necessariumest nomen speciale, cum fundare
fundatsimilitudinem,
non ponant ipsam in alia et alia specie.
et non fundaresimilitudinem
<1.3.2. 10> Ad decimum,quod ponitursexto loco, cum dicitur"absoluex dictis.
tum ut actu fundansetc.", patet sufficienter
B' 10album]
ar"1
B' 5 est1]
om.B' 8 album]
om.B' 6 aliquid]
3 hominem]
hominum
ar"1
B' 21 albedo]arB' 21
ar"cB' 21 album1]
B' 12albo]arB' 18albedine]
ar"1
B' 27 cum]con.s.l.exquiaB'
ar
B' 26 albedini]
ar
B' 22 albedini]
ar"1
album2]
8 ad 1.2.8 15 ad 1.2.9 18 ad 1.2.10 29 ad 1.2.6
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<Articulussecundus>
<2.0> Istae sunt radones magistiThomae Wyltona.Secundus articulus
quaestionisest removereobiectionesreplicatascontra praedicta.
<2.1.1> Primo arguitursic, voceturabsolutumin virtuteA', absolutum
actu fundansvocetur'B', et respectuscongruentiaevoceturC' Quaero 5
tunc,utrumB addat aliquid ultraA vel nihil.Si nihildicat plus quam A,
igitursicutA non est virtus,sic nec B. Si dicat plus, sequitur,quod virtus
eritaliquidintrinsece
constitutum
ex A et ilio alio, quod est negatumprius.
<2.1.2> Item ad idem sic, B fundatC aut per rationemaliam ab A aut
non. Si non per rationemaliam ab A, igitursicutB fundatet est virtus, 10
sic A secundum se et absolute. Si per rationemaliam ab A, igiturB
includitduo, scilicetA et illud aliud, et sic virtusest intrinsececonstitutum
ex duobus absolutisvel saltemex absolutoet respectu,quod est negatum.
<2.1.3> Item ad idem, B connotatC, et non connotatA, igiturA et B
non idem.
15
<2.1.4> Item, communissententiaphilosophorumest, quod absolutum
absolutum,
possitintelligisine respectu,igiturvirtus,cum sit essentialiter
quod tamen negatur.
<2.1.5> Item,Aristoteles
vult,quod tota causa, quare aliquid non potest
ex ilio. Cum igiturvirtus 20
intelligisine alio, est, quod illud constituitur
non constituitur
ex respectu,sequitur,quod possitintelligisine ilio.
subiectumpassioni, id est posteri<2.1.6> Item, oportetpraeintelligere
ori. Sed in minoreoportetaccipere medium,quod est quidditassubiecti.
Si igitursubiectumactu fundetvel includat passionem,sequitur,quod
statmin minorepropositionehabebiturpassio concludenda de subiecto 25
in conclusione.Et sic non praeintelligitur
subiectumsuae passioni tempore, cuius oppositumdicit Philosophus.
tiam interrelativasecundum
<2.1.7> Item, Philosophusassignatdifieren
esse et secundumdici, quia relativasecundumesse non possuntintelligi
sine suis correlativis,
relativasecundum dici possunt. Cum igiturvirtus 30
non possitintelligisine respectu,videturetiam,quod sit relativumsecundum esse.
18:22:46 PM
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
13 B', fol.19va
om.B' 25 ethoc]om.
viisB' 18motus]
3 grammaticae]
quodadd.etdel.B' 17divisis]
B' 26 unum]con.exunamB'
InAristot.
1 Averroes,
VIII,f. 129vb)5 Augustinus,
, lib.5, t. 20 (ed.Iuntina,
Metaphysicam
, b.7, cap.3 (246b
Physica
, cap."Adaliquid"(PL 32,col. 1431) 9 Aristoteles,
Categoriae
In Aristot.
2 sqq.) 12 Averroes,
IV, f. 320rb) 14
, lib. 7, t. 17 (ed. Iuntina,
Physicam
, lib.5, cap.6
Metaphysica
, lib.7, cap. 3 (246b2 sqq.) 28 Aristoteles,
Aristoteles,
Physica,
, lib.7, cap.3 (1028b34 sqq.)
Metaphysica
(1015b16 sqq.) 28 Aristoteles,
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1 imprimeretur]
B' 1 verum]
scribendum
verus 3 albedine]
ar"eB'
impraevenietur
fortasse
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
APPENDIX
II
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ab habitutheologiae,
<1.5> Quod autemhabitusfideisithabitusdistinctus
fide
|
pollentplurimumetc.
patet per Augustinumdicentem,quod
<1.6> Unde imaginaturiste doctoret dicit,quod 'practicum'et 'speculativum'non suntdifferentiae
accidentales,ita quod practicumdistinguitur
a speculativoper habere duplicemet non habere ilium,sicutponitScotus. 5
Sed dicit,quod scientiadiciturpracticaper propriamactivitatemintrinsecam, qua nata est dirigereactus aliorumhabituum.
<b. Quod logica est practica>
<2> Ex quo sequi statuit,quod logica est vere practica. Et hoc probat
10
multipliciter.
nisi
Primo
ex
<2.1>
sic,
directione,quam habet respectualiorum
logica
habituumultraspeculationempropriisubiecti,dicereturpractica,sequitur,
quod essetbis speculativa,semel a speculationepropriisubiecti,et semel
a directionerespectualiorumhabituum.Sed hoc est inconveniens,sicut
inconveniensesset dicere,quod homo esset bis risibilisvel bis rationalis. 15
<2.2> Item secundo sic, ille habitus,qui habet actum, qui consimili
ter
a speculari,est practicus.Ista patet,quia habitusdistinguitur
distinguitur
per actus. Sed logica est huiusmodi,quia si suum dirigereesset speculari, sequeretur,cum dirigatcirca conclusionesgeomtricas,quod eas
20
cognosceret,quod non est verisimile.Igituretc.
<2.3> Item tertiosic, illa scientiaest practica,quae intenditopus. Huiusmodi est logica, quae 6 Topicorum
docet, quid eligendum,et quid
fugiendum.
<2.4. 1> Item quarto sic, illa scientiaest practica,quae habet subiectum
de metaphysica,mathema- 25
operabile a nobis. Patet ex 6 Metaphysicae
tica et naturali.Ibi enim arguitPhilosophussic, illa, de quibus suntistae
scientiae,habent in eis principiamotus sive factionis.Igituristae scientiae nec suntfactivaenec activae. Sed logica non est huiusmodi,sive sit
de syllogismosive de secundisintentionibus.
Igituretc.
<2.4.2> Imaginaturenim, quod sicut sutor,si praesentatursibi corium 30
magnum,per arteminciditcoriumet inducitformamsubtalaris,sic habens
2 B', fol.19vb
4 differentiae]
B' 5 duplicem]
definitones
om.B' 9 statuit]
statim
B' 12practica]
practicusB' 28 non]om.B' 30 praesentatur]
B' 31 subtalaris]
subtellaris
B'
pertenetur
2 Augustinus,
De frinitale,
DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
XIV,1,3(CGSL50,p. 424). 5 Johannes
,
vol. 1, p. 115). 22 Aristoteles,
Prologus,
, lib.6,
pars5, qq. 1-2 (ed.Vaticana,
Topica
, lib.6, cap. 1 (1025b3 sqq.)
cap. 1 (139b6 sqq.) 25 Aristoteles,
Metaphysica
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
sintdifferentiae
essen<3.1> Itemprobat,quod practicumet speculativum
tiales, sic, quando duae differentiae
primae dividuntaliquem habitm,
duabus
differentiis
subdividitur
habitus
aliis,si differentiae
postmodum
qui
10 secundae subdivisionssintessentiales,et primaeeruntmultomagis essentiales. Sed nunc est ita, quod habitus sive scientiaprimo dividiturper
per metaphyspeculativumet practicum;scientiaspeculativasubdividitur
sicam,naturalemetc. Sed constat,quod ista subdivisioest per differentias
essentiales.Igituret divisioprima,quae est per speculativumet practicum.
15 <3.2. 1> Postea respondetad rationemScoti, qui probat ex intentione,
essentiales.ArguitScotus sic, speculativum
quod istae non suntdifferentiae
habere
et practicumdistinguuntur
duplicemrespectumet non habere.
per
Sed scientia quaecumque est de prima specie qualitatis.Et per conseessentialiseius non poteritesse respectus.
quens differentia
20 <3.2.2> Solvitdicens,quod respectusnon clauditurin rationehabitusin
recto,sed solum connotaturextrinsecein obliquo. Vide de istisin quaestione praecedentiper totum.
<d. Quod articulifideinon sunt principiain theologia>
<4> Item dicitdoctoriste,quod articulifideinon sunt principiain the25 ologia.
<4.1> Quod etiam probat, nullus artifexsive scientiaprobat sua principia. Sed theologiamultuminsudatcirca hoc testeAugustino,qui dicit,
quo fidesgignitur,nutrituretc.
quod huic scientiaeattribuitur,
<4.2> Item, omnes articulisunt conclusionesunius articuli,igiturnon
30 sunt principia. Antecedenspatet, quia omnia concludunturet habent
rhetosaribendum
2 debet] add.s.l.B' 4 logica. . . rhetoricae]
logicaeestassecutiva
forlasse
sintB' 15 qui]quodB'
rica 7 et]praadd.etdel.B' 10 sint]scilicet
vol.1,p. 115).
DunsScotus,
16Johannes
Ordination
Prologus,
pars5,qq. 1-2(ed.Vaticana,
"Utrum
De trini..." 27 Augustinus,
inquantum
virtus
Aureoli
virtus
21-22i.e.,inquaestione
tate
, XIV,1,3 (CGSL50,p. 424).
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firmitatem
ex ista "Credo ecclesiamcatholicam".Igituretc.
<4.3> Item,conclusiofideinon est conclusiotheologiae,cum sinthabitus
distincti.
Sed si articulifideiessentprincipiain theologia,sequeretur,quod
eadem esset conclusiofideiet theologiae.Verbi gratia,si dicatur,omne
habensin se duas naturasintellectuales
habetin se duas volun- 5
suppositum
Filii
sed
sive
Christus
est
huiusmodi;igiturChristushabet
tates; suppositum
duas voluntates.Certum est, quod haec conclusio sequiturcertitudinem
praemissaedebilioris,et ilia est minor,quae tantumest eredita.Igiturhaec
conclusio"in Christosunt duae voluntates"tantummodoest credita.Si
igiturcum hoc dicatur,quod conclusionesdeductae ex articulisfideisint 10
conclusionestheologicae,sequitur,quod eadem eritconclusiofideiet theologiae, quae sunt distinctihabitus.Dicit igiturdoctor,quod conclusiones
omnes deductae ex articulisfideisolum sunt conclusionesfidei.
<4.4> Quis igiturest habitustheologiae?Dicit, quod habitus,quo scimus
exponereunum locum Scripturaeper alium; quo scimusinvenirevias et 15
rationesad defendendum
fidemecclesiae;et quo scimusdeclarareartculos
fidei.Iste talis habitusproprieloquendo est theologicus.Et addit, quod
habitusiste nihilfacitad firmitatem
adhaesionis,sed solum ad maiorem
sunt
fidei.
cognitionemeorum,quae
20
<4.5> Haec est opinio sua fideliteraccepta.
<11. Contra opinionemAureoli de speculativoet practico>
<5> Contra ista per ordinem.
<5.1> Contra per Wyltona.Et quia dicit se velie loqui de practico et
speculativo,sicutlocutisuntphilosophi,ideo primoprobo, quod ista non
stantsimul,quod theologiasit propriepractica, et quod loquitur,sicut 25
philosophisuntlocuti.Et probo primoex parteobiectisic,Philosophus,1Io
et in 6 etiam,Veritasmetaphysicae
, facitistamconsequentiam,
Metaphyskae
est de rebusaeterniset immobilibus,
igiturest speculativa.Si consequentia
Philosophivaleat, ita arguii de theologiasicut de metaphysica,quia quis
habitusita est de immobilibuset aeternissicut theologia?Igituretc.
30
6 sive]sintB' 7 certitudinem]
conclusionem
B' 14 habitus2]
quae add.etdel.B' 15
. . . Wyltona]
add.i.m.B' 26] signum
add.i.m.B'
locum]add.i.m.B' 23 Contra
speciale
26 IIo] 10B' 27 istam]
isteB' 27 Veritas]
in virtute
B'
26 Aristoteles,
, lib.11,cap.7 (1064a30 sqq.) 27 Aristoteles,
Metaphysica
, lib.
Metaphysica
6, cap. 1 (1026a30).
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18:22:46 PM
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1 dicta]cm.exdietm
B' 7 credere]
quodadd.etdel.B' 23 cadere]a add.etdel B'
26 operari]
B'
quodadd.etdel.B' 29 intellectu]
intelligi
10cf.1.2 15Aristoteles,
, lib.4,cap.4 (1006a1 sqq.) 26Aristoteles,
Metaphysica
,
Metaphysica
lib.9, cap.8 (1050a10sqq.)
10ad 1.1 16 ad 1.2 24 ad 1.3
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add.i.m.B' 11ponitquod]add.s.l.B'
. etdel.B' 10-11Nec. . . negaret]
6 sint]sintadd
om.B' 22 Ad]EtB' 27
ex10B' 14 Topicorum]
124]c<m.
TopicisB' 15considrt]
B'
B' 28 subtalaris]
subtellaris
inscisio
incisio]
lib.4, cap.4 (1006a1 sqq.) 14Aristoteles,
12Aristoteles,
, lib.6, cap.
Topica
Metapkysica,
1 (139b6 sqq.)
2 ad 2. 8 ad 2.2 14
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<7.5> Ad quintumdicendum,quod pro tantoest logica assecutivarhetoricae, quia utraque proceditex communibus,cum quo stat,quod logica
sit speculativa.
<7.6> Et sic patet,quod rationesnon concludunt.
<8> Nunc ad rationes,quibus probat,quod articulifideietc.
<8. 1> Ad primam,cum dicitur"nullascientiaprobatprincipiasua", dicendeclarat
dum,quod hoc verumesta priori.Tarnenquod scientiaa posteriori
communiter.
immo
hoc
facit
Aristoteles
est
non
inconveniens,
principia,
<8.2> Ad secundumde ecclesia catholica dicendum,quod secus est de
ilio articuloet de aliis, quia ille quodam modo est medium nobis concludensomnes alios.
<8.3> Et cum dicitur"alii sunt solum crediti",dicendum,quod aliquid
concludiex articuloduplicitercontingit.Aliquando immediate,sicutscilicet si dicatur"ecclesia tenet,quod Christusest Deus et homo, igiturest
verum". Tunc dicendum est, quod habitus talis conclusionissolum est
habitusfideiet non est habitustheologicus,quia immediatedependetex
testimonioChristiet ecclesiae. Aliquando ex articuloconcludituraliquid
non immediate,sed per medium,sicutsi sic dicatur"in Christosuntduae
naturae intellectuals;sed omne suppositum,in quo sunt duae naturae
intellectuals,habet duas voluntates;igiturChristushabet duas voluntates". Ista conclusio est theologicaet scientifica,quia discursusyllogistico conclusa et non immediatedependetex testimonio,sed mediate.
<8.4> Ad tertiumpatet responsioex immediatepraecedentibus,ubi dictum est, qualiteralia conclusioest conclusiofidei,et qualitertheologica.
Unde concedo,quod uterquehabitusest theologicus,tam ille, quo scimus
unum locum Scripturaeexponereper alium et defendereartculosfidei,
quam etiam ille, qui deduciturex articulisipsis, dum tarnenfiat per
mediumet discursumsyllogisticum.
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mediumnec rei nec rationis;et quando quaeriturab eo, per quid differunt
ilia, quae suntin primaspecie,ab his,quae suntin tertiavel quarta,dicit,
extrinseceilio respectucongruentiae,sed intrinsece
quod distinguuntur
copulationeipsa
5
<10.2> arguo contraista similiter.
< 10.2. 1> Primo sic, tu ponis absolutumcopulans, respectumcopulatum
et copulationem.Ista copulationon est absolutum,quia absolutummanet
etiam per te isto respectunon manente; et etiam per copulationemest
virtus,non per absolutum;nec ista copulatioest respectuscopulatus,quia
virtusintrinsece,
non autem per respectum, 10
per copulationemdistinguitur
sed solumextrinsece.
Aut igiturista copulatioest aliquid aut nihil.Si nihil,
contraper te,per illamdistinguitur
virtusa vitio.Si est aliquid,aut rei vel
rationis.Sed utrumquecontrate, et edam essetens per accidens,cum esset
constitutum
ex rebus diversorumgenerum.
sub genere distinguuntur 15
<10.2.2> Item secundo sic, species diffrentes
in
de
eis
differentiis,
quid primomodo dicendiper se.
quae praedicantur
Sed haec copulationon potestponi huiusmodi.Igituretc.
<10.2.3> Item tertiosic, accipio simum,quaero, utrumaliquid sitin simo,
quod praedicaturde ilio in primomodo dicendiper se praetercavitatem
vel non. Si non, igiturnon plus intrinseceincluditsimitasquam cavitas, 20
et per consequensnon constituiturintinseceper copulationemtalem,sicut
nec cavitas.Si aliquid includatsimitas,quod non includitcavitas,quid est
illud? Sive sit rei sive sit rationis,est contra te.
<VI. Solutio prima Thomae Wyltonde natura theologiae>
<11> Solutio quaestionis.Dico igitur,quod secundumviam Philosophi 25
nec propriepotestponi, quod theologiasit practicanec speculativa.Quid
igiturponam? Quod sit affectiva.
< 11. 1> Dico, quod non potest ilia via de affectivaimprobariper aliNon enim credo
quid, quod possitconvinciesse de intentioneAristotelis.
in
Aristotelem
posuisse volntatenostraaliquem actumdirigibilem
respectu 30
Dei, ex quo actu homo dicereturvirtuosus,si diligereicum 'oportet'et
3 distinguuntur]
B' 3 congruentiae]
teradd.etdel.B' 5] signum
add.
distinguitur
speciale
i.m.B' 13utrumque]
B' 13contra
utrum
B' 25
te]con.execceB' 18insimo]m5*1
Solutio
add.i.m.B' 31 cum]et B'
quaestionis]
5 signum
hicadd.i.m.etiaminvenitur
inAureoli
"Ultrum
habitus
speciale
quaestione
practicusetspeculatiuus
. . 2.1.3.
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25
4 iurenaturali]
B' 26 aliquas]aliasB'
supernaturali
8 ad 12.1 12ad 12.2 13 ad 12.3 15 ad 12.4 19 ad 12.5 22 ad 12.6
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<Nota scholariumII>
Hie respondeiWyltonaprimoad rationes,quae probanttheologiamesse
practicam;secundo ad rationes,quae probant logicam esse practicam;
tertioad rationes,quae probant,quod articulifidei non sunt principia
theologiae;et quartosolvitquaestionemde logicatenens,quod sitspeculativa;
et quinto improbatopinionemde copulationerespectuscongruentiae.
1 Sequentia
inveniuntur
in margine
inferiori
B', fol.20ra.
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
APPENDIX
<Petri>
Quaestio
III
Aureoli
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91
in 7 Metaphyskae
Sed Aristoteles
Commentatorem.
ponitunam orationem,
indicai
habitus
istam
scilicet,quod ilia sunt
quae
propterquid
practici,
in
nobis
ut
sunt
intellectus
et ars; activa,
factiva,quorum principium
est
in
electio
et
In
nobis
ista
autemoratione
quorumprincipium
phronesis.
5
contine
tur esse principiumactivumetc. Igituretc.
<1.4. 1> Sed dices, quod dicit quidam doctor,quod istae non sunt definitionesverae, sed sunt quaedam propositiones,quae non convertuntur.
Unde licet habeatur a Philosopho,quod omnis habituspracticusest de
ente,cuiusprincipiumest in nobis,non tarnenhabemus ab eo conversam
huius,scilicetquod omnisscientia,quae est de ente,cuius principiumest 10
in nobis, sit practica,nec licet istam conversaminferreex illa conver- nisiconvertendo
universalem
tendo,quam dat Philosophus
propositionem
affirmativam
simpliciter.
< 1.4.2.1> Sed contra,Commentator,commentoIo, expresseexponitPhiet dicit,intenditautem dare causam prop- 15
losophumad istumintellectum,
terquid quorundamentium,suntenimhabitusactiviet quorundamfactivi
et quorundam neutro modo. Propterhoc supple, quod entia quaedam
habentprincipiumin nobis, quaedam non.
<1.4.2.2> Item, 2 Ethicorum
poniturconversa eius expresse.Et confirloco
matur,quia
'praxis' semperutiturCommentator'operatione',quia 20
est
'praxis' graece
'operatio' latine.
etiam per opinionemsubtilemde duplici habitu<1.4.2.3> Confirmatur
dineprioritatis
et conformitatis,
quae quidemduplexhabitudoest causalitas
ad
cuius
fitaliquid posteriusessentialiter.
imitationem
exemplaris,
<Articulussecundus>
25
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25
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
18:22:46 PM
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AURIOLANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
93
<Articulustertius>
<3> Nunc tertiorespondendumest ad rationeset difficultates.
<3.1> Ad cuius evidentiampraemittounam distinctionem
de principio
activo,quod 'principiumactivum5tripliciter
potestaccipi: uno modo elicitiveet formaliter,
et sic non constituit
practicum,quia hoc est commune
omnibusformistam vitalibusquam non-vitalibus.
Secundo accipitur'prinet coelicitive,et sic non adhuc constituit
cipiumactivum'instrumentaliter
praxim,quia est communenotitiaeet formisaliis.Isto modo dicimus,quod
propositionessunt principiaactiva respectuconclusionis,et omnis scientia, quae aliae scientiaepraebet aliquas propositiones,est activa respectu
eius. Tertiomodo potestaccipi 'principiumactivum'per modumprincipii
exemplariset per modumregulaeet formaepraeconceptaein mente,quae
quidem formanon est elicitiva,sed potentia ad eius imitationemelicit
aliquidsicutad exemplaret respectumut ad principiumactivum,quia sine
ilio nulla actio fieripotest.Et ista est activitas,quae constituit
praxim,quia
est proprianotitiae,unde notitiaest.
motas.
<3.2> Hac distinctione
praemissadicendumest ad difficultates
in<3.2. 1> Ad primumdicendumsicutprius,quod habitusdistinguitur
trinseceper copulationemad respectum,qui est duplex,quia aut congruit
solum veritati,et tunc solum constituitur
per copulationemad talem reaut
scientia
spectum
speculativa; congruitoperationi,quae est duplex,aut
est manensin agenteet vocatur'dictio',et sic constituit
practicamactivam;
aut transitin materiamextraet vocatur'factiva',et sic constituit
practicam
factivam.
<3.2. 1. 1> Ad primumcontrahoc, cum dicitur"ista copulatioest aliquid
vel nihil etc.", dicendum est, | quod est aliquid, sed non est aliquod
33 B', fol.21rb
17aliae]alterius
B' 17propositiones]
estadd.etdel.B'
"Utrum
. . 10.2.1
25 ad 2.1.1 32 ThomaeWylton,
habitus
theologicus
18:22:46 PM
10
15
20
25
30
94
10
15
20
25
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
1 accipiuntur]
B' 10Damascenus]
DamB' 10 12]13B' 12Metaphysicorum
]
accipitur
alia
B' 13 in2]om.B' 21-23Item... animae]add.i.m.B' 22 corporis]
Physicorum
animaeadd.etdel.B' 24 animae]add.s.l.B' 24 activi]con.exactivaeB' 26 activi]
add.etdel.B' 27 quae]estadd.etdel.B'
actione
transeunte
9 Augustinus,
Damascenus,
, cap."De qualitate"
(PL 32,col.1435) 10Johannes
Categoriae
InAristot.
,
Elementarium,
Metaphyska
(PG 94,col.574). 11Averroes,
cap."De differentia"
InAristot.
lib.7, t. 2 (ed.Iuntina,
Praedicamenta;
VIII, f. 153rb-va).12 Simplicius,
Corpus
latinm
commentariorum
inAristotelem
vol.V, p. 349,11.17 sqq.(Louvain,
1971).
graecorum,
6 ThomaeWylton,
"Utrum
habitus
. . .", 10.2.2
theologicus
18:22:46 PM
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OL ANDWYLTONON THEOLOGY
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LAUGEO. NIELSEN
scientiain anima, cui sempercongruit;quaedam non suntnisi in subiectis, quibus numquam congruunt,sicut error;quaedam sunt in subiectis,
quibus aliquando congruunt,aliquando non congruunt,sicut albedo in
utin
corpore,quae in alia parte congruit,ut in dente,in alia incongruit,
oculo; quaedam sunt in subiectis,quibus nec congruuntisto modo nec
sicut calor in ligno.
incongruunt,
de angelo dicendum,quod non est
<3.2.5. 1> Ad secundam difficultatem
eadem scientiaspecie in angelo et in nobis propterdiversitatem
potentiarum,scilicetpotentiaeintellectivaein nobis et in angelo.
<3.2.5.2> Sed ad illud de rosa dicendum,quod illud impossibilesolum
sequiturex mutationenaturae et obiecti.
<3.2.5.3> Vel possetdici ad difficultatem,
quod idem absolutummanetin
ideo in
me et in angelo. Quia tamenin me copulaturrespectuiactivitatis,
me induitrationempractici,sed non sic in angelo. Et tune non sequitur,
sed sequitur,quod eadem
quod idem habituseritpracticuset speculativus,
uni
induit
rationem
qualitascopulata
practici,et proutcopulatur
respectui
alterirespectui,induitrationemspeculativi.
<3.2.6> Ad tertiumde medicina dicendum,quod ad hoc, quod habitus
quod attingatformamultimam
aliquisveredicaturpracticus,non requiritur,
modum
sic
non
essetin toto mundo una ars,
per
principalisagentis,quia
formaintenta
quae vere posset dici practica,quia in nulla arte attingitur
isto modo ab arte, sed a natura, quae mota ab arte et adiuta inducit
formam.Sicut patet in arte scribendi,quod a natura pennae habentis
duritiamet etiam naturali fluxibilitateencausti, prout moveturmanu
scribentis,induciturformalitteraeet scripturae.Similiterdicendum est
de medicina,quod non obstante,quod non attingatad sanitatemcausandam per modumagentisprincipalis,
vere tamenest practicanon solum
sed
ad
respectudispositionis sanitatem, respectuetiam sanitatis,ad quam
inducendamsuo modo concurritcum natura.
<3.2.7> Ad quartumde scientiaDei dicendum,quod esse practicumest
dupliciter;uno modo ut prudentia,quae determinaiagentemet modum
agendi,scilicetquod agat, quando oportet,et ut oportet,et sic de ceteris.
Isto modo non est scientiaDei practica,quia rpugntDeo omnis talis
determinado.Alio modo est aliquid practicumut ars,quae non determinai
B' 24 movetur]
incausti
3 albedo]ar00B' 19 quod]in add.etdel B' 24 encausti]
B'
moventur
7 ad 2.2.1-2 10
2.2.3 12 orf
2.2.1-2 18 ad 2.3 30 ad 2.4
18:22:46 PM
ON THEOLOGY
ANDVIRTUE
AURIOLANDWYLTON
97
22 B', fol.2lva
B' 11 dicendum]
add.s.l.B'
con.exconcludit
add.i.m.B' 10 includit]
3 sitpractica]
"Utrum
. . 5.1 11Thomae
"Utrum
habitus
3 ad2.5 8 Thomae
Wylton,
theofogicus
Wylton,
"Utrum
habitus
.
.
18
Thomae
habitus
.
.
5.3.2
theofogicus5.4;responWylton,
theologicus
. . 5.2 et5.5habitus
in "Utrum
ThomaeWylton
siones
Aureoli
ad obiectiones
theofogicus
in B' 20 ad 2.6 23 ad 2.7
9, noninveniuntur
18:22:46 PM
98
LAUGEO. NIELSEN
vel dirigeresit respectu talis vel talis potentiae,hoc accidit. Hoc vult
Avicenna in Logicasua expresse,ubi dicit,quod logica non est scientia
Et postea subdit,quod dominuslogicae
speculativa,sed est instrumentum.
indigetfrequentiusu sui operis.
<3.2. 12> Ad octavumde geometriadicendum,quod altimetriabene est
practica,quia est de linea concretaad terram.Sed geometria,quae est de
linea similiter,est speculativa.
<3.3> Ad argumentaprincipaliapatet ex dictis.
5 quod]alinetri
add.etdel.B' 5 altimetria]
altmetra
B'
2 Avicenna,
(1508,f.2ra-va)3 Avicenna,
Logica
Logica
(1508,f.2vb)
5 ad 2.8
18:22:46 PM
In his OutofMy LaterTearsEinsteinobservesthat what is incomprehensiblein the universeis just the factthatit is comprehensible.
Yet, the
of
as
well
as many
comprehensibility the world,which troubledEinstein
other 20th centuryscientistsand epistemologists,
was not a problem at
all formedievalthinkers.The standardtheoryof divineideas, developed
sis quaestionibus
83 providedan excellent
by St Augustinein his De diver
answer(or scheme for an answer)to thisquestion. Our world is intelligible and orderedbecause God has createdit accordingto (some of) the
formed
patterns(or universaltypes,conceivedof as distinctfromindividual tokens)eternallypresentin his mind- that is, the divine ideas. As
God thinksof them,He knows everything
other than Himself,and, as
in the world.
He looks to them,He rationallycreateseverything
But in a genuinephilosophicalcontext,everysolutionposes its problems. This is also the case with the theoryof divine ideas. In fact,it
raisesat least two main problems:it apparentlycompromises(i) the thesis of divinesimplicity,
since a pluralityof thingsseems to be somehow
presentin God, and (ii) thatof divineomniscience(and providence),since
God seemsto knowcreaturesmediatelyonly,by means of somethingelse.
medievalphilosophers
and theologianshad to discussextensively
Therefore,
* Thisarticle
isa revised
version
ofa paperI readattheXthInternational
of
Congress
Medieval
in Erfurt
inAugust
1997.I wishto express
to Russell
Philosophy
mygratitude
L. Friedman,
whokindly
reviewed
theEnglish
ofthearticle,
itstexton many
clarifying
points.
1 Cf.St.
De diversis
83,q. 46,PL 40,cols.29-31:"Suntnamque
quaestionibus
Augustine,
ideaeprincipales
formae
velrationes
rerum
stabiles
quaedam,
atqueincommutabiles,
quae
nonsunt(acperhocaeternae
ac semper
eodemmodosesehabentes),
ipsaeformatae
quae
indivina
etcumipsaenequeoriantur
secundum
continentur;
intelligentia
nequeintereant,
eas tamenformari
dicitur
omnequodoririet interire
et omnequodoritur
et
potest,
Foran assessment
interit."
inAntiquity
ofthisAugustinin
doctrine
andMiddleAges,see
L.M.deRijk,Quaestio
de Ideis.Some
onanImportant
Notes
, in:J.Mansfeld
ofPlatonism
Chapter
andL.M.de Rijk(eds.),
Studies
inGreek
andItsContinuation
, Assen1975,
Kephalaion.
Philosophy
204-13.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
Vivarium
, 38,1
18:22:54 PM
100
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
ThomasAquinas
18:22:54 PM
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
CAUSALITY
101
18:22:54 PM
102
D. CONTI
ALESSANDRO
18:22:54 PM
CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
103
14Gf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 15,a. 2: "[Deus]enimessenti
amsuamperfecte
Aquinas,
cognoscit:
undecognoscit
earnsecundum
omnem
modum
est.Potestautemearn
quo cognoscibilis
... secundum
secundum
a
cognosci
quodestparticipabilis
aliquemmodumsimilitudinis
creaturis.
autemcreatura
habetpropriam
secundum
Unaquaeque
speciem,
quodaliquo
modoparticipt
divinae
essentiae
similitudinem.
Sicigitur
inquantum
Deuscognoscit
suam
essentiam
utsicimitabilem
a talicreatura,
earnutpropriam
rationem
etideam
cognoscit
huiuscreaturae."
15Gf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 14,a. 8; andq. 22,a. 2, on divine
providence.
16Thomas Aquinas,
STh.I, q. 14, a. 11.
Aquinas,
17Cf.Thomas
STh.I, q. 14,a. 2.
Aquinas,
18Cf.ThomasAquinas,
STh.I, q. 14,a. 11.
19Cf.ThomasAquinas,
STh.I, q. 44,a. 2. See alsoabove,n. 11.
18:22:54 PM
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
104
1.2 Duns Scotus
18:22:54 PM
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
CAUSALITY
105
theirintelligible
and thinksof them;third,the divine
being (esseintelligibile)
intellectcompares its own intellectionsto the intelligibles,and thereby
for each intelligible;fourth,it
producesa mental relation(relatiorationis)
reflectson these mental relationsand knows them as such.22The relationof instabilityplays no decisiverole in this"chain" of mentalactions,
nor do the respectas
rationis
, which,in contrast,were the cause of the mulof
ideas
tiplicity
accordingto St Thomas.
This explanationhas the meritof avoiding the two main problems
- that the
raised by the standard(Thomistic)theory
is,
presencein God
of a pluralityof "things"co-eternalwithhis mind,and the possibilityof
- since the ideas are the
a perfectknowledgeof individuals
i)
objectsproduced by thementalactivityof God, and ii) theyare not ideas of universal
natures,but of individuals(moreprecisely,of all produciblesingularcreaturesthatthe divinemind can conceive):"Iuxta hoc additurquod ideae
divinaemaximeeruntsingularium,
omnia alia
quia distincterepraesentant
a
Deo."23
intelligibilia
Yet Scotus' solutionis weak on one importantpoint: it does not clarifythe relationbetweenthe divine essence which God thinksof "at the
firstinstant"and the ideas of possiblesthat He produces straightafter.
The relationshipbetweenthese ideas and the essence is leftambiguous.
What Duns Scotus seems to suggestis that God produces the ideas of
possiblesas He is able to create thatis to say, as He is omnipotent.In
fact,God createsthe world since He can, and He thinksof everymakable thingbeforecreatingthe world since He is an infinitely
intelligent
agent,and everyintelligentagent acts accordingto some plan.24
22Cf.DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
I, d. 35,q. unica,ed.Vaticana
VI, 258:"Deusinprimo
instanti
essentiam
suamsubratione
mereabsoluta;
in secundo
instanti
intelligit
producit
inesseintelligibili
etintelligit
itaquodibiestrelatio
in lapideintellecto
lapidem
lapidem,
ad intellectionem
sednullaadhucin intellectione
divinaad lapidem,
sedinteldivinam,
lectiodivinatermint
relationem
ad ipsam;in tertio
'lapidisut intellects
instanti,
forte,
intellectus
divinus
suamintellectionem
ad quodcumque
ad
potest
comparare
intelligibile
et tunccomparando
se ad lapidem
quodnospossumus
comparare,
intellectum,
potest
causare
inse relationem
etinquarto
instanti
relarationis;
potest
quasireflecti
superistam
tionem
causatam
in tertio
et tuneillarelatio
rationis
eritcognita.
Sic ergonon
instanti,
- tamquam
- utobiecestrelatio
rationis
necessaria
ad intelligendum
lapidem
priorlapide
et adhucposterior
eritipsa
tum,immoipsa'utcausata'estposterior
(intertio
instanti),
'utcognita',
in quartoinstanti."
quia
23DunsScotus,
libros
Aristotelis
Quaestiones
, lib.VII, q. 15,in: Opera
super
Metaphysicorum
NY 1997,299.
,vol.IV, St.Bonaventure,
Philosophic
Cf.DunsScotus,Ordinatio
I, d. 2, pars1, qq. 1-2,ed. VaticanaII, 174:"Ostenso
essede proprietatibus
relativis
ad ostendendum
ulterius
illiusprimi
infinitatem
entis,
primi
etperconsequens
essede enteinfinito
sic:primo
ostendo
efficiens
procedo
quodprimum
18:22:54 PM
106
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
2. AurionsCriticisms
1. Auriol accepts the Aristotelianthesis of the absolute simplicityand
actuality{actuspurus)of God; moreover,he also stressesthat the divine
essenceis the onlyproperobject of God's knowledge.On the otherhand,
followingSt Augustine,he acknowledgesi) that there is a pluralityof
knowsany individualcreature(the
ideas in God, and ii) thatHe perfectly
thatdivineideas are univeronly realitiesin the world),notwithstanding
sal. So apparentlyhe seems to admitthe essenceof the Thomistic assessment of the theoryof ideas. In reality,he triesto remove the tension
between the Aristotelianand Christiandemands by diminishingthe requirementsof the Christianhorn of the dilemma,choosingto remainas
as possibleto Aristotelian
faithful
principles,concepts,and schemesrather
than appropriatelymodifythem in order to adapt them to Christian
belief,as St. Thomas did. As a consequence, he rejectsDuns Scotus'
approach to the subject and St Thomas' account of exemplarcausality,
and proposes a different
explanation,where i) much more stressis put
of God, and ii) a new conceptionof the relaon the absolute simplicity
tionshipsbetweendivineessence and ideas, and betweenideas and creaturesis workedout.
2. Aquinas' solutionis unsatisfactory
accordingto Auriol,because St
Thomas' qualificationof ideas as that which is understoodby God is a
which thereforedoes not solve the problem of the
mere petitio
principila
thearguments
of "things"in Him. Further,
"real" presenceof a multiplicity
advanced forexpoundingGod's completeknowledgeof singularsqua such
are ineffective.
Auriol objects: according to St. Thomas' theorythe divine essence
would be simple and compositeat the same time, since Aquinas conceives of divineideas as rerum
eternallyexistingin the essence.
perfectiones
him
idea
is
the
for
each
propermeasure(or pattern)of a
Consequently,
singleset of possibleand/orreal individuals.Therefore,divineideas would
be not only epistemologicalprinciples,but ontologicalalso, and, as such,
entitiessomehow existingin God. This solution
a pluralityof different
etquodsuaessendistincte
estinfinitorum
itaquodsuaintelligentia
etvolens
estintelligens
et ex hoc
estsua intelligentia),
infinitorum
tiaestrepraesentativa
(quaequidemessentia
eritquadruplex
ostensa
Et sic cumtriplici
sua infinitas.
concludetur
secundo
primitate
scilicet
istudquartum
Sedtarnen
eiusinfinitatem.
medium
ad ostendendum
medium,
quod
ex quo sicutex quodammedioaliisadditoconetvolens,
efficiens
estintelligens
primm
35."See also
ad aliquidusquead distinctionem
cluditur
sua infinitas,
quantum
suppono
ibidem
, 175-88.
18:22:54 PM
CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
107
to understandhow a
failsto achieve its goal, since it is more difficult
in
an
of
distinct
can
subsist
absolutelysimple reality
plurality
principles
than to understandhow an absolutelysimple realitycan be the model
imitated(similitude*)
else:
by everything
enimdifficultas
et impossibilitas
Sed istemodusdicendi
petitprincipium.
Aequalis
essevidetur
etdistinctae
omnium
rerum
quodinaliquosimplici
perfectiones
propriae
etquodilludsimpliciter
sitsimilitudo
omnium
rerum
praeexistant
propria
perquam
omniainsuadistinctione
etcognoscuntur.
Immoetmaiordifficultas
repraesentantur
videtur
etdistinctae
perfectiones
quodinaliquosimplici
propriae
praeexistere
possint
sitsimilitudo
diversorum.
Sed nosquaerimus
hicquoquamquodunumsimpliciter
modosimplex
Deiessentia
sitsimilitudo
dissimilium
etnumerorum,
ergohocdeclarare
formae
et perfectiones
est
perhocquodin ea praeexistant
propriae
singulorum
declarare.25
difficile,
quiaestmagisdifficile
Moreover,if creatureswere in God like imperfectacts in a perfectone,
in the same way as animal is in man (so St Thomas),26then creatures'
patternswould be in God as his principlesand metaphysicalconstituents
et quidditative
(formaliter
), and thereforeGod would be everythingwhich
He certainlyis, but metaphorically
(translative)
only,insofaras He is the
cause of everything:
animal
continetur
inhomine
formaliter
etquidditative,
undehaecestvera
Praeterea,
'homoestanimal';
minores
etiamnumeri
in maiori,
continentur
binarius
in
utpote
trinario
etpermodum
Sedmanifestum
estquodpropriae
formae
potentialiter
partis.
creaturarum
noncontinentur
inDeo formaliter
etquidditative.
Nonestenimverum
necetiamcontinentur
ibiutpartes
deiquodDeussitlapisvelleo nisitranslative,
tatis.Ergoincongrua
estista:'siccreaturae
suntin Deo quasiactusimperfecti
in
actuperfecto,
inhomine,
sicutanimal
velbinarius
intrinario'.
Etideonecprobatur;
noverit
et qui novitDeumex hoccognoscat
animal,
quamvis
qui novithominem
entiasecundum
rationes.27
proprias
In sum, accordingto Auriol,Aquinas' conceptionof divine ideas hypostatizesthem,so that God's being itselfis nothingbut the "union" of
divineideas. The problemwithsuch a doctrineis the relationship
between
the divineessence and ideas, since these latterare conceived of as constitutive
parts of the former,and the real objects of divineknowledge.
Nor does Auriol agree with Aquinas' affirmations
concerningGod's
understandingof individuals.The Franciscan notes that St. Thomas'
answeris inadequate,since it presupposesthat matteris the principleof
whereas matterin itselfis as common as form,and only
individuation,
25Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 795b-796a.
Sent.,
26Cf.Thomas
Summa
contra
Gentiles
I, ch.54; andSTh.I, q. 14,a. 6.
Aquinas,
27Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 796a.
Sent.,
18:22:54 PM
108
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
18:22:54 PM
CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
109
all that He
One can agree i) that God mustknow perfectly
powerless.30
causes and has caused, and ii) that He is the firstcause of everything
whichexists(individualsand theirown metaphysicalprinciplesincluded),
but it does not necessarilyfollowfromthis that He thereforeperfecdy
knowsindividuals.In fact,thisconsequenceis necessaryonlyifwe assume
thatGod knowswhatHe produces(or has produced)as its efficient
cause,
but in thiscase his knowledgewould be dianoetical(scientia
discursiva
) and
not intuitive,
since no effectfallswithinthe essence of its efficient
cause.
This kindof knowledgeis clearlyat odds withGos perfectionand simsinceit impliesa processof reasoningfrompremissesto conclusions
plicity,
and consequentlya multiplicity
of acts of understanding
concerningthe
same object:
sic:cognitis
in quibusconstituitur
essentia
Praeterea,
rei,necesse
arguunt
principiis
estremillamcognosci;
sedmateria
etforma
individuata
suntprincipia
ex
designata
Dei autemcognitio
forquibusconstituitur
singulare
signatum;
usquead materiam,
mametaccidentia
individuantia
cumomniasintvirtualiter
indivina
essenpertinget,
tiatamquam
inprimaorigine
essendi;
ergoDeususquead cognitionem
singularium
Sedhaecratiodeficit,
utpraecedens.
Nonenimcontinentur
istavirtualiter
pertinget.
inDeo,nisiquatenus
estexemplar,
secundum
quiaDeusnonestefficiens
opinionem
istorum
et datoquodesset,noncognoscit
Deusresperhocquod
philosophorum;
estefficiens,
sedproeo quodestexemplar
uniforme
discursive,31
alioquin
intelligeret
huiusmateriae
etillius,
ethuiusformae
etillius;
etideononrepraesentat
uthocvel
absolute
secundum
istos.32
illud,sedtantum
There are only two ways of avoidingthis aporia: i) one can reformulate
the relationshipsbetween divine essence and ideas, and between ideas
and creatures,or ii) one can assume,as Duns Scotus did, that the ideas
are ideas of singularsand not of species. Auriol does not examine this
last hypothesiswhen he discussesScotus' opinion, but in at least one
importantpassage he, like Aquinas, speaks of divine ideas as rationes
tres<angulos>,
et sicde omnibus
sciatur
omnistriangulus
habet
aliis,quamsi absolute
tres<angulos>
illiusvelistius.
Et similiter
de veritate
absquesignatione
incomplexa
patet
nonmelius
scitur
hunctriangulum
veliliumquam
quodquidditas
trianguli
cognoscendo
absolute
sciendo
definitionem."
See alsoforAurioPs
ofintellectual
trianguli
theory
cognitionofsingulars,
Russell
Friedman's
contribution
to thisvolume.
30Cf.Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars4, a. 2, 814b-6b.
Sent.,
31On theconnection
between
as efficient
causeandknowing
ina dainoetical
knowing
enimquodDeusestcausaomnium
wayseethefollowing
(ibid.,
814b):"Concederent
passage
rerum
etitacognoscit
omniainquantum
estsimilitudo
omnium
etcausaexemexemplairs,
noninquantum
suascientia
essetdiscursiva,
noneniminefficiente
efficiens,
plaris,
alioquin
> tantum
tureffectus
sed< supple',
turintuitive
insuasimiintuitive,
cognosci
aliquid
cognosci
litudine
eminenti."
Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars4, a. 2, 814b-5a.
Sent.,
18:22:54 PM
110
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
18:22:54 PM
CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
111
18:22:54 PM
112
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
- ; immosubunaeteademsimplici
secunvidentur
perfectione,
I, q. 14,a. 6> imaginari
estomnium
dumremetrationem
<ipsadeitas>exemplar
perdeitatem,
quaeimportatur
sedtota
circadeitatem,
secundum
rationem
Nec aliquamultitudo
entitatum.
concipitur
See
circacreaturas
et concipitur
in connotatis
atttenditur
istamultiplicitas
exemplatas."
also:pars4, a. 3, 820a-b.
37Comm.
d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 796b.
inI librum
Sent.,
18:22:54 PM
CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
113
in connotatis.
sitinse,esttamen
divina
Licetessentia
Quamvis
plures
simplicissima
intuitum
et una sittamre quam
enimessentia,
divinum,
simplex
quae termint
sed
nonquidemterminative,
nihilominus
ea cognita
ratione,
pluradicuntur
cognita,
nonquin
... Et propter
hocradones
incommutabiles
dicuntur
denominative
plures,
sedquiaab ipsaunicaexistente
situnaincommutabilis
ratioinse quidditative,
plura
- sicutapparebit
cumagetur
et connotantur
de multitudine
denominantur
inferius,
idearum.38
This thesisis more radical than the common one maintainedby 13th
and 14thcenturytheologians,such as Aquinas, Henryof Ghent,or Giles
of Rome. They appealed to a sortof non-realmode of existenceof the
divineideas,39originating
fromthe relationsof imitability
holdingbetween
the divine essence and the possible creatures,so that the existenceof
divineideas is purelyof reason.Auriolappears to deny divineideas even
thiskind of existence.Divine ideas are not the indirectobjects of divine
as St Thomas believed,nor is the divine essence like a mirintellection,
ror where theyare presentas images of the possible creatures,so that
God can knowindividualsby reflection.
Were thisthe case, knowinghis
own essence and knowingcreatureswould be two distinct"acts" (so to
kindsof principles
speak)in God, performedby means of two different
a conclusioninconsistent
withdivinesimplicity,
and actuality:
perfection,
Greaturae
nonsuntobiectasecundaria
terminantia
intuitum
relucendo
divinum,
in speculoin divinaessentia,
sicutvidetur
communis.
tamquam
fingere
imaginado
enimaliquidaspicitur
in aliquotamquam
in speculo,
tuncestibialius
Quandoque
actusvidendi
et aliaspecies,
siveratio,
et qua videtur
resin
qua videtur
speculum
ineodemoculosimulspecies
concurrant
etspecies
rei.Sed
speculo,
quamvis
speculi
secundum
sicponentes
divinus
intellectus
intuetur
creaturas
in sua essentia
quasi
relucentes.
videbit
creaturas
speculo
Ergoperaliamsimilitudinem
quamperessenessentia
nonse habebit
utspeculum.
Cumergoperaliamsimilitudinem
tiam,
alioquin
nonvideat
nonsehabeat
creaturas,
patetquodessentia
Praeterea,
permodum
speculi.
Deusnonintelligit
creaturas
Actusenimreflexus
videtur
perreflexionem.
imperfectiorquamdirectus;
sedsi divinus
intuitus
inessendam
ferretur
etdeinde
primo
procedereiad creaturas
videret
eas perreflexionem
quasiperquoddam
speculum,
in speculo,
videntur
reflexam.
quaeenimvidentur
perlineam
Ergoid quodprius.40
38Comm.
inI librum
d. 35,pars2, a. 2, 777b.
Sent.,
39Cf.
McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, NotreDame,Ind.1987,1037.
Marilyn
40Comm.
inI librum
Sent
to this,Auriolthinks
., d. 35,pars2, a. 1, 774a.In addition
thatthisis thegenuine
intention
ofSt Augustine
whoseconviction
on thisparhimself,
ticular
wouldcoincide
with
Aristotle's
ofdivine
Cf.ibid
., 774b:
point
conception
knowledge.
"Tertia
tioestquodhaecfuit
intendo
etinhoccumPhilosopho
quoqueproposi
Augustini,
scilicet
concordavi^
obiectivo,
quodnihilaliudextraDeumessetin ipsiusintuitu
quinimmo
suiipsius
intuido
essetintuido
omnium
aliorum
eteminenter."
Thus,
aequipollenter
toAuriol,
thecommon
tothismatter
lacksadequate
authoritative
according
approach
supportas well.
18:22:54 PM
114
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
41Cf. Comm.
Sent
inI librum
., d. 35,pars2, a. 2, 775a-b:"Anconcedidebeatquod
vero
autaliquidaliudextrase. Circasecundum
creaturas
Deusvereetproprie
intelligat
autaliquidaliud<extra>se subunoquicreaturas
considerandum
quodDeumintelligere
an DeussicintelSi enimquaeratur
subalioverononpotest.
demsensuconcedi
potest,
ulterius
et ex hocprocedat
suumferat
superessentiam,
quodintuitum
ligatcreaturam
ac
et sitibipluralitas
Deuset creatura,
itaquodsintduointuita,
usquead creaturam,
sic
cumDeo in ratione
creatura
etponatin numerum
multitudo
intellecti;
intellectorum,
autaliquidaliudextrase."
creaturas
nullomodoconcedi
quodDeusintelligat
potest
42The edition
doesnotmakesense.
reads:denominative
, butthisreading
43Comm.
d. 35,pars2, a. 2, 776b-7a.
inI librum
Sent.,
44Cf.Comm.
Sent
inI librum
., d. 35,pars3, a. 2, 796a.
18:22:54 PM
CAUSALITY
DIVINEIDEASANDEXEMPLAR
115
18:22:54 PM
116
ALESSANDRO
D. CONTI
- an evident
becomesas necessaryas the divineessenceitself
heresy,which
is the price paid by Auriolforhis fidelity
to Aristotelian
philosophy.This
finalresultshowsonce again the way Christianfaithexceeds its own theof its main conological systems,whenevertheyare simpletranscriptions
tentsinto the termsof a given rigidphilosophicalapparatus.
Universit
deglistudide L'Aquila
18:22:54 PM
Vivarium
, 38,1
18:23:04 PM
118
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
119
18:23:04 PM
120
CHRISSCHABEL
hotthing,
norbythe
at thatinstant,
to you.Norbyanother
according
corrupted
Thusit remains
thatitwouldbe generated
heavens.
diminishing
bythecoldthing
etc.9
is false.Therefore,
it.Butforsomething
to be generated
byitsopposite
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
121
an atomisticview of forms,
at thatinstant.So while grantingtemporarily
Auriol denies the necessaryconcomitantatomisticview of time.
Thus Auriol opts for a type of additiontheory.Of the six positions12
Aurioltreats,fourare variationsof the additiontheory.The solutionsof
Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Hervaeus Natalis all involvean increase
of intensity
withoutthe destructionof the previousformor the decrease
in the contraryform,and thus by defaultcan be put under the 'addition' rubric.Auriol,however,rejectsthese theories,assertinginsteadone
of the bases of the classic addition theoryof his Franciscan brothers
RichardofMiddleton,and Scotus:thatwhengraceincreases,
Bonaventure,
it is because a new chunkof grace is added: "Every formis made more
intenseby somethingreal thatcomes to {adveniens)
and participatesin the
Auriol gives severalargumentsexplaining
specificnatureof thatform."13
why this 'reality'must 'come to' or 'arrive',but withoutdefiningadveniens.One mightinferthat it means 'arrivefromwithout',and that the
Franciscantheoryis an 'external' addition theory,in contrastto what
could be termedthe 'internal'theoriesof Aquinas, Henry,and Hervaeus.
Auriol uses supernaturaland natural evidence. For instance,the reality
thatintendsthe formcannot be a part of the subjectin which the form
inheres,because in the case of a soul, whichis the subjectof grace, there
are no such parts. The realitycannot be a part of a dispositioneither,
since in the example of air becoming more illuminated,Auriol claims
that air is alreadyperfecdydisposed (dispositissimus)
with respectto light.
is
not
intended
in
air
because
of
an
addition
with respectto part
Light
of air's dispositiontowardthe form.14
Auriolthen explainswhy thisrealitymust 'participate'or share in the
nature:Only
specificnatureof the form,and not be of a totallydifferent
like can perfectand augmentlike withoutadulteration.Otherwise,if the
nature,the formwould not be intended,"but
realitywere of a different
rather'drawn' to anotherperfectionand combinedwithit, as withform
and matter,"15
thus creatingsomethingdifferent.
Matter is not intended
when perfectedby form.
12Wood1990,374,n. 7, hasnotedthatAuriol
mentions
sixpositions.
loc.at., a. 2, prop.1 (= Rome435bE): Quodommsforma
mtenAunol,Scriptum,
ditur
realeadveniens,
rationem
illiusformae."
per
aliquid
participans
specificam
14Auriol,
a. 2, prop.1 (= Rome436aA):"Nonpotest
autemillareal, he.cit.,
Scriptum
itasesseparssubiecti,
nonhabet,
si loquamur
de caritate;
necparsdisquiaanimapartes
lucis."
positions,
quiaaerestdispositissimus
respectu
nullum
, loc.at., a. 2,prop.1 (= Rome436bC):"Praeterea,
Aunol,
Scriptum
perfectibile
alterius
rationis
dicitur
sedmagistrahi,
ad aliamperfectionem,
et
intendi,
perrealitatem
cumea, sicutpatetde forma
materiae."
componi
respectu
18:23:04 PM
122
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
123
The defenseof thispositioninvolvesprimarilya rejectionof the classic Franciscanadditiontheory,thatgrace itselfis what is added. If grace
were added, accordingto Auriol,then one could separate the grace into
two partsbeforehand,which is impossible.Not only is the added 'grace'
but onlyco-intelligible.
not 'makeable',it is not even intuitively
intelligible,
dividethe augmentedgrace
Even an angelicintellectcould not intuitively
afterintensioninto two graces,because grace is alwaysincreasedas one,
as a unit,to which "somethingof grace" is added, but not grace. Auriol
emphasizesthat the same is true of all formsthat are intensified.19
To illustratethis, Auriol gives several examples, often taken from
Aristodeand Averros.A curvedline does not become more curved,or
air rarer,or earthdenser,by the comingof more curvatureor rarityor
densityso that the line, e.g., becomes more curved by a double curvature.What happens,Auriolmaintains,is thata realitythat 'unseparately'
or 'non-discretely'
(impraecise
) pertainsto the specificnature of curvature
comes to and is added to the curvatureof a line to make it more curved.20
Auriolprovidesarguments
forthis.One relieson theexampleof Tarification.
When Tarification
occurs in a body, thereis a concomitantincrease in
dimensionor quantity,but thereis no 'part' arrivingthat is quantityor
dimensionseparatelyor discretely.
One cannotpointto a part of the new
dimensionthatwas not therebeforeand was added de novowhen we heat
or densificationoccurs,it
up a balloon, for example. When Tarification
occurs throughout.Likewise,one cannot show the new chunk of grace
whichis supposedlyadded when grace increases.21
concaritas
andMaierquitecorrectly
linksit to the
important
aspectofAuriol's
position,
wider
ofindividuation,
which
is beyond
thescopeofthepresent
problem
paper.
19Auriol
., a. 2,prop.3 (441aC-D;Vb 22Ivb):"Undenonestfactibilis
1596,loc.cit
per
se etiamperdivinam
sicquodcapiatessepraecisum
etdemonstratum,
necest
potentiam
intuitive
sedcointelligibilis
itaquodintellectus
nonposset
tantum,
intelligibilis,
angelicus
caritatem
dividere
intuitive
induascaritates,
sedsemper
caritas
auctaoccuraugmentatam
ritsibi,ut unumcui additum
estaliquidcaritatis,
noncaritas,
et pereumdem
modum
estde albedine,
et calore,
et omniforma
intelligendum
quae
augetur."
MAunol1596,loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.3 (441aF-bA;
Vb 22Ivb): Sed linea[44lb] curva
et minus
et lenitas,
et
curva,et similiter
raritas,
suscipit
magiset minusutfiatcurvior,
et sicde aliisquae intenduntur
et remittuntur;
in omnibus
autemhisnonfit
asperitas,
ad illamspeciem
realitatis
Nonenimadvenit
peradventm
augmentum
praecise
pertinentis.
aliacurvitas
lineaeutfiatcurvior
ratione
autaliararitas
curvitatis,
aeri,autdenduplicis
sitasterrae,
sedid quodadvenit
ad rationem
Undecurvapertinet
specificam
impraecise.
tatiadditur
ad curvitatem
fit."
aliquarealitas
pertinens
qua additalineacurvior
21Auriol
Vb 222ra-b):
"Sedmanifestum
estquod
., a. 2,prop.3 (442aB-D;
1596,loc.cit
crescit
et augmentantur
dimensiones
perrarefactionem
quantitas
absquehocquodadveniatparsquaesitpraecise
autpraecise
dimensio.
enimmusto
Rarefacto
etaugquantitas
nonpotest
demonstran
autdimensio
Necenim
mentato,
parsaddita,
quaeantenonfuit.
18:23:04 PM
124
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
125
18:23:04 PM
126
CHRISSCHABEL
of the intensionand remissionof formsare rathervague, perhaps charso. Nevertheless,it appears that Auriol was sincerein the
acteristically
of
the otherpossibilities,
and thatin the end he thought
process eliminating
and
his con-formsolution, nebulous
negative as it is, solved all the
and was the only positionto adopt. Hence Auriol concludes:
difficulties
thefirst
is peris notadded,butrather
to thissolution
a newessence
According
Nordoesitpositthattheremitted
claims.
as thefirst
fected,
[ofAquinas]
opinion
itsactuality
in theintensified
is actually
contained
form
one,butonlypotentially,
aimed.Norcan anybeenlost,at whichthesecondopinion
[ofGodfrey]
having
thatwhatis added
as somewishtosay.It posits
be addedexcept
thing
perfection,
a pointforwhichothers
to theessence,
is notnothing,
butsomething
pertaining
are
whatall theothers
It is therefore
manifest
thatthismethod
explains
struggle.
tosay.30
andwhattheywereall trying
after,
Place, Space, and Local Motionin theScriptum
In the course of his refutation
of the successiontheory,Auriolhas a long
The contextof the
an
related
on
important
topic: local motion.31
passage
is not excluded
that
the
the
form
of
is
Auriol's
claim
priorreality
passage
to
the
succession
'new5
theory.
by the
realityduringintension,contrary
"The aforesaidpropositionis not conThe sectiongets its own rubric:32
tradictedby what we see in local motion,and it is shown that [local
but ratherthe
motion] is not the successionof 'wherenesses'(ubeitatum),
transferaccordingto parts of a space (magnitudini
)."
This is directedat anonymousfollowersof Godfreyof Fontaines,perof the later exponents
haps includingWalterBurley,the most significant
of the successiontheory.AlthoughAuriol may not have had Burleyin
of the positionand use his
mind, we can take him as a representative
name to designatethe anonymousopponent.33
Justas qualitativechange
30Auriol1596,loc.dt.,a. 2,prop.4 (445aB-C;
hunc
Vb 223va):"Undecumsecundum
vultprima
sicutomnino
novaessentia,
sedprima
nonaddatur
modum
opinio;
perficiatur,
sua
tantum
in intensa,
actualiter
sedpotentialiter
formam
contineri
necponatremissam
sicut
addinisiperfectio,
necpotest
actualitate
contendit;
amissa,
proquo opiniosecunda
ad essentiam,
sedaliquidpertinens
intendunt
proquo alii
aliqui;etponataddinonnihil,
et quod
aliissalvatquodquaerunt,
estquodhiemodusomnibus
manifestum
pugnant,
omneshi dicereintendebant."
31Fora succinct
thelatitude
oflocalmotion
ofmedieval
theories
overview
(andindeed
seeMurdoch
andSylla1978.
offorms)
32Auriol,
turex
nonimpedi
loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2: "Quodpraemissa
propositio
Scriptum,
sed
in motulocali,et ostenditur
hisquae apparent
successio,
quodnonestubeitatum
translatio
secundum
partes
magnitudinis."
33On Burley's
comesfrom
seeSylla1973,233-8,and1981,126.Theposition
theory,
onthe
inhiscommentary
a discussion
from
Tractatus
, apparently
stemming
Burley's
primus
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
127
18:23:04 PM
128
CHRISSCHABEL
So in orderto refutethe successiontheoryand at the same timesafeguard the continuityof motion, Auriol modifiesthe concept of local
motion.Auriolclaimsthatmotiondoes not arisefromthe changefromone
ubi or ubeitasto the next. Instead Auriol concludes that local motionis
- which is the surfaceof the
a change in place (locus)
'resting'body, not
Local
the containingbody across or over (super)a space (magnitudinem)'.
motionis "the fluxof the movingobject accordingto diversepartsof a
space," "just as whiteningis a change accordingto diversepartsof whiteness." The older views of place and local motion,accordingto Auriol,
involve difficult
problemsof indivisibles.Auriol's solutionis to thinkof
local motionas occurringacross a space thatat firstglance appears basiLike
callymathematicalratherthanphysical,i.e. it is pure dimensionality.
to
actual
forms,a space or magnitudethatis traversedis not susceptible
divisioninto discreteparts,and it is certainlycontinuousand not made
Auriolmaintains,is that 'parts' of
up of indivisibles.The only difference,
whitenessinhere in the subject,but 'parts' of a space traverseddo not.
Rather a mobile is transmuted'across' a space. Local motionis nothing
fromone part of a space to anotherpart
other than the transmutation
of the space, not fromone part of an ubeitasto another.36
In sidesteppingthe difficulties
involved in tyinglocal motion to the
ubis, however,Auriolappears to preintensionand remissionof different
sent a rathernon-Aristotelian
concept of local motion,place, and per36Auriol,
est
"Etidcirco
tenendum
, loc.cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome439aF-bC):
Scriptum
in locum,accipiendo
incunctanter
peripsumnonsuperquodmotuslocalisestdirecte
VI
DicitenimCommentator
sed superficiem
ficiem
continentis,
quiescentis.
corporis
etomne
dividitur
illudPhilosophi
XXXIX,exponens
, commento
quodlongitudo
Physicorum
in ubidividitur
illudin quo esttransmutatio,
perdiviquodspatium
perquodestmotus
in quantitate.
Et subdit
sionem
motus.
quaeestin ubinumeratur
quodtransmutatio
illiusquod
Similiter
etiamquartoPhysicorum
XLIII,dicitquodde ratione
, commento
motus
Et quiade ratione
sedmoveri
movetur
superquiescens.
perse nonestcontineri,
situs
diversitas
motum
localem
ideoconcomitantur
estquodsitsupermagnitudinem,
localis
si magnitudo
contineat
et moti,et circumscriptio,
mobilis
et varietas
commensurationis
suntidinquod
neccircumscriptio
neccommensuratio,
Undepatetquodnecsitus,
mobile.
Undeestfluxus
estdirecte
motus
sedmotus
estessentialiter
localis,
supermagnitudinem.
secundum
esttransmutatio
sicutdealbatio
mobilis
secundum
diversas
partes
magnitudinis,
suntinhaerentes,
Nec estdifferentia
nisiquodpartesalbedinis
diversas
partesalbedinis.
transmutan
dicitur
non.Et hincestquodmobile
veromagnitudinis
supermagnipartes
diciet nonsecundum
tudinem,
quodverodealbatur
magnitudinem,
quianoninhaeret,
Motusergolocalisnonest
etnonsuperalbedinem.
tursecundum
albedinem
transmutari,
nontransmutari
de parte
inpartem
de partemagnitudinis
nisitransmutatio
magnitudinis,
et circumscriptione
in partem
immoexclusaomniubeitate
ubeitatis
ubeitatis,
passiva,
in occidens."
moveri
de oriente
caelumdicitur
18:23:04 PM
129
Aristotlemaintainedthat
haps also of space.37In book fourof the Physics
a
of
inner
surface
is
immobile
the
containingbody, a common
place
in
wine
a
that
of
the place
jug is the innersurfaceof the
examplebeing
withoutthicknessor
jug. As such, place is in a way two-dimensional,
are
with
this
mostmediethere
serious
definition,
problems
depth.Although
in chapter
were
also
aware
that
val commentators
but
they
accepted it,
Aristotlehad said thatplace is a continuousquantity.
six of the Categories
As this implied the non-Aristotelianexistence of a three-dimensional
incorporealspace, it was usuallyrejectedor portrayedas merelyAristotle's
of the vulgaropinion.Auriol,however,seems to be moving
presentation
towardthe Categories
and departingfromAristotle'sdefinitionof place in
the Physics.Auriol rejects the latterview, using versionsof traditional
These are based on the ultiargumentsthatgo back to Theophrastus.38
mate sphereof the heavens,which has no such passive circumscription,
and the examplesof a boat anchoredon a riverand a towerin the wind,
which do not move locally,althoughtheirpassive circumscription,
i.e.
waterand air, are continuallychanging.Anotherargumentis thatcorpora
gloriosacan move throughother bodies withouttheir givingway; they
have local motionwithoutany change in theirpassive circumscription.39
37Thereis muchrecent
literature
on thesubject
ofplaceandspace.See e.g.Grant
ofDuhem1985,133-291;
1976,1981aand 1981b;thetranslation
1988,1997,
Trifogli
and 1998b;andMurdoch
1998.
1998a,179-208,
38Cf.e.g.Sorabji1988,192.
39Auriol,
. cit.,a. 2, prop.2 (= Rome438bC-439aC):
loe
"Etpropterea
dicenScriptum,
infalsaimaginatione.
dumestquodistudmedium
fundatur
Oritur
haecdifficultas
quidem
exhocquodphilosophantes
hodiemotum
localem
essetamquam
interminm
imaginantur
ad circumscriptionem
Hoc autemomnino
falsum
essesatisapparet.
Constat
passivam.
utCommentator
deducit
movetur
enim,
, quodultima
localiter,
quartoPhysicorum
sphaera
sednonmovetur
ad aliquod
ubiautcircumscriptionem
Nonenimsphaera
ultima
passivam.
habetextrase corpus
ambiens
etcircumscribens.
localisnonesttamquam
ad
Ergomotus
terminm
formalem
etperse ad ubisivead circumscriptionem
passivam.
si motus
localisessetessentialiter
etperse ad ubi,quodestpassivacircumPraeterea,
variatis
diceretur
essemotum.
Sed
scriptio,
passivis
circumscriptionibus,
corpuslocaliter
hocestomnino
falsum.
enimcircanavemaqua et aere,nonestdubium
Variatis
quod
variatae
suntcircumscriptiones
etcontinentiae.
Nihilominus
navisinflumine
nonestmota.
Etsimiliter
aeremcircaturrem
vento
nullus
diceret
motasit
agitante,
aliquam
quodturris
de locosuo.Nihilominus
aercontinens
motusest,et perconsequens
turris
circumscriptionem
et ambiebatur
ab aere.Ergomotus
localisnonest
amisit,
qua circumscribebatur
inubiquodestpassiva
directe
circumscriptio.
si motus
localisessetperse etdirecte
ad ubi,tuneubeitates
etcircumscripPraeterea,
tiones
fluentes
dicerentur
motus
localismaterialiter,
etsubiectum
talisfluxus
dicepassivae
returlocaliter
moveri.
Sed manifeste
videmus
in turrecircaquamfluunt
oppositum
ubeitates
et circumscriptiones
dumventus
mutat
aeremcircaipsam.
continuae,
passivae
18:23:04 PM
130
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
131
All of the discussionso far has been in the contextof grace and the
latitudo
, i.e. book one, distinction17, of AurioFs Scriptum
, comformarum
is
Auriol
as
in
at
the
latest.
It
to
view
here
1316
pleted
tempting
leaning
towarda concept of local motion as change of positionacross a threedimensional,incorporealspace. Such a radicalbreakfromAristotlewould
have to be expressedmore explicitly,however,and indeed Auriol still
retainsmanyAristotelian
notionshere.Thus whilehe changesthe definition
of place fromthe passive inner surfaceof the containingbody, he preservesthe elementof surfacein the new definitionof place as the outer
surfaceof the mobile. Moreover,Auriol accepts a meaning of ubi and
which still echoes the Aristotelian
ubeitasas 'passive circumscription',
definition
of place.
When Auriol uses the term ubi,however,he oftenmakes a point of
"
" in
writingsomethinglike quod estpassiva circumscriptio
apposition. By
explicitly
definingthe termubiin each instance,Auriolimpliesthatthere
mightbe anotherway to look at ubi. That this is so is clear in a discussionof the categories,in distinction30 of the Scriptum
, where Auriol
from
the
further
ubi
cannot
be constrays
Philosopher.Stricdyspeaking,
nected to circumscription:
Ifonewereto imagine
a flatspace(magnitudinem)
anda manwalking
on it,while
other
there
is no doubtonewouldunderstand
the
bodyhasbeenannihilated,
every
mantochange
aforesaid
placeacrossthatspace,andyethewouldnotbe encircled.
Thesethings
ubi'
s nature
in thecategories.
It is something
first
said,onecaninfer
leftbehind
in thething
in a place(locato
) byplaceperse. 'Placeperse'
(derelictum)
is saidso thatpassive
is excluded.42
containing
Thus excludingthe old definitionof place, Auriol continuesby claiming
thatthisthingthatis "firstleftbehind" "is a fixedsituation(situs)or position (positio
), and if we allow ourselvesto coin a term,it is clear that
'somewhereness'(<alicubitas
), or being here or thereor somewhere,is left
.43
behind." Ubi stricdyspeakingis nothingbut alicubitas
42Auriol1596,d. 30, 1,a. 3 (681aD;Vb 327vb):
"Undesi quisimaginaretur
unam
q.
ethominem
incedentem
omnialiocorpore,
planam
magnitudinem,
superearn,adnihilato
nondubium
hominem
locummutare
quodintelligeret
praedictum
superipsammagniettarnen
nonambiretur.
Hispraemissis,
ratioubi.
tudinem,
colligi
potest
praedicamentalis
Estenimaliquidprimo
derelictum
in locatoa perse loco.Dicitur
autem'a perse loco'
utexcludatur
continentia
passiva."
43Auriol1596,loc.dt.(681aE-bA;
Vb 327vb):
Illudigitur
ab
quodprimo
derelinquitur
ultimo
sivepositio.
Et si liceret
corporis
tangentis,
quodestlocusperse,et situscertus
nomina
alicubitas
siveessehicvelibiautalieubi
. . . Sic
fingere,
patetquodderelinquitur
ratioubiin rectononestaliudquamalicubitas."
[681b]praedicamentalis
igitur
18:23:04 PM
132
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
133
TheDiscussion
ofPlace in theReportationes
At his deathin early1322 Auriolhad not completedpolishinghis Parisian
4
', based on lecturesgiven in 1316-1318. Thus perhaps five
Reportationes
and the writingof
yearselapsed betweenthe completionof the Scriptum
the presentversionof the ParisianReportationes
, duringwhich timeAuriol
became aware of further
implicationsof his opinion,and decided to make
a sharperbreak fromAristotle'sphysics.In distinction17 of the Scriptum
,
Auriol had said that exclusiveof everyubeitate
and passive circumscription,the heavensmove fromeast to west (cf. above, n. 36). A quotation
fromthe correspondingdistinction17 of Auriol's Parisian Reportatio
on
book one, a passage withoutparallel in the Scriptum
, seems to defendthe
need forabsoluteplace and forabsolute motion:
Ifa newpresentness
is theterminus
oflocalmotion,
itfollows
thattheEarthwould
movelocally.
The proof:
Whatcontinually
a newterminus
of
continually
acquires
moveslocally.
ButtheEarthcontinually
a newpremotion,
continually
acquires
sentness
to thepartsofthesky.Therefore,
etc.The confirmation:
It is impossible
fora formal
element
ofmotion
tobe posited
in a subject
andforthatsubject
not
tomove.Perhaps
itwillbe saidthattheEarthdoesnotmove,although
itacquires
a newpresentness,
becauseitdoesnotgetitviaitsownmotion
butfrom
thesky's
motion.
this:Therefore
is nothing
butflowing
Against
beingmovedin theheavens
topresentnesses.
Foriftheformal
ratio
ofmoving
wereflowing
according
according
topresentnesses,
inanything
where
sucha fluxwerefound,
motion
wouldbe found,
sinceofthosethings
thatarethesamething,
oneis notfound
without
theother.49
By treatingplace apart fromthe physicalmedium and presentness,it
seems thatAuriol is adheringto a notionof absolute place, therebynot
only solvingthe problemsconnectedto the intensionand remissionof
the relativity
of motioninherent
forms,but also the difficulties
surrounding
titatem
nonestaliudquamextensio.
Et hincestquodSimplicius
aitde capitulo
de quannondebetaccipisecundum
intellectum
utestspecies
titate,
quodpositio
quantitatis,
quod
necessarium
sitalicubi
seddicitur
sive'thesis'
Latine,
poniea quaesicponuntur,
'positio'
extensionem
Graece,a 'thein',
quodestcurrere
[682b]vel recedere,
quia ut aestimo
Cf.Simplicius
1975,187.17-20.
significat."
49Auriol, Id. 17,
Staatsbibliothek
Theol.Fol.536,f.
Rep.
pars2, q. 2 (Mss.Berlin,
Antoniana
292scaff.
48va;Padua,Biblioteca
xiii,f.74vb;Vatican
123,ff.84raBorghese
sitterminus
motus
continue
moveb): "Si novapraesentialitas
localis,
sequitur
quodterra
turlocaliter.
Probatio:
illudmovetur
continue
localiter
aliumet
quodcontinue
acquirit
aliumterminm
motus
localis.
Sedterra
continue
aliametaliampraesentialitatem
acquirit
ad partes
caeli.Ergo,etc.Et confirmo
estquodponatur
formali
tas
hoc,quiaimpossible
in subiecto
motus
etquodsubiectum
nonmoveatur.
Dicetur
forte
quodterranonmovenovam
illampermotum
suumsed
tur,licetacquirat
praesentialitatem,
quianonacquirit
ad motum
caeli.Contra:
moveri
in caeloestaliudquamfluere
secundum
igitur
praesentialitates.
Namsiformalis
ratio
moveri
esset
fluere
secundum
inquocumque
praesentialitates,
inveniretur
talisfluxus,
necessario
inveniretur
motus,
quia quae suntidem,unumnon
invenitur
sinealio."
18:23:04 PM
134
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
135
18:23:04 PM
136
CHRISSCHABEL
in thisway place is none otherthan situationitselfand position"[149.22whetherwe use the term'respect'or not,locadmotion
35]. Nevertheless,
occurs while 'everyabsolute' staysthe same.
Above I alluded to Auriol's tendencyto reason by processof elimination to an answerthat,while simpleand unified,is oftenvague and negative, as in the case of the latitudeof forms.When possible,however,
Auriol settleson a theorythat is both simple and unified,on the one
hand, and also precise and positive.One sees thisin Auriol's notionof
accountsfor
esseapparens
that,when applied to vision and epistemology,
both 'normal' visual phenomena and 'anomalies'.54Auriol does the same
with place: A theoryof place must not only account for 'normal' circumstances,but also for'anomalies',such as a towerin the wind,a boat
anchoredon a river,the ultimatesphereof the heavens,or even glorified
bodies, all of which have no stable, passive container.Equating place
withpositionin the universedoes just that,forAuriol.But how does one
establishpositionin theuniverse?
which are objectionsto
At this point Auriol gives eight 'difficulties',
Auriol's equating place with position [151.2-20]. These objectionsare
as "the motiongroundedin Aristotle'sdefinitionof place in the Physics
less inneredge of the containingbody," his categorizationof place in the
of place as
, and several other related traditionalcharacteristics
Categories
to
we
can
Auriol's
reconciliation
Here,
finally,
expect
opposed
position.
in Aristotle'sopera
of the apparentlycontradictory
statements
, and Auriol's
explanationof positionin the universe.
thisis exactlywhere the Rome editionand most manuDisturbingly,
one mustknow. . ." and
scriptsstop,adding "because of thesedifficulties
"whether
the
to
the
next
question,
angelswere createdin the
proceeding
Empyreanheaven." The way Auriol appears to finishin the Rome edition leads one to believe eitherthat he will resolvethe eightdifficulties
in the next question,which he does not, or thatAuriolis placingin serious doubt his own opening conclusions,which is odd and would thereforeplace even PierreDuhem's analysisin doubt.In fact,however,Auriol
in his determination
of the article,in a large
does resolvethe difficulties
sectioncontainedin a minorityof the witnesses.
and completesthe picture
Auriol's determinationis most interesting,
in
of
He draws a dis30
the
he had begun to paint distinction
Scriptum.
tinctionbetweendifferent
ways of understanding
'place', and in doing so
54On esseapparens
, seee.g.Tachau1988,esp.89-104.
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
137
18:23:04 PM
138
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
139
TheReception
Conclusion:
ofAurioVs
PhysicalTheories
In the contextof the latitudeof forms,AurioPs solutionis both indicativeof the lack of consensuson the issue and, perhaps,of the ultimately
unfruitful
way of approachingthe matterthroughgrace. Auriolwas decisive but also vague and ultimatelyconservativewith the intensionand
remissionof forms,whereiconoclasm,perhapsin the greateruse of mathematical analysis,for example, mighthave been more productive.Still,
his opiniondid not go unnoticed:Soon afterAurioPslecturesthe Oxford
FranciscanWilliamof Ockham aimed his defenseof the classicFranciscan
which Ockham quotes
additiontheorysquarelyat AurioPsmodification,
In Paris, however,Francis of Meyronneswas mindful
at great length.58
of AurioPscriticismof the classic theoryof his order and adopted some
of his intent,althoughhe rejectedAurioPsterminology.59
AurioPsopinion on the issue of
Even on a conservativeinterpretation,
place is a departurefromAristotle.Looked at more boldly,and fromthe
point of view of historiansof the ScientificRevolution,one mightsay
thatAurioPstheoryof place and his worriesabout definingabsolutemotionare smallstepson the way to a Newtonianworldview.AurioPsclearest statements,
however,among the last thingshe wrote,are buried in a
and whereit does existit is
sectionthatis absentfrommostmanuscripts,
oftenin lateradditions.This suggeststhathis opiniondid not have much
directinfluence.For example, writingjust afterAuriol, the Carmelite
John Baconthorpe,who aims his entirediscussionof place at refuting
Auriol,goes so faras to quote AurioPsargumentsforhis firsttwo propositions[143.15-144.24; 144.29-145.3] verbatim,but shows no knowledge
of AurioPsdetermination.60
Thus, althoughDuhem claims thatJoannes
Canonicus and, at least indirectly,Ockham and Francis of Marchia
opposed elementsof AurioPsdoctrine,while Burleymay have borrowed
fromit, thisdoes not mean theyhad AurioPscompletetext.61
Still,Ockham's theory,while not as radical as AurioPs,appears to be
closerto AurioPsthan is any of his scholasticpredecessors'or immediate
58Gf.Ockham1977,519-45(d. 17,q. 7),andalsoDuhem1956,511-2.
59Gf.Francis
ofMeyronnes
Sent.
I, d. 18,q. 2, a. 4 (f.78ra),andalsoMaier
1505-07,
toAuriol
on thispoint.
1968,56,whogoeson to mention
Baconthorpe's
opposition
60Cf.Baconthorpe
1618,II Sent
., d. 3, q. 2, a. 1 ("Quidsitlocus?"pp. 484a-487b),
Auriol
on p. 484aB-bA.
quotine:
61Gf.Duhem1985,198-201,
wasprobably
and224-5.Marchia's
210-1,
opinion
expressed
as Duhemheld.
before
andnotvice-versa
Ockham's,
18:23:04 PM
140
CHRISSCHABEL
successors'.62
It is not surprisingthatDuhem did not notice this,because
he did not have access to the missingtext.But Nicholas Bonet, writing
about a decade afterAuriol,did have it. Duhem describesBones theory of place in some depth,concludingthat "the real initiatorof his theorywas someonewho immediatelyprecededhim,Williamof Ockham."63
In fact,however,Bones conclusion,which Duhem quotes in full,reads
likea paraphraseof Auriol's'missing'determination.
AlthoughBonet does
not accept the equation of the termspositionand place, he does follow
Auriol'smeaning.64
It is interesting
thatBonet employs'mathematical'in
of
There
are
two ways of takingplace, one physplace
'metaphysical':65
ical by the physicist,
one mathematicalby the mathematician;the physicistconsidersthe natureof the container,ratherthanplace itself,whereas
the mathematiciantreatsthe surfaceindependendyfromall physicalbodies; place for the mathematicianis absolutelyimmobile,althoughit is
mobile for the physicist,and so on.66Finally,Duhem quotes what he
thinksis Bones main point as given in his own Metaphysics
:
62Ockham's
is described
at length
in Duhem1985,207-20,andGrant1981,
theory
67-72.
63Duhem'streatment
ofBonetis in Duhem1985,229-37,
andthequotation
is from
thatBonetdoesnotmention
at thetimeOckham's
237.Duhemassumes
Ockham
because
namewas"theopposite
ofan authority"
(Duhem1985,237).
64Duhemdoesnotrecognize
ofsitus
andlocus
is thelastof
it,butAuriol's
equation
fiveopinions
on theimmobility
ofplaceagainst
whichBonetargues.Cf.Bonet1503,
Naturalis
VIII,c. 4 (f.74vb).
philosophic
65This
intheeditions
orinBonesreading
ofan Auriol
maybe an error
manuscript,
' areoften
becausetheabbreviations
for'mathematicus'
and'methaphisicus
thesame
however,
andfrequently
confused.
66It should
be notedthatBonetmaynothavehadthe'complete'
sincethefirst
text,
A survive
inonlyonewitness.
from
thefollowing
22 linesofAppendix
Compare
passage,
A [152.15-154.20]:
Bonet's
Naturalis
VIII,c. 4 (Bonet
1503,f.75ra)with
phibsophia
Appendix
de locoestduplexspeculatio,
et alia naturalis,
unamathematica
consideratio
"Quoniam
autemde locomathematica
fuitapudAristotelem
cumdiffinit
locumdicensquodest
continentis
immobile.
Consideratio
autemde loconaturali
siclocum
superficies
corporis
enimutnatNaturalis
diffinit
continentis
immobile
primm.
quodestsuperficies
corporis
uralis
estnonconsidrt
rationem
vasis.Omnisautem
locusqui
loci,sedrationem
proprie
habetrationem
vasismobilis
est.Debesigitur
conadvertere
diligenter
quodmathematica
de locoestconsideratio
sideratio
continentis
corporis
primum
absquehocquod
superficiei
naturale
cuiusestillasuperficies.
Undemathematicus
considat
consideretur
corpus
superficiem
in quo corpore
sivesit
aerisambientem
et continentem
noncurando
existt,
immediate,
aervelaliquidaliud,sedprecise
considrt
illamsuperficiem.
Et utsitabsoluta
ab omni
naturali
immobilis
est,quia omniamathematicabilia
(?) suntimmobilia,
quia
corpore
abstrahunt
a motuet a materia
Nec in taliabstractione
estmendacium,
sensibili.
quia
est
considrant
hecpreter
considrt
nonhecsinehis.Ideolocusutde eo mathematicus
mobilis
omnino
immobilis
. . . Secundum
autemconsiderationem
naturalem
est,ettantum
utscilicet
estincorhabetrationem
locinaturalis
vasis,
quia<est>consideratio
superficies
istoet ilio,et illasuperficies
estbenemobilis
et subiective
etobiective
..
porenaturali
Notethatthepassagemaybe corrupt.
18:23:04 PM
141
in conceptual
Letus first
existence
speakoftheseparation
practiced
(esse
)...
cognito
theintellect
canabstract
a particular
from
formagnitude
can
anysubject,
magnitude
inwhich
itinheres
takeconceptual
existence
without
thesubject
alsotoexist
having
is nothing
thustoabstract
otherthantoconsider
thiswithout
considconceptually;
that.He whoaccomplishes
is notlying.
suchan abstraction
Suchan abstracering
a magnitude
fromanysubject
tionthatseparates
and sensible
matter
is properly
in fact,consider
of bodieswithout
themagnitudes
mathematical;
mathematicians,
toknowin whatwaythesemagnitudes
exist.67
having
Even thispassage,especially
withitsessecognition,
seemsto be an extrapolation
fromAuriol.68If Duhem is rightthat Bonet's positioncould, or would,
otherwisehave been inspiredby Ockham, then perhaps Auriol exerted
some influenceon the Venerable Inceptor'sopinion.69Moreover,Bonet's
wordsin the quoted paragraphare almostwithoutdoubt the inspiration
forFranciscusToletus (1532-1593),whose opinionEdward Grant uses to
illustrate
the Renaissancetrendwithinthe Aristotelian
traditionto undermine the Philosopher'sconcept of place and space.70How Auriol's theory influencedthe course of physicsthen is an interesting
question.
But the presentanalysisis merelya briefand somewhatsuperficial
introductionto some of Auriol's physicaltheories.It is clear, however,
that discussionsof a 'purely' philosophicalor scientificnature can be
foundin theologicalwritings.
Ironically,Auriol'smove away fromAristotle
on the issue of place and space is more purelyphilosophicalthan many
slightlylater departuresin non-theologicalcontexts,which may demonstratethe influenceof the condemnationsof 1277 or at least of the debate
over God's power.71It is also clear, however,that for Auriol the interplay betweentheologyand philosophyis constant,or ratherthereis no
67Duhem1985,236.I havetodisagree,
withDuhem's
claimthatspacewhich
however,
hasessecognitum
exists
within
theintellect.
merely
only
68AtthetimeBonetwas
Auriol's
mostsympathetic
ofanysignificance
reader
perhaps
inthecontext
offuture
so there
(cf.Schabel1994,245-56),
contingents
maybe a general
here.
influence
69It is
thatAlgra1995,230,callsOckham's
"theonlyreally
satisinteresting
position
solution
to theproblem
at issuehere."
factory
[Aristotelian]
70On Toletus,
seeGrant1976,155-9,esp.157,where,
Grantdoesnotgive
although
theLatin,theposition
described
is a paraphrase
ofBonet.I quotefrom
another
edition,
Toletus
modoincommuni
ab hocveliliospaciosin1615,f.122ra:"Altero
abstrahendo,
incommuni
inquo modosuntcorpora;
totius
mundi
abstragulorum
corporum,
spacium
ab hoc vel iliocorpore,
et haecconsiderado
nonestficta,
sed vera.
hendo,inquam,
abstrahentium
nonestmendacium
... etitaconsideramus
hocspacium
abstracSiquidem
tumin communi,
nonhabitorespectu
ad subiecta
sicutmathematicus
consingularia,
in abstracto
sidrt
. . ." Toletusalso knewand refuted
Auriol'sopinion
quantitatem
he assigned
it to certain
moderni.
Cf.Toletus1615,ff.
, although
equating
placewithubi
118ra-band 118vb-119ra.
71On thisissueseee.g.Grant1976andMurdoch
1998.
18:23:04 PM
142
CHRISSCHABEL
72Auriol
inbookIV,
bodiesina veryinteresting
treats
theplaceofglorified
discussion
d. 48,parsprima,
Auriol
oftheRomeedition,
qq. 1-3(q. unica,aa. 1-3,in224bD-228aF
is in explicit
withwhatAuriol
1605).Thistreatment
saysin bookII (cf.q. 1,
agreement
butI cannotdetermine
ifthisis Auriol's
ultimate
Thanks
226aA-B),
pointofdeparture.
to LaugeNielsen
forpointing
to thispossibility.
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
143
APPENDIX A
<Petri Aureoli>
<Reportatio
in 2umlibrum Sententiarum>
<Primaconclusio>
18:23:04 PM
144
10
15
20
25
CHRISSCHABEL
non habet
Secundam conclusionemprobo, tum quia corpus glorificatum
30 continens,et tarnenest in loco.
Secundo, quia caelum est in loco per hoc quod habet determinatam
positionem.
.
manebit
1 remanebit]
PbPjVi 5 ad*]aliudFbPb 7 quod2]om.PbPcVi;si Pj; velexp
14
idem
inv.
13
irw.
8
infra
ad
add.
sunt
Pi;
est]
omnino]
PcPjVi;
iuxta]
Pj
Pj
PjVg
17alius]estadd.NPbX 18et1]om.FcPgPjViX
idemFb 15et2]om.DFcNPbPgPiPjVi
rendetur
etexp.PgPjVi 25 respondetur]
23 locari]etadd.FbFcPbPi;
Pj 26 ut]om.FcN;
inv.FcPgVg31 hoc]om.
i.m.Pg;etPj 26 respondetur]
rendetur
"intra"]
Pj 26 "extra"
FcNPgVg
18:23:04 PM
145
Tertioprincipaliter
salvo quae dicunturde loco. Diciturenim de loco quod
est quantitascontinuaet distinctaspecies quantitatiscontinuae.Ista volo
declarare,et ut melius videaturpropositum,primo insto et secundo ex
solutioneinstantiarum
propositumostendo.
10
<Instantiae>
18:23:04 PM
146
CHRISSCHABEL
<Responsionesaliorumad instantias>
10
15
20
25
30
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
147
18:23:04 PM
10
15
20
25
30
35
148
CHRISSCHABEL
alteram
fiatin termino.Ad hoc igiturquod virganon sit in aqua, sufficit
duorum,vel quod virga sit mota, vel quod aqua sit mota.
Haec sunt quae communiterdicunturab aliis.
<PrimapropositioAureoli contra responsionesaliorum>
5
10
15
20
25
30
N
om.perhomoeo.
8 Primum]
N 11-13formaliter
. . . quantitatis
primo
FcPgViX;
primam
Pgac;
12 igitur
om.
. . . locabilitatis]
locatiFcPcVgViX,
(N) 17 locari]
perhomoeo.
FcPgVgX
verbi
lociPgpcs.l.;locusY]ac 21 'ubi'igitur]
Metaphysice
gratia
NPcVgX 25 Physicorum]
FcVgX
11 Gf.Aristoteles,
VII, c. 12: 1037bl7-1038a9
(AL XXV 3.2,pp. 156-157,
Metaphyskae
11.661-685).
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
149
18:23:04 PM
150
CHRISSCHABEL
3 ut. . . distincta]
add.
om.DFcNViVgX4 lineae]ad partes
situsadd.D; ad suumsitum
Fe 5 suumPjac'situm
add.i.m.Pb;sivead situm
add.
add.N; situm
DPgVg,Pj'pc'situm
. . . situs]
X 6 habet]
add.Vi;suisitus
habent
Pi;totum
FcNPgX 6 partem
partem
partes
+ ? Pc; situm
suisitus
situsD; suampartem
add.i.m.supra
Pj (pc)'ad situm
Pj; partem
X 12 Quare]om.FbPi 16 etc]et ibiD; etctamen
Fc; et tamen
PbViX;etcettamen
? Pj 19vas]om.FcNVgX
Vg;et conclusio
13 Cf.Aristoteles,
Praedicamenta
, c. 6: 4b20-5a24
(ALI 3, pp.92,1.30-94,1.3).
18:23:04 PM
151
<Articulus
quartus)
<Difficultates
octo>
Sed hic sunt aliquae difficultates.
definiendolocum,4 Physicorum
<dl> Primaest quia Aristoteles,
, dicitquod
locus est ultimumcontinentisimmobile primum,nullam faciens mentionemde situ et positione.Non igiturlocus est essentialiter
positio, vel
Aristoteles
fuitinsufficiens.
dicit quod locus est quan<d2>Item secundo,Aristotelesin Praedicamentis
titashabens positionem;non igiturest positio.
<d3>Tertio,quia tunevideturquod sintduo genera distinctaloci, scilicet
locus vas et locus positio.
<d4>Quarto, quia positio est ordo partium;ordo est relatio;igiturpositio est relatio;igiturlocus est relatio.
<d5> Quinto, quia tunc una species quantitatisesset subiectumalterius,
quia linea subiectumpositionis.
<d6>Sexto,quia quantitascontinuanon est nisi quaedam partibilitas;sed
positionon videtur esse huiusmodi.
<d7> Septimo,quia tunc videturquod locus sit de genere 'ubi'. Positio
enim qua virga dicitursic posita non videturaliud quam quoddam ubi.
<d8>Octavo, quia de rationeloci est continere.
10
15
20
<SolutionesAureoli ad difficultates>
sciendumest quod ratio loci aliteraccipitursePropteristas difficultates
cundumconsiderationem
alitersecundumconsiderationem
metaphysicam,
enim
dfinit
physicam.Physicus
per materiam,non quidem per materiam
est
altera
quae
pars
compositi,quia hoc modo metaphysicusdfinitper 25
materiam,sed debet hic accipi 'materia*pro omni eo quod est extra
rationemquidditatis.Secundum hoc igiturdiflfert
consideratiometaphysial a consideratione
tantummodo
physici,quia metaphysicus
accipitillud
intrinsece
ad
sed
materialia
et
quod
pertinet quidditatem, physicusaccipit
18:23:04 PM
152
CHRISSCHABEL
18:23:04 PM
153
1vel]siveDPbPgPj1 etiam]
veroDPbPgPj5 Commentator]
magister
DPbPgPj5 dicens]
om.D; dicitPbPgPj 5 quod]quiaPj 8 aliquid]aliquodPbPg;ad Pj 9 dico]dicendum
ubialioPg;nulloalioPj 9 nec]utPj 10 dicit]estD; utPb; sitPg
DPj 9 ubeatio]
10respectum]
D; verum
respectus
PbPg 14quia]quodFc 14qualitas]
quantitas
DPbPg,
Fc 17 a] aliquoPgPj 19 accipit]
iter.
attendit
Y)aci.m.216 concedo]
DPbPg;accedit
etadd.Pj 19vel2]nonPg;ideo
Pj 19vel1]om.PgPj 19vulgares]
vulgariter
DPbPgPj;
om.DPbPgPj 21 et]necDPbPgPj 26
Pj 19 quia]quodPbPg 20 sexprincipiorum]
inu.DPb 29 loco]locisPj
respondeo]
quodadd.Pj 27-28localem
naturalem]
5 Averros,
InAristotel
comm.16 (ed.cit.,p. 161,
V, c. 11 (dequantitate),
Metaphysicam
1. 93). 16Cf.Liber
deSexPrincipiis
Gilberto
Porretae
etD. VanDen
, ed.A. Heysse
Ascriptus
1953,p. 20,11.15-16).
Eynde(Mnster
18:23:04 PM
154
CHRISSCHABEL
rationecontinentis,
continentiautem rationespecialiumqualitatumphysicarum. Et idcircototumhoc cadit in aspectuphysici.Circumscribeenim
omnem qualitatema corpore continente,non amplius erit locus secundum physicamconsiderationem.
5
Et si inferas:igiturultimasphaera eritin loco, cuius tarnenoppositum
4 Physicorum
sentiuntomnes physiciet commentatores
, respondeo:verum
est quod non est in loco physicequo ad rationemcontinentiae;tamen
est utique in loco realiteret formaliter.
Quod patet per Commentatorem
contra Avicennam,qui dicit quod ultima sphaera est susceptivamotus
10 localis et situs.Unde ex hoc potestconfirmari
propositum,quia illud est
locus quod est terminusmotuslocalis; sed positio,passio quantitatis,quae
idem est quod ubi, est terminusmotuslocalis; quare etc.
factamper "ubi" respondeConfirmoetiam quia ad interrogationem
tur de loco; quare etc.
Et si arguasquod ubi est locado passiva,locus autemvideturdicereloca15
illud quo corpus dicitur
tionemactivam,respondeo:locus est formaliter
locari, sicut albedo est qua corpus dicituralbum. Sicut igiturimproprie
sic improprie
diciturdealbatio activa nisi ut se tenetex parte efficientis,
tantum.
et metaphoricelocus diciturlocare active.Locat enim formaliter
20 Locatum vero locatur active non a loco, sed a movente.
sensibilium
1 specialium
inv.D; qualitatum
Pg
spiritualium
PbPj;quantitatum
qualitatum]
tenent
2 totum
philosophi
DPg; habentPb 6 physici]
hoc]inv.DPbPgPj 6 sentiunt]
. . . est]quod D 10
commentator
DPbPgPj 10propositum
DPbPg 6 commentatores]
quia]quodPbPgPj(D) 10 illudest]idemPbPg(Pj n.p.l.)11 quod]quiDPb 11pasPj 11 quae]om.Pg; autD; autemPbPj
sio]passivaPgPj
pc 11 quantitatis]
quantitas
Pb 13
eritDPgPj;confirmo
12 ubiest]om.DPbPgPj 13 Confirmo
etiam]confirmatio
rendetur
add.Pj 13-14respondetur]
communen
Pj 15 dicere]habere
interrogationem]
om.
PbPgPj 17qua]om.Pb;s.l.Pj; quoPg 17dicitur]
DPbPgPj 16est]om.D; dicitur
autemDPbPgPj18 se] s.l.Pj; om.PbPg
Pb; estPgPj 17 Sicut]sicPbPgPj 17 igitur]
om.D; metaphorice
et nonalbedinis
add.D 19 et metaphorice]
18 efficientis]
PbPgPj
tamen
inv.PbPgPj 19Locat]locatum
19locareactive]
DPgPj;cumPb
Pj 19 tantum]
nuncadd.PbPgPj
20 vero]om.DPbPgPj 20 locatur]
8 Cf.Averros,
InAristotelu
IV, c. 9, comm.45 (ed.cit.,ff.144E-I).
Physicam
18:23:04 PM
155
Tradition
forAurioVs
Manuscript
Reportado II, d. 2, pars 3, q. 1
Sigla:
D
B 159 (26vb-28va)
Dsseldorf,Universittsbibliothek,
Fb Firenze,Bibliotecanaz. centrale,conv. soppr. A.3.120 (18vb-19vb)
Fe Firenze, Biblioteca naz. centrale, conv. soppr. B.6.121 (lrb-2rb,
2va-b [no foliation])
N Napoli, Bibliotecanazionale, VII C 3 (121ra-121vb)
Pb Paris, Bibliothquenationale,Latin 3066 (19va-21ra)
Pc Paris, Bibliothquenationale,Latin 15867 (21vb-23ra)
Pg Padova, BibliotecaAntoniana 161 scaff.ix (16vb-17vb; 11Orb)
Pi Padova, BibliotecaUniversitaria1580 (200rb-202ra)
Pj Pelplin,BibliotkaSeminariumduchownego46/85 (130va-131vb)
Vg Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolicaBorghese404 (14rb-15va)
Vi Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolicaVat. lat. 942 (14vb-15vb)
X Roma printededitionof 1605 (49a-52a)
VariantsChart forfirstthree-fourths
of the question [143.4-151.22]:
Mss.
D
Fb
Fc
N
Pb
Pc
Pg
Pi
Pj
Vg
Vi
X
Shared Variants
SingularVariants
Om.>Wds. I | Others Om.>Wds. | | Others
Total Variants
Om.>Wds. | | Others
17 > 43
2 > 2
14 > 41
10 > 29
19 > 63
14 > 16
0 > 0
7 > 22
2 > 3
11 > 40
14 > 14
13 > 19
24 > 56
5>6
30 > 66
23 > 51
25 > 69
21 > 24
10 > 20
11 > 26
4 > 5
26 > 74
25 > 34
26 > 45
27
0
28
51
65
33
22
28
13
41
52
79
7 > 13
3 > 4
16 > 25
13 > 22
6 > 6
7 > 8
10 > 20
4 > 4
2 > 2
15 > 34
11 > 20
13 > 26
11
5
25
18
17
19
19
10
6
30
15
23
38
5
53
69
82
52
41
38
19
71
67
102
18:23:04 PM
CHRISSCHABEL
156
SingularVariants
Om.>Wds. I IOthers
13 > 23
21
1>1
2
>
8
6
28
4 > 11
20
0 > 0
20
Shared Variants
Om.>Wds. | | Others
8 > 10
22
0
0>0
>
31
13
10
11 > 14
38
33
10 > 13
Total Variants
Om.>Wds. || Others
43
21 > 33
1>1
2
39
16 > 41
>
58
15 25
10 > 13
53
73Unfortunately,
ofall.
themicrofilm
forFb is theworst
18:23:04 PM
157
18:23:04 PM
158
CHRISSCHABEL
APPENDIX
Tradition
Manuscript
forAuriol'sScriptumI, d. 17, q. 2, aa. 1-2
Sigla are as in Schabel 1995, 85-6, with the followingadditions:
Sa Sarnano, Bibliotecacomunale,E. 101
Va Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolica,Borghese318
Ve Vaticano, BibliotecaApostolica,Ottob. lat. 995
SingularVariants Shared Variants Total Variants
Mss./Foliation Om>Wds/Others Om>Wds/Others Om>Wds/Others
15 > 44 62
16
13 > 28 46
A (143va-145vb) 2 > 16
>
>
1
14
15 > 50 51
14
49
37
1
Bo (139rb-141ra)
>
>
17 > 23 75
Br (197ra-200rb) 11 15 5
6
8
22
9 > 50
28
28 > 152 88
Fa (143vb-145vb) 19 > 102 60
Pa (116vb-l18rb) 18 > 32 48
8 > 10 24
26 > 42 72
>
>
17
41
18
9
Pe (135vb-138ra) 12
32
21 > 73 35
>
>
41 > 85 223
Sa (189ra-191va) 3
3
52
38 82 171
7
0>0
27
Tr (21lvb-214va) 1>2
20
1>2
10 > 46 28
Va (119va-121ra) 16 > 21 40
26 > 67 68
7 > 18
14
Vb (218vb-221va) 5 > 5
8
12 > 23 22
>
>
31 24
5
13
16
12 > 44 40
Vc (221v-224r) 7
6 > 10 27
Vd (130vb-132va) 14 > 45 34
20 > 55 61
8 > 28
29
22 > 72 79
Ve (113ra-l14va) 14 > 44 50
17
6 > 23
Vn (122vb-124va) 6 > 11
21
12 > 34 38
>
>
14 78
37 81 179
43 > 95 257
X (434b-441a)
6
1
ASaVbX
0>0
2 > 13 8
2 > 13 7
10 > 14 25
10 > 14 20
0 > 0
5
ASaX
> 54 113
>
>
4
4
SaX
50
101
12
25
21
No clear stemmaemerges.Minor shared variantsas a whole show that
BrFaPaPeVaVcVdVeVn in generalare opposed to ABoSaTrVbX. In the
formergroup, FaPeVaVeVn share all or most of an omissionof a 24word rubric,where PaVcVd have the text,but this divisionis not reinforcedby othercommonvariants.Withinthe lattergroup,ABoSaTrVbX,
are the only obvious familiesof witnesses:ASaVbX sometimesread vs.
BoTr and the rest,ASaX share furthervariants,and finallySaX still
and illud/istud).Despite Sa's manyminorvarimore (even on igitur/ergo
in thissectionit was the main exemplarfor
it
is
that
ants,
verypossible
the Rome edition(X). The fact that Rome's editor,Costanzo Sarnano,
was Bishop of Sarnano, makes this scenario even more likely.Ignoring
18:23:04 PM
PLAGE,
SPACE,ANDTHE PHYSICSOF GRACE
159
18:23:04 PM
160
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Foundations
Knowingnaturaliter:AurioVsPropositional
CHARLES BOLYARD1
1 A draft
of
version
of thispaperwaspresented
at the10thInternational
Congress
inErfurt,
alsogoouttoPaulVincent
Medieval
(1997).Specialthanks
Germany
Philosophy
bothhelpful
andbotherwhograciously
Friedman,
SpadeandRussell
provided
suggestions
all translations
Unlessotherwise
aremyown.
someobjections.
indicated,
2 Themainstudy
ofthistopicis R. Schmcker,
, und
Propositio
perse nota:Gottesbeweis
thesingle
ihrVerhltnis
Aureoli
1941.Thoughundoubtedly
nachPetrus
, Werlin Westfalen
knownthrough
mostimportant
workon Auriol'snotionof propositions
themselves,
thana philosopher.
AddiSchmiicker's
is thatofan intellectual
historian
rather
approach
diswithpropositions
insofar
as theyinform
concerned
he is mainly
tionally,
persenotae
is theconverse.
cussions
ofGod'sexistence,
whilemyconcern
3 PeterAuriol,
Primum
St.
d. 2, q. 10,edited
Sententiarum,
Scriptum
super
byE. Buytaert,
Dei esse
NY 1956,vol.II, 524,22-3:". . . ideoinquirendum
est:Utrum
Bonaventure,
velsitaliquidperse notum."
egeattestimonio,
Vivarium
, 38,1
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2000
18:23:55 PM
KNOWING
NATURAUTER
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
163
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164
CHARLES
BOLYARD
Thus,
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KNOWING
NATURALITER
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CHARLES
BOLYARD
18:23:55 PM
167
KNOWING
NATURAUTER
18:23:55 PM
168
CHARLES
BOLYARD
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TURALITER
KNOWING
NA
169
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170
CHARLES
BOLYARD
whatAuriol(following
in thisway are knownthroughthemselves:
Aristotle)
are notperse known.These typesof sudcalls suppositionsor definitions
den propositionsare posited or assumed to be true,and thus need not
reallybe true. To use AurioPsfavoriteexample, the proposition'an ass
having wings is able to fly'is not known throughitselfsince it is not
true.For Auriol,as forAristotle,universalpropositionsare takento have
existential
import.Thus sincethereare no asseswithwings,theproposition
are not knownthroughthemselves.35
is false.Similarly,obscuredefinitions
in
this
the
distinction
way, he comes to his second charBy explaining
acterizationof propositionsperse known,whichis meant to separatethe
'improper' sudden propositions,mentionedin the previous paragraph,
fromtrue ones. For Auriol,trueperse notaepropositionsdo not require
a teacher.36In otherwords,such propositionscan be knownby an individual, withoutany (at least non-divine)assistancefromother sentient
beings. Even though some per se known propositionsmightbe taught,
theydon't require such teachingin principle.Robinson Crusoe, on his
philosophicallywell-traveledisland,would be just as capable of grasping
As Auriol
these truthsas would a studentin the finestof universities.
in
a
natural
arise
naturaliter
these
,
way.37
propositions
puts it,
Given thistwofoldcharacterization
temporalsuddennessand the nonrequirementof a teacher it becomes a bit clearerwhy Auriol includes
propositions(1) through(4) above among the perse knownpropositions.
Some of them are what we would be more comfortabledescribingas
a prionpropositions
e.g., (1) thatnothingboth existsand does not exist.
35Auriol,
17-21:
d. 2, q. 10,ed.Buytaert
above,n. 3),vol.II, 561-562,
(op.t.,
Scriptum
is
'an ass having
"Fortheproposition
wingscan fly'is nottrue,andyetthepredicate
a
in 'thatthanwhich
Andsimilarly,
in thesubject.
included
'being'is included
although
in its
is evident
itis notbecauseofthisthatthisproposition
be thought',
cannot
greater
et
veraest'asinushabensalaspotest
. . ("Nonenimhaecpropositio
owntruth
volare',
in eo
'esse'includatur
in subiecto;
et consimiliter,
includitur
tarnen
quamvis
praedicatum
insuaverestevidens
nonpropter
hochaecpropositio
nonpotest',
'quomaiusexcogitari
itate. . .").
36Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,ed. Buytaert
above,n. 3),vol.II, 558,12-3: . .
{pp.cit.,
Scriptum
a teacher."
itself
. . . doesnotrequire
known
a proposition
(".. . propositio
perse
through
nota. . . nonindiget
instructore.").
37Auriol,
d. 2, q. 10,cd.Buytaert
above,n. 3),vol.II, 558,42-3: . .
{op.t.,
Scriptum
illaesunt
manifest
andnaturally
themselves
arepropositions
known
these
through
. . .") Cf.Alhazen,
manifestae
II.3,paragr.
Optics
propositiones
perse notaeet naturaliter
natsoulmustmakeinferences
above,n. 23),137:"... thehuman
39,ed. Sabra[op.t.,
andevident
allsensible
inferences
andinmostcasesperceives
makes
anditalways
urally;
noris oneawareat
ordeliberation,
without
effort
thatareperceptible
byinference
things
ofan inference."
thatone'sperception
is theresult
suchthings
thetimeofperceiving
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KNOWING
NATURAUTER
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172
CHARLES
BOLYARD
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173
KNOWING
NATURAUTER
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174
CHARLES
BOLYARD
18:23:55 PM
175
KNOWING
NATURAUTER
45Fora fuller
ofintuitive
discussion
andabstractive
1 ofmysoon
seechapter
cognition,
tobe completed
dissertation,
, and.
Knowledge,
Certainty
Propositions
perse notae:a Study
ofPeter
Auriol
a fewinterpretive
refinements
I suggest,
(Indiana
University,
Beyond
Bloomington).
Tachau1988(op.dt
introduction
to thisissuewithrespect
., above,n. 24) is an excellent
toAuriol's
thought.
18:23:55 PM
176
CHARLES
BOLYARD
Conclusion
We have now come to the point at which our originalquestionmay be
answered:What place do perse knownpropositionshold in Auriol'sworldview? We should firstbrieflyrecountwhat theyare not. First,theyare
not simplyhis broadest characterizationof true propositions.We must
workto gain some knowledge,and propositionsreached in thisactiveway
fail to meet the criterionof suddenness.Second, they are not simply
unmediated,firsttruths.As we have seen, imperceptibleinferencescan
take place, and these can have all the psychologicalforceof unproved
and perhaps unprovable
propositions.Such propositionsare not necessarilyfoundationalin an epistemicsense, even if theyare psychologically
foundational.
Instead,AurioPsperse knownpropositionsare best describedas 'core'
similarin many respectsto what contemporary
philosophers
propositions,
in Auriol's
Such propositions,
of science such as Lakatos have discussed.46
in
but
our
an
role
inferences,
view,certainlyplay
theyare not
important
unmediated.
not
be
and
need
the
first
they
always
propositionsknown,
And, as with Lakatos, the core has some degree of fluidity:
propositions
can enter and exit the core. They enter if, throughexperience,they
become sudden.And theycan exit the core if the knowerfailsto remember them. Despite such similarities,
however,Auriol does not share the
beliefof some contemporary
philosophersthat truthis a relativenotion.
For him, everypropositionknownthroughitselfis true simpliciter.
Auriol'stheoryof propositionsperse notaestandsalone not only forits
ties to innovationsin Islamic optics,but even more forits willingacceptnatureof much of our psychologicalexpeance of the hidden,inferential
rience. Rather than using this realizationto undercutour pretensionsto
as later philosopherssuch as Hume have been inclinedto do,
certainty,
Auriol
he insteadturnsthe argumentto everyone'sadvantage.If anything,
confirms
insists,the existenceof such involuntary,
syllogisms
imperceptible
rationalstructureof our naturalinstinctsforknowing.
the inherently
Bloomington
IndianaUniversity
46See I. Lakatos,
Research
andtheMethodology
, in:Imre
ofScientific
Programmes
Falsification
andtheGrowth
andAlanMusgrave
Lakatos
1970,
, Cambridge
ofKnowledge
(eds.),Criticism
91-196.
18:23:55 PM
PeterAuriolon Intellectual
of Singulars
Cognition
RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN*
Vivarium
, 38,1
18:24:05 PM
178
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
Here I will examine the way in whichAuriol deals withhuman intellectual cognitionof singulars,both his analysisof the problemsassociated
with the issue and his solutionsto those problems.It will emerge that,
forAuriol,human beingsformconceptsof singularsonly in cooperation
with the imaginationand its product,the phantasm.The phantasmis a
necessarycomponentin the intellectualcognitionof singulars,because the
of the
imagination"designates",i.e. marksor brands,the representation
singularin the phantasmwitha featurewithoutwhichthe intellectcould
not forma concept of the singularas singular.Thus, forAuriol,human
beings have an abstractintellectualcognitionof singulars.
in AurioVsThought
of theProblem
Origins
Auriol'sparticularcontributionto the debate on intellectualcognitionof
singularshas its originsin two of the most basic principlesof his metaphysics,principlesthat he affirmsand justifiesin many places throughout his work. On the one hand, accordingto Auriol,only individuals
I use the termsinterchangeablyhave real,extra-mental
existence.
singulars,
On the other hand, Auriol insiststhat individualsof the same species
have utterlysimilarintelligibilities:
individualsof the same species direct
the intellectto formexactlythe same conceptsabout themselves,
withno
differences.
Now, the questionarisesforAuriol:ifindividualsof the same
how can there be intellectual
species have utterlysimilarintelligibility,
with
as they
the individualsthat reallyexistextra-mentally
acquaintance
are individuals?
It mustbe stressedhere at the outset,that Auriol is dealing withthe
questionof how an individualis knownas an individual,not withwhat
about an individualmakes it an individualin extra-mentalreality.That
is to say, the questionis: how do we have a concept of a singular?not:
indihow does a singularcome about? As to the source of extra-mental
noththere
is
none:
there
is
Auriol
that
viduation,
repliesunequivocally
ing throughwhich a singularis a singular.There are, for example, no
individuatingpropertiesadded or attached to the species,human being,
in order to bring about the singularhuman beings,Socrates and Plato.
In saying this, Auriol is clearly turninghis back on a view that was
held on this issue by a number of Franciscanintellectualsbeforehim:
thatindividualsarise on account of a positiveindividuating
propertythat
contractsthe species to the individual.The best knownadherentof this
, but otherFranciscan
typeofviewis Duns Scotuswithhis theoryof haecceitas
and
Matthew
of
authors,e.g.
Roger Marston,also held this
Aquasparta
18:24:05 PM
OF SINGULARS
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
179
typeof view.3In contrastto them,forAuriol,individualsare simplyindividuals,distincton theirown account. As Auriol writes:"every thing,
reseo quodest, singulariter
insofaras it exists,existsas a singular"(omnis
est).4
But thisverypositioncreatesa problemwhen we turnto the way that
individualsare cognizedas individuals.Auriolis fullyaware of thisproblem. As he writesin the contextof discussingthe way an angel can have
intellectualcognitionof singulars:
Ifwesuppose
thata species
is contracted
toindividuals
added
through
something
- so thatthereis something
as somemaintain
in oneindividual
ofwhichnothing
similar
in another,
canbe found
thenthequestion
[ofthewayan angelcanknow
is unproblematic,
becausewe canclaimthattheangelwouldunderstand
singulars]
itsownsimplerepresentation
thatexistsin the
everyindividual
through
(speciem)
. . . but,as I haveshown
intellect.
thisposition
is untenable.5
elsewhere,
angel's
The problemput most basicallyis that thereis no intelligibleproperty
fromany other singular
by which one singularof a species is different
of the same species.As Auriol remarksin the quotationabove, if somethingcould be foundin one individualof which nothingsimilarcould
be foundin anothertherewould be no problem:we could in that case
individualson account of these dissimilarindividuatingpropdistinguish
In
erties. the period beforeAuriol, positingthat singularswere known
as singularsthroughtheirindividuatingpropertywas a not an atypical
3 See on later-medieval
of individuation,
theories
in
J.J.E.Gracia(ed.),Individuation
Scholasticism:
TheLater
Middle
andtheCounter-Reformation
, 1150-1650, Albany1994and
Ages
forScotus
inparticular,
A. Wolter's
article
inthesamebook:John
DunsScotus
(b.ca.J265;
d. 1308),271-98;Auriol
is notdealtwithin Gracia'sbook.Further
information
on late
13th-century
Franciscan
ideason thesubject
ofindividuation
canbe found
inJ.E.Lynch,
TheKnowledge
toVital
duFour
29 (1969),
ofSingular
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Things
According
271-301
andG.R.Payne,
Intuition
Revisited
versus
Cognitive
ofSingulars
(Matthew
ofAquasparta
41 (1981),346-84;especially
the
Studies,
B.J.F.Loner
gan),in:Franciscan
Lynchcontrasts
Franciscan
tackwithAquinas'
viewson thesubject.
Auriol
dealsat somelength
withthe
- andespecially
- in II Sent.,
issueofindividuation
withScotus'ideason thetopic
d. 9,
q. 3, aa. 1-3,ed. Rome1605,109-17.
II Sent.,
d. 9, q. 3, art.3, ed. Rome1605,114aF:"Quaeroergoquidsitprincipium
individuations.
Etsineargumentis
Ponohictrespropositiones.
Primaestquod
respondeo.
realiter
nullaest,cumquaeritur
ad rationem
loquendo
quaestio
quidadditindividuum
omnis
reseo quodest,singulariter
et
est;eteo ipsoquodestindifferens
speciei,
quoniam
communis
ratioestconcepta.
Ideoquaerere
aliquidperquidres,quaeextraintellectum
nihilestquaerere."
est,estsingularis,
5 II Sent.,
d. 11,q. 4, art.4, ed.Rome1605,147aF-bB:
"Si ergoponatur
quodspecies
contrahatur
ad individua
utquidamdicunt,
sicquodaliudsitin uno
peraliudadditum,
cuiussimile
nonpossitreperiri
in alio,tuncquaestio
nonhabetdifficultatem,
individuo,
estquodAngelus
individuum
quiatenendum
quodlibet
intelligent
perpropriam
speciem
eiussimplicem
inintellectu
suoexistentem.
. . . Sedquiaaliasostendi
illamnon
opinionem
..
possestare.
18:24:05 PM
180
L. FRIEDMAN
RUSSELL
18:24:05 PM
OF SINGULARS
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
181
ultimately
just one: its ratio.This ultimateratiolies at the level of the most
the individualhas.
specialspeciesand encompassesall of the otherrationes
For Auriol,then,the ratioof the mostspecial species is an indivisibleratio
Now, the most impor[ratioatoma),not subject to furtherspecification.9
tant thingto know about these rationes
, besides the fact that they are
in
of
the
similar
individuals
same
utterly
species, is that they are the
for
extra-mental
or
bases
concepts.Upon intellectualacquaingrounds
intellect
to formone certainconcept,and this
ratio
directs
the
each
tance,
of itself,
is because a ratiocan make an intelligiblerepresentation
[species)
intellectualacquaintance.10These rationes
, then, are
therebyfacilitating
utterlysimilarproperties,and the ratioof the most special
intelligible,
of everyindividual.
is
the
species
aggregateintelligibility
TheIntellectual
toAuriol
ofSingulars
Cognition
According
This, then,is how the problemof intellectualcognitionof singularsarises
forAuriol:no individualhas an intelligiblepropertythat could set it off
fromother individualsof the same species. How then can the human
intellectknow an individualin its individuality?
Accordingto Auriol,a
- not
the
can
be
intellect,but by any cogonly cognized
singular
just by
as
it
and
nitivepower11
is singular
incommunicable,if it is cognized in
a particular,determinedposition[situs).A singularcognized in thisway,
so thatit is distinctfromeveryothersingular,is called by Auriola "signed
singular"[signatum
singulare):
It is impossible
foranyrepresentation
or likeness
to represent
a signed
sin{species)
anddeterminately
in contrast
to every
other
ofthe
gulardistinctly
signed[singular]
it represents
it in a certain
sameratio
, unless
(), so thattherepresentaposition
tioncomesaboutbywayofintentional
lines. . . Forifa representation
were
(species)
9 E.g.,Auriol,
II Sent.
thetheyd. 9, q. 3, ed. Rome1605,lllaC-D, arguing
against
makes
individuals
ofthesamespecies
distinct
from
eachother:
orythata positive
property
nonessetratioatoma.Ratioest,quiatuncratiospecieiesset
"Item,
species
specialissima
essetgenus.
ratiorespectu
differentiarum.
...
Item,tuncspeciesspecialissima
possibilis
individuum
essetunaspecies."
etiamquodquodlibet
Sequeretur
10FormoreonAuriol
ontheratio,
seeR.L.Friedman,
textreferences,
including
Conceiving
andModifying
Some
Modist
Roots
Auriol's
Formation
, in:G. Marmo
Reality:
ofPeter
ofConcept
Theory
Verba.
Auriol
Turnhout
onIntentions
and
1997,305-21and id.,Peter
(ed.),Vestigia,
Imagines,
Essential
inLanguage
Predication
andR.L. Friedman
, in:S. Ebbesen
(eds.),Medieval
Analyses
andCognition
toAuriol's
useofratio
Forthebroadbackground
, Copenhagen
1999,415-30.
,
seeL.M.de Rijk,A Special
Useofratioin13thand14thCentury
, in:M. Fattori
Metaphysics
andM.L. Bianchi
Intellettuale
Internazionale
, Lessico
, Rome
(eds.),Ratio.VIIColloquio
Europeo
1994,197-218.
11Cf.aboveat andaround
n. 7.
18:24:05 PM
182
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
abstracted
sucha modeofrepresenting,
from
it wouldbe indifferent
to eachand
ofthespecies;
forsingulars,
sincetheyhaveultimately
thesameratio
,
every
singular
aresimilar.
. . . Nowthislikeness
insofar
as itis an
[i.e.therepresentative
likeness],
indifferent
is appropriated
as itreplikeness,
individual]
[toa signed
onlyinasmuch
in a linearway,at theendofwhich[line],either
resents
closebyor
intentionally
further
willbejustas many
which
is cognized.
Andthusthere
away,is setthething
andpositionally
as there
arerepresentations
distinct
things
[species)}2
represented
18:24:05 PM
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS
183
ing what would otherwisebe universal e.g. human being unique: 'this
human being'.14The mere fact of demonstrating,
by saying,e.g., 'this
human being', makes the apprehensionapply to only one singular.
The last quotationtranslatedabove supplies us with another important piece of information:the position (situs)of the signed singularis
"intentional".For Auriol,thismeans thatit is generatedexclusivelyby a
cognitivepower.15Thus, the signed singular'spositionis imposed upon
it throughan act of the cognizingsoul, settingthe cognized thingin a
certainpositionin relationto the cognizeritself.This act of the soul is
called by Auriol "designating"or "demonstrating"the thing.Although
sometimesthe intentionalpositionof the signed singularis an adequate
of its real position,thisis not necessarilythe case; we can
representation
see why,ifwe imaginewithAurioltwo similarand equal signedglorious
bodies(corpora
gloriosa
), thatare in the same physicalpositionat once; then:
in terms
oftheir
indeedtheywouldbe in
theycouldnotbe distinct
(situ),
position
thesameplacewhether
andnevertheless
onewouldnotbe theother
hereorthere,
in reality
andsomeone
couldsay:"thisbodyis not
(realiter),
[them]
apprehending
in
thatone".... [ina caselikethis]ofnecessity
theoneapprehending
byspeaking
andhe willposition
onebodycloserin relation
thiswaywillvarytheposition,
to
as whenhe says:"this(hoc)
buttheotherfarther
himself,
away,as whenhe
body",
. . . On account
ofthis,
itis obvious
thattheposition
says:"isnotthat(illud)
body".
withwhich
wearedealing
hereis notrequired
tobe real,rather
itis an intentional
theindividual
thatterminates
andtheapprehension.16
position
(termint)
14Scriptum
omne
, d. 35, pars4, art.1, prop.1, (X, 806b;Vb 381va"vb):
"Praeterea,
virtute
illiuscognitionis
cognoscens
aliquidpropria
distinguit
ipsumab omni
cognitione,
duohomines
in coloreet figura
alioquocumque.
Sed si ponerentur
simili
ac quantitate,
etuniversaliter
inomniaccidente
tamanimaequamcorporis,
constat
quodquiillosimaunumdistinguere
nonpossunt
ab alionisicognitione
demonstrativa
et situativa,
ginantur
intra
se 'quamvis
dicendo
scilicet
istisintsimillimi,
istetarnen
nonestille' Dicendoautem
'istum'
et'ilium',
unumhicetreliquum
'hunc'et'illum'
demonillic,
vel,sidiceret
poneret
strarei
huneuthicetillum
utillic.Pronomina
enimdemonstrativa
sunta differensumpta
tiissitus,
ab 'hic'adverbio
loci.
quia'iste'ab 'istuc'et 'ille'ab 'illic',et 'hic'pronomen
illiduohomines
autemmodoconsiderarentur
nondisQuocumque
perconsiderationem,
unusab alio,nisiperconsiderationem
certitudinaliter
etdesigdemonstrativam
tinguentur
nativam
eorumin diverso
alium.Ergopatet
situ,immoqui acciperet
unum,acciperet
nonpotest
inquantum
etindividuum
nisi
huiusmodi,
quodsingulare
apprehendi
signatum
subdeterminata
distantia
situali."
cognitione
ipsum
designante
15On Auriol's
in itshistorical
ofintentionality
seemostrecently
K.H.
context,
theory
Existence
atParis
Notion
, 1250-1320
Tachau,Some
, in:S. Ebbesen
ofthe
ofIntentional
Aspects
andR.L.Friedman
1999(op.dt
andtheliterature
referred
tothere.
., above,n. 10),331-53,
16Scriptum
dicetur
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, prop.1, (X, 807a;Vb,f. 381vb):"Sedforte
in eodemsitusignata
duocorpora
siindividua,
quoddatoquodessent
utpote
gloriosa
insitu,immoessent
ineodemhie
miliaetaequaliaessent
tuncnonpossent
simul,
distingui
veleodemilluc,et tarnen
unumnonessetaliudrealiter,
et possetdicereapprehendens
'hoccorpus
nonestillud'.
Si utique
siedicatur,
nonvalet,
quiapernecessitatem
apprehendens
18:24:05 PM
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L. FRIEDMAN
RUSSELL
18:24:05 PM
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS
185
18:24:05 PM
186
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
18:24:05 PM
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS
187
- that the
is a quantitativeor materialjudgement
quantityis intentional
does not alter that fact.Yet, because the intellectis an abstractpower,
and because "the mode of operatingfollowsthe mode of being", the
and incorpointellectcan only understandabstracdy,non-quantitatively,
a
itself
nor
it
can
neither
hence,
cognize the
designate singular
really;
a
of
of
intentional
the
conditions
position
signed singular.30
quantitative
Indeed, it is preciselythe possibilityof cognizingquantitythat Auriol
claims distinguishes
the imagination'sact fromthe intellect's:that the
of
object cognitionoccupiesa positionis part and parcel of the act of the
imagination;the act of the intellect,on the otherhand, abstractstotally
fromposition.31
How can intellectualcognitionof singularsbe explained
whentheintellectcan neitherdesignatea singularitself(sincethatinvolves
a materialjudgement)nor even understanddirectlythe materialjudgementsof the imagination?
Auriol admits the problem,and claims in response that the human
intellectcan only cognize a signed singularwhile workingtogetherwith
the imaginationand its productthe phantasm:
individual
evenbydemonstrating
thesigned
intellect
cannot
understand
... thehuman
andneither
a separate
canitunderstand
sinceitis [itself]
andpositioning,
power,
30Scriptum
"Sed manifestum
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,prop.1, (X, 807a-b;Vb,f. 382ra):
etdemonstrativa
estquodtalisapprehensio
rei,ponensremin esseintentiondesignativa
hicvel
subcertosituautsubcertosuccessionis
aliautinesseapprehenso
termino,
utpote
taleestquantitativum
talisveliudicium
ibi,autnuncveltunc;omnis
apprehensio
inquam
cuius
sublineaimaginaria
demonstrativum
Sic enimtaleiudicium
intentionali.
quantitate
ab ipso
hicvelibi,velnuncveltunc,utquasiquaedamlineaprocedat
terminus
dicitur
'tunc
'tunefuit';autin posterius,
utcumdicitur
utcumdicitur
in prius,
apprehendente
utcum
autinsitum
'nuncsit*;
etsimul
utcumdicitur
eri;autindirectum
propinquum,
'illehomo';autin eundem
utcumdicitur
'istehomo';autin distans,
dicitur
reflectendo,
estet quodnotitia
linearis
utcumdicitur
'ipseego'.Ex quo patetquoddemonstrativa
nonquidemquodsintibilidamiudicium
apprehendendi,
quoadmodum
quantitativum
talis
esttalis.Ergononcompetit
neaetalesreales,
sedquiamodusiudicandi
apprehensio
etnon-quantum
servaret
etincorporeae,
alioquin
incorporeum
potentiae
non-quantitativae
modusoperandi
et quantum,
et nonsequeretur
in sua operatione
modumcorporeum
et nonCumigitur
sitabstracta,
modum
essendi.
intellectiva
quia incorporea
potentia
nihil
ab istomodocognoscendi,
et perconsequens
estquodabstrahat
quanta,necesse
videlicet
'hanclinem'vel 'hanc
demonstrando
velsituando,
dicendo
potest
cognoscere
velquantilinem
sedabstrahendo
vel'hominem
istum';
concipit
simpliciter
quantitatem'
modum
materialem
et quantitativum."
haberet
tatem
velhominem,
cognoscendi
alioquin
31Auriol,
II Sent.,
d. 17,art.2, ed. Rome1605,241aC-D: Undeex hocpossumus
inobiecto
concernit
intellectus
etimaginations,
actum
quiaactusimaginations
distinguere
retinentem
se exparte
etstando
hic[ed.:sic]velibi;nondicositum
situm,
putaponendo
estsitualis,
etconcernit
hocmodo
itaquodmodus
suusferendi
sedexparteactus,
obiecti,
Actusverointellectus
situtextrapartem.
situm
et proportionem
partium,
quia partem
in obiecto
suo."
abstrahit
ab omnisituetproportione
18:24:05 PM
188
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
and directly
without
or signing
...
[thesignedindividual]
precisely
demonstrating
Forno onefinds
becauseit is conjoined
withthephantasm.
thathe cangraspan
individual
lineunlesshe says'thisline'or 'thisman',i.e. bydesignating,
norcan
thatperson
drawa distinction
between
twolinesexcept
withrespect
todiverse
posiifthoselinesaresimilar.32
tions,
What Auriol needs to explain,then,is the way that the human intellect
and imaginationwork togetherin the intellectualcognitionof singulars.
As we have seen, it is the imaginationthatsignsthe individual,i.e. makes
thejudgementby which the representation
of the singularis set along a
intentional
line.
as
Further, appeared above, making or even
unique
this
directlyunderstanding typeof materialjudgementis barredthe intellect. On the otherhand, accordingto Auriol,thereis no difficulty
involved
in the intellectunderstanding
thatanotherpower has designatedan individual, i.e. recognizingthat the imaginationhas designatedthe individual withoutdirectlyunderstanding
the designationitself.How? The signed
singular,as already mentioned,is a compositeof the signationimposed
by the cognizingsoul on the reallyexistingsingular,on the one hand,
and the reallyexistingsingularthat acts as a substrateforthe signation,
on the other. The intellecthas as its object the representation
of this
whole composite;the imagination'ssignationis an integralpart of the
that cannot be separated out.33Here is the crux of the
representation
an
as
of the signed singular
theory:
integralpart of the representation
that the intellectreceives,the imagination'smaterialact can be understood "abstractly"by the intellect.Auriol claims that the intellectcan
understandabstracdyany materialcondition
quantity,position,line,dis-
32Scriptum
. . Intellectus
vero
, d. 35,pars4, art.1,prop.3, (X,810b;Vb,f.383rb"va):
humanus
individuum
nonpotest
etiam
demonstrando
etsituando,
cum
signatum
intelligere
sitpotentia
sednecpotest
illudintelligere
nondemonstrando
etdirecte,
separata,
praecise
. . . quia cumphantasmate
Nullusenimexperitur
se posse
equesignando
coniungitur.
ad individualem
vel'hunehominem'
lineam
attingere
quindicat'hanclinem'
designando,
necpotest
differentiam
inter
duaslineas,
nisipenesdiversos
sisintsimiliae
..
situs,
ponere
scriptum
estquod
, d. 35,pars4, art.1, (X, 813a;Vb,f. 384 ): Undeimpossibile
haecalbedosignata,
nisialteroduorum
modorum.
. . . Secundoveroper
apprehendatur
actum
actum
veldesignare;
ethocmodo
aliquem
attingentem
primum,
quiestdemonstrare
nihilrpugnt
et signatum.
Et haecestmens
demonstratum
quinintellectus
apprehendat
etCommentatoris,
utallegatum
estsupra,
cumdicunt
Philosophi
quodintellectus
experiformam
mentatur
estprimo,
et perse et immediate,
formam
vero
quaecommunicabilis
hancsingulrem
nonprimo
necperse,sedmediante
actuvirtutis
nonquiimaginativae,
demmediante
eo formaliter,
cumintellectus
nonpossitinformali
peractum<virtutis>
sedmediante
eo obiective,
huiusalbedinis
eteius
imaginativae,
quiaactusdemonstrative
in ratione
terminus
concurrunt
uniusobiecti
dumintelligit
etapprehendit
intellectus
hanc
tam."
albedinem
demonstra
18:24:05 PM
ON INTELLECTUAL
OF SINGULARS
COGNITION
189
18:24:05 PM
190
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
18:24:05 PM
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS
191
18:24:05 PM
192
L. FRIEDMAN
RUSSELL
18:24:05 PM
ON INTELLECTUAL
COGNITION
OF SINGULARS
193
43Eleonore
with
bearscomparison
outtomethatAuriol's
theory
Aquinas';
Stump
pointed
onAquinas.
material
tosendmeunpublished
shewasalsokindenough
Stump's
Aquinas's
de Philosophie,
204
Account
Mechanisms
, in:RevueInternationale
ofIntellective
Cognition
ofthe
be noted,
thatAuriol
does
hasbeenofparticular
(1998),287-307,
helpto me.It should
contrast
in Scriptum
examine
, d. 35,pars4, art.1 andsetsit in direct
position
Aquinas'
thusthe
tothatofWilliam
de la Mareandhisfollowers
Vb,f.381ra*va);
(X, 805a-806a;
I plan
ofthetwotheories.
ownpresentation
Auriol's
word'rival'thatI useherereflects
in whichI will
herein a morecomprehensive
offered
to expandon theremarks
study
in their
historiandcognition
moregenerally,
Auriol's
ideason concept
consider
theory,
cal context.
18:24:05 PM
Scotuson Freedom
and theFoundation
of Ethics.
1
An Utrecht
Contribution
ANTONIEVOS
The Research
Group
JohnDuns Scotusfirstpublicizedits workin Contingentie
en Vryheid.
LecturaI 39 in 1992. This studycontainsa Dutch translation
2
of and commentary
on Scotus' Lectura
I, distinction39. The background
ofthisresearchconsistsof some specificproposalsforrenewingtheresearch
on Scotus5philosophyand theology.In 1994 a re-workedEnglishverwas published.3Translation,comand Freedom
sion, entitledContingency
aim
at
and
introduction
mentary
presentingthe systematiccontentof
LecturaI 39 as a cornerstoneof Scotus' theologyand philosophy.
This claim,of course,entailsin itselfa widerprogramme.As forScotus'
work,we may continueto explorenew partsof it fromthe viewpointof
its systematiccentre,the so-called theoryof 'synchroniccontingency'.4
as furtherelaborationsof this
We presenthere fournew contributions
approach:
1. 'The Scotian notionof naturallaw' (by A. Vos)
I 44' (byH. Veldhuis)
2. 'Ordainedand absolutepowerin Scotus' Ordinatio
3. 'The theoryof divinepermissionaccordingto Scotus' Ordinatio
I 47'
E.
(by Dekker)
4. 'Freedom in regard to opposite acts and objects in Scotus' LecturaI
39, 49-54' (by N. W. den Bok)
1 Manythanks
toprof.
dr.Timothy
Nooneandprof.dr.Richard
whohelped
Muller,
ofthissetofcontributions
us a greatdealwiththetranslation
intoEnglish.
2Johannes
I 39, Ingeleid,
DunsScotus,
envryheid.
lectura
en vancomvertaald
Contingentie
H. Veldhuis,
voorzien
doorA. VosJaczn.,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
mentaar
E. Dekker
en N. W. denBok,Zoetermeer
1992.
3John
DunsScotus
I 39, Introduction,
andFreedom.
Lectura
and
Translation
, Contingency
H. Veldhuis,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
E. Dekker
and
Commentary
byA. VosJaczn.,
N. W. denBok,Dordrecht/Boston
/London
1994.
4 Thisexploration
alsoimplies
anewthecomplex
Scotianterminology.
In
mapping
A. VosJaczn.,
DunsScotus
, Leiden1994thewholeofScotus'systematic
Johannes
theology
is described
thesamepointofview,sc. thetheory
of'synchronic
An
from
contingency'.
ofthistheory
andFreedom
canbe found,
., above,n. 3),
(op.cit
explanation
e.g.,in Contingency
ofNicodenBokin thisissue.
23-33.See alsothecontribution
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
Vivarium
, 38,2
18:17:05 PM
196
ANTONIE
VOS
The firstcontribution
discussesthe foundationof Scotus' ethics.The thesis of thisessay is thatthe Scotian use of the term'lex naturae'mustbe
in termsof the functionswhich 'ratio' and 'naturalis'have in
interpreted
the contextof Scotus' language of argumentation.A rationaturalis
, it is
found,is a necessaryargument,whichnecessarilylinksnecessaryand selfevidentpremisseswith theirconclusion.The foundationof the Scotian
and contingent
concept of natural law is the distinctionbetween necessary
ethics. The law of nature consistsof the principlesof necessaryethics.
This concept of naturallaw can be enlargedin the sense thatwhat can
be derived fromthese principlesis consideredto belong to the natural
law also.
In LecturaI 44 the young Duns Scotus explains conciselythe wellknown distinctionbetweenabsolute
and ofdained
I
power, and in Ordinatio
44 he elaboratesthistheme.In thesecondessay,VeldhuisanalyzesOrdinatio
I 44 and refutes
nominalistic
and theirreproachthatScotus'
interpretations
is
and
theory spiritually
ethicallyerroneous.
The thirdcontribution
treatsDuns' theoryof divinepermission.Since
the Lecturaends with distinction45, furtherinvestigations
of Duns' theof
divine
will
have
to
consult
the
Ordinatio
The
ory
(I 46-48).
theoryof
divine permissioncomes up for discussionin I 47. The question to be
consideredis whetherdivinepermissionis an act of will. Dekker follows
Scotus' argumentationand distinguishes
between two theories:firstly,
a
of
effective
and
non-effective
and
a
of
theory
willing,
secondly, theory
the negationof the positiveact of will. The second theoryseems to be
best fromboth an historicaland a systematical
point of view.
The last contribution
sketchesan aspect of the systematicbackground
of the theoryof synchroniccontingency.Searchingforthe cause of contingencyin thingsScotus turnsto the divinewill and introducesa twofold
freedomof the will (sc. freedomin regard to opposite acts and that to
follows(sc. diachronic
oppositeobjects)fromwhicha twofoldcontingency
and synchroniccontingency).Scotus' exposition,outliningthe fourpossible combinations,is not very perspicuous.The main reason for this is
his introductionof the aspects immutability
and mutability,
and
infinity
finitudeinto the exposition,most likelybecause in Scotus' terminology
'contingency'is always relatedto factualstatesof affairs.
Utrecht
Facultyof Theolog))
University
of Utrecht
18:17:05 PM
The ScotianNotionofNaturalLaw
ANTONIE VOS
1. Introduction
The complicatedhistoryof the concept of naturallaw has not yet been
written.In standardsurveysof the concept, ideas fromancient Greek
and Hellenisticphilosophydominate the scene. Given the centuriesof
Christiandevelopmentof the concept that intervene,this general backgrounddoes not make it easy to locate adequately Duns' place within
thishistory.
In a broad sense natural
law is a rule of action derivedfromthe essential characterof reality and what is at stakehere depends on the ontoof 'essential5and 'reality'.If naturallaw is invoked
logical interpretation
as a standard,what kind of rule is being invoked?Does the validityof
this kind of rule consistin being invokedor is realityas such law-like
and natural?The decisivepoint is whetherbeingnaturalhas to be seen as
an ethical or political rule in its own rightor whethernature itselfis
sociomorphicand social realityis natural.1Of course, the historyof the
notionof naturallaw is tighdylinkedup with the historyof the concept
or determinism,everyof nature{natura).Accordingto necessitarianism,
thingis consideredto be necessary,law-likeand natural. This absolute
is the hard core of everyimportantmovementof ancient
necessitarianism
philosophy,apart frompatristicphilosophy and even the philosophyof
the churchfathersonlydepartsfromit on an intuitivelevel. Nevertheless,
view of life
patristicthoughtis quite clear in rejectingthe deterministic
and realityin ancientreligionand philosophy.
This kind of naturallaw approach is clearlyexpressedby the Roman
philosopherCicero (106-43 BC): True law is rightreason in agreement
1 See E.W.Beth,Metafsica
enAlgemene
over
enwetenschap
in:Door
causaliteit,
beschouwingen
totwijsheid.
Assen1964,28-36and 74-81.Gf.E.W.
Verzamelde
Studien,
wetenschap
wijsgerige
De wijsbegeerte
derwiskunde
vanParmenides
totBolzano
Beth,
1944,5-92,
, Antwerpen/Nijmegen
H.L.A.Hart,Theconcept
, Vienna
oflaw,Oxford1961,and Ota Weinberger,
Rechtslogik
1970.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
Vivarium
, 38,2
18:13:54 PM
198
ANTONIE
VOS
2 See MarcusTulliusCicero,
De republica.
Confer
law
Natural
, in: The
DouglasSturm,
X, NewYork/London
1987,318-24.
of
religion
encyclopedia
3 Richard
law
Natural
, V, NewYork/London
Wollheim,
, in:TheEncyclopedia
ofPhilosophy
1967,451-2.
4 See A. Vos,Kennis
in
enNoodzakelijkheid.
Eenkritische
vanhetabsolute
euidentialisme
analyse
entheologie
DunsScotus
2 and 7, and idem,Johannes
, Kampen1981,chapters
wijsbegeerte
DS), Leiden1994,chapters
11 and 12.
(abbrev.:
18:13:54 PM
LAW
THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
199
2. Duns' Spiritual
Background
Duns' personal spirituality
enjoys a strongtheoreticalfooting.Thus his
has
its
own existentialcolour. In Scotus' view,God
foundation
theological
is good and his doing is doing well. Since, moreoverhis 'doing' is not a
privateinterest,we cannot be of a privateinterestto Him. Therefore,
we all have to be made freefor God. He does not spoil anybodyand
He does not favourany personabove another.We have to love Him for
Himself,withoutimmediateself-interest,
inspiredand absorbed by the
of his character.In Duns' expositions
endlessgoodnessand attractiveness
on hope, charity(love) and faithhe indirectlysketcheshis own spiritual
life. The argumentregularlypasses on to the personal 7' and is supportedby his own longingand intenseexpectationin order to reach out
communicative.
to Him who is absolutelygood and infinitely
The experienceof faithshows that hope is distinctive.We live from
expectationand what we expect is as such somethinggood. Expectation
is built on desire. He who is infinitely
good, arouses our desire most
intensely.Such a desire can be hope or can be despair. In the experience of faithGod is present,in the experienceof hope He is absent,but
He who cannot disappoint,is then presentin our expectationsof the
One who is hoped for,just as an expectedone is- as the expectedonepresentin our longingsforher or forhim: That is hope. It is orientated
to God because of God's personallovelinessand not in order to be used
by us. We cannot manipulateHim whom we are longingfor.According
to Scotus,we all experiencethe longingthatHe will be ours. He has to
be our God. In the midstof the argument,Scotus offersa verypersonal
sentence:I do not give up the act of desiring!'Thus hope is a very
18:13:54 PM
200
ANTONIE
VOS
18:13:54 PM
THE SCOTI
ANNOTIONOF NATURAL
LAW
201
chroniccontingency
The divineessence
pervadesthewhole of his thought.8
is both the firstsubject of the necessarytruthsof theologyand of the
ones.9One alreadyfindsthe main methodologicalstructureof
contingent
and
necessary
contingenttheologyillustratedby an ethicalexample in
Scotus' Prologus
to his Lectura
:
I saythatthere
arenecessary
truths
aboutwhatis contingent,
because
Therefore,
A stone
isfalling
down
is contingent
andyettherearenecessary
truths
aboutfalling,
forexample,
thatit
looksforthecentre
andthatitfallsdownaccording
to a straight
line.In thesame
way,
I loveGod
is contingent
andyettherecan be a necessary
truth
aboutit,forexample,
thatI
mustloveGodaboveall.
Thisthesis
canbe proven
as follows:
'Godis the
onewecanthink
greatest
of'
I mustloveHimin thehighest
He is lovable
aboveall.Therefore,
Therefore,
way.
In thiswayI canhaveknowledge
ofcontingent
Thenthisknowledge
propositions.
in itsfirst
contents
it is nota content
in
really
regards
contingent
object,
although
thefirst
sense.Yetit concerns
truths
whichcanbe derived
from
continnecessary
gentpropositions.10
In termsof this basic distinctionbetween necessarytheologyand contingenttheologywe may assertthat withDuns thereare also two kinds
of ethics:necessary
ethics
and contingent
ethics
. Thus necessaryethicsis a part
of necessarytheologyand contingentethicsis a part of contingenttheology.Alreadyat thisstage we may suggestthatthe incisiveproblemsof
the statusof the commandsof the decalogue and the nature of revocation of law will be treatedin termsof this distinction.11
3Lectura:
8 See A. Vos,Thetheoretical
centre
andstructure
ina newkey
,
ofScotus
Philosophy
in: ViaScoti
ad
mentem
Duns
Scoti
Rome
I,
1995,455-73.
methodologica
Joannis
9 See Lectura
Prologus
114and 118.
10Lectura
suntveritates
necessariae,
Prologus
172:"Ideodicoquodde contingentibus
estlapidem
et tamende descensu
eiusveritates
descendere,
necessariae,
quiacontingens
utquodapptit
centrum
etquoddescendit
secundum
linem
rectam.
mediligere
Similiter,
Deumestcontingens,
et tamende hocpotestesseVeritas
ut quoddebeam
necessaria,
Deumdiligere
Ethocdemonstrative
concludi
sic:'Deusestquomaius
superomnia.
potest
nonpotest';
estsumme
summe
debeoeumdiligere.
Et sic
cogitali
igitur
diligibilis;
igitur
secundum
hocpossum
habere
scientiam
de contingentibus.
Istaigitur
scientia
estverecirca
in primoobiecto,
contentum
nonsitprimoibicontentum,
et tamen
contingens
quamvis
estde verisnecessariis
concludi
de contingentibus."
Cf.themuchlaterparquaepossunt
alleltextin Ordinatio
III 27 (= OpusOxoniense
III 27) in thefirst
article
ofthebodyofthe
- See AllanB. Wolter,
DunsScotus
onthewillandmorality
D.G. 1986,
, Washington
question
and425(English).
424(Latin)
11See DunsScotus'OpusOxoniense
III 37; IV 17.Thistextis highly
so we
reliable,
couldin factrefer
to thosetexts
as Ordinatio
III 37 andIV 17.
18:13:54 PM
202
ANTONIE
VOS
18:13:54 PM
LAW
THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
203
18:13:54 PM
204
ANTONIE
VOS
:
meaningsof ratio'
of'Ratio*
is:
(1) WithDunstheregular
rangeofmeanings
a) analysis;
b) argumentation,
argument;
characteristic;
c) structure,
aspect,
and
d) concept
account;
e) reason,
ground.
For thisreason,a firstcriticalremarkfitsin here. As much as the transin the modernrationalistic
lation reason
sense of Vernunft
rede
{raison,
) is not
ratioAnselmiin most cases 'reason
' is not
in
the
case
of
,
adequate
very
'
'17 In general,it would be misleadingto transadequate in translatingratio
' and ' rationecessaria
' with naturalreasonand
late termslike 'rationaturalis
reason
Ratiois primarily
a ratioand a ratiois an argu, respectively.
necessary
mentor analysisprovidedby somebody,just as 'ratioAnselmirefersto an
(or the)argumentprovidedby Saint Anselmand 'ratioRichardimeans an
argumentelaborated by Richard of Saint Victor. On this fundamental
level the meaningsa) and b) are to be applied.18
16L.M.de Rijk,A Special
Useofratioin13th
and14thCentury
, in:Ratio
cit.,
Metaphysics
{op.
at 218.
above,n. 15),197-218,
esp.
'
'reddere
17An exception
in theexpression
is thecaseof'ratio
rationerr
which
occurring
means:toaccount
for.
18An
ofDuns'useof'ratio
Anselmi
is tobe found
I 2, 9. Cf.also
inLectura
example
I 2, 35 andOrdinatio
Lectura
I 2, 11and35.Examples
ofhisuseof'ratio
Richardi
are
to be found
inLectura
I 2, 41 and 123andOrdinatio
t 2, 180.
18:13:54 PM
THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
LAW
205
18:13:54 PM
206
VOS
ANTONIE
We haveto saythathaving
a necessary
and(having)
a demonstrative
argument
argument
to thesamething.23
(. . .) do notamount
18:13:54 PM
LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL
THE SCOTIAN
207
18:13:54 PM
208
ANTONIE
VOS
ture is necessity
and the fundamentallogicalfeaturewhich governsa neces{logicalnecessity).
saryargument,is validity
or natural
Moving on to the meaningof demonstrative
arguments,we see
that Scotus adds to the concept of a necessaryargumentthe condition
of 'evidentknowledge'.So, an epistemological
featurestillto be definedis
added to the logicalfeatureof validityand the ontologicalfeatureof the
necessityof the premisses.Hence, there are necessaryargumentswhich
can 'prove' something,althoughtheirpremissesare not 'evidently'true
I 42, 21).27
and necessary(Ordinatio
4.5 Propositioper se nota
In order to see the specificdifference
betweennecessaryand naturalarwe
the
still another (and last) important
need
introduction
of
guments
c
I 2 part 1 Duns elucinotd.
In Lectura
term:
se
propositio
per
epistemological
dates the natureof a self-evident
propositionis
perse notae).28
proposition(ratio
The self-evident
characterof such a propositiondepends on knowingthe
termsused. The truthof a self-evident
propositionis evidenton the basis
of the knowledgeof the termsand the involvedcertaintyis only based
on somethingof the propositionitself.29
Therefore,it cannot be derived
fromthe outside,as it were. The main idea is that the con(mendicata)
A selfcept of the predicateis entailedby the termin subjectposition.30
is
evident
to
be
certified
from
two
sides:
From
for
the
itself,
proposition
knoweris certainof it on account of the contentsof the termsthemselves; fromthe side of other terms,because a propositioncannot be
Thus
derivedfromother
terms,if it must be true on account of itself.
27We canalsoapproach
A fallacy
thesamephenomenon
from
theopposite
direction:
be true.It is
cannot
is an argument
whichshowssomething
andso a fallacy
impossible
in orderto substantiate
it. Supposethereis a
to deliver
a 'natural
argument
impossible
I 42, 21).Sucha propunfalsifiable
which
is argumentatively
(See Ordinatio
proposition
is either
ofitsterms
canshow,oritturns
outto
osition
trueas theanalysis
immediately
evident.
from
terms
whicheventually
areimmediately
be a conclusion
28Lectura
I 2, 13.
29See Lectura
est
I 2, 14: "Adintellectum
persenotai)
primi(sc.theratio
propositionis
sciendum
quaecumque
quoddicitur
propositio
perse nota,perly'perse' nonexcluditur
estperse notanisihabeatur
terminorum,
causa,quia nonnotitia
quia nullapropositio
causaet ratioquaeestextraperse consedexcluditur
notitia
terminorum;
quaecumque
estperse notaquae
terminorum
ceptus
propositionis
perse notae.Et ideoillapropositio
habetveritatem
nonhabetnotitiam
aliunde
sedillaquaeex terminis
mendicatam,
cognitis
etquaenonhabetcertitudinem
evidentem
nisiex aliquoin se."
30See Lectura
I 2, 15-19.Section19yields
"Iliaigitur
est
a finesummary:
propositio
etnonmendicatam
ex evihabetevidentiam
terminorum
perse notaquaeex solanotitia
dentiaaliorum
conceptuum."
18:13:54 PM
LAW
ANNOTIONOF NATURAL
THE SGOTI
209
or the
itsowntruth
on thebasisofthecontents
warrants
persenota
(7)A propositio
ofitsterms.
meanings
4.6 Ratio naturalis
'
'
makes up the
This elementof Scotian, and medieval, evidence
(evidentia)
The logical
natural
and
a
difference
betweena necessary
argument.
argument
foundationof (1) and (6) togetherwith
demonstrativa
is a ratio
(4)A demonstratio
and
is thesameas a natural
(ratio
argument
demonstrativa)
{ratio
argument
(5) A demonstrative
naturalis)
'
withthe help
of 'natural
{rationaturalis)
argument
providesforthe definition
of the additionof (7):
in whichthenecesandlogically
validargument
naturalis
is a necessary
(8a)A ratio
andself-evident
is derived
from
necessary
premisses.
saryconclusion
of the necessarypremissesis the feature
The featureof the self-evidence
which accountsfor the distinctivecharacterof a naturalargument
, a ratio
naturalis.
4.7 Proof
formthe only kind
Of course we cannot conclude that naturalarguments
based on proven
not.
certain
of
Necessaryarguments,
Certainly
arguments.
premisses,and argumentsbased on contingenciesprovide us very often
with certainty.Indeed, Duns would not like to deny this. Many argumentsfromScotus' theologyon the Trinityare in factproofsaccording
'
'
to modern terminology,
althoughthey are definitelynot demonstrations
which considerssuch argumentsas
according to Scotian terminology,
'
*
or
ostender
which
e).
(
prove probare
arguments
or ratiodemonstrativa)
selfratio
In the idea of demonstration
naturalis
(
contrasted:If thereis any proof
are specifically
evidenceand derivability
of a particularpropositionpossible, then that propositioncannot be a
is
self-evident
one.31Thus we see that the Scotian notion of selfevidence
in
down
to
and
fact
boils
strict
underivability.
extremely
is an underivable
proposition.
(9) A self-evident
proposition
31Lectura
intelI 2, 20: "Nondicitur
propositio
perse notaquiaestnotacuicumque
notitiam
intellectui
natisuntfacere
lects,sed(. . .) termini
concipienti
perse evidentem
18:13:54 PM
210
VOS
ANTONIE
4
With the help of the termspresentedsofarit is easy to define rationatuis by definitiona necessary
ralis*in an alternativeway: A rationaturalis
has
to be added to it in order
time
at
the
same
but
something
argument,
and the componentto be added to
to make it up for a naturalargument
it is, what I would like to call, absolute
; absolute
derivability
derivability
presupposes the provabilityof a conclusionwhile the premissesare eventuAccordingto this line of argument(8a) can be specified
ally underivable.
in termsof (9), and then we obtain:
conclusion
is
in whichthenecessary
is a necessary
naturalis
argument
(8b)A ratio
underivable
and(absolutely)
from
derived
premisses.
necessary
eventually
These resultsshed a ratherdifferent
lighton the problemwhetherspecific
propositionsfromthe philosophyof religionand the philosophicaltheory
or proven.In many cases Duns
of divine propertiescan be demonstrated
remarksthat such propositionscannot be demonstrated
, althoughtheycan
betweendemonbe proven
or shownto be true.If we overlookthe difference
and neglectthe specificdomain of Duns' argumentation
and probare
strare
that such and such theologicaltruthscannot be
the
statement
language,
makes
a ratherdifferent
demonstrated/
impressionfromwhat Duns in
proven
fact triesto say and seems to inviteto fideismand theologicalauthoritarianism.But Duns only scores a veryspecialisedpoint in termsof the
theoryof argumentation:
demonstrationes.
naturales/
setofrationes
tothespecific
doesnotbelong
andsuch
anargument
Such
'
In thislightwe have also to translatepersuasiowith 'proof' in the modern sense of the word.32It is decisivein studyingDuns' epistemological
evaluationsto realise that valid argumentsbased on provable premisses
/demonstrations
are not called 'proofs'
by Duns.33In factjust the oppositeis
true. The youngJohn Duns enlargedthe range of debatable and prov-
demonterminos
potest
perse notos;et ideonullaestperse notaquaealicuiintellectui
stran."
32See Lectura
I 42, 19.
33Concerning
is withI onlypointoutthatAnthony
thisproblem
Quinton's
allegation
animated
'Whatis clearis thatalthough
outanyground:
bythesamekindofgeneral
dethatfirm
effective
Scotustookthefirst
as Aquinas,
intent
rationalistic
stepstoward
reasonthatwasthe
faith
andphilosophical
ofrevealed
thedomains
between
marcation
disrational
to eliminate
andthattended
ofOckham's
fundamental
philosophy
principle
British
See hislemma
truth
ofreligious
cussion
, in: TheEncyclopedia
of
philosophy
altogether'.
seebelow,
1967,372.Formoreon Quinton,
6.
, I, NewYork/London
Philosophy
18:13:54 PM
THE SGOTIAN
LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL
211
18:13:54 PM
212
ANTONIE
VOS
18:13:54 PM
THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
LAW
213
sarypropositions.Of course the ethicallynecessaryprinciplesare themselves also part of natural law, as Duns explicitlystates earlier in this
quotation,where he refutesan alternativetheory.
In a typically
Scotianway necessarytruthand willare connected.What
is necessarilytrue,is trueeven if therewere no mind,nor will. Goodness
in termsof willor a volition(an act of willing)does not belongto thegoodness of 'the law of nature',because the law of natureis true 'beforeany
' known and
act of will' {anteomnem
actumvoluntatis)*2
Its truthis 4naturally
this 'naturally(structurally)'
being knownis being known on account of
the termsthe propositionunder considerationconsistsof. So the necessarytruthof suchbasic propositions
dependson the analysisof theinvolved
terms.The necessityof such propositionsis analyticalin the broad sense
of the word 'analytical'.Therefore,'what is known on account of the
termsused, is naturally(structurally)
known(beforeany act of will)':43
Whenwe applythispattern
to theethical
theresult
is as follows:
content,
'Whenwe completely
leaveouttheactofwillandtheintellect
ofGodgrasps
the
ofthoseprinciples,
it grasps
thepowerandcorrectness
terms
ofthose(prin(then)
an actofwill.'44
before
ciples)
Basicallya truthis naturally(natur
aliter)true,because it is true in terms
of the intrinsicnatureor structureof the propositioninvolved.Thus the
'
'
'
'
meaningsof naturaand naturalishave to be elucidatedin a logical-analyticalway and not in termsof an absolutisticand unpersonalconcept
of nature
derivedfromcosmology.Naturaltruths
are truthswhich are true
in termsof themselves
. A 'recta
, they are true in termsof theirownnature
' is a
ratio
piece of correctreasoningwhichoriginatesfroma correctbasis.
Conclusions
Preciselyin these termsDuns definesin ethicswhat he calls a truthde
' is the
The analyticalmeaningof 'rationaturalis
legenaturae.
key to explainwhat
de
is
true
naturae/
aliter.
natur
this
ing
lege
Definitely
key is not an
absolutenotionof natural
law or absolute
reason
. In thisanalyticaland conand stripsoffthe old notion of naturallaw.
ceptualvein, Duns simplifies
42Lectura
III 37, 13.See note39.
43Ibidem.
44Lectura
III 37, 13:"gitur,circumscripto
omniactuvoluntatis,
cumintellectus
Dei
terminos
illorum
virtutem
illorum
et rectitudinem
apprehendit
principiorum,
apprehendit
anteactum
voluntatis."
The lastpartofthissection
runsas follows:
velvoluntas
"Igitur,
necessario
vulthoc,si estrecta,
cumintellectus
dicitilludesserectum,
veleritnonrecta,
si discordet."
18:13:54 PM
VOS
ANTONIE
214
18:13:54 PM
THE SGOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
LAW
215
and his general attitudeis certainlynot unfairto Duns. "It was John
Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308), the firstmajor Britishphilosophersince
Erigena and perhaps the most powerfulphilosophical intellectof the
Middle Ages, who initiateda new systemof ideas which led English
thoughtin a freshdirection,away fromthe conflictof Aristotleand Augustine".48
Quinton points to Scotus' fertileinnovationsof terminology.
In spite of this prudentinsightfulness,
the complex terminologyis not
natural
reason
and Duns definitely
takenintoaccount.Quintonhypostatizes
would not followhim in this direction.Accordingto Quinton's analysis
Duns separatesgoodness
and necessity
, but as we have seen above, Duns
does not linkgoodnessand will fromsuch an extremelynominalisticbias.
This allegation of an absolute connection of will and goodness is an
unwarrantedclaim which does not only run throughthe whole history
of neothomistic
histhought,but also dominatesthe nineteenth-century
of
tory Westernphilosophy.
In a sense,C.R.S. Harris's two volumeson Duns Scotus (1927) are a
phenomenonin Scotisticscholarship.Scotianado not count many monographswhichtryto describethe whole of Duns' philosophyor the whole
of his theology.Neitheris Oxford fertilein producingworkson his life
and subtleworks.Harris realized all this and carried out his huge proentitledLes comject. 1927 was the same year as C. Balic's dissertation,
mentaires
deJeanDuns Scotsurles quatrelivresdes Sentences
.49When we look
at the list of worksaccordingto Harris righdyattributedto Duns, we
discerna gulfbetweenhis orientationand Balic's text-critical
work.The
immenseproblemof spuriousworksand of the reliabilityof the text of
the authenticworksdo not seem to botherHarris verymuch, except in
a late note or appendix.50
Although'Duns was above all thingsa metaphysicianand speculative
Harris devotes
theologian,and his interestin ethicswas onlysecondary',51
a long chapterto the moral and politicalphilosophyof Scotus. He takes
as an antipode of Duns' thoughtThomas Aquinas', and his departure
pointis the assumedmedievalreconciliationof philosophyand theology.
here Harris is quite receptive:
Nevertheless,
48Quinton
1967(op.cit.,
above,n. 46),372-3.
49tude
etcritique
, 2 vols.,2med.,Louvain1927.
historique
50Harris[DunsScotus
inMedieval
, vol.I: ThePlaceofDunsScotus
, vol.II: The
Thought
Doctrines
theworkofKarlWerner
, Oxford
ofDunsScotus
Philosophical
1927)stillappreciates
of1881,whileMaurice
de Wulfhadalready
ofthesuperficiality
ofWerner's
complained
in 1900.
contributions
51Harris1927(op.citabove,n. 51),II, 305.
18:13:54 PM
216
ANTONIE
VOS
withsomedegree
The boundary
linebetween
wasmarked
reasonand revelation
on thefrontier
linecouldbe
ofclarity,
and fora timeat leastan openconflict
Butthecaseofethics
different.
Instead
ofdogma
avoided.
wassomewhat
ofa system
whichwaspartially
reconcilable
withthenewly
Aristotelian
metaphysics
imported
insucha wayas nottocontradict
tooobviandwhichcouldat leastbe interpreted
which
theprinciples
ofreason,
there
existed
a moraltradition
wastoo
already
ously
theethics
ofGreecetoadmitquiteso satisfactory
a
definite
andtoodifferent
from
partition.52
So scholasticism
ethicallypresentsa more thanusuallyheterogeneouspicwithAnselm's
ture.Harrisalso discernsthatScotusshowsa greateraffinity
of
doctrine
the
will,
metaphysical
while
oftherationalistic
ethic
ofthePhilosopher.
atthesametime
theform
preserving
ofhisownmaking,
Hiswholeethical
is thushaunted
theory
bya vastinconsistency
thedomain
ofnatural
itself.
Forwhilehedoesnotdenytherational
within
morality
ofthemoral
tomakeitdependent
onthedivine
nature
law,theattempts,
nevertheless,
in hisdoctrine
which
hasrendered
ofthiscontradiction
will,anditis thepresence
itso peculiarly
to one-sided
susceptible
misinterpretation.53
Harris himselfis rathercriticalof a one-sidedvoluntaristic
interpretation
of Duns' ethics.His proud point is thatmost criticshave overlookedthe
decisive antinomywhich reignsin Duns' ethical philosophy."Yet it is
only by recognizingits existencethatwe can account forhis statements.
In spite of thisseriousdefect,it must,however,be admittedthatScotus'
ethicalteachingrepresentsin some importantrespectsa distinctadvance
upon that of his predecessors,inasmuch as he bringsout more clearly
the moral significanceof the freedomof the will."54
AnthonyQuinton overlookedthe pivotalrole of necessarytheologyand
necessaryethicswithinScotian thoughtand thusthe essentialinteraction
betweennecessaryand contingent
propositionsin Scotus' theoriesof intellect, will and ethics.If we miss one of the two banks,we cannot build
discernedthe
the bridge.In contrastwith Quinton, Harris had fruitfully
kernelof Scotus' ethicalphilosophy,
whilestressing
theso-calledAnselmian
core of his ethics:
himtograpple
more
willanddesire
enables
between
Hisinsistence
onthedistinction
ofethical
andlendshisthinking
withthepsychological
analysis
problems
adequately
ofmoralexperience
thanwasdisplayed
a deeperinsight
intothefacts
byanychristianthinker
sincethedaysofAugustine.55
52Harris1927(op.cit
., above,n. 51),305-6.
53Harris1927(op.cit
., above,n. 51),307-8.
54Harns1927
above,n. 51),II, 303.
55Harris1927(op.cit.,
, above,n. 51),II, 303.
(op.cit.
18:13:54 PM
LAW
THE SCOTIAN
NOTIONOF NATURAL
217
On the one hand Harris sees the independentimportanceof the distinctionbetweenwill and desireand thereforethe proper role of the will
in the theoryof action and in ethicsand on the other hand he warns
not to look at Duns as a simple voluntarist.Therefore,he judges the
of Landry and Jourdain,Schwane and Wernerto be misinterpretation
taken.Moreover,he discernsthe second bank: Scotus' statementthatthe
with 'rightreason'. So far,so
goodnessof an act depends on conformity
that
the
of both banks conHarris
concludes
but
then
conjunction
good,
stitutesa contradiction.So Harris replaces the dilemma of an arbitrary
voluntarismby the antinomyof a frankinconsistency.'It is only by a
frankrecognition
of thisantinomythatwe can hope to avoid the onesided
in which his teachinghas so oftenbeen distorted'.56
interpretation
However, if the illnessdoes not exist,there is no need of a one-sided
to be cured. Duns does not work with an exclusivedisinterpretation
intellect
and will. The key lies in the distinctionsbetween
of
junction
and
necessary
contingentpropositionsin ethics. There is a realm of
by contingentacts of will.Both
necessaryentities,whichis not constituted
dimensionsof necessityand contingencyin ethics are themselvesnecessary. The systematicalupshot is that there is no separated theoretical
heaven of 'the rightreason'. This heaven is demythologizedand made
empty,for 'natural reason' and 'rightreason' are both adequately unpacked in termsof logical,ontologicaland epistemologicalcharacteristics
of propositions.
of our sections3 and 5 solve the HarrisianparaThe ethicalstructures
dox. This paradox itselfturnsout to be a paradox. It is a paradox that
of Duns' ethicsand theoryof willshow so many
traditional
interpretations
There is no gulf or antinomybetween will and reason.
deficiencies.57
There is only the indispensabledistinctionbetween necessaryand contingentpropositionsand the rightways in which knowledgeand will can
'
'
'
be related to them. 'Ratio necessaria
, rationaturalisand ratiorecta!are
relatedto certainlogical, ontologicaland epistemologicalcharacteristics
of arguments.The will fillsin the realm of contingency,constitutedby
' have
what is not necessary.Moreover, 'naturallaw' and ' naturalreason
different
completely
meaningswithDuns in comparisonwiththeAristotelian
and (neo)thomistic
tradition.
18:13:54 PM
ANTONIE
VOS
218
18:13:54 PM
THE SCOTIAN
LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL
219
18:13:54 PM
220
ANTONIE
VOS
concludes that it must be a part of necessaryethics.However, a necessarytruthof ethicscannot be revoked,or dispensedwith.When thereis
alternativebiblical information,
contingencyseems the only logical way
out and Duns utilizesthisway out.
Modern systematictheologyhas alternativemeans of handlingsuch a
dilemma available, i.e. to treatit in a purelyhistoricalway, but the historicalway of thoughtwas not available in the Middle Ages.
8. Perspective
The specialistliteratureon Duns Scotus is familiarwith a rich harvest
of paradoxes and antinomiesDuns mightbe blamed for. The general
cause of such allegationsis that the logical and ontologicalcentreand
structureof Scotus' thoughtare overlooked:The theoryof synchronic
of Scotus' theologyand philstructure
contingency
shapes the systematical
and
semanticalfieldswhichyield
features
constitute
These
logical
osophy.
Thus
his
characteristic
terms.
to
many traditionaltermsreceive
meaning
'
are the most disnew meanings,of which logical'and 'potency/
possibility'
tinctiveexamples.
Exact exposition of Scotus' thought shows again and again that
qualificationslike Voluntarism'and 'Scotism' easilymiss the point. Here
theoryand life,head and heartpointintothe same direction.His scientific
passion consistsof truthand consistency.The whole of truthas he sees
it, is anchored in basic propositionsabout God and the essentialpropositionsabout God are necessary.If true,it is impossiblethat theyare
false. On the same level the fundamentaltruthsof Duns' ethicsare to
hold out a hand to each
be located. Faith and logic (reason/reasoning)
otherboth in the necessarytheoryof divinepropertiesand in necessary
ethics.
This basic dimensionsolves the allegationsof paradox and antinomy.
Exploring Duns' philosophical language points the way to consistent
philosophy;exploringDuns' theologicallanguage pointsthe way to con3 chartranscendent
sistenttheology.Ludger Honnefelder'sthesisin Scientia
63L. Honnefelder,
in
undRealitt
derSeiendheit
Dieformale
Scientia
transcendem.
Bestimmung
undderNeuzeit
desMittelalters
derMetaphysik
1990,XI-XII:"In zunehmendem
, Hamburg
alseinedenkerische
Maerwies
sichvorallemseineMetaphysik
eigenen
Ranges,
Leistung
bezeichunddiealsderzweite
zurcksteht
diehinter
derdesThomasnicht
groeEntwurf
mitderaristotelisch-arabischen
netwerden
mu,zu derdieAuseinandersetzung
Metaphysik
damitauchdieVoraussetzung
Deudicher
alszuvorwurde
fhrte.
im 13./14.Jahrhundert
18:13:54 PM
LAW
NOTIONOF NATURAL
THE SCOTIAN
221
sichtbar
frdas bergewicht,
da imSptmittelalter
nichtdiethomistische,
sondern
die
Schulegewann,
seies in FormdermitAntonius
FranzvonMayronis
scotische
Andreas,
- oftepigonalen
- Fortfhrung,
u.a. beginnenden
sei es in FormdermitWilhelm
von
Ockham
einsetzenden
kritischen
Transformation."
64See W. Kluxen,
Thomas
unddiePhilosophie
von
vonAquin
, in:W. Kluxen(ed.),Thomas
der
imphilosophischen
1975,221-8,andid.,DieOriginalitt
, Freiburg/Mnchen
Aquin
Gesprch
skotischen
Einetypologische
hominis
etregnum
D. Actaquarti
, in:Regnum
Metaphysik.
Betrachtung
Scotistici
Romae1978(= Studiascholas2 vols.,ed.G. Brub,
internationalis,
Congressus
tico-scotistica,
6-7),I, 303-13.
18:13:54 PM
' Ordinario I 44
Ordainedand AbsolutePowerin Scotus
HENRI VELDHUIS
1. Introduction
The distinctionbetweenpotentia
ordinata
and potentia
absolutawas a much
discussedthemein later medievaltheologyand philosophy.The content
and usefulnessof these conceptswere disputed.It is clear, however,that
the distinctionwas introducedin the firstplace to be able us to indicate
that God, throughhis potentia
absoluta
, could have acted otherwisethan
He factuallywills to do and factuallydoes.1
The distinctionis also a much discussedtopic among medievalistsof
our century.Many hold the opinionthatthe distinction
betweenabsolute
and ordained power led to theologicaldeviations,especiallyduringthe
fourteenth
century,in which the reliabilityof God's characterand the
of
reliability created realitywould no longerbe guaranteed,forit would
implythat God could deviate fromthe order he created before.
The heart of this critiqueis as follows.The originalfunctionof the
and potentia
distinction
betweenpotentia
ordinata
absoluta
was to explainthat
God could have created, by his potentiaabsoluta
another
,
physical and
moral order than He factuallydid. Given the order of thiscreated realwhich
absolutaonly is a hypotheticalrealm of possibilities,
ityhis potentia
were not realisedand neverwill be. OtherwiseGod would deviatefrom
his earlier intentionsand fromthe order to which He decided before,
which would implicateunreliability
and arbitrariness
of God and of the
order which He created.
Later on in medievaltheology,however,one took over what is called
ofpotentia
absoluta
(thephrasewas introducedby Ober'operationalisation'
absoluta
as a capacitywhichreally
man).2Theologiansstartedto see potentia
1 Cf.fora
ordinata
and
oforigin
anddevelopment
oftheconcepts
potentia
description
TheDialectic
intheHighandLateMiddle
W.J. Courtenay,
absoluta
Ages,
ofOmnipotence
potentia
andOmnipotence
inMedieval
in:T. Rudavsky
Omniscience
, Dordrecht/Bos(ed.),Divine
Philosophy
in: Historisches
Wrterbuch
der
ton/Lancaster
absoluta/
ordinata,
1985,243-69;id.,Potentia
undK. Grnder,
Bd. 7, Darmstadt
1989,1157-62;
id.,
, Herausg.
v.J. Ritter
Philosophie
A History
andordained
1990.
andVolition.
Power,
ofabsolute
Capacity
oftheDistinction
Bergamo
2 Cf.H. A. Oberman,
: LateMedieval
toEarly
ViaAntiqua
andViaModerna
Prolegomena
Vivarium
, 38,2
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2000
18:14:18 PM
POWER
ANDABSOLUTE
ORDAINED
223
18:14:18 PM
224
HENRIVELDHUIS
Lombard
(ed.),La puissance
Luther
etprsents
O. Boulnois
, Textestraduits
a.o.,Paris1994,279-85.
par
5 See fora Dutchtranslation
withcommentary
ofLectura
I 39:Johannes
DunsScotus.
envrijheid.
I 39, Ingeleid,
Lectura
vertaald
en vancommentaar
voorzien
door
Contingentie
A. Vos,H. Veldhuis,
A. H. Looman-Graaskamp,
E. Dekker
en N. W. denBok,Zoetermeer1992.TheEnglish
translation:
DunsScotus.
andFreedom
with
, Translated
John
Contingency
an Introduction
A. Vos,a.o.,Dordrecht/Boston/London
andCommentary
1994.
by
6 Thistermwasintroduced
DunsScotus.
Some
byA. Vos,Onthephilosophy
ofthe
young
semantical
andlogical
andMetaphysics.
Semantics
Studies
ded, in:E. P. Bos(ed.),Mediaeval
aspects
icated
toL. M. deRijkj
Ph.D. ontheoccasion
at
, Nijmegen
1985,195-220,
ofhis60thbirthday
on Scotus'theory
ofsynchronic
en
213.See foran exposition
A. Vos,Kennis
contingency:
Eenkritische
vanhet
absolute
inwijsbegeerte
evidentialisme
entheologie
, Kampen
Noodzakelykheid.
analyse
1981,81-7,269-74.
18:14:18 PM
ANDABSOLUTE
ORDAINED
POWER
225
agente
perintellectum
potente
agere
rectaeet tarnen
nonnecessario
conformiter
legi
agerelegirectae".
8 Cf.forthis'canonistic
ofthedistinction
ordinata/
absoluta:
interpretation'
potentia
potentia
1985(op.cit
1990(op.cit
., above,n. 1),251v.,264v.; Gourtenay
., above,n. 1),
Courtenay
92-5.
9 Scotuscalls
from
ordinata
Tacerede iure',acting
from
absoluta
acting
potentia
potentia
Tacere
de facto'
toGourtenay
1985[op.cit.,
above,n. 1),276,n. 43,
(I 44, 3).According
theterms
'de facto'and 'de iure'originally
wereusedin connection
with'impotentia'.
Therecan be an 'impotency'
basedon legallimits
limits
('de iure')or on physical
('de
Understood
likethattheterm'de facto'doesnotconcern
absofacto').
actualising
potentia
luta
, as VandenBrink1993(op.cit.,
above,n. 3),79 suggests.
18:14:18 PM
226
HENRIVELDHUIS
18:14:18 PM
ANDABSOLUTE
ORDAINED
POWER
227
18:14:18 PM
228
HENRIVELDHUIS
18:14:18 PM
ANDABSOLUTE
POWER
ORDAINED
229
18:14:18 PM
230
HENRIVELDHUIS
15Cf.on therelation
Wolter
hismorallawsandhisessence:
between
God'sacting,
Freedom
1986(op.cit
Native
., above,n. 4), 13-5,22-3,29; A. B. Wolter,
oftheWillas a Key
DunsScotus
totheEthics
in:A. B. Wolter,
,
O.F.M.,ThePhilosophical
ofJohn
Theology
ofScotus,
A. Vos,De ethiat 159-62;
IthacaN.Y./London
ed. M. McCordAdams,
1990,148-62,
44 (1993),17-32;A. Vosa.o. 1995(op.cit
sche
vanDunsScotus
.,
, in:KerkenTheologie,
optie
above,n. 14),85-92.
18:14:18 PM
The TheoryofDivinePermission
3 Ordinario I 47
to Scotus
According
EEF DEKKER
1. Introduction
The questionsas to whetherGod permitssin and why He does so, have
played a significantrole in the historyof Christian thought. These
If we want to analyse a theologian'stheory
questionsremainsignificant.
of divine permissionof sin, the question must firstbe answered what
exactlypermissionamountsto. In otherwords,we have to considerour
notionof permissionbeforeapplyingit to the case of permissionofsin.
More particularly,
the questionwhetheror not an act of permissionconsistsin an act of will is an importantone. For if God permitssin, does
He willit, and if He willsit, does thismean thatHe is the cause of sin?
betweenat least two notionsof permission
Moreover,one mustdistinguish
relevanthere. One is deontic
permission,well-knownin deonticlogic and
ethics.It says thatsomethingis permittedif thereis no moral obligation
to preventit. The otheris what I callfactualpermission.That is, roughly,
the case if a stateof affairsis factualwhile some person had the power
and means to avoid it, but does not want to avoid it.
This articleprovidessome commentsupon Scotus' main texton permission,and, in an Appendix,an Englishtranslationof it. The textcan
be foundin Ordinatio
I 47.1 Here, Scotus answersthe questionabout the
relationshipbetweenpermissionand volition.First,and most important,
we will analyse the distinctionquite closely,and in the course of this
analysismy main conclusionswill emerge.One of the more importantis
thatScotus has in facttwo theoriesof permission.Secondly,I will make
some further
systematiccommentsupon the itemsfound.
1 Thereexistsa Dutchtranslation
of and commentary
on thistext,published
in:
A. VosJaczn.,
H. Veldhuis,
E. Dekker,
N.W.denBok,A.J.Beck(eds.),Johannes
Duns
Scotus
Godenwerkelijkheid
over
yTeksten
, Zoetermeer
1995,77-85.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
Vivarium,
38,2
18:14:28 PM
232
EEF DEKKER
Two Theories
2. Sketch
ofPermission
of Scotus1
I 47 is whetheror not the divineperThe questiondiscussedin Ordinatio
missionis an act of will. On the one hand, permissionmustbe such an
act. For as Scotus implieshere and explains elsewhere,only by having
an act of will can God have certainknowledgeof futurecontingents
e.g. that thisperson will sin ( 1). An object mustbe knownin order to
be permitted.2
But, on the otherhand, permissionis one of the fivetraditional 'signs' ( praeceptio,
consilium
, permissio,
3), whichcannot
operatio
prohibido,
count as genuine acts of the divinewill ( 2). How can thisdilemmabe
solved?
Scotus startshis explanationby sketchinga small part of his general
theoryof willing( 3). This general theorywas given in I 39.4 He conand thensubsequendyappliesthe results
centrateson the humanwillfirst,
of his analysisof the human will later on to the divinewill.5
Our volition,says Scotus, can be twofold,namelyto will a thingand
to not-willa thing.'To not-wilP{nolle)a thingis to will thatit is not the
case. In my view Scotus uses thisexpressionin orderto have a clear disnonvelie)and to have a will whichis
tinctionbetweennot having a will (3
directedtowardthe non-existenceof something{nolle).He does not stress
thispoint,but seems to regardit as sufficiently
explainedby sayingthat
2 Gf.Ordinatio
I 47, 5. Anexplanation
oftherelationship
between
divine
knowledge
in Lectura
II d. 34-37.See also
anddivinewillcanbe found,
offuture
e.g.,
contingents
' ParisLectures
in:AllanB. Wolter
AllanB. Wolter,
onGod's
Scotus
Events,
Knowledge
ofFuture
Ithaca
McCordAdams,
DunsScotus
The
, ed. Marilyn
O.F.M., Philosophical
ofJohn
Theology
N.Y./London
1990,285-333.
3 Theseare theexpressions
and severalothers.
Cf. Peter
usedby PeterLombard
19713,I d. 45 cap.6 (195),p. 310;
inIV Libris
Distinctae
Sententiae
, Grottaferrata
Lombard,
howI d. 45 c.a.;S.Th.I q. 19a. 12.Variant
a.o. Scriptum
ThomasAquinas,
expressions,
Bonaventure
andothers.
ever,areusedbyScotus(seebelow),
4 Ordinatio
waspubandtherefore
I 39 hasbeenregarded
as notwritten
byScotus,
recent
research
A ofvol.VI oftheVatican
Edition.
inAppendix
lished
However,
byprof.
A of
B. Noonehas shownthatit mustcountas byScotus.See Manuscript
Timothy
PalatinaMS
Bibliotheca
Alnwick's
Determinationes
, VaticanCity,Biblioteca
Apostolica,
T.B.
G. Gi,A.B.Wolter,
edition
ofthistextis forthcoming:
1805,fol.104r.A critical
the
NY. See especially
Alnwick
Noone(eds.),Guillelmus
, Determinationes
, St. Bonaventure
I 39 into
from
Ordinatio
in thispublication.
We havetranslated
Introduction
keypassages
I 39 desJohannes
DunsScotus
inderOrdinatio
undKontingenz
German:
seeA. Vosetal.,Freiheit
,
I 39 is
translation
ofLectura
AnEnglish
61 (1998),99-136.
in:Wissenschaft
undWeisheit,
I 39.See 48-54,transanditssystematic
contents
arethesameas in Ordinatio
available,
andN.W.den
E. Dekker
A.H.Looman-Graaskamp,
H. Velduis,
latedin A. VosJaczn.,
1994,
andFreedom.
Lectura
1 39,Dordrecht/Boston/London
DunsScotus,
Bok,John
Contingency
108-129.
5 A procedure
whichScotususesmoreoften,
e.g.,in I 39.
18:14:28 PM
233
sW-p
s-Wp
s-W-p
forthe
a subject;
W: operator
forwilling;
constant,
p: constant
(s: individual
denoting
in front
of
actsarethosein whichthereis no negation
So the'positive'
objectwilled).
ofNicodenBokas wellas in
*W' Pleasenotethatin thecontribution
theoperator
for'nolle'whilehereitis used
andFreedom
above,n. 4),s-Wpis reserved
cit.,
(op.
Contingency
for'nonvelie'.See alsobelow.
8 "Et
invelieefficax
et rernisin nobispotest
utveliedistinguatur
distingui,
utrumque
sedsi potest
nontantum
essevoliti,
'velieefficax'
sum:utdicatur
complacet
quovoluntati
dicitur
inesse,statim
efficax'
volitum
statim
qua nontanponit;itaetiam'nolitio
ponere
illuddestruit.
'Voluntas
remissa'
estqua
sedsi possit,
omnino
tumnolens
aliquid,
impedit
nonponitilludin esse,licetpossit
itaplacetvolitum,
ponereillud
quodtamenvoluntas
illudesse,licet
nolitum
in esse;'nolitio
remissa'
estqua itadisplicet
quodnonprohibeat
I 47,in: Opera
Omnia
arefrom
Allquotations
Ordinatio
, Vol.VI (Vatican
Edition),
possit."
Rome1963.
9 HereI translate
I takeitas neutral,
thatis tosay,
as 'ineffective'.
theLatin'remissus'
andthelike.
a connotation
ofinaccurateness
without
18:14:28 PM
234
EEF DEKKER
ineffective
volitionis the act of will in the case of non-realisation
of the
willed.
an
Scotus
ineffective
volition
is
not
the
However,
thing
explains,
a
resultof a lack of power
for
to
realise
the
willed
must
be
,
power
thing
assumed as well.
[3] is parallel to [1], witha nolitioninvolvedinsteadof a volition.In
nolitioncan be seen as the effective
non-realisationof
[3], the effective
the not-willedobject. [4] An ineffective
nolitionapplies to a not-willed
object that is realised,althoughit could have been stopped frombeing
realised.There is, parallel to the case of the ineffective
volition,no lack
of power involved.
Subsequently,permissionof an evil thingis then definedin termsof
thisfourthcategory,the ineffective
nolition( 5).
- the
In ourselves
an 'ineffective
seemsto be- strictly
therefore,
not-willing'
spoken
ofan evilknown
thataboutwhich
byme.Foronedoesnotsaytopermit
permission
orthatwhich
I knownothing,
is donebysomeone
elseandwhich
pleasesme- no,
thatwhichI knowto be badlydonebysomeone
else,butwhichI do notprevent,
I permit.10
Scotus also observes,as we see, that the object which is permittedmust
be known
to us, since we cannot reasonablybe said to permitthatwhich
we do not know.
BeforeScotus applies his distinction
to the divinewill,he firstattaches
it to the well-knownmedieval doctrineof the signavoluntatis
(commonly
applied to the divine will only; Scotus widens its scope). How are the
in acts of will connectedto the fivesigns?In the case
fourdistinctions
of [1], the effective
volition,thereare two signsto be connected.Firstly,
if it is about just one person willing,the sign is fulfilment
(adimpletio).
Secondly,if thereare two personsinvolvedand the effectstemsfromthe
will of the otherperson,it is a precept(praeceptio
). To [2], the ineffective
volition,apply perhaps, Scotus adds counsel (consilium),
persuasionor
advice. To [4], the ineffective
volition,apply permission(of course),and
nolition,appliesprevention(prohibitio
dissuasion,and to [3], the effective
).
All thisdoes not look immediately
obviousto someonewho is acquainted
with the standard Lombardian and Thomist interpretation
of the five
not
the
the
For
Scotus
does
widen
of
scope
only
signs to apply
signs.11
themto the human will as well as to the divinewill,but he also re-inter10"In nobisigitur
- proprie
- videtur
mali
nolitio
remissa
dicta
essepermissio
alicuius
illudde quonihilscio,velilludquoditafitab alio
quodscio:nonenimdicorpermittere
- sedilludquodscioab aliomalefieri,
sednonprohibeo,
hocpermiti."
quod
placetmihi,
11Cf.
aregiven.
note3, in whichsomereferences
18:14:28 PM
235
in this respectI
prtsthem to some extent.One of the characteristics
take to be the fact that he does not allow a deontic
meaning of some of
For
the signs,but only a factualmeaning.12 instance,'precept'is not that
which is prescribedbut not necessarilyobeyed, but that which is factufunctions
mainlyto show
allyobeyed.I thinkthatScotus' re-interpretation
that his thinkingdoes fitin with more traditionalthoughton the matter,in which thereis supposed to be an account of the signavoluntatis.
thatthe fourdifferent
Scotusresumesby stating,in carefulformulations,
acts of will apply to God ( 7):13
suchthat,as oneact
to applyto God,namely
couldbe supposed
Thisdistinction
ordissimilitude
innercontrareity
andnot-willing
ofhimis willing
(andthiswithout
thatitis about'effective
inthatact),so itcouldbe saidofsomeofthewilled
objects
is
thatthatwilling
and in thesamewayaboutsomenot-willed
objects,
willing',
- butofother[not-willed]
it cannotbe said.Andthen
effective
objects
not-willing,
tothoseobjects,
withregard
itcouldbe saidthatGodhasan ineffective
not-willing
toprevent
doesnot-will
in sucha waythatHe nevertheless
which
He doesnot-will
Andinthiswaythe
ofGodcanbe calledhispermission.
andthisnot-willing
them;
to the
withrespect
to thedivine
actin Godrelates
will,in so faras it is regarded
object.14
not-willit.15It does
So, for God to permitan evil act is to ineffectively
He factuallydoes
not please God that evil acts happen, but nevertheless
not preventthemfromhappening.
Scotus was carefuland hesitantabout the applicationof permissionin
thisway to God's will. In fact,in the next paragraph( 8) he startsoff
by saying:"If this solution,however,does not please (because the notwillingof whateveris the case, could seem to be attendedwitha certain
of thatvolitionand will),thenit can be said . . ."
sadnessand imperfection
Scotus seems eitherto formulatehis own worryor that of his readers.
12Anexception
in 8. Cf.note18.
occurs
13Careful,
sincemostverbsarein theirrealis
onlythelastclause
'poneretur');
('posset',
mood('potest
tensenon-coniunctive
a present
contains
dici').
14"Sedistadistinctio
possetponiin Deo, itaquodsicutunusactuseiusestvelieet
in ilioactuin se),itaponeretur
veldissimilitudine
nolle(ethocsinecontrarietate
super
nollesuumsuperquaedamobiecta
et similiter
eiusvolita'velieefficax',
obiecta
quaedam
Dei remissa
dicinolitio
non.Ettuncposset
autem
nolita,
efficax,
respectu
super
quaedam
Dei
et haecnolitio
nolietea prohibere;
illorum
obiectorum,
quodtarnen
quae-itanoliet
sicse
transit
dicipermissio
eius, etitaactusin Deo,inquantum
superobiectum,
potest
divinam."
habetad voluntatem
15Leaving
as 'nollepro'nolitio
remissa'
thatScotusexplains
asideforthemoment
with 4) or,as
should
be 'nonprohibere'
which
hibere',
(inaccordance
stricdy
speaking
seemto have,'nonvelieprohibere'.
somemanuscripts
18:14:28 PM
236
EEF DEKKER
For is it not the case that somehow it sounds strangeto say that God
God seems to restrainhis willing
can will or nill somethingineffectively?
to grasp; divinewill and realitydo not seem to cohere.
in a way difficult
Scotus thereforeprovidesanothersolution,albeit verybriefly.This soluact of willing(i.e. the absence of a
tion takes into account the negative
volitionor nolitionproper)instead of the positiveact. He says:
is the
'outside
[God]'(orthesign)is thatwhich
[. . .] itcanbe saidthatpermission
which
is a sign
Thisis thepermission
thedivine
is against
butwhich
result,
precept.
willitself
ofthedivine
will;butto this[sign]in thedivine
onlythenot
corresponds
whichis thenegaor thenotnot-willing,
to happen,
to prevent
something
willing
notpositive.16
actandtherefore
divine
tionofa positive
Permissionis now taken as the 'sign' of not not-willing.Scotus does
and ineffective
not need any furtherdistinctionsinto effective
here, for
between positiveand negativeacts of will does the
now the difference
work.Here we can apply a 'complete' square of opposition,fornow the
lower cornerpointscan be used.17
Anotherfeatureof thisparagraphis thatwe see Scotus payingimplicit
and factualpermission.He says
betweendeontic
attentionto the distinction
thatthatwhichis permittedis againstthe divineprecept.That is to say,
that which is deonticallynot permittedcan be- but of course need not
be- factuallypermitted.Some sins are in fact the case, while forbidden
by God, and yet theyare not preventedto come into existence,while
permitted.18
The nextparagraph( 9) adds anotherimportantdetail to thissecond
theoryof permission.God's permissionwas perceivedas an act of not
but Scotus proceeds by adding a positivesecond-orderact of
not-willing,
will. He says:
notin this
be understood
should
to allow'[volens
Andwhatis called'willing
sinere]
butthatHe hasa reflexive
He permits,
ofthatwhich
willing
waythatHe hasa direct
offers
act:forhisintellect
beingwillsinorsinstohiswill,
[thefact]thatthishuman
willthatthat
aboutthis(forHe cannot
andfirst
hiswilldoesnothavea volition
doesnotwill
hiswillwhich
He canunderstand
human
sin);secondly,
beingcommits
16"... potest
estquodeffectus
extra(velsignum)
diciquodpermissio
sit,quodtamen
- etistaestpermissio
voluntatis
estcontra
divinae;
divinum,
quaeestsignum
praeceptum
alinisinonvelieprohibere
divina
huicautemnoncorrespondet
aliquidin ipsavolntate
nonest
etperconsequens
actusdivini
sivenonnolle,quodestnegatio
positivi
quidfieri,
positivus."
17See alsonote7. Notnotis thelowerleftcornerpomt
(s-W-p).
willing
18Here,'precept'
in
with'precept'
in contrast
mustbe takento be a deontic
notion,
6. Cf.note12.
18:14:28 PM
237
andthenHe canwillthathiswillwills'notwilling
this'.In thiswayitis said
this,
thatHe willingly
allowsand voluntarily
and voluntarily
allows,willingly
permits
. . .'9
permits.
That is to say: God wantshis will not to have a volition.Scotus develthe expressionof Lombard and
ops thisthoughtas a way of interpreting
or
Augustine:'volens sinere' ('willingto allow').20It is not about a direct,
will- such a will God cannothave concerningsin- , it mustbe
first-order
about a reflexiveor second-orderact of will. The fact that God cannot
willsin seemsto be the reasonwhythe firsttheoryis not the best account.
In the firsttheory,thereis and remainsa positiveact of divine willing
concerningsin. In the second, there is only a negativeact, combined
witha positivesecond order act that has as object not sin itself,but the
negativeact of will.
3. Further
Comments
Systematic
In this section,I proceed by makinga few briefand tentativeremarks
about Scotus' theorizing.
A firstremarkconcernsthe factthat Scotus switchesfromone theory
to another.The second theorybetterexplains the way in which God's
will is and remainsconnectedto factualstatesof affairs.There is no systematicambiguity
about theway God willsand does not will,forinstance,
a sinfulhuman act. He does not will the sinfulact itselfin a directway,
but has a volitionabout the absence of His directwill. In thisway God
is involvedwith,but not responsiblefor a creaturelysinfulact. In the
firsttheoryGod seems to restrainin a way difficult
to grasp.
A second remarkapplies to the second theory.The basic concept of
thatis, not willingto prevent(s-W-p).
permissionhere is 'not not-willing',
We may ponder about the usefulnessof a combined concept of permission as it is used, for instance,in Aquinas' theoryof permission.He
19"Et quoddicitur'volens
hocpotest
nonquodhabeatvelierectum
sinere',
intelligi
circailludquodpermittit,
sedactumreflexm:
offert
enimvoluntati
suaehuncpeccaturumvelpeccare,
et primovoluntas
eiuscircahuncnonhabetvelie(velieenimipsum
haberepeccatum
nonpotest);
secundo
voluntatem
suamnonvolentem
potest
intelligere
- etitadicitur
velievoluntatem
suam'nonveliehoc',
volens
sinere
et
hoc,ettuncpotest
voluntrie
volens
etvoluntrie
..
sinere,
permittere
permittere.
20Thisexpression
occurs
in Lombard's
I 46 cap.3 (199)section
Sententiae,
11,p. 316;
I 47 cap.1 (204)sect.2,p. 322;cap.2 (205)sect.1,p. 323.SeealsoAugustine,
Enchiridion
,
in:Joseph
Barbel(ed.),Enchiridion/
Dsseldorf
Handbchlein,
1960,cap.96 (p. 160)and 100
(p. 168).
18:14:28 PM
238
EEF DEKKER
18:14:28 PM
239
26See myRijker
enpredestinatie
indetheologie
vanJacobus
Arminius
danMidas.Vryheid}
genade
1993,113-22.
), Zoetermeer
(1559-1609
18:14:28 PM
240
EEF DEKKER
Appendix:
I 47
Translationof Ordinatio
18:14:28 PM
241
18:14:28 PM
242
EEF DEKKER
27Thisconcerns
I d. 41 n. 50.
Ordinatio
18:14:28 PM
Freedom
in Regardto Opposite
Actsand Objects
in Scotus3Lectura I 39, 45-54
NICO DEN BOK
Vivarium
, 38,2
18:14:39 PM
NICODENBOK
244
in things:
The divine
willcauseofcontingency
how?
in things:
willas causeofcontingency
thehuman
Studying
in regard
andacts
to opposite
(a) Freedom
objects
andtwofold
(b)Twofold
contingency
possibility
of(a) and(b) to thedivine
will.
Application
possibility
48
49-50
i
'
2 The samething
to
It canbe reduced
an effect:
or not-willing
canbe saidofwilling
internal
relaof
the
an
Cf.
E.
Gilson's
or
actualized).
analysis
object
being
not-willing
willing
'si cettetroisime
andeffects:
in regard
to opposite
tionsbetween
freedom
acts,objects
la deuelleen dcoule travers
forme
ne se confond
de libert
pas avecla premire,
doncaussi
desobjetsopposs,
entre
estchoisir
carchoisir
entredesactesopposs
xime,
ad opposita
actus
ad oppositos
fondela libertas
des effets
Ainsi,la libertas
opposs.
produire
Introduction
in:id.,JeanDunsScot.
la libertas
ad oppositos
et,parcettedernire,
effectus'
objecta
sespositions
Paris1952,586-7.
fondamentales
3 Willing
as: sWpands-Wp.Willing
actscanbe formalized
objects:
opposite
opposite
for
'W' is theoperator
a subject;
constant,
denoting
sWpandsW-p.V is an individual
fortheobjectwilled.
is a constant
willing;
'p'
4 47,at theend:"... sedex hocquodhabetlibertatem
ad actusoppositos,
respectu
To mymind(cf.
etcontingentia."
torumconsequitur
obiectorum
duplex
possibilitas
opposi
18:14:39 PM
IN REGARD
ACTSANDOBJECTS
FREEDOM
TO OPPOSITE
245
Article
2. Question
ofthePresent
The issue of the presentarticleis Scotus' view on the two aspects of
freedomas it can be derived fromhis analysisin 45-54. How preciselyare the notionsof contingencyand possibilityconnectedwithfreedom in regard to opposite objects and opposite acts respectively?
This
connectionseems problematicsince we can make two observations.
, thereare fourpossiblecombinationsof diachronicand
(I) Systematically
on the one hand and freedomin
and possibility5
synchronic
contingency
regardto oppositeacts and oppositeobjects on the otherhand6:
willssomething,
it can at a latermoment
not(1) Whenthewillat onemoment
willthatthing
willssomething,
it can at a latermoment
will
(2) Whenthewillat onemoment
itsopposite
willssomething,
itcanat thesamemoment
not(3) Whenthewillat onemoment
willthatthing
willssomething,
itcanat thesamemoment
will
(4) Whenthewillat onemoment
itsopposite
Scotusconsidersstatements
(1) and (2) applicableto the human will ( 48),
but not to the divine will ( 53). For unlikethe human will, the divine
andFreedom
to 'in ista
., above,n. 1), 113)'ex istalibertate'
(op.cit
Contingency
( 47) refers
totali
libertate
voluntatis'
in regard
to opposite
actsandfreedom
in
( 46),so to freedom
toopposite
andnottofreedom
in regard
toopposite
(andeventoeffects),
regard
objects
voluntatis'
is,again,bothkindsoffreedom.
objects
only.Cf.also 49: 'illalibertas
5 Contingency
andpossibility
aretreated
forreasons
ofsimplicity.
Laterinthis
together
their
section
willbe elucidated.
respective
meanings
6 Formalized:
diachrony
synchrony
in regard
freedom
to opposite
& Ms-Wt2p sWtlp
acts
& Ms-WtIp
sWtlP
freedom
in regard
to opposite
& MsW|2-p sWptl
& MsWt-p
objects sWtlp
- unlike
In theseformulas
thoseusedin Contingency
andFreedom
(<
op.citabove,n. 1),n. 46,
which
arealsousedinsomearticles
theResearch
DunsScotus
49-50,
published
by
Group
John
- in all fourcasesthetime-index
sofar
is connected
withW. Foran explanation
ofthis
' text
seebelow,
section
n. 17ff.
connection,
, especially
fiomScotus
Answering
We canseethatall fourpossibilities
shown
in thescheme
arepossible
(non-contradicIn fact,
indeed.
ifonlythepossibilities
oftheleftcolumn
werepossible
andthoseof
tory)
theright
onewereimpossible,
onecandeducethatwilling
ornot-willing
p or -p at one
moment
must
be necessary.
In other
diachronic
(andhenceatevery
words,
moment)
single
- whether
as such
thatofvarious
actsandobjects
or thatofvarious
contingency
objects
be butreduced
tosynchronic
ifsynchronic
grasped
byoneact(cf.n. 19)- cannot
necessity
is considered
to be impossible.
Scotus'analysis
doesnotexplicitly
showthis
contingency
sideofthecoin;yet,it is verymuchat thebackofhismindandit is mosthelpful
in
a morecomplete
oftheimpact
ofhisanalysis.
Cf.Contingency
elucidating
understanding
andFreedom
above,n. 1),Introduction,
(op.cit.,
p. 20f.
18:14:39 PM
246
NICODENBOK
acts
50 and51
.
.
will
.
53
and
54
divine
(and acts)
objects
For 48,cf.Contingency
andFreedom
cit.
115:in theexam, above,n. 1),commentary,
(op.
andhating
actsinstead
Scotusseemsto think
ofopposite
of,as announced
pleofloving
at theoutset
of 48,opposite
ForScotus,
or hating
however,
something
objects.
loving
in the
can be considered
to be an objectofthewill.In general,
something
'objectum'
13thcentury
is a termprimarily
a grammatical
derived
from
a linguistic
context;
object
canontologically
be an objectoran act.
18:14:39 PM
IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITEACTSANDOBJECTS
FREEDOM
247
18:14:39 PM
248
NICODENBOK
vande werkgroep
alwetendheid
ThomasvanAquino,
Utrecht
1982,
, in:Jaarboek
goddelijke
ofcontingency,
on Scotus'innovation
ofthenotion
alsopublished
59-60.)S. Knuuttila
butindependently
ofVos.Theformer
usesdifferent,
more'phenomenological'
terms
(like
See hisTime
inscholasticism,
in:S. Knuuttila
'statistical'
instead
of'diachronic').
andmodality
the
chain
Studies
inthehistory
, Dordrecht/Boston/London
ofideas
(ed.),Reforging
great
ofbeing.
Modalities
in medieval
York
, London/New
1981,117-37.Gf.also S. Knuuttila,
philosophy
1993,Iff.and 139-49.
offacin thesimultaneity
In an earlier
Duns'specific
insight
stageofScotus-research
DunsScot
tualandpossible
volition
seems
tohavebeennoticed
, 587:
bye.g.E. Gilson
(Jean
le contraire
de ce qu'elleveutde causerle con"Unevolont
estdonccapablede vouloir
the
traire
de ce qu'ellecause,dansle temps
mmeo ellele veutet cause."However,
sucha sentence
is stillambiguous.
Moreover,
expression
'capablede' in thissentence
tobe a paraphrase,
nota clarifying
ofwhatcanbe readinScotus'
appears
interpretation
of
thesystematic
text.Lastbutnotleast,Gilsondoesnotshowthathe realized
impact
in sucha sentence;
infact,
he explicitly
whatis meant
saysthathe didnotfinda specific
in Scotianthought
).
(seehisIntroduction
system
14Scotusdemonstrates
ofthestatement
in twoways:(a) byan analysis
thispossibility
thegrammaticalat thesamemoment'
'Thewillwilling
at onemoment
cannot-will
using
and
distinction
of'sensus
divisionis'
and'sensus
(seefurther
Contingency
logical
compositionis'
thatwilling
andnot-willing
arenonFreedom
, above,n. 1),115,12If.);(b)byshowing
(op.cit.
andFreedom
essential
ofthewill(seefurther
, 119f.).
Contingency
properties
18:14:39 PM
FREEDOM
IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITE
ACTSANDOBJECTS
249
This distinction
is not studiedforits own sake; it is adduced in order to
the
notion
of contingencyinvolvedin (free)willing.
analyze
Of course,thisdoes not explain the particularsuccessionin question.
There may be a very plausible reason for it, however. I have already
remarkedthatScotus,explainingthe cause of contingency
in things,searches
for the rationale of a specificproperty:their non-necessaryj actuality
.
Consideringthispoint of departureit seems a matterof course that he,
afterhavingintroducedthe twofoldfreedom,primarilythinksnot onlyof
twofactualacts of willing,both for the human will ( 46) and for the
divinewill ( 53), but also of twofactualobjectsof willing,again both for
the human will ( 46) and for the divinewill ( 53). In between( 49of one factualact
52) and at the end ( 54) Duns shows the compatibility
and itspossible
as
well
as
that
of
one
factual
opposite,
object and its possible opposite
both
for
the
human
will
and
for
the divine will.
again,
Thus, the opposites
, act and object, are in factintroducedas beingfactual,
whereasonly later does it appear that theycan also be possible.
This departurefromfactuality
introducesa complicationin the analywhich
seems
to
be
sis,
responsibleforsome alternationsin Scotus' exposition.Startingthe discussionof the human will in 45-47 and of the
divinewillin 53 Scotus immediatelyobservesan asymmetry
betweenfreedom in regardto oppositeacts and that to oppositeobjects withrespect
to the factualityof these acts and objects respectively.In freedomin
whereas in
regardto oppositeacts, he says, thereis some 'imperfectio',
freedomin regardto oppositeobjects thereis not. What does he mean
by this?A 'perfectio'is, generally,a qualityor propertythatmakessomethingmore complete.In 53 it is clearlysuggested,in particular,thatif
a will needs two factualacts, willingand not-willing,
in order to will all
that it wills,the will is less 'perfect'than a will which can will all that
it wills by one factualact. A will is more complete if it is capable of
is that the posgraspingall its objects in one act. Thus, the asymmetry
of
an
and
sibility factually
having object factually
havingits opposite(by one
act) as such is a completingfeaturefor the will (see 46), whereas the
possibilityoffactually
having an act of will and factually
having its opposite is not.
A will complete
in all respects
is immutable(withregard to its act) and
infinite(withregardto its objects).15Such a will is the divinewill,which
15For 46 the
of'autem'is ofsomeimportance.
Howexactly
is freeinterpretation
domin regard
to opposite
in regard
to opposite
acts?My
objects
opposedto freedom
reconstruction
ofScotus'
train
ofthought
wouldbe thatthedistinction
ofone-many
objects
18:14:39 PM
250
NICODENBOK
18:14:39 PM
FREEDOM
IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITEACTSANDOBJECTS
251
18:14:39 PM
252
NICODENBOK
18:14:39 PM
FREEDOM
IN REGARD
TO OPPOSITEACTSANDOBJECTS
253
18:14:39 PM
254
NICODENBOK
27See forsomeobservations
thehistory
ofboththetermandtheconcept
concerning
inregard
'freedom
toopposite
acts/
inAugustine:
NicodenBok,Freedom
objects'
ofthewill.
A systematic
andbiographical
onhuman
sounding
ofAugustine's
, in:Augustiniana,
thoughts
willing
44 (1994),237-70,
II (2),VI andVII (3);inBernard
ofClairvaux:
id.,Human
esp.section
anddivine
inthetheology
A systematic
freedom
ofBernard
, in:Bijdragen,
ofClairvaux.
analysis
tijd'
schrift
voorfilosofie
entheologie,
54 (1993),271-95,
II; inOckham:
id.,Scotus
esp.section
a (postmodern
Some
theory
ofcontingency
from
perspective:
ofthenotion
ofconimportant
developments
DunsScotus
, in:Sileo1995(<
.,' above,n. 1),431-44,section
tingency
after
II; in Surez
op.t
andMolina:E. Dekker,
Thereception
inMolina
andSurez
ofScotus
, in:
theoiy
ofcontingency
Sileo1995{op.
cit.,above,n. 1),445-54.
18:14:39 PM
and Remission
Oresmeon Intension
of Qualitiesin His Commentary
on Aristotle's
Physics
ST. KIRSCHNER
The purposeof thispaper is to give an account of how Oresme understood the intensionand remissionof qualities in his Commentaryon
. In order to avoid misunderstandings
it must firstbe
Aristotle'sPhysics
stressedthatthe QuestionsV.6 to V.9, which are to be consideredhere,
of the intensityof qualido not deal with the geometricrepresentation
ties inheringin a substance,a notionthat is well knownfromOresme's
"Tractatusde configurationibus
qualitatumet motuum"but is onlybriefly
} Rather,
and incidentally
touchedupon in his Commentaryon the Physics
the point of discussionin Questions V.6 to V.92 is, how the intension
and remissionof a qualitytakesplace, thatis- to mentiononlytwo com- whetherthereis in
mon theories
,
any instantof alterationanotherqualor
accidental
form
or
whether
the intensionoccurs by adding new
ity
of
to
an
the
already existingone.
parts
quality
The question,how the intensionand remissionof qualitiesoccurs,was
a "fundamental
Aristotlehimproblemof scholasticnaturalphilosophy".3
selfdid not pay much attentionto the problemof intensionand remission of qualities.In the eighthchapterof his CategoriesAristotlesays:4
"Qualifications[xa rcoux]admit of a more and a less; for one thingis
called more pale or less pale than another,and morejust than another.
Moreover,it itselfsustainsincrease (for what is pale can still become
paler) not in all cases though,but in most". With the latter remark
Aristotleraises the problem5whetherconditionslike justice and health
1See Stefan
Kommentar
desAristoteles.
mit
Oresmes
Kommentar
Nicolaus
zurPhysik
Kirschner,
Edition
derQuaestionen
3 und4 deraristotelischen
sowie
vonvier
zuBuch
zuBuch
Quaestionen
Physik
5, Stuttgart
1997,26-7,457-8.
2 Foran edition
oftheseQuestions
seeKirschner
1997(op.cit
., above,n. 1),395-417.
3SeeAnneliese
derscholastischen
Maier,%wei
, 3rded.,Roma
Naturphilosophie
Grundprobleme
1968(= Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik,
2).
4 Aristotle,
The English
translation
is derived
fromTheComplete
, 8.1026-30.
Categories
Works
TheRevised
ed.Jonathan
Vol.1,NewJersey/Oxford:
Translation,
Barnes,
Oxford
ofAristotle.
Princeton
Press,1991,17.
University
5 Aristotle,
la2.
, 8.10b30-l
Categories
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2000
Vivarium,
38,2
18:14:48 PM
256
ST. KIRSCHNER
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME
ON INTENSION
257
18:14:48 PM
258
ST. KIRSCHNER
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME
259
18:14:48 PM
260
ST. KIRSCHNER
With regard to the way in which the increase or decrease of a qualoccurs by additionor loss of degreesOresme confineshimity'sintensity
selfto a ratherbriefaccount,which is mainlybased on an analogywith
thatOresme does
It is noteworthy
the increaseor decrease of quantities.21
in his account of the additiontheorybetweenessentialor
not distinguish
formaland materialor accidental (or individual)parts of the quality's
accidentalform.As A. Maier pointed out,22the purpose of this distinction, which was introducedby William of Ware, was to take into considerationthat an increase in the intensityof a qualitydoes not involve
an intensionof the quality'sspecificnature,since heat remainsheat irrespectiveof how intensiveit is. By statingthat the intensiononly takes
is avoided.
place in the material,but not the essentialparts,thisdifficulty
However,in Oresme'saccountthereis no traceat all of such a distinction.
of a
Nearly the whole discussionin Qu. V.7 comprisesthe refutation
which
are
the
addition
seriesof counter-arguments
nearly
theory,
against
completelyderivedfromWalterBurley'streatise"De intensioneet remisAs proponentsof the addition theorycan be mensione formarum".23
and WilliamOckham.26However,
tionedDuns Scotus,24
JohnDumbleton25
in order to understandOresme's discussionrightly,one has to bear in
'x' caliditates
cum10frigidhabere
estmateriam
remisse
habere,
<quia>,sicutimpossibile
<ita> impossibile
esthabereunumcumunoprecise,
itatibus,
posquiatunc<materia>
essecalidainsummo,
necdecenter
setseparali
ab eisnechaberet
posset
semper
equaliter
etsimsursum
estquodaliquidsitsimpliciter
sicutpatetexemplo;
unde,sicutimpossibile
et
unumpedemsursum
estquodaliquidsitsecundum
itaimpossibile
deorsum,
pliciter
in semidiametro
mundi."
sicutpotest
unumpedemdeorsum
tantum,
imaginan
per
21Qu. V.7,50-64:"Tuncestconclusio
istismodisfitintensio
peraddiquodsemper
sicutestin
et remissio
<et> gradusad gradum
tionem
deperditione,
partisad partem
estaddiIstudpersuadetur,
albedine.
caliditate,
lumine,
quiasicut<in> extensione
primo
itavidetur
utpatetde augmentatione,
tiopartis
ad partem
extensive,
quodin intensione
SecundodicitCommentator
id estgradualiter.
fitadditiopartispostpartem
intensive,
a.
M.
In
Frankfurt
Venetiis
1562
V, Comm.6, f. 21OD]
.,
1962),
Phys
(repr.
[Averroes,
ibieritplusde unoquamde alio,
ex extremis,
ergoequaliter
quodmediacomponuntur
dicitur
talesgradus.
et hocnonnisisecundum
Exemplariter
quodactiofita proportione
mot<iv>am
secundum
etmotus
mixti
maioris
igipredominantem,
qualitatem
inequalitatis
in eodem,et hocnonestnisiquiaibisunt
habetaliudexcedere
turunumcontrarium
comalterum
etplures
confirmari,
quiaomneexcedens
Quodpotest
gradus
partes.
plures
sensicutvidemus
etcumhocex aliquoaddito,
estexcessum,
ex tanto,
quantum
ponitur
videtur
aliamintensive,
excedat
inqualitatibus;
sibiliter
quodexceergo,si aliquacaliditas
a subiecto."
estforma
distincta
<si> iliaqualitas
ethocmaxime,
denssitcomposita
intensive,
22Maier1968(op.cit.,
above,n. 3),48ff.
23Forthereferences
seeKirschner
1997(op.cit.,
above,n. 1),402-5.
24See Maier1968(op.cit
., above,n. 3),50ff.
25See Sylla1991(op.cit.,
above,n. 13),207-11.
26See Maier1968(op.cit
andPlace
Motion
Herman
, Time
., above,n. 3), 74ff.;
Shapiro,
/Paderborn
toWilliam
1957,88-91.
, Louvain
ofOckham
according
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
ON INTENSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME
261
mind thatcharacteristic
forthe firstview is the combinationof the thewith
of
the
idea that contraryqualitiescan existsimultaneaddition
ory
in
ously one and the same subject. One of the supportersof this view
was Buridan.27
Oresme regardsthe firsttheoryto be the most probable.28He argues
thataccordingto thisopinion it is easy to conceive how the intensio
and
a
as
the
remissio
increase
or
conis produced by gradual
decrease, and,
how the intensio
trariesare regardedto existsimultaneously,
of one qual's rather
entails
the
remissio
of
its
Oresme
However,
ity
contrary.29
despite
addition
has
to
in
assessment
of
the
one
bear
mind
that
positive
theory
he prefersanothersolution,as will be shownlater.Accordingto the second of the above mentionedtheoriescontraryqualitiesdo not existsimultaneouslyin one and the same subject,but followeach other.Moreover
it is statedthat the intensionand remissionof qualities does not occur
by an additionor loss of partsor degreesof the quality,as the addition
theoryheld, but by changes of the subject'sdispositionfor the quality.
Finally,in the case of a hot body becomingcold, the heat, reduced in
the wayjust described,all at once {totasimul)ceases to existand the cold
all at once beginsto exist.
It is difficult
to identify
real proponentsof thisview. William Ockham
held that contraryqualitiesdo not existsimultaneously,
but followeach
other in a subject,30so that, if somethingchanges from cold to hot,
firstthe whole coldnessvanishesbeforethe heat is introducedinto the
27See Acutissimi
reuerendi
buridani
subtilissime
octo
philosophi
Magisti
Johannis
questiones
super
Aristotelis
etreuise
A magistro
libros
dullaert
degandano
antea
phisicorum
diligenter
recognite
Johanne
in facsimile
1509(reprinted
Frankfurt
am Main1964),Qu. III.3
, Parisiis
nusquam
impresse
a. III.5.
28Qu. V.6,53-54:"Ideoperordinem
tractande
suntistevie.Primaratio[thatis the
first
etfacilior
view]est<prob>abilior
postultimam
[thatis thefourth
view][. . .]." Qu.
ofthepassagethetextoftheedition
has beenslightly
V.9, 152-157
(inthebeginning
ad secundum,
scilicet
de quesito,
est,comparando
changed):
"Quantum
primosciendum
simulesse,<est> probabilior
quattuor
quodprimatrium,
opiniones
que ponitcontraria
etsecundum
earnestfacile
intensio
fitperadditionem
ad gradum
videre,
qualiter
gradus
etqualiter
e converso
remissio
etqualiter,
suntsimul,
si unumintenquando<contraria>
alterum
et e converso."
datur,
remittitur,
29See thesecond
citedin theprevious
footnote.
passage
30See Ockham's
inlibrum
secundum
sententiarum
Quaestiones
, ed. byG. Gi andR. Wood,
St.Bonaventure,
N. Y., 1981(= Guillelmi
de Ockham
OTh,Vol.V),Qu. 7, 137,1.23 to
Summula
naturalis
St.Bonaventure,
N. Y. 1984
138,1.11;idem,
, ed.byS. Brown,
philosophiae
de Ockham
inlibros
OPh,Vol.VI),BookIII, Ch.23;idem,
(= Guillelmi
Expositio
Physkorum
Aristotelis
F. Kelly,G. Leiboldand
, ed. byR. Wood,R. Green,G. Gi,J. Giermek,
G. Etzkern,
St.Bonaventure,
N. Y. 1985(BookIV-VIII[= Guillelmi
de Ockham
OPh,
Vol.V]),BookVI, Ch.6, 499,1. 12ff.;
seealsoShapiro
1957(op.citabove,n. 26),79-82;
McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, 2 vols.,NotreDame,Indiana1987,729-31.
Marilyn
18:14:48 PM
262
ST. KIRSCHNER
18:14:48 PM
OF QUALITIES
ANDREMISSION
ON INTENSION
ORESME
263
18:14:48 PM
264
ST. KIRSCHNER
40Ms.Sevilla,
TheorthogBiblioteca
7-6-30,
y Colombina,
Qu. 1.5,f.3rb"va.
Capitular
intoclasfrom
theSevilla-Ms.
hasbeenchanged
inthisandthefollowing
citations
raphy
of"e" fordiphthongs.
sicalusage,except
forthewriting
41Anneliese
undMechanik,
Maierbriefly
treats
thisviewin ^wischen
, Roma
Philosophie
derSptscholastik,
1958(= Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
5), 329-30.
42Ms. Sevilla,
Biblioteca
7-6-30,
y Colombina,
Qu. 1.5,f.3va.
Capitular
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME
265
18:14:48 PM
266
ST. KIRSGHNER
become hot thatwas not hot when the thingwas less hot;just as, if the
arc or curve of a greatercircle becomes that of a smaller,whetherit
remainsthe same or becomes a different
curve,convexityhas not come
of
in
to exist anythingthat was not convex but straight(fordifferences
of the quality);nor can we get
degree do not depend on an intermission
in
a
which
both
heat
and whitenessare not preof
flame,
any portion
sent." With referenceto thispassage Oresme shows that the quantityof
a substanceor a qualitylike whitenessis no independently
inherentform,
it is true,but neverthelessit is not identicalwith the substanceeither.
The reason is thataccordingto the cited passage the same is trueof the
or albedoof a body, and it cannot be
circuitas
of a circleand the quantitas
circulo
nor would Aristotleconis a formainherens
imaginedthatthe circuitas
and circle are the same.47
cede that circuitas
Oresme oftenuses the term "condicio" or "modus" to characterizethe
ontologicalstatusof accidents.For him motion,to be in a place (essein
, are such condiciones
loco),and the quantityof a substance,its essetantam
.48In the questionson the intensionand remissionof qualitiesthe
or modi
term "condicio" or "modus" does not occur, but in Qu. 1.16 Oresme
rerum
countstheessealbumamongthecondiciones
significabiles.
affirmative
explicitly
The termjust mentioned,"condicionesrerumaffirmative
significabiles",
which Oresmes puts forindicatesa furthersubdivisionof the condiciones
betweencondiward in Qu. 1.15 and 1.16. In Qu. 1.15 he distinguishes
47Oresme
ofthediscussion
on thenature
of
occurs
in theframework
's argumentation
status
ofquanAs thethird
ofthree
different
viewson theontological
a body'squantity.
himself
towhich
hesubscribes
thefollowing
Oresme
(Qu.IV.15,46presents
opinion,
tity
necaliquaforma
nonestipsasubstantia
54): "Tertiavia estAristotelis
quodquantitas
et
ut tricubitam
scilicet
substantie,
talis,sed estquedamcondicio
ipsamessequantam,
ubiponit
veliein quartohuius[Aristoteles,
etistudvidetur
cetera,
IV.9.217a33-b5],
Phys^
modononestimagiad circulum;
ad subiectum
et de circuitate
de qualitate
exemplum
concederet
necetiamAristoteles
inherens
circulo
nandum
situna forma
quodcircuitas
in quibusconcedit
velrectitudo
et circuitas,
et circuitas
quod
quodidemessetcirculus
et aliudestessecurvum,
et ideo,ut aliasdictum
aliudestesserectum
est,ensdicitur
For
de substantia,
et de taliesseaccidentali."
de ilio,quodvereest,scilicet
equivoce
1997(op.t
ofquantitas
seeKirschner
onthenature
Oresme's
discussion
., above,n. 1),138Sicutaliquidestmagisetminus
inQu. V.9,71-77:"Quarto.
occurs
43.A similar
passage
sedquiafitactuillud,
tali
minus
rarum
aut
durum
sine
et
curvum,
compositione,
magis
ita
sicutpatetquartohuius[Aristoteles,
IV.9.217a33-bl6],
Phys.,
quoderatin potentia,
Aristoteles
inaliis,sicutalbedine,
videtur
calido,
ponit
quiasimilitudinem
nigredine,
frigido,
et etiamnullaratioprobatalbedinem
IV.9.217a33-b5],
Phys^
quartohuius[Aristoteles,
et
et etiame converso,
et raritate
essealiuda substantia
quinprobathocde curvitate
voluntarium."
et raritas
<non>'estdictum
'albedoestunaforma
ideodicimus
quod
48See Kirschner
1997(op.
cit.,above,n. 1),52-61,73-6,121,141-2.
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME
ON INTENSION
267
etnegdonesaffirmative
like "Sortemcurrere",condiciones
significabiles
affirmative
is called "rest"
ativelike"Sortemposse moveriet non moveri",whichcondicio
merenegative
like "Sortemnon currere".Naturallythe
(<quies
), and condiciones
conditionsto the purelynegdegreeof beingdeclinesfromthe affirmative
ative ones.49In Qu. 1.16 Oresme proposes a furthersubdivisionof the
and condiciones
relative.
absolute
affirmative
conditionsin condiciones
Amongthe
affirmative
conditionsOresme countsall the accidentswhichare acquired
perse by a motion,e.g. an alteration,and are not onlya sequel to motions.
The whitenessor the essealbumservesas an example. In contrastto this
and equality,whichare not
relativeconditionsare relationslike similarity
a
but
are
se
consequencesof motions.50
acquired per by motion,
Afterthisoutlineof Oresme's ontologyof accidentsattentionmustbe
drawn to a seriousproblemwhich arises fromhis view: if accidentsare
of the substance,it
not real accidentalforms,but only modior condiciones
is clear thatnot even God could separate themfromtheirsubject,since
or modiof a substancecan existwithit is not imaginablethat condiciones
out the substance.But thisstandsin contradictionto the wonder of the
Eucharistwhich happens in the momentof consecrationwhen the substance of the bread is changed into the substanceof the body of Christ,
while the bread's accidentsremain.
49Ms. Sevilla,
Biblioteca
7-6-30,
Qu. 1.15,f. llrb:"[...] est
Capitular
y Colombina,
sicutpatetprimohuius[...]:
unadistinctio
et equivoce,
quod'ens'dicitur
multipliciter
in thisquestion
whether
theprivation
is an
discusses
unomodoad propositum
[Oresme
talisquodunomodoaccipitur
'ens'proaliquoperse existente,
essedivisio
ens'potest
estens,sicutSor,et
<sicut>individuum
etsictotum
de genere
substantie
demonstratum,
Secundomodoaccipitur
'ens'vel'esse'proessenhoc,quiahabetoperationem
proprie.
velforma,
etsicdicuntur
essemateria,
tiaaliqua,sicutpropartesubstantie
manus
forma,
etalbedosecundum
communem
Tertiocapitur
viam,et istemoduspossetsubdividi.
pro
sicutest'Sortem
currere'.
sicutprocondicione
affirmativa,
complexe,
Quarto
significabili
affirmative
et negative,
verbigratia
procondicione
quasi<h>ypothetica
significabili
estquedamcondicio,
'Sor<tem>
etnonmoveri'
possemoveri
quedicitur
'quies',etomnis
extendi
ad condicionem
continetur
subistomodo.Ulterius
mere
possetlargius
privatio
<sicut'Sortem>
noncurrere'
vel'intellegentiam
nonmoveri'."
negativam,
50Ibid.,
estprimo,
utpatuit
inaliaquestione,
Qu. 1.16,f.1lva:"[. . .] notandum
<quod>
multi
suntgradus
etaliquod
illorum
membrorum
subdividi.
Suntenimquedam
entis,
potest
rerum
affirmative
etdplices,
condiciones
etper
significabiles,
quiaquedamsuntabsolute
sicutestalbedovelessealbum,
et sicde aliis.Aliesuntrelase acquisibiles
permotum,
<et> equalitas,
sicutsimilitudo
nonperse,sedcontive,
quesuntacquisibiles
permotum,
sicutpatetseptimo
huius[Aristoteles,
et
secutive
., VII.3.246blO-17],
Phys
peraccidens,
alierespectu
sicutpotenillarum
sicutpaternitas,
futuri,
quedamsuntrespectu
presents,
coniuncta
starecumforma,
et
tia,et ideoquedamestpotentia
actui,qua materia
potest
de quadicitCommentator
aliaestseparata,
formam,
quapotest
recipere
quodcorrumpitur
in a<d>ventuforme.
Secundonotandum
estquodcondiciones
absolute
magisproprie
referred
tointhefirst
notabile
dicuntur
essequamrelative
("utpatuit
[. . Thedistinction
footnote.
in aliaquestione")
is thedistinction
citedin theprevious
18:14:48 PM
268
ST. KIRSCHNER
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME
269
lems withregardto the Eucharistand thus will also have been affected
by the condemnation.Hence it is probable that Oresme's Commentary
on the Physics
was composed beforethe condemnationof 1347.53
and remission
3. Oresme's
to theproblem
ownsolution
ofintension
ofqualities:
succession
ofcondiciones
Oresme does not confinehimselfto a discussionof the threetheoriesdescribedin sectionI. For him the above-mentionedadditiontheoryis only
the secondbest solution.Hence A. Maier was wrongto statethatOresme
additiontheory.54
subscribestotallyto the usual scotistic-occamistic
Rather,
him is the most reasona
for
Oresme argues for fourthopinion,which
able and simplestof all55and which he probablydeveloped himself.56
In Qu. V.6 Oresme gave the followingbriefaccount of the fourth
opinion:
suntsimulnecestibimedium
nisi
Quartaest,utcredo,
quodnullomodocontraria
inrespectu,
solum
sicutinter
etdeorsum,
etinquolibet
sursum
instanti,
quoestaltertertia
sednonsicutimaginatur
atio,estnovum
accidens,
opinio.57
The expression"sed non sicutimaginaturtertiaopinio" refersto Burley's
view that in everymomentof an intensionor remissionthereis a new
accidentalform.The fourthopinionis discussedin Qu. V.9 and may be
characterizedby the following:
1. Qualitieswhichare commonlyconsideredas accidentalforms,such as
heat and cold, are no such forms.Rather,theyare nothingelse but the
taleesseof the substance,e.g. whitenessis nothingelse but the essealbum.
Oresme adds thatcommon sense givesus the same idea if it is not used
to the contrary.
53Maierhadalready
cometothisconclusion;
seeDie Vorlufer
Galileis
im14.Jahrhundert
,
2nded.,Roma1966(= Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
derSptscholastik,
1),323.
54Gf.Maier1968(op.cit
top. 86).
., above,n. 3),358(addition
55Oresme
thatin comparison
whichhe considered
states
withthefirst
as the
theory,
bestamong
thefirst
three
is morereasonable
andsimpler
thefourth
theory
(Qu.
opinions,
et facilior
"Secundo
sciendum
nec
V.9, 157-162):
quodquartaopinioestrationabilior
facere
unusgradus
autqualiter
autgeneratur
difficultates,
oportet
qualiter
prius
corrumpitur
sunt
sediuxtaearnaliquid
secundum
intendi
nonestnisiaccedere
simul,
aliquam
qualitatem
etapproximari
ad summum,
si estdaresummum,
velquodilludfiatmagistale,etremitti
estfieri
minus
taleet recedere
illamqualitatem."
ab esseperfecto
secundum
56Compare
Biblioteca
themarginal
notinthehandofthemanuscript
note,
(Ms.Sevilla,
f.60ra):
nicolaior[..
Colombina,
7-6-30,
Capitular
y
"quarta
oppinio
57Qu. V.6,49-52.
18:14:48 PM
270
ST. KIRSCHNER
Probatur
intercontraria.
Tuncestprimaconclusio
quodnullaestveracompositio
etcaliditas
etCommentatoris
etcetera
non
dictis
Aristotelis
albedo
quod
primo
quiaexmultis
patet
nonestaliudquam
esse
sunt
talesresettales
immo
albedo
skutcommuniter
forme
imaginatur,
album
etiam
datsensus
naturalis
ad oppositum'
nonconsuetus
, sicut
ergononestibialiqua
velplurium,
taliscompositio
duarum
rerum
quiaunaresnonhabetnisiunumesse
subunogenere,
sicutessecoloratum.58
58Qu. V.9,55-61(italics
mine).
59See
Kirschner
1997(<
., above,n. 1),52-76,138-43.
op.cit
60See thefirst
conclusion
cited.
just
61"Above"meanstheregion
oftheelefireand"below"theregion
oftheelement
mentearth.
62Qu. V.9,61-67:"Sicutestincontrarietate
ad hocimaginandum
locali,itaquantum
etdeorsum
cominter
sursum
nonestmagis
estincontrarietate
sedlocusmdius
formali;
habet<minus>de locoin medioquam
necetiammobile
quamlocusextremus,
positus
et
unaestsursum
etaliadeorsum
inextremis
nechabetduasvelocitates,
partialiter
quarum
inter
calidum
etfrigidum."
immo
estimaginario
eteodemmodoestde medio
remisse,
ficta,
63Qu. V.9,78-92:"Secunda
etmedietas
non
conclusio
estquodibinonestcompositio
<est>vera,sedrelativa
etinaliis.Hocprobatur:
sicutinproportionibus
solum,
<tepidum>
ex quo concludo
et etiamfrigido
estsimilius
calidoquamsitfrigidum
quamsitcalidum,
etdeorsum,
unde
<inter>sursum
sicutindistinctione
quodomnino
quoadhocestsimile
deoralterius
dicitur
sursum
et respectu
uniusdicitur
illud,quodestin medio,respectu
18:14:48 PM
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ON INTENSION
ORESME
271
18:14:48 PM
272
ST. KIRSCHNER
18:14:48 PM
ON INTENSION
ANDREMISSION
OF QUALITIES
ORESME
273
18:14:48 PM
274
ST. KIRSCHNER
alternatives
approachesBurley'spositionit was onlyBurleywho definitely
traditionalview that cold and heat are separate entities.
the
rejected
It is uncertainwhetherOresmeknewBurley's"tractatus
primus"inwhich
the latterexpounded his view of the specificunityof contraries.But it is
quite obviousthatOresme was familiarwithBurley's"tractatussecundus",
as the discussionin Qu. V.7 shows, since nearly all of the arguments
raised thereagainst the additiontheorycan be foundin Burley's"tracIt is therefore
tatussecundus".74
quite probablethatOresme knewBurley's
"tractatusprimus" as well. And even if he did not, he certainlyknew
about Burley'sexceptionalview, as is indicatedby the followingremark
in Qu. V.8: "et ideo dixeruntaliqui quod contrariasunteiusdemspeciei".75
To summarize:in treatingthe problem of intensionand remissionof
qualities,which belonged to the fundamentalproblemsof medievalnatural philosophy,Oresme applies his specifictheoryof accidents,according to which a qualityis nothingelse than the taleesseof the substance,
of the substance,but not a real accidentalform.
which is only a condicio
For Oresme the addition theoryis only the second best solution.He
prefersanother view, developed probably by himself,which could be
-condiciones
called "succession-of
theory",accordingto whichin everyinstant
of an intensionor remissionthereis a new taleesse
, thatis a new condido.
Oresme thus succeeds in avoidinga major problemwithwhich Burley's
succession-of-forms
theoryis confronted.While the succession-of-forms
theoryimpliesthatduringan alterationan infinitenumberof things,the
accidentalforms,is generated,Oresme need not fear thisobjectionsince
or modirank on a far lower ontologicallevel than accidental
condiciones
forms.However, although Oresme did not identifyaccidentswith the
have
substance,article27 of the condemnationof 1347 will nevertheless
also been applicable to his own view on the ontologicalstatusof accidents,so that his theoryon the intensionand remissionof qualitieswas
deprivedof its ontologicalbasis.
Mnchen
derNaturwissenschaften
Institut
fr Geschichte
Mnchen
Universitt
Ludwig-Maximilians-
74Forthereferences
1997(<
seeKirschner
., above,n. 1),402-5.
op.cit
75Qu. V.8, 134-135.
18:14:48 PM
Reviews
etduMoyen
La sirne
dansla pense
etdansl'artdel'Antiquit
Age.
Leclercq-Marx,
Jacqueline
ClassedesBeauxchrtien
Du mythe
, Acadmie
Royalede Belgique,
paenau symbole
ISBN 2-803
1-153-X
Brussels
1997;XI + 373p.; 188+ 178illustrations
Arts,
us withmanyfascinating
reliefs
on capitals,
etc.,stillpresents
sculpture,
Romanesque
in comtheir
Gothicimages,
that,so far,havenotyetyielded
precise
meaning.
images
us.
Thus
the
Gothic
ofa
understandable
to
more
human
and
more
seem
image
parison,
saintis represented,
comes
evenifwe cannot
at oncesaywhichparticular
saint,
always
The monsters
acrossas a human
episodes.
being;thesameis trueforGothicnarrative
to come
andhybrid
so often
seenin Romanesque
creatures
seem,in contrast,
sculpture
to us.Thereare,of
a worldthatliesin thedistant
from
pastandthatis unintelligible
as e.g.gardevils
orjustmonstrous
forms
Gothic
buttheyareclearly
course,
monsters,
thewallsofa Gothiccathedral.
which
werecreated
to leadtherainwaterfrom
goyles
withthemostfantastic
combinaButwhatdo all thosedifferent
creatures
Romanesque
are notalways
and
mean?Theysurely
devilswhohavecometo tempt
tionsofforms
menandwomen.
Christian
frighten
creature
The sirenis onesucha Romanesque
thatis stillintriguing
us. It is thereas
of Santo
cloister
a magnificent
birdwomanon somecapitalsof thefamous
alluring
faceandwith
de SilosinSpain,oras a hideous
repulsive
beingwitha ferocious
Domingo
itstaillegsapartas on a capitalin thecathedral
ofModenain Italy.Theyarereprewitha female
ofa bird.The
sented
as beings
upperhalfanda lowerhalfin theform
as a fishtail,eventwotails.Thoughtheupperpart
lowerhalfis alsooften
represented
is mostly
malesalsooccur.
female,
ofthe
The sceneofOdysseus
boundto themastofhisshipto resist
theallurements
willalsobe wellknown
is wellknown.
The fishsirens
to those
songsofthebirdsirens
whohavevisited
theRomanesque
churches
ofe.g.Burgundy.
We comeacrosssirens
not
andminiabutalsoin otherartforms
suchas mosaics
onlyin Romanesque
sculpture,
inliterary
wecanreadaboutthem
texts
andreligious
tracts.
tures.
Further
Leclercq-Marx
in an all comprehensive
dealswithall thesesirens
andveryexhaustive
study.
In the"Introduction"
theauthor
follows
thelineofsuch
literally
saysthatherstudy
theUniandart,as on Galatea(byH. Drrie),
letters
studies,
comprehensive
combining
corn(byJ.Einhorn)
orAlexander's
ascencin
Shefurther
takesas
(byCh.Settis-Frugoni).
herexamples
authors
whotriedto showthesurvival
oftheantique
thefamous
godsin
E. Panofsky,
theMiddleAgesandtheRenaissance,
suchas K. Weitzmann,
W. Oakshott,
AndI mustsay,thereader
willnotbe disappointed.
We haveherea
F. Saxlandothers.
notbe
thatonecanandwillconsult
veryrichstudy
againandagainandthatwillsurely
fora longtimetocome.
superseded
In thefirst,
The workis divided
intofourchapters.
"D'Homer Hygin.Sourcedu
theattention
is on thefirst
sirens
as mentioned
thme",
byHomerandtheirinfluence.
Cleardescriptions
oftheirform
halfwomanhalfbird,comelaterthanthe
as hybrids,
first
sometimes
is already
a fish
vases.In theearlyphasesthere
depictions,
e.g.on Greek
inphilowitha woman's
Theirmeaning,
as expressed
head,butbirdsirens
predominate.
andhistorical
canbe bothevilandpositive.
occur
texts,
Theyoften
sophical,
mythological
infunerary
as attendants
contexts
ofthesoul.Gradually
theyaremoreandmoreseenas
withtheauthor
badqualities
anditis as temptors
ofthetruth,
Tseudo-Heraclites',
having
thatthey
intheMiddleAges.Yettheynever
as symbols
disappear
gaina widespreading
ofphysical
attractions.
In a secondchapter,
chrtiennes
"Desorigines
dessixpremiers
juivesauxconceptions
weseethat'siren'is usedas a
sicles.
Du demondu dsert
au symbole
de la tentation",
Vivarium
, 38,2
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
18:14:58 PM
276
REVIEWS
translation
oftheOld Testament
demonfigure
ofLilith.
Yetin late-antique
artandliterature
thepositive
remain
to be seen.In patristic
textswe see thatantique
qualities
and poetsare equatedwithsirens,
whichshouldbe avoided
rhetoricians,
philosophers
becauseof therefined
buthollowphrases
theyuse.Sirensare also dealtwithin the
and laterthebestiaries,
wherein themanymoralinterpretations
ofanimals
Physiologus,
thataregivensomenewideascropup in so faras sirens
aresometimes
as
interpreted
ofheresy
andareseenas expressions
ofantifeministic
ideas.In thischapter
we
symbols
alsocomeacrossthefirst
in a clearly
ofsirens
Christian
context:
on a Coptic
depictions
relief
from
ofthefourth
in the
or fifth
century
Herakleiopolis
Magna-Ahman
preserved
in Recklinghausen,
Ikonen-Museum
It concerns,
twosirens
Germany.
strangely
enough,
witha fishtailcarrying
crosses
on a necklace.
The third
"Du VIIeau Xe sicles.
traces
formes
anciens,
nouvelles",
chapter,
Concepts
ofthebirdsirento thefishsiren.
the.transition
Thefirst
fishsirenin theChristian
West
to occurin an IrishorAnglo-Saxon
Liber
is paid
Monstrorum
ofc. 800.Attention
appears
toa possible
connection
between
ofsea creaCopticandIrishartandtheomnipresence
inCelticculture.
tures
themythographical,
andsymbolic
allusions
remain
Although
literary
connected
as theyarewithwaterghosts.
The iconograpagan,themorphology
changes,
to occur,asfemmes
continue
andjustas Roman
physeemsto waver.Birdsirens
fatales
butthefishsirenis moreandmoregetting
theupperhand.
ornaments,
The lastandlongest
"XIe-XIFsicles.
l'heroine
Du symbole
antifministe
chapter,
first
dealswiththecontinuing
existence
ofbothforms
nexttoeachother
compatissante",
as wellas oftheseveral
ofthese.The medieval
interpretations,
good,bad or a mixture
innovations
areseenin themorerealistic
thatonehasactually
as creatures
forms,
seen,
oras 'sirnes
creatures
from
farunknown
butwithhuman
compatissantes',
strange
regions
traits.
The secondpartofthechapter
dealswithall thekindsofsirens
that
extensively
aretobe seeninRomanesque
thedistribution
ofdifferent
acrossdifferent
sculpture,
types
andthemorphological
to thedifferent
artforms.
The manyillustraregions
adaptations
tionsin thebook,188dispersed
in thetextandan extra178in a supplement
arehere
The thoroughness
in theexplanation
ofthemanyliterary
texts
in theforveryhelpful.
merpartofthestudy
is matched
herebythesoundattention
thatis paidtotypically
arthistorical
ofform
andmaterial.
aspects
In theoldchurch
ofOurLadyat Maastricht
inTheNetherlands
in
there
is a capital
theapsewiththedepiction
oftwomalebirdsirens
in twigs.
Theyareholding
entrapped
a fishin oneanda shieldin theotherhandandtheyareopposedto eachother
as in
In a recent
combat.
extensive
E. denHartog("In themidstofnations
. . . The
article
ofthechoircapitals
in thechurch
ofOurLadyin Maastricht",
iconography
Z^chrift
fur
thesemalesirens
as "symboliz(ing)
62 (1999),pp. 320-365)
Kunstgeschichte
heresy
interprets
or unorthodoxy"
ofheresy
andun(p. 336)."Theywarntheonlooker
dangers
against
is a purely
withthe
one,dealing
orthodoxy"
study
(p. 338).Den Hartog's
iconographical
Maastricht
to theexclusion,
ofpractically
all
capitalseries,
exceptfora fewminiatures,
othercomparable
theMaastricht
mentions
depictions.
Leclercq-Marx
capitaland even
The lastauthor
as
theMaastricht
sirens
reproduction.
givesa photographic
justtreats
sirens
sirens.
DenHartog's
strange
maybe coramongmanyother
strange
interpretation
butthepurely
doesnot
ofa very
restricted
series
ofcapitals
rect,
iconographical
approach
convince
thereaderas thestudy
is themorepersuaofLeclercq-Marx
does.The latter
ofa sculpted
sivebecause
ofitsbroadsurvey,
intoaccount
allkinds
ofaspects
taking
capofan everchanging
ofa particular
scene
ital,thelongtradition
idea,theiconography
and theinfluence
offact,
offormal
and material
oftheartform.
As a matter
aspects
ofsirens
andsculpted
as suchneveroccurin isolation.
depictions
capitals
Den Hartogmentions
an in-depth
An
on sirens
De sirenibus.
study
(S. de Rachewiltz,
intoSirens
Homer
toShakespeare
London
, GarlandPublishing
Inc.,NewYork/
from
inquiry
wasapparently
notknown
toLeclercq-Marx,
herbibliography
runs
1987),which
although
to35pagesoftides.
De Rachewiltz's
dealswith
texts
Dante,
study
mainly
literary
including
18:14:58 PM
REVIEWS
277
thechange
inwhich
on "Christian
buthasa chapter
andShakespeare,
Boccaccio
Sirens",
in theSacramentarium
His first
fishsirenis found
is treated.
intofishsirens
ofbirdsirens
ofthefourth
first
fishsirenis a Copticstonerelief
ofc. 780;Leclercq-Marx's
ofGellone
inthecreation
influence
Herideaofthegreat
as mentioned.
orfifth
Anglo-Saxon
century
On thewholethelatter
is notfoundwithDe Rachewiltz.
offishsirens
anddiffusion
Homeric
oftheoriginal
forms
as deviations
author
tends
toseemostlaterChristian
idea,
ofthesiren.
De Rachewiltz's
ofthepureantique
intent
as he is on thesurvival
concept
aresome
alsobecausethere
in thebookunderreview,
omission
a strange
remains
study
are
sirens
as
far
as
studies.
Yet
the
two
between
other
minor
Romanesque
discrepancies
as faras I cansee.
harmLeclercq-Marx's
doesnotseriously
theomission
concerned
study,
ofsirens,
It willbe hardto findrepresentations
ones,whichhave
sculpted
especially
in
as on a capital
I wouldsay,theycanbe found,
But,naturally
escaped
Leclercq-Marx.
roman
etsonsymbolisme
Lebestiaire
Belleville-sur-Sane
, Chtillon-sur-Chalaronne
(F.-P.Formas,
Deux-Svres
inSaint-Maixent,
(A.Tcherikover,
Romanesque
High
1998,p. 43),ona capital
c. 1090-1140
inthe
1998,plate17)oronpilgrim's
, Oxford
badges
Duchy
ofAquitaine
sculpture
1000laatmiddeleeuwse
enProfaan.
& A. Koldewey,
, Rotterdam
insignes
Heilig
(H.vanBeuningen
to knowthatnotso longago a wall
moreinteresting
It is probably
1993,pp.252-253).
from
before
inthewestporchofCorvey,
hasbeendiscovered
885,depictdating
painting
andSkyllaandwitha birdsirennextto it.Thisseemingly
inga scenewithOdysseus
undKultur
der
is interpreted
church
classical
scenein an earlymonastic
(seeKunst
purely
Paderborn
exhibition
LeoIII. In Paderborn,
undpapst
KarlderGrosze
catalogue,
Karolingerzeit.
hero.
ina general
1999,pp.583-585)
wayas a sceneofa virtuous
the
andthe366 illustrations
extensive
mentioned
Nextto thealready
'Bilbiographie'
andsome
desoeuvres
a 'Catalogue
a 'Tablede concordance',
bookcontains
reproduites'
willcertainly
be thehandbook
Thisvery
four'Indices'.
study
byLeclerc-Marx
stimulating
foryearstocome.
on medieval
sirens
Nijmegen
HarryTummers
A Social
Portrait.
CamintheEarly
Fourteenth
Parisian
Scholars
William
Century.
J. Courtenay,
in Medieval
Life
Studies
Press,1999,pp. xix+ 284 (Cambridge
University
bridge
4.
andThought
41) ISBN0 52164212
ofmoney
outa collection
ofPariscarried
In late1329or early1330theUniversity
topay1/2bursa
eachofwhomwasobliged
itsmembers,
from
, a bursa
beingthe
among
inquestion
wouldordinarily
theperson
sumofmoney
spendonfoodandas pocket-money
in a sillycase
weretocoverlitigation
ofthecollecta
in oneweek.Theproceeds
expenses
between
the
in a confrontation
andending
in a student's
rapeofa jongleuse
originating
withcolThepersons
entrusted
ofprinciple.
ofParisonmatters
andthebishop
university
menlived,notwheremanyuniversity
thedistricts
first
wentthrough
themoney
lecting
andwhattheypaid,iftheypaidon beingvisited
street
bystreet,
ingdownthepersons
Somelaterdaythosewhohadnotbeenat homeor hadnothadany
bythecollectors.
at a fixed
to thecollectors
themselves
occasion
cashreadyon thefirst
spotto
presented
themselves
and
in theordertheypresented
dues.Theirnameswereregistered
paytheir
withtheamount
paid.
from
a docureconstructed
hasconvincingly
thatWilliam
Suchis thestory
Courtenay
II of
involume
inprinciple
since1891whenitwaspublished
ment
thathasbeenknown
ThiscomParisiensis
Universitatis
Chartularium
Denifle
andChatelain's
famous
, atpp.661-671.
A major
andmoney
received.
ofstreets,
thecollectors'
contains
persons
registration
putus
in
the
14th
introduced
the
was
of
obstacle
to a correct
already
understanding computus
itwerepartly
whenthetwoquiresthatconstitute
misfolded,
disassembled,
partly
century
oftheEnglish
oftheproctor
to form
theregister
documents
andthenboundwithother
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2000
Vivarium,
38,2
18:14:58 PM
278
REVIEWS
and
Nation.
Denifle
andChatelain
didnotrealizethattheleaveshadbeendisarranged,
so published
a seriously
thefactbefore
disordered
text.Nobodyseemsto havenoticed
makesthetextmuch
whosere-edition
withtheoriginal
orderre-established
Courtenay,
morecomprehensible
anda muchmorevaluable
document.
historical
Now,forthefirst
itcanbe seentowhat
itreceives
a firm
dateofcomposition;
now,forthefirst
time,
time,
extent
itshowsthecomposition
oftheuniversity
andnow,forthefirst
(high)
population;
itcanbe usedas a mapofthescholars'
Paris.
time,
takeshisreaderwithhimfora guidedtouroftheQuartier
Latinofca.
Courtenay
tolivein
therouteofthecollectors.
He showsus howmasters
1330,following
preferred
ofrent-taxation
thecloseneighbourhood
oftheir
howthesystem
schools,
byhouserather
to whichmasters
thanbysmaller
unitswasintimately
linked
witha practice
according
a wholehouseandsupplemented
rented
theirmeagre
income
to students.
bysubletting
comHe investigates
theinstitution
ofuniversity
thegeographical
andsociological
collectae,
ofthebodyofscolares
us witha "Biographical
withthor, andprovides
register"
position
ofuniversity
members.
information
abouta largenumber
oughprosopographical
factsthatappearfromGourtenay's
and
reconstruction
Amongthemanyinteresting
a
of thecomputus
I maymention:
included
interpretation
(a) The university
population
ofrichpersons,
number
someofwhomwerenoblemen
whosurely
werenot
significant
actumeanteverto graduate,
taxation
basedon eachperson's
bursa
(b) The progressive
Whereas
mostcontributions
wereintherange1-3sous(1 soubeingtheminallyworked.
somewereof20 sousormore,
France
thelargest
imum),
(c)Also,whileNorthern
provided
from
there
wasnotonlya fairnumber
ofpersons
other
partoftheuniversity
population,
butalsoa noticeable
from
Northern
contingent
Italyandthe
partsofNorthern
Europe,
IberianPeninsula,
withtheSouthern
in thefaculty
of
groupmainly
occupied
European
medicine.
Thisis a richbookthatwillbe ofgreathelpto future
of
research
on theUniversity
in a clearandgoodEnglish
I haveonlya few
written
Paris,andit is,ofcourse,
style.
ofcriticism.
points
edendi
of
is thetotallackofinformation
abouttheratio
Mymostimportant
objection
thecomputus.
To whatextent
doesorthography,
and
paragraphing
punctuation,
spelling,
ofthe
two-dimensional
etc.correspond
Whatis thefunction
to theoriginal?
arrangement
- [. . .] ? Bylooking
I gathered
thematetheedition
thatusually
squarebrackets
through
rialin squarebrackets
oftheeditor's
consists
emendations
comments,
proposed
including
oftheimmediately
text.Butwhatam I todo withthefollowing
from
p. 218?
preceding
de Maulinea
Magister
Johannes
> 8 s. sol.
Dominus
de [Maulinea]J
Sigerus
I gather
that
thatinsomewaythemanuscript
indicates
JohnandSigerpaid(solverunt)
8 sous(solidos),
andthatthesumcovered
bothofthem.
ButI do notknowhowthemanbraces?
thatfact.Doesitcontain
similar
toCourtenay's
indicates
Quite
something
uscript
andonefrom
thesecondtermostlikely
onelinefrom
thefirst
entry
perhaps
possibly,
in a common
ofmoney
theindication
paid.Butthisis guessminating
point
justbefore
into
I trust
whichin theedition
hasbeentranslated
work.Anyhow,
thereis something
I amindeeper
withthesquarebrackets
in'Dominus
de [Maulinea]'.
braces.
waters
Sigerus
I knowthat,
scholars
usesquare
toEuropean
someAmerican
medieval
contrary
practice,
"dominus
brackets
forinsertions,
butamI toimagine
thatthescribe
wrote
sigerus
simply
which
theeditor
thensupplied?
de"andforgot
toaddthenameoftheplacefrom
where,
Or wasthetextwritten
in sucha waythatthereaderoftheoriginal
canseewhatthe
to "Magister
edition
doesnotshow,namely
that"Maulinea"
arc
koivo
Johannes
applies
de" andto "Dominus
de"?
Sigerus
butmoreimporTo mytastethebookcontains
toomuchrepetition
ofinformation,
18:15:07 PM
REVIEWS
279
in thewealth
ofinformation
aboutpersons
andplaces,thereaderis notwarned
tantly:
thattheauthor
hasnotbeenequally
meticulous
withall thepeoplementioned.
thecollectors
found
"Prior
Berdoniss
cum
Thus,in theViens
Ospitaliorum
amongothers
suisrebellibus"
and"Dominus
de Vombernk,
aliasde AltoMonte"(p. 226).In thesubis listedunder"students
de Vombernk
andmasters,
jectindexp. 284 dominus
foreign,
butneither
he northeprioroccursin thebiographical
or anywhere
German",
register
elsein thework.
Which
institution
wasthegoodpriorpriorof?"Berdoniss"
is noteasily
an abbreviated
In thatcase,
A misspelt
Or,morelikely,
interpretable.
genitive?
adjective?
= "ofBerdoues"
oneshould
read"Berdonensis"
ofAuch).
Andwhatdoes
(diocese
perhaps
+ sociis
"cumsuisrebellibus"
mean?A name+ cum
is usually
followed
, i.e.
bya numeral
"NNwithso manyboarders".
The explanation
in a footnote
on p. 226
maybe hidden
totheeffect
"Refused
topay,university
thatthescribe
hasaddedan "+" meaning
priva (secondary)
should
be suspended",
ofa sumpaidsuggests
thatafter
ileges
though
entry
a whiletheprior
hadbetter
So,"thepriorandhisrebels"
thoughts.
maymean"theprior
andhisboarders,
declined
toobeytheorder
tocontribute."
AsGourtenay
who,likehimself,
theLordofVombernk
hasrealized,
mustbe a misspelt
German.
Butwhere
didhe come
from?
The addition
Whatis hidden
under"Vombernk"?
"aliasde AltoMonte"suggests
hewasa "vonHohenberg"
Theidentification
ofthis
(inmodern
HighGerman
spelling).
is notdevoidofinterest,
forhe surely
wasnotjust
man,orat leastofa probable
origin,
hepaidtheenormous
contribution
of30 sous,bigger
anybody:
byan orderofmagnitude
thanthatofordinary
scholars!
Minorpoints:
On p. 10 theChartularium's
"ab Universitte
Paris."is quotedin theincorrect
form
"abUniversitte
Parisiense"
instead
of"ab Universitte
A similar
Parisiensi".
error
occurs
at p. 49 n. 1.
On p. 39 thecomputus
itself
is quotedas having
"coram
instead
ofthecorrect
portam"
"coram
thatoccurs
intheedition
thisas "before
porta"
p. 222.Courtenay
p. 39 translates
thegate"andseesthisas an indication
thatsometimes
thecollectors
received
from
money
scholars
butwholivedelsewhere.
I doubtthat.Atp. 222weread
theymetinthestreet,
"Dominus
GuidocoramPortaJacobi"and twoentries
later"Simonde Suciacum4
- obviously
sociispropeportam"
we in bothcaseshavean indication
ofaddress
"close
to PorteSt.Jacques",
himself
and,in fact,thisis theinterpretation
givenbyGourtenay
onp. 66.
Atp. 49 innote1 there
theunedited
is a quotation
from
ofNotreDame,startregister
le Fourbeur
filius
fuitabsolutus".
translates
ing"Item,
Johanninus
Johannis
Gourtenay
I propose
sonofJeanleFourbeur".
sonofJohannes,
leFourbeur".
'Johanninus,
"Johanninus,
A little
laterin thequotation
we read"iuravit
in curiaParisiense,
ubieratdetentus
in
eorum
EvenoHohicet Ivonede Gurianotariis
nostris
ad hoca nobis
presione
magistro
incuriaParisiens*',
Hereoneshould
read"iuravit
ubieratdetentus
inpresione,
deputati".
coram
EvenoHohicet Ivonede Curianotariis
nostris
ad hoca nobisdeputatii".
magistro
tomostnative
ofEnglish
doesnotanglicize
all medieval
Contrary
speakers
Courtenay
Christian
names.A French
willappearas "Jean"in thisbookrather
thanas
Johannes
Thiscourtesy
isnotextended
toother
nations
thantheFrench,
anditgoes
"John".
though,
toofarwhenpopeJohnXXII appears
as "JeanXXII" in note3 at p. 50, anditgoes
fartoofarwhen
Dacus(JohnofDenmark)
becomes
Johannes
"JeanDacus"on p. 172.
In vicoHarpethecollectors
Andreede Suetia,canonicus
"Otto,magister
registered
Londonensis
cum3 sociis"
toCourtenay's
edition
according
p. 221.On p. 69 thisis interas "magister
Ottoandhispupil,Andreas
ofSweden",
andon on p. 87 we read
preted
"Andreas
from
Sweden
wasoneofthree
orfour
students
withmaster
OttoofLund,
living
alsofrom
A footnote
Sweden".
on p. 87 callsattention
to thestrangeness
ofthemaster,
withhisstudent,
andsuggests
thatthis
Otto,beingidentified
Andreas,
byhisassociation
wasin somewaya prominent
maymeanthatAndreas
person
(repeated
p. 133).Thisis
18:15:07 PM
280
REVIEWS
so strange
it mustbe wrong.
thetownofLundandthesurroundthatI think
Further,
ofScaniadidnotbecomeSwedish
till1658,before
thatScaniawasDanish
ingprovince
and untilthereformation
in 1536theholderof thesee of Lundwasarchbishop
of
Denmark.
"ofLund"suggests
a closer
withthetownthanweneed
Moreover,
relationship
a canonofLundis mostlikely
tohavebeena Dane,buthe neednoteverhave
assume;
beento Lund.Finally,
in thecomputus
oftheform
, entries
"Name,title"
generally
signal
thattheperson's
status
is suchthathe is,or couldbe thought
to be,exempt
confrom
tribution.
Thusatp. 218'Johannes
deMolines,
nonscolares."
Beatus,
"Nicolaus,
Reginaldus
SanctiBenedicti".
On theotherhand,we findseveral
ecclesiastical
Johannes,
capellani
withtheirtitlealone,thus"Canonicus
unusde Carnoto"
dignitaries
registered
(p. 228),
"Archidiaconus
de Chalons"
tomethatwemaybe dealing
with
(p. 229).Allthissuggests
threepersons:
Andrew
ofSweden,
anda canonofLund.Admittedly,
this
Otto,master
leavesthegenitive
"Andree"
anditmeansthatwemustgiveupCourtenay's
unexplained,
tentative
identification
with
theAndreas
Freuati
deSmalandia
Swedish:
[a province
(Modern
in Southern
Swedenbordering
on thethenDanishScania],whoincepted
in
Smland)
ofthename"Andrew",
thelatter
factis no realobjection.
1339;butgiventhepopularity
To getridofthedifficulty
withthegenitive
we might
consider
thepossibility
thatonly
twopersons
arelisted:
OttoAndree
ofSwedenandthecanonofLund.In that
master
casethescribe
hadfirst
toenter
Otto'sacademic
itimmetide,buttheninserted
forgotten
after
theChristian
namebefore
thisis thenicest
diately
addingthepatronymic.
Perhaps
solution
sincethecomputus
usesa Christian
name(like"Otto")quitealonewithout
rarely
or toponymie.
tide,family
name,patronymic
Somewhere
thecollectors
an "Ancelmus
found
ifwe areto trust
medici",
Courtenay
Sincethismakes
nosense,
andsinceAnselm
(edition
p. 231,indexp. 263s.v.Anselmus).
is oneoutofeightpersons
whoarenotedto havepaid"simul
xvisol.","medici"
must
refer
to thewholegroup,
or at leastto Anselm
andthefourwhoprecede
himin the
A litdeabove,on thesamepage,wefinda morewealthy
in medicina"
group.
"magister
whopaid8 sousall byhimself.
notjustAnselm
butthewholeofhisgroupto
Adding
therepresentatives
ofmedicine
ofthefaculty
that
observation
onlyreinforces
Courtenay's
tradetended
tostick
whenitcametochosing
areas
peopleofthesameacademic
together
oflodging.
On p. 236 thecomputus
has"In domomagisti
Dachiisiiiisuntsocii".Now,
Johannes
in thefirst
mustbe an error.
On p. 172thepassageis citedwiththe
place,Johannes"
andCourtenay
thedotting
continues
ofthetwominims
in
"Johannis",
expected
"despite
"Dachiis"theentry
"is probably
a reference
to thecollegefounded
forscholars
from
Denmark
from
histestamentary
bymaster
JeanDacus,canonofSteGenevive
bequest
in October1275."Thiswasalsothetheory
ofHeinrich
i anden
Roos("Danske
filosoffer
halvdel
afdet13.rhundrede",
7 rk.6. bd.:497-519,
Kirkehistoriske
1968,at
Samlinger
we can readsomething
different
thanthe"Dachiis"
offered
p. 502),butunless
byboth
andDenifle
& Chatelain,
thetheory
mustbe dropped.
is no possi"Dachiis"
Courtenay
blewayofspelling
at thetimewouldbe pronounced
"Daci",which
[datsi],
[dasi]orthe
"Dachiis"
cannot
evenbe a dative
like,butnever[daki].Forthesamereason,
plural"for
Danes".Courtenay
seemsto think
thatin spiteofthetwodotsoverthei's,"Dachus"
couldbe meant.
Thatwouldbe an unusual,
butunderstandable,
variant
orthographical
of"Dacus"(pronounced
caretoindicate
taken
that
, butnotonlyhasthescribe
[dakus])
he meant"ii"andnot"u",thenominative
"Dacus"makes
no sense.So, muchas I hate
to losefourcompatriots,
I think
"Dachiis"
mustbe master
vernacular
John's
(andthereforeundeclined)
I cannottellwhichlanguage
it comesfrom.
It is
name,though
family
notlikely
tobe Danish.
StenEbbesen
Copenhagen
18:15:07 PM
BooksReceived
A Medieval
SummaZoologica.
Translated
Albertus
OnAnimals.
andannotated
by
Magnus,
Baltimore
K.F. Kitchell
2 vols.JohnHopkins
Press,
University
Jr.& I.M. Resnick,
andLondon1999xlii& 1827pp. ISBN0 801848237
Walter
undEpochenstil
imlateinischen
Mittelalter
, IV: Ottonische
Berschin,
Biographie
Biographie.
n.Chr.
n. Chr.Hiersemann,
Dashohe
Mittelalter
Erster
Halbband:
920-1070
, 920-1220
undUntersuchungen
zurlateinischen
desMittelalters,
1999(Quellen
Stuttgart
Philologie
Bd 12/1)xiii& 272pp. ISBN3 777299219
Bochumer
undMittelalter
vonB. Mojsisch,
, herausgegeben
Jahrbuch
fiirAntike
Philosophisches
R. Rehn.Bd3 (1993)288pp.ISSN 1384-6663.
Contents
M. Stemich,
O. Pluta,
(Beitrge)'.
Vorsokratische
als Seelentherapie?
Das Beispiel
Heraklit.
and
; B. Mojsisch,
Ayo
Philosophie
RoleofLanguage
TheConstitutive
inPlato's
emovffiT].
; J. Halfwassen,
ofKnowledge
Theory
DerAufstieg
alsTranszendieren.
hchsten
beiPiaton
und
M. Enders,
zum
Pbtin;
Philosophie
Prinzip
undUnendlichkeit
Gottes
inderlateinischen
Patristik
sowie
imphilosophischen
und
Allgegenwart
Denken
des
Mittelaters
onDivine
Illumination
; M.L.Fhrer,
;
theologischen
frhen
Henry
ofGhent
Zdisiaw
discuts
etla censure
d'Orlans
Kuksewicz,
Quelques
problmes
thologiques
parGilles
de1277'M. Lenz,Himmlische
DieBeweisbarkeit
vonGlaubensstzen
nachWilhelm
von
Stze:
- Beweise
Ockham
Aristoteles:
Ideen
derAkademiker.
iev/
ber
bersetzt
; (Materialien)
IJepi
vonA. Graeser
undmiteinerEinleitung
versehen
vonA. Malmsheimer;
Albert
der
Grosse:
De animalibus,
liber
Quaestiones
XV,quaestiones
1-9;11/berdieLebewesen
,
super
Buch
undbersetzt
vonB. Mojsisch
undmit
XV,Probleme
1-9;11' Herausgegeben
einer
versehen
vonS. Schulz;
Miscellanea,
Rezensionen,
Einleitung
Neuerscheinungen,
Autorenverzeichnis
Namenregister,
Olivier
tre
etreprsentation.
Unegnalogie
dela mtaphysique
moderne
l'poque
deDuns
Boulnois,
Scotus.
Presses
Universitaires
de France,
Paris1999538pp. ISBN 2 13 0504566
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
: B. Schartau
& Chr.
, 67 (1997)288pp. Contents
grec
A Small
Treatise
onthe
P. Harsting,
TwoRenaissance
Phthorai;
Troelsgrd,
ofthe
Interpretation
Translations
Rhetor
ontheMonody'
A. de Libera& I. RosierCatach,Les
ofMenander
del'analyse
delaformule
dela consecration
; Chr.Fleler,
enjeux
logico-linguistiques
eucharistique
Twomanuscripts
ontheMetaphysics:
Paris,BN,lat.16131andDarmstadt,
ofBuridan
Hessische
Simon
s Institutiones
insacram
Lu&HB,Hs 516; C. Marmo,
ofTournai'
paginam.AnEdition
about
& H.A.G.Braakhuis,
; S. Ebbesen
ofHisIntroduction
Signification
est; I. Rosier-Catach
tantum
unum
Anonymi
Erfordernis
(- Roberti
Kilwardby?)
Sophisma
& S. Ebbesen,
TwoRoberts
andPeter
ofSpain
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
: F.S. Pedersen,
The
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A listofManuscripts.
Tables:
Adcorrectionem
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; Chr.Schabel,
toClement
VI'sInitiative*
EliasofNabinaux,
Chr.Schabel,
Background
Archbishop
"Testimonia
" ofNicosia,
andtheIntellectual
Medieval
; B. Schartau,
ofLater
History
Cyprus
ofByzantine
III; D. Mur,Anonymus
musical
onEquivocation
Texts
on
; S. Ebbesen,
practice,
Pragensis
Part.
II. Ca.1250-1310
& corrigenda
to CIMAGL59-67
; Addenda
Equivocation.
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-ge
etlatin
: Traits
duXIIesicle
, 69 (1999)262pp. Contents
grec
surla symbolique
desnombres
: Odonde Morimond
Amletica
numerorum
et
(1116-1161),
rerum
inTheographyam
(III). Edition
critique
princeps
parH. Lange
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyenetlatin
: P. Harsting,
More
, 70 (1999)423 pp. Contents
Agegrec
Evidence
Translation
Rhetor
ontheMonody
; A. Jung,TheLong
oftheEarliest
ofMenander
Melismas
in theNon-kalophonic
K.M. Fredborg,
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AnEdition
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;
'
S. Ebbesen,
D'Orvillensis
onAristotle's
Anonymus
Commentary
Categories
A.V.Canale,Herejas
enLa Iglesia
El octavo
libro
delasEtimologas
deIsidoro
y sectas
Antigua.
deSevilla
Universidad
Pontificia
Madrid2000(Publicaciones
de
Comillas,
y susfuentes.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2000
Vivarium
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282
BOOKSRECEIVED
la Universidad
Pontificia
Madrid.
SerieI: Estudios,
Comillas,
78)278pp.ISBN84
8970871 1
TheChanging
Tradition.
Women
in theHistory
&
, ed. Chr.MasonSutherland
ofRhetoric
R. Sutcliffe.
ofCalgary
Alberta
1999vii& 279pp.ISBN
Press,
University
Calgary,
1 55238008 4
AnneAshley
Measure
Greatness.
TheIntensive
1250-1650.
ofa Different
Davenport,
Brill,
Innite,
Leiden/Boston/Kln
1999(Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
67) XV& 438pp. ISBN90 04 114815
Dietrich
vonFreiberg.
seiner
und
Neue
Perspektiven
Philosophie,
Theologie
Naturwissenschaft.
Freiberger
10.-13.Mrz 1997.Herausgegeben
vonK.H. Kandier,
B. Mojsisch,
Symposium:
F.-B.Stammktter.
B.R. Grner,
1999(Bochumer
Studien
Amsterdam-Philadelphia
zurPhilosophie,
28) 287pp. ISBN90 60323556
e studi
Documenti
sullatradizione
medievale
, 8 (1997)568 pp. ISBN 2 503 505511
filosofica
Contents
: L.P. Gerson,1EniaxpO(pi]
andMeaning,
I. Hadot,Aspects
npavtv:History
dela thorie
dela perception
sensation
sensation
commune
chezlesnoplatoniciens:
(aoQr)<ji),
sensibles
communs
etconscience
desoi(ovvao0r'oiq)'
(Koivf}
aoOrioi),
(icoiv
aio9rxa)
J.M. Narbonne,
Aristote
etle mal
Theprovenance
; F.M. Schroeder,
ofthe"DeIntellectu"
atributed
toAlexander
d'Aristote
R. Bods,
Le texte
desCatgories
etle
ofAphrodisias;
grec
duCommentaire
dePorphyre,
Were
Aristotle's
Intentions
inwrittmoignage
H.J.Blumenthal,
inLateAntiquity
Plotinus
andAlexandria
: Scholastic
?,J.Whittaker,
ingthe"Deanima"
forgotten
intheSecond
andThird
Centuries
Non-discursive
inPlo; J. Bussanich,
Experiences
Thought
'
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tinus
andProclus
Steel- F. Rumbach
Proclus
; C.
of
onthe"Parmenides
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the
Retroversion
Latin
Translation
K.
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;
of
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'
F. Hudry,
L'hebdomade
etlesrgles.
SurviPhiloponus
ofPlato's
Interpretation
Cosmogony,
dudbat
vances
scolaire
d'Aristote
H. Hugonnard-Roche,
LesCatgories
comme
alexandrin',
introduction
la philosophie
deSergius
deRes(ain(f 536);
, dansuncommentaire
syriaque
R. Brague,
Laphilosophie
laThologie
dans
d'Aristote
LeParadis
delasagesse
; R. Arnaldez,
dumdecin
(Aix
b.Rabbn
Th.-A.Druart,
Ethics
al-Tabar;
Al-Frb,
, andFirst
;
Intelligibles
D.L. Black,
Avicenna
ontheOntological
andEpistemic
Status
ofFictional
Beings;
J.Janssens,
Creation
andEmanation
inIbnSn;C. Baffioni,
Sullaricezione
di dueluoghi
di Platone
e
Aristotele
D. Urvoy,
Uncurieux
avatar
d'unmythe
danslelitIwn
negli
al-Safa3;
platonicien
' "Short
tralisme
d'IbnHazm;A.L. Ivry,
Averroes
onAristotle's
"Deanima";
Commentary"
Indicedeimanoscritti;
Indicedeinomini
LennE. Goodman,
andIslamic
intheClassic
Jewish
Philosophy.
Crosspollinations
Age.Edinburgh
1999xv& 256pp.ISBN0 748612777
Press,
University
Edinburgh
Guillelmi
de Conchis
Glosae
Boetium
curaetstudio
L. Nauta.Brepols,
Turnhout
1999
super
Continatio
Mediaevalis,
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158)cxlv& 384 pp. ISBN 2 503
045820
Arspractica
mensurabilis
cantus
secundum
Iohannem
deMris.
Die Recensio
maiordessogenannten"Libellus
cantus
ed.Chr.Berktold.
Akademie
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practice
Bayerische
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derMusikhistorischen
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Kommission,
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Mnchen
1999xxxii& 128pp. ISBN 3 769660072
Norman
TheMetaphysics
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Natural
Kretzmann,
ofCreation.
Aquinas's
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II. Clarendon
Oxford
1999xii& 483pp.ISBN0 19 8237871
Press,
HenrikLagerlund,
ModalSyllogistics
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2000
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undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
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90 04 116265
Lesmanuscrits
deslexiques
etglossaires
del'antiquit
tardive
lafinduMoyen
Actes
duColloque
ge.
international
Centre
forScientific
Culture"
organis
parle "Ettore
Majorana
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23-30Septembre
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parJ.Hamesse.
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Louvain-la-Neuve
1996(Texteset tudesdu Moyen
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Medieval
andSociety:
Sermons
Cloister
oftheInternational
,City,
University.
Proceedings
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at Kalamazoo
andNewYork,editedbyJ. Hamesse,
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des Instituts
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Internationale
d'tudes
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1998(Texteset tudesdu Moyenge,9) viii& 414 pp. ISBN
02 1500902 9
Models
inMedieval
Sermons.
oftheInternational
ofHoliness
(Kalamazoo,
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4-7 May 1995,editedby B.M. Kienzle,E. WilksDolnikowski,
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andA.T.Thayer.
Fdration
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desInstituts
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1996(Texteset tudesdu Moyenge,5) xx& 402pp.
Brepols,
ISBN02 1500502 3
Auxorigines
dulexique
dela Latinitas.
Actesdu Colloque
interphilosophique
Europen.
L'influence
national
Romeparla F.I.D.Em.en collaboration
avecl'Universit
organis
degli
StudidiRoma(Dipartimento
diricerche
filosofiche
e pedagogiche),
le Lessico
storiche,
Intelletuale
l'Universit
de Louvain
Louvain-la-Neuve
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Europea
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Suprieur
parla Prsidence
1996(Academia
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Belgica,
parJ. Hamesse.
1997(Fdration
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du Moyenge,8) xiv& 298pp.ISBN02 1500802 2- Contents
: A. de Libera,
Le
latin
delaphilosophie
La latinitas
etcul, vritable
?]P. Tombeur,
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langue
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turelle
ettradition
latine
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europenne
Philosophie
grecque
La tradition
etlaformation
duvocabulaire
latin
L'laboration
; F. Bossier,
syro-arabe
philosophique
duvocabulaire
dePise
TheLatin
andArabie
chez
; Ch.Burnett,
philosophique
Burgundio
Influences
ontheVocabulary
demonstrative
intheVersions
Elements
assoconcerning
Argument
ofEuclid's
ciated
with
Adelard
Dugrec
au latin
travers
l'arabe:
la langue,
cratrice
; G. Endress,
ofBath
d'ides
dansla terminologie
De l'arabe
aulatin:
dequelques
; D. Jacquart,
philosophique
l'influence
choix
lexicaux
G. Spinosa,
aristotelici
e neopla(impressio,
intuitio);
ingenium,
Neologismi
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nelleteorie
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dellaconoscenza
: Alteratio,
alteritas,
sensitivus,
scientificus,
compositio
chezThomas
A. Zimmermann,
Lesdivers
sensduterme
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cognoscivus;
d'Aquin
Unnouveau
desnologismes
dulatin
La sur; M. Fattori,
J. Hamesse,
glossaire
philosophique
vivance
dulatin
comme
XVIIesicle
anciens
; indexdesauteurs
langue
jusqu'au
philosophique
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indexdesauteurs
indexdesmanuscrits
modernes;
ClaudePanaccio,
Lediscours
intrieur.
De Platon
Guillaume
d'Ockham.
ditions
du Seuil,Paris
1999345pp.ISBN2 02 0358352
AbtSugervonSaint-Denis,
: Ordinatio,
De consecratione,
De admiAusgewhlte
Schriften
vonA. SpeerundG. Binding,
zusammen
mitG. Annas,
nistratione,
herausgegeben
S. Linscheid-Burdich,
M. Pickav.
Wissenschaftliche
Darmstadt
2000
Buchgesellschaft,
500pp.& 4 KartenISBN3 534 113209
DieRezeption
dermittelalterlichen
inderTheologie
desThomas
Park,
Seung-Chan
Sprachphilosophie
vonAquin.
Mitbesonderer
derAnalogie.
1999
Brill,Leiden-Boston-Kln
Bercksichtigung
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
(Studien
65)x & 524pp.ISBN90
04 112723
FoodandtheBody.
Some
Peculiar
inHighMedieval
Questions
Philip
Lyndon
Reynolds,
Theology.
Leiden-Boston-Kln
1999(Studien
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desMittelalters,
Brill,
69)XV& 458pp. ISBN90 04 115323
Giovanni
R. Ricci,L'interpretazione
I primi
rimossa.
dueversi
delContrasto
di Cielod'Alcamo.
1999(Quaderni
di Gazebo,3) 57 pp.
Gazebo,Firenze
Sancti
Thomae
deAquinoOpera
omnia
iussuLeonisXIII p.m.editacuraetstudio
Fratrum
TomusXXIV,2: Quaestio
despiritualibus
creaturis
Praedicatorum,
, ed.J. Cop,
disputata
Roma/Paris
200032*& 175pp. ISBN2 20406498X
CeciliaTrifogli,
intheThirteenth
Place
Motion,
Oxford
(ca.1250-1270).
Physics
Century
Infinity,
andTime.
Leiden-Boston-Kln
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
2000(Studien
Brill,
desMittelalters,
72)vii& 289pp. ISBN90 04 116575
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284
BOOKSRECEIVED
von
undForschungen.
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imMittelalter.
PaulUiblein,
Beitrge
Herausgegeben
undK. Kadletz.
1999675pp.ISBN3 85114
K. Mhlberger
WUV-Universittsverlag
492 9
inHonour
edited
TheWinged
Chariot.
Collected
onPlato
andPlatonism
ofL.M.deRyk,
by
Essays
in
Studies
Leiden-Boston-Kln
MariaKardaunandJokeSpruyt.
2000(Brill's
Brill,
Intellectual
vol.100)xxvi& 331pp.ISBN90 04 114807
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