Warrantless Search and Seizure

G.R. No. 164815

September 3, 2009

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso)
praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a
new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his/her possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio
Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District
Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives
Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer
directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom.6

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the
Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw
Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him
under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a
Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked
in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms
and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject
firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia
Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified
for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children
located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4)
heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the
room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then
went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the
raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering
the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as
charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of the case was
further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.

Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once more take a
contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment on
Valerosos Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valerosos
acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a
boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was
obtained by the police officers in violation of Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search
and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming
that the subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the
crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum
Receipt issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSGs
position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While a
second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the
sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever
substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case
from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De
Guzmans motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was
actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision
and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners
evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex
technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a
crime which he might not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second
motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case,
then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of
the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to
suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondents second motion for
reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the

merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier
decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
to promote justice, it would always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a
particular case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is
different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near
the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle.
After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found
the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested
inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly
opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal
by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person,
house, papers, or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section
3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized
instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations.33

In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down above,
is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches
and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In
People v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to
lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on
the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible
area within the latters reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his

children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him
out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him
under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked
the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such
discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served
the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under
their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied.
To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered
as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon
or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as
the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the
former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search
through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a
lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its
purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to
have been within Valerosos immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what
may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants
guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused

 and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valerosos children, because they
were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police
officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would
inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers
did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for
evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in
evidence against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high
a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who
conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of
their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless.
This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies
a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is simply no
sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as
constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised by
Valeroso.

One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic
constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and
prosecutory powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008
Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby
ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH
certiorari to the supreme court of georgia
No. 041067.Argued November 8, 2005Decided March 22, 2006
Respondents estranged wife gave police permission to search the marital residence for items of
drug use after respondent, who was also present, had unequivocally refused to give consent.
Respondent was indicted for possession of cocaine, and the trial court denied his motion to
suppress the evidence as products of a warrantless search unauthorized by consent. The Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held that consent given by one
occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another physically present occupant, and
distinguished United States v. Matlock,415 U. S. 164, which recognized the permissibility of an
entry made with the consent of one co-occupant in the others absence.
Held: In the circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupants stated refusal to
permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him. Pp. 419.
(a) The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of a premises when
the police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to
share, common authority over the property, and no present co-tenant objects. Matlock, supra, at
170; Illinois v. Rodriguez,497 U. S. 177, 186. The constant element in assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in such cases is the great significance given to widely shared social
expectations, which are influenced by property law but not controlled by its rules. Thus, Matlock
not only holds that a solitary co-inhabitant may sometimes consent to a search of shared
premises, but also stands for the proposition that the reasonableness of such a search is in

significant part a function of commonly held understandings about the authority that coinhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each others interests. Pp. 46.
(b) Matlocks example of common understanding is readily apparent. The assumption tenants
usually make about their common authority when they share quarters is that any one of them
may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may be admitted in his
absence. Matlock placed no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical
arrangements, absent reason to doubt that the regular scheme was in place. Pp. 68.
(c) This Court took a step toward addressing the issue here when it held in Minnesota v.
Olson,495 U. S. 91, that overnight houseguests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
temporary quarters. If that customary expectation is a foundation of a houseguests Fourth
Amendment rights, it should follow that an inhabitant of shared premises may claim at least as
much. In fact, a co-inhabitant naturally has an even stronger claim. No sensible person would
enter shared premises based on one occupants invitation when a fellow tenant said to stay out.
Such reticence would show not timidity but a realization that when people living together
disagree over the use of their common quarters, a resolution must come through voluntary
accommodation, not by appeals to authority. Absent some recognized hierarchy, e.g., parent and
child, there is no societal or legal understanding of superior and inferior as between co-tenants.
Pp. 810.
(d) Thus, a disputed invitation, without more, gives an officer no better claim to reasonableness
in entering than the officer would have absent any consent. Disputed permission is no match for
the Fourth Amendment central value of respect for the privacy of the home, Wilson v.
Layne,526 U. S. 603, 610, and the States other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh
it.
A co-tenant who has an interest in bringing criminal activity to light or in deflecting suspicion
from himself can, e.g., tell the police what he knows, for use before a magistrate in getting a
warrant. This case, which recognizes limits on evidentiary searches, has no bearing on the
capacity of the police, at the invitation of one tenant, to enter a dwelling over another tenants
objection in order to protect a resident from domestic violence. Though alternatives to disputed
consent will not always open the door to search for evidence that the police suspect is inside,
nothing in social custom or its reflection in private law argues for placing a higher value on
delving into private premises to search for evidence in the face of disputed consent, than on
requiring clear justification before the government searches private living quarters over a
residents objection. Pp. 1016.
(e) There are two loose ends. First, while Matlocks explanation for the constitutional
sufficiency of a co-tenants consent to enter and search recognized a co-inhabitants right to
permit the inspection in his own right, 415 U. S., at 171, n. 7, the right to admit the police is not
a right as understood under property law. It is, instead, the authority recognized by customary
social usage as having a substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific
circumstances. The question here is whether customary social understanding accords the
consenting tenant authority to prevail over the co-tenants objection, a question Matlock did not
answer. Second, a fine line must be drawn to avoid undercutting Matlockwhere the defendant,

though not present, was in a squad car not far awayand Rodriguezwhere the defendant was
asleep in the apartment and could have been roused by a knock on the door; if a potential
defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenants
permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but
not part of the threshold colloquy, loses out. Such formalism is justified. So long as there is no
evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance
specifically to avoid a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of
complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenants permission when no fellow occupant is on
hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupants expressed contrary
indication. Pp. 1618.
(f) Here, respondents refusal is clear, and nothing in the record justifies the search on grounds
independent of his wifes consent. Pp. 1819.
278 Ga. 614, 604 S. E. 2d 835, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., and Breyer, J., filed concurring opinions. Roberts, C. J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed dissenting
opinions. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City;
HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA,
respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar
Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings
will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of
NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILARROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by
respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously
beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not
specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have
alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august
6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied
for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground
house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for
being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was
submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus,
were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has

been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were
kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the
CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and
local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search
was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay
Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents
attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were
charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the
CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P.
Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that
AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November
16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE
praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection
with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office
and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return,
which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence
obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized
documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS
CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7,
1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT

CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Pao of December 13th issued in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search
Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying
petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or
their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and
that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding
that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for
the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New
Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party
Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive
books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money
from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties
vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to
the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There
is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving
the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of
this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.
Thus:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as
'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other
subversive materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search
team as to what articles might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no
different from if not worse than, the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos,
et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of
printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication,
newspaper dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language
used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration
was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant
for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno
and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many suspicious persons
with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.
Q What else?

A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front, Organization of the
Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public and support money from foreign and local sources.

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will
10

Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th

pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers
from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11
induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is
with the Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show,
however, that petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated
October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the
Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as
a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one
Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the
service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal
case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to
exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized
under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to
AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules
of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a
person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or
premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the
extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has
been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what

constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is
the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public
order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was
arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a
half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as
evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask
Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive
Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1,
pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque
objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents
and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.
Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.
Aquino, J.; took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's
decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that

"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all
illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional
mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience
to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and
thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such
basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power
of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and
cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent
case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court has
held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction
should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."
(Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's)
arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched,
even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional
proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this
in the dissenting portion of his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the
arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained
the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his
person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case,
petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the
road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the
same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not
nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. 80-84
issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao for the reasons adduced by Justice
Melencio Herrera. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal
and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed
himself to be used by the military. In either case his action can only be described as
deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained
by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal
Case No. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with
Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by
the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree
with Justice Cuevas, statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to
their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents."
What are subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion
of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not
competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter.
thus copies of Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader now deceased and
medicines were also seized from a physician who was suspected of being a subversive.
I say return everything to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant
No. 80-84 issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City It does not
specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized
hereunder. Being in the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional
mandate that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be
particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on
the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search
under the aforequoted provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and
circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the
warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and
things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Hence
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money
or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of
the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
cause ... (In Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must
have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only
at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person
lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where
the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as
weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be
doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does not
extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks distant
from Alba's house where the arrest was made. When it was entered and
searched, the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under
arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot be sustained as an
incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis
supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to
the general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the
arrest.
The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not
incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269
U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a right to make a search
contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in
making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain

evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest.
BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P.
Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was
conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that
same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner
AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayn St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is
that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the
record. But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than
the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot
be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not
being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St.,
Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the
constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion
of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary
rule. However, not all the things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners.
Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot be returned
to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive
materials seized by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by
anyone under the law can and must be retained by the government.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's
decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all
illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional
mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience
to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against

unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and
thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such
basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power
of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and
cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent
case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court has
held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction
should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."
(Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's)
arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched,
even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional
proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this
in the dissenting portion of his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the
arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained
the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his
person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case,
petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the
road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the
same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not
nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant
No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao for the reasons adduced by
Justice Melencio Herrera. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know
the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he

allowed himself to be used by the military. In either case his action can only be
described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained
by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal
Case No. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with
Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by
the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree
with Justice Cuevas, statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to
their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents."
What are subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion
of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not
competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter.
thus copies of Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader now deceased and
medicines were also seized from a physician who was suspected of being a subversive.
I say return everything to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant
No. 80-84 issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City It does not
specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized
hereunder. Being in the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional
mandate that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be
particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on
the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search
under the aforequoted provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and
circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the
warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and
things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Hence

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money
or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of
the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
cause ... (In Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must
have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only
at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person
lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where
the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as
weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be
doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does not
extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks distant
from Alba's house where the arrest was made. When it was entered and
searched, the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under
arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot be sustained as an
incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis
supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to
the general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the
arrest.
The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not
incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269
U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a right to make a search
contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in
making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain
evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest.
BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P.
Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was
conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that
same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner

AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayon St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is
that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the
record. But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than
the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot
be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not
being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St.,
Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the
constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion
of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary
rule. However, not all the things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners.
Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot be returned
to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive
materials seized by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by
anyone under the law can and must be retained by the government.
ARIZONA V. GANT
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ARIZONA v. GANT
certiorari to the supreme court of arizona
No. 07542.Argued October 7, 2008Decided April 21, 2009
Respondent Gant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in a
patrol car before officers searched his car and found cocaine in a jacket pocket. The Arizona trial
court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, and he was convicted of drug offenses.
Reversing, the State Supreme Court distinguished New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454which
held that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as
a contemporaneous incident of a recent occupants lawful arreston the ground that it concerned
the scope of a search incident to arrest but did not answer the question whether officers may
conduct such a search once the scene has been secured. Because Chimel v. California, 395 U. S.
752, requires that a search incident to arrest be justified by either the interest in officer safety or
the interest in preserving evidence and the circumstances of Gants arrest implicated neither of
those interests, the State Supreme Court found the search unreasonable.
Held: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupants
arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of
the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Pp. 518.

(a) Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357. The
exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applies only to the area from within which [an
arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.
This Court applied that exception to the automobile context in Belton, the holding of which
rested in large part on the assumption that articles inside a vehicles passenger compartment are
generally within the area into which an arrestee might reach. 453 U. S., at 460. Pp. 58.
(b) This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would permit a vehicle search incident to a
recent occupants arrest even if there were no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the
vehicle at the time of the search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimels
exception authorize a vehicle search only when there is a reasonable possibility of such access.
Although it does not follow from Chimel, circumstances unique to the automobile context also
justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 632
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Neither Chimels reaching-distancerule nor Thorntons
allowance for evidentiary searches authorized the search in this case. In contrast to Belton, which
involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, five officers handcuffed and
secured Gant and the two other suspects in separate patrol cars before the search began. Gant
clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the
search was also lacking. Belton and Thornton were both arrested for drug offenses, but Gant was
arrested for driving with a suspended licensean offense for which police could not reasonably
expect to find evidence in Gants car. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118. The search in this
case was therefore unreasonable. Pp. 811.
(c) This Court is unpersuaded by the States argument that its expansive reading of Belton
correctly balances law enforcement interests with an arrestees limited privacy interest in his
vehicle. The State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake, and it exaggerates both the
clarity provided by a broad reading of Belton and its importance to law enforcement interests. A
narrow reading of Belton and Thornton,together with this Courts other Fourth Amendment
decisions, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 103, and United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798,
permit an officer to search a vehicle when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. Pp. 1114.
(d) Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton. The experience of the
28 years since Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that
decision is unfounded, and blind adherence to its faulty assumption would authorize myriad
unconstitutional searches. Pp. 1518.
216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined, and in which Breyer,
J., joined except as to Part IIE.

Arizona v. Gant

Argued: October 7, 2008

Decided: April 21, 2009
Facts
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and
usually requires an officer to have both probable cause and a warrant in
order to search a person or her property. There are, however, a number of
exceptions to this requirement. One of the times when an officer does not
need a warrant to search someone is at the time of a lawful arrest. Typically,
in the interest of the officers safety and evidence discovery and
preservation, the officer can search an arrestee and the area within his
immediate control without first obtaining a warrant. This case addresses the
extent of an officers power in searching an arrestees vehicle after he has
been arrested and placed in the back of a police car.
On August 25, 1999, the police responded to an anonymous tip of drug
activity at a particular residence. When they arrived, Rodney Gant
answered the door and identified himself. He informed police that the
owner of the house was not home but would return later that evening. When
the police left, they checked records and discovered that Gant had a
warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.
The officers returned to the home later that evening and arrested two
individuals. After both arrestees were handcuffed and placed in the back of
police cars, Gant arrived at the house driving a vehicle. When he stepped
out of his car, he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After
Gant was handcuffed and placed in the back of a third police car, officers
searched Gants car. They found a gun in the car along with a bag of cocaine
in a jacket pocket on the backseat.
Gant was charged with possession of the cocaine. He sought to have the
evidence found in his car suppressed at trial because, he claimed, the
search of his car had been unreasonable. The trial court denied Gants
motion and Gant was convicted. The state appellate court and the Arizona
Supreme Court reversed the trial courts conviction, ruling that the search
of Gants car was not allowed because it did not promote officer safety or
evidence discovery and preservation. Because the search violated Gants
Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence found in Gants car should have
been suppressed and not presented at trial. The State appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Issue
Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers, when arresting a
recent occupant of a vehicle, demonstrate either a threat to officer safety or
a need to preserve evidence related to the crime in order to conduct a
search of that vehicle without a warrant?

Constitutional Amendment and Precedents

The Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Chimel v. California (1969)
Officers came to Chimels home with a warrant for Chimels arrest for
burglary; they did not have a search warrant. After they arrested
Chimel they asked to search his home. Chimel refused, but the
officers informed him that they could search his house anyway on the
basis of his lawful arrest.
The Court ruled that an officer could search the area within an
arrestees immediate control if the officers safety was at risk or the
arrestee could destroy evidence relating to his arrest. A search of
Chimels entire home went beyond the area that was within Chimels
immediate control and, therefore, the Court ruled in favor of Chimel.
New York v. Belton (1981)
A police officer pulled over a car with four male passengers for
speeding. The policeman smelled marijuana and saw what appeared
to be an envelope that contained marijuana lying on the floor of the
car. He arrested all four men for unlawful possession of marijuana,
but did not place them in the back of a police car. The officer then
searched the passenger compartment of the car, including Beltons
jacket that was lying in the backseat, while the four arrestees stood
nearby. In the jacket pocket the officer found a bag of cocaine. Belton
was then also charged with criminal possession of a controlled
substance.
The Court ruled that because the jacket was within the passenger
compartment of the car it was within Beltons immediate control, even
though Belton was standing outside the car. Belton had been lawfully
arrested, and therefore a warrantless search of the arrestees vehicle
was lawful.
Thornton v. U.S. (2004)
Before a police officer could pull Marcus Thornton over for a violation
involving the tags on his license plate, Thornton parked his car and
got out. The officer approached Thornton and after Thornton agreed
to be patted down, the officer found marijuana and crack cocaine on
his person. The officer then arrested Thornton and searched his car,
finding a firearm.

The Court ruled that the firearm was seized incident to a lawful
arrest, and therefore no warrant was needed. The Court ruled that the
search of a vehicle was unique and therefore not only could an officer
search the arrestee and the immediate area in the interest of officer
safety and evidence preservation, but he could also search the vehicle
if it was reasonable to believe that doing so would turn up evidence
relevant to the arrest.
Arguments for Arizona
Officer safety and evidence preservation are vital government
interests. If necessary, police officers should temporarily be able to
limit an arrestees privacy to promote these interests.
Thornton clearly established that vehicles are unique because they
are mobile and evidence of a crime that remains in the vehicle is at
much greater risk of being lost. Officers should therefore have more
power to secure evidence of criminal activity from a vehicle.
Due to the unique nature of vehicular searches, Chimel does not apply
because Chimel involved the search of a home.
Belton has been interpreted as giving officers the power to search a
vehicle during an arrest as long as the arrestee remains at the scene
of the arrest and the search is close in time to the arrest, even if the
arrestee cannot reach the passenger compartment of the car.
A ruling for Gant in this case would require a departure from the
typical interpretation of Belton. This would, in effect, overturn Belton.
In order to overturn precedent, a great burden must be met.
Overturning the precedent would cause undue hardship, and
circumstances have not changed enough to warrant overturning
Belton. Therefore, the great burden is not met.
Arguments for Gant
Warrantless vehicular searches are subject to the limitations set out in
Chimel. Therefore, an officer can only search the area within the
immediate control of the arrestee in order to promote officer safety or
to preserve evidence from being destroyed. In this case, Gant was
locked in the police car at the time of the search. The passenger
compartment of his car was not within his immediate control, and
therefore neither officer safety nor evidence preservation was an
issue.
Thornton says that police are allowed to search a vehicle if it is
reasonable to believe that doing so would uncover evidence related to
the arrest of the occupant. Gant was arrested for driving with a

suspended license. It was not reasonable to think that searching the

car would uncover any evidence in relation to that charge.
Belton has been misinterpreted in the past; rather than allowing
officers to search a vehicle at the time of an arrest under any
circumstances, Belton only allows officers to search the vehicle if the
arrestee is within reach of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search.
Interpreting Belton this way (allowing officers to only search the
vehicle if the arrestee is within reach of the passenger compartment)
still ensures officer safety and evidence preservation while also
respecting the rights of the individual arrestee.
Decision
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Scalia,
Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg joined. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer
joined.
Majority
In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Courts ruling. In
order for a warrantless vehicular search at the time of an arrest to be
constitutional, the arrestee has to be within reach of the passenger
compartment, or it has to be reasonable that a search of the vehicle will
turn up evidence of the crime for which the person is being arrested.
Gant was handcuffed in the back of the police car with five police officers
guarding him. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he was not within reach of the
passenger compartment and officer safety and evidence preservation was
not an issue. Further, he was arrested for driving with a suspended license.
Therefore, it was not reasonable for the police to believe that a search of
Gants vehicle would turn up evidence related to that charge. Because
neither of these requirements was met, the search in this situation was not
constitutional.
Finally, the Court asserted that they were not violating stare decisis because
they were not overruling Belton. The interpretation of Belton that the State
relied upon was inaccurate; therefore, the Court was not overruling Belton,
but rather interpreting it properly.
Dissent
The dissenting justices argued that Belton was meant to give police officers
the power to search a vehicle at the time of arrest regardless of the
arrestees ability to reach the vehicle, and the Courts interpretation of
Belton, which limits the area of search to the area within the arrestees

reach, in effect, overruled precedent. They noted that while their

interpretation of Belton may be imperfect, it is precedent that has been
followed for twenty-eight years. The burden to overturn precedent is great,
and that burden is not met here. Therefore, the Court should follow
precedent and rule that, because the search was close in time to the arrest,
Gants Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

RESOLUTION FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[G.R. No. L-69803. January 30, 1987.]
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO,
Petitioners, v. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA,
Respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution are petitioners and public respondents respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration of this Courts Decision of October 8, 1985, which decreed that:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent
Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the
Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby made permanent, the personalities
seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence
in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military Commission No. 1, without
prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said
Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles." (Rollo, p. 154; 139
SCRA 165)
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, public respondents maintain that the subject Search
Warrant meets the standards for validity and that it should be considered in the context of the
criminal offense of Rebellion for which the Warrant was issued, the documents to establish
which are less susceptible of particularization since the offense does not involve an isolated act
or transaction.
chanrobl es virtual lawlibrary

In their own Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners assail that portion of the Decision
holding that, in so far as petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search made in her
premises was incident to her arrest and could be made without a search warrant. Petitioners
submit that a warrantless search can be justified only if it is an incident to a lawful arrest and that
since Mila Aguilar was not lawfully arrested a search without warrant could not be made.
On April 10, 1986, we required the parties to MOVE in the premises considering the supervening
events, including the change of administration that have transpired, and pursuant to the
provisions of Section 18 of Rule 3 in so far as the public respondents are concerned (which
requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken
by his predecessor-in-office).
In their Compliance, petitioners maintain that the arrest of petitioners and the search of their
premises thereafter are both illegal and that the personalities seized should be ordered returned to
their owners.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of public respondents, "in deference to the dissenting opinion of
then Supreme Court Justice (now Chief Justice) Claudio Teehankee," now offer no further
objection to a declaration that the subject search is illegal and to the return of the seized items to
the petitioners. Respondents state, however, that they cannot agree to having the arrest of
petitioners declared illegal.
The pertinent portion of the dissenting opinion referred to reads:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Courts
decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that the
right of the people to be secure on their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated (Bill of
Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding (Sec. 4[21). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary
rule has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence
illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the
power of the courts to change or modify.
"All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot
be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman
v. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985) . . ."
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ACCORDINGLY, considering the respective positions now taken by the parties, petitioners
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Decision of October 8, 1985 is GRANTED,
and the dispositive portion thereof is hereby revised to read as follows:
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WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive

Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents Case hereby made permanent. The personalities seized by virtue of the
illegal Search Warrant are hereby ordered returned to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla and
Bidin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

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I felicitate my colleagues for granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and now totally
applying the exclusionary rule by declaring that the search and seizure of the personalities at
petitioner Mila Aguilar Roques dwelling at Mayon Street, Quezon City was illegal and could not
be deemed as incident to her arrest earlier on board a public vehicle on the road away from and
outside of her dwelling. Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoez stand in support hereof signifies
one more great step in fulfillment of the pledge of the present government of granting full
recognition and restoration of the civil and political liberties of the people and rejecting the
oppressive and repressive measures of the past authoritarian regime.
The original majority decision citing sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 1 had held that said
Rule states "a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest
was made can also be searched without a search warrant. In this latter case, the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been
stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. What must be
considered is the balancing of the individuals right to privacy and the publics interest in the
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals."
This pronouncement had the support of a majority of nine (9) Justices of the Court at the time.
Three (3) members had dissented, 2 while two (2) other members took no part or reserved their
vote. 3
As the petitioners stressed in their motion for reconsideration," (I)f the majority opinion becomes
settled law, the constitutional protection would become meaningless. The military or police
would no longer apply for search warrants. All that they would do is procure a search (sic) 4
warrant or better still, a PDA, for the person whose house they would want to search. Armed
with a warrant of arrest or a PDA, the military or police would simply wait for the person to
reach his house, then arrest him. Even if the person arrested does not resist and has in fact been
taken away already from his house, under the majority ruling, the arresting party would still have
the right to search the house of the arrestee and cart away all his things and use them as evidence
against him in court.

"In such a situation, what then happens to that stringent constitutional requirement that no
search warrant . . . shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the things to be seized and the constitutional injunction that any
evidence obtained in violation of this . . . shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding" 5
The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided in Rule 126, sec.
12 and that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his
or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to "dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. 6
Applying the aforestated rule to this case, the undisputed fact is that petitioner Mila Aquilar
Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. aboard a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margal
Sts.). The pronouncement by the majority at that time, that as an incident to her arrest, her
dwelling at 239-B Mayon Street could be searched even without a warrant for evidence of the
charges of rebellion filed against her was contrary to the constitutional proscription, as defined
by law and jurisprudence. It was tantamount to sanctioning an untenable violation, if not
nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
With the Court now unanimously upholding the exclusionary rule, in toto, the constitutional
mandate is given full force and effect. This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the
exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence
illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of the military and police officers
to disregard such basic rights. This is of special public importance and serves as a shield in the
remote provinces and rural areas to the people who have no access to courts for prompt and
immediate relief from violations of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
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In this case, the arresting CSG group of the military themselves knew that they needed a search
warrant but they obtained the void general warrant in question. Necessarily, the seizure of
documents and personal effects with such a void warrant could not be justified "as an incident of
an arrest" outside petitioners dwelling and the Constitution bars their admissibility as evidence
and ordains their return to petitioners.
Endnotes:

1. "Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged with an offense
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense."
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2. Claudio Teehankee, Vicente Abad Santos and Serafin Cuevas, JJ.,

3. Ramon Aquino and Hermogenes Concepcion Jr., JJ.,
4. A manifest error: This clearly refers to arrest warrant, from the thrust of the argument.
5. Record, page 201.
6. The 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly clarifies this through a change in the
caption, as follows: "Sec. 12 Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant." (Rule 126)