/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:14:10 AM

VIVARIUM
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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE
OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XLIV (2006)

BRILL
LEIDEN BOSTON

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VIVARIUM
An International
andIntellectual
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forthePhilosophy
LifeoftheMiddleAgesand
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Aims& Scope
Vivarium
extensive
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INTHENETHERLANDS

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CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

XLIV (2006)

Russell L. Friedman Introduction

and Chris Schabel
Mark Thakkar
Francis of Marchia on the Heavens
Chris Schabel
Francis of Marchia's Virtusderelida and
the Context of Its Development
Fabio Zanin
Francis of Marchia, Virtusderelicta
, and
Modificationsof the Basic Principlesof
AristotelianPhysics
Francis
accidentis.
Fabrizio Amerini
sitdeessentia
Utrum
inhaerentia
the
Nature
Debate
on
of Marchia and the
of Accidents
Andrea A. Robiglio
How Is Strengthof the Will Possible?
Francis of Marchia and the Act of the
Will
Roberto Lambertini Francis of Marchia and William of
Ockham: Fragmentsfroma Dialogue ....
Andrea A. Robiglio
The Thinkeras a Noble Man (benenatus)
Remarkson the Medieval
and Preliminary
Concepts of Nobility
Brooke Heidenreigh Does the Habit Make the Nun? A Case
Findley
Study of Heloise's Influenceon Abelard's
Ethical Philosophy
P.S. Eardley
Conceptionsof Happiness and Human
Destinyin the Late Thirteenth
Michael J. Fitzgerald
Catarina Dutilh
Novaes
Lodi Nauta
Lorenzo Casini

1
21
41

81

96

151
184

205

248

276
Century
ProblemswithTemporalityand Scientific
Propositionsin John Buridan and Albert
305
of Saxony
of
:
The
Return
Strode
's
obligationes
Ralph
338
Consistencyand the EpistemicTurn
Lorenzo Valla and Quattrocento
375
Scepticism
of
Freedom
Luis
Vives'
Juan
Conception
of the Will and Its Scholastic
396
Background

11:20:07 AM

iv
Reviews

CONTENTS
Isabel Iribarren,Durandus of St Pourain. A
DominicanTheologianin the Shadow of Aquinas
418
{rev.by William
J. Courtenay
)
Medieval
New
AnthonyKenny,
Philosophy(A
Historyof WesternPhilosophy,vol. 2) (Rev. by
DominikPerler)
420

Books Received

424

Corrigenda to
Vivarium
, XLIV/1

427

11:20:07 AM

The Thinkeras a NobleMan (bene natus) and

Remarkson theMedievalConcepts
ofNobility*
Preliminary
ANDREAA. ROBIGLIO

Ce beaumot,bientrivial
maisbien
cGaudent
benenati'
nergique:
[CharlesLe Maitrede Claville1]
Abstract
The late medievaldiscussionof 'nobility'(= nobilitas,dignitas)definedin
terms(as opposedto othersocialnotionslike'aristocracy')
, prophilosophical
duceda largenumberofwritings,
Nevertheless,
manyofwhichare stillunedited.
modernphilosophicalhistoriography
the seventeenth
(developedthroughout
has
and
its
first
with
century
reaching
apogee
Hegel)
neglectedthe concepassumed
it
to
be a dead relicof the
tual debateson nobility.
Perhapshaving
and
historians
understood
'pre-illuminist'
past,
philosophers
'nobility'as a
in
issue
and
so
it
still
non-philosophical
appears contemporary
scholarship.
The firstaim of thisessayis to draw attentionto thisissue by presenting
a
sortof preliminary
of
the
different
of
of
catalogue
types conceptualizations
of the
'mobility'.By exploringthe meaningsand philosophicalemployment
'benenasci' and ' bene
this
article
also
reveals
a
new
natus'
aspect
expressions
of the Aristotelian
notionof magnanimity.
* Thisresearch
n 360-20is a partofa project
funded
bytheDutchNWO (Grant
drewmyattention
to thequestionable
translation
of"virbene
093).ZnonKaluzafirst
ofAutrecourt's
natus"
as noble-man,
andtoNicolas
usageofthisexpression.
PepijnRutten
in theInternational
me to present
thesereflections
invited
'Tradition,
Truth,
Workshop
ofNijmegen
March4-6,2004),whereMaarten
Transition'
at theUniversity
(Nijmegen:
HoenenandCharles
offered
thesimilarCaspers
helpful
suggestions,
especially
regarding
andennobling
ofthemedieval
medieval
rituals
Theanonyitiesbetween
Liturgy
university.
ofthisJournal
mousreader(s)
drewmyattention
to someweakpoints
ofmyfirst
draft
In addition,
and madeinsightful
remarks.
OlivierBoulnois,
Charlesde Miramon
and
Grellard
havehelpedmein various
to all
Christophe
ways.I express
mydeepgratitude
oftheabove.
1 C. F. N. Le Maitrede Claville,
Trait
duvraimrite
del'homme
danstousles
, considr
lesconditions:
avecdesprincipes
former
lesjeunes
la vertu,
d'ducation,
gesetdanstoutes
propres
de
(3rded.) 1737,83: "Unephysionomie
Paris-Lyon
qui plat,desyeuxqui annoncent
d'heureuses
de la bont,
de la docilit,
& le dsird'apprendre,
voil
dispositions,
l'esprit,
le mrite
naturel.
De-lvientce beaumot,bientrivial,
maisbiennergique,
bene
gaudent
nati".Cf.n. 69 below.
BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Koninklijke
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
44,2-3

11:14:29 AM

206

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

' and
withJuridical
as a Philosophical
Problem
1. Nobility
Religious
Edges
Nobilityis a fundamentalconcept which shapes the contoursof philosophical discourse,yetone not oftenexaminedon itsown termsby historians
of philosophy.2In Book Three of De consolatione
(P. 6, 7),
philosophie
Boethiusclaims that 'nobility'does not deservethe attentionof philosoboth of the concept of
phers: it is plain for everyoneto see the futility
it
more
to
and
of
precisely[iamveroquam
nobility
any attempt explicate
non
's
nobilitati
sit inane
nomen,
, quamfittile
videat?).However, the very
quis
fact that he makes this polemical claim implies that there were others
who held a different
point of view.3
This essay shall presentseveral medieval conceptionsof 'good birth',
their essentialconsistencyand clarifying
with two aims: demonstrating
2 No majorencyclopaedia
an entry
hasyetincluded
ofphilosophy,
to myknowledge,
Wrterbuch
derPhilosophie
cf.inter
alia: J. Ritter
on thetopicof'nobility',
,
(ed.),Historisches
- Stuttgart
1971
Basel
-ff.;TheStanford
(onlineat: http://plato.
ofPhilosophy
Encyclopaedia
as a
is treated
theconcept
Andwhere
itdoesreceive
consideration,
merely
stanford.edu).
A. De Liberaand
in:C. Gauvard,
or socialissue;cf.Ph.Contamine,
'Noblesse',
political
W. Conze,Adel,
duMoyen-ge
M. Zink(eds),Dictionnaire
Aristokratie,
, Paris2004,990a-992a;
Historisches
W. Conzeand R. Koselleck
in: O. Brunner,
Grundbegriffe.
(eds.),Geschichtliche
vol. 1 (A-D),Stuttgart
inDeutschland,
Lexikon
1972,1-48.Two
zurpolitisch-sozialen
Sprache
therule:cf.A. Kolnai,
thatproves
remarkable
articles
byAurelKolnaiaretheexception
in:
andId.,Dignity,
46 (1971),203-21,esp.219ff.,
Theconcept
, in:Philosophy,
ofhierarchy
51 (1976),251-71.
Philosophy,
3 Thequestion
thewritings
issues
ofnobility
isoneofthemostrecurring
in,forexample,
- in connection
studia
litterarum".
cultivation
ofthe"sancta
withthenecessary
ofEnnodius
Ennodius
usestheideain a sense
forhisnephew
In theDictio
VIII, written
Lupicinus,
Rome.He employs
andcloseto thatofancient
Christian'
which
is both'moderate
vegis theapproundera goodSchoolmaster
howthetraining
to explain
etablemetaphors
dicta
treebearnoblefruit.
Ennodius,
quando
Praefatio
Lupicino
waytomakea well-born
priate
ed.W.Hrtel,
Vienna1882(CSEL,6),
estDeuterio
V S.,in:Id.,Opera
inauditorio
traditus
omnia,
testatur
et naturae
odoresignificai
446-50:"Meritum
(. . .)
primavisione
genim
cespitis
feritatis
maculam
auditur
licetinrecessibus,
voxmundae
(. . .) [nevertheless]
semper
originis,
novitesseplaciturum.
adserere
nonvittqui nonfestinat
(. . .) Nascitur
quodmeritis
est".Andlatertheauthor
telluris:
vomeribus
de fertilitate
exercitii
desiderium
agendum
oftheartes
liberales
: "Spemsolidam
arenotbutthestudy
thatsuch'ploughshares'
explains
doctori
bonumingenium
de tuaperfectione
(. . .) genus
optimo
mancipamus
concipimus:
eruditio
laudisindoctoribus
estsingulare
(. . .) caelum
magisti
opinioperpuist
discipuli
at least
useoftheideathatbeing'well-born'
Foranother
fectione
interesting
discipuli".
'
'bene
natus
oftheexpression
of'nobility',
seetheoccurrence
tothedevelopment
contributes
Teodorico
F.
Delle
Cf.
ed.
Hrtel
liber
221.
in Id.,Epistularum
Donne,
1882,
VIII,cap.33,
in: Invigilata
di Ennodio,
di stirpe
nelpanegirico
di nobilt
' II concetto
'rexgenitus
lucernis,
strand
to theanti-aristocratic
on thetopic,withrespect
20 (1998),73-84.Fineresearch
Oxford
andSociety
intheMiddle
Reason
is in A. Murray,
in laterScholastic
Ages,
thought,
1978,esp.partiv: 317-404.

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

207

theirrespectivepositions( 12-13 below). By analyzingthe work of a

successionof medieval thinkersup to Nicholas of Autrecourt,thispaper
' as it was
will outlinethe generaland agreed sense of the term' benenatus
understoodwithinmedieval scholasticdiscourse,as well as explore the
term'suse in connectionwithconceptsof intellectualperfection,
the pursuit of happiness,and spiritual(namely,Christian)perfection.
To this end, some preliminarysteps are required.Firstthe topic will
be delimitedand the scope of the presentwork definedin relationto
otherratherisolated scholarlytreatments( 2).4
The medievalperiod had a distinctive
concept of nobility,particularly
in termsof its legal and religiousimplications( 3-5). As thisis different
fromthe one generallyarticulatedby ancient thinkers,the understandof
ing of the ancientlegacy of this notionwill enrichour understanding
itsmedievalconception( 6-7). To thatend thevarioususes of the expression benenatuswill be analyzed ( 8) before turningto some canonical
whoseself-conscious
use of theconceptof nobility
withina theoretical
figures
in
illuminates
its
the
medieval
context
setting
significance
(9-10). The
of
Nicholas
of
Autrecourt
of
conception
representssomething a departure
of good birththat thisinvestiga( 11); thusit is withhis representation
tion will conclude.
The prominentlegal and religioususes of the idea contradictone
another.As a legal notion,nobilityis most closely bound up with the
maintenanceof highsocial rankin an establishedorderby virtueof bloodline- nobilitas
nonestvirtus
, the juristssay (cf. 4 below). The Christian
of
on
the
otherhand, in some ways bears the seeds of
concept nobility,
a transvaluation
(cf. 5 below). That is to say, thisChristianelementhas
the sense that nobilityis not the embodimentof intellectualgenius or
but is instead derivedfromboth divine grace and the cultisuperiority,
vation of moral virtue.In principle,therefore,
the potentialto acquire it
is universal.The impetusforthistransvaluation
is the catholicdimension
of Christianity;
forin Christthereis neitherJew nor Greek,neitherslave
nor master.This was difficult
formedievalphilosophyand learnedtheology
4 Alexander
andAlainDe Liberaareamongtherarescholars
tohavetreated
Murray
thetopicalsoin philosophical
terms.
See A. De Libera,Penser
auMoyen
, Paris1991,
ge
to RuediImbach(374,n. 13) and Luca Bianchi
246-98,as wellas his references
see also
(383 n. 20). Murray1978(n. 3), 261-63,270-81.For further
development,
A. A. Robiglio,
Dante(bene
nato'Guido
Cavalcanti
e Margherita
Porete
in Par.V,115' in:
26 (2005),45-62.
L'Alighieri,

11:14:29 AM

208

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

to assimilate,as it seemed, at least on the surface,to underminetheir

dignityas disciplines.
Anotherelementinforming
the medievalphilosophicaltheoriesof nobilitywas a traditionof 'knightly'and courtlynobility.This was indirectly
- in the formof discourses
connectedto the environment
of the university
about clerksand masters,as well as about the social rank of scholars
accordingto theirintellectualdignity.
These interpretations
of the nature of nobilityspeak to the question
of whetherthereexistsa structuralconnectionbetweenthe exerciseand
teachingof speculativethought,on the one hand, and the nobilityof the
thinkeron the other.The convictionthatit does existdates back at least
to the time of Pythagoras.Though it must be said that relativelyfew
authorsthroughoutthe centurieshave writtenexplicitlyabout such connections,thisdoes not implythat theybelieved such connectionsdid not
exist.The issue functionedon different
levels. On the one hand, a man's
good birthcould be seen as merelyone of a numberof social and physical 'conditions'whichfixedhis characterand influencedhis educationand thushis inclination
to studyphilosophy.This case shouldbe considered
an elementof human education and is not philosophicallyproblematic.
However, at another level, the trainingin and developmentof higher
philosophicalskillscould be viewed as a conditionforthe attainmentof
human excellenceand 'nobility'.In thiscase, a natural-bornphilosopher,
would, ipsofacto
, be a member of a chosen elite and thus trulynoble.5
From thisperspective,the conceptuallink betweennobilityand philosophy could not be regardedas accidental.6The problem of this concep5 Theissueis thusnotmerely
socialquatale
a barely
received
notion
of"noble
, though
birth"
as "socialprestige"
circulated
theMiddleAges,informing
and interthroughout
oftheconcept
ofnobility.
The socialissueis theonewe find
withotheraspects
acting
in University
whereit often
means"beingbornofnobleparents";
some
documentation,
scholars
usedthis"factoflife"to theiradvantage,
forinstance,
theirnoble
mentioning
in their
orviaanother
to thePope- either
birth
direcdy
Examples
supplications
patron.
inW.Courtenay
andE. D. Goddard
Rotuli
Parisienses:
ofthistendency
aredocumented
(eds),
tothePope
, vol.II: 1352-1378,
, vol.I: 1316-1349
ofParis
Supplications
fiomtheUniversity
of"dign.":
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2002-2004
(seetheoccurrences
e.g.I, 261and265).
6 Anexplicit
linkbetween
andsystematic
hadbeenpreingenuitas
professionis
philosophy
De mundo
sentinLateAntiquity.
Cf.Apuleius,
, prol.,ed. C. Moreschini,
Leipzig-Stuttgart
cui
suumnondespexit
necindignam
se existimavit
1989,146:"Solaphilosophia
ingenium
ac dicere
tambonas
rerum
sedconducere
divinarum
ethumanarum
deferatur,
disceptatio
istiusmodi
suaecredidit
et congruere
arteset eiusmodi
professionis
operamcumingenuitate
aremine).
Tencenturies
theItaliandoctor
curamtalibus
studiis
etmoribus"
after,
(italics
- calledII Galateo
- (1448-1517),
with
dealtextensively
andhumanist,
Antonio
De Ferraris

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BEME
NATUS)

209

tuallinkand thevariouswaysin whichcertainmedievalthinkers

attempted
to elucidateit constitutesthe heart of this examination.
2. A Definition
ofNobility
of theConcept
The concept of nobilitywhich concernsthis investigationapproximates
an expressionof it used in recentliteratureby Claudio Donati, withsome
Donati's paradigmof nobilityhas threeelements:(a) a privileged
alterations.
"social" statusthatbears (b) certification
by explicitpublic laws or statutes
and/or
historical
a
scientific
Followingthisdelinjustification.7
having(c)
eation, Donati tends to deny that therewas a clear concept of nobility
beforethe Middle Ages. For instance,he holds thatancientRoman patricians, althoughtheycomprisedthe politicalelite, did not have juridical
recognition.8

Christian
ofnobility
withrationality
theissue.Hisequation
conception
gavean essentially
denobilitate
A. De Ferrariis,
flavours.
bothStoicandAristotelian
(1495),ed. in:
Epistola
differentia
"Verarerum
detto
il Galateo
Antonio
De Ferraris
D. Colucci,
, Lecce1939,140-41:
ratio
differentia
a forma,
ea est,quaesumitur
quae datesserei;iliaenimin hominibus
a quibusmenteet ratione
differentiae,
est;in brutis,
ignoramus;
quae sintsingulorum
recteappellabimus
Nobiles
valent,
qui
ignobiles,
plusratione
quicumque
igitur
separamur.
autPriamo
etiamsi sintCraesolocupletiores
minus,
obtemperat,
antiquiores;
qui rationi
is nechominis
immohicverehomoest;qui minus
hicverenobilis,
dignus;
appellationi
sunt
vitavivere.
maximam
brutali
hominum
Nobiles
ideodicunt,
quivere
philosoigitur
partem
to De Ferraris,
aremine).Philosophical
etiamsi
training,
according
(italics
inopes"
phantur
'
'
from1496,in E. Garin(ed.),Prosatori
via (seealsohisEremita
is butthe heroica
, dating
sources
werenot
De Ferraris's
delQuattrocento
latini
1952,at 1070).Among
, Milan-Naples
Renaissance
of
the
humanistic
and
Aristotelian
Juande
{e.g.
dialogues
philosophy
only
the
CanonLaw.The Glossa
De vita
butalsomedieval
Lucena's
(Divitias'
byquoting
felici)
and(atleastvirtually)
wasequatedwithbothvirtue
stressed
thatnobility
50.5.8.4,
Digest
Cf.B. Croce,Poeti
contemnunt
"Verephilosophantes
economic
pecuniam".
independence:
Rinascimento
delpieno
e tardo
e scrittori
, vol.I, Bari1945,17-35,
Knights
esp.21;A. Scaglione,
Italian
Renaissance
Ottoman
tothe
& Courtesy
atCourt:
, BerkeleyCourtliness,
from
Germany
Chivalry
LosAngeles-Oxford
1991,224.
7 Oneshould
evenconof'historical
notethatthenotion
different,
justification'
presents
fields.
Forjuridical
to itsuse in distinct
connotations
disciplinary
according
tradictory,
need
a practical
whichanswered
a sortofparadigmatic
it constituted
argument
thought
iniure.
On theother
intempore,
oneofRomanlaw's'first
andapplied
prius
potior
principles':
sameclaimwasinterpreted
thevery
hand,inanAristotelian
differendy:
setting
philosophical
itself
to whatis 'necesreveals
itself
'to be' as longas it assimilates
whatalways
persists
as it was
couldhavebeenvalidinsofar
thehistorical
argument
sary'.On thesegrounds
On theconcealment
ornatural
tothe'unhistorical',
abletoconform
argument.
biological
hasmadeinteresting
Pierre
Bourdieu
ofone'struehistorical
sugges/family
background,
Paris1979,78ff.
sociale
dujugement,
La Distinction:
tion;cf.P. Bourdieu,
critique
8 C. Donati,Nobilt
Rome
sociali
delle
scienze
, vol.VI [Moneta-rrezziJ,
, in: Enciclopedia

11:14:29 AM

210

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

During the late medieval period, however,a more loose relationship

betweenstatuteand rule prevailedin a numberof formsof intellectual
organization,especiallyin the case of the humanistscholars.Therefore
it is more appropriateto considera paradigmrequiringconditionsa and c,
but conditionb only in a general sense (thatis, I considerthe scholarly
setting,as such, as a juridical frame).Moreover,the notionof 'privilege'
is used primarilywithoutexclusivereferenceto personsor, when it does
have such reference,it is both in terms of his (1) access to the best
scientific
and educationalresourcesavailable and in termsof his (2) participationin settingthe socio-politicalagenda by way of being wellpositionedto establishthe hierarchyof learningpriorities.9
3 in Medieval
3. 'Nobility
A FirstGlanceat Different
Traditions
Thought:
The question de veranobilitate
, that is to say its nature and thus how it
mightbe achieved,characterisedvarious traditionsin medieval thought,
particularlyfromthe thirteenthcenturyonward. Andreas Cappellanus'
De amore(ca. 1180) dealt withit extensively;
thistreatisewas the onlywork
and Cappellanus the sole author to be explicitlyand distinctly
cited in
Tempier's 1277 condemnations,
perhapsindicatingitssubstantialinfluence
by attemptingto stem its tide. The writing'On true nobility'by the
Dominican William Peyraut,though less developed, also had a wide
influence.10
The epistlesof the jurist-statesman
Pier delle Vigne likewise
contain points that implicitlyrecall the keen courtlycontentionabout
whethernobilitywas determinedby one's lineage or by virtueof one's
- in otherwords:
animiprobitas
by good birthor by personalworth.Also
addressed in Aristotle'swritings,this issue provided an ongoing source
for disputesabout similartopics.11

a selected
theclassic
works
1996,235a-246a
(with
bibliography
ennumerating
byN. Elias,
G. Tabacco,M. L. Bush,andbyDonatihimself):
at 235a.
9 I consider
c to be thecorephilosophical
condition
andintend
to develop
it
aspect,
in a further
on Scholastic
study
Ingenuity.
10Guillelmus
Deeruditone
omnia
Peraldus,
,
(ca. 1265),in:Thomas
principm
Aquinas,
Opera
t. 16,Parma1865,395a-396b;
cf.Id.,Summa
devitiis
tract.
VI 'de superbia',
(1250?),
esp.
- consultation:
on-line
at:www.unc.edu/~swenzel/superbit.html
cap.28 (available
February
' e la teoria
3nelDuecento
Lefonti
del*Fiore
divirt
della*nobilt
, in:Giornale
2004).Cf.M. Corti,
storico
dellaletteratura
136(1959),1-82;Murray
1978(n. 3),274-75and471.
italiana,
11Petrus
de Vinea,Friderici
II. Imperatori
Basel1740,
, III, 27,ed.J. R. Iselius,
epistulae
inquosvires
"Vosigitur
virifortes
etnobiles,
& nimos
432-33:
grata
proavorum
generositas

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THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

211

The late medieval receptionof the Liberde causisfromJohn of Wales

to HeymericusofCampo, forexample,saw some unique developmentsin
the concept of the 'noble soul' {animanobilis).
Accordingto Heymericus's
syntheticapproach, Neoplatonic philosophical concepts correspond to
accordTrinitariantheologyand assume different
shades of interpretation
to
the
different
'schools'
or
traditions
of
thought.12
ing
Disputeson the dignityof variouslanguagesand stylesoccurredunder
the auspices of the Trivium,especiallygrammarand rhetoric.13

& honorem
nostrum
de potentiae
vestrae
felicitate
est,
confidite,
qui vester
propagavit,
De nobilSee alsotheinteresting
claro
rumoperum
affectibus
courtiy
dispute
promovete".
Petrode Vineaet Taddeode
etprobitate
animi
to both"magistris
itate
, dedicated
generis
II
allacorte
diFederico
sullanobilt
editedbyF. DelleDonne,Unadisputa
Suessa",
recently
ofthisdispute
in:Medioevo
diSvevia,
23 (1999),3-20.Another
Romanzo,
pointevocative
II
Frederick
ofDante'sBanquet
toemperor
be theAristotelian
, attributed
quotation
might
, IV, hi,6).
(Dante,TheBanquet
12In hisDisputatio
andPeripatetici
describes
howPlatonici
ecclesiastica
depotestate
, Heymericus
"Deus per suum
of theUniverse
theTrinitarian
understand
differently:
production
etPerypatetici
ad modum,
verbum,
ponunt
quoPlatoponitmentem
quodestextraipsum
secundum
Platonem
16v/et
cumeiusspiritu,
quise habetutanimamundi
intelligencias/1
universa"
aremine).On thistextby
fecit
velanima
nobilis
secundum
(italics
Perypateticos,
fromtheMs. Trier,CodexCusanus106,f. 116,see now
transcribed
Heymericus,
und
vonHeymericus
deCampo
F. Hamann,
Koran
undKonziliarismus.
zumVerhltnis
Anmerkungen
43 (2005),275-91,
at 278n. 3 and284n. 36.Heymericus
vonKues,
in:Vivarium,
Nikolaus
divinoofthenotion
of'thenoblesoul'in hisCompendium
a parallel
development
presents
8 (1967),56-75and 9 (1968),3-90.
ed.J. K. Korolec,
in: StudiaMediewistyczne,
rum,
ofintellecconnects
thethemeofthenoblesoulwiththeAlbertist
The author
concept
in thehighest
form
of
nobilis
allowsparticipation
theanima
tualdivinisation
("deificado"):
strahabensesseintellectuale,
life,sinceitis the"imagointelligentis
quo efficitur
agentis,
suaeintellectualitatis
mentum
(2ndpart,75);so that"propter
perfectionem
intelligentiae"
level("caeloautemstellato
nobilis"
activae
(2ndpart,76).Ata cosmic
dignatur
appellari
thenoblesoulis he whorefuses
to degealiaforma
nondebetur
quamanimanobilis"),
life(thatis to say"vitasimaffairs
andattains
thetrueintellectual
nerate
intomaterial
in comparationem
ad animasignobiles,
earumin
"Dicitur
nobilis
quaepropter
pliciter"):
immersionem
nonexserentes
vitamsimpliciter
materiam
supermateriam
dgnrant,
ofthought
ofa viarum
concordia
distinct
traditions
elevatam".
(ib.).Thissynthesis
amongst
ofCusa'scultural
a 'Neoplatonic
frame'
alsocomestobe a focalpointofNicholas
within
ofthe'noblesoul',seealsotheworkofDe Libera,
esp.De Libera
agenda.On thetheme
1991(n.4), 277-78.
13See forinstance,
De vulgari
DanteAlighieri,
II, n, 2-3,ed. P. V. Mengaldo,
eloquentia,
danin:Id., Opere
minori,
, in:Enciclopedia
1979,148.Cf.F. Salsano,
Dignit
Milan-Naples
of Seville's
t. 2 (Cim-Fo),
Rome19963,443b.On medieval
cf.Isidorus
tesca,
stylistics,
De musica,
, I, 39, 9; readalsoAugustinus's
V, 8, ed. Migne,PL 32, 1155:
Etymologiae
duoillinobilissimi:
heroicus
et quemiambicum
etiam
"Qualessuntversus
vulgovocant,
ipsesenarius".

11:14:29 AM

212

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

In the school, 'nobility'itselfalso became a crucial tool for disputation.Indeed, in the structureof scholasticargumentation,
the role played
the
criteria
of
excellenceis omnipresent,
as is evidentby the common
by
In logic,morenobilitatisi
usage of the vocabularyof nobility:hocestratione
withnobility,firstprincipleswere also
over,since dignitywas synonymous
called dignitates
, because theyare the principalcause of knowledge.15
The question'on nobility',in fact,became part of a strategyto establish a new hierarchyof knowledge,and also, by way of this strategy,to
endorsea new social order.16
Scholarshave pointedout thatthis'explosion'
14Petrus
inII librum
Sententiarum
Olivi,Quaesones
, q. 21,ed.Jansen,
Johannis
Quararcchi
all scholastic
authors
usethevocabulary
of'nobility'
to present
their
1922,386.Almost
from
GilesofRome,Duns
excellence';
'arguments
amongthesewereHenryofGhent,
Scotus(oneofwhoseprinciples
is "quodmelius
ponitur,
ponendum
est"),HenryBate,
evenPeterofJohnOliviandWilliam
ofOckham.
Lullus,
Raymond
Theymadeparticuandstriking
useofthiskindofargumentation,
anditsstrong
seems
larly
frequent
presence
to go handin handwitha neoplatonic
Authors
whooften
de
mentality.
quotetheLiber
causis
tomyreading,
tendtobe extremely
sensitive
tothe'meta-nobility
, according
argutheDominican
fourteenth
constitutes
a parment';
JohnReginaofNaples(early
century)
toJohn,
since"numerus
binarius
estprincipium
adigmatic
example.
divisionis",
According
thatis to saybad anddiabolic,
all alternatives
or divisions
shouldbe reduced
to a hierso thatoneofthetwois nobler;
seeF.Johannes
de Neapoli,
variae
Parisiis
archy
Quaestiones
ed.D. Gravina,
ofthehuman
disputatae,
soul,forinstance,
Naples1618,377a.Thesimplicity
is demonstrated
on thebasisofa lackofdifference
ordivision
amongitsparts(a sortof
oftheindiscernibles
antelitteram):
"In eodemetiamlibroDe causis
identity
dicitur,
quod
estsimplex,
& nondividitur,
& quia unaparseiusnonestcilianobilior
et
intelligentia
melior"
sucha typeofargument
hasrelevant
(ib.,214b).Moreover,
metaphysical
applications.
Olivi(quotedabove)arguesthat:"Quia formae
substantificare
magiscompetit
cumsubstantificare
etperse essesitnobilissimus
actussubstantiae"
quammateriae,
[InII
he says:"Quodin nobispossemoveri
ad
Sent.,
q. 16,ed.Jansen1922,299);similarly,
et idemestin omnibus
habentibus
pluralocavelin eodemlocoestnobilitatis
partialem
situm
et locum,
in Deo hocessetvaldeignobile
quamvis
(. . .)" (ib.,313);"Quodforma
sicabsoluta
habetactualitatem
modoettotalis"
longenobiliorem"
(ib.,320);"Nobilissimo
cf.Averroes,
libri
Aristoteli^
De memoria
etreminiscentia
(ib.,334).Additionally,
, 196
Compendium
ra 63-64,ed. E. L. Shields,
etvigilia
, 201 ra
(Mass.)1949,65; Id.,De sompno
Cambridge
18-24,202 ra 50 and202vb 22,ed. Shields1949,77, 102and 116;Id., Commentaum
medium
inAristoteli
's De generatone
etcorruptione
libros
, I, 21 (158vb 52) andII, 41 (172ra
Die
14),ed. F. H. Fobes,Cambridge
(Mass.)1956,33-34and 129-30.Cf.N. Wicki,
desKanzlers
material
forfurther
research
, Freiburg
Philosophie
Philipps
(CH) 2005,109.Useful
canbe found
in:E. P. Mahoney,
II concetto
digerarchia
nellatradizione
e nelpensiero
padovana
moderno
veneto
e scienza
moderna.
Atti
deXXVanno
accademico
, in:L. Olivieri
(ed.),Aristotelismo
delCentro
dellatradizione
aristotelica
nelVeneto
, Padua1983,vol.2, 729-41.
perlostudio
15Cf.Les 'Auctoritates
ed.J. Hamesse,
Louvain-Paris
Aristotelis'
1974,123(op. 1, 97).
Butseealsoother
occurrences
ofthesamevocabulary:
estnobile.g.117: "Nullascientia
ioret melior
118(op. 1,43); 128(op. 1, 157);174(op.6, 2); 176(op.6,
metaphysica";
24-25);187(op.6, 150);231(op. 11,2); etc.
16Duringthesecondhalfof thethirteenth
thereception
and studyof the
century,
in theFaculty
Aristotelian
of theArtsprovided
newmaterial
forjustifying
the
corpus

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THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATII
S)

213

of theproblemof nobilitydatesfromthe middleof the thirteenth

century.17
This is supportedby the markedincrease in the numberof philosophical textsdealing with the issue duringthe late Middle Ages, reflecting
and humanist
the growingweightplaced upon it in both the university
traditions.
The mastersof Civil law increasinglydiscussedthe 'concept' of nobilcentury,while comity,as Bartolo of Sassoferratodid in the fourteenth
18Their
of the Roman CodexJuris.
mentingon the sectionDe dignitatibus
referencesreveal that there was an 'open library'in which Aristotle's
Ethics
, Aquinas's Summa
, the Decretalsof Pope InnocentiusIII (whomthey
call doctorsubtilis)belonged to the juridical canon, along with Sacred
, particularly
Scripture.They also referto Dante Alighieri'sThe Banquet
to the fourthand final book which, in addition to being the longest
- in thesenseofhisbeinga follower
ofAristotle,
as "Periexcellence
ofthe'philosopher'
in De principiti
forexample,
sectator".
toJeande Scheville,
veritatis
According
patetice
ofnature
Montral-Paris
naturae
1956,35-57,thestudy
, prol.,ed.R.-M.Gigure,
permits
thusmerely
artium
meditationibus
a 'newbirth'
consolari,
quasimodogeniti"),
("Liberalium
"Otium
ofSeneca'smotto:
cum
vita
Consider
there-reading
from
itsneglect.
'death'results
areinterpreted
as knowlvivisepultura",
where'theLetters'
sinelitteris
mors
est
, hominis
to"ea quaeantiqui
tradidere".
Sciences
peripathetici
according
edgeofLogicandNatural
whichis
formtheverysamebackground
andAristotle's
Averroes's
Categories
Commentary
inBoccaccio's
novelonGuidoCavalcanti
recalled
, VI,9: "Adimostrarci
(.Decameron
implicitly
di luie deglialtri
idiotie nonletterati
chenoie glialtriuomini
siamo,a comparazione
ofScheville's
short
See alsoPseudo-John
uomini
scienziati,
morti").
peggiocheuomini
ofDe principiis
naturae
we findit in thesamemanuscript
De excellentia
treatise
philosophiae'
account
ofthesedebates,
cf.De
Fora first
Merton
(Oxford,
College,292,if.85r-87v).
status
hominis
'
Von
den'beatiores
Libera1991 (n.4),ch.vu;Th.Ricklin,
zum(optimus
philosophy
im
derradikalen
in:J. A. Aertsen-A.
Aristoteliker,
Speer(eds),Geistesleben
ZurEntradikalisierung
Berlin-New
York2000(Miscellanea
13.Jahrhundert,
Mediaevalia,
27),217-30;S. Ebbesen,
Arts
Masters
Or: Philosophy
andFreedom
Brito:
TheLastofGreat
, ib.,230-51;andthe
Radulphus
TheRoleofthePhilosopher
inthePolitical
ofM. Toste,'Nobiles,
solidstudy
vi,
optimi
philosoph.
attheFaculty
inParisintheLateThirteenth
, in:J. F. Meirinhos
(ed.),
Century
ofArts
Community
MariaCndida
Pacheco
dephilosophie
mdivale
Itinraires
dela raison.
tudes
, Louvain-laofferts
Neuve2005,269-308.
17Cf.M. Ascheri,
medievale:
nellaGlossa
e inBartolo
diSassoferrato
La nobilt
, in:Id.,Diritto
e delle
Problemi
delprocesso,
dellacultura
medievale
e moderno.
, Rimini1991,72.
fonti
giuridiche
evidence.
PaulOskarKristeller,
themostoftdiscussed
Thereisalsocodicological
presenting
outtheimportance
ofnobiissuesin earlyRenaissance
(1300-1600),
manuscripts
pointed
di L. Lehnus
e G. Velli),
difilologia
lezioni
Quattro
(conduescritti
lity.Cf.P. O. Kristeller,
differences
ed.byL. C. Rossi,Venice2003(Medioevo
1),18;withslight
europeo-Ritratti,
of
as TheLachmann
Method:
Merits
andLimitations
, in:Text.Transactions
already
published
1 (1981),11-20.
forTextualScholarship,
theSociety
18Cf.Ascheri
Intorno
1991(n. 17),55-80.See alsotheexcellent
study
byE. Cortese,
toscani
e ai caratter
diunceto
medievale
in:Id.,Scritti
, ed.byI. Biracchi
(1981),
agliantichi
'judices'
andU. Petronio,
vol.I, Spoleto1999,747-82.

11:14:29 AM

214

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

section of the work,is exclusivelyconcerned with the issue of nobility

and its nature.
The vocabularyof the university
or studiaoffersfurther
evidenceof the
connectionbetweenthesediscusionson intellectualnobilityand the institutionalsettingof philosophicalteaching.The word 'bachelor' (baccalar
ins),for instance,derivesfromthe glossaryof feudal chivalry,where it
meant'a youngnoble' or 'youngster',
a propercandidatefordefinitive
ennoFrom the fourteenth
blement.19
centuryonward,moreover,a new means
of social mobilitywas instituted.By means of a twentyyear-longperiod
of university
teachingone could potentiallyattain noble statusfor oneselfand one's descendents.Especiallyin the Facultyof Law, thisbecame
a normal and accepted method of social ennoblement.20
Outside of the University,humanistsalso contributednotablyto the
debate about the natureof nobilityand the means by which true ennoblementcould be achieved.Coluccio Salutati,forinstance,wrotea treatise
De nobilitate
at the end of the fourteenth
legumet medicine
century.Before
in
favour
of
the
social
and
of
arguing
politicalprominence Law (in chapterI) Coluccio dealt philosophicallywith the 'essence' and definitionof

19See Du Cange'sGlossarium
mediae
etinmae
Latinitatis
, ad vocem'Bacchalari'.
Apart
from
the'bachelor'
musthaveall themoralandphysical
oftheknight.
money,
requisites
See alsoM. Teeuwen,
TheVocabulary
Turnhout
2003
ofIntellectual
LifeintheMiddle
Ages,
surle vocabulaire
intellectuel
du Moyen-ge,
(Etudes
10),33-35.
20Cortese1991(n. 18),780,n. 91. See,forinstance,
theEpistola
o siaRagionamento
by
theElder(d. 1381),a summary
ofjuridical
doctrine
written
for
Lapoda Casteglionchio
hissonBernardo.
di Dottore,
, ed. L. Mehus,
Lapo,Epistola
Bologne1753,29: "Di stirpe
e specialmente
se lettoavesseil Dottore
di cui si cercasse,
o di coluiche fossedi lui
XXanni,perciocch
allorasarebbe
di Conte".The singular
Liber
disceso,
Conte,o disceso
da Prato(1270-ca 1338),
madeincollaboration
with
theBolognese
figuraram
byConvenevole
and dedicated
inluminator
Bartolomeo
de' Bartoli
to KingRobertofNaples,depicts
a
a portrait
ofConvenevole
whorepresents
thepersonification
of
himself)
knight
(probably
thetownofPrato(nearFlorence).
Thesignsofnobility
tothemanofLetters
and
belong
ofHumanities
fora longperiod.So, theverbaldidasmatchhishaving
beena teacher
mili
caliatells:"Causajubetquiasicin equostem,
tisarmati
sum
rex,modosessor/
signi,
aremine).
suamsicstando
Cf.A. Frugoni,
(italics
namque
professor/
pratensis
figuram"
referoque
I. Convenevole
inonore
delPetrarca.
daPrato
e unlibro
Studi
suConvenevole
daPrato
, maestro
figurato
dell'Istituto
Storico
Italiano
diRoberto
, in:Bullettino
peril MedioEvo e Archivio
d'Angi
careerseemsto havecon81 (1969),1-32,at 27. Suchan accomplished
Muratoriano,
in this
anduniversity
cerned
butalso'schools'
notonlyindividual
masters,
dpartements;
di stemma
e di lignaggio
couldwrite
that:"La nobilt
senseCarloDionisotti
(. . .) erano
halfofthe15thCentury]
dellaormaivecchia
scuola
a quellastessadata[second
propri
e lafortuna
diSuiseth
e
Ermolao
Barbaro
'moderna'
di Pavia";cf.C. Dionisotti,
, in:Medioevo
Studi
inonore
diBruno
Rinascimento.
Nardi
, Florence
1955,vol.I, 232n. 11.

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215

In such cases a connectionclearlyemergesbetweenthe theme

nobility.21
of philosophicalnobilitywiththe idea of a corporativeidentityof a group
of learned men (eitherLegisteor Artiste).
These debates about nobilityin and outside of the Universityduring
the late Middle Ages were enmeshedin broader traditionsof philosophical discussions,two of which can enhance our perspectiveon the question. The firstbringsus to Roman Law throughthe Latin language and
the historicalusage of the term 'nobilitas
'.
4. TheJuridicalConcept
ofNobility

The Latin term 'nobilis V appeared in the fourthcenturyB.C., and

derived fromthe verb 'cognosco
, cognitum,
, -is, cognvi
-cre' which means
'to know' or 'to attest',but also 'to express a judgement' or 'to judge
someone'.22The meaningof nobiliswas essential'dignity'and renownor
reputation,not far from the definitionof Aristotle'sPolitics(1294a2 1):
"Nobilitymeans ancientwealthand virtue".This conceptionwas retained
in Marius Victorinus'sDe definitionibus
(known in the Middle Ages as
Pseudo-Boethius):"Nobilityis the virtue of ancestors,and the accoutrementsof successors".23

- De verecundia
21C. Salutati,
De nobilitate
etmedicine
, ed. E. Garin,Florence
1947,
legum
8-10.Forthebackground
ofthisdispute,
thefundamental
articles
apartfrom
byEugenio
GarinandCarloDionisotti
see nowP. Gilli,La noblesse
dudroit.
Dbats
etcontro(below),
verses
surla culture
etle rledesjuristes
dansl'Italie
mdivale
), Paris
juridique
(XIIe-XVesicles
TheItalian
Noblemen:
Humanists
onHappiness
2003;cf.alsoCh.E. Trinkhaus,
, New
Adversity's
York1940,80-120;F. Tateo,La disputa
sullanobilt
e realt
dell'Umanesimo
, in:Id.,Tradizione
italiano
del sapiente
nellasocietperfetta',
, Bari1967,355-421(esp.'L'ufficio
390-421).
Thework
ofDionisotti
remains
C. Dionisotti,
umanistica
e testi
irreplaceable;
Filologia
giurdici
e Cinquecento
deltesto.
AttidelII Congresso
dellaSociet
internazionale
, in:La Crtica
fia Quattro
italiana
distoria
deldiritto
, t. I, Florence
1971,189-204.
22Cf.Donati1996(n.8), 235.
23MariusVictorinus,
De definitionibus
in:Th. Stangl,
Tulliana
etMaro, ed. Th. Stangl,
Mnchen
nobilitas
estvirtus
Victoriniana,
1888,22: "Utmoneat
maiorum,
apudposteros
sarcina".
We findtheverysamedefinition
in Isidorus
ofSeville's
, II, 29,8. In
Etymologiae
thelatemedieval
Latintexts,
nobilitas
anddignitas
aresynonyms.
On
generally
speaking,
thesocialconnotations
ofnobility
in theancient
Romanworld,
cf.H. Oppermann
(ed.),
Rmische
cOrdo
senatorius
undnobilitas'.
Die
, Darmstadt
1967,446-67;D. Schlinkert,
Wertbegriffe
Konstitution
desSenatsadels
inderSptantike
1996.Everyone
remembers
thewell^ Stuttgart
known
as recorded
Claudius,
speechoftheEmperor
, advocating
byTacitusin hisAnnals
admission
ofGallicnobility
intotheRomanSenate(48A.D.);sinceexcellence
wasbased

11:14:29 AM

216

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

line of enquirywhen, in one of his

Cicero gives us a more intriguing
sacerdotium
.24At least
Summa
nobilitas
est
. . . amplissimum
he
wrote:
,
Philippus
was connectedto 'nobility'.
one of the connotationsof the termsacerdotium
The sacerdotal elite was a fractionof ancient Roman intellectualarisinstitutedthe 'rules of the
tocracy,but the fractionwhich,nevertheless,
- that is to
of
the
the
foundations
originalRoman Law.25
say,
game5
Roman Law affectedmedievalthoughtdeeply.Apartfromitsinfluence
on technicalaspects and proceduresof both medieval Civil and Canon
Law, the Roman juridical traditionintroducedinto medieval thought
some of its implicittheoreticalassumptions.In particular,it introduced
rei
a tensionbetweentwo competingmodels of 'truth':truthas adaequatio
etintelkctusin otherwords,a model
but also as adaequatio
etintellectus
operis
on the one hand (also shared by philosophers)and one
of representation
of procedureon the other.26
Accordingto Roman Law, as it was understoodduringthe thirteenth
century,nobilityis treatedas a juridical conceptin commentarieson the

wouldhavebeenintrinsically
andthetradition
ofthegentes
on seniority
, nobility
expanan interesting
is alsothatofCh. Badel,
andpeoples;
sivethroughout
survey
generations
ofTacitus,
Theinfluence
La noblesse
del'Empire
romain
2005,esp.106-90.
, Seyssel
(France)
cf.M. Ferrari,
Il rilancio
deiclasindirect:
theMiddleAgeshadbeennevertheless
during
delMedioevo,
letterario
Menest
sicie deiPadri
, in:G. Cavallo-C.Leonardi-E.
(eds),LoSpazio
1978(n.3),271-72.
Latino
deltesto
1. Il Medioevo
, Rome1995,441.Murray
, voi.3,La ricezione
24M. TulliusCicero,In M. Antonim
orationes
, 13,4, ed. P. Fedeli,Leipzig
Philippicae
1982,158,12.
25Cf.A. Schiavone,
dellarivoluzione
Roma
Il secolo
Giuristi
e nobili
nella
scientifica
repubblicana.
antico
1992(2nded.),vii: a selected
nelpensiero
, Rome-Bari
groupof persons
giuridico
wisdom
, hadbuilta social-casuistic
unparalleled
), bymeansoftheir
responsa
(thesacerdotes
Mucius
Scevola
Cf.alsoG. Lepointe,
civilizations.
, t. I. Sa vieetson
Quintus
amongancient
La Religion
romaine
surledroit
oeuvre
Sesdoctrines
, Paris1926;G. Dumzil,
pontifical
juridique.
La
destrusques
surla religion
avecuneappendice
, Paris1974(2nded.);P. Veyne,
archaque:
oftheLatin
Paris2001,v-vi,247-280(onthejuridical
socit
romaine
meaning
(3rd
ed.),
'liber
alis
, V).
adjective
26I cannot
WhenI say"modelofrepresentation"
whatI havehereassumed.
develop
hasrecendy
as JanAertsen
I do notrefer
to modern
recalled,
notions;
representational
as a represenas muchan ontological
reietintellectus"-formula
the"adequatio
expresses
TheCity
seeAugustine's
Fora better
oftruth.
tionalconcept
, IV,
ofGod
understanding,
1992(n. 25),73-108(fortheideaof'doubletruth',
ch. 27. See alsoSchiavone
justified
at 105);Dumzil1974(n.22),
andcommon
noblemen
between
people,
bythedistinction
ordealmayalsohaverepresented
medieval
In this'juridical'
111-15.
sense,thebarbaric
Studio
distoria
deldiritto
Leordalie.
See thesolidworkofF. Patetta,
a sortoftestofnobility.
delDiritto
e scienza
, Turin1890,333-99.
comparato

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

217

sectionof theJustinianCode: 'On dignities'.27

Firstof all, dignitas
makes a
man free,since it rescues him fromparental power and tutelage (the
In earlyRoman law onlysacerdotaldignitycould do that;28
patriapotestas).
theemperorextendedthispowerto otherdignities:the Patrice,the Consul,
etc. The ancientjuridical notionof nobilitywas coupled withthe notions
of freedom,independenceand governance.Withoutenteringinto detailed
analysis,let me note some aspects of thisjuridical meaning of nobility:
to be freeof bondage or tutelage,to be able to choose foroneself,to be
allowedto inherit,and to have the skilland authority
to commandothers.29

27See Codex
andpassim.
Cf. Corpus
, BookXII, Tit.i butalso Tit.in ('de consulibus')
IurisCivilis,
Codex
Iustinianus
Berlin1877,454aff.See G. Barni,
,' 12,3, ed. P. Krger,
suiconcetti
di'dignitas',
nobilitas
inBartolo
daSasso/errato
' 'officium'
Appunti
, in:Archivio
giuridico
Serafini',
1958,130-44,
'Filippo
esp.132-36.
28SeeDigesta
Iusniani
ed.Th.Mommsen,
14,6 ('desenatusconsulto
Augusti,
macedoniano'),
vol.I, Berlin1870,43Iff.Cf.alsoInstitutiones
ed. P. Krger,
Berlin
, 1, 4 ('de ingenuis'),
1886,2.
29Fora detailed
ofthosedifferent
seethebibliography
above.One
commentary
aspects,
couldnotea linguistic
connection
between
the(predisposition
andtheideaof
to)
nobility
- mileBenveniste
- l'homme
thefreeman:
"En latinet en grec
teaches
libre,(e)leutheros,
se dfinit
une'croissance',
une'souche';
positivement
parsonappartenance
(. . .) en
des'enfants'
: natre
de bonsoucheet trelibre
latin,la dsignation
(bienns)parliberi
c'esttoutun".According
toBenveniste,
intheGreek-Latin
ofbirth,
freeworld,
legitimacy
andstock
allconjoin.
"EnGermanie,
selonTacite,la socit
comdom,(virtual)
nobility,
desnobiles,
desingenui
Il estclairque nobiles
et ingenui
, desliberti
prenait
, desservi.
, avec
la distinction
de la noblesse
etde la naissance,
liberi;
d'autre
font
quivalent
partlesservi
aveclesliberti
servi.
ainsiquela notion
de 'libert'
se con, anciens
groupe
(. . .) Il apparat
stitue
partir
de la notion
socialise
de 'croissance',
croissance
d'unecatgorie
sociale,
d'unecommunaut.
Tousceuxquisontissusde cette'souche',
de ce 'stock1,
dveloppement
sontpourvus
de la qualitde (e)-leutheros.
(. . .) Le senspremier
(. . .) estceluide l'appartenance
unesoucheethnique
de croissance
Cette
dsigne
parunemtaphore
vgtale.
confre
un privilge
et l'esclave
ne connaissent
appartenance
que l'tranger
jamais(. . .).
Ainsiliber
. . . 'denaissance
aboutit
former
unterme
celuide liberi
lgitime',
indpendant,
'enfants'"
Le vocabulaire
desinstitutions
1. Economie,
(E. Benveniste,
indo-europennes.
parent,
socit/
2. Pouvoir,
droit,
, Paris1969,vol. 1, ch. 3 'L'homme
religion
libre',321-33;butsee
alsovol.2, ch.8 'Royaut
et noblesse',
denoted
85-88).Notethattheideaofa stock
by
meansofa "mtaphore
de croissance
is exemplified
vgtale"
bythetreesofgenerations,
from
ofFloreto modern
thearbora
iuris
ofmedieval
law.
Joachim
genealogists,
through
alia,Johannes
de Legnano's
Dearbore
See,inter
, inthems.Paris,
consanguintatis
Bibliothque
Mazarine,
1434,ff.109r-115ra
oneis
(I couldonlyreadthisms.,whiletheauthoritative
Vat.Lat.2639,ff.215-226v).
to whomalsoa treatise
De virtute
JohnofLegnano,
heroyca
isascribed,
became
nobleforhaving
beenteaching
overtwenty-years
longattheUniversity;
seeJ. P. McCall,TheWritings
with
a ListofManuscripts
23
ofJohn
ofLegnano
, in:
' Traditio,
Thegenealogy
trees
deo(1967),415-37;cf.E. H. Wilkins,
ofthegenealogical
oftheGenealogia
23 (1925),61-65.
rum'in:Modern
Philology,

11:14:29 AM

218

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

How to Be Nobleafter
Adam'sSin
5. Aspects
of theReligions
Conception:
At least at firstglance, nobilityseems to be condemned by Christians:
engage'aristocracy'is a sin,even ifa venial one. Rejectingactivepoliticeli
mentin favourof 'equality'among peoples,the Christianmessagestressed
the relevanceof the equalityclaim. Firstof all, Adam's sin cancelled any
eitherinnateor originalhuman excellence;secondly,Jesus Christ'sIncarnationopened again to all people the possibilityof being electedby God.
de dominico
die octavarum
sanctaePaschae
, says as
Augustine,in his Tractatns
follows:
in
Alloquoritaque vos, unus dies,infantesmalenatiex Adam, benerenati
Christo(. . .) Simulredemptisumus,unumpretiumomneshabemus:frumentumnostrumest sanctumevangelium.Fratresnos facitde servis,
qui redimii:coheredesnos unicumfecit.Unus erat, et fratreshabere
carissimi(. . .). Videte
dignatusest: nolite oblivisciistam dignationem,
in
sed venturaest ventite.
Palea
abundat
dico:
esto
area,
quod
grana
lado, separabitur
palea".30
Accordingto Saint Paul, there should be neitherJew nor Greek, freeman nor slave. Christiandoctrineseems indeed to rejectpreviousrepresentationsof human excellence,but not to renounce the conceptionof
'excellence' or nobilityas such. The new Christianconcept of nobility
becomes ratherits only acceptable,or exclusiveform,which is indepen30EditedbyG. Morin,
Sermones
in:Miscellanea
, I, Sancii
Augustini
postMaurinos
Agostiniana
are mine).See alsoAugustinus,
Sermo
182,
at 500 (italics
, Rome1930,499-501,
reperti
Si benenatisumus,
c. 3, ed. Migne,PL 38, 986: "Fratres,
quidestquodrenascimus?
naturaquae lapsa
Naturaquae corrupta
fuerat,
reparatur;
quidestquodrenascimus?
Eusebius
naturaquae deformis
'Gallicanus',
fuerat,
jacebat,gratiareformatur".
erigitur;
Turnhout
1970(GC SL,
ed.Fr.Glorie,
XIV'DePascha
Homilia
homiliarumi
iii' in : Collectio
dicereaudeat,quemtotdomini
se interhaecingenuum
"Nescioquomodo
101),167-68:
in partes
suasdistrahunt.
quod
quodaliquisbenenatusest?Quidprodest
Quidprodest
nosextrinsecus
claritate
Videmus
estinconscientia?
liberestin natura,
generis
quiservus
etcriminum
serinnocentum
infirmitate
intrinsecus
mentis
dominos,
sublimes,
degeneres;
"
velhonore
velgenere
vos.(. . .) Sinecausaesta foris
ingenuus
conspicuus,
quinonestintus
divine
Incarnation
cf.also
of'nobility'
aremine).
Aboutthetransvaluation
through
(italics
at
Rome1968,b 65b-68a,
De rationibus
Thomasde Aquino,
, 7, ed. H.-F.Dondaine,
fidei
- pauperes
- evenif he was "homoinfinitae
66a:"UndeChristus
parentes
dignitatis"
et parentum
divitiis
ne quisde sola carnisnobilitate
virtute
perfectos,
elegitet tarnen
honorum
revout homines
ab inordinato
vixit,
appetitu
(. . .) absquedignitate
glorietur
of
alsoin terms
thePelagian
has recently
studied
Salamito
caret".
struggle
Jean-Marie
one:cf.
andthe'new'Christian
ideaofnobility
theRoman-juridical
between
thetension
etles
enteAugustin
sociaux
dela controverse
Lesvirtuoses
etla multitude.
Aspects
J.-M.Salamito,
Grenoble
2005.
plagiens,

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

219

dent of earthlypower and position.In this Christianconception,'nobility' depends instead upon election (eitherof a nation or of a man) by
God: it is a question of divine grace.
God's choice, accordingto the Old Testament,is the reason forone's
excellenceof lineage. The Christianreading of the ancient pagan writings,at least fromthe thirdcenturyA.D., proceededwithcaution,assimuniversalisticaspect of late Hellenistic
ilatinga yet to be fully-realised
culture.Thus the true nobleman is the holy man, the saint who follows
a patternof conductset forthin the Gospels,as interpreted
by the Church.
In this sense onlyJesus Christis the principleof nobility,because he is
the veresanctus
, the verymodel and source of human holiness.Ambrose
of Milan, forinstance,repeatedin his De paradiso(c. 4, 24) that:Non loci,
nongeneris
sed virtute
nobilitate,
unusquisque
gratiamsibi comparaiThe claim
an
established
was directedalso against
against
people's specificdignitas
to
be
the
nation.
Christianauthors,from
Jewishpretensions
unique holy
Gregorythe Great, went over the subject repeatedly.Their authority
was integratedinto Canon Law. In the Decretum
Gratiani
magisti
(pars Ia,
D. 40, c. 3) we read:
Nos, qui presumus,non ex locorumvel generisdignitate,sed morum
nobilitateinnotescere
debemus,nec urbiumclaritate,sed fideipuritate.31
Only God has the rightto make distinctions
among men; so thatif there
in dignitytheyare merelya consequenceof divinedecree.32
are differences
The two sides of this statement,even if theyare completelydifferent
in
mirror
in
one
another
In
other
neither
social
nor
words,
practice,
theory.
intellectualaristocracyis an institution
peculiar to Christendom.But the
Christiancontextualisation
became possible by means of an alternative
of
distinction.33
(theological)conception
31Decretum
Gratiani
, I, d. 40, 3, ed. E. L. Richter,
Leipzig1839,126.Cf.ib.,9, ed.
nonlocussalvatanimam.
128: "Gratia,
ItemAmbrosius,
lib.De paradiso".
The
Richter,
authoritative
workbyHenry
ofSuse'Hostiensis'
suchopinion.
Cf.
(d. 1271)strengthened
alsoBadel2005(n.23),190-99.
32On thisaspect,
seetheiudicious
ofSalamito
analysis
(n. 30),ch.2.
33TheideaofChristian
wasuseful,
whenlatemedieval
authors
wished
tocritnobility
icizetheapproach
ofthephilosophical
schools.
Francis
forinstance,
offer
us a
Petrarch,
clearexample
ofambiguity:
on theonehandhe stresses
theennobling
powerofknowlautaulicisartibus,
edge("Nonmeritis
(. . .) meorum,
nequemilitaribus
(. . .) sedingenio
ac litteris"),
whileon theother
handdismissing
the'pagan'valueofbothknowledge
and
culture
in contrast
withthesimplicity
ofChristian
life:"Titulorusticiore
ac
(. . .) meliore
contentus
sum".Cf.F. Petrarca,
Desuisipsius
sanctiore,
atqueob earnremetiamnobiliore,

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

Additionally,the developmentof medieval liturgyshows a continuous

It should be noted
interplaywiththe vocabularyand ritualsof chivalry.34
that at the end of the feudal age we finda newlyarticulatedconception
of nobility,which stillconstitutesthe semanticreferentof our common
Because of this,the medievalinstitution
of chivalry,
politicalexpression.35
its development,and relation to Christian doctrine deserve particular
attentionwhich I cannot give here.36I will limitmyselfin the following
one elementwhichtypifies
the 'noble
paragraphs(cf. 7-13) to suggesting
thinker'in a university
milieu.
etmultorum,
III, 37 and42 (cf.IV,49),in:Id.,Invectives
, ed. D. Marsh,
ignorantia,
Cambridge
2003,254and258.See alsothebrilliant
(Mass.)-London
essaybyO. Boulnois,
Scolastique
ethumanisme.
etla croise
designorances
Monignorance
etcelledetant
, in: Ptrarque,
Ptrarque
d'autres
2000,5-43.
(1367-1368
% Grenoble
34The sacrament
ofconfirmation
in theMiddleAgesmeantalso'giving
so
courage':
theconfirmed
Christian
becomes
a valiant
Cf.A. Adam,Das Sakrament
derFirmung
knight.
nachThomas
vonAquin,
1958(Freiburger
Studien,
Freiburg
73),68-84;at 84
theologische
theopposition
between
'Ehre'and'Schande':
wiedasmilitrische
Zeichen
"(.. .) hnlich
nachderSchlacht
denSiegern
zumRuhm".
The German
Dominican
of
Hugo
Ripelinus
' whenhe
tothe'militia
andthe'clipeus
crucis
(d. ca. 1268)alsorefers
Strasbourg
spiritualit
dealswithconfirmation
in his Compendium
totius
veritatis
theologiae
(lib.VI, c.. 10/11,ed.
from
the13th
J.Prss,
Strassbourg
1489).See alsotheritual
gesture
"peralapam",
dating
cf.Guillelmus
Rationale
divinorum
Duranti,
V-VI,ed. A. Davril- T.M.
century;
ociorum,
Turnhout
1998(CC CM, 140A),433.
Thibodeau,
35MarcBloch,inhisLa Socit
thata proper
fiodale,Paris1940,maintained
conception
of'nobility'
connected
withdefinite
did
(sinceit hadbeenintrinsically
rituals)
ennobling
notappearbefore
In recent
theXII century.
decadesBloch'saccount
hasbeendeeply
discussed
and revised.
dansla France
Cf.G. Duby,La noblesse
mdivale
, in: Id.,La socit
etstructures
Hommes
auMoyen
chevaleresque.
ge(I), Paris1988(2nded.),9-33;Ph.Contamine,
La noblesse
auroyaume
deFrance.
DePhilippe
leBel Louis
XII, Paris1998(2nded.);M. Aureli,
TheWestern
intheLateMiddle
: A Survey
andSome
Ages
oftheHistoriography
Nobility
Prospects
for
andNobility
inMedieval
: Concepts,
NewResearch
, in:A J. Duggan(ed.),Nobles
,
Europe
Origins
Tabaccois still
, Woodbridge
2002,263-73.The survey
Transformations
by Giovanni
cf.G. Tabacco,Su nobilt
e cavalleria
nelmedioevo.
Unritorno
a MarcBloch?
fundamental;
',
in:Rivista
storica
91 (1979),5-25.
italiana,
36SeeScaglione
ofScaglione's
1991(n.6),chs.1-8.Somedetails
learned
research
should
be revised,
thanks
tolight
shedonthesubject
deAdam's
(onSalimbene
byCinzioViolante
ofcourtesy),
Girolamo
Arnaldi
ofDante),Ernst
Benzandoth(onthenobility
conception
ers(onthe'truenoblemen'
offourteenth-century
Nevertheless
mystics).
survey
Scaglione's
a sufficient
Cf.C. Violante,
La 'Cortesia'
clericale
e
stillprovides
basisformyreflections.
nelDuecento
1994(Saggidi 'Lettere
La nobilit
Italiane',
, Florence
49);G. Arnaldi,
borghese
diDante
laprovvidenzialit
dellamobilit
sociale
41 (2003),
e Cacciaguida,
ovvero
, in:La Cultura,
Raison
etfoi: archeologie
d'une
crise
d'Albert
leGrand
JeanPaulII, Paris
203-15; A. De Libera,
C. S. Jaeger,
Love:
In search
one-sided,
2003,334-43and490-93.Although
ofa
Ennobling
a stimulating
from
thetwelve
cenLostSensibility
, Philadelphia
1999,presents
perspective
ofU. Carpi,La nobilt
diDante
theimportant
research
, vol.I, Florence
2004,
tury.
Lastly,
esp.20-84.

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221

During the Late Middle Ages the concept of nobilitycarriedvarious

connotations,dependingupon the context[e.g.juridical or theological)in
which it occurred.This both enrichesand complicatesour picture.The
distinction
betweenclerksand laymenwas a freshdevelopmentin medieval
one which made the statusof those who shared characteristics
society,37
of both sides difficult
to evaluate a couple of centurieslater. This was
the case withthe receptionof the ideal of 'chivalry'in the late thirteenth
stacentury.On the one hand, the twelfth-century
knighthad a different
tus than the cleric:he undertookmilitaryserviceand was dependentupon
the grace of the king(the anoblissement
), in a way analogous to the dependence of a virtuousChristianupon the grace of God. On the otherhand,
the Latin termmilesbelongedalso to the clericalvocabularyand referred
to the noblemaninsofaras he became a milesChristi
and integratedhimselfinto the (lower) aristocracyas a servantof the Ecclesiain hoc mundo
.38Those knightsand the social groupstheyrepresentedhad an ideposita
alised code of conduct,expressedin a collectionof textswrittenforthem
by clerks(AndreasCappellanus' De amoreis one importantexample)39and
in eponymousliterature.The importanceplaced upon 'nobility'in such
a 'canon' cannot be overemphasized.
In the contextof the urban and higher-education
developmentsof the
thirteenth
as
has
been
these
documents
were read in a
noted,
century,
37See myreview
ofDante,
lafilosofia
e i laici
44 (2003),140-45,
withref, in:L'Alighieri,
erenceto bothDomenico
and CarloDionisotti,
to whoseworks
shouldbe
Comparetti
addedCh. T. Davis,Dante's
andother
1984.Among
recent
contri, Philadelphia
Italy
essays
cf.G. Guldentops-C.
'Liarsd'amour,
de
butions,
Steel,Vernacular
fortheNobility:
Philosophy
vertu
etdeboneut',
anOldFrench
s Ethics
ca.1300, in:Bulletin
Adaptation
ofThomas
Aquinas'
from
de philosophie
de mdivale,
45 (2003),67-85.
38In thissense,according
to thewellknown
ofmedieval
the
orders,
example
military
nobleknight
ina form
shares
ofclerical
status.
WhentheFrench
kingPhilipIV ofValois
hislong-term
battle
theTemplars,
heperhaps
calculated
interms
ofmateengaged
against
rialandpolitical
we cannotavoidseeingit alsoas an opposition
However,
advantage.
between
twoconflicting
models
ofnobility:
thealready
obsolete
twelve-century
conception
andthenewlayconception,
sharedbyPhilipIV's advisors;
cf.A. Murray
1978(n. 3),
Idealietici
e pensiero
nel'Derecuperatane
Terrae
sanctae'
253-55;A. Ghisalberti,
politico
(1306)
diPierre
Dubois
da Pucrs,
PortoAlegre],
159(1995),643-58.See also,
, in:Veritas
[Revista
on thenotion
ofmilitia
Christi
La langue
desaint
Benot
, Chr.Mohrmann,
, in : Ead.,tudes
surlelatin
desChrtiens
chrtien
etmdival
at 337;andj. Flori,
, t.II: Latin
,'Rome1961,325-42,
De la chevalerie
la chevalerie
chrtienne?
Christi'
e Crociata
neisecoli
XI-XIII.
fiodale
, in: Militia
AttidellaXI Settimana
internazionale
di studio,
Mendola,
1989,Milan1992,67-101.
39Cf.thefinearticle
La struttura
del'DeAmore'
diAndrea
byF. Colombo,
, in:
Cappellano
Rivista
di filosofia
89 (1997),553-624.
Subdeis d'A.S. Avalle,
Ai luoghi
di
neo-scolastica,
sullalineaitaliana
delXIIIsecolo,
Delizia
pieni.
Saggio
1977,25-29,34,andesp.
Milan-Naples
cf.Murray
1978(n. 3),275-77,
onJeande Meung.
38ff.;

11:14:29 AM

222

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

new light,togetherwith new books, verse poetry,and treatiseswritten

forlaymen.40
And when an Italian layman,Dante Alighieri,wrotea sort
of philosophicalhandbookforfreebornmen, The Banquet
, a striking
portion of it (the entirefourthbook) concernedthe debate on the nobility
of man. This long treatiseon nobilityshould not be considereda digression on a social issue, as Etienne Gilson did41and scholarstend stillto
do. Dante's Banquetinsistsupon a very specificphilosophicalinterpretation of nobility,and was understoodas such by later commentators:
both
and
masters
of
the
Arts
This
let
us
turn
jurists
faculty.42 rapidlysketched,
back to the Ancientconceptionof nobility.
6. Nobility
as a 'Network
witha HistoryitsPhilosophical
and the
Background
'
birthof theAncientSchoolsof Thought
'
The notionof nobilityemerged,thoughimplicitly,
at the verybeginning
of the Western Philosophy,since the rise of an autonomous space of
researchentailed the conscience of a specificphilosophicaliog, a 'way
of Life', defined(and justified)against the others.43
A rigorousinterpretationof nobilitywas employedby Plato in his sternattackon the Sophists.
He integrated
criticisms
of absolutesocial aristocracy,
such as thosedepicted
like
in
and
order
to offera renewed
by poets
Lycophron
Euripides,
40See thepioneering
overview
ofK. Vossler,
Diephilosophischen
neuen
zursen
Grundlagen
StildesGuido
Guinicelli
Cavalcanti
undDante
, Guido
, Heidelberg
1904,24-41("die
Alighieri
Adelsfrage").
41Cf.. Gilson's
ReviewofNardi'sDal 'Convivio'
alla 'Commedia
storico
' in: Giornale
dellaletteratura
138
at
568.
italiana, (1961),562-73
42Basicbibliographical
references
arein:F. Cancelli,
Bartolo
daSasso/errato
, in:Enciclopedia
dantesca
D. Consoli,
e nobile
Nobilt
, t. 1 (A-Cil),524b-526b;
, in:ib.,t. 4 (N-Sam),58a-62a;
theseminal
sullanobilt
storica
101
, in: Rivista
italiana,
study
by C. Dionisotti,
Appunti
La noblesse
danslessermons
desDominicains
deNaples
(1989),295-316;
J.-P.Boyer,
(premire
moiti
duXIVsicle),
in:N. Couplet
andJ.-M.Matz(eds),La noblesse
dansleterritoires
angevins
lafinduMoyen
Actes
ducolloque
international
Saumur
,
Age.
organis
parl'Universit
d'Angers
(Angers3-6Juin1998),Rome2000,567-80.Olivi'sshort
treatise
Milesarmatus
as Lo
(alsoknown
cavalier
deserves
seeCarpi2004(n.36),34.Fora rich,
well-reasoned
'catmention;
armat)
ofnobility,
seeJeanGerson's
De nobilitate
alogue'ofthemedieval
(1423).
interpretations
muchelusive,
R. HowardBloch,Etymologies
andGenealogies.
A Literary
Suggestive,
though
Middle
oftheFrench
Ages,
Anthropology
Chicago1983,83-87.
43PierreHadothasrepeatedly
dreawn
theattention
to thisaspect.Cf.alsoB. Snell,
DieEntdeckung
desGeistes.
Studien
deseuropischen
Denkens
beidenGriechen,
zurEntstehung
Gttingen
Le thme
desgen219-30and314-17(ontheideaofLebensweg
19937,
); R.Joly,
philosophique
resdeviedansl'antiquit
S. Gastaldi,
}. Generi
Bruxelles
'Bioshairetotatos
di
1956,12if.;
classique,
vitaefelicit
inAristotele,
Naples2003.

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

223

thatDiogenes Laertius
not surprising
conceptionof nobility.It is therefore
included a long treatmentof Plato's own nobilityin his Vita Platonis
(III, 88-89).44
Plato understoodthe expression'nobility'to mean human excellence
in a social,physical,and moral dimension.Such a conceptionof 'nobility'
is less a social or politicalrole than a calling or vocation (close to Max
Weber's idea of Beruf
).45Moreover,it is less a matterof parentalqualinoble stock.Plato thought
virtutis
of the originating
tiesthanof theprimordio,
of noblemenas rulersand governorsof the State; those men who have
rightto rule must be philosophers,because the love of wisdom comes
fromafar,fromthe relationto Solon:
Verymuch so, said Critias;for,I may say, he is in facta philosopher
[...]. That, my dear Critias I said is a giftwhichyour familyhas
withSolon.*6
had a long whileback, through
yourkinship
The founderof a house or a lineage is thus introducedas an essential
characterin 'nobility',which is a sort of networkoriginatingfromand
back to him.
referring
Thus, Solon is presentedas the founderof the familyof 'philosophers'.
Since Solon is also the well-knownprince of Greek rulers,accordingto
Plato,thissame nobilitymakespossiblethe fusionof philosophyand political leadership.So, when Plato foundeda school of philosophy,the famous
research
forscientific
AthenianAcademy,he promotednot onlyan institute
and highereducationbut also a way of life,a communityof fellowssharing the same kind of social and political outlook and practices.Among
manyof thesephilosophersand men of science existedboth strongfamilial associationsand bonds of friendship.Hence, even if theirrespective
44Forthebackground
of'nobility',
cf.A. Capizzi(ed.),I sofisti
ofPlato'sre-construction
,
nellasociet
La concezione
dellanobilt
Florence
1976,v-xxv;R. Laurenti,
greca:
filoaristotelici
I Frammenti
deidialoghi
e antiaristotelici
Antichi,
, II, Naples1987(Filosofi
, in:Aristotele,
8),
N.
su Platone
lezioni
Einaudi,
, Turin2003(PiccolaBiblioteca
767-81;M.Vegetti,
Quindici
Idealidivitanella
is A. Momigliano,
, in:
S., 238),201-14.Stilluseful
sofistica:
Ippiae Crizia
estoriografia
antica
in:Id.,Stona
La Cultura,
9 (1930),321-30,
, Bologne1987,63-72
reprinted
45Notsurprisingly,
inbothDonati's
andSalamito's
thereference
toMaxWeberappears
works.
Cf.Salamito
2005(n. 30),18-25,
, and340-44.
passim
"
46 Plato, Charmides
, 155 a, ed. J. Burnet,Oxford1903: n zrjlcovo
his
'divina
withthe
of
Solon
. Forthemedieval
(jvyyevea"
sapienza'
reputation
(coupling
G. Boccaccio,
Trattatello
inlaude
diDante
ofgrace)see,forinstance,
Christian
, ed.
concept
Boccaccio
Balduino-P.
G. Ricci(eds),Tutte
leopere
diGiovanni
P. G. Ricci,in:V. Branca-A.
,
Milan1974,437.

11:14:29 AM

224

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

theoriesdiffered,
Plato and Aristotlenonethelessshared a common set of
and
questions
philosophicalproblems,not least of which was nobilitasa
problemwhichwas discussedin the ancientschools and destinedto have
a long life.47
The word 'school', as everyoneknows,derivesfromthe Greek oxoXfj
,
which originallydenoted leisure or otium.Later it came to referto the
kind of occupation peculiar to men who have leisure at theirdisposal.
It then came to signifythe group of such freebornmen, as well as their
associationforliberalpurposes.As it is well known,both Latin and Greek
derive the meanings of 'trade' or 'business' by means of a negation
Yet to have leisurewithoutbeing compelledto work
(-GxoXa,neg-otiurr).
in the mechanicalarts or commercewas not a universalcondition.This
was a 'distinction'connectedto the practiceof philosophyfromits very
beginning.
In his Dialogues
, Plato equated having 'leisure' with one of the conditionsforphilosophicalconversation:"You shall hear- Phaedrus said- if
you have leisureto walk along and listen".48In The Laws (VII, 820 c),
on the otherhand, he suggestedthatdealingwithphilosophicalproblems
The
would be "a more refinedpastime for old men than draughts".49
Platonic academy offeredto its membersthis 'nobler' formof leisure.
Moreover,theirmembers'love forwisdom((piXoao)seems also to have
beta a dynasticpursuit,thatis, the businessor specialityof a clan (yvo
).
Each noble family,includingthe higherlevels of its clientle
, shared a sort
fromthatof otherfamilies.Philosophy
of characteristic
hobby,distinctive

47Cf.C. Natali,
e l'organizzazione
della
srnscuola
La vita
diAristotele
BiosTheoretikos.
, Bologne
with'themost
Laurenti
1987(n. 44),II, 770-81.Aristotle,
1991,28 and45ff.;
dealing
whichhad
ofthephilosopher,
commitment
thepolitical
noblekindofLife',relativized
in Plato'sRepublic.
Cf.Gastaldi
element
2003(n.43),19-65.
beenan essential
48Plato,Phaedrus
Oxford1901"[levarie croio^oAr
npovxi
, 227 b, ed.J. Burnet,
between
Politics
Koveiv".In Aristotle's
opposition
(VII, 14) we findan interesting
xxpil^i^ontheother
ontheonehand,andaxoXa/
/ xkccxx,
Jtke^io/
eiprvr
axoXrf/
intobusi"Alsolifeas a wholeis divided
Politica
one:e.g.Aristoteles,
, VII, 14,1333a31-33:
are aimedsomeofthemat things
andouractions
nessand leisure
, andwarandpeace,
On the
nobles
at things
anduseful,
others
(ta Ka)" (transi,
byH. Rackham).
necessary
of'leisure',
cf.F. Solmsen,
Plato'sandAristotle's
difference
between
conceptions
respective
IdealState
Leisure
andPlayinAristotle's
1968,1-28,esp.
, II, Hildesheim
, in:Id.,Kleine
Schriften
book(n.43).
to Gastaldi's
15.See alsothebibliography
appended
49Plato,Leges
ikevv rarovrcov
Oxford
1907:"(piXov
aioi
, 820 c, ed.J. Burnet,
herebyPlatowasthatoftherelarecalled
Theparticular
axoki<'
philosophical
problem
withincommensurable.
tionofcommensurable

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
MTLJS)

225

could be the hobby of a yvo

, as for other clans it was horse riding.
Carlo Natali, in his fineaccount of Aristotle'slife,drew attentionto this
point.50
One of Aristotle'slost dialogues dealt with the conceptionof nobility.
Diogenes Laertiusrecordsa one-booktreatiseOn nobility
( Uepi evyevea
),
threefragmentsof which are extant,as number 15 in his catalogue of
Aristotle'sworks.51Nobility,according to Aristotle,connotes a network
and refersto a firstparadigmaticfounder.On one level, this definition
is clearlythe verysame as that of the 'philosophicalschool'.
Aristotle'sconceptionof nobilityis a ratherdynamicone, and seems
to accord with what we read in his other academic works.In Book II
of Rhetoric
(c. 15, 1390b24-27),forinstance,dealingwithcharacters'turns
and qualities,Aristotleteaches that:
For the generations
of men thereis a kindof crop as in the fruitsof
if the race is good, fora certainperiodmen out of
the field;sometime,
the commonare born in it, and thenit deteriorates.52
For men as well as crops, thereare varyingyieldsacross the years and
generations;now and then,where the stockis good, exceptionalmen are
produced for a time, and then decadence sets in. The prerequisiteof
'nobility',in this case, primarilyrefersto heredity.Nevertheless,in the
verysame passage, Aristotleemploysanothermeaningand introducesa
tensioninto the traditionalidea of nobility.The 'deterioration'of the
race, in fact,is not only that of a set of materialconditions{e.g.the loss
of goods and privileges),
but is foremosta 'degeneration',thatis, the deteriorationof the ipsageneris
virtus.
And, at the same time,Aristotleshows
how power and goods can be noxious to the virtueof a freebornman.
Worst of all, the rich man cannot have either 'measure' or 'common
sense' (ib., c. 16, 139 1al 7-19). Since the lattertwo comprisethe ethical
50Natali1991(n.47),71-72:"Questaparticolare
sceltadi dedicare
la propria
vitaalla
filosofia
a volteci appareanchecomeunaquestione
di yvo,
unaffare
di famiglia
e sembrarientrare
nell'ambito
di quellecaratteristiche
checostituiscono
tratti
differenziali
tipici
di unafamiglia
o di un gruppo
di famiglie
aristocratiche".
Natalibelieves,
forinstance,
thatAristotle
entered
intothePlatonic
between
(also)becauseofthefriendship
Academy
hisfellow
Prossenus
andthemaster
Plato.
51Stobeaus
recorded
themin hisAnthologii
libri
duoposteriores
cf.
, c. 29 (On Nobility);
selecta
Aristoteles,
, ed. W. D. Ross,Oxford
1955,57-60:'On GoodBirth'.
Fragmenta
52Aristoteles,
Arsrethorica
trans, ed. W. D. Ross,Oxford
1959,105(I usetheEnglish
lationbyJ. H. Freese).

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

226

and intellectualcharacteristics
of Aristotle'swise man, we see how, when
materialconditionsconflictswithvirtue,'nobility'becomes but a hollow
shell that cannot endure.
7. A Particular
Distinction:
Aristotle
and thePhilosopher
as a Man ofNatural
Ability
Withoutdiscrediting
completelythe relevanceof social conditions,Aristode
reformulates
a conceptof nobilitythatintegrates
otherelements.A certain
social comfortpermittedby fortunatebirthdefines'nobility'only if an
additionalelementis present.For thepreservation
of nobility,
one requires
also the capacityto imitatethe liberal inclinationsof the one's founding
fathersand to repeat the deeds of the yevoq.'Common sense', a keen
intelligence,and a sense of 'measure' are also needed. Such qualitiesare
those of the men of good nature (' ayad vrp),53the one called to be
a thinker.Consequently,the good thinkerbecomes a bettercandidatefor
authenticnobility.Let us see how.
In the TopicsAristotleexplicitlyrefersto the man of natural ability
(expvij).There, the contextis stricdyphilosophical,withoutany reference to societyor formsof government.
Aristotleassertsthatthe rulesof syllogismcan be taught.Nevertheless,
theirproperuse in philosophicaldiscussioninvolvesa certainnaturalskill
which cannot be learned at school. He writes:
- one should,in the
For trainingand practicein thiskindof argument
firstplace, accustomoneselfto converting
arguments(...). Also to take
and to have takenin at a glancethe resultsof each of two hypotheses
forthe cultof knowledgeand philosophical
is no mean instrument
wis53Aristoteles,
W. D. Ross,Oxford1958.Cf.alsoib.,
, VIII, 14, 163a30,ed.
Topica
'
163b13-14.Forcognate
ofthe'bonus
vir
connotations
opento usein theMiddleAges,
De vocabulis
see Isidorus
ofSeville's
ed. W. M. Linsday,
Oxford
1911:
,
b,
,
X,
Etymologiae
"Beatus
dicitquasibeneauctus,
scilicet
ab habendo
etnihilpariendo
quodvellet
quodnollet.Illeautemverebeatusestqui et habetomniaquaevultbona,et nihilvultmale.Ex
Bonus
a venustate
creditur
dictus:
hisenimduobusbeatushomoefficitur.
postea
corporis
nomen.
Eumautemdicimus
bonumcuinonpevlet
malum:
et ad animum
translatum
estvirsponte
ad benefaciendum
Benignus
paratus
eumqueoptimum
quipeccatminimum.
distat
a bono,quia et ipsead benefaet dulcisadloquio.
Nonautemmultum
benignus
bonusesseettristior,
etbenequiciendum
videtur
Sedineo diifert
expositus.
quiapotest
nontarnen
suavisessenovitconsortio;
demfacere
et praestare
benignus
quodposcitur,
autemsuacunctos
novit
invitare
dulcedine.
, quasiobrutus,
(...)Brutus
quiasensucaret.Est
sineprudentia".
enimsineratione,

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

227

choice
of one of them.
dorn;forthenit only remainsto make a correct
For such a process one must possess a certainnatural ability,and
realnatural
consistsin beingable correctly
to choose the trueand
ability
avoid the false.Men ofnatural
cando this
; fortheyjudge correctly
ability
whatis bestby a correctfeelingof love or hatredforwhatis set before
them.54
Boethiustranslatedthe Topicsinto Latin in the sixthcentury.The Latin
virbenenatusrenderedthe Aristotelianexpression'man of naturalability'
It has also been recordedin one of themostwidespreadAristotelian
(evcpvrig).
05
Qui benenatisuntbenefacere
florilegia:
possunt.
Settingaside the otheraspects of thisstatement,I wish now to examine this particularnotion of 'well-born'.It seems a worthyinvestigation
as, to my knowledge,the medievalusage of it has not yet been analysed.
8. A Condition
To Be Well-born
ofPhilosophical
((benenatus')
Nobility:
56with the Latin
When Boethiusdecided to translatethe Greek evcpvrig
benenatus
, he used an establishedexpression,more or less equivalentto
the Latin bonaeindolis,boniingenii
or even ingenuus.
34Ib., 163a30-164bl5
translation
(I usetheEnglish
byE. S. Forster).
55Hamesse
1974(n.15),331(op.37,126).Notethat,
tosomemedieval
traditions,
according
theStagirite
himself
hadbeendescribed
as a 'virbene
fortunatus'
(andibenefaciens>
) because
ofbothhislogicalability
and moralcontinence.
Cf.De vitaAristotel
, ed. V. Rose,in:
V. Rose(ed.),Aristotel
librorum
quiferebantur
fragmenta,
Leipzig1886,442-50:at 447.This
short
is recorded
alsoinJohnofWales'sCompendiloquium,
III, 5. Cf.I. Dring,
biography
Aristotle
inthe
Ancient
Tradition
1957(ActaUniversitatis
, Gteborg
Biographical
Gotheburgensis,
'71 e' (taken
from
63/2),142-63and(onJohnofWales)164-65.See alsotheFragment
Policraticus
Incubidaemonis
, VII, 6): "Fuerunt
JohnofSalisbury's
qui eum<Aristotilem>
filium
crederent
et gloriaeappetitum"
propter
agilitatem
corporis,
perspicaciam
ingenii
of "demfiliidegeneres"
fromthatof 'heroes');
cf.
(ib.,408).On thetheory
(distinct
M. vanderLugt,Lever,
ledemon
etla vierge.
Lesthories
mdivales
delagnration
extraordinaire
,
Paris2004,349-50.
56A further
on themeaning
in bothancient
and
and usesofsuchexpression
study
medieval
is inpreparation.
In thecontext
ofthisessay,
thefollowing
texts
are
philosophy
Departibus
animalPlato,Respublica
, III, 12,401 c, and 17,409e; Aristoteles,
noteworthy:
ium
via means"being
born
, IV, 11,69lb15;Id.,Ethica
JVicom.,
Ill, 5, 1114b8-12 (hereevq>
withmoralvision")
andVI, 13, 1144b34;
Cf.Eustratius,
Id.,Rhetorica
, II, 14, 1390b28.
Ethica
See alsoAlexander
ofAphrodisias,
Ethical
, VI, 13,ad 1144b34.
Super
, Probi.
problems
Ithaca1989(Ancient
Commentators
on Aristode),
29,trans,
byR. W. Sharpies,
76-82;
Alexander
In VIIIlibros
Aristotelis
ed. Venice1541,
commentatio,
Aphrodisiensis,
Topicorum
f. 102va.Important
remarks
in M. Vegetti
La 1Repubblica
' voi.2 (BooksII(ed.),Platone,
III),Naples1998(Elenchos,
28/2),116-17,
esp.n. 93,andthecommentary
byF. de Luise
andG. Farinetti,
ib.,200-02,
esp.n. 13.

11:14:29 AM

228

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

11 ('Canace to her brotherMacareus'),

Ovid, in the EpistulaeHeroidum
refersto the virbenenatusas a man of good birthwho has (and respects)
his familytradition.57
In his Res rusticae
, TerentiusVarro describesa mixture of naturalgiftand agriculturaltalent:
De solo fundividendumhaec quattuor,quae sit forma,quo in genere
terrae,
quantus,quam perse tutus.Formaeveroduo generasint,una quam
naturadat, alteraquam sationesimponunt;prior,quod alius ager bene
natus
, aliusmale;posterior,
est,aliusmale.58
quod aliusfundusbeneconsitus
In late antiquity,the expressionis equivalentto the Italian "nato con la
camicia" (also to the French"n avec une cuillreen or dans la bouche",
and the German "ein Glckskindsein"). We find clear examples of
this in textsdating fromthe fourthcentury.In the interesting
Altercatio
Heraclianilaici cumEpiscopoSirrniensi
at
the
, Bishop Germinus,
beginning,
triesto turnHeraclian towardArianism:59
57P. Ovidius
ed. H. Bornecque,
Paris19912,
69: "Nubite
Naso,Heroides
, XI, 107-12,
felices
Parcameliore
/amissae
memores
sedtarnen
estemei!/Quidpueradmisit
sorores,
tampauciseditus
horis
facto
vixbenenatus
avum?/Sipotuit
meruisse
necem,
?/Quolaesit
meruisse
miser
admisso
illemeo(. . Cf.alsoQ. Horatius
putetur:/a!
Flaccus,
plectitur
ed.D. R. Shackleton
ref, II, 1,232-34,
Epistulae
1985,300(with
Bailey,
Leipzig-Stuttgart
erenceto 'Beotian
taste'ofsomearistocrats):
"Gratus
fuitille/
Alexandro,
regimagno,
incultis
et malenatis/rettulit
Choerilus,
qui' versibus
acceptos,
regalenomisma,
Philippos
natus
heremeans"poorly
orunseemly).
Sucha classic
mean[i.e.coins]"iemale
composed"
onelateremployed
forinstance,
ingseemsto mecloseto theRenaissance
byErasmus,
in hisInstitutio
Christiani
et educatione
6.
, I ('De nativitate
Principis
Christiani'),
Principis
58T. Varro,Rerum
rusticarum
libritres,
are
I, 6, 1, ed. G. Gtz,Leipzig1929(italics
we findin theCorpus
to the
mine).Someoccurrences
42, 1) refer
priapeorum
('Carmen'
sameagricultural
context.
59Theedition
is stillthatmadeavailable
C. P. Caspari,
KirchenbyCarlPaulCaspari:
historische
Anecdota
nebst
neuen
undkirchlich-mittelalterlicher
, I. Lateinische
Ausgaben
patristischer
Schriften
had
, Oslo 1883,131-47;as Caspariacknowledges
Schuften
(atvii),HenryFynesClinton
first
drawntheattention
of thescholars
to theAltercatio.
The topicof 'bonanativitas'
Veteris
etNoviTestamenti
CXXVI
Quaestiones
I, ed. A. Souter,
appearsin Ambrosiaster's
1908(CSEL,50),q. 13 (On God'selection
andrejection)
andq. 127(On
Wien-Leipzig
Adam'ssin);at 408 [10-25]we read: "A fidelibus
enimet beneagentibus
melioratur
ab infidelibus
autemetmaleagentibus
deterioratur.
Sic enimestnativitas
nativitas,
quasi
arborquaeinseritur,
melior
fietet bonadicetur,
sinvero
inseritur,
quia,si bonosurculo
malosurculo
et deterior
eritet nonbona,sedmalavocabitur.
Ita et nativitati
inseratur,
sibonaaccedat
bonosfaciet
si autem
malosfaciei
fructus.
Itasicut
doctrina,
fructus;
mzda,
necessaria
estarbor,
utsit'ubi'inseratur,
itaetnecessaria
estnativitas,
utsitubiproficiatur.
Sedrespondetur
e contra:
'Si utilis
estnativitas,
currenascitur?'
Nonrenascemur,
nisiutilis
essetnativitas.
Renascienimrenovari
estet qui renovatur
instauratur.
Nonergoaccusai
renascibilitas
sedreformat,
etquodreformatur
beneab initio
institutum
nativitatem,
probatur.Igitur
... utreddamur
ad statum
Adae".Thereareoccurrences
quodrenascimur
of'benenati'alsoin Ennodius
Sermones
the
, andJerome.
(n.3),Augustine's
Commenting

11:14:29 AM

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AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

229

Germinuscoepiteum collaudare,dicens:'Bonumcor habes,et benenatus

es, et ab infantiatua novimuste; converteread ecclesiam nostrani
[i.e. 'Arii'].60
Heraclianrejectsthisofferand (drawingheavilyon Tertullian'sApologeticum)
professeshis faithaccordingthe Nicean credo. Germinus'swords should
be understoodas a preliminarycaptatio
benevolentiae
, in rhetoricalterms.61
That said, in Boethius'swords,the Aristoteliantextread above ( Topica
VIII, 14, 163b9-16) is translatedas follows:
Et ad cognitionemet secundumphilosophiamprudentiamposse conspicereet conspexissequae utrimqueacciditdicere ex hypothesinon
nam reliquumhorumrecteeligerealterum.
parvuminstrumentum;
Oportet
autemad huiusmodiinesseboni ingenii;et hoc est secundumveritatem
bonumingenium,posse bene eligereverumet fugerefalsum;quod qui
natisunt benepossuntfacerebene; nam qui amant et qui odiunthoc
facilediscernunt
quod profertur
optimum.62
In the thirdtreatiseof his commentaryon Topics
, Book VIII, Albertthe
Great observes:63
Psalm105,Jerome
refers
tothe'noble'
venumdatus
est",andwrites:
Joseph
"quiinservum
"Benenatuset sanctus
virvendi
tur".See Hieronymus
XL inPsalmis
Tractatus
,
Presbyter,
Ps. 104,17,ed. G. Morin,
Turnhout
1958(CG/SL,78),191.PeterofRavenna
already
stressed
the'ingenuity'
ofthebiblical
whiletheRomanLaw,approximately
inthe
Joseph,
sameperiod,
recalled
thesamecaseinpointandtried
tolimit
itsconsequences;
cf.Novellae
Constitutiones
Valentiniani
III, tit.32,ed. G. Hnel,Bonn1844,237-40:"De parentibus,
qui
filiossuospernecessitatem
distraxerunt
et ne ingenui
barbaris
venumdentur
equead
transmarine
ducantur".
Morethantwocenturies
Eusebius
'Gallicanus'
describes
the
later,
' with
servi
oftheslavery
ofvices,andequates'bene
natus
tus",symbol
"Aegypti
tyrannical
(cf.n. 30 above).
beingfree-born
60Caspari1883(n.59),135-136
italics).
'(my
61Cf.M. Simonetti,
suli
'Altercato
Heracliani
cum
in:Vigiliae
Osservazioni
Germinio',
Christianae,
' at
21 (1967),39-58:on 'bene
natus
42,n. 12
62Aristoteles
Latinus
Bruxelles-Paris
, V 1-3,Topica
, ed.L. Minio-Paluello,
1969,177,18-25.
Boethius's
translation
oftheTopics
datesfrom
thebeginning
ofthesixth
andabout
century
areextant.
Cf.B. G. Dod,Aristoteles
270manuscripts
latinus
, inN. Kretzmann-A.
KennyMediaeval
From
J.Pinborg
(eds),TheCambridge
ofLater
History
Philosophy:
ofAristotle
Rediscovery
tothedisintegration
1100-1600,
1982,45-79:at 75. See alsoN.J.
ofScholasticism
Cambridge
TheTradition
intheMiddle
Mnchen
Vienna1984;and
Green-Pedersen,
oftheTopics
Ages,
T. Hunt,Aristotle,
andCourtly
in:Viator,10 (1979),
at97-98.
Dialectic,
Literature,
95-129,
63NotethatAlbert
theGreatwillbe one of themainsources
forfifteenth-century
scholastic
authors
isa paradigmatic
dealwiththepast'schools
(Heymericus
case)whenthey
ofthought'.
On thispoint,
from
theclassicworks
andKaluza,see
apart
byMesserman
'
nowP. Rutten,
Secundum
etmentem
Versori
s':John
sorandHisRelation
Ver
totheSchools
processum
in:Vivarium,
43 (2005),292-336,
Reconsidered,
ofThought
esp.294n. 6. A textbook
printed
in Colognein 1494,namely
theReparationes
librorum
totius
naturalis
couldbe
philosophiae,

11:14:29 AM

230

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO
bene
Quiaqui natisuntbene
, hoc est,quibusbene innatumest,hoc possunt
: quia ingeniumdiciturintusgenitus,et hic est qui subtileshabet
facere
et expeditasanimalesoperationes,
et bonmradonemcollativam.64
spiritus

The point is mainlybiological:intellectualactivityand learningis facilitated by a good physicaldispositionand well balanced mind-bodyrelation(notethe referenceto the ratiocoIlativa).
an innatequality
Additionally,
claim is consonantwiththe originaldistinction
and slaveamong free-born
born men (accordingto the readingof Aristotle'sPolitics).
' in his influential
Albertalso dealt withthe conceptof 6benenatus
comon
the
Ethics
Nicomachean
it
in
, discussing implicitly connection
mentary
withthe notionof 'heroic virtue'.65
This commentary,
in additionto the
Aristotelian
Liberde bonafortuna
, is one of the sourcesforThomas Aquinas,
mentioned
ofthenobler
andsanior
schoolofthought,
thePeripatetic
here;thedefinition
one (ofwhichAlbert
wouldhavebeenthenoblerfollower
anda sortofre-founder)
is
madebyreference
to theancient
former
founder:
vero,quorum
"Peripatetici
archipater
Aristoteles"
theideaof'degeneration',
in similar
contexts
(f.103r).Moreover,
employed
showssomeconnection
withthetheme
ofnobility,
i.e.thedegeneration
from
byAlbert,
to Epicurean
theGreat,
Liber
denatura
etorigine
animae
Peripatetic
(cf.Albert
philosophy
,
tr.2, c. 5) wouldnotbe possible
ifthefirst
schoolhadnotbeennobler
thanthesecond.
On Heymericus,
seealsoGreen-Pedersen
1984(n.62),404 (A.42).
64Albertus
omnia,
vol.II, Paris1890,520-24:at 521a
, ed. A. Borgnet,
Magnus,
Opera
(myitalics).
65Cf.Albertus
Ethica
commentum
etquestiones
Magnus,
, III, 7, andVII, 1, ed. W.
Super
vol.1, 173-78,
andvol.2, 514-20.
Theconnection
ofthe'heroic
Kbel,Mnster
1968-87,
virtue'
withthetheme
of(divine)
wasalready
stressed
nobility
Grosseteste;
cf.,
byRobert
forinstance,
Robertus
Grosseteste,
, 124,ed.H. R. Luard,London1861,350.Cf.
Epistolae
DoesTheolog)):
andthe'Pearl'-Poet,
Notre-Dame
J. Rhodes,
Chaucer,
Grosseteste,
Poetry
2001,
offourteenth
the
43-71,260-65.It is extremely
that,in themiddle
noteworthy
century,
'heroic
virtue'
becamea necessary
in theChurch's
evidence
cf.A.
canonising
processes;
La saintet
enoccident
auxderniers
sicles
duMoyen
lesprocs
decanonisation
Vauchez,
ged'aprs
etlesdocuments
insufficient
crit, Rome1988,607.See thestimulating
hagiographiques
though
icismofP. L. Giovannucci,
Genesi
e significato
diunconcetto
la virt
eroica
nell'et
modagiologico:
erna
di storiadellaChiesain Italia,58 (2004),433-78,esp.459-66.Cf.also
, in: Rivista
R. Saarinen,
'Virtus
heroica
'. 'Held'und'Genie'
alsBegriffe
deschristlichen
Aristotelismus
, in:Archiv
frBegriffsgeschichte,
33 (1990),96-114;on Luther:
101-03(esp.n. 26) and 114n. 96.
At 101: "Luther
willeineArtvonFrstenspiegel
indemerunter
den'Gttern'
schreiben,
desersten
Psalmenverses
die Frsten
zu denen
versteht,
[A. 82: 'Der hchste
Richter']
Gottspricht".
IndeedtheVulgate
s words(= Ps. 81, 1: "Deusstetit
in synagoga
deorum
in medioautemDeusdeiudicat")
weretranslated
as follows:
"Gottstehet
byLuther
ynn
desgemaine
Gotes/und
istRichter
interdenGttern".
On thepost-Renaissance
notion
of'genius',
cf.at 113:"Interessant
istauch,da baldnachderReformationszeit
neben
denmonarchischen
Frsten
auchderintellektuelle
dasGenie,alsBeispiel
Heros,nmlich
dermenschlichen
Vollkommenheit
tritt"
Bruno,
ib.,113n. 91).AndJ.M.
(onGiordano
Heroic
Virtue
andtheDivine
in 'Paradise
Lost
oftheWarburg
Steadman,
' in:Journal
Image
andCourtauld
22 (1959),88-105.
Institutes,

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

231

who touched on the topic in his Tractatus

de ventate
fidei(the so-called
ContraGentiles
92.66
): III,
The formula,in any case, gained a specific'Aristotelian'sense and was
used especiallyby the Masters of Arts.Well known,for instance,is the
dedicationof Jacobus de Pistoia's Questiodefelicitate
to his friendGuido
"one
of
the
world's
best
Cavalcanti,
logicians":67
Viro benenatoet a naturadilectoet prae aliis amico carissimoGuidoni
dominiCavalcantisde Cavalcantibusde Florentiamagister
Jacobusde
Pistorioille quem respicitEuripussalutemet agere sicutdebes.68
To this,otherexamples taken fromuniversity
textscould be added.69
66Thomas
deAquino,
t. 14/3,Rome1926,279-82.
usestheexpresomnia,
Opera
Aquinas
' as
sion'bene
natus
to 'bene
to 'fortune'
rather
thanto ingefortunatus'
equivalent
referring
'
In thesamecontext
he speaksofthe'bene
naturatus
whohasa finebodily
man,
nuity.
' cf.alsoPetrus
On the'virtus
heroica
de Alvernia's
continuation
ofAquinas's
complexion.
to
Aristode's
Politics
(III, 12,4).
Commentary
67"Unde' migliori
loicicheavesseil mondoe ottimo
filosofo
naturale"
(G. Boccaccio,
Decameron
Milan1976,563;cf.ib.,at 1342,n. 5).
, VI, 9, ed. V. Branca,
68ThisQuestio
in 1931,wasfirst
Grabmann
edited
, discovered
byMartin
byPaulOskar
in 1955.I use themostrecent
Kristeller
edition
IreneZavattero,
whosefinecomby
deserves
mention.
See I. Zavattero,
La 'Quaestio
defelicitate'
di Giacomo
da Pistoia:
mentary
untentativo
diinterpretazione
allalucedi unanuova
critica
deltesto
and
edizione
, in:M. Bettetini
F. D. Paparella
nelMedioevo
2005(Texteset tudesdu
, Louvain-la-Neuve
(eds),Lefelicit
at 395.On thesuicide
ofAristotle,
evoked
to
31),355-409:
Moyen-ge,
bythereference
overlooked
Suicide
intheMiddle
2 voll.,Oxford
'Euripus',
(curiously
byA. Murray,
Ages,
1999-2000),
seeM. de PanizzaLorch,
Il suicidio
diAristotele
o la demistificazione
umanistica
delin:Lettere
43 (1991),391-405;
andRobiglio
2005(n.4),47-50.
l'intellettuale,
Italiane,
69See,forinstance,
thefourteenth-century
Quadrivium's
Rome,Biblioteca
manuscript:
Pal.Lat. 1380,f. lOOr(transcribed
alsoon-line
Vaticana,
Apostolica
byChristian
Meyer,
at:www.lml.badw.de,
lastconsulted
onJune2004):"Etestmultiplex
musica
velmultiplex
scilicet
musica
velproporcio
tocius
mundi
universalis
secundum
suaspartes
uniproporcio,
et estetiammusicavel proporcio
humanain qua proporcione
elementorum
versales,
hominis
consistit
habetbonosmores
etsic
vita,etquihabetbonamproporcionem
etiam,
inbonaproporcione
bene
nati
musice"
aremine);
cf.L. Schuba,
DieQuadriviumsgaudent
(italics
der'Codices
Palatini
Latini'
inderVatikanischen
Bibliothek
Handschriften
, Wiesbaden
1992,111.
Consider
also theinteresting
collection
of miscellaneous
the
texts,
university
including
Secretum
intheMs.Paris,BnF,lat.16089,which
offers
us an eloquent
secretorum,
preserved
One ofthequestions
discussed
example.
bytheMaster
JohnVate(endofthethirteenth
is "Utrum
naturaliter
scabiosi
sintnaturaliter
latrones".
Letus readtheanswer:
century)
"Dicendum
ex hmido
se evaporante
quodscabiesquedamcausatur
superfluo
putrefacto
ad partes
exteriores
etmaxime
ad capud,utpueri;etde istisnonquerit
Aliaest
questio.
scabiescausatamagisex malanaturali
estex malo
hominis,
complexione
quiageneratus
menstruoso
etcorrupto;
etistascabies
durtpertotam
vitam
etmale
sanguine
putrefacto
et maxime
sidetin capite,quia capudestquasicaminus
curari,
potest
[caminum
cod.]
totius
etideoomnes
exhalationes
interius
ad ipsum
ettalessuntlibencorporis
ascendunt;
terlatrones
et ideohabilessuntad malumet inclinativi
quia suntmalenati,
naturaliter;

11:14:29 AM

232

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

in a polemFurthermore,
MargueritePoretereferred thoughadmittedly
ical context to being well-bornas a conditionforbecomingcompletely
mes(at the beginningof the fournoble.70WritingLe Mirouerdessimples
teenthcentury),she developedan originalconceptionof Christiannobility
At the verybeginin orderto presenta paradigmof human excellence.71
the Great,the
to
Alexander
this
makes
reference
of
text,Marguerite
ning
She
uses
the petrine
trulynoble king and disciple of the Philosopher.
equation of the sacerdotaland the regal, and definestrue nobilityin a
way similarto the conceptionof PeterOlivi, accordingto whichthe highest human perfectionis merelythe abilityto offerno resistanceto Divine
action.72Describingthe perfectionof a soul inhabitedby the Holy Spirit,
in chapter 100, Margueritemakes 'Amor' speak:
ideopropter
conversari
inter
nonestnecessarium.
tamen
homines,
Quiaveromalepossunt
one
thequestions
thatfollow,
italics
aremine).Among
suntlatrones"
defectum
(f.74V15;
tothesensible
bonum"
is about"Utrum
bonusgenerat
'complexion
(f.75ra:and,according
in civitate".
debeatesseprinceps
about:"Utrum
is 'yes'),another
theanswer
philosophus
Medii
Commentariorum
seeW. Senko,
ofthemanuscript,
Fora detailed
Repertorium
description
Parisiis
assewantur
Latinorum
AeviinAristotelem
Nationale,
(Bibliothque
publicis
quaeinbibliothecis
MediiAevi/
SteGenevive
Mazarine,
Sorbonne,
), Warsaw1982(OperaPhilosophorum
Arsenal,
Lenumro
16089desmanucf.B. Haurau,
Textusetstudia,
5/1),I, 208-23.Furthermore,
etextraits
desManuscrits
dela Bibliothque
in:Notices
latins
dela Bibliothque
Nationale,
scripts
Die
etautres
Nationale
, t. 35, 1stpart,Paris1896,209-39;M. Grabmann,
bibliothques
Alberts
desGroen
undderEinflu
vonBrssel
desHeinrich
Aristoteleskommentare
aufdiemittelalterin:Mediaeval
'Denobilitate
M. L. Colker,
Mnchen
liche
animi'
1944,17-28;
Aristoteleserklrung,
3e re
depourceaux
Notasu
and50; E. Randi,*Philosophie
23 (1961),17ff.
taumaturghi.
Studies,
in: Quadernimedievali,
22 (1986),129-35,esp. 133;J. Agrimi,
unmanoscritto
parigino,
'
The
P. Biller,
medievale
Studi
sulla
scientia
nature
2002,124-25;
, Florence
fisiognomica
Ingeniosa
inMedieval
Measure
, Oxford2000,271; Id., TheBlackin
Thought
Population
ofMultitude:
Lehrman
Center
Gilder
ofthe5thAnnual
Science:
What
Medieval
?,in:Proceedings
Significance
atYaleUniversity
Conference
International
7-8,2003):'Collective
Degradation:
(November
at:www.yale.edu/glc/
on-line
ofRace',1-16:at 7; available
andtheConstruction
Slavery
onJanuary
2005).
(consulted
events/race/Biller.pdf
70On theconnection
Mirouer
on theoneside,andPorete's
between
,
texts,
University
seeRobiglio
on theother,
2005(n.4), 55-59.
71I use theLatinversion
Commission
whichthecensorial
of Porete's
(and
Speculum
edited
under
their
had
as
of
Fontaines
by P. Verdeyen,
well)
eyes,
Godefroy
maybe
nowin:
is thatbyRomanaGuarnieri,
Turnhout
1986(CC CM, 69).A fineintroduction
Rome2004(Storiae
e istituzioni
tramistica
Donne
e Chiesa,
R. Guarnieri,
XIII-XV),
(secoli
andanniSee alsotheremarks
Nobility
Letteratura,
byJ. M. Robinson,
218),eh.3, 239ff.
NY2001,1-25and111-24,esp.13
souls
Porete's
Mirror
hilation
inMarguerite
' Albany,
ofsimple
and 111,n. 2.
ofBingen)
(onHildegard
72See,amongothers,
textbyOlivi,In II Sent.
thefollowing
q. 16,ed.Jansen1922
intellectualis:
naturae
quodestDei singulaperfectio
(n. 14),311-12:"Haecestsumma
esteiussingularis
riter
imago(...)".The whole
Augustinum,
capaxet in hoc,secundum
remarked.
hadfirst
as Guarnieri
of'nobility',
ontheconcept
a polyphony
Speculum
develops
lateritis
refers
to 'nobility',
whoexplicitly
halfoftheworkitis Amor
Whilein thefirst

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233

natus.Isti enimsuntgentesregales.Ipsi
Qui est de tali genere,est optime
habentcorda excellenter
Ipsi enim
generosaet magnae attemptationis.
non possentfacerealiquod opus parvivaloris,nec inciperealiquidcuius
non attingerent.73
terminm
et complementum
in the place
The polemical use of the expressionand the use of 'optime'
and
the
of
the
reference
both
to
the
of 'bene''
transfiguration
familiarity
testify
of this interpretation.
The innate abilityto understandand to use the tools of logic seems
no longer to be the necessaryconditionof nobility.Marguerite'santiand polemical use of the expressionis neverthelessa sign
intellectualistic
of how establishedits meaning had become.
The followingthreecases will illustratethis.
9. Boethius
)
century
ofDacia (secondhalfof thethirteenth
on theTopics
In his Commentary
,
, Boethiusdoes not referto the virbenenatus
even if many signsof it are evidentin his approach. The firstwords of
are forhonourablemen, thatis to say,the firstphilosophers:
the Proemium
of
whospeaksaboutanddefines
the'Soul'{Anima)
it;see thefollowing
passages
mainly
: I, 17; XIII, 72; XIX, 28; XXII, 12; XXXVI, 1-20;LXXXVI,30ff.;
theSpeculum
CXVIII, 19ff.,
80; CXX, 1; CXXI, 16. Cf. G. Cary,
XCI, 1; XCIX, 1; GUI, 24ff.;
oftheWarburg
andCourtauld
inMedieval
Alexander
TheGreat
Institutes,
, 'in:Journal
Theology
' etles
Uneapproche
socioLe Roman
d'Alexandre
17 (1954),98-114;M. Gosman,
'juvenes'.
notdeveloped,
66 (1982),328-39;also,though
Id.,Alexandre
, in:Neophilologus,
historique
l'histoire
d'une
ouleplaidoyer
le Grand
etlestatut
dela noblesse
Prolgomnes
pourla permanence.
decivilisation
mdiandJ. vanOs (eds),'Nonnova
sednove'.
, in:M. Gosman
Mlanges
lgende
cf.C. Gaullier-Bougassas,
Alexandre
valeofferts
W.Noomen
, Groningen
1984,81-93.Lastly
Maddoz(eds),The
intheFrench
Alexander
Romances
andAristotle
, in D. Maddox-S.Sturm
Medieval
French
Alexander
, NewYork2002,57-73. '
' seeM. Tullius
73C, 7-12,ed.Verdeyen
natus
De
1986(n. 71),275.On optime
Cicero,
ed.
L.
D.
Oxford
bonorum
et
malorum
, V, 56-57,
1998,201-02:"Cumque
finibus
Reynolds,
<inertissimos
homines
videmus>
circuios
nonhabeantingenuas
exdoctrina
oblectationes,
natus
consectari
est,esse
(...).Itaqueutquisqueoptime
institutusque
aliquoset sessiunculas
Nam
orbatus
vescivoluptatibus.
omnino
nolitinvitasi gerendis
negotiis
possit
paratissimis
autqui altiore
animosunt,capessunt
rempublicam
autprivajtim
malunt,
aliquidgerere
honoribus
auttotosse ad studia
doctrinae
conferunt.
Qua invita
imperiisque
adipiscendis,
abestutvoluptates
etiamcurassollicitudines
tantum
consectentur,
vigilias
perferunt
optiaciefruuntur
quae in nobisdivinaducendaest,ingeniet mentis
maquepartehominis,
necvoluptatem
necfugientes
laborem"
aremine).
dealswith
(italics
Marguerite
requirentes
the'optime
natasoul'alsoat chapters
LH, 1,andLXX,48; at LII, 1-3,9-10,ed.Verdeyen
benesitisin solo
1986(n. 71):"O optime
nata,dicitAmor,huicpretiosae
margaritae,
inquodnullus
intrat
libero
nisisitde genere
vestro
manerio,
(...)Nontarnen
legitimus.
per
sedperattingentiam
suiultraamoris".
intellectus
amoris,
attingentiam

11:14:29 AM

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

Cum honorandi
vividelicetpatresnostrireverendiprimiphilosophantes
res temporales contemnenteset vitam suam in studio sapientiae
ponentes...74
is significant
The expression'honorandi
forus. It evokes here the idea of
a 'professional'philosopher,as Boethiuslater explainsthat the honorabiks
scientiae
are Ethics, Physicsand Mathematics,75
which allow the thinker
to attainthe 'divinescience' quaeperaltssimas
rerum
causasprocedit
etde substantiisseparatis
Even if the Topicspresents a less rigorous
perscrutatur.
approach (the topicescireis distinctfromand weaker than demonstrare
), it
stillrequiresingenuityand the full use of human reason, since rarissimi
enimsunt
discretio
.76
, quorum
passionenonimpeditur
Furthermore,in Book III, at question 20, Boethius asks whetheror
not the thinkerwould seek glory(iutrum
which,forhim,
gloriasitappetendo),
- Boethius
is the equivalent of honour.11
The opportunityto seek glory
- is
argues
justifiedfor two reasons: first,due to a Peripateticprinciple,
accordingto which everylearned man ought to look for noble things,
and secondly,out of a socio-politicalcommitment,according to which
the philosopheras a superiorand noble man shouldbe a model forcommon people who stimulatesthemtowardachievementof theirduties,i.e.
theirvirtuouslife:
Gloriaestprincipium
actuumnobiliumet studiosorum.
Qui ergoapptit
actusnobiles,apptitgloriam.Sed quilibetstudiosusdebetappetereactus
nobiles.(...) Inferiores
enim in humanissuperioribus
tenenturhonorem
et gloriamimpendere,
et cum solvunt,
quod tenentur,
complentopussuae
virtu
tis.78
74Boethius
librum
ed. N. J. Green-Pedersen
Dacus,Quaestiones
, proem.,
super
Topicorum
andJ. Pinborg,
in:Id.Opera,
VI/1,Kopenhagen
1976,3. Thetoneofthispassageevokes
theGlose'Divitias'
as "virhonorandus",
see Ricklin
2000
(n. 6). On thePhilosopher
(n. 16),228.
75Ib.,3 [5-7,12].
76Ib., 10 [179-1801.
77CarloDionisotti
hasrightly
recalled
thehugeroleplayedlater,during
thesixteenth
remarks
of'honour';
cf.Dionisotti
1989(n.42),296.Fundamental
century,
bythenotion
alsoinCortese
1999(n.18),776.Evenremaining
limited
tothecommentaries
onAristotle's
a seaofexamples
forsucha phenomenon.
forinstance,
Ethics
Nicomachean
, wefind
Consider,
andwhether
theJesuit
on moralphilosophy
: "Thediscussion
ofhonor
teaching
happiness
3
'Ethics
init"occupied
a position
ofnewrelevance.
Cf.D.A.Lines,
Aristotle's
is tobe found
and
the
Moral
Education
intheItalian
Renaissance
The
Universities
,
(ca.1300-1650).
problem
of
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2002,325-83,
esp.370-73.
78Green-Pedersen
andPinborg
1976(n. 74),195[16-18,29-31].

11:14:29 AM

AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
THE THINKER
NATUS)

235

Here Boethiusdraws a pictureof the thinkeras a man fromthe upper

classes,committed(thoughpassively)to his community,
masteringhis pasis never overriddenby passions),who seeks gloryby
sions (his discretio
seekingphilosophicaltruthin the naturalsciences,ethicsand astrology.
Those elementsare not deniedwhen Boethiustreatsthe 'man of natural
Let
ability'.The passage standsat the beginningof the treatiseOn dreams.
a
moment.
us glance at this for
There are threegoods available to man: natural,moral, and intellectual. The supremenaturalgood is the preservationof the individualand
continuationof the species. Powers of nutritionand growthare ordered
to achieve these goods. Man also pursues 'politicalhappiness'by means
of moral action. This achieved,the ultimateintellectualgood possiblefor
man is then perfectknowledgeand contemplationof truth.The intellectual delightwhich accompaniescontemplationis a part of thismostperfectgood, since it servesto sustaincontemplation(thispoint recalls the
in librum
divisionof goods
, VI, q. 25). This tripartite
Quaestiones
Topicorum
and human facultiesexplicates(some of) the different
approaches to life
found among men. Some are mainly concerned with carnal pleasure,
otherswith political activity,and a chosen few with the pure contemplation of truth;that is to say, with the dispassionatestudyof nature:
Et quia virtusnaturaliter
in suumbonumet suumdelectabile,
inclinatur
ex hoc contingit,
homines
benenatiad scientias
ex
contemplativi
quod quidam
sui
et
animae
nec
ab
eis
curas
exteriores
incipartecorporis
impediti
propter
de eo quod cogitantadmirantes
ob defectum
piuntprofundeperscrutari
sicut
vehementer
causae,
admirantes,quomodo homini
quidam nuper
somnium
fieri
eventuum
de quibus
futurorum,
per
potest
praecognitio
ut
eis
scriberem,
numquamcogitavit,
rogabantinstanter,
quid per somniumsciripossitet quomodo.79
Being benenatusseems to be a necessaryconditionfor the achievement
of higherphilosophicalcontemplation,
even ifit is not identicalwithbeing
a contemplativus.
The explicitreferenceto the body is a sign of the middle
79Boethius
ed.N.J.Green-Pedersen,
in:Id.,Opera
Dacus,Desompniis,
, VI/2,Kopenhagen
at 382[30-37](italics
aremine).
hastranslated
"virbenenatus
1976,381-91,
JohnWippel
ad scientias"
as follows:
"manwellfitted
forthesciences";
cf.Boethius
ofDacia,Onthe
- Ondreams.
Ontheeternity
Translation
and Introduction
goodsupreme
oftheworld
byJ. F.
' di Boezio
Toronto
68-69.
See
also
G. Fioravanti,
La 'scientia
di
1987,
Wippel,
sompnialis
Dacia
delleScienzedi Torino,II. Classedi ScienzeMorali,
, in: AttidellaAccademia
Storiche
e Filologiche,
101(1966-67),
at 335.
329-69,

11:14:29 AM

236

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

stateof benenasci
, as a naturalbodilygiftwhich can dispose men to further intellectualachievements.The higher states,however,involve the
previousdegrees;because thinkerswho reach the higherdegreesof consui et animae
. The
ex partecorporis
templationmust be benenatiad scientias
'sciences' referredto here are the 'honourable' ones: ethicsand natural
the skilfulscholarin thesefieldsmustalso
science above all. Nevertheless,
masterthe basic disciplines,includinggrammarand logic.
If myinterpretation
is correct,we could say thatthe virbenenatusstands
et bonusvir
as the bachelor to the master,as the honestus
to contemplations
to the tided nobleman. In otherwords,accordingto Boethiusof Dacia,
the expressionbenenatusindicatesthe good rational and emotionaldispositionof a man, but at the same time presentshim as a (necessary)
linkin a chain of human philosophicalperfection.Being benenatusis the
firstrung on the ladder leading to nobilityof the mind.
10. JohnBuridan(ca. 1300-ca. 1360)
Aristotle's
Ethics
to benenatuswhilecommenting
, Book 7.80
JohnBuridanrefers
In the second questionhe asks whetherheroicvirtuebelongsto the 'sensensitivo
.
virtus
heroica
sit in appetitu
sibility':utrum
At firstsight,it seems so. Indeed, accordingto Aristotleand his commentators(Eustratiusis quoted) thereare threehierarchicallevels of the
same masteryof the body: continenceand both human and heroicvirtue.
of
To reach human perfection,that is to say felicitas
, the mortification
lower passions is required.But such controlof the emotions,to be natural, cannot be exertedfromthe outside.The virtuerequiredto mortify
(inordinate)passions,namely,heroicvirtue,mustbe in the same 'subject'
as that to which the passions belong:

80I useQuaestiones
adMcomachum
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Buridani
decern
, Paris
super
Joannis
ThepartofthetextI dealwithis alsoavailFrankfurt
1513[repr.
1968],if.cxLva-cxLir'
able online, digitally transcribed by Fabienne Pironet, at
onFebruary
2004).In thesecondary
(lastconsulted
http://mapageweb.umontreal.ca/pironetf
on thisparticular
I havefoundnothing
literature
by
topicapartfroma finefootnote
duprochain.
desoi,amour
Amour
Cf.C. Grellard,
atn.90 below).
Grellard
(quoted
Christophe
n66),
condamn
del'article
morale
etl'ide
d'une
Nicolas
d'Autrcourt,
(autour
laque
JeanBuridan
tudes
^mnKaluza
mdivale.
delapense
in:P.J.J.M. Bakker
, Turnhout
offertes
(ed.),Chemins
2002,215-51,
esp.240.

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

237

Virtusmortificans
passionesdebetponi in subiectoilio in quo passiones
innataesuntfieri;sed ipsae innataesuntfieriin appetitusensitivo;ideo
etc.81
The argumentagainst this opinion is taken fromthe very meaning of
heroic virtue,which is identifiedas 'divine' and ought to belong to the
superiorpart of the soul: not to the appetitebut the intellect:
Oppositumarguitur:
quia virtusheroicavocaturdivinaeo quod per earn
homo maximeassimilatur
diis; ergo heroicaponendaest in partesuperiori. [. . .] Etiam videturquod heroica sit ilia virtusin cuius opere
consistithumana felicitas,
sed secundumillam virtutem
meliorest vita
secundum
hominem.
Habens
enim
non
secundum
earn,
quam
quod
homo est,sic vivitsecundumquod in eo divinumaliquidexistit,
ut dicit
in decimo 'Ethicorurri'.
Aristoteles
Then Buridansums up the different
before
conceptionsof heroicvirtue,82
his
own
of
view.
Here
he
introduces
the
notion
of
bene
natus
:
presenting
point
Ego autemputo,secundumea quae dixiin ultimaquaestioneprimilibri,
si per virtutem
heroicamdebeamusintelligere
virtutem
ad cuiusperfectionemnon possuntnaturaliter
, proutdiximusin
attingerenisi benenati
alia quaestione,quod virtusheroicaponendasitet in appetitusensitivo,
et in
tam/b/concupiscibili
quam irascibili,et in appetituintellectivo,
intellectupracticoet in intellectuspeculativo.In omni enim appetitu
nostrovirtusmoralisponenda est,in omniparteintellectus
virtusintellectualis,ut apparuitin primolibroet in sexto.

81lb, f.CXLV.
82"Multiponunt
in appetitu
istamvirtutem
heroicam
sensitivo
rationes
factas,
propter
sednonin appetitu
sedinirascibili
eiusarduitatem.
concupiscibili
propter
[2] Aliiautem,
rationes
ad oppositum
earninvolntate".
Thethird
caseBuridan
adductas,
propter
ponunt
records
is interesting:
"Etaliidicunt
earnessesapientiam
incuiusoperedicunt
humanam
felicitatem
consistere"
ofOckham
seemed
to hold
(ib.,f.cxlv).Cf.belown. 98. William
theopposite
tohim,theconcept
ofheroic
virtue
determines
itself
pointofview.According
theactofwill),forthesakeofGod'shonour,
all natural
(viz.through
formally
against
inclination.
See Guillelmus
de Ockham,
Bibliae
sivequaestio
deconnexione
virtutum
,
Principium
ed.J. C. Wey,in:Id, Quaestiones
variae
NY 1984(Operatheologica,
, St.Bonaventure,
8),
336-37and354-55.At 336 [163-64]
we readthat"Actus
formaliter
imperativus
(...)est
virtutis
andat 354 [323-29]:
inquinto
"Iustitia
estvirheroicae",
generativus
gradu,
prout
tusheroica
in unochristiano,
honorem
Dei,
perfecta
qui talemactumimperarei
propter
noncompati
tursecumaliquodvitium
necdefectum
eandemcausam.
culpabilem
propter
Tarnen
virtus
heroica
alicuius
benecompatitur
<secum>aliquodvitium,
philosophi
quia
illaesuntalterius
alianon".
speciei,
quiaunahabetDeumproobiecto,

11:14:29 AM

238

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

This said, Buridan then triesto reconcilethe excellenceof heroic virtue

with the fact of its belongingto the 'lower' appetites.For, accordingto
him it does not belong to a higherpart of the soul, but does belong to
a 'nobler subject',a more excellentman (Carlylewould say 'the Hero'),
whose soul must be open to higherachievements:
Quo concesso,rationabileest dicerequod virbenenatusad talemgradm
in appetitusensitivo
virtutis
pervenire
potestad quem alii non pervenirent
etiam
in
intellectu
et volntate,propterin ipso
et, per consequens,
sensumet appetitumsensitivm
esse
subiectosnaturaliter
intelmagis
lectuiet voluntatiet in eis meliusministrare.
The well-bornman shouldnaturallybe self-controlled.
This said, Buridan
continuesand refersto Aristotle'streatmentof Hector,the Homeric hero
who possessedsuch heroic virtue.
heroica
So, as far as I see, the virtus
, accordingto Buridan,is the common virtueof the noblestman, ratherthan the most noble virtueof the
common man. As such it belongs to him as a whole, even if it refers
mainlyto the part due to which a man is the most noble: the intellect
in fullpossessionof itself:
In vita autem contemplativa
virtusheroica dicta principaliter
est ipsa
sapientiavel illa virtusin cuius opere consistitfelicitascontemplativa,
in prologosuo quo praemissit
libroPhysicorum
propterquam Commentator
dixitde Aristotele
talem
virtutem
esse in individuouno miraculoquod
sum et extraneumexistitet quod si haec dispositioin hominereperitur,
digniusforetesse divinusquam humanus.83
In the same way, the indignityof man affectsall partsof his being: both
his body and the parts of his soul. This is what characterizesthe bestialita^
,which is the final topic of the question. From the remarksin this
sectionsome elementsmay be gatheredtogetherwhich will help us to
understandwhat is requisiteto being benenatus
.
First of all, a good bodily complexion;meaning the absence of any
disease of the bodily humours.84In this sense the benenatusmust be a
83Ib. Cf. Averroes,
In Physicam
, ed. Venice1562,vol. 4, f. 5r. Somestimulating
in A. De Libera,Mtaphysique
are nowgathered
etnotique.
Albert
le Grand
,
suggestions
Paris2005(Problmes
et controverses).
84Buridan,
usumrationis
inEthicam,
ed.Paris1513,cxlv:"Aliiamittunt
Questiones
propter
efficiuntur
velmente
alienati
tasesthabiutquimaniaci
(...)nectalisbestiali
aegritudinem,
inorgano
sensus
vel
tusmoralis,
sedestdispositio
naturalis
velcausalis
existens
subiective
sensitivi".
appetitus

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

239

man (vir),rather than a woman (;mulier

).85 Secondly, he must possess
an innate,well-formed
the
of
faculty
imagination,whichis to say a wellbalanced sensibility,with the rightconnection between body and the
sensitiveoperationsof the soul.86Finally,he musthave rightmoral conduct, accordingto reason which rejectsvices and produces good habits.
This thirdconditionof rightconduct,even if it does not oppose the
others,representsan importantaddition (not always admittedby other
Mastersof Arts)whichrelativizesthe biologicalconditions.The rightconin any case, indicatesa strongintellectualistic
duct requirement,
approach
means
of
which
the contraposition
betweensapiensand vulgus
excludes
by
solution(as we read, forinstance,in Marguerite
any anti-intellectualistic
Porete or, later and differently,
Petrarchand Gerson).
11. NicholasofAutrecourt
(ca. 1295-1369)
In the prologue to his main philosophicalwork,the so-called Exigitordo
executionis
,87Nicholas speaks of the well-bornman. Arguingfor a sort of
scepticismabout sensible knowledge,against the useless studyof traditional logic, and in favourof a philosophicalknowledgeapt to support
ethicalcommitment,
Nicholas writes:
Cum etiamapparuitquod hominesmodicumdebentadhaerereapparentibusnaturalibus,
apud me hoc venitjudiciumquod, si hoc cognoscerentbenenaticommunitatis
se ad res morset
politicae,converterent
adhaererent
firmiter
sacrae.88
legi

85Women
often
havediseases,
whentheyaregravid,
infectum
esse
especially
"propter
a fumis
ex retentis
menstruis
ascendentibus".
Theconnection
between
thedisappetitum
cussion
on female
on theone side,andthecourdy
"Anmulier
sit
complexion,
dispute
nobilis"
to themostgeneral
one:"Quidestmulier?"),
on theotherside,is
(belonging
in thesameperiod;cf.Giovanni
Boccaccio,
Boccaccio,
largely
developed
by Giovanni
or'TheLabyrinth
Corbaccio
N.Y. 19932. See also
ofLove'ed. A. K. Cassell,Binghamton,
thebrilliant
notebyA. K. Cassell,7/Corbaccio'
andtheSecundus
Tradition
, in:Comparative
25 (1974),352-60.
Literature,
86Ib.: "Quidamenima nativitate
carent
usurationis
orbitatem
seudefectum
propter
tisymaginativae
virtu
velcogitativae".
87I usetheedition
ofthetextestablished
Nicholas
, in:
byJ. R. O'Donnell,
ofAutrecourt
Mediaeval
1 (1939),179-280.
On Nicholas,
seeZ. Kaluza,Nicolas
d'Autrcourt.
Ami
Studies,
dela vrit
littraire
dela France
, in:Histoire
, t. 42/1,Paris1995,22-43.
88Nicolausde Utricuria,
ordo
ed. O'Donnell1939
, PrimaParsPrimiPrologi,
Exigit
stresses
thelogicalcompetence
ofthenatural
(n. 87), 181 [36-41].A secondoccurence
bornphilosopher,
at 184[7-11]:"<Non>remanens
insuperficie,
sedquasipenetrans
ipsas

11:14:29 AM

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

the civilelite,ratherthanphilosophers,
Here, the 'well-born'men represent
even if theyare public pupils for instruction
in philosophy.The restriction of meaning (the specificationcommunitatis
) probablyexplains
politicai
thisreferenceto politicalicontext.The well-bornmen of the community
are those who learn philosophyin order to become governorsand ministersof the Res publica.The fact that they also have to studylogic is
noteworthy.
In theArticuli
condemnati
(firsthalfof 1346), we findan even more inter6
estingoccurrenceof the expressionbenenatus'At n. 55 the censorsrecall
thatMasterNicholas sponsoreda courseon Aristotle'sPolitics
dealingwith
the subject of justice.89In one of the questions,he had said that there
were cases in which robberywould be permitted.The example Nicholas
gave is the following:Imaginea youngstudent,well fittedforthe sciences,
meetinga masterofferingto teach him all the principlesof knowledge
and askinghim forpaymentof fees in a shorttime. If the studentcannot obtain thatmoneyexceptby theftor deception,thenhe may morally
steal or defraudthe money.The studentis justifiedby the philosophical
principlethat one must do what is honest to the presentmoment.To
learn about the structureof createdbeing is definitively
good in the eyes
of God; ergo
etc.:
,
Ponaturquod sit aliquis iuvenis
benenatus
, qui inveniataliquem,qui in
brevivelitipsuminstruere
in omniscientiaspeculativa,
que potesthaberi
de rebuscreatis,et non velitfacerenisiille iuvenisdet sibicentumlibras,
quas ille iuvenishabere non potestnisi per furtum.Dixit [Nicholas],
eratlicitumilli iuveni,quod probatsic: Quod est
quod ilio casu furtum
amabile Deo, est faciendum.Sed quod iste iuvenisacquiratsuam perfectionem
in predictis,
estamabileDeo. Et non potestper aliummodum
[fieri],ut dictumest,quam per furtum,
ergo furtumest faciendum.90
resperceptivus
illeestrecti
namapparet
causarum,
judicii;
quodtalispotest
pervenire
usque
inquibuscontinetur
In hocconsidrent
ad conceptos
Veritas
bene
natiad
proprios
quaesiti.
a qualibus
intellectibus
doctrine
hominum"
aremine).
The
(italics
judicandum
processerunt
bene
natirepresent
theheroes
ofhuman
knowledge.
89"Quicunque
unacumquibusdam
voluerit
audire
librum
Politicorum
Aristotelis
questionibus,
inquibusdisceptatur
de iustoetiniusto,
novaslegescondere,
conditas,
perquas... poterat
ofAutrecourt,
Proclamatio
si que sintcorrigenda,
(...)".Cf.Nicholas
presumptuosa,
corrigere
art.56, ed. byL. M. de Rijk,in: Ch. Grellard
d'Autrcourt,
(ed.),Nicolas
Correspondance
condamns
Paris
et
150.
Articles
2001
,
(Sic Non),
90Art.56, in: Grellard
bene
2001(n. 89), 150;cf.ib., 181-82n. 140:"(...)L'homme
etla prudence
natus
l'habilit
estdoncceluiquipossde
), ainsique les
(deinotica)
(phronesis
bonnes
moeurs".

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AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

241

Such teachingwas condemnedas heretical{hereticum

quoaddeterminationerri).
The positionheld by Nicholas seems quite radical in its consequences.
In any case, for his argumentto work, the young freebornand skilful
studentmust be in a necessaryrelationwith his own perfection,that is
to say, to arriveat 'speculative'competenceabout createdbeing through
philosophicalstudies.Such connectionpresupposesthat the young man
has all the predispositions
needed to achieve the task;theseare the same
dispositionsrequiredby heroic virtueaccordingto John Buridan, apart
fromethical commitment.
That said, Nicholas's account of intellectualnobilitydoes not match
otheraspectsof the notionwe have seen in others,forinstance,in Boethius
of Dacia. The nature of the textwe have at our disposal (the Articuli
is
a listcompiledby ecclesiasticalcensors,not a systematic
workby Nicholas)
leave us withouta conclusiveanswer.However,let us note some particulars. First,thereis an explicitreferenceto both lack of money and the
need forit; thisreferencesounds bizarre,since accordingto the common
medievalidea of nobility(in this respecta clericalidea, but nevertheless
also accepted by laymen):verephilosophantes
contemnunt
pecuniam.
Secondly,
thiscommondoctrinetendedto punishnoblesand freemenmore severely,
sincegreatdignitymeansgreatresponsibility
and, as Bartoloof Sassoferrato
nobiles
.91
says, magispuniuntur
quamignobiles Thirdly,consideringthat such
a young man 'of natural ability'seems to be isolated fromthe context
of social hierarchy;this promisingiuvenis
, indeed, is hardlya link in an
intellectualchain of wise men; he pays his masterand in brevilearns all
thetheoretical
forinstance,
knowledgehe wishes;he showsno commitment,
to the teachingof otheryoung freebornmen. Perhaps thislast reflection
seems hasty;howeveranotherarticlecould confirmmy reading.
In articlen. 23 Nicholasbreakswiththe fundamental
logic of the notion
of nobility,in denyingthe possibilityof maintainingthe superiorityor
excellenceof one being to another:Nonpotestevidenter
ostendi
nobilitas
unius
reisuperaliam?2No one, havinggrownup in the chools, had ever dared
91Evenif,ontheother
cannot
bepunished
likecommon
hand,noblemen
people"eisdem
cf.Ascheri
1991(n. 17),79.
poenis";
92Grellard
2001(n.89),138.The art.24 recalls
a cognate
idea:"(.. .) Quacunque
re
demonstrata
nullusseitevidenter,
omnesalias-Revoco
quinipsaexcedatin nobilitate
hereticum
et blasfemum".
Atn. 25 Nicholas
deniestheequivalence
of
falsum,
tamquam
Godwiththeensnobilissimum.
One couldnote,however,
thatthepointofviewaccording
towhich
all entities
arealikeshould
be seenin thecontext
ofNicholas's
atomism:
thisis
an ontological
to do withthedebates
aboutbothintellectual
pointandhaslittle
nobility

11:14:29 AM

242

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

to say that.Once again,Nicholasrevealshimselfas a nonconformist

thinker,
rejectingthe scholasticidea of nobility(evenifkeepingone of itssignificant
key expressionsin use), but he does not substitutefor it any 'mystical'
alternativenotion.In his time,he set himselfoutsidethe neo-peripatetic
as well as the ecclesiasticnetworks;and he probablypaid for this with
his rupturewith the schools.
Account
12. Nobilities
of theMedievalMind: a Provisional
At the close of this firstengagementwith a heterogeneousset of theoand fourteenth
centuries,
logical and philosophicaltextsof the thirteenth
we can summarizesome different
of
conceptualisations 'nobility':
a. The political concept: It was developed primarilyby jurists and
probablyhas itsmostinfluential
championin Bartoloof Sassoferrato.
In thissense, the notionof nobilitymustbe connectedto that of a
(particular)communityand cannot existwithoutbeing certifiedby
Any 'ontological'nobilityof sinexplicitpublic laws or statutes.93
is
as
individuals94
unacceptable withina Christian
gular
rejected
so
that
the
notion
framework,
only functionsin a politicalcontext.
as
does
not requirevirtue,but onlyprincely
Moreover,nobility, such,
recognition.It representsthe medievalequivalentof a legal-positivist
concept of nobility,according to which there is no privilegedor
'natural'statuspriorto, or independentof a definedjuridical status.
b. The philosophical'peripatetic'concept:Dante setsforthin Book IV
such
of The Banquet
, and even if it permitsvarious interpretations,
a notion admits,to some degree, an ontologicalhierarchyof the
human being grounded in the use of 'philosophical'reason, connectingnobilitywith intellectualvirtue.Moreover,the conceptualisation of emotionsand human sensualitas
plays a vital role: one of
a possible
analHereI limit
tostress
ofphilosophical
andtheexcellence
myself
profession.
I amaware,
inother
of'nobility'.
ofapplication
ofthenotion
different
fields
ogybetween
underthelightshedbyJ. R. Weinberg,
ofmyreading,
ofa possible
one-sideness
words,
A Study
in14thCentury
Nicolaus
, NewYork19692,149-62and237-38;
Thought
ofAutrecourt.
selon
d'Autrcourt
dela connaissance
Croire
etsavoir.
Lesprincipes
Nicolas
andbyCh. Grellard,
,
de la spculation"),
Paris2005,29-38("Le statut
esp.33,n. 1.
93Cf. G. Salvemini,
di Firenze
e altriscritti
cavalleresca
nelComune
La dignit
, ed. byE.
andCarpi2004(n. 36),258-59.
Milan(2nded.) 1972,99ff.
Sestan,
94The ontological
is ofcourse
i.e.thescaleofdifferent
ofbeings,
species,
hierarchy
maintained.

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENEMTUs)

243

the conditionsforbecominga noble thinker,in fact,is to be wellwhich

born; thatis to say, to have a bettermind-bodyconfiguration
facilitatesthe controlof passions.95This articleexplored aspects of
the philosophicalnotion,albeitfroma narrowperspective,following
some interpretations
of the peripateticformula'virbenenatus'
c. The radical Christianconceptof nobility,accordingto whicha man
is a true noble-mansola gratia
: It refersto ancientsources (such as
the Stoic tripartite
divisionof beatitudeand the Gnostictaxonomy
of pneumatic,psychicand materialmen),but is engaged forpolemical purposeswith the other competingnotions(<a and b). In some
cases (e.g.MargueritePorete) the reformulation
and criticismof the
sense
seems
me
to
and
indubitable.Some
'peripatetic'
(b)
explicit
conservativetheologians,such as Jean Gerson, at the beginningof
the fifteenth
century,seemed to have sharedsuch a 'mystical'notion
of nobility,usefulforcontrastingand correctingthe 'independence'
of the Schools.96
d. The onto-logicalnotionof 'nobility'(I would call it 'meta-nobility'):
Even if this has not been directlytreatedin this article,97
it must
be mentionedhere.For, in the use of arguments,
one of the common
scholasticstrategies,up to the time of Leibniz, was to 'decide' for
95Themedieval
ofsensualitas
and'sensuality')
stilldeserves
(bothas 'sensibility'
concept
accurate
Somereflections
on thistopicmaybe foundin mypaper'Sensualitas'
study.
d'Ablard
Albert
leGrand
at theinternational
Conference
"De l'meanimale

, presented
l'animalmachine:
thories
des fonctions
sensorielles
et motives
de XIIme
au XVIIme
ofexcellence
ofMind'(Departement
ofSystematic
sicles",
organised
bytheCentre
'History
in collaboration
of Helsinki)
withtheFrench
E.H.E.S.S.(Institut
Theology,
University
November
willappearsoon(granted
Finlandais,
Paris,
15-16,
4, 15).
2004).Thearticle
James
On thetheme
ofthe'noblepassion
oflove'("amor
seeM. F. Wack,Lovesickness
heroicus"),
'
9
intheMiddle
The Viaticum
andItsCommentaries
, Philadelphia
1990,51-73and276-81.
Ages.
Someofthecharacteristics
recalled
stilltoday,
tojustify
the'sexuality'
ofnobility,
aresurcf.e.g.D. Quint,
Passioni
nobili:
e la storia
delromanzo
l'aristocrazia
similar;
, in:Annali
prisingly
dellaScuolaNormale
di Pisa,SeriesIV, 5 (2000),601-20.
Superiore
96Gerson
usedc,buttempered
itwiththejuridical
a. Cf.J. Gerson,
De
interpretation
nobilitate
in: Id., Oeuvres
, ed. P. Glorieux,
, vol.9, Paris1973,476-99,at 476:
compltes
nonestnobilitas
sineprinciptu
Thistreatise
"Quoniam
quodam".
openswitha quotationoftheGospel(Lk 19, 12):"A certain
nobleman
wentintoa farcountry
to receive
forhimself
a kingdom,
andtoreturn".
Thisisthevery
samebeginning
as Meister
Eckhart's
Vondemedeln
menschen.
Cf.De Libera2003(n. 36),336.A lessdeveloped
ofa
example
mixedinterpretation
timeofb andc),is asserted
de Villena(d. 1434).Cf.
(this
by
Henry
'
P. M. Ctedra,
Ciencia~
Literatura.
La Exposicin
delsalmo
videbo'
deEmrique
Exgesis'Quoniam
deVillena.
, Madrid1985,104-07[324-33,
359-95]and 117[597-6021.
97See nn.14 and 15 above.

11:14:29 AM

244

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO
the nobler conclusion.Examples of such argumentationfollowthe
principlethat,giventwo elements,eitherone is less noble and dependent upon the other(nobler)element,or both are dependentupon
a thirdelementthatis noblerthan both {ubiduo,unusab altero
, etc.).

Apart frompoint d (whichdeservesa separateand detailedtreatmenton

both logical and metaphysicalniveau
), we can easily see that each conof
a
entails
toward
the dialecticalrejectionof the
cept nobility
tendency
others.
Two
of
those
a
and
c
notions,
, could co-existunder certain
(two)
conditions.But the relationbetweenthem and b must be exclusive.
which tend to blend the firstthreeconIndeed, we assistthose efforts
b
and
into
different
idea of excelcepts (a,
c)
stepsof a unique 'historical5
lence. The value of havinga good educationaltrainingand belongingto
a 'good' communitycould temperthe radicalismof c. Accordingto such
a conception,which I call the moderate Christianconcept of nobility,
divinegrace ordinarie
acts throughhistoryand by mean of historicalmediation (for instance,throughthe teaching of noble theologicalschools).
Nevertheless,the irenic reading was a practical tendencyin philosophy
ratherthan an actual conception.
Moreover,each idea (again, apart fromd) becomes an expressionofa
characteristic
social and institutional
network,the membersof which are
recruitedor undergo formationin part because they share a particular
and exclusiveideal of human excellence.In a more specificsense, each
'School of thought'tended to represent,more or less implicitly,a particularkind of nobility;each had a shared commonlanguage,a common
set of referencesand a privileged ' bibliothque
imaginaire'The expression 'virbenenatus' as we have seen, also became a sortof shibbolethof
a philosophicalneo-Aristotelian
networkthat,in recentyears,has beenwellSuch a shibboleth,
reveals
researchedfromotherperspectives.98
incidentally,
as well some elementsof the paradigm of the 'PhilosopherGentleman',
one which was to have a long lifein modernEurope's courtlysociety."
98Luca Bianchiand Gianfranco
Fioravanti
haveillustrated
thisaspectwell.See,for
'
'ascetismo
L. Bianchi,
Felicit
botha perspective
and a selected
intellettuale,
bibliography,
3diBoezio
andPaparella
e 'arabismo':
nota
sul'Desummo
bono
diDacia
2005(n.68),
, in:Bettetini
13-34.
99Forbackground,
references
Eliasarestilltherequired
works
theclassical
byNorbert
Cf. also
theemotions').
hisstudyof thehistorical
(inparticular
processof 'educating
: Some
Between
andLikemindedness
A.A.Robiglio,
of'conversatio
Aspects
oftheConcept
Language
andCultural
toGuazzo
civilis3
, in:L. Nauta(ed.),Language
ofthe
Change:
Aspects
from
Aquinas

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

245

bornMany(vir bene natus) and theImportance

13. The Meaningof cWellof
' School
Been
Studied
in
One
!
Noble
Having
Summingup: the man benenatuswill be of good birth,from'honest'100
(if not rich) parents;he will be physicallyfit,withoutany major bodily
defects;he will be good-natured,will possess naturalintelligence,ability,
and talentswhich may be developed duringhis earlyeducation 'under a
he
good master'.Thanks to his having studiedin a prestigiousschool,101
Middle
andUseofLanguage
intheLater
, Leuven2006,113-32.
AgesandtheRenaissance
Study
A stimulating
is still
Geschonden
Wereld.
Eenbeschouwing
over
de/cansen
J. Huizinga,
reading
in: Id., Verzamelde
Werken
vanonzebeschaving
, VII, Haarlem1950,
(1943-1945),
opherstel
from
Charles
Le Maitre
thequotation
taken
477-606,
Additionally,
esp.483-84and575-78.
' thatwas
to a meaning
of 'bene
natus
use;in thesame
(n. 1) is related
opento stillricher
andFrench
seventeenthandeighteenth-century
authors.
senseI couldquoteother
English
there
In theBritish
ancient
traditions
as wellas oftheir
universities,
jargon,
proudoftheir
'
'bene
or'borntogladness'),
natus
areinteresting
usesoftheexpression
('well-born'
employed
achievements
andfora brilto signify
theyoungundergraduate
student
aptforfurther
Anexample
liantcareer.
be theOxford
to whichmatricmight
commonplace,
according
inhiswitty
ulaemustbe welldressed,
bene
natietmdce
doti.
DuffTraill,
Henry
biography
ofLawrence
stillemployed
late-medieval
scholastic
distinctions:
on theonehand,
Sterne,
which
included
a certain
and
whendealing
withthegoodbodily
disposition
light-heartness
Traillusedtheexpression
on theother
ofcharacter,
hand,he
'good-naturated';
generosity
bene
natus
whenreferring
totheSchool's
under'an able
usedtheLatinexpression
training
to a cultural
established
elite.Describing
Sterne's
ownentry
master'
andtheappartenance
ofJesusCollegewasa natural
intotheUniversity,
Traillcomments:
"Theselection
one:
hadbeenitsMaster,
andhadfounded
scholSterne's
laterArchbishop,
great-grandfather,
to oneofwhichtheyoungsizarwas,a yearafter
hisadmission,
elected.
there,
arships
from
orevenindusNo inference
be drawn
thisas toSterne's
can,ofcourse,
proficiency,
inhisacademic
studies:
itis scarcely
morethana testimony
tothefactofdecent
and
try,
in thesenseofbeingrelated
He wasbene
behaviour.
to theright
natus,
man,the
regular
founder"
London1882,14).
(H. D. Traill,Sterne,
100
I cannot
The senseoftheLatinword"honestum"
hada widewebofconnotations
here.FortheRenaissance
debateconcerning
theuseof'honestum'
intheLatintransstudy
cf.A. Birkenmajer,
DerStreit
vonCartagena
lations
ofAristotle's
desAlfonso
mit
Leonardo
Ethics,
in Id., Etudes
etdela philosophie
Bruni
d'histoire
dessciences
duMoyen
Aretino,
Age,WroclawWarswa-Krakw
1970(StudiaCopernicana,
1) 405-86,esp.452-54.See alsothebibliogto P. Cherchi,
L'onestade
e l'onesto
raccontare
del'Decameron',
Fiesole2004.A
raphy
appended
further
hintforclarifying
therelation
between
"nasci"and"benenasci"couldbe found
3d'Evrard
in an analogy
takenfrom
Le 'Grecismus
deBthune
travers
logic:cf.A. Grondeux,
XIIIe
sesgloses
entre
et
du
et
XIVesicle,
Turhout
2000,
grammaire
positivegrammaire
spculative
176-78
"esse'V'bene
497-51
1;lookat499:
(onthedistinction
esse")andthesecond
Prologue,
"de essephilosophie
naturalis"
[76-77]vs."de beneessenaturalis
[78-80];
philosophie"
andagainat 507 [285-91].
101
A prestigious
musthavea prestigious
founder
or,laterin
Academy
(likeAristode
thefifteenth
ofteaching
tohim:these
Plato)as wellas a longtradition
century,
referring
aretwoprerequisites
forthenobility
ofa school.An explicit
reflection
isolated)
(though
on thenobility
ofa schoolofthought
in Dionisotti
canbe found
1955(n. 20).

11:14:29 AM

246

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

will have gained competencein logic, a sound knowledgeof Aristotle's

works,and will have learned the naturalsciencesin order to be able to
This having
explain natural phenomena,both per causasand per effectus.
been done, he will become ipsofactoa member of the intellectualelite
and, as such, his behaviourwill always be 'measured by Reason' (even
if interpretationsof the meaning of 'reason' and 'measure' may be
disputed).
Moreover, attendinga school in which higher 'scientific'trainingis
offeredand illustriousmastersteach, becomes a conditionof the Bildung
the nobilityof the school
of a man 'born to gladness'; correspondingly,
is also establishedby its having benenatistudents.
In the course of the fifteenth
gradcentury,nonetheless,the University
a
'school
idea
of
education.
The
on
such
its
lost
higher
ually
monopoly
of thought' as independent from political authorityand nevertheless
the mostnoble knowledge,
deservingthe academic reputationforoffering
The true'nobilloses itsappeal and (to some extent)itshistoricalreality.102
Aristotle
resituated
when
scholars
left
the
of
wisdom'
Peripateticschool,
ity
in
now
also
him
in a more varied landscape by presenting
complete(and
originalGreek) editions,instead of the anonymouscompanyof barbaric
gothicflorilegia.
While Dante boasted the authorityof having attended'the schools of
the philosophers'(and, accordingto an ancientbiographicaltradition,he
had travelledto Paris, because it was the motherof scholasticwisdom),
Petrarch(thoughhe firstthoughtof being a 'laureate' in Paris) preferred
umbra
to go to Rome, beneathits laurelssubImperatoris
, farfromany acain some of Carlo Dionisotti's
This evolutionhas been illustrated
demicmilieu.
studies:in courtlysociety(and an eminentcentreof this world was the
Roman Curia) the theme of the nobilityof the thinkerdid not lose its
importance,but it did change its nature and references.'Honour' and
102
to
is indebted
idea of 'schoolofthought',
The non-scholastic
speaking,
generally
to
reference
of
with
narrow
I
a
Humanist
this,
case-study
thought.presented
pedagogical
deV
in mypaperPourla lecture
themid-fifteenth
ofPaviaduring
theUniversity
century,
' deLorenzo
4Encomium
at the
le 7 mars
Valla(Rome:
Thome
sancti
1457),presented
Aquinatis
1370to 1500'(Leuven,
ofIntellectual
Tarameters
International
Conference
Changefrom
de philosophie
mdivale,
jr.,in:Bulletin
byK. Emery
June17-20,2003);cf.thereview
to
datesandcolourations
haddifferent
ofcourse,
45 (2003),246-47.Thisshift,
according
ofthe
foundation
forinstance,
theimperial
andpeople.In Germany,
countries
different
as a
of something
to theframing
also withreference
mustbe considered
universities
'national'
elite.

11:14:29 AM

THE THINKER
AS A NOBLEMAN(BENE
NATUS)

247

'glory' became its prominentaspects, and the main ennoblingpowers

Princeand Pope- powers againstwhom the two Renaissance paradigms
of nobilitywere formed,in the figuresof the Courtierand the Cardinal.
So John of Lucena, in the fifteenth
century,could write:luegolos cardenales
son los beatos.
Freiburgim Breisgau
Seminar
Philosophisches
Universitt
Albert-Ludwigs-

11:14:29 AM

Does theHabit Make theNun?

A Case Studyof Heloise'sInfluence
s EthicalPhilosophy
on Abelard'
BROOKE HEIDENREICH FINDLEY

Abstract
to Abelars
A carefulreadingofHeloise'sletters
revealsbothhercontribution
betweenher ethicalconcernsand his. In
ethicalthoughtand the differences
her letters,
Heloise focuseson the innatemoralqualitiesof the innerperson
oftheinnerpersonthroughfalse
or animus.
Hypocrisy themisrepresentation
deceitfulreligioushabitor
outerappearance,exemplified
by the potentially
- is a matterof
habitus
greatmoralconcernto her. When Abelardresponds
and
to Heloise's ideas, firstin his lettersto her and later in his Collationes
He
Scitote ipsum
, he turnsthe discussionaway fromher originalinterests.
as falseappearanceinto a discussion
her metaphorof the habitus
transforms
of anothertypeof habitus
, the habitualprocessof acquiringvirtue,and inteinto his developingideas about sin as intengratesher focuson the animus
and Abelard's
betweenHeloise'sethicalthought
thedifferences
tion.Examining
of both.
allowsus to appreciatethe distinctcontributions
Recent scholarshiphas begun to recognize Heloise, not only for her
particuimpressiveliterarytalent,but forher philosophicalcontribution,
that
the
scholars
are
in
the
area
of
ethics.
realizing
Increasingly,
larly
famouslettersaddressed by Heloise to Abelard can also be read as an
ethical treatise.Andrea Nye has shown how "[Heloise's] views on love,
religiousdevotion,and language [present]an alternativeto philosophic
method as it is conceived by Abelard."1Constant Mews has examined
and
Heloise's ethicalthoughton love, innerdispositionand intentionality
different
is
concluded,not onlythatHeloise'sethicalphilosophy significantly
fromAbelard's,but thather influenceon him in thisarea was "decisive."2
1 Andrea
andHeloise
TheLetters
ora Man'sDiscipline?
,
ofAbelard
Thought
Nye,A Woman's
7.3 (1992),1-22,esp.1.
in:Hypatia,
2 Constant
andAbelard
, NewYork1999,135.For
Mews,TheLostLoveLetters
ofHeloise
See alsoMews,Philosophical
131-35and 138-39.
see 116-17,
ofHeloise's
overviews
ethics,
theVoice
toHeloise:
Wheeler
Amantium
inthe
Duorum
Themes
, in:Bonnie
(ed.),Listening
Epistolae
York
35-52.
Woman
New
a
2000,
,
of Twelfth-Century
Vivarium
44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

11:14:36 AM

ETHICALPHILOSOPHY
HELOISE'SINFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S

249

When he turnedto writingethicalworkslate in life,Mews argues:"Abelard

came closer to acknowledging[Heloise's] concerns,withoutever explicitlyacknowledgingher contribution."3
This article takes as its subject one specificcase in which Heloise's
influenceon Abelard's ethicalthoughtis apparent:a debate betweenthe
famous couple over the nature and ethical implicationsof hypocrisy,
, or nun's habit. This
loosely organized around the image of the habitus
debate beginsin the couple's well-knownexchange of letters,but it does
not end there. Abelard continuesto reflecton it in two ethical works
that were most likelywrittenafterthe letterexchange: his Collationes
(or
a
with
a
and
a
Christian
and
Scito
te
),
Dialogueof Philosopher
Jew
ipsum(or
4 Yet the
in
as
Abelard
treats
it
these
works
moves
Ethics).
away
question
fromHeloise's originalconcerns.What begins as Heloise's discussionof
of innerselfand outercovering,ultimately
becomes
and hypocrisy,
sincerity
Abelard's examinationof intention,consentand the struggleforvirtue.
The habitus
debate providesa strikingexample of the phenomenonfor
whichMews has argued: Heloise did indeed have a profound,frequently
unacknowledgedinfluenceon Abelard's ethicalthought.As the following
discussionwill show, passages of his ethical philosophycan be traced
debate also
directlyto concernsraised in her letters.However,the habitus
some significant
differences
betweenHeloise's ethicalpreoccuhighlights
pationsand Abelard's.While the ethicalproblemsthatAbelard takes up
of themremainsuniquely
are manifestly
inspiredby Heloise, his treatment
his own. Examiningsuch pointsof disjunctionpermitsus to continuethe
processthatscholarslikeMews and Nye have begun: to separateHeloise's
philosophyfromAbelard's in order to appreciate,not only her influence
on her famoushusband,but the value of her thoughtin its own right.

3 Mews1999,172.
4 DatingAbelard's
works
is a difficult
issuethatwillbe treated
in moredetailbelow,
note46. The letters
are typically
datedaround1133,soonafter
theHistoria
calamitatimi
arecontroversial
in date,butI acceptAllen's
thatthey
(1132).The Collationes
arguments
datefrom
after
theletter
withHeloise.
SeeJulieA. Allen,Onthe
probably
exchange
Dating
A Reply
toMews
36 (1998),135-51.Payeralsodates
, in:Vivarium,
ofAbailard's
Dialogus:
theCollationes
from
1136-39.
sometime
between
SeePierre
A Dialogue
J.Payer,
ofa Philosopher
a Jewanda Christian
with
teipsum
seemstohavebeenincircu, Toronto
1979,6-8.TheScito
lation
Abelard's
Peter
Abelard's
Ethics
, Oxford
among
by1139.See D.E. Luscombe,
disciples
1971,XXX.

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I. HeloiseRaisestheQuestion
Heloise devotesher firsttwo lettersto Abelard- her so-called "personal
- to an examinationof her own
letters"
guiltand innocence,both in her
formerstate as Abelard's lover and in her presentstate as an outwardly
of
successfulabbess. Her concern is, continually,with the interrogation
What provesthather love forAbelard was selflessand
her own sincerity.
purelymotivated?What, on the otherhand, were the motivationsforher
religiousconversion,and what are the ethicalimplicationsof her apparent success in the religiouslife?Heloise emergesfromthese lettersas a
self-identified
"sincerehypocrite":the sincerityof her love forAbelard is
tied
inextricably
up with her religioushypocrisy,and her apparentconversionis false preciselybecause her love for Abelard is true. That she
has taken the veil out of love forAbelard and followinghis commandof her love forhim and the
mentstandsas proofboth of the selflessness
to
God.5
of
her
outward
commitment
hypocrisy
and hypocrisy,
Heloise insists
of sincerity
Throughouther interrogation
on the primacyof the innerself,or animus(mind,soul).6For Heloise, the
inner selfrepresentsthe core essence of the person, and hypocrisyconsists in seekingto conceal that inner self. Hence, she interrogatesthe
in tesemper
habuerim"1
natureof her love forAbelardby asking"quemanimum
what soul I always
I alwayshad towardsyou; or, literally,
(whataffections
had in you); and demonstratesher continueddesire for him by describ"
"8
infixasuntanimo (are fixed in my
ing the erotic memoriesthat nostro
soul). The primacyof the inner selffor Heloise formspart of a larger
systemof contraststhatshe sets up betweeninside and outside,the inner
person and externalappearance, the spiritualand the corporeal. These

5 Heloise,
sa Fame
Pierres
Abaelart
etHeloys
La VieetlesEpistres
1, ed. EricHicks,
,
Epistola
ofHeloiseand
to theLatintextoftheEpistolae
Paris-Genve
1991,52,67.Allreferences
willbe myown.
translations
oftheletters
willbe from
theHicksedition;
Abelard
English
6 Latindistinguishes
alsoused
theanimus
between
soul,mindorconscience;
(therational
thebreath).
orlife,literally
andtheanima
ortheheart)
torefer
tothepassions
(thespirit
Latin
See Oxford
, ed. P.G.W.Glare,Oxford1982,132,134-35.HeloiseconsisDictionary
theinnerself;shespecifically
animus
to refer
towhatI havetermed
the
term
uses
tently
to be
thatsheconsiders
in opposition
to thosepartsoftheindividual
placestheanimus
I havetranslated
animus
as soulor mind.
exterior.
7 Heloise,
Eto.1,51.
8 Heloise,
Ep. 2, 66.

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opposingconceptsare apparentin the followingpassage,in whichHeloise

dramaticallyaccuses herselfof hypocrisy:
Castamme predicant,
munditiam
carqui non deprehendunt
ypocritam;
nis conferunt
in virtu
tem: cum non sit corporissed animivirtus,aliquid laudis apud homineshabens,nichilapud Deum mereor,qui cordis
et renumprobatorest et in absconditovidet.9
People declareme to be chaste,who do notperceive[thatI am] a hypocrite.They ascribepurityof the fleshto virtue,but sincevirtueis not
of the body but of the soul [animus
], I have some praisefrommen but
do not deserveany fromGod, who is thejudge of heartand entrails
and sees whatis hidden.
In proclaimingthat "virtueis not of the body but of the soul," Heloise
opposes the physicalto the spiritual,and what is manifestto "what is
hidden"- specifically,
what is inside the body (the "heart and entrails").
Heloise employsthe image thatwill particularlysparkAbelard's interest,thatof the habit,as just one componentof thissystemof oppositions.
In herfirstletter,she uses the habitas a metonymy
of externalappearance,
in
placing it parallel with the body and opposingit to the inner self:
Ad tuamstatim
jussionemtamhabitmipsa quam animumimmutarem,
ut te tam corporismei quam animiunicumpossessoremostenderem.10
at yourcommandI myself
Immediately
changedmyhabitand mymind
[animus
] alike,that I mightshow you to be the sole possessorof my
body and mindalike.
AlthoughHeloise here suggestsa harmoniouscorrespondencebetween
her externaland internalaspects,in her second lettershe insteademploys
the religioushabit as a metaphorof her own hypocrisy,
using it to refer
to the purelyoutwardaspects of her conversion:
Tua me ad religionis
habitmjussio, non divinatraxitdilectio.. . . Diu
simuladomea fefellit,
ut religioni
te,sicutet muitos,
deputares
ypochrisim.11
Your commandbroughtme to the religioushabit,not divinelove.. . .
For a long time,my feigningdeceivedyou as it did many others,so
thatyou tookhypocrisy
forreligion.
9 Heloise,
Ep.2, 67.
10Heloise,
Et).1,49.
11Heloise,
Ep.2, 67.

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Heloise's referenceto her nun's habit is closelyfollowedby a reference

to hypocrisyas a formof simulating(simulatio).
Her choice of word suglink
a
between
the
habit
and
the
gests
religious
adoption of a deceitful
has a visual connotation.12
In the lines that
appearance, since simulatio
follow,she developstheseconnectionsfurther,
challengingAbelardto recher
her
habitus
ognize
hypocrisyby lookingbeyond
(whichmightbe read
here not onlyas "clothing,"but as "appearance")to her "internaldisease":
Nemo medicinaperitusinteriorem
morbumex exterioris
habitusinspectionedijudicat.Nulla quicquidmeritiapud Deum optinent,que reprobis eque ut electiscommuniasunt. Hec autem ea sunt que exterius
tamstudioseperaguntquantumypochrite.13
aguntur,
que nullisanctorum
No one experiencedin medicinejudges an internaldiseaseby an inspectionofexternalhabit[clothing/
. Those thingsthatthereproappearance]
bates and the elect have in commondo not gain any meritin God's
thethingsthatare done outwardly,
whichnone
eyes.Those are certainly
of the saintsperformas fervently
as the hypocrites.
Here, Heloise links the externalappearance or habit with the outward
worksthathave gained her the praiseof many,includingAbelard.Neither
her actions nor her dress,she argues,should be taken as representative
of her internalstate.
Heloise's imageryof hypocrisyas a contrastbetweeninternalselfand
externalappearance or actionsis familiarto us today,and it also speaks
In particular,
to a richmedievaltradition.
the associationbetweenhypocrisy
and clothingas concealingcoveringgoes back long beforeHeloise. In his
"wolves
homilyon the Sermonon theMount,Augustinetermedhypocrites
in sheep's clothing,"and the associationbetweenthisbiblical image and
the figureof the hypocritequicklyattainedproverbialstatus.14
Already,
12Heloise's
discussion
ofthe
useofthetermsimulatio
mayalsobe a nodto Gregory's
inhisMoralia
inlob.According
toGregory,
simulator
ofthehypocrite
, as hecallsthefigure
Heloiserecognizes
andobsessive
loveofpraise";
thesimulator
hasan "inordinate
similarly,
forAbelard's
thatherownthirst
religious
praisehas led herto perform
hypocritically
totheHigh
TheSemantic
actions.
See Frederic
Whited
ofHypocrisy
Sepulchres:
History
Amory,
53(1986),
in:Recherches
de Thologie
ancienne
etmdivale,
Middle
5-39,esp.25-30.
Ages,
withclothing:
thehypocrite's
likeHeloise,
alsoassociates
thehypocrite
clothing
Gregory,
in Deuteronomy,
is double,
likethemixedwoolandlinenforbidden
1986,26.
Amory
13Heloise,
Ep. 2, 68.
14Augustine,
Turnholt
1967(Corpus
inmonte
Desermone
Domini
Mutzenbecher,
, ed.Almut
contains
theimageofthe
SeriesLatina,35),132.Matthew
7:15already
Christianorum,
buttomyknowledge
"false
wolfinsheep's
usedtodescribe
Augustine
prophets,"
clothing,

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in the CarolingiansatireDe Hypocritis

, Theodulfususes the phrase to refer
to
the
monks
who are the butt of his criticism:
specifically
hypocritical
"A loose hood coversthe head, an ulteriormotivethe mind,/Uncarded
wool the limbs,sheep's clothingthe wolf. / The cloak outsideis double
Sartorialhypocrisyamong monks
[lined], the heart withintwo-faced."15
and nuns was also a favoritetopic of many of Heloise's contemporaries:
PeterDamian, St. Bernard,John of Salisbury,and Guibertof Nogent all
spilled ink on the subject.16And, well afterHeloise, such 13th century
writersas Jean de Meun and Rutebeufwould re-useAugustine'simage
as theyelaboratedon the tradition,again and again employingthe religious habit as a metaphorfor religioushypocrisy.17
For Heloise in these two letters,the metaphorof the habit functions
primarilyas a rhetoricaltool: it allows her to locate the selfin an interior
The importancethatHeloise
space, independentof its exteriorcovering.18
thatshe asso, and the recurringimagesof interiority
assignsto the animus
ciateswithit,place her squarelywithinthetraditionsof Roman Stoicism19
is thefirst
to associate
themetaphor
withhypocrites,
thusvalidating
a direct
specifically
linkbetween
andhypocrisy.
clothing
15Quotedin Amory
1986(n. 12),31.
16Amory
1986,31-33.
17The hypocritical
monkFauxSemblant,
whoexploits
hisreligious
habitas a deceitfuldisguise,
all thewhileinsisting
that"thehabitdoesnotmakethemonk,"
playsan
dela Rose.FauxSemblant's
discussion
ofsartoimportant
partinJeande Meun'sRoman
rialhypocrisy
contains
a specific
reference
to the"wolf
in sheep'sclothing."
SeeJeande
dela Rose
ed.Armand
Paris1992,594.Jean's
Meun,LeRoman
, 11.11127-11139,
Strubel,
concern
withhypocrisy
owesa debtto thepoemsofRutebeuf.
to the
Jean'sreference
wolfinsheep's
echoesRutebeuf's
discussion
ofhypocritical
inhisDiscorde
clothing
clothing
del'Universit
etdesJacobins.
See Rutebeuf,
Discorde
del'Universit
etdesJacobins
, 11.41-56,
Oeuvres
FaraiandJuliaBastin,
Paris1959,t. 1, 240-41.See also
, eds.Edmond
compltes
Strubel
from
Rutebeuf's
1992,595 n. 1.JeantakesthenameFauxSemblant
Complainte
deGuillaume
deSaint
Amour
, 11.78-86,BastinandFaraieds. 1959,t. 1, 261-62.See also
Strubel
1992,585 n. 2.
18Heloise's
in theinnerselfmayextend
interest
to herother,
lessexamined
writings.
Mews1999,131-34,
hasshown
thata rhetoric
ofinteriority
or "inner
disposition"
plays
a keypart,notonlyin Heloise's
better-known
letters
butin an earlier,
letter
anonymous
collection
thatMewsbelieves
shouldbe attributed
toAbelard
andHeloise.
19AsGretchen
eventhough
theStoictradition
ingeneral
views
Reydam-Schils
explains,
"intheRomanStoicstheemphasis
on interiority
interwoven,"
bodyandsoulas "closely
is striking."
TheRoman
Stoics:
andAffection
Reydam-Schils,
, Chicago2005,
Self,
Responsibility,
35.Scholars
havenotedAbelard's
affinities
withtheStoics,
mostimportantly
inhisdevelofan ethics
basedonconsent
andintention.
See CalvinNormore,
Abelard's
Stoicism
opment
anditsConsequences
andJackZupko(eds),Stoicism:
Traditions
and
, in: StevenK. Strange
Intentionalist
Ethics
, Cambridge
2004,132-47;PeterKing,Abelard's
Transformations
, in:The
Modern
72 (1995),228-31;Gerard
ThePresence
inMedieval
Schoolman,
Verbeke,
ofStoicism

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and Augustinindualism.20By contrast,Abelard's replyto Heloise will

be informedby an Aristotelian
universe,in whichthe term"habit" stands
at the centerof a rich array of associationsthat go far beyond its link
to deceitfulappearance. The Aristotelianimportanceof the term may
and hypocrisy
explainwhy,whenAbelardtakeson thequestionsof sincerity
that Heloise has posed, he does so almost exclusivelythrougha discussion of the habit,makingwhat was forher one metaphoramong many
into the primaryfocus of his argument.21
II. AbelarsReply:Two BlackBrides
In his replyto Heloise's second letter,Abelard returnstwiceto the image
of the religioushabit that she has invoked:first,in his discussionof the
"black bride" of the Song of Songs as a figureof the nun; second,in his
retellingof an anecdote fromhis and Heloise's past concerningHeloise's
own habitus
.
The "black bride," or Ethiopian beloved of the Song of Songs, had
Abelard
since Origen been taken to be a figureof the bride of Christ.22
as a figureof the nun, notingin particularthather
reads her specifically
andGiovanni
Orlandi
D.G. 1983,51-53;andJohnMarenbon
, Washington,
(ed.
Thought
forHeloise
theprimacy
oftheanimus
andtrans.),
Collationes
2001,Iii.However,
, Oxford
in Abelard,
hasno exactparallel
as I willshowin moredetailbelow.
20On Augustine's
and oftheduality
between
ofinteriority
bodyand
understanding
- seeCharles
- sometimes
The
dualism"
Sources
soul
termed
oftheSelf:
Taylor,
"Augustinin
Abelard's
ethical
is mani, Cambridge
1989,127-42.
thought
Making
oftheModern
Identity
intheinner
thatsinoriginates
influenced
doctrine
person,
specifically
byAugustine's
fesdy
Ablard:
Meister
undOpfer
desScharfsinns
in thewill.See L.M. de Rijk,Peter
, in: Rudolf
undWirkung.
Abaelardus:
Person
Thomas(ed.),Petrus
, Werk
, Trier1980,125-38,
esp.137.
21In Abelard's
wealsoseewhat
context
intothedebate,
introduction
ofanAristotelian
andStoic
fusion
between
theAristotelian
ofanAbelardian
be termed
thebeginnings
might
whatMatthias
todevelop
hereisprecisely
Theethical
thatAbelard
traditions.
system
begins
- modified,
ofa modified
Stoicism"
Abelard's
"ethics
Lutz-Bachmann
hastermed
significantly,
ofhuman
ofhabitas an acquired
of"theAristotelian
disposition
concept
bytheaddition
Ethics
Abelard's
Modem
mind."
, in:TheModern
Lutz-Bachmann,
Philosophical
ofPeter
Aspects
72 (1995),201-11,
Schoolman,
esp.207.
22The locus
on theSongofSongs,citedby
classicus
forthisis Origen's
commentary
ofHeloiseandAbelard
totheLatintextoftheEpistolae
Abelard,
Ep.2, 71.Allreferences
sa Fame
Pierres
Abaelart
etHeloys
La VieetlesEpistres
EricHicks,
willbe from
, Paris-Genve
ofthe"blackbride"
willbe myown.Fora different
translations
1991.English
analysis
Desire
Fictions
seePeggy
, Lincoln1982,27-32.WhileKamuf's
Kamuf,
ofFeminine
passage,
theletters
because
shedoesnottreat
thanmine,
hasa different
specifically
purpose
analysis
Heloise
themes.
"Theanalogy
similar
sheidentifies
as a philosophical
debate,
[between
becauseit appearsto
Heloise's
to displace
andtheblackbride]can function
hypocrisy

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ETHICALPHILOSOPHY

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blacknessis similarto the blacknessof the nun's "exterior

habitus
."23Abelard
takesthisanalogybetweenthe habit and the bride'sblack fleshas a point
of departurefor an extendedredirectingof the interior/exterior
images
that for Heloise functionas metaphorsof hypocrisy:
Habet autem Ethyopissaexteriorem
in carne nigredinem,
et quantum
ad exteriorapertinet,ceterisapparet feminisdeformior;cum non sit
tamenin interioribus
dispar,sed in plerisqueetiamformosior
atque canin
sicut
ossibus
seu
dentibus.
videlicet
dentium
candor
didior,
Quorum
in ipso etiam commendatur
cum
dicitur:
"et
dentes
eius
lacte
sponso,
candidiores."Nigra itaque in exterioribus,
sed formosain interioribus
tribulationibus
est, quia in hac vita crebrisadversitatum
corporaliter
in
carne
exterius.24
afflicta,
quasi
nigrescit
The Ethiopianwomanhas a blackexterioron her flesh,and in all that
concernsher exteriorshe appearsuglierthanotherwomen.Still,she is
not different
fromthemin interiorthings,but in many thingsshe is
even morebeautifuland whiter,as in her bones or her teeth.Whiteness
of teethis commendedin the bridegroom
whenit is said "and
himself,
his teethare whiterthan milk."Thus, she is black in exteriorthings,
but beautifulin interiorthings.Because in thislifeshe is afflicted
corof adversities,
it is as if the exterior
poreallywithfrequenttribulations
of her fleshdarkens.
The analogythatAbelarddrawsbetweenthe nun'shabitand the Ethiopian
woman's fleshhas the immediateeffectof elidingclothingwith flesh,a
covering that can easily be removed with the exteriorsurface of the
body itself.This is indicativeof an importantdifferencebetween what
exteriorappearance signifies
forHeloise and what it signifies
forAbelard.
While Heloise considersexteriorsto be superficialand potentiallydeceitful,forAbelardthe bride'sexterioris an aspect of her identityas a whole.
Her externalblacknessdoes not conceal or contradicther internalwhiteness; rather,each complementsthe otherand togethertheyforma complete entity.
Abelard'sdiscussionof the bride'sanima
illustrates
the
, or spirit,further
between
her
interior
and
exterior.
Not
is
the
bride's
anima
harmony
only
- evensanctify
- thecontradiction
sanction
ofappearances.
thissanction
is tied
Moreover,
notonlyto thereduction
oftheinteriority
ofherdesirebutalsoto itsreappropriation
within
a noncontradictory
masculine
space,"Kamuf1982,30.
23Abelard,
Ep. 2, 71.
24Abelard,
Ep. 2, 72.

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256

inseparablefromher flesh,but her fleshis the outward expressionof

:
her anima
Ossa quippe,que interiora
suntexteriori
carnecircumdata,
et ipsiuscarnis quam geruntvel sustentant,
roburac fortitudo
sunt,bene animam
movetatque
sustentt,
exprimunt,
que carnemipsamcui inestvivificat,
ministrat.25
regit,atque ei omnemvalitudinem
The bones, that are withinand surroundedby exteriorflesh'exteriori
of thatveryfleshthattheybear
carn],and are the core and strength
whichbringsto life,sustains,moves
or sustain,expressthespirit[anima],
all its
and rulesthe fleshitselfin whichit is contained,and furnishes
to
it.
vigor
For Abelard, animaand fleshforma unified,workingsystem:the anima
has the power to influenceand governthe flesh,while the fleshin turn
expressesthe "vigor"of the anima.This passage may be read as a direct
and animus.In responseto
responseto Heloise's polarizationof her corpus
Heloise's discussionof the animus(mind or inner self),Abelard invokes
the anima(the life forceanimatingthe flesh),suggestingby his veryterminologythe degree to which body and soul are inseparable.
Thus, Abelard revisitsHeloise's metaphorsof interiorand exterior,
black and white,soul and body, but he does so in order to forma new
system,one emphasizingharmonyand unityover polarization.In this
nor the
system,the interioris not necessarilyequated with truthfulness,
exteriorwith hypocrisy.In fact,the black bride's exteriorqualities are
the ones that Abelard linksto truthwhen he says:
amorsponsiearnsichumilit.26
Sic veroearnsolverusdcolort,
quia celestis
Thus surelythe truesun discolorsher,because thusthe celestiallove of
makesher humble.
her bridegroom
The bride's black fleshowes its color to the "true sun" (sol verus). In
otherwords,God (frequendyreferredto by both Abelard and Heloise as
Veritas
) is responsibleforher appearance, and leaves a markon her body
thatexpressesthe humilitythatis in her soul. In the same way, the nuns'
habit is revelatoryof theirtrue nature,as the word "vere"(truly)in the
followingpassage indicates:
25Abelard,
Ep.2, 72.
26Abelard,
Ep.2, 72.

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instar
Ipse quippe cultusexteriornigrorumaut viliumindumentorum,
virosplanlugubrishabitusbonarumviduarummortuosquos dilexerant
gentium,vos in hoc mundo. . . vereviduaset desolatasostendit.27
Indeed thisexteriorattireof black or vile clothing,a semblanceof the
mourninghabitof good widowslamentingtheirdead husbandswhom
widowedand forsakenin thisworld
theyloved, showsyou to be truly
(emphasismine).
Markingthe importanceof clothingin this passage, Abelard uses three
" and "habitus
differentwords to designate it: "cultus" " indumentum
."
"
"
Significantly,cultus can mean not only an outfitor toilette(specifically,
any aspect of the appearance that is cultivated)but a cult, religionor
way of life.28Through his choice of words, Abelard emphasizes the
factthat the nuns' holy way of life {cultus)
is summedup by theirclothing [cultus).
In the above passages, Abelard respondsto Heloise's use of the habitusmetaphorby emphasizingthat the clothing(or flesh)of the nun (or
black bride) need not be symbolicof hypocrisy.However,when Abelard
discussesthe nun's habit again later in the same letter,he does use it to
explorethe implicationsof a deceitfulexterior.It is at thispoint that he
tellsan anecdote,takenfromhis and Heloise's own past,in whichanother
"black bride" figures:Heloise herself:
Nosti etiam,quando te gravidamin meam transmisi
patriam,sacro te
habituindutam monialemte finxisse,
et tali simulatione
tue quam nunc
habes religioniirreverenter
illusisse.Unde etiam pensa quam conve- immo
nienterad hanc te religionemdivinajustifia
gratia traxerit
nolentem,cui veritnon es illudere,volensut in ipso luas habituquod
in ipsumdeliquisti,et simulationis
mendacioipsa rei Veritasremedium
emendet.29
prestet,et falsitatem
You knowthatwhenI sentyou to myhomelandpregnantyou disguised
mocked
yourselfas a nun dressedin a sacred habit,and irreverently
withsuch a simulationthe religionthatyou now have. Now thinkhow
to
suitablydivinejustice,or rathergrace,has draggedyou all unwilling
this religiouslife,whichyou did not fear to mock,wishingthat you
shineforthin thatsame habitagainstwhichyou transgressed,
and that
27Abelard,
Ep.2, 71.
28See Glare1982(n.6), 467.
29Abelard,
Ep. 2, 79.

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a remedyforthe lie of the pretense,
the truthitselfof the thingfurnish
and emendthe falsehood.

Although,at the beginningof thispassage, Heloise's habit is a deceitful

coveringservingto conceal truth,it turnsout in the end that the habit
has actuallyreshapedtruth.God suppliesa remedyforfalse representaso thatit will reflectrealitymore
tion,not by changingthe representation
willbecome,
accurately,but by changingrealityso thatthe representation
use
Heloise's
at least in retrospect,
true.The "pretense"(simulation
echoing
becomes "the truthitselfof the thing"
of the word in a similarcontext)30
(;ipsareiventas).While Heloise believesthat appearance oughtto conform
to an inner reality,Abelard sets out to show her how realitycan and
does conformto appearance. In hindsight,Heloise's disguisefunctions,
not as a lyingsign, but as a propheticact- the sartorialequivalentof
a performative
statement,perhaps. The habit has, quite literally,made
the nun.
The implicationsof Abelard's anecdote are especiallyrich because the
evokesso manylayersof meaningwithintheAristotelian
Latinwordhabitus
traditionas Abelard knew it. As Abelard himselfputs it in his Dialctica:
"habitusautemvocabulum
habui (the
apudphilosophos
significationem
multiplicem
Habitusis one
word habitushas had many meaningsfor philosophers).31
: it describes
of the termsused in the Latin versionof Aristode'sCategories
a settledstate,less easily altered than a "disposition"(<iispositio
).32To a
it has a veryspecificuse as a technical
logician like Abelard, therefore,
term.However, "habit" also has ethical connotationsof which Abelard
was equally aware. Accordingto a traditionoriginatingwith Aristotle,
and which Abelard knew throughBoethius' commentaryon Aristode's
, virtueis a habit acquired throughdoing good.33Abelard cites
Categories
30Heloise,
Ep.2, 67; seeabovepp. 251-52.
31PeterAbelard,
mine.
Dialctica
, ed. L.M. De Rijk,Assen1956,109.Translation
32Aristotle,
Oxford
trans.
andDe Interpretationen
1963,24. See also
J.L.Ackrill,
Categories
andOrlandi2001(n. 19),128,n. 98.
Marenbon
33Forclarity,
ofvirtue
knewthedefinition
thatAbelard
to understand
itis important
Aristotle's
Mcomachean
ontheCategories
Boethius'
as a habitfrom
, andnotfrom
commentary
fortheideathat
classicus
Ethics
to be thelocus
theNicomachean
Ethics.
We nowconsider
intoLatin
butthistextwasnotyettranslated
canbe acquired
virtue
habituation,
through
ofGreekwillwantto notethatthe
Scholars
to Abelard.
unavailable
andwastherefore
in
ofa confusion
from
result
intheLatinAristotle
ofhabitus
something
meanings
multiple
- a confusion
In the
wouldofcoursehavebeenunaware.
ofwhichAbelard
translation
. See Aristotle,
a habit[Greekethos]
Nicomachean
callsvirtue
Ethics
Nicomachean
, Aristotle
intheCategories
NewYork2000,23.However,
anded.RogerCrisp,
Ethics
, Aristode
, trans,

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thisdefinitionin his Sic etNon, and will later discussit in more detail in
his ethicalworks.34If virtueis a habit acquired throughthe practice of
virtuousactions,it is all the more symbolicallyapt thatbecominga nun
for Heloise should have resultedfromthe practiceof wearingthe nun's
In this anecdote turnedphilosophicalparahabit,even if disrespectfully.
in
the process of acquiringthe "habit of the habit,"
ble, we see Heloise
so to speak. In thisway, Abelard's explorationof the symbolicpossibilities of the habitusalso servesas a directresponseto Heloise's contention
that "virtueis not of the body but of the soul," insofaras it refocuses
the discussionon Aristotelianideas about the habitualprocess of acquiring virtue.
In a sense,Abelard'sanecdote sidestepsthe issue of Heloise's hypocrisy
altogether,portrayingher instead as caught up in a granderscheme in
whichGod's designtakesprecedenceoverherown motivations.
Nevertheless,
Abelard does not entirelyignorethe questionof hypocrisy:he also refers
to and condemnshypocritesin his letter.Significantly,
however,he bases
his condemnationon a different
of
one centered
understanding hypocrisy,
not around falsehoodbut around "disrespect."Abelard does not referto
hypocritesas hidingtheirtruenatureunder a deceitfulhabit,but as "disrespecting"that habit. Condemningthose who, "sicutypocrite"
(behaving
likehypocrites),
disregardthe commandmentto prayin privateand instead
make a public spectacle of theirprayers,Abelard says:
- immo
Cuius quidemconsilii
preceptidivini muitoshuiushabitusnostricontemptores
adhuc gravitersustinemus.35
We stillendurewithdifficulty
themanywho holdin contempt
thiscoun- and thishabitof ours.
sel- or ratherdivineprecept
Abelard refersto hypocritesas disregarders,
or holders-in-contempt
[conof the habit. Instead of being a concealingcoveringover their
temptores)
instead
usesa termthatmight
be translated
as "settled
state"[Greek
he opposed
hexis];
thistoa temporary
condition
diathesis
See Marenbon
andOrlandi
, Latindispositif.
[Greek
2001(n. 19),128,n. 98.TheLatintradition
renders
bothethos
andhexis
as habitus.
Habitus
is further
related
to habere
another
termofimportance
in theCategories,
(having),
making
thewordintoa particularly
richsiteofdisparate
Aristotelian
associations
thatarespecific
to theLatintradition.
34PeterAbelard,
SicetNon
, 144,ed. BlancheBoyerand Richard
McKeon,Chicago
497-98.On virtue
as a habitin Abelard's
laterethical
seebelow.
1976-77,
works,
35Abelard,
Ep. 2, 74.

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truenature,the habit is a sign thattheyhave not yet learned to respect.

to any wrongdoingof Heloise's in this
AlthoughAbelard is not referring
passage, there is still an analogy to be drawn here. In recountingthe
storyof Heloise's disguisein a nun's habit,Abelard seems less concerned
with the false externalappearance that she cultivatesthan with the disthather choice of costumeimplies.He does not mentionthe exterrespect
nal/internaldichotomyat all, but he referstwiceto the factthatHeloise
"mocked" {illudere)
the habit throughher misuseof it. Like the individuals
to whom Abelard refersin the above passage, Heloise was a hypocrite
because she "held the habit in contempt,"not because she used it as a
coveringto conceal her true nature.36
Kamuf has claimed of thisletter:"[Abelard's] counter-portrait
[of the
black bride] [. . .] eradicatesthe charge of hypocrisyeven as it preserves
its formalstructure.[. . .] It is not the structureof hypocrisywhich is
convertedbut thevalue placed on it."37I agree thatAbelardhas effectively
emptiedHeloise's originalinside/outsidecontrastsof theirnegativevalue,
preservingthe structureof her metaphorswhile imaginingnew meanings
forthem. However,I would take issue withKamuf by emphasizingthat
- he has
Abelard has notceased to condemn hypocrites
only moved the
label "hypocrisy"aside, away fromwhat has become an essentiallyunrelated discussionof clothingand the habitual process of acquiringvirtue.
not to any contrastbetween
Hypocrisynow refersto disrespector mockery,
exteriorselfand interiorappearance. Indeed, hypocrisyas Heloise conceives of it, the coveringover of the innerselfwitha falseexterior,cannot exist accordingto Abelard. Instead, he considersthe exterior,even
to be an aspect of the self
if it is initiallyincompatiblewithtruthfulness,
ratherthan a disguisingcoveringover the self (fleshratherthan clothing, as it were). In this way, he rejectsHeloise's idea of the self as an
interioressence thatremainsuntouchedby the mere "externals"of body,
clothingand insincereactions.

36JohnMarenbon
all sinas, at base,
defines
teipsum
Abelard
arguesthatin theScito
Abelard
ThePhilosophy
ofGod."Marenbon,
1997,265-66.
, Cambridge
ofPeter
"contempt
to hypocrisy,
hereis notspecific
ofcontempt
thathiscondemnation
Thiswouldimply
at all.
in hypocrisy
interested
thathe is notparticularly
substantiating
mybelief
37Kamuf1982(n. 22),29.

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HELOISE'S
ON ABELARD'S

261

III. HeloiseEmptiesherMetaphors
In her thirdletter,ratherthan continuingto engage Abelard on a personal level by writingto him about her love, past and present,Heloise
begins to engage him on a professionallevel by askinghim to establish
a rule forher and her nuns. Yet even as she makes thisprofoundchange
in subjectmattershe continuesto referto the habitusthat has become a
bone of contentionbetweenherselfand Abelard. In so doing, she establishes a philosophicaland ethical continuitybetweenher "personal" lettersand this,the firstof the so-called "lettersof direction."
Early in her letter,Heloise says that she would like a rule "[qui] ex
nostre
conversionis
statum
describa
(that describesthe state
integro
habitumque
and habit of our conversionin its entirety).38
"The habit of our conversion" is an enigmaticphrase. Habituscan also mean "nature,"and, for
the purposesof a literalreading,that seems the best way to understand
it here. Nevertheless,
given Heloise's earlieruse of the habit as a symbol
ofthepurelyoutwardaspectsof conversion,
her demandsoundscontentious.
In the lines that follow,Heloise makes it clear that she uses the word
habitus
in its most
here,withwhat seems to be an ironicdisingenuousness,
literalsense. She justifiesher requestfor a rule by pointingout that the
Benedictinerule is not well suited for women. In order to prove her
point, she begins with the example of clothing.Followingare the very
firstquestionsthat she asks Abelard about the Benedictinerule,just a
fewlines afterher requestthathe writethema rule describingthe "habit
of theirconversion":
et scapularibusibi scripQuid ad feminasquod de cucullis,femoralibus
tumest?Quid deniquead ipsasde tunicisaut de laneisad carnemindumenstrue
hec omnino
mentis,cum earumhumorissuperflui
purgationes
rfugiant?39
How does what is writtenthereabout cowls,breechesand scapulars
abouttunicsor woolensworn
applyto women?And how whatis written
nextto the flesh,since theirmonthlypurgationsof superfluous
humor
are entirely
averseto thesethings?
Once again, Heloise takes up the issue of the habitus
, but this time her
discussionremainson a literallevel. Instead of tacklingthe philosophical
38Heloise,
Ep. 3, 89.
39Heloise,
Ep. 3, 89.

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262

questionsthatboth she and Abelard raised earlier,she descendsinto the

and even biological,questionsthat arise when the word habinitty-gritty,
tus is understoodas simplyreferringto prescribedreligiousclothing
more particularly,
religiousclothingin its relationshipto the femalebody.
While tantalizing,her referencecomes as a non sequiturin the philosophical debate that she originallysparkedwithAbelard.
The way in which Heloise is at once redirectingand continuingthe
debate,just as she redirectsand continuesthe correspondence,does not
become clear untillater in her letter,when yet another allusion to the
habitus
arises. Once again, the referenceis a seeminglydisingenuousone:
this time, because the discussionof the habitusis not in Heloise's own
words, but contained within an extended quote from Augustine.Yet
Augustine'smessage turnsout to be Heloise's own. In this passage, as
Heloise tellsus, Augustinedistinguishes
"intervirtutem
etvirtutis
exhibitionem"
(betweenvirtueand the exhibitionof virtue),saying:
Continentia
non corporis,sed animevirtusest.Virtutesautemanimialiin
quando corporemanifestantur,
aliquandoin habitulatent.40
Continenceis a virtue,not of the body but of the soul. Now virtuesof
in the body,and sometimeshide in
the soul are sometimesmanifested
the habit.
It is surelyno coincidence that the passage of Augustinethat Heloise
citeshere is also the source of her self-accusation
of hypocrisyin her second letter.Heloise now calls her reader's attentionto the fact that she
was echoing Augustine("continentia
noncorporis
, sed animevirtus
es) when
she insisted,in her second letter,"non [est]corporis
sed animivirtus
," with
Merely by inserting
specificreferenceto her own lack of continence.41
this citationinto her thirdletter,Heloise uses Augustine'sauthorityto
back up her originalpoint, implicitlyreclaimingher status as "sincere
of
understanding
hypocrite"and throwingdoubt on Abelard's conflicting
the habitusas a sartorialact.
As Heloise's quotation of Augustinecontinues,however,it becomes
is quite different
fromeither
clear thatAugustine'suse of the termhabitus
Abelard's or Heloise's. While Heloise used the termto referto outward
and potentiallydeceitfulappearance, Augustineuses it here in one of its
40Heloise,
Ep. 3, 101.
41Heloise,
Ep.2, 67.

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alternatemeanings:"nature" or "mode of existence."Thus, he explains

sit
"how virtuemay existin habit even if it does not in works"("quomodo
2
abstithe
nonsit in opere")
virtus
in habitu
, etiamsi
,4 by usingJohn
Baptist's
nence fromfood and drink as an example of "virtuein works," and
Christ'slack of abstinencefromfood and drinkas an example of "virtue
in habit." Similarly,he says:
in Johannequi nullasexpertusest
Non est imparmeritumcontinentie
. . . Sed continentiam
Johannes
nuptias,et in Abrahamqui filiosgeneravit.
et in opere,Abrahamvero in solo habituhabebat.43
The meritof continenceis not unequal inJohn,who knewno wedlock,
and in Abraham,who begatsons.. . . ButJohn'scontinenceis in works,
and Abraham'sonlyin habit.
What Augustinemeans by "habit" in these passages, then,is effectively
the opposite of what Heloise meant by "habit" in her firsttwo letters.
There, Heloise used the metaphorof habit as disguisingcoveringto refer
to the hypocriticalappearance of virtue;here, Augustineuses the same
word, under an alternatemeaning,to referto the essentialnature from
which virtuousdeeds spring.By includingthis quote fromAugustinein
source of her
her letter,then,Heloise not only reveals the authoritative
virtue's
not
to
the
statement
about
belonging
body but to the
original
which
functions
the
extent
to
this
statement
she
also
soul;
displays
as
that
of
the
habit.
Her
earlier
insisof
such
independently metaphors
tence on the split between appearance and realityparallels Augustine's
divisionbetween "works" and "habit" (nature),yet her usage of terminologyis opposite to Augustine's.Kamuf has noted Heloise's penchant
forbreakingdown oppositions,and here,in her skilledhands,we see the
into its
termat the heart of her debate withAbelard being transformed
own antonym.44
Through her two seeminglydisingenuousreferencesto habit, Heloise
in factmakes a particularlyastuterhetoricalmove. Earlier,Abelard preservedthe superficialstructures
of her metaphorsof clothingas covering
42Heloise,
Ep. 3, 101.
43Heloise,
Et. 3, 102.
44Kamuf1982(n.22),44,argues
thatHeloise's
letters
ofthestrucstagea "breakdown
As shedemonstrates,
tureofopposition."
Heloisefrequently
buildsarguments
or creates
aroundopposing
or destroy
theputative
metaphors
onlyto destabilize
pairsofconcepts,
differences
on whichtheseoppositions
arebased.

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and insideversusoutside,even as he changed theirmeaningsto the detrimentof Heloise's originalpoint.Here, Heloise does the opposite:she dismantlesher originalhabitus
repeatingthe
metaphor,while simultaneously
substanceof the argumentin which she exploitedit. Not acts, but the
nature of the person, are what determinesvirtue,she (and, as it turns
out, Augustine)insist.This is truewhetheror not the image of the habitusis employedto elucidate the problem: in this letter,Heloise repeatbut pointedlydoes notemployit as a metaphor
edly mentionsthe habitus
in her argument.In thisway, she pulls the rug out fromunderAbelard's
and philosophicallysubtle manipulationof the word"habitus"
artistically
of her metaphors.The real
effectively
puttinga stop to his refiguring
question here, Heloise seems to say, is an ethical one: its substanceis
what is important,not the images withwhich she has illustratedit, and
which she can deconstruct
just as easily as she has constructedthem.
In drawingan implicitdistinctionbetween the substanceof an argumentand the metaphorsthatfacilitateits expression,Heloise is of course
metaphor.Subtly,she seemsto imply
creatinganothereven more effective
thatby pursuingimages ratherthan substance,the letterratherthan the
spirit,Abelard has in a sense been guiltyof his own brand of rhetorical
on her origBy contrast,Heloise continuesto focusrelentlessly
hypocrisy.
inal question.It is possible to read this entireletteras a furtherinquiry
betweenvirtueand the appearanceof virtue,"between
into "the difference
the essence of a person and her acts. That this inquiryhas been transplanted fromthe personal realm of Heloise's own experienceinto the
theologicalrealm of what constitutesan appropriaterule for nuns does
not make it any the less piercing.
Heloise acknowledgesher strong
By invokingAugustineas an authority,
with Augustinindualism: she, like Augustine,insistson drawaffinities
between a "virtueof mind" and a "virtueof works."
a
distinction
ing
Her ethical focus,as we have seen, is on the inner essence of the person, not on thatperson'soutwardsacts. Such views mightseem to recall
an ethicsof intention,or what we have now come to call "Abelardian
differences
ethics."45
However,as I willarguebelow,thereremainsignificant
45Indeed,de RijkhasshownthatAbelard's
as a
ethical
maybe understood
thought
of
ofsinwiththemoment
identification
Abelard's
doctrine:
oftheAugustinin
reworking
locationof sinin thewill.De Rijk 1980(n. 20), 137.
consent
Augustine's
parallels
focus
Heloise's
between
to distinguish
itis important
as I willarguebelow,
Nevertheless,
andAbelard's
closer
toAugustine's
selforessence
ontheinner
pinpointing
"will")
(perhaps
as sin.
thatcanbe identified
ofinneraction("consent")
ofa moment

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265

between Heloise's ideas here and the ideas that Abelard will eventually
put forwardin his worksof ethicalphilosophy.
IV. Continuations
and theScitote ipsum
of theDebate:The Collationes
At this point, Heloise's voice falls silent on the subject of habit and
hypocrisy.However,in Abelard's two major ethicalworks,the Collationes
and the Scitote ipsum
, we can see him continuingto work throughthe
ideas thatHeloise has raised in her letters
as it seems,seekpersistently,
out
answers
with
which
to
to
ing
satisfactory
respond her challenges.46
The followingpassage of the Collationes
acquires a new depth when it is
read as a continuationof the habitus
debate, and a replyto Heloise's selfaccusationsof concupiscenceand hypocrisy.
Virtus,inquiunt,est habitusanimioptimus.. . . Est igiturhabitusqualitas rei non naturaliter
insita,sed studioac deliberationeconquistaet
difficile
mobilis.Unde hanc quam naturalemin quibusdamcastitatem
nominantex corporisvidelicetfrigiditate
vel aliqua complexionenature,
nullam
que
umquamconcupiscentie
pugnamsustinetde qua triumphet,
nec meritumobtinet,nequaquam virtutibusconnumeramus.
. . . Ubi
non
est
non
est
quippe
aliqua repugnantiepugna,
superantisvirtutis
iuxta
illud
etiam
vestii
'Non
coronabitur
corona,
magni
philosophi:
quis
nisilegittime
certaverit.'47
"Virtue,"theysay, "is an excellenthabitof the mind.". . . For habitis
a qualityof a thingnot presentin it by nature,but acquiredby strivand whichis difficult
to alter.So thechastity
which
ingand deliberation,
fromfrigidity
of the body or
theycall naturalin some people,resulting
46It willbe clearthatmydiscussion
hereandin section
V is basedon mybelief
that
theCollationes
werecomposed
Abelard's
ofletters
withHeloise.
Scholars
have
after
exchange
haddifficulty
on a datefortheCollationes
a
, withMewsin particular
agreeing
proposing
dateas earlyas themid1120s.See Constant
theWorks
Abelard
Mews,OnDating
,
ofPeter
in:Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
duMoyen
However,
Age,52 (1985),104-126.
inhismorerecent
workMewsleanstowards
a dateintheearly1130s.See Mews,
Abelard
andHeloise
Mews'1985article,
Allenhasargued
fora later
, Oxford
2005,176.Countering
date.In particular,
shemakesthecasethatthedefinition
ofsinin theCollationes
represents
a progression
inthinking
from
theCommentaria
inRomanos
must
, so thattheCollationes
havebeenwritten
after
theCommentaria.
See Allen1998(n.4), 148.The Commentaria
has
inturn
beenshown
todatefrom
after
Abelard's
VII toHeloise.
See E.M.Buytaert,
Epistle
Petri
Abaelardi
continuado
medievalis
I, CorpusChristianorum
Opera
Theologica
11,Turnholt
thisparticular
oftheCollationes
makes
senseas a response
1969,36.AsI arguehere,
passage
to issuesraisedin Heloise's
letters.
47PeterAbelard,
Collationes
andOrlandi,
Oxford
2001(n.19),128-30.
, ed. Marenbon

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ofnature,whichdoes nothave to struggle
fromsomeconstitution
against
concupiscenceover whichit mighttriumphand whichdoes not obtain
. . . Indeed,wherethere
merit,we in no wise reckonamongthevirtues.
is no fightagainstoppositionthereis no crownfora conqueringvirtue,
of yourgreatphilosopher:"He is not
even accordingto the statement
crownedunlesshe has competedaccordingto the rules."48

Abelard begins his discussionof virtueby citingBoethius' definitionof

virtueas a habit,and explainingthathabitsare acquired qualitiesdifficult
to alter.These are ideas, ultimatelyderivingfromBoethius'commentary
on Aristotle,that Abelard has already discussedin his Sic etNon*9New
and striking
here,however,are both Abelard's emphasison "strivingand
deliberation"as a means to acquiringvirtue,and his choice of the example of chastityand concupiscence.Accordingto Marenbon and Orlandi,
the idea that the habit of virtuemust be acquired throughapplication
and hard work does not appear in Aristotleor Boethius,but is original
with Abelard.50Yet this is an idea that never appears in Abelard's discussionof virtueas a habit in the Sic etMn , suggestingthatit may have
been conceived later,perhaps as a way of replyingto Heloise. Indeed,
and to "thefightforthecrown"specifically
to "striving"
Abelard'sreferences
recall his injunctionsto Heloise in his second letter,where he encourages her to win virtueby strivingagainsther own desires:
nisi
cui enimsuperestpugna,superestet corona,quia 'non coronabitur
qui legitimecertaverit.'51
For whomthefightremains,thecrownalso remains,because "he is not
crownedwho has not competedaccordingto the rules."
Abelard's choice of concupiscenceas an example also seems tailoredto
Heloise's complaintsabout her inabilityto be "displeased"by eroticmemories of herselfand Abelard.52Indeed, in this passage of the Collationes
,
Abelard almostseems to be backhandedlypraisingHeloise, implyingthat
she has proved she is not "frigid."Finally,a slightchange that Abelard

48Trans.Payer1979(n.4), 109.
49See alsoMarenbon
of
combination
ofAbelard's
1997(n. 36),284,fora discussion
here.
andAristotle
Boethius
50Marenbon
1997(n. 36),285.
andOrlandi2001(n. 19),129n. 98; Marenbon
51Abelard,
Ep. 2, 86.
52Heloise,
Ep. 2, 66.

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makes to Boethius' wordingmay perhaps be a nod to Heloise. While

Boethius' commentaryas quoted in the Sic et nonreferredto virtueas
"mentis
animi Optimus
."53
habitus
here Abelard calls virtuea "habitus
optimus"
Heloise's passionateinsistencethat virtueproceeds fromthe animusmay
be in his thoughtshere. It would seem that,as he writesthe Collationes
,
Abelard has not ceased to reflecton the ethical questionsthat Heloise
has posed, nor has he ceased to defendher cause and praise her as virtuous,even as she herselfclaims to be sinful.However, despitehis sympatheticattentionto some of Heloise's concerns,Abelard continuesto
directthe conversationaway fromher originalfocuson hypocrisyas coninto
cealmentof the self.Heloise's concealinghabit is here transformed
the "habit of virtue";the possibilityof falsehoodand deceit never enters
into a discussionthat instead focuseson the struggleto conquer inborn
inclinationsthroughgood actions.
In the Scitote ipsum
, Abelard continuesto develop the issues that he
. He devotes severalpages to
outlinesin this paragraph of the Collationes
in
and
of
itself
does not constitutea sin,54
that
concupiscence
proving
once again quotingthe Biblicalpassage about the struggleand the crown
to demonstratethat strivingagainst a bad inclinationleads to virtue.55
answerto the problemof Heloise's claim
However,his most satisfactory
comes
when he introducesthe idea of consent.
of persistent
concupiscence
mulierem
sed concupiscentiae
consentire
Non itaqueconcupiscere
peccatum
consensus
concubitus
sed
voluntatis
nec
voluntas
est,
dampnabilisest.56
Sin is not lustingfora woman but consentingto lust; the consentof
the will is damnablebut not the will forintercourse.57
The "consentof the will" is perhaps the crucial componentof Abelard's
eventualsolutionto the problemthat Heloise has posed him: lust in and
of itselfis not a sin,as long as our willdoes not consentto it but continues
to struggleagainstit. Alongside"intention,""consent"comes to forma
53Abelard,
SicetNon144,p. 498.
54Abelard,
Scito
teipsum
Oxford
41-45.
, ed. D.E. Luscombe,
1971,11-15,
55Abelard,
Scito
teipsum,
13.
56Abelard,
Scito
teipsum
, 14.
57Trans.Luscombe
1971(n. 4), 15.Interestingly,
Luscombe
outthatthisis a
points
from
theEpistola
ofAbelard's
, 15,n. 2. On theprogression
changein thinking
thinking
- a termthatdoesnotappearbefore
towards
thenotion
of"consent"
teipsum
theScito
seeMarenbon
1997(n. 36),259-60.

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De Rijk has demonstratedthat

lynchpinof Abelars ethical system.58
Abelarsidentification
of sin as consentis in parta reworking
ofAugustine's
doctrinethat sin originatesin the will. Accordingto de Rijk, Abelars
originalitywith respectto Augustineis to distinguishcarefullybetween
desire and consent,thus clarifyingAugustine'sconcept of the "will."59
withhis own
Indeed, here we see Abelard combiningAugustininvoluntas
In revisitingAugustine,Abelard is also to some extentrevisitconsensus.
ing Heloise: we have alreadyseen how Heloise inscribesher ethicswithin
the Augustinintradition.
WhileI concurwithde Rijk'sobservations,
I believethatwhereAbelars
ethicsdiffercruciallyfromboth Augustine'sand Heloise's is in Abelars
focuson sin as a momentof action
, albeit mental action,ratherthan on
the innate good or bad qualities of the animus(Heloise) or the voluntas
(Augustine).Like Heloise, Abelard believes that outwardactions in and
of themselves
are indifferent.
However,unlikeHeloise,he does not attempt
to measurethe moral qualitiesof the innerpersonas a whole,but rather
to pinpointa momentof mental action that can be identifiedas a sin.
As Marenbon has shown,"intention"forAbelard bears a directrelation
to action: "intentions[. . .] are sinfulonly in relation to a definitely
intended(althoughperhapsprevented)action."60Furthermore,
as Abelard
himselfspecifies,"consent" is a moment of mental action that can be
pinpointed:
Tunc vero consentimus
ei quod non licet,cum nos ab eius perpetratione nequaquam retrahimus
parati penitus,si dareturfacultas,illud
perficere.61
The timewhen we consentto what is unlawfulis in factwhen we in
no way draw back fromits accomplishment
and are inwardlyready,if
the
to
do
it.62
chance,
given

58See Lutz-Bachmann
1995(n.21),208-09.
59De Rijk1980(n.20),137:Ablards
dieSndeseiderKonsens,
istim
Grundthese,
Grunde
eineweitere,
desaugustinischen
genommen
scharfsinnige
Ausarbeitung
Standpunktes
desHandelns;
dieSndebestehe
alsoimWillen"),
denu. a.
(derWilleseidas Prinzip
dieSchuleAnselms
vonLonschonvertreten
hatte.
Ablards
zurursprnglichen
Beitrag
Lehrewares, des weiteren
zwischen
undZustimmung
zu unterVerlangen
(Begierde)
scheiden".
60Marenbon
1997(n. 36),256.
61Abelard,
Scito
teipsum,
14.
62Trans.Luscombe
1971(n.4), 15.Similarly,
Marenbon
1997(n. 36),262 describes

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ETHICALPHILOSOPHY
ON ABELARD'S
INFLUENCE
HELOISE'S

269

AlthoughAbelard internalizesthe momentof sin, he is still concerned

it as a moment,an act ratherthan an essence as it were.
withidentifying
Perhapsthisis whyHeloise's concernwiththe natureof the innerselfand
the possibilityof hypocrisyseems to hold only a limitedinterestforhim.
Andrea Nye sums up this differencesuccinctlywhen she explains
that virtue for Heloise depends on who an individual really is; for
Abelard,on how an individualacts by forceof will on who he is. As she
puts it:
Heloise'svirtuedoes not requiretheheroicact of willofAbelard'sdualIn Abelard'sethics,the innerevil of appetiteis eradiist metaphysics.
desirable
even,so thatthe rationalmasteryof the soul overvice
cable,
can be exercised.Virtuecan neverbe a "naturalhabit" because such
buta change
Heloise'svirtuerequiresnotwillpower
a thingis impossible.
of heart.63
Nye's insight,thoughbased on her readingof the lettercollectionalone,
is fullyapplicable to the largercorpus of Abelard's ethicalwritings.The
betweenthe termanimusas Heloise uses it, and termssuch
keydifference
as Abelard uses them,has all too oftenbeen overand consensus
as intentio
looked. The concludingsectionof this essay will take a closer look at a
particulartextualmomentin Heloise's letters:one that servesto demonstrateboth the importancethat she places on the animus
, and the extent
to which criticalreceptionof her thoughtmay have tended either to
effacethat focus,or to mistakenlyattributeit to Abelard. This textual
momentalso indicatesjust how far we may need to reassess Heloise's
influential
to, the philothoughtas separatefrom,althoughunquestionably
sophical systemknown as "Abelardianethics."
or "Heloisian"Ethics?
V. "Abelardian"
In one of the more famouspassages of her firstletter,Heloise draws a
betweenactionsand the spiritin whichtheyare accomplished,
distinction
in order to weigh her own guilt and innocence in the outcome of the
disastrouslove affair:
of theoutward
theperformance
and prompting
as "a mentalact preceding
consent
act".
sinful
63Nye1992(n. 1),11.

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BROOKEHEIDENREICH
FINDLEY
Que plurimumnocens,plurimum ut nosti sum innocens:non enim
rei effectus,
in crimineest,nec que fiunt,sed quo
sed efficientis
affectus
animo fiunt,equitaspenst.64
I who was harmfulin manythingswas also, as you know,innocentin
manythings.Crime is not in the doing of the thing,but the stateof
mind [affectus]
of the doing,and justicethinksnot of whatis done, but
in what spirit'quo animo]it is done.

Heloise reiteratesthis idea using similarwordingin her thirdletter:

Non itaque magnopereque fiunt,sed quo animo fiantpensandumest,
si illipiacerestudemus,
qui 'cordiset renumprobatorest' et 'in abscondito videt.'65
Thus,we shouldnot thinkof whatis done,but in whatspiritit is done,
if we striveto please him who 'is the inspectorof heartand entrails'
and 'sees whatis concealed.'
This second passage repeats a pair of Biblical quotationsthat Heloise
used earlier in her self-accusationof hypocrisy.66
At all three of these
,
points,Heloise's focusis on the innerperson,representedby the animus
whom God is able to judge throughhis investigationof the "heart,"
"entrails"and "whatis concealed." It is the stateof the animusthatallows
us to assignguiltor innocence.Heloise's words are strikingand succinct
in theirexpressionof a fundamentalaspect of her ethical thought,but
theyalso contain an echo of one of her favoriteauthors.She draws her
turnof phrase fromAugustine'sDe sermone
Dominiin monte
, a textthat is
also veryconcernedwith the problemof hypocrisy:
Non ergoquid quisquefaciat,sed quo animofaciat,considerandum
est.67
Thereforenot whatsomeonedoes, but in whatspirithe does it, should
be considered.
The parallel betweenHeloise's words and Augustine'sdoes not mitigate
her originality,
but insteadmarksthe philosophicaltraditionwithinwhich

64Heloise,
Ep. 1,51.
65Heloise,
Ep. 3, 103.
66Heloise,
Ep. 2, 67; quotedabovep. 252.
67Augustine,
mine.
Desermone
Domini
inmonte
, ed.Mutzenbecher
(n. 14),137;translation

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HELOISE'S
INFLUENCE
ON ABELARD'S

271

she places herself.As we have already seen, it is typicalof Heloise to

reformulate
statementsfromauthoritiesand incorporatethem seamlessly
into her text.
This is one of the more frequently
quoted passages of Heloise's letters.
Yet, ironically,commentatorson her words have tended to term them
an expressionof Abelars"ethics of intention,"and even to implythat
Heloise is borrowingan idea of Abelard'sin orderto apply it to her own
case.68However,beforewe assume that Heloise's thoughtis derivativeof
Abelard'shere,we shouldstop to considertwo things.First,Heloise never
uses the word "intention"(;intentio
), a term typicalof Abelardian ethics;
she
about
the
soul
or innerselfand the emotionsor state
instead,
speaks
of mind (animus,
Her focusis not on the intentionthatleads one
affectus).
to performa specificdeed, but on a certain state of being: a crucial
as I have argued. Second, althoughAbelard was alreadycondifference,
the
sidering problemof intentionbeforethisletterwas written,onlythose
worksdemonstrably
writtenafter
thislettershow the influenceof thispassage, with its focus on the animus.
Already,in works dating fromthe mid-1120s, before his correspondence withHeloise, Abelard is in the processof thinkingthroughan ethical distinctionbetween works (opera)and their source in the thought
"
or intention(iintentio
(cogitatio)
).69In the Sic et Non, he states: omniaopera
velbonavelmalaa cogitatone
."70And, in the TheologiaChristiana
, he
procedunt
" tota
secundum
intentionis
radiem
sit"71
While
says:
qualitasoperum
accipienda
these statementsclearlylay the framework
forsome of the ideas that he
will develop more fullyin the Scitote ipsum
, theyare not directlyrelated
to Heloise's statementabout the primacyof the animus.However, four
different
worksby Abelard, all of which probablypostdateHeloise's letter, do contain echoes of her words. In the course of these passages,
68See Etienne
Hlose
etAblard,
Paris1938,105-07;
ThePersonal
Gilson,
J.T.Mckle,
Letters
Between
Abelard
andHeloise
15 (1953),47-94,esp.55-56;and
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
andHeloise
Radice,TheLetters
, NewYork1974,18, 115n. 2. However,
Betty
ofAbelard
thatthisis an entirely
unfounded
Nye1992(n. 1),9 and 19 n. 15,recognizes
assumption.
69Indeed,
Marenbon
hasshown
thatthefocuson "intentional
ethics"
wasnotin fact
withAbelard,
hisdevelopment
ofitwasmorecomplete
thanthatofhis
original
although
"Abelard's
views
. . . arethecontinuation
anddevelopment
ofa
instead,
contemporaries:
Marenbon
1997(n. 36),252.
longtradition,"
70Abelard,
SicetNon142,p. 492.
71PeterAbelard,
Christiana
Abaelardi
, V, 49,Petri
II, ed. E.M.
Theologia
Opera
Theologica
Turnholt
1969(Corpus
Continuatio
Christianorum,
Mediaevalis,
Buytaert,
12),369.

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BROOKEHEIDENREICH

Abelard develops Heloise's thought,and cruciallyfusesit with his own

thus changingthe focus of her
by adding the term"intention"[intentio],
are
the
relevant
passages, given (to the
originalidea slightly.Following
best of scholarlydatingability)in chronologicalorder.72
Nec tam quod fiat,quam quod quomodo vel quo animo fiat,pensandum est.73
We shouldthinknot so much of what is done as of the way or spirit
in whichit is done.
[animus]
ubi cunctaquae fiuntsecundum
Hoc quidemest examenveraeiustitiae,
secundum
intentionem
operumqualitatem.Quae
pensanturmagisquam
cum nunc
intentionem
attendebant,
quidem operaJudaei magisquam
Christianinaturalisuscitatajustifianon tam attendantquae fiuntquam
quo animo fiant.74
of truejustice,in which all that is done is
This is the consideration
ratherthanaccordingto thequalthe
intention
of
to
according
thought
ityof the deed. Indeed, theJews are more attentiveto deeds than to
whilejusticeinventedby Christiannatureattendsless to
the intention,
in whichit is done.
whatis done thanto the spirit[animus]
vel quecumque usibus nostrissunt
Et nulla, credo, sunt instrumenta,
intentionum
commodata,quibus pro
qualitatetam male uti non possimusquam bene; ad quod scilicetnichilrefert
quid fiatsed quo animo
fiat.75
or anythingsuitableforour
And, I believe,thereare no instruments
use whichwe are not able to use bothevillyand well throughthequalityof our intention.In this,what is done is not what matters,but in
it is done.76
whatmind [animus]
Non enim quae fiunt,sed quo animo fiantpenstDeus, nec in opere
. . . Quis etiam
sed in intentionemeritumoperantisvel laus consistit.
electorumin his quae ad opera pertinent
ypocritis
potestadequali?77
72On thedating
seenote46 above.
oftheCollationes,
73PeterAbelard,
in:Mediaeval
ed. T.P. McLaughlin,
Rule
Studies,
Women,
forReligious
mine.
18 (1956),241-92,
esp.265.Translation
74PeterAbelard,
Abaelardi
PauliadRomanos
inepistolam
Commentarla
, Petri
Theofogica
Opera
Mediaevalis
Continuatio
1969(Corpus
Turnholt
ed.
Christianorum,
12),
I,
E.M.Buytaert,
mine.
65. Translation
75Abelard,
Collationes
, 210.
76Trans.Payer1979(n.4), 161.
77Abelard,
teipsum
Scito
, 28.

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INFLUENCE
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY
ON ABELARD'S

273

For God thinksnot of whatis done but in whatmindit may be done,

and themeritor gloryof thedoer lies in theintention,
notthedeed. . . .
Moreover,in respectof works,who among the elect can be compared
withhypocrites?78
Deus vero solus qui non tam quae fiunt,quam quo animo fiantadtennostrareatumpenstet vero iudicioculpam
dit,veraciterin intentione
examinat.Unde et probatorcordiset renumdicitur et in abscondito
videre.79
Indeed God alone,who considersnot so muchwhatis done as in what
mind it may be done, trulyconsidersthe guiltin our intentionand
examinesthe faultin a true trial.Whence he is said to be both the
proverof the heartand the reinsand to see in the dark.80
Abelard's earliestreiterationof Heloise's words occurs in his "Rule for
nuns,"a textthatstandsas a directreplyto her letters.There, his words
are essentiallya quotation of hers.81In later works,however,he echoes
her wordsin conjunctionwithhis own thinking
on intention,making"the
spiritin which somethingis done" appear to be anotherway of expressing "intention."The last two passages cited here, both fromthe Scitote
, seem to acknowledgeHeloise's contributionmore directly,since
ipsum
echoes of her letters.In the first
theycombineher statementwithfurther
of these passages, Abelard draws a connectionbetween Heloise's statementand her condemnationof hypocriteswho, as she describesthemin
her second letter,energetically
pursuegood deeds withoutpossessinginner
In the second,Abelard cites Heloise's statementalongsidea pair
virtue.82
of Biblical quotationsthat she uses twice in a similarcontext,83
creating
an especiallystrikingecho. At both of these points,Abelard also moves
his discussioncloser to Heloise's concerns: hypocrisy,concealmentand
the hidden selfrevealed to God.
In sum, here we see Abelard taking an arrestingphrase coined by
Heloise via Augustine,and reusingit as a way of both clarifying
his own
78Trans.Luscombe
1971(n.4), 29.
79Abelard,
Scito
teipsum
, 40.
80Trans.Luscombe
1971(n.4),41.
81A closelookat bothAugustine's
andHeloise's
showsthatAbelard
wording
clearly
is notmerely
theAugustine
ofHeloise,
butis specifically
echoing
passageindependently
herwording:
forexample,
Abelard
Heloise's
est"rather
than
reusing
repeats
"pensandum
"considerandum
est."
Augustine's
82Heloise,
Ep.2, 68.
83Heloise,
Ep.2, 67,andEp. 3, 103.

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FINDLEY
BROOKEHEIDENREICH

and buildingproductivelinksbetweenhis ideas and hers.However,

thinking
Abelard's
withoutbeing aware of the originalcontext
reading
reworkings
of Heloise's statementmay tend to obscure the key difference
between
Abelard's pinpointingof momentsof mental action, and Heloise's striving to uncovera particularstate of mind betweenthe momentof consensusto a crime and the qffectus
accompanyingthe doing of that crime,
as it were. Yet this distinctionis crucial to understandingthe difference
betweenAbelardianand Heloisian ethics.
Previousscholarshiphas not onlyfailedto acknowledgethisdifference,
it has even failedto recognizeHeloise's famousstatementas her own. It
is especiallypainfulto see Mckle,facedwiththisverycollectionof related
passages, attemptingto attributethe originalthoughtin Heloise's letters
to Abelard, speculatingthat "Heloise had likelyheard Abelard speak of
this doctrinemore than once" and that "we cannot rule out the possibilitythatthe commonsource [ofthisidea] is Abelard'smind."84Instead,
the sequence of passages and the progressionof thoughtthat they disstatement,
play clearlypointsto Heloise's originalauthorshipof a striking
and Abelard's reworkingof it over the course of the last decade of his
lifeto fitwith ethicalideas that he was already developing.
We may seem to have come a long way fromthe debate over habit
with which we started.However, the common thread lies in Heloise's
beliefthatany ethicaldiscussionmustbeginby uncoveringthe truenature
- one
of the inner self.Virtue forher proceeds froman interioridentity
over which an individualmay not have completecontrol,for she seems
to believe her own animus
, at least, to be unchangeableby any amount
sin as she understandsit has its root in falseof struggle.Concomitantly,
taken as a lack of correspondencebetweenthe inner
hood or hypocrisy,
selfand an individual'souter appearance or actions.
In his multiplereuses of Heloise's statementabout the animus
, as in
himself
Abelard
shows
his transformation
of her metaphorof the habitus
,
to be more interestedin her imageryand turnsof phrase than in her
underlyingideas about the inner self. While this demonstrateshis creativityin effectingintelligentand artfulreworkingsof his source, it
of Heloise's thought.Abelard's
has also tended to obscure the specificity
of
a
comprehensivesystemof intentionalethics,based in
development
systems,remainsuniquely
part on a fusionbetweenStoic and Aristotelian
84Mckle1953(n.68),55,56.

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INFLUENCE
ETHICALPHILOSOPHY
HELOISE'S
ON ABELARD'S

275

his. However,Heloise deservesrecognitionin her own rightforher explorationof the ethicalimplicationsof interiorsubjectivity.85
, TN
Memphis
Rhodes College

85Theinteriority
- and,I believe,
- taken
oftheselfis frequently
as a charmistakenly
modern
notion.
whoframes
hisstudy
ofinterior
See,forexample,
acteristically
Taylor,
inWestern
as a history
ofthedevelopment
of"modern
1989
subjectivity
thought
identity,"
theStoicandAugustinin
traditions
evidence
(n. 20),3. However,
that,
provide
strong
evenin Antiquity,
somethinkers
didlocatetheselfin an interior
space.Heloiseis thus
notoriginal
forherideasofinteriority
ofthose
perse,butforherparticular
development
ideasin an ethical
context.

11:14:36 AM

of Happinessand HumanDestiny
Conceptions
in theLate Thirteenth
Century
P.S. EARDLEY

Abstract
as
Medievaltheoriesof ethicstendedon the whole to regardself-perfection
thegoal ofhumanlife.Howevertherewas profound
disagreement,
particularly
in the late thirteenth
century,over how exactlythiswas to be understood.
Intellectualists
such as Aquinas famouslyarguedthathumanperfection
lay
in
primarily comingto knowtheessenceof God in thenextlife.Voluntarists
such as the Franciscan
arguedthatultimateperJohnPeckham,by contrast,
fectionwas to be achievedinpatriathroughthe act of lovingGod. The present articleargues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defendeda
withrespectto thefinaldestinyofhumanbeings.
different
sortofvoluntarism
of the
Ratherthanclaimingthatthegoal of humanlifelay in theperfection
achieved
with
God
was
to
be
that
ultimate
union
instead
self,theyargued
whichoccurredthrough
an act ofself-transcendence,
ecstasy
through
mystically
or quasi-deification.
It is commonplaceto associatemedievalconceptionsof ethicswithancient
conceptionsas being broadly eudaimonisticin nature.1This association
is justifiedto the extent that the majorityof Christian thinkersfrom
Augustineto Aquinas tended to agree with such predecessorsas Plato
and Aristotlethatthe goal of human lifewas happinessor self-perfection.
They also shared with the ancientsthe notion that happiness,insofaras
it was an activity,had to involvethe perfectionor actualizationof what
was best in human nature.Accordingly,theyvery oftenconcluded that
it mustlie in the operationof reason. Of course,Christianthinkersoften
disagreedwith theirpagan predecessorsas to the appropriateobject of
1 Cf.V. Bourke,
, 2 vols.,NewYork1970,I, 10-11;B. Kent,TheMoral
ofEthics
History
toMedieval
in:A.S.McGrade
2003,
Philosophy,
Cambridge
Companion
(ed.),TheCambridge
Lifei
toMaclntyre
From
Bonaventure
Virtues.
Conscience
andOther
Park,
, University
232;D. Langston,
andC. Becker
Ethics
LateMedieval
PA. 2001,2; andS. MacDonald,
, in:L. Becker
(eds),
NewYork2003,54-56.
Ethics
A History
, 2ndedition.
ofWestern
Vivarium
44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2006
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

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ANDHUMAN
DESTINY
CONCEPTIONS
OF HAPPINESS

277

happiness,along with the question of whetherit could be achieved in

the presentlife. Still,in theircommon beliefthat the purpose of ethics
themselvesfrom
lay in discoveringwhat it is goodto be, theydistinguished
modern ethical theoriessuch as Kantianism and Utilitarianism,
which
as
the
of
ethics
the
of
what
it
is
to
do.2
Hence
regard
goal
discovery
right
the common label of eudaimonisticas attachedto ancientand medieval
moral philosophy,in contrastto theirmore modern successors.
A particularlyprominentexample of this accepted picture is Georg
Wieland's chapter on medieval theoriesof happiness in The Cambridge
ofLaterMedievalPhilosophy.
History
Accordingto Wieland,Christianthinkers
both agreed with Aristotleand disagreedwith him over how to understand the goal of human life. They shared with Aristotlethe view that
happinesshad to consistin "the perfectionof human nature, <that is,
of> the actualisationof possibilitiesinherentin man."3 They disagreed
with him, however,over the question of whetherhappiness could be
achieved in via. Aristotleclearlythoughtthatit could by means of moral
and intellectualexcellence,while for the Christianthinkersof the middle ages the presentlifewas too filledwithvicissitudes,its goods simply
too open to fortuneand abuse. True happiness,in the Christiantradition,was thereforenecessarilyreservedfor the life to come.4
Wieland's characterizationis accurate to a degree,but it failsfullyto
capture the richness,complexityand diversityof later-thirteenth
century
views on the finaldestinyof human beings. In this paper, then,I want
to challengeWieland's blanketassertionthatforthe Christiantheologians
of the medievalperiod human happinesslay in the fullactualizationor
perfectionof the self.On Wieland's account, medieval thinkersbelieved
thatthe goal of human lifewas self-perfection,
whichwould be achieved
in the next life in union with God, either throughcontemplatingthe
divine essence in the beatific vision, or through loving God.5 And
while the textual evidence supportsthis interpretation
for perhaps the
majorityof medieval thinkers,two of the most prominenttheologiansof
the late-thirteenth
century,Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Giles of Rome
2 Bourke,
, I: 10.
ofEthics
History
3 G. Wieland,
ThePerfection
A. Kenny,
Happiness:
ofMan, in:N. Kretzmann,
J. Pinborg
Medieval
, Cambridge
(eds),TheCambridge
1982,673. See also
ofLater
History
Philosophy
Wieland's
moreextensive
Ethicascientia
DieAnfange
der
studyon thesubject,
practica.
Ethik
im13.Jahrhundert
Westfalen
1981.
, Mnster
philosophischen
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.,673-83.

11:14:57 AM

278

P.S. EARDLEY

(1243/7-1316), departed fromthis conceptionby defendinga radically

unorthodoxaccount of human destiny.Rather than understandingthe
finalend of human beings to lie in self-perfection,
theyargued that the
true destinyof human beings lay in a certaintranscendence
of the selfto
be achievedthrougha typeof deificationor excstasy.In this,theydirectly
challengedthe teachingsof Thomas Aquinas and otherson the question
of happiness and the final goal of human beings. In establishingthis
claim, it will also become apparent that Giles of Rome, at least in his
mature works,was more closely allied to the voluntarismof Henry of
of Thomas Aquinas than has previously
Ghent than to the intellectualism
been supposed.6
The Will vs. The Intellect
The majorityof medieval thinkersagreed with Aristodethat happiness,
insofaras it was an activity,could only be achieved by the highestor
suchas JohnPeckham
bestof humanpowers{EN 1098a29-31).7Voluntarists
Franciscan
(ca. 1225-1292),Aquinas's
contemporary,
argued thatthe will
in
the
was the highest(altissima
soul; accordingly,on Peckham's
) power
account,beatitudeconsistsprimarilyin an act of love.8Intellectualists,
by
6 Thetraditionell
inthethomistic
ofGileswasthathewasanintellectualist
interpretation
morale
aristotliciens
seeJ. de Blic,Uintellectmlism
tradition.
Forthisinterpretation,
chezdeux
moralia
inhonorem
eximii
Domini
Arthur
delafinduXIIIesicle
, 2 vols.,
, in:Miscellanea
Janssen
7Ime,Contradiction
andFreedom
Louvain1948,I: 45-76;S.D. Dumont,
oftheWillin the
3 (1992),
filosofica
LateThirteenth
in:Documeni
e studisullatradizione
medievale,
Century,
Medieval
FreeWillandFreeChoice
, in: TheCambridge
578-79;
ofLater
History
J.B.Korolec,
etmorale
auxXIIeetXIIIesicles
andO. Lottin,
, 6 vols.,Louvain, 629-41;
Psychologie
Philosophy
evidence
to support
theview
there
is textual
Gembloux
I, 315-18.However,
1942-1960,
ofhumanaction,
at leastin hismature
a morevoluntaristic
thatGilesdefended
picture
andGiles
ontheWill
Thomas
works.
See P.S. Eardley,
, in:The Reviewof
ofRome
Aquinas
inLater
Medieval
56 (2003),835-62and TheFoundations
ofFreedom
Philosophy.
Metaphysics,
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy
Giles
andhisContemporaries
, in:Journal
(forthcoming).
ofRome
7 See,forexample,
Summa
theologiae
(= ST) I-II,q. 3, a. 5, corp.:". . . si beatAquinas's
autemoperhominis.
itudohominis
estoperario,
Optima
operatio
oportet
quodsitoptima
obiecti.
autem
estquaeestoptimae
ariohominis
Optima
potentia
respectu
optimi
potentiae
nonestobiecestbonumdivinum,
cuiusobiectum
estintellectus,
quodquidem
optimum
sedspeculativi."
tumpractici
intellectus,
8JohnPeckham,
Pecham
, ed.
Quodlibeta
Quodlibet
quatuor
(= Quod),I, q. 5, in: Ioannis
consistit
Grottaferrata
F. Delorme
andG. Etzkorn,
1989,16:"Dicoquodbeatitudo
prinmeriti
et praemii.
in actuvoluntatis
. . . Primodicoconsiderando
proportionem
cipalius
- nisi
et etiampraemium
meritum
Certum
estenimquodpraecipue
prosuiperfectione,
est
XII Super
Genesim
: 'Unaibiettotavirtus
UndeAugustinus,
caritas
cadita perfectione.
totavirtus
estibi
felicitas
esthaberequodamas.'Si igitur
amarequodvideas,
et summa

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ANDHUMAN
CONCEPTIONS
DESTINY

279

contrast,claimed thatthe intellectwas the highestpower in the soul and

thattruehappinesshad thereforeto consistin the beatificvision.Related
to the questionof human happiness,then,is the questionof whetherthe
will or the intellectis the higherpower of the soul. Aquinas is probably
the best-knownrepresentative
of the intellectualist
position.He was also
the focal point of later voluntaristicreactions such as that of Henry
and Giles.9
In the Summatheologiae
Thomas famouslyaddresses the question of
whetherthe will is a "higher" (altior
Later
) power than the intellect.10
willask whetherit is "greater"(superior
thinkers
"nobler"
nobilior
or
"more
),
),
(;
Whatever the terminology,at issue was whether
perfect"(perfectior).u
the intellectis dependenton, and thereforesubordinateto the will, or
vice versa.
In addressingthis question Aquinas draws a distinctionbetween that
whichis absolutelyhigher{simpliciter)
and thatwhichis higherin a qualified
sense (.secundum
quid).He definesthe formeras takenin itself,and the latter in relationto somethingelse.12This distinctionpermitshim to show
that,althoughthe intellectmust be considered,in the final analysis,as
the intrinsically
higherpower, the will also has nobility.
According to Aquinas the intellect is the higher potency without
qualificationbecause its object is simplerand more abstractthan that of
the will. That is, since the object of the will is the desirablethingitself,
etfelicitas
estibiamarequiafelicitas
estvirtus
consummata."
amare,
ergototabeatitudo
dicendum
Ibid.,q. 6 (ed.Etzkorn,
XXV),19:"Adsextum
perinteremptionem,
quiavoluntasestaltissima
etfinis
animaeabsentis
a sensuusquead summum
animae."
9 On Henry's
voluntarism
andgeneral
theories
ofthewill,seeR. Macken,
Heinrich
von
Gent
imGesprch
mitsdnen
ber
diemenschliche
Freiheit
Studien
Zeitgenossen
, in:Franziskanische
59 (1977),125-82andLa doctrine
deS. Thomas
concernant
la volont
etlescritiques
d'Henri
de
Gand
nellastoria
delpensiero
studies
, in: Tommaso
, Naples1976,84-91.Forgeneral
d'Aquino
on thedebates
between
voluntarists
andintellectualists
in thelate-thirteenth
see
century,
B. Kent,Virtues
inthe
LateThirteenth
oftheWill.TheTransformation
ofEthics
, Washington,
Century
D.C. 1995;Lottin,
etmorale
Insolente
libert.
Controverses
, vol.I andF.-X.Putallaz,
Psychologie
etcondamnations
au XIIIesicle,
Friboure
1995.
10Aquinas,
ST I, q. 82,a. 3: "Utrum
voluntas
sitaltior
potentia
quamintellectus."
11Cf. Henryof Ghent,
de Gandavo
Quod.I, q. 14,in: Henrici
, Leuven
OperaOmnia
vol.V, ed.R. Macken,
ofFontaines,
1979-,
83; Godfrey
Quod.
VI, q. 10,in:,LesQuodlibets
deFontaines
Louvain1914,
, sixetseptdeGodefioid
cinq
, ed. M. de WulfandJ. Hofmans,
vol.III, 182.
12Aquinas,
ST I, q. 82,a. 3, corp.:"Respondeo
dicendum
alicuius
ad
quodeminentia
alterum
uno modo,simpliciter;
alio modo,secundum
potestattendi
dupliciter:
quid.
Consideratur
autemaliquidtalesimpliciter,
tale;secundum
proutestsecundum
seipsum
talesecundum
ad alterum."
quidautem,
proutdicitur
respectum

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280

P.S. EARDLEY

which is a compositeof matterand form,while that of the intellectis

only the formor ratioof the desirablething,it followsthat the latteris
more simple and abstractthan the former.Since the more abstractor
detached frommattera thingis, the higherit is, it standsto reason that
the object of the intellectis higherwithoutqualificationthan that of the
will. Now accordingto Aquinas, the nature of a potencyis determined
by the mannerin which it is relatedto its object. Thus, if the object of
the intellectis higherthan that of the will, it followsthat the intellect
itselfwill possess a nobler naturethan that of the will.13
position on this
AlthoughAquinas clearly endorses an intellectualist
in
the will is
some
instances
that
to
concede
question,he is prepared
higherthan the intellect.Advertingto Aristode,he admitsthatthe objects
of the will, good and bad, are in things,while the objects of the intellect, truthand error,are in the mind. From thisit followsthatwhen an
object is higherthan the soul and thereforeincapable of being understood as fullyas it is capable of being loved, it is betterto love such an
object than to know it. Material objects,on the other hand, are lower
thanthe immaterialsoul. It is therefore
better,so Thomas thinks,to know
them.
such objectsthan to love
Althoughthe will may be noblerin relation to certainobjects such as God, Aquinas nonethelessinsiststhat the
intellectis unqualifiedlythe nobler of the two potencies.14
13Ibid.:"Si ergointellectus
emisecundum
considerentur
etvoluntas
se,sicintellectus
enim
Obiectum
obiectorum
ad invicem.
excomparatione
invenitur.
Ethocapparet
nentior
intelnamobiectum
absolutum
etmagis
estsimplicius
intellectus
voluntatis;
quamobiectum
cuiusratioestin intellectu,
autemappetibile,
bonm
estipsaratioboniappetibilis;
lectus
tantosecunet abstractius,
voluntatis.
estobiectum
Quantoautemaliquidestsimplicius
volestaltiusquamobiectum
intellectus
et altius.Et ideoobiectum
dumse estnobilius
ad obiectum,
ordinem
sitsecundum
ratiopotentiae
Cumergopropria
untatis.
sequitur
volntate."
sitaltior
et nobilior
intellectus
se et simpliciter
quodsecundum
14Ibid.:"Secundum
invenitur
voluntas
ad alterum,
etpercomparationem
quidautem,
re invenitur
in altiori
voluntatis
ex eo scilicet
altiorintellectu;
interdum
quodobiectum
essesecundum
auditum
Sicutsi dicerem
intellectus.
visu,
quidnobiliorem
quamobiectum
color
estaliquarecuiusestcolor,quamvis
nobilior
resaliquacuiusestsonus,
inquantum
in hoc
consistit
sono.Ut enimsupradictum
etsimplicior
sitnobilior
est,actiointellectus
exeo quodvolactusverovoluntatis
estinintelligente;
perficitur
quodratioreiintellectae
ad ipsamremproutin se est.Et ideoPhilosophus
untasinclinatur
dicit,in VI Metaph.,
etfalsum,
verum
suntinrebus;
etmalum,
voluntatis,
quae
quaesuntobiecta
quodbonum
estnobilior
resin qua estbonum,
suntin mente.
suntobiecta
intellectus,
Quandoigitur
estaltior
ad talemrem,voluntas
inqua estratiointellecta;
percomparationem
ipsaanima,
tuncetiamin compaestinfra
intellectu.
animam;
Quandoveroresin qua estbonum,
estamorDei quam
Undemelior
estaltiorvolntate.
ad talemrem,intellectus
ratione
rerum
estcognitio
autemmelior
e contrario
quamamor.Simpliciter
corporalium
cognitio;
estnobilior
intellectus
tarnen
quamvoluntas."

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DESTINY
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281

of the intellectare conNotice thatAquinas's claimsforthe superiority

sistentwith the notion that the will is inferiorbecause it relies on the
as Aquinas assigns
intellectforitsdetermination.15
Indeed, such superiority
to the intellectwill in turnprovide the foundation,as we shall see, for
his claim that true happinessconsistsprincipallyin an act of the rational potency.16
As withseveralof his othertheories,Thomas's view of the primacyof
the intellectwas firstchallengedby Henry of Ghent. Disputed in 1276,
twoyearsafterAquinas'sdeath,Henry'sfirstQuodlibetcontainsa sustained
defenseof the claim that the will is a superiorpotencyto the intellect.17
Given thatpriorto Aquinas thereis no evidenceof such a questionbeing
discussed,it is reasonableto suppose that Henry's disputationis a direct
However,whereasAquinas based
responseto his Dominicanpredecessor.18
his claim that the intellectis nobler than the will on the superiority
of
an
its object alone, Henry bases his conclusionnot only on
investigation
of theirrespectiveobjects,but also of theiracts and habitsas well. This
is because, so Henry thinks,"the power whose habit,act and object are
superiorto the habit act and object of anotheris withoutqualification
superiorto that otherpower."19
is supeFirst,accordingto Henry,the habit of the will,charity(caritas),
riorto the habit of the intellect,wisdom(.sapientia
because
),
throughcharwe
at
a
arrive
love
of
God
and
does
not explain,
ity
neighbour.Henry
on philosophicalgrounds,whylove of God shouldbe superiorto the wisdom throughwhichwe contemplateGod and "thingseternal."20
Because
15Ibid.,ad 2: "Dicendum
ettempore,
estimperquodilludquodestpriusgeneratione
et imperfectio
fectius;
actum,
quiain unoeodemque
potentia
tempore
praecedit
perfectionem.
Sed illudquodestpriussimpliciter
et secundum
naturae
estperfectius;
ordinem,
sicenimactusestprior
Ethocmodointellectus
estprior
sicutmotivm
volntate,
potentia.
et activum
bonmenimintellectum
movet
voluntatem."
mobili,
passivo;
16Aquinas,
ST I-II,q. 3, a. 6, corp.
17Fordiscussions
ofthisQuodlibet
n.9),84-91;andR. Macken,
, cf.Macken1976(above,
La volont
selon
Henri
deGand
de
humaine,
, in: Recherches
facult
plusleve
quel'intelligence
ancienne
et mdivale,
42 (1975),5-51.
Thologie
18Kent1995(n.9), 102.
19Henry
ofGhent,
86: "Etdicendum
estsimQuod.
I, q. 14,in:vol.V, ed. Macken,
cuiushabitus,
actuset obiectum
alteri,
pliciter
quodillapotentia
praeminet
praeminet
actuiet obiecto
alterius."
habitui,
20Ibid.,84-85:"Etpatetassumptum
habitus
voluntatis
in
quoniam
proprius
quo fertur
bonum
actuveriamoris,
esthabitus
caritatis,
quo secundum
Augustinum
perse diligimus
inDeo etpropter
Deumetproximum
Deum.Habitus
autem
intellectus
estsapisupremus
secundum
XIVoDe Trinitate.
entia,
quaDeumetaeterna
speculamur
Augustinum
Quantum
autempraeminet
habitus
caritatis
omnihabitusapientiali
et cognitivo,
beneexprimit

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P.S. EARDLEY

thiswas a standardclaim, Henry simplyassertsit, citingas his evidence

the authorityof Augustineand St. Paul.
Having comparedintellectand will withrespectto theirhabits,Henry
proceeds to explain how it is that the act of the will, which is to love,
is superiorto thatof the intellect,which is to know. He argues thatwilling is superiorto knowingboth in comparisonto theirrespectiveacts
Central to his view that the
and insofaras theyperfecttheirsubjects.21
act of the will is superiorto thatof the intellectis the claim thatthe will
is the commandingpower,or motiveforcewithinthe soul. From Walter
of Bruges (fl. 1267-1269) he inheritsthe notionthat the will is the "universaland firstmoverin the whole kingdomof the soul."22FromAristode,
he derivesthe view thatwhatevermovesis noblerthan thatwhichundergoes motion.23It is worthpointingout that Aquinas had employedthe
.24
of the intellect
same textfromtheDe animaas evidenceforthe superiority
in
defense
of
the
voluntarist
identical
text
Given Henry'suse of this
posito avoid the conclusionthatHenryis takingdirectaim
tion,it is difficult
at Thomas here.
In comparingthe act of the will with that of the intellectinsofaras
theyperfectthe subjectsin which theyinhere,Henry employsan argument which he derivesfromDionysiusAreopagite,and which Giles of
Rome will subsequentlymake a focal point of his own theory.Because
the will is inclinedtowardthe object as it existsin reality,it transforms
itselfinto the object willed. The intellect,on the otherhand,
{transformat)
merelyapprehendsa likenessof the realitythatis known.That is, by the
whereas
act of lovingthewillis perfected
by becominglikethe objectitself,
of the thing.
in knowingthe intellectis perfectedby a mere representation
As regardsobjects such as God, it is clearlybetter,accordingto Henry,
etangelorum,
hominum
XIIIo:Si Unguis
cumcumdicitla <ad> Corinthios,
loquar
Apostolus
nonhabeam
caritatem
autem
, etc."
21Ibid.,, 85: "Quantum
actusvoluntatis
autemsupereminet
qui estveliesivediligere,
excomactuiintellectus
primo
comparatione:
patetexduplici
quiestsciresivecognoscere,
ad suumsubiectum
ex comparatione
secundo
uniusactusad alterum,
utriusque
paratione
perobiectum."
perficiendum
22Ibid.,85: "Voluntas
in totoregnoanimae,
motor
et primus
autemestuniversalis
Themetaphor
videbitur."
utinfra
omniaaliaad finem
movens
etprimus
etsuperior,
suum,
voluntarist
ofthesoulwasa common
overthe"kingdom"
forthewillas a ruler
metaphor
ofthesoul.Cf.R. Teske,
theother
tocommand
thewill'sability
usedtoillustrate
powers
intheThirteenth
over
the
Powers
TheWillasRuler
,
Century
ofanImage
oftheSoul.UsesandSources
in:Vivarium,
32 (1994),62-71.
23Ibid.ForAristode's
seeDe anima
III, 5, 430a18-19.
text,
24Aquinas,
ST I, q. 82,a. 3, ad. 2.

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ANDHUMAN
DESTINY

283

to become like God as He is in Himselfthan merelyto possess a likeness of Him in accordance withour mode of knowing.25
Aquinas, recall,
had argued similarly.Where an object is higherthan the soul, it is better to love such an object; where it is lower, it is betterto know it.
However accordingto Aquinas this relationentailsthat the will is only
higherin a certainrespect(.secundum
quid).Henry turnsthe tables against
Aquinas. He impliesthaton Aquinas's ownreasoning,if the will is higher
with respectto its act of loving God, this entailsthat it mustbe higher,
not secundum
This is because the nobiltyof a
quid, but rathersimpliciter.
is
to
power judged absolutelyaccording the absolutelyhighestobject.26
When God is the object, then,the act of lovingsuch an object mustbe
consideredhigherthan the act of knowingit.27
of theirobjects,Henry maintains
Finally,as to the relativesuperiority
that the good in generalis superiorto the true. He bases this argument
on the notionthat the object of the will, the good withoutqualification,
encompassesand includesthe object of the intellect.On thisaccount,the
true is reducibleto a relativesort of goodness,the good of the intellect.
the true is merelya particulargood that serveshappiness,
Furthermore,
which is the object of the will. The object of the intellect,on Henry's
account,is thereforesubordinateto that of the will.28
25Henry
ofGhent,
86-87:"Ex secunda
I, 14,in:vol.V, ed. Macken,
Quod.
comparatonesimiliter
actione
voluntatis
voluntas
patetintentum,
quoniam
perficitur
ipsaredilecta
utinse habetesse,quiavoluntas
inipsamrem,actione
actione
suainclinatur
autemintellects perficitur
uthabetessein intellectu,
ipseintellectus
ipsare intellecta
quiaintellects actione
suatrahit
inse ipsamremintellectam,
voluntas
autemactione
suatransfert
se
in ipsumvolitum
se uteo fruatur,
et perhoc,utdicitDionysius
4o capitulo
De
propter
divinis
actione
intellectus
sua assimilai
se reiintellectae,
voluntas
verotransnominibus,
format
se inipsum
volitum.
Cumergomulto
etaltiusesttransforman
inipsum
perfectius
bonumutin se estsecundum
suamnaturam,
quamassimilali
ipsiveroutestin intelli. . . multoperfectior
voluntatis
gentepermodum
intelligentis,
ergoet altiorestoperario
estamoretdilectio
Dei quamcognitio
eius."
quamintellectus,
quantomelior
26Ibid.,87: "Etsienimrespectu
eorumquae suntinfra
animam
e converso
contingit
actiositaltior
etnobilior
estinanimacognitio
rerum
volntate,
quodintellectus
quiaaltior
essenobiliorem
volcorporalium
quamearumamor,hocfacitsecundum
quidintellectum
autemrespectus
etcomparatio
facit
voluntatem
essesuperiorem
ntate,
primus
simpliciter
bonumet primum
verum
suntperse et primaobiectavoluntatis
et intelquiaprimum
et aliarespectu
illorum
secundario
et secundum
lectus,
quid. .
27Ibid.,88: . . simpliciter
etabsolute
melior
iudicandus
estactusvoluntatis
quamintelcumrespectu
suiprimi
obiecti
melior
estilio."
lectus,
simpliciter
28Ibid.:"Quodautemobiectum
voluntatis
obiecto
intellectus,
supereminet
patet,quia
obiectum
voluntatis
habetrationem
finis
etultimi
quodestbonumsimpliciter,
simpliciter
obiectum
autemintellectus
habetrationem
bonialicuius
ut intelfinis,
quodestverum,
et itautfinis
subfineet ordinatum
ad aliudutad ultimum
finem."
lectus,

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P.S. EARDLEY

AlthoughGiles of Rome, unlike Aquinas and Henry, supplies no ex

treatmentof whetherthe will as such is higherthan the intellect,
professo
of the formeris assertedin his Quodlibet
the superiority
III, question 18.
in
an act of the
consists
In the course of discussingwhetherbeatitude
will or the intellectGiles claims that the will is nobler than the intellect
it. The intelsince the will moves the intellectby commanding{imperando)
will
the
moves
on
the
other
hand, merely[solum)
lect,
by "showing"(<osten
the higher(altior)power,according
it the end. The will is therefore
derido)
to Giles, because it commands the otherpotenciesof the soul.29Henry
of Ghent had employed an identicalargumentin supportof the view
that the act of the will is betterthan that of the intellectsince the will
is the rulerof the kingdomof the soul.
The superiorityof the will is furtherimplied in Giles's Quodlibet
V,
is
to
united
rational
creature
the
whether
addresses
which
question 5,
Giles
Here
the
act
of
or
act
of
the
more
God
knowing.30
loving
through
between
address the issue of the relativesuperiority
does not specifically
intellectand will. Still,his view of the mattercan be inferredfromhis
answerto the question,in which he treatsthe relativeperfectionof the
actsof intellectand will.
Now whileit is truethatGiles is not concernedhere to settlethe question of which power is higher,he nonethelessshows littlehesitationin
adjudicatingwhich act, love or knowledge,achieves union with God in
the "betterand greater"( potioret maior)way. That love unitesus more
to God than knowingis assertedimmediately,and is mainlygrounded
in the two standard authorities:Dionysius Areopagite and Hugh of
nominibus
St. Victor.Relyingon chapterfourof theDe divinis
, whichasserts
God achieves
love
of
how
the
thatlove is a unitiveforce,Giles explains
greaterunion with God forthe agent than does intellection.

29Gilesof Rome,Quod.Ill, q. 18,in:Aegidii

Romani
Columnae
, ed. P. de
Quodlibets
am Main1966,193: . . dicendum
Louvain1646;repr.Frankfurt
quodintelConinck,
Sed
ostendendo.
sedsolumei finem
voluntatem
necmoveat
lects necdirigat
imperando,
et
voluntad
subiecta
sunt
nostra
et
omnia
intellectum
movet
voluntas
opera
imperando,
sitaltior
Ideoex hocnonhabetur
eiusimperio.
quamvoluntas,
potentia
quodintellectus
onthe
andGiles
Thomas
See also,P.S. Eardley,
imomagiseste contrario."
ofRome
Aquinas
in
56 (2003),835-62and TheFoundations
Will
ofFreedom
, in:The ReviewofMetaphysics
of
oftheHistory
andHis Contemporaries
Giles
Medieval
Later
, in:Journal
ofRome
Philosophy:
Philosophy
(forthcoming).
30GilesofRome,Quod.
rationalis
creatura
276:"Utrum
V, q. 5, in:ed. De Coninck,
Deo
uniatur
amare,
quamintelligere."
per
magis

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ANDHUMAN
DESTINY

285

Intellectionis inferiorto lovingbecause it merelyperfectsthe intellect.

Love, by contrast,perfectsthe entireagent, or "lover" (amans),since it
him into the beloved object itself.
transforms
When the intellect"desires"
(imit)the presenceof the intelligibleobject thisis forthe sake of its own
This is not true of love, for "the lover,such as he is, does
perfection.31
not will the presence of the beloved only on account of love itself,but
indeed for the sake of the beloved thingitself,to which,as far as he is
Giles goes so far as to add approvingly
able, he wills to join himself."32
that love, when it has God as its object, permitsa sort of self-transcendence to occur, for "divine love, which is to say the love by which we
love God, causes extasy(extasim),
thatis, places loversbeyondthemselves."33
Giles marshals two furtherargumentsto support the position that
union throughloving is betterthan union throughknowing.First,if it
is true that even in heaven we will know God as he is in us, but will
love him as he is in himself,it followsthat union to God throughintellection will occur in a merelyhuman manner. Union throughloving,
however,will occur in a divine one. Because it is betterto be unitedto
God as he is in himselfratherthan as he is in us, i.e., as a mere likeness, it is necessaryto conclude that union throughlove is betterthan
union throughknowing.34
Giles's second argumentrelieson the standarddistinction
betweenpriin
in
versus
It
asserts
that
while
the informority origin
priority perfection.
ing principlemay be temporallyprior to the formedobject, it is often
31Ibid.,277:"Si ergointellectus,
secundum
vultpraesentiam
intelliquodhuiusmodi,
hocestpropter
utquiaforte
nonpotest
id intelligere
gibilis,
ipsamintellectionem,
plene
nisiperpraesentiam
eius."
32Ibid.:". . . sedamans,
secundum
nonvultpraesentiam
amatisolum
quodhuiusmodi,
enimveropropter
vult
cui,quantum
propter
ipsumamorem,
ipsamremamatam
potest,
se coniungere;
velletseipsam
in ipsam
imo,secundum
quodhuiusmodi
quantum
posset,
transformare.
amoriapproprientur,
utpatetper
Ideoqueestquodunireet transformare
4. cap.De divinis
recitante
verbaHierochea,
nominibus,
Dionysium,
'quodomnisamor
estquaedam
virtus
unitiva'
..."
33Ibid.:"Divinus
id
Deum,estfaciens
extasim,
ergoamor,id estamorquo diligimus
estponensamantes
extraseipsos,
nonpermittens
eos amaresiveipsosamantes
essesui
sedfaciteosesseamantes
id est,rerum
amatarum."
amatorum,
ipsorum,
34Ibid.,278:"Namsi Deusetiamin patriaintelligetur
secundum
quoderitin nobis,
et diligetur
a nobisut estin seipso,consequens
estquodperintelligere
uniemur
Deo
secundum
modum
sedperdiligere
uniemur
ei
nostrum,
quoderitin nobis,et secundum
utestin seipso,
etsecundum
modum
divinum.
Et quiaunioad Deumsecundum
modum
divinum
estmulto
etmaiorquamunioad ipsum
secundum
modum
connostrum,
potior
estquodunioperamorem
eritpotior
et maiorquamunioperintelligere."
sequens

11:14:57 AM

286

P.S. EARDLEY

the case that the latteris priorin perfection.For instance,althoughthe

seed is priorto the flowerin origin,the floweritselfhas priorityin perfection.This principleapplies equally to the relationbetween knowing
and loving.Giles, like all thinkersof the period,voluntaristand intellectualistalike, concedes that we must know an object beforewe can love
the act of the intellectmustbe consideredpriorin origin.
it. Accordingly,
union
However,
throughknowingis merelyinchoate;it achieves perfection,accordingto Giles, only once the knownobject is loved. On Giles's
account, then, union throughlove is more perfect,since it has priority
in perfection.35
Giles of Rome's solutionto whetherrationalagentsare unitedto God
morethroughthe act of lovingthanthroughknowingexhibitsunmistakable
with,and possiblyeven relianceon Henry of Ghent,particularly
affinity
his conclusionthat lovingis betterthan knowingsince it unitesus more
V, question 5, also shows
closelyto God. On the other hand, Quodlibet
For one thing,in this Quodlibet Giles focusesexcluseveraldifferences.
the
acts
of
the will and the intellect;for another,his concern
on
sively
withthe relationof these acts to God. Henry,by contrast,had
is strictly
compared the will and the intellectin termsnot only of theiracts, but
of theirhabits and objects as well. Moreover,Henry did not restricthis
to the relationof the respectiveacts to God, but also cominvestigation
in
relationto one another.
them
pared
The crucial
The foregoing,of course,are relativelyminordifferences.
point is Giles's defenseof the idea that love, which is an act of the will,
unitesthe rationalcreatureto God more closelythan knowledge,which
is an act of the intellect.Implied in this argumentis the notionthat the
will is superiorto the intellect,a claim that Giles had made explicidy,as
we saw, in Quodlibet
III, question 18.
35Ibid.:"Namea quae suntprioraorigine
Undeet Aug.
suntposteriora
perfectione.
flos
et tempore
Namorigine
et priuselectione.
interpriusorigine
12. Conf.Distinguit
et
ibidem
eumdem
florem.
Sic etiamsecundum
verofructus
electione
fructum,
praecedit
forminforme
saltem
in pluribus
aliislocis,etsinontempore,
praecedit
semper
origine,
informe.
Eo
formtm
et perfectione
praecedit
tm;nullitamendubium
quodelectione
aliud
unumpraecedat
et amandinostrum,
modum
intelligendi
ergoipsoquodsecundum
estobiectum
hocest,quodintelligere
amare,
quiabonumapprehensum
praecedit
origine
et
sitpotior
estquodunioperamorem
in 3. De anima.Consequens
utdicitur
voluntatis,
unio
et amare,sedhuiusmodi
reiperintelligere
ergomodouniemur
Utroque
perfection
unioperintelsed in amoreconsummatur;
in intelligendo
inchoatur,
praecedit
origine
estergounioperamorem,
unioperamare.Potior
sedperfectione
quam
praecedit
ligere,
estpotius
sicutconsummatum
quaminchoatum."
perintelligere,

11:14:57 AM

DESTINY
ANDHUMAN
CONCEPTIONS
OF HAPPINESS

287

The ScopeandNatureofHappiness
Does happinessconsist,then,in an act of the intellector an act of the
will? Does it consist chieflyor essentiallyin the contemplationof the
such as Aquinas
divine essence, or in the love of God? Intellectualists
claimed thatthe finalend forhumans consistedessentiallyin the beatific
vision,althoughtheyacknowledgedGod's role as the object of beatitude.
Voluntariststypicallyargued, as we've indicated,that love of God was
the finalend of rationalagents.John Peckham,forexample,argued this,
as we saw above.36Richard of Middleton(ca. 1249-1300),anotherpromiof the period,took a more measuredapproach. Although
nentvoluntarist
Richard stressesthe priorityof the will in human action, happinessfor
him nonethelessconsistsin a certaincooperationbetween the will and
Whateverone's emphasis,most theologiansof the period,
the intellect.37
in stressing
as Wielandhas correctly
noted,followedAristotle
self-perfection
as the final destinyof human beings.38That is, they located happiness
primarilyin human activity,whetherof the intellect,the will,or a combinationof the two.
Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome, at least in the latter'smature
works,stand out by theirlack of willingnessto "baptize" Aristotleon the
questionof the finaldestinyof human beings.Instead,theylooked to the
older, mysticaltraditionof Dionysius Areopagite as a primarysource.
as the final end of human
That is, ratherthan stressingself-perfection
or exstacy.Accordingly,
theylocated
beings,theystressedself-transcendence
in
will
and
the intelwho
is
the
of
the
God,
object
happinessprimarily
Giles
endorses
lect. As we shall see presently,
Henry's
although
ultimately
view of thefinaldestinyof humanbeingsin the matureQuodlibetal
,
Questions
the influenceof Aquinas is undeniable. To appreciate the reasons for
which Giles incorporatesthe thomisticview into his own formof voluntarism,it is necessaryto turnto Thomas's and Henry's theoriesfirst.

36See note8 above.

37Richard
ofMiddleton,
Sent.
libros
Sententiarum,
IV, d. 49, a. 1, q. 6, in:Super
quatuor
4 vols.,Brescia1591[repr.
Frankfurt
amMain1963],vol.IV, 652:"Videtur
mihidicenin actuintellectus
dumquodbeatitudo
consistit
et voluntatis
cuiusratioestquia
simul,
in perfecta
essebeatitudinis
vitaehumanae
consistit
unioneanimaerationalis
cumDeo.
Haecautemunioincludit
animaeunionem
cumDeo secundum
omnem
suipotentiam
...
On Richard's
<id> estintellectus
etvoluntas."
seeKent1995(n.9), 138-40.
voluntarism,
38See note3 above.

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P.S. EARDLEY

On Aquinas's account, beatitudo

is the universalend or "perfectgood
It is also the object of the will.Because
thatwhollybringsdesireto rest."39
the object of the will is universal,it cannot be completelysatisfiedwith
any created good since such objects are by definitionlimited.Such an
account, of course, necessarilyexcludes goods such as pleasure,wealth,
power and honors frombeing identifiedwith the finedend, for if some
good is reallyto bringdesireto rest,it mustbe infinite.
Aquinas identifies
such an object with God.40
Having associated the source of human happinesswith God, who is
obviouslyoutside of the created soul, what then does Thomas make of
is an activity
of the soul? For
Aristotle'sclaim that happiness(eaijiovoc)
Aristode,the sourceof humanhappinessis not some externalgood; rather,
it is associated with an internaloperationof the soul {EN 1098a16-18).
Indeed, Aristodeexplicitlydismissedthe notion that happiness can be
of happiness
externalto the soul in rejectingthe Platonic identification
withthe subsistentForm of the Good {EN 1096b31-34).Aquinas is aware
of the discrepancybetweenhis account of happinessand Aristotle's,and
takes pains to ensure that he does not entirelydeviate fromthe latter.
he distinguishes
betweenhappinessas "created" and happiAccordingly,
ness as "uncreated,"a distinctionhe inheritedfromWilliam of Auxerre
{ca. 1140/50-123 1).41
39Aquinas,
ofbeatitude,
ST I-II,q. 2, a. 8, corp.ForAquinas's
see,
understanding
Reason
andHuman
ontheTwofold
Human
Good.
D. Bradley,
treatment's
Aquinas
amongother
A. Celano,TheConcept
D.C. 1997,369-423;
inAquinas's
Moral
Science
, Washington,
Happiness
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
Beatitude
intheWritings
, in:Journal
ofThomas
Aquinas
ofWorldly
and
onAristotelian
in:S. MacDonald
25 (1987),215-26;andA. Kenny,
Happinessi
Aquinas
MoralTheory.
inHonour
E. Stump
Kretzmann
, Cornell
1998,
ofNorman
(eds),Aquinas's
Essay's
15-27.
40Ibid.:"Respondeo
hominis
esseinaliquo
estbeatitudinem
dicendum
quodimpossibile
alioBeatitudo
enimestbonum
bonocreato.
quietat
appetitum;
quodtotaliter
perfectum,
Obiectum
autemvolsi adhucrestaret
finis,
aliquidappetendum.
quinnonessetultimus
intellectus
est
sicutobiectum
estuniversale
bonum;
humanus,
untatis,
quaeestappetitus
nisibonum
voluntatem
Ex quopatetquodnihilpotest
universale
verum.
hominis,
quietare
in aliquocreato,
sedsolumin Deo, quiaomniscreatura
universale.
Quodnoninvenitur
secunhominis
UndesolusDeusvoluntatem
habetbonitatem
implere
potest;
participatam.
Deo
etc.In soloigitur
inbonisdesiderium'
in PsalmoCil: 'Qui replet
dumquoddicitur
hominis
consistit."
beatitudo
41William
Summa
Altissiodorensis
Guillelmi
Summa
aurea
ofAuxerre,
, III, tr.20,in:Magisti
'Deusdilig663:"Tamendicimus
Rome1980-87,
aurea
, ed.J.Ribailler,
quodcumdicitur
connotat
divinam
iturquia bonus,'haecdictio'bonus'praeter
essentiam,
quamsignt,
vel beatitudinem
vel dilectionem
suavitatem
scilicet
creatam,
quae est
aliquidcreatum,
1981
Cf.alsoWieland
inquoquiescitur."
estfinis
inDeo; Deusautem
finis
quoquiescitur
(n. 3),675.

11:14:57 AM

OF HAPPINESS
ANDHUMAN
CONCEPTIONS
DESTINY

289

Now according to Aquinas, the term "end" {finis)has a twofold

It can representeitherthe externalobject towardwhich the
signification.
rationalagent is striving,
or it can signifythe possessionof the appetible
object. In the firstsense, the finalend refersto God, the infiniteobject
thatfulfills
all human aspirations.In the second sense,it signifies
an activof
the
human
soul.
Insofar
as
the
final
end
God
as the
ity
represents
source of happiness,it is uncreated.Insofaras it signifiesthe subjective
attainmentof God, however,it refersto human, and thereforecreated
In identifying
the source of happinesswith God as an uncreactivity.42
ated object, Aquinas remainstrue to the Christiantheologicaltradition;
in associatingcreatedhappinesswithan activityof the soul, on the other
hand, Aquinas is faithfulto Aristotle.
Having seen thatuncreatedhappinessconsistsin God who is the objectiveend of rationalbeings,and havingestablishedthatcreatedhappiness
is an activityof the soul, Aquinas proceeds to address the question of
whetherthe latterconsistsessentially(essentialiter)
in an act of the will or
the intellect.He concludes that uncreatedhappiness consistsessentially
in an act of the intellect.43
Now it is impossible,on Thomas's account, that beatitudeconsistin
an act of the will. Happiness is definedas the attainmentof the ultimate
end. Will, however,is merelyan inclinationtowards the ultimateend
when it is absent,and an enjoymentof it when present.That is, in relation to the finalend the will acts in one of two ways: it is eithermerely
an inclinationtoward
or a delightin perfectiononce achieved.
perfection,
In neithercase does it compriseperfectionitself,and thereforecannot
constitutehappiness.44
42Aquinas,
ST I-II,q. 3, a. 1, corp.:". . .finisdicitur
Unomodo,ipsares
dupliciter.
sicutavaroestfinis
Aliomodo,ipsaadeptio
velpossesquamcupimus
adipisci,
pecunia.
eiusreiquaedesideratur;
sicutsi dicatur
sio,seuususautfruitio
quodpossessio
pecuniae
estfinis
etfrui
revoluptuosa
estfinis
Primo
hominis
avari,
intemperati.
ergomodo,ultimus
finis
estbonumincreatum,
scilicet
bonitate
voluntatem
Deus,qui solussuainfinita
potest
hominis
Secundo
autemmodo,ultimus
finis
hominis
estcreatum
perfecte
implere.
aliquid
in ipsoexistens,
velfruitio
finis
ultimi.
Ultimus
autem
quodnihilestaliudquamadeptio
finis
vocatur
beatitudo.
Si ergobeatitudo
hominis
consideretur
ad causamvel
quantum
sicestaliquidincreatum;
si autemconsideretur
ad ipsamessentiam
obiectum,
quantum
sicestaliquidcreatum."
beatitudinis,
43Ibid.,q. 3, a. 4, corp.
44Ibid.,:"Dicoergoquodquantum
ad id quodestessentialiter
ipsabeatitudo,
impossibileestquodconsistt
in actuvoluntatis.
Manifestum
estenimex praemissis
quodbeatitudoestconsecutio
finis
ultimi.
Consecutio
autem
nonconsistit
inipsoactuvoluntatis.
finis
Voluntas
autemfertur
infinem
etabsentem,
cumipsum
etpraesentem,
cumin
desiderat;

11:14:57 AM

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P.S. EARDLEY

It would be inaccurate to conclude fromthis that Aquinas entirely

excludesthe will fromthe activityof createdhappiness.He acknowledges
that once the intellectattainsthe essence of God in the beatificvision,
the glorifiedsoul will experiencewhat he calls delight(<dekctatio
).45Aquinas
even acknowledgesthat such an act of the will accompanies the beatific
vision.46Still,he is emphaticin rejectingthe notionthatthe will can play
an essential
role in happiness.Instead,he assignsit merelyan accidental,
secondaryrole.47Created happinessforAquinas, then,essentiallyconsists
in the beatificvision,which is an act of the intellect.Only when rational creaturesknow the essence of God will theirdesirescome to restand
theirintellectsbe fullyperfected.48
In his Summaquaestonum
ordinarium
(1275-93)Henryof Ghentchallenged
the thomisticunderstanding
of beatitude.He took issue withAquinas on
two counts: (1) for claimingthat happiness consists,at least pardy, in
delectatur.
Manifestum
estautemquodipsumdesiderium
finisnonest
ipsorequiescens
consecutio
sedestmotum
ad finem.
Delectado
autemadvenit
voluntad
ex hocquod
finis,
ex hocaliquidfitpraesens,
delecfinis
estpraesens;
nonauteme converso
quiavoluntas
taturin ipso.Oportet
perquodfitfinis
igitur
aliquidaliudessequamactumvoluntatis,
in actuintellectus
consistit
..."
voluntati
. . . Sic igitur
essentia
beatitudinis
ipsepraesens
45Foran extensive
ofmedieval
theories
ofthebeatific
vision,
included,
study
Aquinas's
XII,
desdisputes
sa dfinition
cf.Christian
Trottmann's
La vision
scolastiques
parBenot
batifique
Rome1995.
46Aquinas,
ST I-II,q. 4,a. 1,corp.:"Respondeo
dicendum
requirquadrupliciter
aliquid
ad ipsum,
iturad aliud.Uno modo,sicutpraeambulum
velpraeparatorium
sicutdiscisicutanimarequiritur
ad
ad scientiam.
Aliomodo,sicutperficiens
aliquid,
plinarequiritur
sicutanimarequiritur
ad aliqTertiomodo,sicutcoadiuvans
vitam
extrinsecus,
corporis.
utsidicamus
uidagendum.
Quartomodo,sicutaliquidconcomitans,
quodcalorrequiritur
ad beatitudinem.
Delectado
enimcausatur
ad ignem.
Et hocmododelectatio
requiritur
nihilaliudsitquam
inbonoadepto.
Undecumbeatitudo
exhocquodappetitus
requiescit
essebeatitudo
sinedelectatione
concomitante."
summi
boni,nonpotest
adeptio
47Ibid.,q. 4, a. 2, corp.:"Sedsi quisdiligenter
ex necessitate
consideret,
oportet
quod
in
Delectatio
enimconsistit
intellectus,
quae estvisio,sitpotiordelectatione.
operatio
in aliquoquietatur,
nonestnisi
voluntatis.
Quod autemvoluntas
quadamquietatione
in aliquaoperatione,
Si ergovoluntas
bonitatem
eiusin quo quietatur.
quietatur
propter
Necvoluntas
bonum
ex bonitate
voluntatis.
propter
quietatio
quaerit
operationis
procedit
Sedideo
sicenimipseactusvoluntatis
essetfinis,
quodestcontra
praemissa.
quietationem:
inoperatione,
eius.Undemanifestum
est
estbonum
quiaoperatio
quaerit
quodquietetur
in qua quietatur
volbonum
estipsaoperatio
voluntas,
quamquietatio
quodprincipalius
in ipso."
untatis
48Ibid.,q. 3, a. 8, corp.:"Si igitur
alicuius
essentiam
intellectus
humanus,
cognoscens
eiusattingit
noncognoscat
de Deo nisian est;nondum
effectus
creati,
perfectio
simpliciter
desiderium
causam.Unde
sedremanet
ei adhucnaturale
ad causamprimam,
inquirendi
beatitudinem
estperfecte
beatus.
Ad perfectam
nondum
requiritur
quodintellectus
igitur
suamhabebit
causae.Etsicperfectionem
ad ipsamessentiam
perunionem
primae
pertingat
hominis
..."
in quo solobeatitudo
consistit
ad Deumsicutad obiectum,

11:14:57 AM

DESTINY
ANDHUMAN
OF HAPPINESS
CONCEPTIONS

291

human activity,and (2) for excludingthe will fromthe attainmentof

beatitudeby assigningit a merelyaccidentalrole.49
Henry of Ghent is firstand foremostopposed to the thomisticimplication that man can contributeto his own salvation.50He accordingly
rejectsthe claim that happinessconsistsessentiallyin an activityof the
soul, intellectualor otherwise.He suggeststhatwhile it is understandable
that happiness should be denominatedas an activityby some, this is
nonethelessinaccurate.On Henry'sview, it is not the act of the intellect
or even that of the will that constitutesthe happiness of the blessed;
rather,it is God, who is the ultimateend. The source of beatitudethereforeconsistsprincipally( pncipaliter
), so Henrythinks,in the object of the
will and the intellectratherthan in any of theiracts.51
Recall that Thomas, like Henry, had associated the source of beatitude with God. However, Aquinas also attemptedto remain true to
ofthesoul,specifically
Aristotle's
claimthathappinessconsistedin an activity
in the perfectionof the intellect.Thomas thereforeposited a twofold
aspectto the finalend: God, who is the object of the will,and the human
subjectiveresponseto thisobject, or the beatificvision.He termedthese
two aspects created and uncreatedhappiness,respectively.
Henryof Ghentresistssuch an incorporationof Aristotleinto Christian
conceptionsof beatitude.To claim that happinessconsistsin an activity
of the soul, for Henry,is to argue that acts can be equivalentto ends.
Henry here adopts the argumentthat Aquinas had used to exclude the
beatitudeand, as it were,turnsit against
act of the will fromconstituting
him.That is,whileThomas had exludedtheact of thewillfromcomprising
happiness on the grounds that it is merelya means toward the end,
49Fordiscussions
orAct
ActoftheIntellect
ofbeatitude,
seeA. Celano,
ofHenry's
theory
in the13thandEarly
IdeaofHuman
Perfection
ofAristotle's
Reception
oftheWill.TheCritical
et Littraire
du MoyenAge,57 (1990),
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
14thCenturies
, in:Archives
deGante
La vision
deDiossegn
andJ.RoviraBelloso,
1960,113-53.
, Barcelona
103-09;
Enrique
50Celano1990,108.
51HenryofGhent,
a
ordinarium
Summa
(= SQO),a. 49, q. 5, in: Henricus
quaestionum
Ordinariarum
Summa
, ed. Badius,Paris1520[repr.St.Bonaventure,
Gandavo,
Quaestionum
denominali
beatus
in proposito
N.Y.,1953],fol.37rO-P:"Quarequamvis
aliquidpotest
illaoperatione,
infinem
etab ipsofinequemadipiscitur
etab operatione
quia
qua tendit
ab ilioquodprincipaliter
intendenominatur
beatustamquam
tarnen
a fineprincipaliter
finem
et ita secundario,
ab ilioquodintendit
dit,et ab operatione
tamquam
propter
- quia si praescribatur
finisa substantia
scilicet
actionis,
ipsofinisadipiscitur
inquantum
- cumquaeritur
illamposset
dicibeatus
absolute
nonpropter
quidsitilluda quo istedicin finem,
eiusquodtendit
iturbeatus,
etsiquoquemodobenedicitur
quodsitoperario
obiectum."
melius
tarnen
dicitur
siveoperationis
quodsitipsefinis

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P.S. EARDLEY

Henry argues that by thisreasoningthe act of the intellectmustalso be

excluded fromcomprisingbeatitude.52
Both the act of love and the act
of knowingare interiorends toward the exteriorend that is God. For
Henry,theyare "ends under an end," {finessubfine)or means towardthe
ultimateend of being unitedwithGod.53The questionnow becomes,for
Put otherwise,
Henry,whichact accomplishessucha goal mostefficaciously.
is
that
our
end
which
instrumental
God,
activitywill get us
assuming
closestto union withthe divine:the act of loving,or the act of knowing?
Unsurprisingly
Henry concludesthatit is an act of the will thatunites
the rational soul more closelyto God than an act of the intellect.He
offersthreereasonsforthis.First,the will is the more activepotency,for
while it transfers
itselfto the object "by means of its own action" {sua
actione
sdpsamtransfer
e)^ the intellectcan only elicitan act of understandonce
it
has
ing
passivelyreceivedthe formof the object.54Second, the
intellectmerelyunites itselfto God as if to an assimilatingform.The
will,by contrast,unitesitselfto God as to an "end" {finis)and a "good"
{bonum)
throughan act of love. Because love has the power to transform
52Ibid.,fol.37rP:"Sic ergooperatio
siveintellectus
sivevoluntatis
nonpotestesse
ultimus
finis
eiussecundum
utideonullomodopotest
inipsaprinsumitur,
quodpraecise
consistere
utaperte
iampatebit."
fol.40vG:"Eo
beatitudo,
Ibid.,in:ed. Badius,
cipaliter
estfinis
ultimus
et primum
obiectum
voluntatis
et intellectus
et per
ipsoquodbeatitudo
hoc principium
omnium
actionum
et operationum
sunttamquam
quae in beatitudine
in finem,
quaedamordinata
igitur
nequeactusintellectus
nequeactusvoluntatis
possunt
esseessentialis
beatitudo
beatusnecpertinet
ad ipsamut
quae debetessefinisultimus
obiectum
in quo consistit.
intellectum
autvolitum
Nectamensequitur
ex hocquodnon
ad ipsamut actuseius,perquemattingit
finem
iliumut obiectum
beatificans.
pertinet
Vanumestergoquodaliquinituntur
excludere
actumvoluntatis
a beatitudine,
quianon
volitum.
Eademenimratione
excluditur
actusintellectus,
potestesseprimum
quia nec
esseprimum
intellectum
autvolitum."
potest
53Ibid.,a. 49, q. 6, in: ed. Badius,fol.40vH:"Nonpossunt
essefinesultimi
... Si
utiliasittamquam
finis
subfine.
ergoin ipsisconsistt
aliquaratiobeatitudinis
oportet
Actioautemveloperatio,
nonestsicutfinis
subfinenisiquiaestsicutfinis
interior
conexteriori
velsecundum
beatitudinem
rem,velsecundum
rationem,
tingens
primum
propter
secundum
beatitudinem
Dei."
creaturarum,
propter
54Ibid.,fol.42rO-P:"Finisilleseipsum
inintellectum
facit
creatum
... etperhocquod
inintellectu,
veriexistit
ex intellectu
finis
subratione
ipseintellectus,
quasiunumexistens
in intelligibili,
ex intellectu
elicitactumintelligendi
perintelligibile
tamquam
performale
ineo,utordine
existit
illudinintellectu
existens
principium
quodamrationis
quasiprimo
. . . Econverso
sicutforma
et quasisecundo
elicitur
ex intellectu
actusintelligendi
autem
in actione
voluntatis.
Voluntas
enimprimoallectasuaactione
transfert
contingit
seipsam
in ipsumobiectum
in intellectu,
et peractumsuumfacitquodillud
sibipraesens,
primo
in intellectu,
idemsitsibipraesens
verius
secundo,
quamsitsibiautintellectui
praesens
finis
in ipsavolntate
maximesub ratione
et veriusexistens
quamin ipsointellectu
beatifican
tis,utiampatebit."

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ANDHUMAN
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293

and convertthe loverinto the beloved,such an act unitesus more closely

to God, who is our end, than that of the intellect.55
Finally,a thingis
to
it
when
its
perfectedmore,according Henry,
possesses object underthe
aspect of the good than when it does so it under the aspect of the true.56
Centralto Henry'sinsistencethatthe willunitesus to God more nearly
thanthe intellectis DionysiusAreopagite'sidea that"love, whetherdivine
or angelic, intellectual,animal or natural,is a certainunitiveand continuativepower."57Perfectbeatitude,in a subjectivesense,consistsin the
will, by its own act of love, convertingitselfto the known good. After
thisinitialact of desire,a "nobler" and "more perfect"act of the will is
) itselfon the end,
engendered by which the will impresses (imprimit
"immersesitselfin it, adheresto it, and enjoysit."58For Henryof Ghent,
what he calls "divineexstaticlove" (<exsta
the act of love, and particularly
ticusdivinusamor),allows the lover to become, as it were, the beloved.59
When God is the objectof such love Henryarguesthatthe agentbecomes
God-likethrougha certainparticipation.He followsDionysiusAreopagite
in referingto such a process as "deification"(deificatici).60
55Ibid.,fol.42rP:"Exquosequitur
uniatur
secunda
differentia:
quodlicetilludultimum
licet
ad ipsum,
intellectus
intellectui
et pertingat
atqueipsumadipiscatur,
quodammodo
in divino
intelintellectui
creatovelnaturaliter
nonactione
sua,sedipsoseipsoillabendo
eidem
etunitur
voluntas
suaoperatione,
tarnen
illudadipiscitur
lect existendo
perfectius
nonunitur
uniatseipsum;
iliocooperante,
seipsonisiut
quiaintellectui
quamintellectui
inipso,etassimilans
noninhaerens,
sedexpressa
intellectus
forma
quodammodo
quaedam
secundum
secundum
actumestintellecta
secundum
sibiintellectum,
quod intellectus
sedutfinietbono,quasi
. . . Voluntas
autemunitse illi,nonutformae
actum
assimilanti,
sivetransformando
et
sese,vi amoris,
peractumsuum,in illudquasitransubstantiando,
vimquamdam
conconvertendo.
Amorenimsiveactusamoris,
qui estactusvoluntatis,
in amatum
. . ."
versivam
habetamantis
56Ibid.,fol.42rP:"Exquosequitur
resactione
tertia
differentia,
perficiatur
quodmagis
bonietfinis
ultimum
sibiobiectum
subratione
voluntatis
quamactione
qua habetbonum
veriet formae."
subratione
intellectus
qua habetipsumobiectum
57Henryof Ghent,
Omnia.
Summa
de Gandavo
,Opera
SQO,a. 46, q. 3, in: Henricus
ed. L. Hdl,Leuven1991,145.
art.xxxi-xxxiv,
Ordinariarum,
Quaestionum
58Henry
ex
fol.43rS:"Ex ipsotamquam
ofGhent,
SQO, a. 49,q. 6, in:ed. Badius,
convertit
in volntate:
emanat
bonocognito
actusamatorius
desiderio,
quo,iamcessante
et immeret nobiliori,
se in ipsumalteroactuvoluntatis
perfection
quo se finiimprimit,
In quo perfectio
consistit."
beatitudinis
et ipsofruitur.
gitatqueinhaeret
59Henry
divinus
ofGhent,
SQO, a. 46,q. 4, in:ed. Hdl,154:"Estautemexstaticus
esseamantes
sedamandorum,
utscilicet
amansnonmaneat
amor,nonsinens
ipse
seipsos
Paulus:
secundum
sedfiatquodammodo
amans,
perilludquoddicit
ipseamatus
quoddeclarai
et mente
dicens:
Ut vereamator
'Vivoego;iamnonego,vivetautemin meChristus,'
sedamativitamutnimis
dilectissimam."
excedens
sicinquit
Deo, nonipsamsuivivens
60HenryofGhent,
illam
SQO, a. 49, q. 6, in:ed. Badius,fol.42vQj"Undepropter
inquo consistit
identitatem
cumfineultimo
beatitudinis,
perfectio
quiDeusest,tamquam

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The carefulreader will notice that at root there is a very different

of human destinyforHenrythanforThomas. For Thomas
understanding
the goal of human lifeis the perfectionof the selfby means of the intellect. For Henry,by contrast,the goal is not the perfectionof the selfbut
a sortof (<quodammodo
of the selfinto God, which occurs by
) transference
an autonomousconversionof the will.61
Henry understandsthe final end for rational agents,then, to consist
principallyin God. The acts of the will and the intellectcertainlycontributeto beatitude,but they do not constituteit, for they are merely
means towardunion with God, which is the end towardwhich rational
agents are striving.There is, then, a sort of hierarchywith respectto
beatitude.At the summitis God, in union with whom beatitudeessentiallyconsists.Afterthisfollowacts of the will and the intellect,the former of which is nobler than the latterbecause the act of love joins the
rationalagent to God more nearlythan the act of knowledgeby transformingthe lover into the beloved.62Aquinas, by contrast,sees no such
hierarchy:both God and the intellectare essentialpartnersin the final
end forman. But the chiefpoint to bear in mind is that,unlikeThomas
forwhom the finalend consistsin perfectionof the self,for Henry the
finalend is characterizedby an immersionof the selfin God by means
of love.
Giles of Rome's understandingof the will's contributionto beatitude
evolved over the course of his career. In his early commentaryon the
dicitBoetius
licetparticipadeitatis,
quodomnisbeatusestDeus,et hocperessentiam
tive. . . Quodbeneexprimit
cumdicitDe eccl.
hier.
estad Deum
I, 3: 'Deificatio
Dionysius
"
sicutestpossibile
assimilado
et unido.'
61Ibid.,a. 48, q. 2, in: ed. Badius,fol.30vL:"Magisautemperficitur
in
voluntas
Deo actusuotransferendo
se in ipsum,
quamrecipiendo
ipsumin se,eo quodtransferendoseinDeumsubratione
boniperactum
convertitur
inipsum
voluntatis,
quodammodo
secundum
Celanomakestheobservation
thatthegoal,for
quodhabetessein ipsum."
is an overcoming
ofhumannature
rather
thanself-perfection.
Cf.Celano1990
Henry,
(n.49),109.
62Ibid.,in:ed. Badius,
fol.30vL-M:
"Amor
estvirtus
conenim,
quiestratiovolendi,
versiva
et unitiva
transformans
amantem
in amatum
. . . Recipiendo
autemin se Deum
subratione
veriperactum
assimilatur
intellectus
intellecto
secunintellectus,
quodammodo
dumquodhabetintellectum
essein ipsointelligente.
Notitia
enimquae estratiointellinonestnisivirtus
assimilativa.
Maiusautemetnoblius
indeumetfieri
estconverti
gendi,
unumquodammodo
cumipsosecundum
quodhabetessein seipsoquamassimilali
quodammodo
Idcircodicendum
in
estquodsimpliciter
ipsisecundum
quodestintelligente.
volente
etintelligente
deumnobilior
etprincipalior
estvoluntas
etactusvolendi
quocumque
et actusintelligendi.
Et sicpropter
idemdicendum
estquodsimpliciter
quamintellectus
etabsolute
estvoluntas
seuactusvolendi
seuactusintelligendi."
principalior
quamintellectus

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Sentences
, for instance,he maintainsthat beatitudeconsistsin an act of
the will, thus evidentlysiding with voluntaristssuch as John Peckham
Questions
, on the otherhand, he
againstAquinas. In the later Quodlibetal
resemblesHenryof Ghent's,
presentsa theorythat,althoughit ultimately
nonethelesstakes certainprinciplesfromAquinas.
The firstof Giles's discussionson the will's contributionto beatitude
can be foundin his commentaryon book IV of the Sentences
, the reportatio
ofwhichhas been dated by ConcettaLuna to 1269.63Here Giles rehearses
what he takes to be the intellectualist
position,or the position of the
in oppositionto it.
and
defines
himself
),
"philosophers"(philosophi
He explains that beatitudehas a double component:one that is outside of the self,and one that is within.The firstis identifiedwith God,
and the second with an act of the blessed by which we are united to
God. The troublewiththe "philosophers"(philosophi
) is thattheylimited
theirinvestigations
about the final end for man to naturalphenomena.
him as
They excluded God fromtheirtheoriesand so could not identify
the object of beatitude.Accordingly,theymistakenlybelieved that beatitude had to consistin the perfectionof somethingnatural,concluding
thatthishad to be an act of the intellect.In contrastto the philosophers,
however,the blessed are joined (coniunguntur
) to the essence of God and
as such know that beatitudeconsistsin Him.64
Giles argues that if beatitudeis identified
Againstthe intellectualists,
withthe operationby whichwe are most nearlyjoined to God, thenwe
mustconclude that thisis achieved in an act of the will ratherthan the
intellect.His conclusionis groundedin the standardvoluntarist
argument
thatwas inspiredby DionysiusAreopagiteand lateremployedextensively
63C. Luna,La lecture
deGilles
deRome
surlequatrime
livre
dessentences.
Lesextraits
duCLM.
8005, in:Recherches
de Thologie
ancienne
et mdivale,
57 (1990),183-255,
esp.203.
64GilesofRome,Sent.
IV, d. 49,q. 24,in:Luna1990(n.63),250:"Duplexestbeatitudo:quaedamestextra,
et hocestfinale
scilicet
obiectum,
bonum,
quodestsummum
in actubeati,quo unitur
illisummo
deus.Aliaestbeatitudo
bono.Et quia
que consistit
nonviderunt
illudsummum
bonumperessentiam,
ideononposuerunt
beatiphilosophi
ineo,sedsoluminaliquoactuintelligendi,
naturale
hominis
non
tudinem
quiaintelligere
se extendit
ad essentiam
sedad effectus
divinos.
Et quianullum
natdivinanti,
intelligibile
a nobisestitaperfectum
sicutactusintelligendi
hocnonposuerunt
uraliter
illius,
propter
in aliquare extra,
in eo qod
beatitudinem
sedsolumin intelligere
intellectus,
tamquam
et in velieintelligere,
in illudquodconiungit
nosin actum
perse desideratur,
tamquam
Sedbeati,quicertisuntde aliquameliori
divina
cuiconire,scilicet
essentia,
intelligendi.
habereomnem
modum
beatitudinis
et cuipossibile
esthominem
unguntur,
quamsciunt
beatitudinem
suampercomparationem
ad divinam
uniri,
essentiam,
ponunt
principaliter
itaquoddeusestbeatitudo
hominis."

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by Henry of Ghent. The argumentassertsthatwhereasthe act of knowing merelyreceivesthe intelligiblespecies of the object accordingto the
limitedmode of a rationalagent, an active motion of the soul towards
That is, while intellectionis
the object characterizesthe act of willing.65
characterizedby the passive receptionof a representation
of the object,
the act of love activelyextends toward the object itself.But the chief
point to bear in the mind is that,throughlove, the agent is transformed
into the beloved object for,as Giles puts it, "in knowing,God is in the
blessed soul, <but> in willing,the blessed soul is in God."66According
to Giles, then,the mode of union that occurs throughlove is more perfectthan that which occurs throughintellection.
Finally,Giles advances an argumentthatwe have alreadyencountered
in Henryof Ghent.It is groundedin the identification
of beatitudedefined
as the "end" or the "good" ratherthan as, for example, the "true." It
assertsthat since the highestgood is the end of all things,the act that
unitesus to such an object under the aspect of an "end" is thatin which
beatitudeconsists.Like Henry,Giles argues that such an act accrues to
the will. The intellect,by contrast,apprehendsobjects, God included,
underthe aspect of the true.Beatitudemusttherefore
consist,subjectively
in
an
act
of
the
will
rather
than
the
intellect.67
speaking,
The foregoingdiscussionservesto underscoreGiles's firmcommitment
to the primacyof the will and its principalrole in beatitude.That it
in certaincrucial respectsfromHenry'sdiscussionshould come as
differs
no surprisegiventhatthe reportado
of Book IV of Giles's commentaryon
the Sentences
Summa
ordinariarum
predatesHenry's
quaestionum
by well over
65Ibid.:". . . intelligere
estmotusreiad animam,
ita quodintelligere
estperreceptionem
in anima.Et quiaomnequodrecipitur,
intelligibilis
recipitur
permodum
recipiideointelligere
divinam
essentiam
<fit>secundum
modum
anime.Sed
entis,
recipientis
velieestmotus
animead rem,quitransformat
in amatum
in
amantem
etponitamantem
amato."
66Ibid.:"Etsicpatetquodconiungit
animam
beatam
deosecundum
modum
divinum,
nonsecundum
<modum>animebeate,ita quod <in> intelligendo
deusestin anima
animabeataestin deo.Et hocestmagisbonumet maiorperfectio
beata,in volendo
in actuvoluntatis."
hocdicendum
quamprimm.
Propter
quodconsistit
67Ibid.,250-51:
estpercomparationem
ad beatitudinem
". . . beatitudo
nostra
attendenda
nonsicbeatitudo
scilicet
ad summum
extra,
bonum,
omnium,
philosophoquodestfinis
inilioactuqui
debetconsistere
rum,sedsolumactuanime.Ex hiispatetquodbeatitudo
Hoc autemestactusvoluntatis,
quiaintelmagisnosunitillifinisubratione
qua finis.
ad deumutbonumet
in deumin eo quodverum,
sedvoluntas
inclinatur
lectusrespicit
hocbeatitudo
conobiectum
estratiobonisivefinis.
utfinis,
magis
Propter
quiaproprium
in actuvoluntatis."
sistit

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DESTINY
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297

ten years.68But perhaps the most strikingdifferencebetween the two

worksis Giles's conclusionthatbeatitudeconsists,at least partially,in an
act of the will. Henry,recall, claims that beatitudeconsistsprimarilyin
God, and that the acts of the will and the intellectare merelymeans to
beatitudeor to union with God. He accordinglyargues for a hierarchy
involvingthe uncreatedobject of the will,i.e. God, and the created acts
of the soul, of which the will is higherthan the intellectsince it unitesus
morecloselyto our end. No such hierarchyof means and ends is endorsed
In that work Giles merely
by Giles in the commentaryon the Sentences.
will's love forGod as the
as
of
and
the
God
the
object beatitude,
posits
subjectiveresponse to this object, both of which are equal partnersin
the achievementof beatitude. In this respect Giles resemblesThomas
Aquinas, although,in line with the voluntaristsof the period, he subsitutesthe act of love for the act of intellection.
is not entirelyat odds with
Still, Giles's commentaryon the Sentences
Henryof Ghent'sdiscussionof beatitudein article49 of the latter'sSumma.
The most obvious similarityis the vital role played by the Dionysian
of love as a transformative
power. It is perhapsthisaspect
understanding
more than any otherthat representsthe most significant
departurefrom
the
final
end forratiothat
associates
from
or
indeed
theory
any
Aquinas,
of the self
ratherthan with a transference
nal agentswithself-perfection
into God.
closer to Henry of
Giles draws substantially
In the Quodlibetal
Questions
of beatitude,athoughelementsof his account are
Ghent'sunderstanding
featureof Quodlibet
drawnfromAquinas. The moststriking
almostcertainly
conclusion
that beatiof
his
earlier
18
is
Giles's
III, question
rejection
tude consistsin an act of the will. Beatitudeis now "nothingotherthan
On this
that towardswhich the will tends as its finalcause (finaliter)."69
it
must
tend
toward
its
own
the
will
cannot
incline
act; rather,
account,
an
beatitude
of
"end."
towardthatwhich has the character
Accordingly,
mustprincipallyconsistin the object of the will ratherthan its act.70

68Henry's
toGomezCaffarena,
wascomposed
between
Summa
1277and1293.According
Serparticipado
article
49 canbe datedto Christmas
1282.Cf.J. GmezCaffarena,
y der
enla metafisica
deEnrique
deGante
subsistente
, Rome1958,270.
69GilesofRome,Quod.
187:"... sciendum
III, q. 18,in:ed. De Coninck,
quodnihil
voluntas
tendit
..."
aliudsitbeatitudo
quamilludin quodfinaliter
70Ibid.:". . . beatitudo
voluntatis
sitmagisinipsoobiecto
quaminactuquiaratiofinis
voluntatis
quodomnino
princimagisestin obiecto
quamin actu.Ex hocetiamapparet

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P.S. EARDLEY

AlthoughGiles locates beatitudeprincipallyin the object of the will,

this does not preventhim fromrecognizingthat thereis also a subjective elementto happiness.For thisreason he distinguishes
betweenbeatitude as a finalcause and beatitudeas a formalcause.71As a finalcause,
beatitudecan be consideredeitherwithoutqualification{finaliter
),
simpliciter
or in a certaingenus [finaliter
in aliquocerto
As a finalcause withgeneri).
out qualificationbeatitudeconsists,as we have seen, in God who is our
"repose" (<quies
), a claim Giles derivesfromAugustine.Beatitudeconsidered as a finalcause in a certaingenus, however,consistsin the vision
of God {visioDei). The explanationfor this is that the will cannot tend
to its own act as an object directly,but can only do so reflexively.
As
such, the highestobject to which it can tend in the created order (in
is the visioDei, which is an act of the intellect.72
The
genere
creaturarum)
to two things:God as the "uncreated
will, then,is able to tendfinaliter
increatum
good" {bonum
), and the vision of God as a good in the genus of
created things.73
Now as regardsthesubjectiveelementofbeatitude,beatitudo
, Giles
formaliter
understandsthisto be an act of the will. As withbeatitudefinaliter
, beatitudeformaliter
is consideredin a twofoldway: (1) withoutqualification,
and (2) in a certaingenus. Beatitudein the firstsense is identifiedas an
act of the will tendingdirectlyto God, in the second it is associated
beatitudo
nonpossitessein actuvoluntatis
nontendit
paliter
quiavoluntas
principaliter
in actumsuum,sedprincipaliter
in aliud."
tendit
71Ibid.:". . . distinguemus
de beatitudine
finaliter
et de beatitudine
utsemformaliter,
finaliter
sitvoluntatis
obiectum
et beatitudo
formaliter
sitvoluntatis
actus,
perbeatitudo
in obiectum."
formaliter
tendit
perquemvoluntas
72Ibid.,188:"Dicemus
etiamquodbeatitudo
finaliter
essedupliciter:
velfinaliter
possit
velfinaliter
in aliquocertogenere.
Finaliter
estin ipsoDeo, quia
simpliciter
simpliciter
summum
bonumestprincipalis
finis
noster
et estilludin quo conipseDeustamquam
statconsummate
iuxtailludAugustini
I. Confess,
circaprincipium:
'Adtenos
quiesnostra,
feristi
Domineet inquietum
estcornostrum,
donecrequiescat
in te.'In ipsoergoDeo
eritultima
nostri.
statbeatquiescordis
Propter
quodipseDeusestillud,inquofinaliter
itudonostra.
Finaliter
nonsimpliciter,
sedin certogenere
in
statbeatitudo
nostra
tamen,
visione
Dei. . . namin genere
creaturarum
bonumvelponimus
actumintelpotissimum
velactumvoluntatis.
voluntatis
nonestproprie
obiectum
lectus,
Ipseautemactusnostrae
eius.Infra
Deumergononponimus
inquoddirecte
obiectum
voluntatis
tendat
nisivisionem
voluntas
directe
tendere
Dei. In
Dei,quiain nihilaliudmaiuspotest
quamin visionem
actumautemsuumvoluntas
directe
sedsemper
tendit,
numquam
perreflexionem."
73Ibid.:"Et sicdamusduoin quibusestbeatitudo
finaliter
iuxtaduoobiectavoluninquapotest
tatis
directe
tendere:
unuminquoestbeatitudo
finaliter
utbonum
simpliciter
in certogenere
estfinaliter
increatum,
videlicet,
ipsumDeum;et unumin quo beatitudo
utvisionem
Dei."

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299

withan act of the will that tends,not to God Himself,but to the vision
of God.74
Despite Giles's claim thatbeatitudeconsistsin some way in the vision
of God, it is worthbearingin mindthathe places a ratherstrictqualification
on this claim. Specifically,he maintainsthat happinessis only found in
the vision of God to the extentthat such an act of the intellectis associated withthe will. The explanationforthisis that felicityis the object
of the will ratherthan the intellectand thereforemustbe identifiedwith
the formerfacultyifit is to countas as a formof beatitude.75
Accordingly,
he precludesthe intellectfromhavingan intrinsicrole to play in happiis nothingother
to it a merelyancilliaryone, for"felicity
ness,attributing
than the object of the will or an act of the will."76
Giles, then,recognizesfourtypesof beatitude:(1) God, (2) an act of
the will tendingto God, (3) the vision of God, and (4) an act of the will
tendingtoward the vision of God.77 How preciselyare we to interpret
this taxonomy?In positingfour typesof beatitude,does Giles mean to
ends? In point of fact,Giles
say that rationalagents have fourdifferent
thinksthat rational agents have only one principaland final end, and
that is God himself.The vision of God, thougha finalcause, is merely
the object of the will in the created order; it is an "end under the end"
[finissubfine
).78Indeed, even the acts of the will are merelymeans toward
the goal of being unitedwith God.79
74Ibid.:"Sicoportet
dareduoin quibussitbeati
tudoformaliter:
unumin quo beatiincertogenere.
tudositformaliter
etaliudquodsitformaliter
beatitudo
Damus
simpliciter
in Deumtamquam
autemduplicem
actumvoluntatis:
unumperquemformaliter
tendit
in obiectum
finale
in visionem
voluntatis
et aliumperquemtendit
formaliter
simpliciter,
in obiectum
finale
sedin certogenere.
Actusergo
Dei, tamquam
eius,nonsimpliciter,
voluntatis
formaliter
nosDeo,quiestnoster
finis
eritbeatitudo
forconiungens
simpliciter,
Sed actusvoluntatis
in visionem
maliter
tendit
Dei, non
simpliciter.
perquemvoluntas
infinem
incertogenere,
sedtamquam
finem
estbeatitudo
formaliter
tamquam
simpliciter
nonsimpliciter,
sedin certogenere."
75Ibid.:"Visioergopotest
essebeatitudo
modoquo dictum
est,nonquiaestaliquid
intellectus
necquiaestad intellectum
sedquiaestobiectum
voluntatis.
... Si
pertinens,
in bonumtenhabetrationem
finis
et finis
rationem
boni,et sitvoluntatis
ergofelicitas
ad voluntatem,
nulloautemmodopercomparationem
ad
dere,solum
percomparationem
intellectum
secundum
se estaccipienda
felicitas."
76Ibid.:"Nihilaliudestergofelicitas,
nisivoluntatis
velvoluntatis
actus..."
obiectum,
77Ibid.,190:"Possumus
si velimus,
felicitates
se habentes
autem,
assignare
quatuor
per
ordinem:
videlicet
in Deum;visionem
ipsumDeum;actumvoluntatis
perquemtendimus
in huiusmodi
visionem."
Dei; et actumvoluntatis
perquemtendimus
78Ibid.,189.
79Ibid.:"Hocetiamidempatet:namsi visioestbeatitudo,
hocestproutestobiectum

11:14:57 AM

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P.S. EARDLEY

Althoughthe will and the intellect,then, are merelymeans toward

union with God, it may stillbe asked whetherone act unitesus to God
more closely than the other. Given the voluntaristframeworkof this
, it is not surprisingto findGiles endorsingthe claim that it is
Quodlibet
the will's act thatjoins us to God more closelythan the intellect's.The
The explanavision of God merelyjoins us to God mediately{mediate).
tion for this is that any act of the intellect,no matterhow exalted, is
good. The will's act, however,
merelythe object of the will as a created
is able to surpass any created good- the vision of God included- and
who is, of course, uncreated.80
tend immediatelytoward God himself,
Moreoverit is Giles's view,as we establishedin the previoussection,that
the will is a nobler power than the intellect.It is united to God as he
is in himself,while the intellectis united to God merelyas he existsin
the intellect.81
Based on the foregoingdiscussion,it is safe to conclude that Giles's
representsa species to volunpresentationof beatitudein the Quodlibets
tarism.The discussionacquires additionalsignificancehowever,once it
is recognizedthatthe particularformof voluntarism
beingadvanced bears
a strikingresembanceto that of Henry of Ghent. For one thing,Giles
establishes,as we have seen, a hierarchyof "created beatitudes"(<beati
tudines
creatas)under the final end, much as Henry did. These created
beatitudesare means towardGod, in whom beatitudeessentiallyconsists.
Not all of these grades of beatitudeare equal, however,for some unite
the rationalagentto God morecloselythanothers.Thus, as Giles explains,
"amongstcreated beatitudesthe most principalwill be beatitudeas an
sedestfinis
subfine;
undeestfinis
nonautem
finis
voluntatis
etprout
estfinis,
simpliciter,
felicitas
ad aliumfinem,
id est,ad Deum.Hoc ergomodoeritinvisione
ordinatus
prout
in Deum.
in visionem
Dei et pervisionem
Dei tendit
voluntas
peractumsuumtendit
invisionem,
Deo prout
autemsicvoluntas
coniungitur
peractumsuumtendit
Numquam
in Deum."
in Deumsicutperactsuumimmediate
tendit
etpervisionem
tendit
80Ibid.:"Si visioergositfelicitas,
in Deum,
tendit
hocestproutvoluntas
pervisione
Sedipseactusvoluntatis
estfelicDeo mediate.
scilicet
coniungitur
prout
perearnvoluntas
actus
in
immediate.
Ideo
huiusmodi
tendit
Deum
actum
voluntas
itasprout
huiusmodi
per
Deo utin eo felicitatem
nosconiungit
estfelicitas,
voluntatis
quiaimmediate
principalius
sedest
"Visioergoesttotamerces
creata,
Ibid.,191-92.
ponimus
quamactusintellectus."
beatitudo
excellentior:
utipseDeus,in eo autemestprincipalius
aliamerces
multo
quod
siveipsiDeo."
voluntatem
mercedi,
magisconiungit
ipsiprincipali
81Ibid.,190:"Credimus
voluntas
Deo
modoconiungatur
enimquodpluset nobiliori
voluntas
quiapersuumactumconiungitur
persuumactumquamperactumintellectus,
Deo utestaliqDeo utDeusestaliquidinse,sedintellectus
coniungitur
persuumactum
uidin nobis..."

11:14:57 AM

CONCEPTIONS
OF HAPPINESS
ANDHUMAN
DESTINY

301

act of the will tendingto God, because throughsuch an act the will is
more immediatelyunited to God. Afterwardthere will be beatitudein
the visionof God itself,and finallytherewill be felicityin an act of the
will to the extentthat it tends to the vision of God."82But perhaps the
most obvious and significant
similarityto Henry of Ghent is the claim
is
beatitude
achieved
that, although
by means of the intellectand the
in the act of either.Rather,beatitudeconsistsprinwill,it does not consist
cipallyin the object of the will: God himself.
What does Giles's theoryowe, if anything,to Aquinas? Recall that
Thomas, in orderto reconcileAristotlewiththe Christiantheologicaltrabetweenhappinessas a createdgood and
dition,had drawn a distinction
as
an
uncreated
one.
The formerhe identifiedwiththe attainhappiness
mentor visionof God, and the latterwithGod himself.Giles adopts this
distinctionas his startingpoint. The created good or the vision of God
Giles designatesas the finalcause of the will in a certaingenus (finaliter
in certo
). Happiness as an uncreatedgood, or God himself,on the
genere
other hand, is termed the final cause of the will withoutqualification
(finaliter
simpliciter).
Now althoughAquinas maintainsthat happinessconsistsessentiallyin
the beatificvision,which is an act of the intellect,he rejectsthe notion
thathappinessis the object
of the intellect.83
Rather,it is the object of the
will.84To Giles's mind, such a claim demonstratesthat happinessmust
always be understoodin referenceto the will.85He accordinglydevelops
Aquinas's distinctionbetweenGod and the visioDei as the finalcauses of
the will by introducingthe furtherdistinctionbetweenthe will's act as it
tends to God himselfand its act as it tends to the vision of God. Both
acts are formalcauses of the will: the firstis the formalcause of the will
withoutqualification(formaliter
and the second its formalcause
simpliciter)
in a certaingenus (formaliter
in certo
Giles ranksthesecreatedbeatgenere).
82Ibid.,191:"Ergointer
beatitudines
creatas
eritbeatitudo
actusvoluntatis
principalior
inDeumquiaperhuiusmodi
tendens
actum
immediatius
voluntas
Deo. Postea
coniungitur
in ipsavisione
eritbeatitudo
autemeritfelicitas
in actuvoluntatis
Dei,ultimo
prouttenditin visionem
Dei."
83Aquinas,
ST I-II,q. 3, a. 4, corp.
84Ibid.,ad 2.
85GilesofRome,Quod.
188:"Si ergofelicitas
habet
Ill, q. 18,in: ed. De Coninck,
rationem
finis
et finis
rationem
boniet sitvoluntatis
in bonumtendere,
solumpercomad voluntatem,
nulloautemmodopercomparationem
ad intellectum
secunparatonem
dumse estaccipienda
felicitas."

11:14:57 AM

302

P.S. EARDLEY

itudes- i.e. the will's act of tending to God, the vision of God, and
the will's act of tendingto the vision of God- accordingto the degree
to which they are capable of unitingthe rationalcreatureto God. He
concludes,recall,thatwill's act of tendingto God himselfis nobler than
the intellect'sact of the visioDei in the achievementof beatitudebecause
it joins us to God as he is in himselfratherthan merelyas he is in us,
whichis all thatthe visioDei achieves.86Giles therefore
developsAquinas's
positionin the directionof Henry of Ghent.
In the finalanalysis,Giles of Rome departsfromAquinas because he
thinks,as Henry does, that Thomas's intellectualist
argumentdoes not
ultimatelyachieve what it sets out to. Aquinas's position,as Giles reports
it in his replyto an objection,purportsto show thatthe intellectis higher
than the will because its nobilityis intrinsicto it, that is, "because in
knowingthere is a motion of thingsto the soul."87The will's nobility,
by contrast,is relativeto its object. Now althoughAquinas regardsthe
intellect as the nobler power simpliciter
, he thinks that in regard to
divinethingsthe will is highersince it is betterto love God than to know
him. Relative to thingsthat are beneath the soul, however,it is better
to know than to love since "the cognitionof naturalthingsis more noble
than the thingsthemselves."88
Accordingto Giles, Thomas positiondoes
not demonstratethatthe intellectis higher;rather,it showsthe opposite.
That is, if the will is higherwith respectto God as its object, then as
faras beatitudeis concerned,willingmustbe consideredmore noble than
86See note81 above.
87GilesofRome,Quod.
193:"Datotarnen
Ill, q. 18,in:ed. De Coninck,
quodintellects essetaltior
adhucnonhaberetur
namponentes
intentum,
potentia
quamvoluntas,
intellectum
essealtiorem
dicunt
sitalitor
si considerepotentiam
quodintellectus
potentia
turin se et nobilior
namnobilitas
intellectus
estex hocquodhabeatin se quiaintelliad animam.
Nobilitas
verovoluntatis
estex eo quodtendat
in
gendoestmotusrerum
aliudquiainvolendo
estmotus
animaead res.Simpliciter
autemet absolute
estnobilius
ad aliudetideosimpliciter
et absolute,
quodesttalein se quamquodesttalein ordine
utdicunt,
intellectus
estnobilior
volntate
et intelligere
nobilius
quamvelie."
88Ibid.:"Sedsiintellectus
etvoluntas
etactuseorum,
utaiunt,
nonconsiderentur
secundumse sedin ordine
ad obiectum,
velhoceritad resnaturales
velad resdivinas,
si ad
resnaturelles
sicadhuc,ut aiunt,nobilius
estintelligere
quamvelie,quia ressuntintellectaeutsuntin anima,suntvolitae
utsuntseipsis.
Nobilius
autemhaberit
essein anima
nobilior
estenimcognitio
naturalium
Sed
quamin seipsis,
quamipsaesintresnaturales.
si intelligere
et veliecomparentur
ad resdivinas
sicdicunt
quodveliesitnobilius
quam
bonitas
habetesseutestinseipsaetuta volntate
desiderintelligere
quiadivina
perfectius
ata quamproutab intellectu
et nobilior
resestipseDeusin se quamcogniconcipitur
tioquamhabetcreatura
de Deo."

11:14:57 AM

DESTINY
ANDHUMAN
CONCEPTIONS
OF HAPPINESS

303

knowing.Our beatitude principallymust consist in loving God rather

than in knowinghim, then,chieflybecause, as was indicatedabove, the
act of lovingconjoins the rationalsoul more closelyto God than knowing does.89
The theorythat Giles advanced in the Quodlibets
, then,is significantly
more redolentof Henry of Ghent than thatwhich Giles advanced in the
Perhaps the chiefpoint to bear in mind,
commentaryon the Sentences.
however,is that both works differin the final analysisfromAquinas's
view. First,on Thomas's account, created and uncreatedbeatitude are
essentiallyequal partnersin the final end for rational agents. Second,
Aquinas thinksthatthe will's act, delight,is merelyan accidentalfeature,
a by-productof human beatitude,which consistsessentiallyin the perin
fectionof the intellect.For Giles, althoughthe finalend cannot consist
an act of the will,the will nonethelesshas an essential,ratherthan merely
accidental,role to play in its achievement.
featureof Giles's theoryof the primacy
Perhaps the most significant
of the will is the strongemphasison love as a transformative
power. In
the finalanalysis,this representsa rathersignificant
departurefromthe
standardAristotelianaccount of the final end, which is associated with
of the self.On Giles's view,the finalend forrationalagents
the perfection
is not actuallythe perfectionof the selfor any of its powers,which are
bonum
forrationalagents
just means to the finalend; rather,the summum
of the soul into God. Such a theory,
consitsin a type of transference
in
certain
indebted
to
respects,is far more redolentof
although
Aquinas
than
of
Ghent
of
Thomas.
Henry
Conclusion
In stressing
objectivebeatitudeover subjectivebeatitude,thatis, in stressas
God
our final destinyratherthan the vision or love of God as
ing
theircontemporarieswere doing, Henry and Giles departed quite radically fromthe mainstreamtheologicaltradition.Specifically,theydevel89Ibid.:"Ponentes
sitaltiorpotentia
igitur
quodintellectus
simpliciter
quamvoluntas
rerum
divinarum
veliesitnobilius
etaltiusquamintelligere
etquia
ponunt
quodrespectu
inanima,
rerum
divinarum
beatitudinem
diceredebemus
respectu
ponimus
quodrespectu
felicitatis
et beati
tudinis
veliesitnobilius
Beati
tudoergonostra
quamintelligere.
princietinactuvoluntatis
paliusestinamarevelinveliequamintelligere
quamintellectus
quia
actummagisconiungimur
perhuiusmodi
ipsiDeo ..."

11:14:57 AM

304

P.S. EARDLEY

of happinessthatdoes not repose in

oped a quasi-mystical
understanding
the perfectionof the selfand its human capacities,but in a sort of selftranscendencethroughlove. It is truethatin the EthicsAristotleintimated
that theremightbe a divine aspect to happinessinsofaras it mightbe
a giftfromthe gods (EN 1099b11-14). He never consideredthe possibility,however,that it mightconsistin an exstaticimmersionof the self
in the divine being.
Guelph, Ontario
of Guelph
University

11:14:57 AM

Problems
withTemporality
and Scientific
Propositions
in JohnBurdanand Albertof Saxony
MICHAELJ. FITZGERALD

Abstract
The essaydevelopstwo majorarguments.
First,ifJohnBuridan's'firstargument' for the reintroduction
of naturalsupposition
is only that the "eternal
truth"ofa scientific
is preserved
becausesubjecttermsin scientific
proposition
propositions
suppositforall the term'spast, present,and futuresignificata
thenAlbertof Saxony thinksit is simplyineffective.
indifferently;
Only the
'secondargument',
i.e. the argumentforthe existenceof an 'atemporal
copula'
thistask;but is rejectedby Albert.Second, laterfouradequatelyperforms
criticisms
ofBuridan'snatural
, givenin certainNotabilia
supposition
teenth-century
fromthe anonymousauthorin, Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff.40va-41rb,are
nothingbut an interpolated
hodge-podgeof criticisms
givenearlierin the
various
views
of
Buridan'sby Albertof Saxony.It is thisfact
centuryagainst
that makes Albertthe real source of late fourteenth-century
criticismsof
Buridan'sview of natural
supposition.
The traditionalview of the role of natural
in fourteenth-century
supposition
nominalistsuppositiontheory,as articulatedby L.M. de Rijk, is thatJohn
Buridanimportedthe notionfromthirteenth-century
"realist"supposition
"
" and "eternaltruth
" of
to
account
for
the
theory,specifically
necessity
scientificpropositionswhich involve only referenceto particularspatiotemporalobjects.1More recently,however,H.A.G. Braakhuishas argued
that there are actuallytwo argumentsemployedby Buridan to defend
the reintroduction
of naturalsupposition
into fourteenth-century
nominalist
logical theory.First,"... the acceptabilityof naturalsuppositionis argued
forby stressingthat nouns which signifythingswithoutco-signifying
any
determinatetime, signifypresent,past, and futurethingsindifferently."2

1 L.M.de Rijk,TheDevelopment
naturalis
inMediaeval
II: Fourteenth
ofSuppositio
Logic.
Century
as Atemporal
Natural
11 (1973),43-79.
, in:Vivarium,
Supposition
(Omnitemporal)
Supposition
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
44,2-3

11:15:27 AM

306

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

Second, "... by contrast,'thatsupposition'is presentedas the one according to whichthe verb 'is' may be takenforeverytime,present,past, and
The firstsortof argumentBraakhuisclaimsis develfuture,indifferently."3
but the second sortof argumentis
oped in Buridan'sfc.y-commentary,
more fullydeveloped in his Questions
on De generatione
et corruptione
and
Summulae
.4
In this essay, I will compare Buridan's view of naturalsupposition
with
Albertof Saxony's,and show thatAlbert'saccount sheds some new light
in the fourteenthcentury.My
on the debate over naturalsupposition
will
of
these
two
thinkers
proceedby developingtwo arguments.
comparison
I
if
First, will argue that John Buridan's firstargumentfor the reintrois only that naturalsupposition
duction of naturalsupposition
requires the
in
a
all
term
scientific
to
for
the
term'spast,
subject
proposition supposit
and
future
to
the
eternal
truth
of scientific
significata preserve
present,
as an
propositions;then Albertof Saxony thinksit is simplyineffective
accountforthe eternaltruthof a scientific
proposition.It seems it is only
the second argumentmentionedby Braakhuis,Buridan's argumentfora
special atemporalcopula, which actuallydoes the workof accountingfor
It is Buridan's
the "eternaltruth"( perpetue
veritatis
) of scientific
propositions.
defenseof the existenceof an atemporalcopula that is the real targetof
Albertof Saxony's criticismsagainst naturalsupposition
, and not the fact
for
all
theirpast, present
that naturally
terms
suppositing
subject
supposit
and futuresignificata.5
Second, I will argue that the later fourteenth2 H.A.G.Braakhuis,
and
andContingent
Knowledge,
Signification
Scientific
Knowledge
Reality.
inBuridan's
on De Generatione
etcorruptione,
in:J.M.M.H.
(Natural)
Supposition
Questions
onAristotle's
De Generatione
et
& H.A.G.Braakhuis
Tradition
(eds),TheCommentary
Thijssen
Ancient
Modern
1999(Studia
Artistarum
, Medieval
, andEarly
, Turnhout
7), 139.
corruptione:
3 Braakhuis
1999,139.
4 Braakhuis
1999,143.
5 A briefnoteon myterminology
I use thenotions
and
hereis important.
atemporal
in a different
omni-temporal
omni-temporal
waythandoesDe Rijk.De Rijkusestheterms
andatemporal
a "nominalist
term
to distinguish
usage"ofa naturally
suppositing
subject
a termhasor hasnot,Buridans'
natural
from
a "realist
usage."He says:"Accordingly,
times
ofthetenseoftheproposition,
totheextent
thatall(possible)
supposition
regardless
forthatreasonit canbest
areincluded;
at whichparticular
maybe in existence
beings
is oftheRealist
On theotherhandFerrer's
natural
be termed
omnitemporal
supposition
rather
than
which
as a universale
is time-less
in thatitinvolves
a metaphysical
entity,
type,
De Rijk1973
Therefore
hisnatural
atemporali
maybe termed
supposition
omnitemporal.
arenaturally
I seetheseterms
to thenounswhich
as notapplicable
(n. 1),68. However,
to twopossible
usesof
in a proposition,
butas onlyapplicable
terms
suppositing
subject
tensecopula'is' is
i.e. whenthepresent
tensecopula'is' in a proposition,
thepresent
andwhenit
as tense-less
ortime
construed
), i.e. atemporali
y (intemporale)
(intemporale
independent

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 307
centuryrejectionof Buridan'sview, in variousNotabiliamentionedby an
anonymousauthor,in BnF, lat. 14716, ff.40va-41rb,is nothingbut an
interpolatedhodge-podgeof Albertof Saxony's own criticismsof various
views of Buridan's fromearlierin the century.It is this latterfact that
makes Albertthe ultimatelate fourteenth-century
source forcriticismsof
Buridan'sview on naturalsupposition.
I
John Buridan and Albert of Saxony are typicallyclassifiedas medieval
"nominalist
who acceptthe ontologica!primacyofparticulars,
philosophers"
withuniversaishavinga lesserontologicalstatus.For example,theyboth
certainlyagree that spatio-temporalparticulars". . . come into existence
at a time;pass out of existenceat some later time; and theyexist at all
timesin between."6Medieval ontological"realists"had arguedthat"nominalists"could not have scientific
via demonstration,
understanding
along
the lines suggestedby Aristotlein his Posterior
since
the
,
Analytics
objects
of such demonstrations
were spatio-temporal
particulars.Realistsclaimed
thatpropositionsabout such objectswere at best onlycontingently
truenot necessaryor eternallytrue. As De Rijk points out:

is construed
as a present
tensed
at every/
eachgiven
time
itoccurs
, i.e. omnitemporally
(inomni
Sincenounssignify
all theirsignificata
oftime,I do notfindthe
tempore).
independendy
distinction
withrespect
to theissueof natural
between
helpful
supposition
ontological
"nominalists"
and "realists."
As I see theissue,thereal"shooting"
between
Albert
of
andJohnBuridan
aboutnatural
is actually
aboutwhether
ornotthe
Saxony
supposition
tensecopula:'is' canbe takenina tense-less
ortime-independent
eternal
sense
present
, or only
inthesensethatitis confined
tothe
tense
at every/
eachoccurance
ofitsuse.I believe
present
thelatter
sensecorresponds
to whatBraakhuis
outis Buridan's
secondargument
points
forsubject
terms
natural
in scientific
Moreover,
having
supposition
propositions.
partofmy
motivation
forchanging
De Rijk'susageisthefourteenth-century
menauthor,
anonymous
tioned
a version
oftwoofBuridan's
byDe Rijk,inBnF,lat.14716,formulates
arguments
forthenatural
ofterms,
i.e. Arguments
2.5 & 2.7 below,bydistinguishing
supposition
between
thecopula'is' takenas connoting
notime
atall (nullum
tempus
connotaret)
[whatI call
'
as signifying
time
signifying
atemporali
'y'],andtaken
any
given
(quodlibet
tempus
significam)
[what
I callsignifying
'omnibetween
Hence,thedifference
temporally].
myusageoftheterms
andDe Rijk'sisthatDe Rijk'susageapplies
thedistinction
tonouns,
atemporal/
omni-temporal
butI applythedistinction
to thedifferent
tensecopula
signifying
usagesofthepresent
'is'.I believe
thatmyusagewillhelponemoreclearly
understand
therealdisagreement
overnatural
between
Albert
and Buridan,
andAlbert's
to Buridan's
supposition
responses
in favor
ofnatural
particular
arguments
supposition.
6 M.J.Loux,Metaphysics:
A Contemporary
Introduction
, 2nded.,London2002,216.

11:15:27 AM

308

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD
It is self-evident
thatthelogiciansof the anti-Realist
tradition
who were
all abstractentitiesof whateversort,could
eagerlyinvolvedin exorcising
not help takingthe Realist explanationof demonstrative
propositions
were com(like Ferrer's)forsheernonsense.Since concreteparticulars
theanti-Realists
monlyheldto be theonlyproperclaimantsto existence,
in concrete
ofknowledge
setthemselves
thetaskto establish
theobjectivity
particularbeingand nowhereelse. In theirviewall universalknowledge
was ultimately
knowledgeof concreteparticularbeings.Of courseas a
was of outstandthe doctrineof supposition
generaltheoryof reference
withinthe scope of the anti-Realist
program.
ing interest
The crucialpoint lay in the propositionsof demonstrative
science,
whichare supposedto be necessarily
true,i.e. trueat all possibletimes.
of present
Howevertheyjust have the formof categoricalpropositions
tense,e.g. 'Omnis homo est animal', 'Tonitruusest sonus factusin
tradition
had to takethemfor
nubibus'.For thisreason,the anti-Realist
falseif no man happensto exist(c.q. if no thunderhappensto be) at
the timeat whichthe propositionis writtenor uttered.Puttingit in a
generalway the problemwas: how is the necessityof science to be
particularbeings?7
groundedin contingent

demonstraHence, nominalistslike Buridan all hold that a scientifically

ble proposition,like 'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' is notjust
about the subject term'spresentsignificata,but also about its past and
futuresignificataas well. But, Buridan reasons, if the subject termsof
for
demonstrablepropositionsare takenas personally
suppositing
scientifically
thisor thatparticularinstanceof thunder,when thereis no thunder,the
proposition'All thunderis a sound made in the clouds' willbe falserather
science.Hence, demontruepropositionof demonstrative
thanan eternally
for
the
strativesciencesrequirenaturalsupposition
subjecttermsof their
propositions,in order for the subject termseven to be said ofall (dicide
omni)of theirsignificata.
utunturhuiusmodisuppositione
Deinde quartoscientiaedemonstrativae
in libroMetheorum
'omnetonisi
dicamus
quia,
[i.e. suppositionaturalis],
truumest sonusfactusin nubibus'vel 'omnisirisest reflexioaut refrachoc solumdicerepro praesentibus.
tio lucis',non intendimus
Immo,si
... Et
in praesentivel iris,tamenita diceremus
nullumessettonitruum

7 De Rijk1973(n. 1),51-52.

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
IN BURIDAN
PROPOSITIONS
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 309
hoc manifeste
dicitAristoteles
sic "'de omni' quidem
primoPosteriorum
dico quod non est in aliquo sic et in aliquo non nec aliquando sic nec
aliquando non."8
De Rijk maintainsthat Buridan believed only an atemporal
view of the
demonstrative
"logic of names" would solve the problem of scientifically
propositionsinvolvingclaims about all spatio-temporal
particularobjects.9
"Thus Buridanappearsto hold thatin thecase of demonstrative
propositions,thisviewof thelogicof namesmay solveour problem.They do
not make an assertionabout any particulartime,but about all times.
The termsof suchpropositions
are regardedto standforall thingsthat
i.e. can possiblydenote,regardless
of theparticulartimeof
theysignify,
their(possible)existence.It is here that Buridanhas recourseto the
older logicians.He thinksthat theyrecognizedthis in distinguishing
betweenaccidentaland naturalsupposition.
A termis said to have accidental suppositionif it standsfor thingsexistingat some determinate
time,whereasa termhavingnaturalsuppositionstandsforall concrete
thingsit signifies
), regardlessof whethertheyexistat the
(all itssupposita
in thepastor willexistin thefuture
existed
... So Buridan
presenttime,
takesthe naturalsuppositionused by the older logicians{antiqui
logici)
as an omnitemporal
whichcauses a termto standforall its
supposition,
whethertheyare in the present,past,or
possiblesupposita
indifferently,
future."10
8Johannes
Summutae
De suppositionibus
4.3.4<De diviBuridanus,
, Tractatus
Quartus,
sionesuppositions
communis
innaturalem
etaccidentalem>,
ed.R. vanderLecq,Nijmegen
1998(Artistarium,
De Suppositionibus).
46, 14-17& 22-24.(hereafter
10-4),
Buridanus,
John
Summulm
deDialctica
. Anannotated
witha philosophical
introduction
Buridan,
translation,
andfourth,
thedemonstrabyG. Klima,NewHaven-London
2001,260:"Furthermore,
tivesciencealso use thissortof supposition.
Forifwe sayin [connection
with]the
thatevery
thunder
is a soundmadein theclouds,
or thatevery
rainbow
is
Meteorologica
a reflection
or refraction
oflight,
thenwe do notintend
to saythesethings
onlyconthepresent
eveniftherewereno thunder
or rainbow
at thepreones;indeed,
cerning
senttime,
wewouldnevertheless
. . . Aristode
states
thisin
saythesamethings
explicitly
bk.1 ofthePosterior
"I call'[true]forall' [deomni
Analytics:
] thatwhichis notsuchthat
it holdsforsomeanddoesnotholdforanother,
norsuchthatsometimes
it holdsand
sometimes
itdoesnot."
9 I am usingthenotion
ofa 'proposition'
herein a metaphysically
neutral
way,to
refer
towhatever
is considered
thebearer
oflogical
truth
andfalsity,
whether
indifferently
thatbearer
is takentobe: 1) a sentence;
or 3) a common
con2) a statement;
"meaning
tent"acrossdifferent
without
a position
withregard
to their
languages,
taking
ontological
or howeffective
eachcandidate
is forfulfilling
thetaskofbearing
status,
or
logicaltruth
falsity.
10De Rijk1973(n. 1),55-57.

11:15:27 AM

310

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

has naturalsupposition
Hence, it is reallybecause the subject term thunder
in thatproposition,ratherthanpersonal
that
,
supposition the propositionis
and
we
can
claim
thatit is necessaryand eterdemonstrable
scientifically
nally true.
The view thatit was John Buridanwho reintroducednatural
supposition
for preciselythis purpose,is also confirmedin the mid-fifteenth-century
discussionof naturalsupposition
, c.1456, by Lawrence Sartorerof Sweden
(LaurentiusSartorerisde Swendenetum).Lawrence says:
naturalissuppositionis:
utrumsupDubitatursecundocircadescriptionem
extra
conveniat
terminis
naturalis
communibus,
propoaequaliter
positio
Pro quo notandumquod quidam moderni
sitionemet in propositione.
est quando terminussupponitin
naturalis
opinati sunt quod suppositio
Unde dixerunt
ordinead copulamnonimportantem
aliqwddeterminatimi
tempus.
Tonitruum
estsonus
Homo
est
talium
subiecta
animal;
propositionum:
quod
In
enim
naturaliter.
talibus
in
nubibus
,
propositionibus,
factus
supponunt
ut ipsi dicunt,subiectanon capiunturin ordinead aliquod determinasuntcontingentes.
tumtempus,quia si sic, talespropositiones
Quod est
PrimoPosteorum.
Et ergo ad salvandumillaspropocontraPhilosophum
naturalem
Buridanus
sitionesnecessarias
, dicensquod
suppositionem
excogitavit
nonimporin
ordine
ad
terminus
habet
fieri
copulam
supponit
ipsa
quando
Ex
a
connotatone
immo
absolvitur
determinatum
tantem
,
temporis.
tempus
aliquod
alia
naturalis
et
secundum
quaelibet
ipsumquod suppositio
quo sequitur
suppositiosolum est in propositione.Alii autem dixerunt,sequentes
actualis
solumestin propositione.
Suppositiovero
antiquos,quod suppositio
11
tionem.
in
extra
tam
proposi
quam
propositione,
ponabilis,

11Laurentius
de suppositione
naturali
Tractatus
de Swendenetum,
Sartoreris
, Lat.
naturalis
De suppositione
Ms. Michaelbeuren
, see
57, f. 223vb.Forhisentirediscussion
ofnatural
thedescription
itis doubted
ff.223va-226va.
supposition:
concerning
"Secondly
a proposition
and
terms
outside
whether
natural
appliesto common
equally
supposition
areoftheopinion
moderni
thatcertain
to whichit shouldbe noted,
within
it.According
witha copulanotintroducwhena termsupposits
occurs
thatnatural
arranged
supposition
as 'Man
ofsuchpropositions
time.Hence,they
saythatthesubjects
ingsomedeterminate
Forinthese
is a soundmadeintheclouds'arenaturally
'Thunder
is an animal';
suppositing.
witha copula
arenotarranged
ofpropositions,
as theythemselves
sorts
say,thesubjects
arecontinsomedeterminate
time,becauseifso,thosesortsofpropositions
introducing
And
I
Posterior
in
Book
of
the
what
the
That
is
Analytics.
says
Philosopher
against
gent.
natural
Buridan
devised
ofsuchpropositions
to savethenecessity
therefore,
supposition,
not
witha copula
thatit has to obtainwhena termsupposits
bybeingarranged
saying
itis absolved
determinate
some
,
oftime
time',
from
anyconnotation
nay,on thecontrary,
introducing
occurs
andanyothersupposition
to himthatnatural
sinceitfollows
supposition
according
others
theancients,
supposition
However,
saythatonlyactual
following
onlyina proposition.

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 3 11
In the balance of his essay,De Rijk focuseson only the 'FourthReason'
Buridangivesforwhynatural
mustbe reintroduced.
But,Buridan
supposition
himselfactually gives us several more reasons for reintroducingnatural
seem
, in addition to the reason that scientificdemonstrations
supposition
to requireit. First,Buridan says, thereare certainverbs which ampliate
their subject terms to supposit for all their past, present and future
' intel
significatain a propositionalcontext,such verbs as: Ho understand
(; '
'to
'
'
'
j, 'toknow(scire),tocognize(cognoscere
ligere) signify'
(.significare
), tothink''
(opinan),
and others.
Buridan thinksthat the presenceof theseverbs requiresnatural
fortheirsubjectterms,in orderfortheirsubjecttermsto supposit
supposition
forall theirpast, presentand futuresignificata.12
Second, certain other propositionalcontextsrequire naturalsupposition
fortheirsubjectterms,whetherthe propositionsare trueor false,contexts
like 'Everythingthat is, or was or will be, runs' (Omnequodest, velfuitvel
erit
, currit).13
Third, the presenceof certaintermsin a propositionaffectthe distributionof the subjecttermforall its past, present,and futuresignificata,
and these other termsrequire subject termsto have naturalsupposition
,
'
ratherthanpersonal
or material
Terms such as: 'perpetually
supposition.
(jper'
'
'
functionin thisway. For exam), eternally
petue
), always(semper),
(<aeternaliter
in
the
a
man
is
an
animal (Semper
homoestanimal)'
ple,
proposition'Always
'
the term always
that
the
term
man
have natural
(semper)
requires
subject
in
to
, according Buridan, order to distributethe termmanfor
supposition
all its past, presentand futuresignificata.14
In addition,our intellectspermit us to complexlyconceive of a man or an animal withoutany temThe existenceof theseatemporal
poral determination.
conceptionsexplains
ina proposition.
occurs
cantruly
occurjustas muchwithin
a proposition,
as
Supposition
outside
a proposition."
Noticealsoherethatit is the"secondargument
ofBuridan's,"
mentioned
which
Lawrence
thinks
isthemostimportant
reason
forBuridan's
byBraakhuis,
natural
to account
forthe'eternal
truth'
ofscientific
devising
supposition
propositions.
12Buridanus,
De suppositionibus
, 4.3.4,ed. Van derLecq,45, 13-16:"Primoquia ista
verba'intellegere,'
et alia multafaciunt
'scire','cognoscere',
'opinari',
'significare',
supvelteneri
trminos
cumeisconstructos
et futuris."
ponere
propraesentibus,
praeteritis
13Ibid.,45, 19-21:"Secundo,
hocetiamapparet
intalipropositione
'omnequodestvel
fuitvelerit,curri.
Subiectum
enimsupponit
et futuris,
sive
propraesentibus,
praeteritis
sitverasivefalsa."
propositio
14Buridanus,
De suppositionibus
etiamhoc
, ed. Van derLecq,46, 1-4& 9-11:"Tertio,
ubi terminus
confunderetur
vel consimiles
'aeterapparet
peristasdictiones
'perpetue',
Talesenimdictiones
re ex usu
naliter',
'semper'.
fuerunt,
impositae
proutvidetur
appare
ad distribuendum
vel
auctorum,
antiquorum
proomnitempore
praesenti,
praeterito,
futuro
. . . Undevidetur
homoestanimal'nonaequivalet
isti'omni
quodista'semper

11:15:27 AM

312

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

why we have to utilize various writtenor spoken linguisticexpressions

like 'man' or 'animal' to designatethem. When our intellectscomplexly
foreverytime,past,presentand future.
conceive,theydo so indifferendy
the
have
natural
when they occur in mental
Hence,
supposition
concepts
claims
that
there
are
both 'material'and 'formal'
Buridan
propositions.15
componentsto any given proposition,written,spoken, or mental. The
materialcomponentsare the subjectand predicateterms,and the formal
componentis the copula.16Since Aristotlesays that the most basic elementsof a propositionare a noun and a verb; the copula: is, is reallya
the
syncategorematic
part of the predicatetermwhichmerelyjoins together
of
is
and
This
function
the
subject predicated
conjoining
copula implicitly
containedin every
So, in the proposition'A man runs' forexampredicate.
ple, the presenttenseverb 'runs' impliesthe presenttense copula 'is', in
such a way that the verbs 'runs' can be replaced in any propositionby
'is-running'withoutany loss of truth-valuein the resultingproposition.
Gabriel Nuchelmans summarizesBuridan's view of mental propositions
as follows:
distans.
A mentalproposito
is a complexconceptformedby a complexio
consistsof the conceptsthatare the
The matterof the mentalpropositio
velfuturo
homo
homoestanimal',
sedisti'omnitempore
praesenti,
praeterito
tempore
estveleritanimal'."
fuit,
15Ibid.,48, 13-49,
naturali
2: "Adhuc
quia,sicutposposset
arguiproillasuppostone
omniaammalia,
asinos
sumus
indifferenter
concipere
equosetc.,unoconceptu
putahomines
hocnomen'animal',
a quo sumitur
homines,
equosvelasiabsquehocquodconcipiam
ita
a quibussumuntur
istanomina'homo''equus','asinus',
nosconceptibus
specialibus
a quosumitur
unoconceptu
communi
indifferenter
omniatempora
egopossum
concipere
hocnomen
praesentiam,
praespecialibus
conceptibus
'tempus'
absquehocquodconcipiam
coessetinpropositione
teritionem
velfuturitionem.
categorica
Ergopositoquodnecesse
eam
nonoporteret
cumtempore,
tamencorrespondenter
conceptibus
pulamsignificare
sedposset
velfuturum,
autdeterminate
determinate
praeteritum
tempus
significare
praesens
sinedifferentia
communem
expartetemporum
secundum
consignificare
tempus
conceptum
velfuturi.
praesentis,
praeteriti
16Johannes
inmateria
Librum
Perihermenias
, q. I, 7: utrum
Buridanus,
Quaestiones
longe
super
1983(Artistarium,
universali
naturali
, ed. R. vanderLecq,Nijmegen
4),
particularis
equivalei
in hocloconosintelestprimo
33, 17-18:"Notandum
propositionis
quodpermateriam
etperformam
etpraedicatum
subiectum
copulam."
propositionis
ligimus
17Ibid.,I, 5: utrum
adplatum
"verbum
estvoxsignificativa
verbi
sitbonainquadidtur
diffinitio
dicuntur
nota
eorum
etestsemper
estseparata
cuius
nulla
cumtempore
,
quedealtero
parssignificativa
essecopulavelimplicare
ed.VanderLecq,23,20-24:"Sednecsubiectum
copupotest
ad partem
ad duas,scilicet
orationis
reducuntur
Ideoprincipales
lamnececonverso.
partes
scilicet
etad partem
quiapotest
perse essecopula
perse copulativam,
perse subicibilem
ad subiectum."
velimplicare
copulam
praedicati

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
IN BURIDAN
PROPOSITIONS
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 313
comsubjectand predicate;the formis the mentalcopula, a conceptus
thatis an act of compoundingor separating.The mentalcopplexivus
ula does not signify
thatthe subject-thought
and the predicate-thought
are relatedto the same thingor are not relatedto the same thing.It
or separating
of compounding
is, rather,theactivity
itself,
beinga mode
of conceivingof a thingin a complexway,eitheraffirmatively
or negis the significate
of the vocal proposition
the
atively.The mentalpropositio
vocal termsand
conceptsof thingsbeingsignified
by the categorematic
the way of conceiving,the mentalcopula, being signified
by the synwordsestand nonest.If we wishto speakof the significate
categorematic
of a propositio
as such,we can mean onlythatthe mentalpropositio
is the
of the vocal propositio
or, in a less importantway, that the
significate
vocal propositio
is the significate
of the written
proposition
In addition, the Buridanian "mental copula" signifies
any timeyou please
The mentalcopula in facthas a different
onto(<quodlibet
tempus
significam).
status
than
the
verbal
or
written
'is'.
Because
the
mental
logical
copula
copula signifiesanytime
youplease(<quodlibet
tempus
), it is only veryroughly
correlatedwith its presenttense writtenor spoken "counterpartcopula"
'is' (est).The mental copula completelylacks tense and any connotation
of time:
... ita in intellectu
subiectiet conceptum
oportetpriusformare
conceptum
mentalemoportetdictis
praedicati,et postea formandopropositionem
conceptibussupervenire
conceptumcomplexivumistorumconceptuum
primorum,
qui [que ed.] per copulamverbalemdesignatur[designantur
ed.]. Ideo illi conceptusprimiqui in propositionementalisunt subiectum et predicatum,habent similitudinem
materie.Et conceptusiste
habet modum forme.Sicut igitursubiectum
complexivussuperveniens
et praedicatumdicunturmateriapropositionis.19
18G. Nuchelmans,
Theories
: Ancient
andmedieval
oftheProposition
conceptions
ofthebearers
of
truth
andfalsity
1973(North-Holland
, Amsterdam-London
Series,
Linguistic
8), 244.
19Buridanus,
Librum
Perihermenias
Quaestiones
, I, 7, ed. Van derLecq,33,
longe
super
21-28. . . So in theintellect,
it is required
first
thatoneform
theconcept
ofthesubofthepredicate,
andafter
itis required
forforming
a mental
jectandtheconcept
proposition
thatto thesaidconcepts
a complexive
on thosefirst
concept
supervenes
concepts
which
is designated
theverbalcopula.Therefore,
thosefirst
whichare
through
concepts,
in themental
as subject
andpredicate,
arelikematter.
proposition
And,thesupervening
works
likeform.
thesubject
andpredicate
ofa proposition
Therefore,
complexive
concept
arecalledthe'matter
oftheproposition'."
Buridanian
"mental
are
Perhaps,
propositions"
morelikesomeGreekorRussian
thatdo notrequire
a present
tensecopula
propositions
atall.Conventional
canatbestonlyutilize
written
andspoken
"counlanguages
imprecise
oftheBuridanian
mental
'y'or theLatin'es.
terparts"
copula,e.g.theEnglish

11:15:27 AM

314

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

mental
Withoutthisspecial atemporal
, the subordinatedconventional
copula
writtenand spoken propositionscould not be comprehendedor ever be
true
." Moreover, according to Buridan, we only need a
called "eternally
singlecomplex conceptionto be able to conceive past, presentor future,
particularthings,such as a man or an animal, withoutany additionof
mental
copula
special temporalconceptsat all. This is because the atemporal
the
that
binds
is the 'timelessinvisibleglue5
togetherwith
subject-thought
into a complexmentalthought,i.e. a mentalpropothe predicate-thought
to account forthe ability
sition.Buridanthinks,we need natural
supposition
a
mental
i.e.
of thissingleatemporal
proposition,and its
complex concept,
and
to
to any time
any particularentities.
abilityto apply indifferently
Item,sicutintellectus
potestconciperehominemet animalsine differenistitermini'homo' et
tia temporisillisconceptibusa quibusimponuntur
est quod potestformareconceptumcomplexivum
'animal',ita verisimile
illorumsine differentia
temporis.Et erittuncpropositiomentalisomni
Ideo etiamtermini
vel futuro,indifferens.
tempore,praesentipraeterito
Sed non habemus
indifferenter.
illis
omnibus
supponunt
temporibus
pro
talem copulam mentalem.
vocem proprieimpositamad significandum
talem
Ideo possumusad placitumhac voce 'est' uti ad significandum
non
quam
praepraesens
magis
tempus
significabitur
quam
copulamper
immonullum.Ideo, sic eritsuppositionaturalistervel futurum,
teritum
minorum.20
mental
copulathat is doing all
However, it is actuallythe special atemporal
the work of preservingthe necessityand "eternaltruth"of scientifically
demonstrablepropositions,not the natural suppositionof their subject
demonstrafor scientifically
terms.Buridan's defenseof naturalsupposition
ble propositionsactuallyrestsupon the "second argument"mentionedby
Braakhuis,namely,Buridan's argumentfor the existenceof the atemporal
mental
copula.
20Buridanus,
De suppositionibus
, 4.3.4,ed. Van derLecq,47, 19-22;JohnBuridan,
is ableto
Summulae
4, 4.3.4,p. 261:"Again,
Klima,Treatise
justas theintellect
, trans.
oftimebymeansoftheconcepts
ofmanandanimalwithout
conceive
anydistinction
a
thatitis abletoform
so itis likely
areimposed,
'man'and'animal'
theterms
whence
Butthenthemental
oftime.
without
[formed
proposition
anydistinction
concept
complexive
to all present,
withrespect
willbe indifferent
withthisconcept]
times,
past,andfuture
Butwe
from
thosetimes
foreverything
willsupposit
andso also[its]terms
indifferently.
sucha mentad
to signify
do nothavean utterance
copula,so we can
imposed
properly
thepresent
sucha copulabywhich
usetheverb'is'byconvention
] tosignify
[adplacitum
no
thanis thepastor thefuture:
timewillno morebe signified
indeed,
[itwillsignify]
of
the
terms."
willoccura natural
timeat all,andso there
supposition

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
IN BURIDAN
PROPOSITIONS
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 315
Buridan'sinsistenceupon the existenceof a special atemporal
mental
cop" of
ula for mental propositions,in order to ensure the "eternaltruth
demonstrablepropositions,is a forerunnerof a view of the
scientifically
nature of time which the contemporaryphilosopherMichael J. Loux
characterizesto as "eternalis
ratherthan as atemporal
:
Eternalists
. . . makemuchof tenselesslanguage.Indeed,eternalists
have
wanted
to
claim
that
we
without
loss
traditionally
everything say can,
of content,be expressedin a tenselesslanguage.On thisview,even the
claim thata particulartimeis presentcan be expressedin a language
that exhibitsno built-inprejudicein favorof one time over another.
These eternalists
remindus thatexpressions
like 'now' and 'the present'
are indexicals.Indexicals,recall,are referring
expressionswhose reference on any occasionof utteranceis determined
by the contextof that
utterance."'Now' is an indexicalwhich,on any occasionof utterance,
have genpicksout the timeat whichthe utteranceoccurs.Eternalists
taken
this
fact
to
I
show
that
when
a
refer
to
time
as
'now' or
erally
'the present,'I am not identifying
it as some ontologically
privileged
moment;I am merelypickingit out as the timeat whichmyutterance
occurs.... To speak of an eventas past or futureis not to denigrate
it, to deny it full-blown
ontologicalstatus;it is merelyto say that it
- the
occurs beforeor aftera particularutterance
veryutteranceby
whichI date it.21
II
Unlike Buridan,the presentseems to hold a special ontologicalstatusfor
Albertof Saxony. He defendswhat Michael J. Loux refersto as a "pre"
sentisi
. . . believe
positionwithrespectto the natureof time. "Presentists
thatthe use of tensesis ontologicallysignificant.
As theysee it, onlywhat
existsin the presentreallyexistsand onlywhat is goingon in the present
is reallygoing on."22AlbertclearlysatisfiesLoux's characterizationof a
presentisi:
In propositione
de praesenti,
in qua non ponituraliquisterminus
ampliasive his quae sunt,
tivus,nomendenotatursupponerepro praesentibus
quamvisin eadem propositioneetiambene supponatpro aliis. Et ideo

21Loux2002(n.6), 221-22.
22Loux2002(n.6), 220.

11:15:27 AM

316

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD
in omnipropositione
hoc verbum:est,sit copula explicitesive implicite.
in
omni
terminusobtinetqui denotatursupponere
Igitur,
propositione,
per illam propositionem
pro eo quod est. Unde quamvisin ilia: Adam
tarnenilla proposi
tio resolvi
tur
, ponaturverbumde praeterito,
iit homo
in unam in qua hoc verbum<est> praesentistemporisest copula,ut in
illa:Adamestpraeteritus
homo.
Et ideo sicutdictum<est>, semperterminus23
in propositione
in qua poniturdenotatursupponerepro eo quod est.24

In fact,Albertmaintainsthat everypropositionis reallyonly about the

arguesthatthe presenttensecopula
thingsthatpresentlyexist.He further
a
is
an
of
'is', really independentpart
proposition.It is not any syncategorematicelementin a propositionor a part of the predicateterm,as
Buridan implies.25It is a significative
term in a categoricalproposition
that only signifiesthe presenttime:
Probatur:
Secundaconclusio:quod hoc verbumestnon estsyncategorema.
alicuiusabsque hoc
illudnon est syncategorema
quod est significativum
con, per praecedentem
quod alicuiaddatur;sed sic est de hoc verboest
clusionem,ergo,etc.
Tertia conclusio:hoc verbumest,est significativum
temporispraesentis.
est
Probatur,nam in communimodo loquendi,cum dicimus:Socrates
modo
hoc
non
est
albus
albus;
, significaiquod pro praesentitempore
esse nisi hoc verbumestessetconsignificativum
temporispraesentis.26

23<obtinet>
ed.
24Albert
A critical
ofhisQuaestiones
edition
onLogic.
Questions
Disputed
ofSaxony's
Twenty-foe
Leiden-Boston-Kln
circalogicarci,
ed.MJ.Fitzgerald,
2002,(hereafter
QCL),<Undevicesima
adsupponendum
subiectum
inpropositione
depraesenti
proeoquod
possit
ampliari
Quaestio>Utrum
in
tenseproposition,
5: "In a present
velpotest
esse
, 347. 1, pp. 255,13-256,
iit,velerit,
forpresent
or those
a nounmeansitsupposits
is no ampliating
which
there
term,
things
forothers.
inthatproposition
italsocorrectly
which
Therefore,
are,eventhough
supposits
or implicitly.
in every
thisverb'is',is thecopula,either
Therefore,
explicitly
proposition
in thatproposition
forthat
which
meansitsupposits
in every
a term
prevails
proposition
Adamwas
there
is a verbofthepasttensein theproposition:
which
is.Hence,although
tenseverb
thatproposition
is parsedintoonein whichthepresent
a man;nevertheless
as [is]said,a termis always
'is' is thecopula;as in:Adamis a pastman.Therefore,
forthatwhichis."
in which
itoccurs,
in a proposition
indicated
to supposit
25See notes17 and 18 above.
26Albertus
ed. AngelMuozinArtem
Veter
de Saxonia,Quaestiones
em,edicincritica,
s De Interpretation
InLibrum
Aristoteli
1988:Quaestiones
Maricaibo
, De VerboSecunda
Garca,
cumtempore
sitsignificativum
omne
verbum
utrum
, 885-86,
p. 552 (hereafter
Quaeritur
Quaestio:
Thisis
expression.
QAV). "TheSecondThesisis:Theverb'is' is nota syncategorematic
withofsomething,
is significative
which
Thatisnota syncategorematic
expression
proved.
to thepreceding
butso itis withthisverb'is' according
outbeingaddedto something,
etc.
Thesis.Therefore,

11:15:27 AM

IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 317
SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
the same presentthingthatthe participlebeing
The copula 'is' (est),signifies
time
.
connoting
signifies,
althoughthe noun beingsignifiesthat thingwithout
Similiterhoc verbumest, significaieandem rem quam significaihoc
illamsineconnotatione
ens
, licetnomenenssignificai
temporis.27
participium
The presenttensecopula 'is' independently
signifiesthatthe subjectterm
for
and predicatetermsof the propositionare to be takenas co-suppositing
in
verb
the same presently
Moreover,every
everyproposition
existing
things.
containsthispresenttense copula 'is'. Hence, the categorematic
implicitly
termsin the propositioncan only suppositfor things
(ensvel enti)which
on
the
Albert's
are
ontologicallyprivileged
emphasis
presently (quae sunt).
statusof "the presenttime" also emergesfromhis general characterization of suppositionitself:
turest acceptioseu usus terminicatUnde supposi
tio de qua hic intendi
tione.Unde
qui accipiturpro aliquo vel aliquibusin proposi
egorematici
dico accipi pro ilio de cuiuspronomine
terminm
alicuiuspropositionis
denotaturverificali
iliumpraedicatumin illa propositione
demonstrante
affirmative
vel negative,verbi gratia dicendo 'homo est animai', vel
'homo' accipdicendo'homo est nomen'.In primaistarumhic terminus
Sortemvel
iturpro Sortevel Platone,quia de pronominedemonstrante
Platonemli animal quod est praedicatumpraedictaepropositionis
per
denotaturverifican,
ut dicendo 'hoc est anipraedictampropositionem
mal' demonstrando
per ly hoc Sortemvel Platonemvel aliquem alium
hominem.28
for
ThirdThesisis: Thisverb'is' is significative
ofthepresent
tense.Thisis proved,
in theusualwaywe say:Socrates
is white,
thatat thepresent
timehe is
signifies
speaking
oftheprewhite.
Nowthiswouldnotbe thecase,unlesstheverb'is' is consignificative
verbum
sitnota
eorum
senttense."
Cf.also,QCL,<NonaQuaestio>Utrum
semper
quaedealtero
ad subiectum
dicuntur
velpraedicantur
, 170,pp. 167,15-16:"Et istacompositio
praedicati
See alsonote
nonestaliudnisiidemesseproquo supponit
subiectum
et praedicatum."
20 above.
27QAV:Quaestiones
In Librum
Aristotelis
De Interpretationen
884,pp. 550 & 552:"Similarly,
thisverb'is' signifies
thesamething
as theparticiple
thenoun
'being'signifies,
although
time"
thatthing
without
'being'signifies
connoting
' Alberts
28Christoph
derTermini:
EineUntersuchung
zur(Perutilis
Kann,DieEigenschaften
logica
vonSachsen
terminorum
, Leiden1994,Perutilis
, Tr. II, cap. I: De suppositionibus
, 167,8-19.
"Thesupposition
which
is intended
hereis thetaking
or useofa categorematic
term,
by
in a proposition.
whichitis takenforsomething
or somethings
Hence,I saya termin
a proposition
is taken
forthat,
which
hasbeenpointed
inthatproposiout,thepredicate
ofa pronoun
or negatively;
tionis meantto be verified
forexample
affirmatively
saying
'manis an animal'or saying
'manis a noun'.In thefirst
ofthese,thisterm'man'is
taken
forSocrates
orPlato,becauseofa pronoun,
Socrates
orPlatohaving
beenpointed
whichis thepredicate
ofthepreceding
is meantto
out,theterm'animal',
proposition,
'thisis an
be verified;
as in saying
whilepointing
to Socrates
or Platoor some
animal',
other
man,usingtheterm'this'."

11:15:27 AM

318

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

In order for the termhomoto have anysupposition

at all, in the proposition: Homo est animal
one
be
must
to
Socrates
or Plato right
,
pointing
or
some
man
other
at
the
the
now,
existing
presenttime,using demonstrative
pronoun 'Aoc' and saying: Hoc est animal.So, the subject term in that
that it signifies,
propositioncannot suppositfor everything
past, present,
and future,but only the presentlyexistingones.
Unde non pro omni ilio quod terminussignificat
potestsupponerein
de omni ilio quod significat.
propositione.Nec etiam est verificabilis
Unde lyalbum
, quamvissignificet
albedinem,tamenhaec estfalsa:Albedo
estalba.29
The onlyknownplace in Albertwritingswherehe explicitlydiscussesnaturalsupposition
is in the nineteenthquestion of his Quaestiones
circalogicam:
Utrum
inpropositione
depraesenti
subiectum
ad
possitampliari supponendum
pro eo
In
vel
et
vel
esse.
that
Albert
draws
the
distinction
, potest
Question
,
quodfait,
betweenthe naturaland actualsupposition
of a term.
indifferenter
Secundo,notandumquod suppositioqua terminus
supponit
omnibus
suis
et futuris,
pro
significatis
praesentibus,
praeteritis,
potest
vocari suppositio
naturalis.
Suppositioautem qua terminusaccipiturpro
ilio quod est vel pro illisquae sunt30
actualist
potestvocarisuppositio
a subjectterm's
The presenttensecopula 'is', in any proposition,restricts
actualsupposition
to its presentlyexistingsignificata.Subject termsdo not
For example,in a propositionlike
usuallysuppositforall theirsignificata.
'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' the subjecttermhas natural
supfor
all
and
future
instances
of
but
the
thunder,
position
past,present,
propositionliterallymeans that the subject term has actualsupposition
only for
the presentinstancesof thunder.Albertsays:

29QCL:<Duodecima
iliosupportt
Utrum
terminus
, 228.2.2.2,
proomni
quod
significat
Quaestio>
in a proposition.
Neither
itsignifies
cannot
foreverything
supposit
pp. 197,1-4:"A term
theterm'white'
ofeverything
itsignifies.
is itabletobe verified
Hence,although
signifies
is false."
'Whiteness
is a whitething5
nevertheless
theproposition
whiteness;
30velfuit,
ed.
31QCL: <Undevicesima
it shouldbe noted
348,pp. 256,10-14:"Second,
Quaestio>,
forall itssignificata,
termindifferently
thatthesupposition
supposits
bywhicha subject
The supposition,
can be called'natural
however,
supposition'.
past,andfuture,
present,
a subject
termis taken
is,orthosethatare,canbe called'actual
forthatwhich
bywhich
supposition'."

11:15:27 AM

IN BURIDAN
SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 319
tionemnaturalemtermini,
Tertio,notandumquod quamvispono supposi
non tamen propterhoc
sicutplurimi32
antiquorumlogici posuerunt,33
volo concedereistas 'Tonitruumest sonusfactusin nubibus'(supposito
'Rosa estflos'(suppositoquod nullasitrosa),
quod nullumsittonitruum),
naturalemet consimiles;
quas conceduntpropteristam suppositionem
quia intendobene concederequod in ista 'Rosa est flos' (positoquod
nulla rosa sit),subiectumbene supponitsuppositione naturalipro eo
quod est vel fuit,vel erit,vel potestesse, sed in propositionein qua
ponitur,denotatursupponeresolumpro eo quod est,ex quo est propoEt igitur,
estneganda
siti de praesenti
sinetermino
ampliativo.
propositio
tamquamfalsa,ex quo per eam denotaturquod rosa est quae est flos.
termini
Unde non secundumomnemsuppositionem
propositiodebetdici
vera vel falsa,sed solum secundumistam qua terminusaccipiturpro
tionem.
aliquo vel pro aliquibusper quem denotaturaccipi per proposi
Ideo ilia estfalsa'Tonitruumestsonusfactusin nubibus'(suppositoquod
nullumtonitruumsit). Similiter,in ista: Eclipsislunae etc. (supposito
quod nulla sit),et sic de aliis pluribus.34
In his Perutilis
, Albertsays:
Et sic dico quod subiectumistiuspropositionis
'Tonitruumest sonusfactusin nubibus'supponitpersonaliter35
pro eo quod fuitvel eritvel potest
32plurimum,
ed.
33possuerunt,
ed.
34QCL:<Undevicesima
15.Third,
itshould
be noted:
349,pp.256,19-257,
Quaestio>,
I putforth
thenatural
ofterms,
supposition
Although
justas didmanyoftheolderlogi'Thunder
is a soundmadein the
cians;I do notwantto concedethesepropositions
thatno thunder
nowno roseis; and
clouds',
is; 'A roseis a flower',
assuming
assuming
similar
I intend
which
olderlogicians
concede
becauseofnatural
propositions
supposition.
toconcede
thatin theproposition
'A roseis a flower',
thatno roseis;thesubassuming
forthatwhich
is or was,or willbeor can
jecttermcorrectly
supposits
bynatural
supposition
inwhich
bea rose.But,theproposition
thesubject
term
is placedmeans
that
thesubject
term
is in thepresent
tenseand lacksan
is,sincetheproposition
forthatwhich
supposits
only
term.
sincetheproposition
meansthata roseis whichis a flower;
Therefore,
ampliating
theproposition
is deniedas false.Hence,itis notbecauseofevery
ofterms
supposition
thata proposition
butonlyaccording
to thesuppooughtto be saidto be trueor false,
sition
thesubject
in theproposition
term
is takenforsomething
orsomethings
bywhich
it is meant
tobetaken.
thatno thunder
Therefore,
is, theproposition
forwhich
assuming
'Thunder
is a soundmadein theclouds',
is false.Similarly,
no eclipseofthe
assuming
moonis now,theproposition
'Aneclipseofthemoonetc.'is falseandso on formany
others."
See also,PaulaJ. Smithka,
andNatural
In Albert
Ampliation
Supposition
ofSaxony's
CircaLogicam,
in:J.Biard(ed.),Itinraires
d'Albert
deSaxeParisVienne
AuXIVe
Quaestiones
Sicle,Paris1991,137-148.
35Kann1994(n.28),Tr.II, cap.IUI: De suppositione
177,3-5:"Suppositio
personali,
personalis
estacceptio
termini
vocalis
velscripti
estad significandum
vel
proiliocuiimpositus

11:15:27 AM

320

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD
esse vel imaginan.Sed quia per proposi
tionemdenotatursupponerepro
eo quod est, cum sit de praesentisine terminoampliative,praedicta
sit.Similiter
dicerepropositioestfalsasuppositoquod nullumtonitruum
turde ista 'Rosa estpulcherrimus
florum'positoquod nulla rosa esset.36

Since at presentthereare no particularinstancesof thunder,forwhich

the personally
suppositing
subject term can be taken in the proposition
'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds', the propositionis literally
false.
On Buridan'sview,by contrast,the subjecttermhas natural
for
supposition
all its past, presentand futuresignificata.Even though this is also the
case forAlbert,it is because a subjecttermcan be ampliatedto supposit
for its significatawhich are beyond the tense of the principalverb in a
proposition.Paying carefulattentionto verbal tense in a propositionis
essentialfor determiningthe thingsfor which the subject term actually
For example,when thereis an ampliatingtermin a proposition,
supposits.
like the term 'dead' in the proposition'The king is dead', the subject
termis ampliatedbeyond the presenttense to signifyits past significata.
However,the occurrenceof a past tensedcopula 'was' in the proposition
'Adam waj (fit) a man', he says,is merelya disguisedabbreviationfor
the presenttenseexpression:'is a past man'. Hence, the propositionreally
means 'Adam is a past man'37 The past tense copula 'was', ampliatedthe
subjectterm'Adam' to suppositbeyondthe implicitpresenttensecopula
'is' to include past men as well as presentmen in its supposita.Hence,
the actualsupposition
of the term'Adam' in the proposition:'Adam was a
man' is for both its presentand past supposita.The situationis exactly
the same forscientific
propositionslike 'Thunder is a sound made in the
clouds'. Hence, Albertthinksthat subject termssuppositingin propositionscan onlysuppositforpresendyexistingspatio-temporal
objects,stricdy
"
termini
mentalis
("Personal
significai.
supposiacceptio
proilioquo naturaliter
proprie
or
tionis thetaking
ofa spoken
orwritten
termforthatwhich
itis stipulated
to signify
ofa mental
thetaking
termforthatwhichitproperly
naturally
signifies.")
36Ibid.,cap.V: Depropositionibus
dubitandis
2: "Andso I saythatthesub, 197,17-198,
inthisproposition
'Thunder
is a soundmadeintheclouds'personally
supposits
jectterm
means
forthatwhich
wasorwillbe orcanbe orimagined.
But,becausetheproposition
an ampliatense
without
thatitsupposits
forthatwhich
is,sinceitis a present
proposition
It should
thatthere
is no thunder.
tiveterm,
thepreceding
is false,
assuming
proposition
'The roseis themostbeautiful
offlowers'
forthisproposition
be saidsimilarly
assuming
thatno roseis."
37QCL: <Undevicesima
in ilia:
Quaestio>,347,pp. 255, 18-256,3: "Undequamvis
in unamin
illapropositio
resolvitur
verbum
de praeterito,
tarnen
Adam
, ponatur
fidthomo
homo."
estpraetmtus
<est>praesentis
estcopula,utin ilia:Adam
temporis
qua hocverbum

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
IN BURIDAN
PROPOSITIONS
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 321
speaking,unless there occurs some ampliatingterm which expands the
range of the subject term's supposita to also include its past or future
The suppositaof an actually
significata.
suppositing
subjecttermmighteven
extendto significatathat can be or can be imaginedat present:
. . . terminusin propositionepotestsupponerepro aliquo quod fuitvel
eritvel potestesse vel intellegivel imaginariabsque hoc quod in ilia
vus.38
propositione
ponaturterminusampliati
without
tense
However,verbsnever
, as Buridanclaims.39Albertadopts
signify
what he claims to be the real position of Aristode,in De Interpretation
e:
verbs mustalways signifywithtense.There cannot be atemporal
verbs(verba
), whethersuch verbs are takento be written,spoken,or menintemporalia
tal. He presentseight different
argumentsfor this position. 1) In grammar we acknowledgeknowledgeimpersonal
verbs(verbaimpersonalia
:), e.g. 'It
is raining(Pluit)' 'It is thundering( Tonat)' but we do not hear of "tense40 Verbs
less" atemporal
verbs
actionsand under(verbaintemporalia).
2)
signify
but
both
of
these
actions,
going
concepts require persistentparticular
at all.41
thingsundergoingthe passage of time in orderto be comprehended
If
therewere such atemporal
verbs,therewould be no greaterreason
3)
to say that that a verb was of the past, present,or futuretense, rather
than any other.424) If there were such a thingas an atemporal
copula,
thenassumingtherewould be no animalsnow but were some in the past
or will be some in the future;both partsof a disjunctiveproposition'An
animalis healthyor an animal is sick'havingincompatibledisjunctswould
be true;since the copula 'is' would indifferently
signify
past, present,and
futureanimals. However, the disjunctivepropositionis obviouslyfalse,
38Kann1994(n. 28),cap.V: Depropositionibus
dubitandis
, 197,14-16:". . . A termin a
can supposit
forsomething
thatwas,or willbe,or canbe,or can be comproposition
orimagined,
an ampliative
without
termbeine:
prehended
putin thatproposition."
39QCL:< OctavaQuaestio
> Utrum
verbum
absolvi
a tempore
sicquodnonsignified
cum
possit
breviter
ad quaestionem
istamconclu, 147,pp. 157,18-19:"Respondeo
tempore
ponendo
sionem:
nonpotest
absolvi
a tempore."
quodverbum
40Ibid,148,pp. 158,7-9:"Siverbum
absolvi
a tempore,
posset
sequeretur
quodhaberemusverbaintemporalia
sicuthabemus
verbaimpersonalia.
<De talibus
autem
nonaudimus>.
nonaccipimus
discovered
Viennamanuscript
[itade talibus
ed.]."<Read withthenewly
NB,CVP 5461,f.9ra.>
41Ibid,149,pp. 158,13-15:"Secundo,
omneverbum
sigificat
agerevelpati.Sedagere
velpatinonpossunt
sinetempore."
intelligi
42Ibid,150,pp. 158,15-17:"Tertio,
si aliquaverbapossunt
absolvia tempore
et
indifferenter
etfuturum;
tuncnonessemaior
consignificare
tempus
praesens,
praeteritum,
ratiode aliquibus
quamde aliis."

11:15:27 AM

322

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

verbs
because nowthere are no animals.435) If we allowed for atemporal
could
be
true
verba
togethere.g.
(
), contradictory
propositions
intemporalia
'An eclipse of the moon is a lack of lightfromthe sun', and 'No eclipse
of the moon is a lack of lightfromthe sun5,if thereis no eclipse of the
verbs
moon now.446) & 7) If we allowed foratemporal
, then even scientific
for
terms
whose
nothing,would be true at
supposit
subject
propositions
'An
ass
is an animal' when no
false.
For
rather
than
example,
present,
animal is rightnow; or 'A man is an animal', if thereis no man right
verb
now.458) If therewere such a thingas an atemporal
, it would be pointi.e.
its
tenses
between
less to grammatically
presenttense,is;
distinguish
frompast tense, was; or futuretense, will be.*6Given all these reasons,
or eternal
of the presenttensed copAlbertthinksany atemporal
signifying
ula 'is' is simplyillusory.Even thoughin the presenttense copula 'is' is
implicitin everyverb; AlbertNEVER allows the presenttensecopula 'is5
use. It alwayssignifiesthe presenttense.In addition,
to have an atemporal
tense
since nouns always signifyall of theirsignificatawithout
, even when
nouns are suppositingsubjecttermsin scientific
propositions;theyalways
For Alberttalkingabout
and
future
their
significata.
signify
past, present,
in
Buridan's
terms
of subject
natural
way is simplyotiose.Albert
supposition
seems to reason that even thoughthe subjecttermsof scientific
proposithe
tense
that
are
for
tionscan be said to naturally
beyond
supposit things
of the verb in a particularpropositionalcontext,the proposition'struth
or falsitydoes not depend upon thatsortof supposition.It depends upon
someone at a given time takingthe subjecttermsas personallysuppositto thetenseof theverbin that
ing for somethingor some things,according
:
proposition
non supponunt
Concedoquod in librisclausistermini
pro aliquo,
inscripti
pro aliquo. Et igitursi aliquishomo alius proquia a nulloaccipiuntur
43Ibid.,151,pp. 159,8-16:"Quarto,
animalesset,
positoiamquodnullum
sequeretur
nam
Sedhocestfalsum,
estaegrum'.
velanimal
estsanum
quodhaecessetvera:'Animal
estincasuquod
ex eo quodpositum
cuiusquaelibet
istaestunadisiunctiva
parsestfalsa,
animeil
sit."
nullum
44Ibid.,152,pp. 159,18-19:"Quinto,
essent
simul
sequeretur
quodduocontradictoria
Ibid,154,pp. 160,18-19:"Septimo,
proboquodhaecnonsit
vera,sedhocestfalsum."
homoesset."
Homoestanimal,
concedenda:
positoquodnullus
45Ibid.,153,pp. 159,24-25:"Sexto,
adhuc
essetasinus,
positoquodnullus
sequeretur
estanimal."
haecessetvera:Asinus
46Ibid.,15,pp. 160,12-13:"Octavo,sequeretur
et
temporis,
quodverbapraesentis
ab invicem."
et frustra
frustrarentur
etpraeteriti
futuri,
distinguerentur
temporis,

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 323
ferret'Homo est animal',et nec ipse nec alteracciperetillos trminos
pro aliquo, diceremquod praedictitermininon supponerent.47
Nevertheless,Albertcan say that scientificpropositionslike 'Thunder is
a sound made in the clouds' are in fact "eternallytrue;" if by that one
understandsthat thismeans wheneverthe propositionis actuallyformed
at particulartimesand places it is true,i.e. it is trueon each occurrence
of its thought,utterance,or inscriptionand not otherwise,i.e., it is true
at eachof thosetimesor omni-temporally
true
:
. . . Scientiadebet esse de his quae suntperpetuaeveritatishoc est de
suntverae, et illae
his propositionibus
quae quandocumqueformantur
Et ideo stanteimpositioneterdicunturimmutabiles
et incorruptibiles.
Modo logica,quamvis
minorumnon mutantur
de veritatein falsitatem.
sit de enuntiationibus
et de argumentationibus,
quae suntcorruptibiles
formataede his
tarnenpropositiones
et possuntformariet non formari,
forPatetquia quotienscumque
suntincorruptibiles
ad iliumintellectum.
Et
mantursuntverae, et non suntmutabilesde veritatein falsitatem.
scitaede his vocat
demonstrativae
ideo quia sempersuntpropositiones
.48
veritatis
eas Aristoteles
perpetuae
propositiones
47QCL,253,pp. 209,1-5:"Terms
forsomething
written
closedbooksdo notsupposit
ifa manwereto utter
becausetheyarenottakenforsomething
Therefore,
byanyone.
for
he noranyothermanwereto takethoseterms
'A manis an animal',
andneither
I wouldsaythoseterms
do notsupposit."
something;
48QCL:<PrimaQuaestio>Utrum
velpractica
sitscientia
, 21,pp.70,11-71,
speculativa
logica
whichare eternally
true
4: "Understanding
; thatis,ofpropositions
oughtto be ofthings
andincorsuchthatwhenever
theyaremadetheyaretrue.Theyarecalled'immutable
cannot
ofterms,
thesepropositions
and,therefore,
giventhecurrent
stipulation
ruptible';
Nowalthough
utterances
andarguments
from
a truth
to a falsehood.
logictreats
change
to that
andcapableofbeingmadeor not,nevertheless,
whicharecorruptible
according
madefrom
themareincorruptible.
Thisis clear,because
thepropositions
comprehension,
from
are formed
whenever
thosepropositions
theyare true.Theyare notchangeable
thataredemonintofalsehoods.
becausetherearealways
truths
Therefore,
propositions
'eternar
". See also,
understood
from
Aristotle
callsthosetruepropositions
them,
stratively
0 Lgica
Alberto
de Sajonia,
Perutilis
, ed.ngel
Muoz-Garca,
Logica
MuyUtil(O Utilsima)
demonD.F. 1988,Tractatus
Primus,
, 98: ". . . Propositiones
Mxico,
cap.8: De Praedicato
veldemonstrabiles
scitaevelscibiles
scientia
esseperpetuae
dicta,debent
strantes,
proprie
in LibroPosteriorum,
secundum
dicoquidam'perpetuae
veritatis;
quoddicitAristoteles
veritatis'
id est,quotiescumqe
formantur
velquotiescumque
suntvelerunt
formabuntur,
velfuerunt
veraemanente
eademsignificatione
terminorum.
..." I think
thatW.V.Quine's
viewof"eternal
sentences"
a viewverysimimaybe ofsomehelphere.Quinedefends
lartoAlbert's.
thenaneternal
sentence
isa sentence
whosetokens
Quinesays:"Succincdy,
allhavethesametruth
value. . . Whenwespeakof'2 < 5' as an eternal
then,
sentence,
wemustunderstand
thatwe areconsidering
in ourlanguage,
itexclusively
as a sentence
andclaiming
thetruth
ofitstokens
thatareutterances
orinscriptions
onlyofthose
produced

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MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

with Buridan's view of scientificpropoHence, Albert'smajor difficulty

sitionsis reallynot that theirsubject termshave naturalsupposition
for all
theirpast,present,and futuresignificata
in such propositions.Alberthimself also claims that subject termsin scientificpropositionshave natural
for all theirpast, present,and futuresignificata.What really
supposition
bothersAlbertabout Buridan'streatmentof scientific
propositionsis that
Buridan requiresan atemporal
copulaforthem to be "eternallytrue". It is
not because of the naturalsupposition
of the subject termthat a scientific
or
other
proposition, any
propositionforthatmatter,is true;it is because
the propositionrequiresthat the subject term be verifiedby the predicate termaccordingto the tense of the verb in thatproposition,on each
occasion of the utteranceof the proposition.Albert'sgreatinsightforhis
nominalistprogenywas seeingthat on thisbasis one can have "eternally
trueand necessary,"universalscientific
about presendyexisting
propositions
concreteparticulars,where the subjecttermsof such propositionssupposit
. Consequently,it is not the natural
of theirsubjectterms
personally
supposition
which makes scientificpropositions"eternallytrue or and necessary"at
all. One can have trueand necessaryscientific
withoutrequirpropositions,
of subject terms,the existenceof an "eternal
or
ing the naturalsupposition
"
."
," or special eternally
atemporal
copula
existing
objects
Ill
How does understanding
Albert'sview here help us in understanding
the
context
of
later
discussions
of
natural
?
De
philosophic
supposition Rijk's
anonymousauthorgives to us some Notabiliaincludedwithhis discussion
Buridan'sviews,in BnF, lat. 14.716,ff.40va-41rb.These "Notabilia"
reject
The variousviews
John Buridan'svariousargumentsfornatural
supposition.
given in theseNotabiliaseem to me to be merelyan ad hochodge-podge
of variousviews of Albert's,againstvarious positionsof Buridan's,given
earlierin the centuryand interpolatedby the anonymousauthorforhis
own purposes.Consider for example the formulations
of the two major
in
the
Buridan's
view
of
natural
The
Notabilia
,
arguments
against
supposition.
firstargument,1.2.1, claimsthatsinceany subjecttermas a categorematic

in ourlinguistic
. . . Whenwe calla sentence
we arecalleternal,
therefore,
community
relative
at a particular
time."(W.V.Quine,
ingit eternal
onlyto a particular
language
, Englewood
Cliffs,
Philosophy
ofLogic
NJ1970,14).

11:15:27 AM

& ALBERTOF SAXONY 325

IN BURIDAN
PROPOSITIONS
SCIENTIFIC
noun supposits"properlyarrangedwith the copula of the proposition"
forall of its present,past, and futuresignificata;thereis reallyno need
for the subject termto accomplishthis:
to introducenaturalsupposition
1.2.1 Quilibetterminus
supponitin ordinead copulamsue propositionis. Ergo nulla est suppositionaturalis.Consequentiaest bona. Et antecedenspatetper diffinitionem
suppositionis.49
followsfromAlbert'sposition.50
As I havejust illustrated
above, thisdirectly
The second major argumentagainstBuridan'sview of naturalsuppoin a proposisition,1.2.2, is that if a subject termhas naturalsupposition
tion the way Buridan claims; then if a subjecttermsuppositsfornothing
which is, the propositionwill be false. Consider the propositionCArose
is (Rosa est)'when thereis no rose. If one takesthe subjecttermas naturally
forwhatis, the propositionis true. However,the propositionis
suppositing
it to be {nonestita sicut
asserts
arenotso, as theproposition
falsebecause " things
esse
asseritur
earn
):"
per
1.2.2 Secundo sic. Si aliquis terminussupponeretnaturaliter,
sequitur
'
quod ista propositioessetvera rosaes secundumistamsuppositionem,
suppositoquod nulla rosa sit.Consequensest falsumet non est ita sicut
esse. Consequentiadeclaratur.Quia rosa est vel fuit,
per earn asseritur
'
'
'
sequiturquod ista propositiorosa
ergo si li rosa supponatnaturaliter,
es est vera, suppositoquod nulla rosa sit in temporepraesenti.51
Albertclearlymaintainswhen a subject termin an affirmative
proposition suppositsfor nothingthat is, the propositionis false. The subject
termin a negativeproposition,whichsuppositsfornothingthatis, is true:
cuius subiectumpro
Secundo,inferoquod omnispropositioaffirmativa
nullo supponitest falsa.Propterhoc haec est falsa 'Chymaeraest chymaera'. Et propositionegativacuius subiectumpro nullo supponitest
vera. Et propterhoc haec est vera 'Chymaeranon est chymaera'.52

49De Riik1973(n. 1),57.

50See note34 above.
51De Rijk1973(n. 1),57.
52QCL: <NonaQuaestio>170.2,pp. 168,8-9: Secondly,
I inter:
propoKvery
affirmative
is a chimera'
isfalse.Becauseofthat'A chimera
term
whose
sition
fornothing
supposits
subject
Because
istrue.
fornothing
term
whosesubject
anda negative
isfalse;
supposits
proposition
is true."
is nota chimera'
ofthat'A chimera

11:15:27 AM

326

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

sit vera
Further,in his QCL, <Vicesima Quaestio> Utrumomnispropositio
velfalsa, he accepts thatpropositionsare false,"whentheydo notsignify
just
howthings
are
Isto supposito,propositiovera est quae sic se habet quod est sicutper
earnsignificatur.
Propositioautemest falsaquae sic se habetquod aliter
vel quae sic se habetquod sicutper earn
quam est per earnsignificatur
non taliterest. Unde ad hoc quod aliqua propositiositvera,
significatur
requiritur
quod qualitercumque
significai,
quod ita sit.Unde si significant
aliqualiteraliterqualiteresset,et tarnenaliter;ipsa essetfalsa.53
Hence, the two major objectionsagainst Buridan's utilizationof natural
are clearlydefendedby Albertof SaxonyearlierthantheNotabilia
supposition
of our anonymousauthor.
According to our anonymousauthor, all the Notabiliathat he gives
make two verygeneralassumptions.The firstassumptionis thatif natural
is construedas when the subjecttermsuppositsin a proposition
supposition
forall its past,presentand futuresupposita,theneveryoneaccepts natural
taken in that sense, and everyoneeven grantsthat the subject
supposition
termscan suppositfor significatawhich can be conceived or imagined:
4.1 Primomodo quod terminusin ordinead verbumaliquod,vel ad
vel
predicatum,
supponatpro omnibussuissignificatis
que sunt,fuerunt,
Et istomodoconceditur
ab omnibus
talis
erunt,et sic supponitnaturaliter.
Nam aliquandoterminus
non solum<supponit> pro omnibus
suppositio.
suis significatis
vel
que sunt,fuerunt, erunt,ymmoetiampro illis que
licet
esse,
possunt
numquamerunt,ymmosecundumaliquos terminus
supponitaliquando pro illis que possuntymaginari,licet non possunt
4chimera
esse. Ut in ista propositione:
vel 'vacuum
li
ymagmatuf
ymaginatu
chimera
' et li 4vacuum
'
illis
licet
esse,
supponunt
pro
que possuntymaginari
non possintesse.54
53QCL: <Vicesima
beenassumed,
Quaestio>364,pp.,263,22-264,1-6:"Thishaving
a trueproposition
is suchthatthings
aresojust-as
is signified
a falsepropobyit.However,
sition
is suchthatthings
areother
than
as signified
is signified
arenot
byit, orjust-as
byit,things
insucha way.Hence,it is required
fora proposition
to be truethat:inwhatever
wayit
sothings
are.Ifitsignifies
in somewayotherthanhowthings
are
signifies,
are,andthings
thentheproposition
is false."
otherwise;
54De Rijk1973(n. 1),59: "In thefirst
withtheverb
way,a termproperly
arranged
orpredicate
forallitssignificata
which
are,were,orwillbe,andhencesupposits
supposits
Taken
inthisway,
natural
is conceded
Forsometimes
a term
naturally.
supposition
byeveryone.
notonlysupposits
fortillitssignificata
thatare,were,orwillbe; nay,on thecontrary,
it
alsosupposits
forthosewhichcan be, although
theyneverwere;nay,on thecontrary

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
IN BURIDAN
PROPOSITIONS
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 327
As is clear fromabove, Albertof Saxony clearlyconcedes somethingvery
similarto this firstassumptionin his QCL: <Undevicesima Quaestio>,
Utrum
inpropositione
depraesenti
subiectum
possitamplialiad supponendum
proeo
, velpotestesse.55Althoughhe does not explicitlysay there
quodfait,velerit
naturalsupposition
that "everyone
," when it is construedas the subject
accepts
term in a propositionsuppositingfor all its past, present,and future
in
he certainlyconcedes that he understandsnaturalsupposition
significata,
thatway.56Neitherdoes he see his own view as being a rejectionof naturalsupposition.
, just as the ancient
supposition
Althoughhe claimshe also accepts natural
is in factunnecessaryforhim,
natural
supposition
logiciansdid, nevertheless
since the subjecttermin any propositionis alwaysa categorematicnoun,
it already signifiesall its present,past and futuresignificata.Hence, he
also acceptsthe Second Assumptionof theJVotabilia
, 4.2, namely,ifa subthen natject termis takenforall its present,past, and futuresignificata;
ural suppositionis a superfluous:
tio sic,videlicet
4.2 Secundomodo potestymaginarihuiusmodisupposi
et
naturaliter
terminus
pro omnibussuis
quandoque supponat
quod
in
merede presenti.
vel
erunt
propositione
que sunt,fuerunt,
significatis
est sonus factusin nubibus',li 'tonitruum'supUt in ista: 'tonitruum
Et isto modo non oportet
et futuris.
preteritis,
poneretpro presentibus,
maxime
cum
ipsa non sit de virtute
ponere,
predictamsuppositionem
sermonis.57
De Rijk also points out that the anonymousauthor assertsin this secmaintain"... thatnaturalsupond assumptionthatothercontemporaries
are incompatible.. . .".58However,
sermonis
positionand the ideal of virtus
neitherDe Rijk nor the anonymousauthor gives us an explanationwhy
which
areabletobe imagforsignificata
to some,a termsometimes
supposits
according
is imagined,although
'[A] chimera
theyarenotableto be. Hence,in theproposition
vacuum
forthings
theterm
chimera
andtheterm
isimagined',
ined'or'[A]vacuum
supposit
be."
thatcanbe imagined,
theycannot
although
55Again,seenote34 above.
56Ibid.
57De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "In thesecondway,thissortofsupposition
canbe imagwhich
andforallitssignificata
a termsupposits
inedas: at sometimeorother,
naturally
of thepresent
tense,as in thisproposition
are,or were,or willbe, in a proposition
willsupposit
foritspresent,
'Thunder
is a soundmadein theclouds';theterm'thunder'
to putforth
the
Andtakenin thisway,it is notnecessary
[significata].
past,andfuture
sinceitis nottakenliterally."
supposition,
especially
preceding
58Ibid.,62.

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328

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

naturalsuppositionand a propositionbeing takenliterally

{devirtute
sermonis)
would be incompatible.Buridanhimself,
does
however,
giveus the reason.
He says:
Sed tarnenconvenienter
possetdici quod in hoc casu talis locutioad
talemintentionem
non estde proprietate
sed ad breviloquium.
sermonis,
Cum enim demonstrative
volentesloqui dicimusquod omne tonitruum
estsonusfactusin nubibuset quod omniseclipsislunae estpropterinternon essentverae
positionemterraeintersolem et lunam,propositiones
de proprietate
sermonis
sermonis,cum hoc verbum'est' de proprietate
non sitimpositum
ad significandum
nisipraesenstempus;et tarnenforte
nec est tonitruum
nec eclipsislunae in praesentitempore.Et ita tales
ad breviusloquendumponunturloco talium'omne tonipropositiones
truumquandocumquefuit,est vel erit,est,fuitvel eritsonusfactusin
nubibus';et 'omniseclipsislunae quandocumqueest, fuitvel erit,est,
fuitvel eritpropterinterpositionem
terraeintersolem et lunam'. Nec
tamen tales propositiones
propterhoc sunt negandae quia verae sunt
sicutpositaesunt,sed essentfalsaesi ad sensumpropriumessentpositae et receptae.Et quia sophistaenon voluntreciperepropositiones
nisi
secundumpropriossensus,ideo non soientuti hac suppositione
in isto
casu modo praedicto.59
Buridan himselfgrantsthat the naturalsupposition
of the subject termsin
scientific
sense(devirtute
sermonis
propositionsis incompatiblewiththe literal
deproprietate
such
sermonis)
of
propositions.
59Buridanus,
De suppositionibus
modisdivisionibus
Summuiae,
, 4.3: De communibus
sup4.3.4[De divisione
innaturalem
communis
etaccidentalem]
, ed.
positionum:
suppositions
VanderLecq,47,4-18;JohnBuridan,
Summuiae
, 4.3.4,trans.
Klima,260-62:
"Nevertheless,
wecancorrectly
sucha locution
thunder
is
forth]
saythatin thiscase[putting
<e.g.Every
a sound
made
intheclouds>
is notin accordwithitsproper
, withthisintention
meaning,
forthesakeofbrevity.
Forwhenwewantto speakdemonstratively,
but[itis putforth]
andwesaythatevery
thunder
is a soundmadein theclouds,
orthatevery
lunareclipse
is duetotheinterposition
oftheEarthbetween
thesunandthemoon,thenthesepropositions
wouldnotbe truebyvirtue
oftheirproper
sermonis
[devirtute
]. Forthe
meaning
verb'is' byvirtue
ofitsproper
wasimposed
to signify
time,
meaning
onlythepresent
whereas
there
orlunareclipse
atthepresent
time.
Andso suchpropomaybe nothunder
inplaceof'Every
sitions
arepropounded
forthesakeofbrevity
whenever
itis,
thunder,
lunareclipse,
was,orwillbe,is,was,orwillbe a soundmadein theclouds'and'Every
oftheEarth
whenever
it is,was,or willbe,is,wasor willbe dueto theinterposition
between
thesunandthemoon'.Suchpropositions
therefore
arenottobedenied
, sincethey
aretruegiventhewayin whichtheyarepropounded,
buttheywouldbe falseifthey
wereadvanced
andtakenin their
sense.Andsincesophists
wantto takeproposiproper
inthemanner
described
do notusesuchsupposition
tionsonlyintheir
sense,
they
proper
in thiscase."(Thewordsin [. . .] areKlima's.)

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 329
Now Albertclearlyaccepts Notabiliaassumption4.1, and at least the
firstpart of 4.2. Althoughhe does not explicitlyassertthe claim of incomhe certainly
does say thatit is not because of the natural
patibility,
supposition
of the subjecttermin a scientific
propositionthat the propositionis said
to be true,and at the same time it cannot be at variance withthe actual
of the subject termin propositionin which it is placed. Since
supposition
the propositionis a presenttense propositionand lacks an ampliating
meansthatthesubject
term
term,a presenttense scientific
propositionliterally
if
that
which
is.
the
term
has
natural
Therefore,
supposits
for
suponly
subject
for all its past, present,and futuresignificata,the propositionis
position
denied as false.60This same positioncan be gleaned fromhis treatment
of the truthof the propositions'A rose is a flower';'Thunder is a sound
made in the clouds'; and 'An eclipse of the moon, etc.', when there is
no roses, or thunder,or eclipses.61Moreover, in his QCL: < Vicsima
omnis
sitveravelfalsa, he maintainsthatin obligQuaestio>Utrum
propositio
ational disputes,Respondents
should never have to distinguisha true from
a false sense for any given propositionthat is being proposed to them,
if thosewho begin the obligationreallyknew and comprehendedthe litof propositions.62
eralsense(virtutem
Hence, the claim thatthe presermonis)
is clearlyin conflictwith
sent tense copula 'is', can be taken atemporally
It is mostlikely
a proposition'ssense being takenliterally
[devirtute
sermonis).
that the anonymous author is simply interpolatingboth Albert's and
Buridan'sviews in developinghis own treatmentof the issues.
De Rijk's anonymous author lists seven furtherrefutationsof the
are given in Notabilia
particularargumentsof Buridan's. The refutations
5.1-5.7. With the exceptionof the Notabiliareplyto Buridan's argument
at 2.5, analogues of the remainingcriticismscan also be foundin Albert.
Consider next,Notabilia5.1-5.2:
Ad primamet secundamrationes:quando sic, diciturquod respectu
illarumdictionumbene supponuntpro suissignificatis
que sunt,fuerunt,
vel erunt.Et hoc nonestcontradicta,quia hoc estin ordinead copulam.63

60See note34 above.

61Ibid.
62QCL:<Vicesima
diverQuaestio>367.1.2.1,
pp.268,7-13:"Respondentes
distinguunt
sossensus
unusaliquando
estveruset reliquus
hoc
falsus,
propositionis
quorum
quamvis
etiamnonoporteret
fieri
si omnesassentatores
scirent
et intelligerent
virtutem
sermonis
."
63De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "To thefirst
andsecondreasons,
whenitis saidthatwith

11:15:27 AM

330

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

From notes 33 and 34 above, one can see that Albertearlier also had
made these assumptionsabout naturalsupposition.
LikewiseconsiderNotabilia5.3:
Ad tertiamquando dicitursic: "nisi aliquis terminusetc.," dico quod
. . . etc.' de virtu
te sermonissintfalse,suptiones:'Tonitruum
isteproposi
et
tonitruum
sit
nullum
quod yrisnon sit.Sed ponunturab
positoquod
est vel fuitvel
sub hoc sensu:quando <cum> que tronitruum
Aristotile
in
et
fuit
vel
erit
sonus
factus
est
vel
nubibus, quando <cum>
erit,ipsum
vel
est
<vel>
fuit
vel
eritreflexio
luminissolis.64
est
vel
fuit
erit,
que yris
Albertgives preciselythis sort of responsein QCL, < Octava Quaestio>
cumtempore.
He conUtrum
verbum
sic quodnonsignificet
possitabsolvia tempore
if
cedes that this is Aristotle'sview, but only the copula is construedin
sense.65This
Albert'somni-temporal
sense, and not in Buridan's atemporal
means that the propositionis true only on each presentoccasion of its
utterancewhen an instanceof thunderoccurs. It is not true across all
times,or trueindependentof time.Yet, as I indicatedabove, Albertthinks
it is stilltrueto say "'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' is eternally
true".66
Notabilia5.4 simplyconcedes the claim made at 2.4, that if a geometricianhas knowledge[strictly
) of the proposition'Every
speaking](.scientia
given
trianglehas three angles equal to two rightangles', [i.e. knowledge
in thatproposition
then the termtriangle
via a deductivedemonstration];
indeed signifieseverytrianglethat is now, was and will be, and has natin that proposition.67
uralsupposition
Notabilia5.41 and Notabilia5.42 are
disjunctsof a disjunctivepropositionwhich make two claims about 5.4.
1) The firstclaim, 5.41, is that even thoughthe term 'triangle'in that

which
fortheir
tothosewords,
are,were,orwill
significata
supposit
theycorrectly
respect
2.1 and2.2],because
whatwassaid[i.e.Buridanian
be; thisis notagainst
assumptions
withthecopula,[i.e.is]."
itis arranged
64De Rijk1973(n. 1),60. "To thethird[reason],
a term
whenitis saidthus:'unless
arefalse,
''Thunder
. . . etc.'literally
etc.,"I saythatthesepropositions:
assuming
speaking
wouldnotbe. ButAristode
andthattherainbow
thattherewouldbe no thunder
puts
thereis or was,or will
thereis,or was,or willbe thunder,
forth
thissense:Whenever
there
thereis,wasor willbe a rainbow,
andwhenever
be a soundmadein theclouds,
from
thesun."
oflight
is,orwas,orwillbe a reflection
65See note5 above.
66See note48 above.
67De Rijk1973(n. 1),58.

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 331
geometrician'sdemonstratedpropositionsignifiesevery trianglethat is,
was, or will be; that termdoes not actuallysuppositin that proposition
for all of those significata.Nevertheless,if one has a true understanding
of the demonstratedconclusion'A triangle
[strictly
speaking](i.e. scientia)
has three angles equal to two rightangles', then ipsofactohe also has
of thatsubjectterm.2) 5.42
knowledgethatit holds forall the significata
thenclaims thatone does not need to give a new demonstration
in order
to have the knowledgethat the subject term triangle
all
signifies its past,
in
and
future
'A
the
present
significata,
proposition trianglehas three
if
to
two
angles equal
rightangles', he already acquired that knowledge
fromthosepreviouspremisesand thatpreviouslydemonstrated
conclusion:
5.4 Ad quartam:"si geometreetc.," concedo illud.
5.41 Sed propterhoc non sequiturquia iste terminus'triangulus'in
vel erunt,licet
predictapropositione
supponatpro illisque sunt,fuerunt,
omnes tringulossignificet.
Sed si vera scientiade aliqua conclusione
demonstrata<habeatur>, habeturscientiade omnibussignificatis
per
eius subiectum.
5.42 Vel potestdici quod hoc est quia per casus premissoset per quos
primodemonstratur
predictaconclusio,ipsa possetdemonstrari,
supposito
quod omnes trianguliqui sunt,fueruntvel erunt,iam de factoessent.
Et ideo non oportetfierinovm demonstrationem.68
In his QCL, < Octava Quaestio> Utrumverbum
sic
possitabsolvia tempore
non
all
cum
addresses
three
of
these
Albert
,
quod significet tempore
points.
says:
est,dico quod non habeo sciRespondeoquod quando nullustriangulus
entiamde istaconclusione:
Triangulushabettresngulosaequalesduobus
rectis,sed in intellectumeo bene est aliquid quod fuitde illa scientia
quando fuitvera, et est69scientiaadhuc illiusconclusionis< quando>
illiusconclusionis
vera.Et adhuc72
non
estiver,eteritscientia
quandoerit71
turaliquidde novo.Et quando nuloportetquod in mentemea generare
lus triangulusest, adhuc in mentemea est scientiailliusconclusionis:

68De Rijk1973(n. 1),60.

69esseted.
70esseted.
71esseted.
72ad hoced.

11:15:27 AM

332

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD
habettresaequales duobusrectis.Et ita conesttriangulus,
Si triangulus
similiterdiceretde istis:Homo est animal,posito quod nullushomo
estsonusfactusin nubibus,et de consimilibus
esset,et: Tonitruum
propo73
sitionibus.

These commentsare logicallyequivalentto the responsesgivenin Notabilia

5.4-5.42.
AlthoughI have been unable to findpreciselythisresponsein Albert's
logical works,which would match the criticismof Buridan given by
Notabilia5.51, it is certainlycompatiblewithAlbert'sviews.In fact,Albert
sit
makes preciselythissortof move in the SeptimaQuaestio:Uttum
possibile
libros
Posteriorum
subtilissime
nosaliquidscireof his Quaestiones
super
analyticorum
In that Question,he distinguishes
two sortsof evidence: thebest
Aristotelis.
are
. The examples he gives of thebestevidence
and naturalevidence
evidence
the Principleof Non-Contradictionand evidence of his own existence.
Naturalevidence
; stillcannot be turnout to be
, althoughnot thebestevidence
or
false except by sophisticreasoning deception by some supernatural
is
power. Even though the latteris a distinctpossibility,naturalevidence
stillgood enough for us to be said to have knowledge,especiallyfor us
to have knowledgeof nature:
firmiter
assenSed evidentianaturalisdicitursecundumquam intellectus
vero.Licet sic assentiendonon possetfalliper aliquam
tii alicuifirmiter
potentiamnaturalem,tarnenpossetfalliper potentiamsupernaturalem,
verbigratiasicutevidentiasecundumquam assentiohuiccomplexe:Omnis
ignisestcalidus.Unde in sic assentiendonon possumfalliper aliquam
potentiamnaturalem,cum nulla potentianaturalispotestfacerequin
ignis sit calidus. Unde in sic assentiendopossum falliper potentiam
Unde potentiasupernaturalis
possetfacerequod ignis
supernaturalem.
calidus.
potestesse calidus,et tarnennon esset

73QCL: <OctavaQuaestio>156.2,pp. 161,5-15:"I respond

is notrithatwhenthere
'A triangle
hasthreeanglesequalto
theconclusion
angle,I sayI do notcomprehend
thatwasan understanding
butin mymindthereis rightly
tworight
something
angles',
ofthatconclusion
whenitwastrue,andis an understanding
ofthatconclusion
[when]
whenitwillbe true.Still,itis
ofthatconclusion
itis true,andwillbe an understanding
in mymind.Whenthereis no triangle,
newbe generated
thatsomething
notrequired
is a triangle,
in mymind:'Ifa triangle
ofthisconclusion
therestillis an understanding
itcouldbe saidofthepropothen
ithasthree
Similarly,
angles'.
angles
equaltotworight
thereis no thunder
thereareno men;and [assuming
Manis ananimal
sition:
, assuming
such
and
similar
in
the
is
sound
made
Thunder
clouds',
propositions."
now],

11:15:27 AM

IN BURIDAN
SCIENTIFIC
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 333
PROPOSITIONS
Tertio,sciendumquod non ad omnem scientiamrequiriturevidentia
evidentianaturalis,sicutad scientiamnaturalem.74
summa,sed sufficit
Notabilia5.52 maintainsthat even if time did not exist,the copula 'is',
would connote an imaginable time. Hence, termswould still have the
propertyof suppositionwhen conjoinedwiththe copula.75AlthoughAlbert
does not put the matterexactlyin thisway,forhim the copula 'is', always
verbcontainsthat presenttense copsignifiesthe presenttime,and every
76This is the case even when the
ula implicitly
or explicitly.
suppositingsubterms
that
which
are not, but
terms
involved
would
be
signifythings
ject
which can be, or be imagined or comprehended,termslike 'chimera',
or 'Adam':
'Antichrist',
tionede praesentiin qua non poniQuarta conclusio:In omni proposi
tur aliquis terminusampliativussubiecti,subiectumper illam propositionemdenotatursupponerepro ilio quodest
, si propositiositaffermativa.
denotaturquod idem sit pro quo
Patet quia per illam propositionem
tur per
supponitsubiectumet praedicatum.Hoc autem non denotare
tursubiectumsupponerepro eo quodest.11
istamnisiper eam denotare
Notabilia5.6 raisesthe pointthateven thoughthe copula 'is', has a grammaticalway of signifying
onlythe couplingof the predicateto the subject,
74Albertus
de Saxonia,Quaestiones
subtilissime
libros
Posteriorum
Aris
totelis,
super
analyticorum
TortosaCathedral,
lat.ms.108,f. 166r:"Butthatis callednatural
evidence
to
according
inso assenting
which
theintellect
assents
tosomething
true.Although
itcanfirmly
firmly
nevertheless
it canbe deceived
notbe deceived
bysomenatural
power,
bysomesuperI assent
natural
forexample,
theevidence
tothis:'Allfireis hot'.Hence,
bywhich
power,
in assenting
to thisI cannot
be deceived
sincethereis no such
bysomenatural
power,
I canbe deceived
powerthatcanmakefirenotto be hot.Hence,in so assenting,
bya
supernatural
power.Hence,a supernatural
powercan makefireto be hot,and nevertheless
it notbe hot.Third,it shouldbe known
thatnotall knowledge
thebest
requires
evidence
evidence
as in natural
science."
suffices,
, butnatural
75Ed. De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "5.52Aliter
possetdiciquod,supposito
quodnullum
adhuccopuleconnotarent
in
etsictermini
esset,
tempus
tempus
ymaginabile
supponerent
"In another
ordine
ad copulam;"
an
wayitcanbe saidthatthecopulawillstillconnote
wouldsupposit
no
time,andso terms
imaginable
coupledto thecopula,evenassuming
timewouldbe."
76See note24 above.
77QCL: <Tertiadecima
sitbona,
Quaestio>Utrum
descriptio
suppositionis
quadicitur;
Suppositio
estacceptio
seuusustermini
, 250,pp. 207,
categorematici
quaaccipitur
proaliquoinpropositione
Thesisis: In every
tenseproposition,
inwhichan
21-25& 208,1-2."MyFourth
present
termdoesnotmodify
thesubject,
theproposition
meansthatthesubject
ampliative
supwhich
is.Thisis shown.
The proposition
meansthatthesubject
andprediforthat
posits
cateterm
forthesamething.
Thiswouldnotbe meant
unless
supposit
bytheproposition,
itmeantthatthesubject
termsupposits
which
y."
forthat

11:15:27 AM

334

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD

stillit cannotsignify
withouttense.78
AlthoughAlbertdoes not make these
claimsspecifically
or raisepreciselythoseexamples,he clearlyholds someverbum
sit
thingsimilarto them. In QCL: <Nona Quaestio> Utrum
semper
notaeorum
dicuntur
velpraedicantur
, Albertsaysthatthesignification
quaedealtero
of the copula 'is', is nothingbut the coupling of the predicateterm to
its subjecttermin a proposition:
Ad secundam,dico quod quamvishoc verbum:est,habeatsignificationem
distinctam
tam a significatione
subiectiquam a significatione
praedicati;
tamensua significatio
non est nisiin ordinepraedicatiad subiectum,
et
dicitur:notapraedicati
, propterdictascausas et non subiecti.Quod autem
verbi non sit nisi in ordinepraedicatiad subiectum,patet
significatio
I Perhermenias
, quia hoc verbum:est,significai
per Aristotelem
quandam
compositionem
quam sine extremisnon est intelligere.79
It seems to me, for Albertthese claims would be ultimatelyequivalent
to Notabilia5.6.
At 2.7 our anonymousauthor claims Buridan concedes:
2.7 Septimosic. Licet nullumverbumpotestimponiabsolutea connotationetemporis,
tamenpotestimponialiquod verbumquodlibettempus significans.80
AlthoughI have not been able to findwhere Buridan givespreciselythe
above formulation,
he does say:

78De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "5.6Ad sextam

diciquodcopulaverquandosic,potest
solamunionem
tamenipsanonpotest
a
absolvi
balis,licetratione
copulationis
significet,
connotatione
("To the
temporis
quia ipsa<m> habeta modosignificandi
gramaticali."
itcanbe saidthateventhough
a unionbyits
theverbal
sixth,
copulawouldonlysignify
nevertheless
it cannot
lacka connotation
oftimebecauseit hasthisbecause
copulation,
ofitsgrammatical
modeofsignifying.")
79QCL: <NonaQuaestio>Utrum
verbum
sitnota
eorum
dicuntur
velpraesemper
quaedealtero
dicantur
6: "To theSecondReasonI say:Eventhough
this
, 174,pp. 163-169,
19-170,
from
andpredicate;
itssignification
verbfis'hasa distinct
thatofthesubject
signification
ofthepredicate
to thesubject.
is nothing
butthecoupling
Hence,theverb'is' is called:
'an indicator
forthesaidreason,
andnotofthesubject.
to
ofthepredicate'
According
in BookI ofDe Interpretatione
oftheverb'is' is nothing
other
Aristotle
thesignification
Thisverb'is' signifies
a certain
comthanthecoupling
ofthepredicate
to thesubject.
whichthesubject
andpredicate
cannot
be comprehended."
without
position,
80De Rijk1973(n. 1),58: "Although
no verbcanbe stipulated
to signify
completely
a verbcanbe stipulated
to signify
without
time,nevertheless
(quodlibet
anytime
connoting
)."
tempus
significans

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 335
Tertio,etiam hoc apparetubi terminusconfunderetur
per istas dictiones vel consimiles'perpetue',4aeternali
Tales
enim dictioter','semper'.
nesimpositae
videtur
ex
usu
fuerunt,
auctorum,
prout
apparere
antiquorum
ad distribuendum
omni
vel
pro
temporepraesenti,praeterito futuro.
Unde non apparet esse usus illius dictionis'semper,' si diceremus
totasolumhora,licetea
semperSocratemcurrere,ex eo quod curreret
sola uteremurtamquampraesente. . . Unde videturquod ista 'semper
homo est animal' non aequivaletisti 'omni temporehomo est animal',
sed isti'omnitemporepraesenti,praeterito
vel futurohomo fuit,est vel
eritanimal'."81
Notabilia5.7., given by the anonymousauthor,repliesto Buridan's view
at 2.7:
5.7 Ad ultimam dicitur quod si talis terminusimponereturad
omne tempus,tuncterminiin ordinead ipsumbene supsignificandum
vel erunt.Et
omnibus
suis significatis
ponerentpro
que sunt,fuerunt,
hoc non est contradicta,quia hoc priusfuitconcessum.82
Now Albertdoes not explicitlydiscussthe locution'any time' (quodlibet
tempus
), but he certainlydoes not understandthe locution'at-every-time'
to be about all temporalinstantscollectively
takentogether
(in omnitempore)
i.e.
as
to
'at
,
being equivalent
indifferently
every present,past or future
time'.This is quite clear fromAlbert'sanalysisof the proposition'Always
a man was' (.Semperhomofuit). The term man, he says, supposits nonin the proposition'Always a man was'. It does not supposit
distributively
and
confusedly distributive
ly as Buridan claims:

81Buridanus,
De Suppositionibus
in natucommunis
, 4.3.4.<De divisione
suppositionis
ralem
etaccidentalem>,
ed.VanderLecq,46, 1-8& 9-11;JohnBuridan,
Summulae
, trans.
thesameis clearalsowhentheterm
is confused
Klima,260:"Third,
bythewords'perandtheirlike.Forsuchwordswereimposed,
as it would
petually',
'eternally',
'always',
theusageofauthors,
to distribute
forpresent,
times.
So it
appearfrom
past,andfuture
wouldnotappeartobe correct
ifwesaidthatSocrates
usageoftheword'always'
always
runs,
giventhathe ranonlyin thisonehour,evenifwe tookonlythathouras thepresent... So it seemsthat'Manis alwaysan animal'is notequivalent
to 'Manat every
timeis an animal'butto 'Atevery
manis,wasorwillbe
time,
present,
pastandfuture
an animal'."
82De Rijk1973(n. 1),60. "To thelastit is saidthatifthatsortoftermwasstipulatedto signify
forall there
everytime,theterms
coupledto a copulawouldsupposit
whichwas,or willbe. Butthisis notcontrovert
whatwassaid,becausethis
significata
wasconceded
earlier."

11:15:27 AM

336

MICHAEL
J. FITZGERALD
Ex principaliregulaedam infertur
quod omne syncategorema
aequivalensalicuiorationicompositaeex signouniversali
affirmativo
et termino
illumterminm
communemconfusedistributive
et
communi,confundit
terminm
aliumsequentemconfusetantum.Et propterhoc in istapropositionsSemperhomofuit,ly homo
tantum
, supponitconfuse
, nam ly semper
,
, compositoex signo universaliet
aequivalet huic orationi:omnitempore
terminocommuni.Et igiturdicitur:Semper homo fuit,valet tantum
sicut:'Omni temporehomofuit'.Et hoc estverum,quia non fuitaliquod
85
tempus83
quin in isto homo fuit.84'

Albert'sreasoningis that since the termalwaysis equivalentto 'at-everytime', the term 'man' cannot be confusedlydistributed
for all temporal
instants
distributed
for
time'
, i.e.,
indifferently
'any
(quodlibet
tempus
). The
actual propositionalcontext,he seems to think,requires that the term
'man' suppositmerely
and dwidedly
, foreachgivenmanat eachgiven
confusedly
instant.
Nevertheless,preciselyas in the case of Notabilia5.7, this
temporal
does not make Albert'scomprehensionof the locution'at-every-time'
(omni
with
that
in
terms
scientific
tempore)
incompatible
accepting
subject
propositionshave naturalsupposition
, since Albertalso accepts a view similarto
the one defendedin Notabilia4.1, as I noted above.86
On the basis of the above evidence,I conclude thatupon closerexaminationof Albert'sviews it seems that De Rijk's anonymousauthorwas
viewswhichAlbert
directlyor indirecdydrawingupon and interpolating
himselfhad articulatedsome yearsearlier.Moreover,the criticisms
Albert
defendsare preciselythe criticismsthat the anonymousauthor takes to
be the dominantobjectionsto Buridan's views,especiallyagainst natural
Thus, Albert of Saxony seems to be the best candidate as
supposition.

83temporis
ed.
84semper
add.ed.
85QCL: <Sextadecima
universale
terminm
immeconfiidat
signum
affirmativum
Quaestio>Utrum
diate
etterminm
mediate
tantum
distributive,
, 298.3,p. 231:
confuse
sequentem
sequentem
confuse
"Froma principle
Rule[ofSupposition]
itis alsoinferred:
Every
syncategorematic
expressionequivalent
to a composite
ofa universal
affirmative
expression
signanda common
confuses
thecommon
termconfusedly
anddistributive
term,
ly,andanyothertermfollowing
On account
ofthisinference,
theterm'man'supposits
thecommon
termmerely
confusedly.
in theproposition:
a manwas',fortheterm'always'
is a commerely
confusedly
'Always
andis equivalent
to 'at-everyaffirmative
anda common
term,
sign
positeofa universal
a manwas',is equivalent
to 'At-every-time
a manwas'.
time'.Therefore,
itis said'Always
Thatis truebecausethere
wasno time,
unlessa manwasat it."
86See above,p. 329.

11:15:27 AM

SCIENTIFIC
PROPOSITIONS
IN BURIDAN
& ALBERTOF SAXONY 337
the ultimatesource forlater fourteenth
centuryobjectionsto naturalsupDe
author
does
thinkthat Buridan can easily
position. Rijk's anonymous
, but unfortunately
respond to all the objections given by the Notabilia
does not reallyelaborate and tell us preciselyhow such responseswould
take place.
1073 Lake Estates Dr.
Hattiesburg,MS 39402-3603
USA

11:15:27 AM

Ralph Strdtsobligationes:
The Returnof Consistency
and theEpistemicTurn
CATARINADUTILH NOVAES

Abstract
I have used
In whatfollows,I analyzeRalph Strode'streatiseon obligations.
made
a hithertounpublishededitionof the text(based on 14 manuscripts)
I
a
of
which
first
brief
Strode's
Prof.
Ashworth.
text,
give
description
E.J.
by
is all the morenecessarygiventhatit is not availableto the averagereader;
I also offera reconstruction
of the rulesproposedby Strode,following
the
in
rules
of
and
of
reconstruction
used
Swyneshed's
style
myanalysis Burley's
- that is,
elsewhere
essentiallybased on the idea that obligationescan be
viewedas logicalgames.In the secondpart,I addressStrode'sexplicitargumentscontraSwyneshed.In the thirdpart,I discussStrode'sepistemicand
pragmaticapproachto obligationes.
Introduction
has been a popThe medievalgenre of disputationknownas obligationes
ular object of researchamong medievalistsin the last few decades, and
many studieshave greatlycontributedto create a betterunderstanding
of this(at least at firstsight)ratherpuzzlingformof medievallogical literature.It is known by now, for example, that Walter Burley'streatise
(writtenaround 1302) was very influentialin the decades followingits
composition,and that he spelled out the standardrules of how obligawere to be conducted;1it is also well knownthataround
tionaldisputations
1 The development
stilla matter
is however
oftheobligational
genrepriorto Burley
attribWalter
andtheObligationes
ofcontroversy.
Some(P.V.SpadeandE. Stump,
Burley
ofLogic,4 (1983),9-26)haveargued
andPhilosophy
uted
toWilliam
, in:History
ofSherwood
theendof the
has beenwritten
before
on obligationes
thatno fully
structured
treatise
attributed
toSherwood
thatthetreatise
13thcentury,
andinparticular
(R. GreenThelogwith
Critical
Texts
9:AnIntroduction
icalTreatise
(DeObligationibus
(?) and
ofSherwood
ofWilliam
de Louvain,
PhD dissertation,
Universit
Walter
1963.)couldnothave
Catholique
Burky.
inEarly
inparticular
Braakhuis
beenwritten
Obligations
(H.A.G.Braakhuis,
byhim.Others,
Paris
: theObligationes
Thirteenth
, BJf.lat.,11.412
),
ofParis(?) (MsParis
ofNicholas
Century
Vwarium
44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

11:15:36 AM

339

RALPHSTRODE'S0BUGATI
ONES

1330 Roger Swyneshedwrotea treatiseon obligations,proposinga deep

revisionof the rulesgoverningthisformof disputationin orderto exclude
some aspects of Burley-style
obligationswhich seemed awkwardto him
and to some of his contemporaries.These two stylesof obligationswere
and novaresponsio
sometimesreferredto as antiquaresponsio
, respectively.2
But Burley'sset of rules for obligationaldisputationsseems to have
resistedSwyneshed'sattacksand to have remained more influential;it
has been argued in the secondaryliteraturethat thiswas due, to a great
for the
are more efficient
extent,to the fact that Burley-style
obligationes
of
the
abilities
of
Respondent.Moreover,
putativepurpose testing logical
the rulesintroducedby Swyneshedappeared to generateeven graveroddthan the alleged odditiesgeneratedby
itiesin the obligationalframework
after
a
few
decades
rules.
So
Swyneshedcomposed his treatise,
Burley's
were writtenwhich essentiallysuba couple of treatiseson obligationes
scribed to the antiquaresponsio
, and whose authors openly criticizedthe
novaresponsio.
However, theywere not a mere repetitionof Burley'streahad prompteda more finethe
tise;
challengeposed by the novaresponsio
the rules
structure
the
of
underlying
generallogical
grainedunderstanding
of obligationes.
Therefore,the studyof these later textscan greatlycontributeto the
as well as to the understanding
of these logical structures,
understanding
of each of the two most influentialstylesof obligationaldisputation.In
the secondaryliterature,more and more work is being done on these
latertreatises,but the main focusof researchhas been so faron Burley's
and Swyneshed'streatises.3
In what follows,I analyze Ralph Strode'streatiseon obligations.I have
used a hithertounpublishededitionof the text(based on 14 manuscripts)
evidence
to theeffect
that
haveprovided
in:.Vivarium,
36 (1998),152-233),
compelling
halfofthe13thcencanbe datedtoas earlyas thefirst
treatises
full-fledged
obligational
outofthescopeofthepreThehistory
ofthisgenre
however,
falls,
priortoBurley
tury.
sentpaper.
2 Cf.P.V. Spade,Three
: Burley,
andSwyneshed
onCounterTheories
ofObligationes
Kilvington
andPhilosophy
ofLogic,3 (1982),1-32;C. Dutilh
Novaes,
, in:History
Roger
Reasoning
factual
in:Synthese,
151/1
Game
a Logical
Recognition?,
(2006),125-53.
ofInference
Obligationes:
Swyneshed's
3 Thisholdsofmyownprevious
workon obligations
as well,cf.C. DutilhNovaes,
as Logical
Games
Maintenance
Medieval
145(2005),
, in: Synthese,
ofConsistency
Obligationes
I alsodiscuss
a significant
371-95;DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2). In thesetwotexts
partof
thesecondary
literature
on obligationes
andforthesakeofconcision,
here
; forthisreason,
I shallnotrevisit
eventhough
crucialforthe
manyofthesearticles,
theyarecertainly
topicin general.

11:15:36 AM

340

DUTILHNOVAES
CATARINA

made by Prof.E.J. Ashworth;and I am verygratefulto her for having

shared it with me.4 The importanceof Strode (activein the second half
of the 14thcentury,in England) as a logician has been increasinglyrecognized over the last years,but the publicationof most of his writingsis
stillto take place.5
The only otherstudydedicatedto Strode's treatiseis (not surprisingly)
Ashworth1993; her main topic in thatstudyis the analysisof the notions
of consistencyand inconsistency
thatemergefromhis treatise.In the present study,I also deal extensively
with these notions,as theyare indeed
crucial in the treatise,but I attemptto complementher analysisby outliningsome of its otherinteresting
aspects as well.
In the firstpart of this paper, I give a briefdescriptionof Strode's
text,which is all the more necessarygiven that it is not available to the
of the rules proposed by
average reader; I also offera reconstruction
used in my analysisof Burley's
Strode,followingthe styleof reconstruction
and Swyneshed'srules6 that is, essentiallybased on the idea that obligationescan be viewed as logical games.7 In the second part, I address
Strode's explicitargumentscontraSwyneshed.In the thirdpart, I discuss
He participated
Strode'sepistemicand pragmaticapproach to obligationes.
in the general'epistemicturn'in logic thattook place in the second half
of the 14th centuryin England (cf. Normore 1993, Boh 2001), and this
is clearlyseen in his treatiseon obligationes
, as I attemptto show.
I. The Essentials
ofStrode'sTreatise
a. Description
of thetext
Strode's text presentsa very clear structure.Chapter I is the prefatio.
In the introduction(chap. II), Strode puts forwardfour remarks,five
suppositionsand four conclusions.Chapter III questionsthree opinions
4 It is a 43-pagetypedtext.I willrefer
to the
to it as 'Strode,
Obi.,'andwillrefer
form.
unpublished
pagesofthetextin itscurrent,
5 Foras faras I know,
texts
is nowbeingcoorforpublishing
Strode's
a majorproject
is
itscompletion
ambitious
with
such
Prof.
A.
as
dinated
but,
Maier;
projects,
always
by
ofmanyyears.
a matter
6 Cf.DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3); DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2).
7 In thepresent
thanin thetwo
seemslesshelpful
thelogicalgamemetaphor
study,
I willthough
occaonitas muchas I havedonebefore.
ones,so I willnotinsist
previous
fora particular
ifitappears
to be illuminating
resort
to themetaphor,
point.
sionally

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RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGATIONES

341

. ChaptersIV-VIII discussobjectionsto each of the

concerningobligationes
five suppositions(one suppositionper chapter);chaptersIX-XII discuss
objectionsto each of the four conclusions.Finally,chaptersXIII-XVI
deal with otherformsof obligationes
than positio.
In sum,Strode'srulesof obligationes
are in factall presentedin theintrowhich
is
thus
far
the
most
duction,
by
importantchapter.ChaptersIV-XII
argue forthe soundnessof the rulesproposedin the typicalmedievalway
of examiningobjectionsand sophismata
thatcould threatentheserules,but
which are dealt with and explained away. As in the analysisof Burley's
and Swyneshed'stheoriesof obligationes
, I only deal withposition
therefore,
the fourfinalchaptersof Strode's textare not looked into in the present
below only concernspositio.
discussion,and the reconstruction
b. Remarks
and conclusions
, suppositions
As just said, the rules governingStrode-style
are all presented
obligationes
in the introductionof his treatise,in the formof fourremarks,fivesuppositionsand fourconclusions.These are:
Remarks:
1. Primoergo describendisuntquidam terminiad propositum.
The firstremarkonlygivesa generaldescriptionof the obligationalgenre,
4
in particularof the role of the terms
etc.- definingthe
jbono' deponrf
different
formsof obligationes.
Some of the proceduralrules of the game
are also introducedin thispassage, and theyare identicalto Burley'sand
Swyneshed'sproceduralrules.
2. Secundo notandumquod tempusobligationisdurtab instantiquo
casus admittitur
donee dicat opponens:cedat tempusobligationis,
uel
uel
se
transferat
ad
in
alia
uel
aliquod tale,
materia, pendisputandum
itusdimittatdisputare.
This remarkintroducesan importantaspect of the proceduralrules of
the game, namelywhen it begins and when it ends. Notice that Strode
uses the term 'casus', and this deservesa commentary.In Burley'streawere distinctnotions.The casusdefinedthe hypotise,casusand positum
theticalsituationthat was to be consideredas true for the sake of the
disputation;often,the casusto be acceptedwas simplythingsas theyreally
were ('sit rei ventas*
), but occasionallya casus divergingfromthe actual

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stateof thingswas to be accepted.8The positura

, however,was not to be
taken as true,and Respondentshould only be interestedin the possible
inferentialrelationsbetween the positura
and the subsequentlyproposed
propositions.
In later authors,the two notionswere ofteninterchangeably
used, and
the casus was often simplythe propositionpromptingthe disputation.
Yijnsuuri conjecturesthat these authorsmay have followedOckham's
suggestionthatfollowingthe casus(in contextsotherthan obligations,for
instancewithrespectto sophismata
) amountsto the same as followingthe
, methodologically
positura
speaking.9Indeed, in Strode's case, it seems at
times that he distinguishesthe two notions,but more frequentlythey
appear to be taken as equivalent,for example when he says:
Sed quod remanetdepositosignopositionisdiciturcasus et positum,ut
ista:'tu curris'in istapositione,scilicet:pono tibiistam:'tu curris'.(.Strode
Obi, 2)
In practice,Strode appears to use the term 'casus' for the verysituation
as well
of positingthe positura,
includingthus the contentof the positum
itselfdoes not have
as the fact that it has been posited but the positum
to be consideredas true.
tio pertinensdiciturque sequituruel
3. Tertio notandumquod proposi
diciturque nec sequitur
concesso
uel
concessis.
Sed
impertinens
rpugnt
nec rpugnt.
This remarkis crucial. As widelyacknowledgedin the secondaryliterawas his
ture,10the core of Swyneshed'srevisionof the antiquaresponsio
redefinition
of pertinent/ impertinent
propositions.In the antiquaresponsio a pertinentpropositionis one that followsfrom(.sequens
) or is repugthe
and/or the
followsfrom
nant to (its contradictory
repugnans) positum
of
the
denied
and
the
contradictories
propositions.
grantedpropositions
Accordingto Swyneshed,a pertinentpropositionis one thatfollowsfrom
followsfrom)the positum
or is repugnantto (its contradictory
only; the
As a
not
taken
into
account.
are
subsequentlyproposed propositions
8 Cf.M. Yijnsuuri,
and
onSophismata
Fourteenth
Treatises
TheRoleofCasus
insome
Century
und
Scholastische
zudenlogischen
, in:K. Jacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie.
Forschungen
Obligations
korrekten
semantischen
, Leiden1993,301-22,
esp.304.
Folgems
Regeln
9 Cf.Yrinsuuri
1993,310.
10Andas discussed
in DutilhNovaes2006(n.2).

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
TIONES

343

consequence,I have argued, Swyneshedexcludes the dynamicaspect of

: in the novaresponsio
the antiquaresponsio
, the order in which propositions
are proposed does not matter,and Respondentdoes not have to take his
previousmoves into account to make a good move in fact he may as
well 'forget'the irrelevantpropositionsproposedas much as his responses
to them.11
Strode returnsto Burley'sdefinitionof pertinent/ impertinent
propositions,and thisfactalone means that the dynamiccharacteris again an
obligationes.
importantelementof Strode-style
4. Quarto notandumquod negandumin propositodiciturquod est
dignumnegari,et concedendumquod est dignumconcedi,et dubitantio debet concedi,
dum quod est dignumdubitare.Sed quando proposi
et
in
uel
dubitali
ponendis.
patebit suppositionibus regulisinferius
negari,
but it does
This remarkmay seem ratherredundantand uninformative,
The
rules
rules.
of
the
character
stressthe normative
obligational
properlyspeakingare presentedsubsequently.
Suppositions:
1. Primo:quod omnepossibilescitumesse possibilenon repugnansalicui
et solumtale cum
positouel admissocum poniturest a te admittendum,
ponitur.Et proptertale possibilepositumet admissumnon sit aliquod
Debet enimnegaripropositio
concedendum.
impossibilis
quanimpossibile
uel ponitur.
documqueproponitur
is thatit be possible.Moreover,
The rule forthe admittanceof a positum
an impossiblepropositionshould never be accepted as the positum
, and
since it neverfollowsfroma possibleproposition,ifproposedas a propositum
Therefore,
, an impossiblepropositionis neverpertinentto thepositum.
an impossiblepropositionshould always be denied.
tio: quod omne scitum esse positumet bene admis2. Seconda supposi
sub debitaformasua propositum,
est concesum in temporepositionis,
dendum,et quodlibetsequens ex ilio; et quodlibetrepugnansilli est
negandum.
That is, what followsfromor is repugnantto everypropositionproposed
and rightly
grantedduringthe disputationmustbe granted/ denied,and
11Cf.Yrjnsuuri
1993(n.8), 317.

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CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

not only what followsfromor is repugnantto the positum

.12Notice also
the 'sub debita
which
relates
a
to
forma!clause,
propositionfirstput forward as positum
: it should be grantedproand then again as propositum
vided thatit is in the rightform.This clause is meant to avoid pragmatic
inconsistencies
of the kind that will be discussedbelow.
3. Tertia suppositioest quod ad omnempropositionem
impertinentem
est secundumsui qualitatem,i.13si sit scitaesse uera est
respondendum
concedenda,si scitasit esse falsaest neganda,si dubia dubitanda.
This is the general rule forimpertinent
propositions,presentin Burley's
treatiseas well as in Swyneshed's.In itself,it is an incompleterule,sinceit
of an impertinent
dependson the properdefinition
proposition(remark3).
4. Quarta suppositioest quod extratempusobligationsrei ueritasest
fatenda,quia cum quis conceditfalsumuel negatuerumnon obligatus
male respondet.
The intentionof this remarkseems to be twofold:on the one hand, it
may indicate the fact that mattersof truth,includingthe evaluationof
Respondent'sperformanceduringthe disputation,were to be discussed
only once the disputationwas over;14on the other hand it stressesthe
factthat,duringan obligationaldisputation,it is not truththatis at stake,
as in other formsof disputation,but ratherlogical notionssuch as followingfrom,being repugnantto and being consistentwith.Partisansof
the novaresponsio
had objected that,in the antiquaresponsio,
any falsehood
could be proved;here, Strode seems to be defendingthe view that,given
the verynature of obligationes
, this is not at all problematic.
infratempusobliga5. Quinta suppositioest quod omnesresponsiones
suntdande contions retorquende
suntad idem instans,i. responsiones
tinuepro eodem instantiquo casus est positus.
12Further
ofthe
form
on Strodestates
thisrulein a moregeneral
(in hisdiscussion
omnesequens
talisregula:
fundatur
first
Strode
, Obi, 3: "Superquamregulam
conclusion);
benenegati
uel
uelconsessis
uelopposito
cumbeneconcesso
ex positoet beneadmisso
etsi quidtalibus
cumproponitur
estconcedendum,
benenegatorum
repugnans,
oppositis
illudestnegandum."
13Here(andin subsequent
ofthe
edition
occurences
of"i.") I follow
E.J.Ashworth's
text.
14E.J.Ashworth,
inObligational
onInconsistency
Strode
, in:K.Jacobi(ed.),
Disputations
Ralph
korrekten
undsemantischen
Scholastische
zu denlogischen
Regeln
Forschungen
Argumentationstheorie.
, Leiden1993,363-86,
Folgems
esp.366.

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
HONES

345

- an
This is a modification
improvement? withrespectto Burley'soriginal theory.15
Burleydoes say that all responsesmustbe reduced to one
can be true,but he does not
instant,namely one in which the positura
judge it is necessaryto determinewhich specificinstantthat would be.16
Perhaps this indtermination
gave way to Swyneshed'sintroductionof
several instantsaccording to which impertinentpropositionsshould be
judged (namely,the instantsin which each is respectively
proposed).But
this stipulationgave rise to even more inconsistency
withinSwyneshed(see Il.d below), so Strode feltcompelled to determine
styleobligationes
which
instantwas to be taken into account forthe responseto
explicitly
impertinentpropositions namely the instantin which the disputation
begins.

Conclusions:
1. Primaconclusio:quod non sequitur:tu concedisfalsumseitum a te
essefalsum,
uel negasuerumscituma te esseuerum,uel concedisdubium
scituma te esse dubium,ergo male respondes.
This conclusionis relatedto the fourthsupposition(the truthis not what
is at stake during an obligationaldisputation),and it followsfromthe
firstand second suppositions.Strode remarksthat the casus/ positura
is
and
that
the
to
should
be
to
the
usuallyfalse,
response proposita
according
second supposition,and thus not according to their truth-valuein the
case of pertinentpropositions.
2. Secunda conclusio:quod non est inconueniensquandoque respondentemconcederese male respondere,
uel negarese bene respondere.
This conclusionconcernsthe pragmaticcharacterof Strode's approach
to obligationes
, which is discussed in detail in part III below. What we
could call 'performative
contradictions'
are not consideredto be real contradictionsby Strode; forhim,just as much as a contingentfalsepropositionmaybe admittedat some pointof thedisputation,
'you are responding
is
a
thus
it can be granted
badly'
contingent(hopefullyfalse!)proposition,

15Butnotice
thatthesameclausecanbe found
insome13thcentury
treatises
onobligforexample
inthetreatise
ofParis(?):
"omnes
ationes,
byNicholas
responsiones
retorquende
suntad ideminstans."
1998(n. 1),177,1. 15).
(Braakhuis
16Cf.Yrjnsuuri
1993(n.8), 308.

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CATARINA

A whole different
situationis when,outwithoutgeneratinginconsistency.
side of the time of the disputation,one grantsthat he respondedbadly
duringthe disputation,since,accordingto the fourthsupposition,outside
of the time of the disputation,the truthmust prevail.
debet
3. Tertiaconclusio:quod cumpositumpossibilerpugntpositioni,
debet
sed
et
cum
admitti,
negari
positioproposita
proponiturconcedi,
[. . .].
contraThis conclusion also concernspositathat generateperformative
If such a positum
is put forward(forexample,'Nothingis posited
dictions.17
it
to you'), it should be accepted, and if it is re-proposedas a propositum
should be granted(presumablyas followingfromthe positum
, according
to the validityof the principlethat everypropositionimpliesitself).But
if the situationdescribingthe positiois put forwardas a propositum
, as in
'
be
denied
"Nothingis positedto you" is positedto you', then it should
(althoughit is true),as it is repugnantto the positum.
4. Quarta conclusioet ultimaest talisquod in respondendoper obligatoriasit ordo maximeattendendus.
This conclusionis a maxim to be born in mind ratherthan a rule of
the disputationproperlyspeaking.By statingit explicitly,Strode simply
stresseswhat I have describedas the dynamiccharacterof the obligational
; when followingits rules,
disputationaccording to the antiquaresponsio
his
into
account
take
should
previousmoves.The very
always
Respondent
two disputationsothertimes
of
at
different
same propositionproposed
wise identicalis very likelyto receive different
responses.The example
man
runs' and the responses
mentionedby Strode is the positum
'Every
to be given to 'You are running'and 'You are a man', dependingon
theirrelativeorderof being proposed,whichI have discussedat length.18
Notice thoughthat,once a propositionhas been accepted or denied,
no longermatters.19
its relativeorder with respectto the otherproposita

17SeeIII.cbelow,
inMedieval
andParadox
,
Inconsistency
Disputations
p. 365,andEJ.Ashworth,
44 (1984),129-39.
in:Franciscan
Studies,
18DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2).
19The orderofthepremises
that
ofinferential
fortheexistence
is irrelevant
relations,
is:ifA, B - C is valid,thenB, A - * C isjustas valid.

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RALPHSTRODE'S0BUGATI
ONES

347

c. Reconstruction
A Strode-style
obligationaldisputationis definedby the quadruple
Ob = < So, <D,r, R(cpn)>
S0 is the state of common knowledgeof those presentat the disputation
at themoment
thatthepositumis posited(supposition5). It is an incomplete
value.
model, in the sense that some propositionsdo not receive a truthdiffers
from
Strode
radically
Swyneshed.Swyneshedwants
ConcerningS0,
to
be
impertinent
propositions
judged accordingto the state of common
knowledgeof the verymomentin which the propositionis proposed; so
in Swyneshed'sobligationesthefirstelementof the quadrupleis an ordered
set of successivestatesof common knowledge.
, thenS0 should
Here, ifthe casushappensto be distinctfromthepositum
followthe casusand be complementedby the actual state of knowledge
at the momentin which the disputationbegins.
As for the other three elementsof the quadruple, they are virtually
identicalto thoseof the quadrupledefiningBurley'sgame. O is an ordered
set of propositions,it is the set of propositionsactuallyput forwardby
Opponent duringan obligation.Each elementof O is denoted by '(pn'>
where n is a naturalnumber,denotingthe place of cpnin the ordering.
The order correspondsto the order in which the propositionsare put
T is an ordered set
forwardby Opponent, startingwith cp0(thepositum).
of sets of propositions,which are formedby Respondent'sresponsesto
the various cpn.How each Tn is formedwill be explained below. The
orderingis such that Tn is contained in Tn+1.R(cp)is a functionfrom
propositionsto the values 1, 0, and ?. This functioncorrespondsto the
rules Respondentmust apply to respond to each propositioncpn.1 correspondsto his accepting(pn,0 to his denying(pnand ? to his doubting
(pn.The logical rules of the game are definedby R(cp):
Positum
: Strode holds that any possiblepositum
mustbe accepted, even
ifit is pragmatically
inconsistent
withthe act ofpositing,admitting,
or more
in
the
The
nature
of this
generallyparticipating
obligationaldisputation.
pragmaticinconsistencywill be discussed in section III below, but for
now we must understandwhat it means for a positum
to be possible.20
20Theissueas towhich
weretobe considered
inviewofpragpropositions
'possible',
maticparadoxes,
waswidely
in several
discussed
treatises.
Cf.Ashworth
1984
obligational
(n. 17).

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DUTILHNOVAES

21I used a
In my reconstruction
of Burley'sobligationes
syntacticcriterion
to definea possible propositionas a propositionfromwhich absurdity
not
cannot be derived.I have also stressedthe importanceof thepositum
being an inconsistent
proposition;if thiswas the case, Respondentwould
and thus of winningthe game.
stand no chance of keepingconsistency,
The same appears to be true of Strode,but a semanticcharacterization of a possible propositionalso seems more than welcome, given the
verytermsused by Strode in supposition1. A propositionNnis judged
to be possible according to Sn, the state of common knowledgeat the
momentit is proposed; in the case of the positum
N0, this would be S0.
Using the diamond '0' to representpossibilityand c||"'to representthe
relationof 'being true in' between a propositionand a state of knowledge, we have:
R(<p)- 0 iffS0 II"/0 Po
R(<Po)= 1 iffS0 II"0 <Po
since we stilldo not
As it stands,this definitionis not veryinformative,
knowwhat it means fora propositionto be possibleaccordingto a given
state of knowledge.Let us thus introducea relationof accessibilityR
states of knowledgeSn and Sm,correspondingto the
between different
notionof conceivability:
Sn R SmiffSmis conceivableas a stateof knowldoes
not
contain
absurdities)in the stateof knowledgeSn. This
edge (i.e.
does not mean that everypropositionthat holds in Sn also holds in Sm,
but only that Smdoes not contain propositionsthat are not conceivably
- i.e. Sm
trueaccordingto Sn,and it also does not containcontradictions
for some proposition(pn.Wecan thus definea pos<pn,
II"q>nand Sm ''
in
sible proposition the followingfamiliarway:
Sn II"0 9n ^ There is some Smsuch that Sn R Smand Sm ||*(pn
The definitionthus stated also takes care of positathat are only perforand which thus should be accepted accordingto
mative contradictions,
are
Strode: 'you
asleep' is not true in S0, since Respondentis participating in the disputation,but a state of knowledgein which 'you are
asleep' is true is easily conceivablein S0. Similarly,propositionsthat are
falsifiedby theirown existence,forexample 'No propositionis negative'
also come out possible according
(which were dubbed impossibly-true),
21DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
HOMES

349

- 'No
to this criterion
propositionis negative'describesa state of affairs
conceivablein S0, namelythe stateof affairswhereonlyaffirmative
propositionsare formed,and thus thisverypropositionis not formed.By contrast,a logical contradictionsuch as 'You are in Rome and you are not
in Rome' is not conceivablytrue in any of the statesof knowledgeconceivable in S0.
are virtuallyidenticalto Burley's
The rules for respondingto proposita
rules, includingthe all-importantdefinitionof pertinent/ impertinent
is that S0 is referredto in the responses
propositions;the only difference
to impertinentpropositions,and not some undeterminedinstant,as in
Burley'sobligations.
R(<pn)= 1 iff - r I*<pn,or
^
i - r -, '/ <p,r

<p

- rn-1 I" -'Pn,or

R(<Pn)= 0 iff
'
R(Pn)= ? iff

(/-> <pnand S0

- rn

'/ <pn,r -I '/

- rn

(/(pn,r .1 '/ ->(p,S0 II"/(p,Soil"/"'Pn

'(pnand So II"-'(Pn

I here presentthe rules of the game viewed as a determinedgame, i.e.

where thereis only one correctmove at each stage. However,it appears
that Strode's treatiseofferseven more compellingevidence than Burley's
treatiseto a non-deterministic
of obligationes,
interpretation
corresponding
to some degree of freedomfor strategicplayingconcerningimpertinent
propositions.22
Formation
setsof propositions
ofrn.The different
acceptedby Respondent
the
to
which
he
has
in the game) are
committed
himself
(i.e.
propositions
formedin the followingway:
If R((pn)= 1, then Tn = rn_iU {q>n}
If R(q>n)= 0, then Tn = Tn_iU {^(pn}
If R((pn)= ?, then Tn = rn_i
In particular,if R(cp0)= 1, then T0 = {cp0}.If R((p0)= 0, then the disputationdoes not get started.
22An account
ofa non-deterministic
ofthegame(interms
ofa 'point
interpretation
canbe found
in DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).
system')

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DUTILHNOVAES
CATARINA

re-established
maintenance
II. ContraSwyneshed:
consistency
Throughoutthe treatise,it is clear that Strode is reactingto Swyneshed,
in generaland
as much as Swyneshedhad reactedto the antiquaresponsio
in chapterIII,
named
in
is
even
to Burley particular.Swyneshed
explicitly
where Strode discusses and rejects three specificopinions. Strode also
that questionedthe
appears to be reactingto other views of obligationes
as
such
of
the
,
Kilvington'sand thoseproposed
antiquaresponsio
principles
But his main
in an anonymoustreatiseknownas the 'Merton treatise'.23
enemyreallyseems to be Swyneshed,so in thissectionI discusssome of
Strode's explicitobjectionsagainst Swyneshed.
thewrong
a. Swyneshed
problems
spotted
The firstthingto noticeabout Ralph Strode'sreactionto the theories
is thathe did not agree withtheirdiagnosisof the
of his predecessors
at
issue.24
problems
The two main problemsattributedto the antiquaresponsio
by authorssuch
falsehoodcould
as Swyneshedwere the fact that any randomly-chosen
of
is
a
if
the
be proved forexample,
positum disjunction two contingent
is one of the disjuncts,thispropositum
falsehoodsand the firstpropositum
mustbe accepted
shouldbe denied,and subsequentlythe otherpropositum
when proposed- ; and the factthat,in two disputationshavingthe same
, the same propositioncould be accepted in one and denied in the
positum
other.25
is not a real problem for Strode can be seen
That the firstdifficulty
fromhis fourthsupposition,where he stressesthat the truthof thingsis
est/atenda')only outsideof the time of the
to be acknowledged{'reiVeritas
obligationaldisputation;therefore,grantinga falsehood,any falsehood,
and the previouslygrantedpropositions,
which followsfromthe positum
or the contradictoriesof previouslydenied propositions,is simply a
Even thoughthis
consequence of the rules of this formof disputation.26
23N. Kretzmann
inMerton
De arteobligatoria
andE. Stump1985,TheAnonymous
College
toL.M.de
Dedicated
: Studies
andMetaphysics
Semantics
MS. 306, in: E.P. Bos (ed.),Medieval
ontheOccasion
attheUniversity
andMediaeval
ofLeiden
, Ph.D.,Professor
Philosophy
ofAncient
Ryk
375.
1993
Ashworth
cf.
His
60th
239-80;
(n.
14),
1985,
, Nijmegen
of
Birthday
24Ashworth
1993(n. 14),379.
25Cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n.2).
26Strode
conceditur
debite
Obi.
supposition],
[second
persecundam
, 3: "Etcumproponitur,

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RALPHSTRODE'SOBUGATIONES

351

so-called randomly-chosefalsehood seems at firstirrelevant,since it is

to the positum
(even thoughit is one of the disjuncts,froma
impertinent
the
individual
disjunction
disjunctsdo not follow),it becomes pertinent
as the disputationcontinues.
As forthe second difficulty,
again Strodedoes not see whatthe problem
is witha propositionreceivingdifferent
responsesin two disputationswith
The responseto a propositionis essentiallydependent
the same positum.
on the relativeorder withinthe disputationin which the propositionis
proposed,as Strode points out several times(forexample, in the fourth
- see also
conclusion
chapterXII, where possible objectionsto this conclusion are dealt with).We also encounterhere tracesof the 'pragmatic'
approach to obligationaldisputationsproperto Strode; the responseto a
givenpropositionmustdepend on the actual course of thingsin a given
only.
disputation,and cannot be determinedabstractlyfromthe positum
b. An evenworse
formof inconsistency
is that the application
Strode's main accusation against the novaresponsio
withinthe obligational
of its rulesyieldsthe worstformof inconsistency
framework
(farworsethan the two 'inconsistencies'
just discussed),namely
that in some occasions Respondent may be forcedby the rules of the
novaresponsio
to grant the contradictoryof the positum/ casus. Strode's
are
'), and are disarguments presentedin chapterIII (' Contratresopiniones
cussed in.27Ashworthconcludes that Strode's argumentas she reconstructsit is not sound and that it could be blocked by Swyneshed.
Strode's argumentsgoes as follows:
, accepted
cp0:'Every man is running' positum
(pt:'You are a man' irrelevantand true,accepted
<p2*'Every man is runningand you are a man' irrelevantand false,
denied
cp3:'Not everyman is runningor you are not a man' irrelevantand
true(thecontradictory
of a correcdydeniedproposition,
3), accepted
cp4:'Not everyman is runningor you are not a man, but you are a
- bona
not everyman is running'
man, therefore
consequential
accepted

utpriusdictum
est.Undepatetquodaliquando
officium,
que fundatur
superadmissionis
concedens
falsum
in istaartepositas,
benerespondet
secundum
et nonmale."
regulas
27Ashworth
1993(n. 14),381-3.

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CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

- must be
<p5:'Not everyman is running'
accepted, but is the opposite of the positura
Accordingto Strode, (p5must be accepted by modusponenson the basis
of (pl5cp3and q>4,and thereforethe contradictory
of the positura
must be
accepted. Ashworthclaims28that the problemwith Strode's argumentis
that Swyneshedwould not be obliged to grantthe conjunctionof cp,and
and true(impertinent
because both conjunctsare impercp3as impertinent
he
would
be
entitled
to
tinent);rather,
deny thisconjunctionas pertinent
and repugnantto the positura.
As I see it, the problemwithStrode'sargumentsdoes not concernthe
statusof a conjunctionformedby two irrelevant(accepted)propositions;
rather,what Strode seems to be claimingis that,once one has granted
q>l5<p3and <p4(regardlessof the statusof the conjunctionof and cp3,or
whetherit has actuallybeen proposed as a conjunction),one mustgrant
the consequentof the consequentia
in q>4,simplybecause one has granted
its antecedent(by modusponens).The faultof the argumentis to assume
and true
that,in the aova responsio
, what has been grantedas impertinent
can functionas premise of an inferenceso that its conclusioncan be
inferred.But as noted before,impertinent
propositionsthat are granted
as true are simply'forgotten'if one plays the game according to the
novaresponsio
, theyseem to have no 'assertiveforce'whatsoever;so they
cannot be used as premises in an application of modusponens.They
would of course have this'assertiveforce'in a game played accordingto
the antiquaresponsio
, and that is perhaps the source of Strode's miscast
argument.
So Strode's attributionof this formof inconsistencyto Swyneshed's
a formof what
theoryseems to be unfounded.He could thoughidentify
is now called a co-inconsistency
with respectto the positum,
on the basis
of the conceptof T-consistency
introducedby Godei in his famousincomA theoryis co-inconsistent
if both of the following
pletenesstheorem.29
hold in it, for some predicate'F':
There is an x such that F(*), but
-> F(*0, " F(x2),-> F(*3)etc., for all x.
28Cf.Ashworth
1993(n. 14),383.
29Cf.K. Godei,On formally
undecidable
ofPrincipia
mathematica
and
propositions
related
Works
I, in: Collected
, vol.I, Oxford
1986,145-95.
systems

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
TIONES

353

In the case of Strode's example,what we have is a similarsituation,but

then with a universalproposition:it is grantedthat everyman is run, but of all men who are not running,'you are a man'
ning as thepositum
and 'you are not running'must be accepted as true and impertinent.30
ifthepositum
is an existential
Similarly,
propositionthatis acceptedbecause
it is possible but in fact at that momentno individualsatisfiesthe predicate expressedin it (forexample, 'There is an antichrist'),
then of each
individual('He is the antichrist')it will be denied that (s)he satisfiesthe
with respectto the positum
predicate,generatingco-inconsistency
properly
speaking.
This propertyis also related to the notoriouslyawkwardbehavior of
a universalpropodisjunctionsand conjunctionswithinthe novaresponsio;
sitioncan be seen as equivalentto an infiniteconjunction,whereas an
existentialproposition('particularproposition',in medievalterms)can be
seen as equivalentto an infinitedisjunction.31
Now, it is well knownthat
while everydisfor Swynesheda disjunctioncan be accepted as positum
as
and
but
here
the
situationseems
must
be
denied
false
irrelevant;
junct
is a conjunction(or, equiveven more awkward,since even if thepositum
alently,a universalproposition),some of the conjunctsmust be denied
as false and irrelevant.
is a
In the frameworkof the incompletenesstheorem,co-inconsistency
so ifco-inconsistency
weaker(lessdamaging)property
thanplaininconsistency;
with respectto the positumor somethingsimilarto it is what threatens
Swyneshed'stheory,and not plain inconsistency,then Strode's attack
against Swyneshedis less effectivethan he, Strode, thoughtit to be.
ifSwyneshed'sobligationes
withrespect
Nevertheless,
generateco-inconsistency
to thepositum
, thisseems alreadybad enough,so the gistof Strode's critique is not entirelymiscast.
/ impertinent
a. The coreof thematter:
ofpertinent
definition
propositions
As alreadynoted,the core of Strode'sstrategy
to 'correct'the novaresponsio
and exclude the inconsistencies
it generatedfromobligationaldisputations
30Provided
thattheyarenotproposed
as a conjunction,
inwhich
case
simultaneously,
thisconjunction
wouldbe repugnant
to thepositum
and thusshouldbe denied.So the
actuallogicalform
ofthisargument
is: V* (F(*)-*
butforsomexsuch
G(*))is granted,
thatF(*)is granted,
G(*)is denied.
31Cf.E.J.Ashworth,
des Obligationes
'Autour
de RogerSwyneshed:
la NovaResponsio
Lestudes
, 3 (1996),341-60,
philosophiques
esp.349.

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CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

is to returnto Burley'sdefinition
of pertinent/ impertinent
propositions
just as much as the core of Sywneshed'sstrategyto 'correct'the antiqua
had been to reformulate
this distinctionand let it depend only
responsio
on the positum.
I have proved that,if one followsthe rules proposed by
Elsewhere,32
thus
Burley(and
by Strode),in particularwith respectto the definition
of a pertinent/ impertinentproposition,then Respondent can always
maintainthe consistency
of the set of propo(and even the co-consistency)33
sitionsformedduringthe disputationby the propositionshe grantsand
the contradictories
of the propositionshe denies. In other words, there
is always a winningstrategyfor Respondent,assumingthat the goal of
the game is consistencymaintenance.
Hence, the same holds here; the strangefeaturesof the novaresponsio
were all relatedto different
formsof inconsistency
being producedby the
application of its rules. Since the fundamentalchange introducedby
Swyneshedwas the new definitionof the notion of pertinent/ impertinentpropositions,all Strode had to do to re-establishconsistencywas to
returnto the old distinction,which differentiates
a pertinentfroman
impertinent
propositionon the basis of all previouslygranted/ denied
propositionsin a given disputation(cf. his thirdremark):
Strode
Obi., 5: Respondetur igiturquod non solum capitur'sequens' in
locis predictispro sequenteex posito,sed pro sequenteex positocum
bene concessouel consessis,ut dicebaturin primaconclusione.
d. Avoiding
time-related
inconsistency
Besides introducinga new notionof pertinent/ impertinent
propositions,
anothercontroversial
move by Swyneshedwas the stipulationthatchanges
in thingsduringthe timeof the disputationshould be takeninto account
in Respondent'sresponsesto impertinent
propositions.The resultof this
stipulationwas that the set composed of granted / denied impertinent
propositionscould be inconsistentnot only on the level of molecular
32DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).
33Presumably,
in a Burley-style
ifa positum
is an existential,
obligation,
contingently
falseproposition,
andeachofitsindividuell
instances
is gradually
anddeniedas
proposed
andfalse,thentheverylastindividuad
instance
wouldhaveto be
impertinent
proposed
as sequens
itis false(justas whena disjunction
is thepositum
: ifall
, eventhough
granted
other
havebeenproposed
anddenied,
thelastdisjunct
must
begranted
as sequens).
disjuncts

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
TIONES

355

but even on the atomiclevel.

propositions(conjunctionsand disjunctions),
If at the beginningof the disputation'you are sitting'was proposed to
Respondentand he was in fact sittingat that moment,then he would
have to grantthispropositionas impertinent
and true. But if soon after
in
are
not
was
and
indeed
the meantimeRespondent
'you
sitting' proposed,
had stood up, then he would have to grantthispropositionas irrelevant
in the meantime
and true,since the firstpropositionhad been 'forgotten'
and had not been added to the informationalbase of the disputation
and possiblyof otherpositasubsequently
positum
(composedonlyof the first
posed).34
Strode, of course, is not willingto accept this formof inconsistency.
of the notion of pertinentpropositionsis in fact
The mere redefinition
as logical relationsbetween
sufficient
to excludethisformof inconsistency,
over
the
actual
state
of things.So, in the examhave
priority
propositions
ple when 'You are not sitting'is proposed,accordingto Strode'sdefinition
of a pertinentproposition,it is not impertinent
(as it is for Swyneshed),
- in
since
it
contradictsa previously
but ratherpertinent
fact,repugnant,
in
This
is
why, Burley'stheory,no specificinstant
grantedproposition.
had to be referredto in the responsesto impertinent
propositions;the
to exclude thisform
notionof pertinentpropositionsalone was sufficient
of inconsistency.
But Strode goes further.He is more aware of this issue than Burley
, so he stipulatesthat
was, having been exposed to the nova responsio
one specificinstant,namely the moment when the disputationbegins,
should be consideredfor the responsesto impertinent
propositions(fifth
supposition).
One possibleobjectionto thisstipulationis discussedby Strode in the
chapterdedicated to the fifthsupposition(chapterVIII). Say the positum
is 'you are runningand the king is sitting'.Then 'the king is sitting'is
proposed; Respondentmust doubt it, since at momentS0 when the disputationbegan, he had no idea whetherthe kingwas sittingor not. Then
'you are running'is proposed; he must deny it, since at S0 he was not
running.Then 'the kingis sitting'is proposedagain, and mustbe granted.
34Swyneshed
ofa secondor third
thepossibility
positum
accepted
beingposedduring
thedisputation,
so thatin practice
theactualpositum
becametheconjunction
ofthetwo
in theantiqua
itis
; cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2). Bycomparison,
posita
responsio
accepted
as though
ordenied
orimpertinent,
orproposievery
granted
positum
proposition
(pertinent
becamea newpositum.
tum)

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356

CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

Now, if all responsesreferto the same instant,how can Respondentfirst

doubt whetherthe king is sittingand then accept it?
The same objectioncould have been raised against Burley,but since
Burleydoes not explicitlysay thatall responsesreferto the same specific
instant,this situationappears to be less awkwardwithina Burley-style
obligationaldisputation.Strode,however,mustexplain how it is possible
thatat the same momentRespondentgrantsand doubts the same thing.
In his discussion,he proposes many ways around this difficulty,
but an
accurateand straightforward
would
in
be
to
reply
simply
say that, itsfirst
'the
is
was
and
thereforeindeed
occurrence,
king sitting'
impertinent,
judged accordingto S0, but that in its second occurrenceit had become
a pertinentproposition,and therefore
the responseto it simplyhad nothto
do
with
is
not
S0. Thus, S0
ing
therebyproved to be an inconsistent
state of knowledge.
e. Conjunctions
and disjunctions
Finally,what was consideredby many as the most embarrassingcharacteristicof the novaresponsio,
namelythe behaviorof conjunctionsand diswas
also
discussed
junctions,
by Strode (in particularin his analysisof
the firstof the three opinions he objects to in chapter III). Obviously,
Strode is not happy with the inconsistencies
relatedto conjunctionsand
in
that
a
disjunctions
appear
Swyneshed-style
obligation,so in chapterIII
he proposesways to avoid thisphenomenon.
Let us recapitulate.Accordingto Swyneshed,it is entirelypossiblethat
both conjunctsare grantedwhen proposedas individualpropositions,
but
- for
that their conjunctionis denied when proposed as a conjunction
example, in the case of the conjunctionof a false positumand a true
impertinent
propositionalready granted(the conjunctionis then a false
impertinent
proposition,and thereforeshould be denied). Similarly,it is
possiblethata disjunctionis grantedand thatsubsequentlyboth disjuncts
are denied (if theyare both false,impertinent
propositions).35
How do conjunctionsand disjunctionsbehave in Burley'sobligational
framework?
Such inconsistencies
do not occur, but it is worthexamining
why it is so, which I shall do by means of some examples.
1. Suppose thatN0,a falsebut possiblepositum
, is granted.Then
Disputation
a
true
it
is
propose Nb
impertinent
proposition;
granted.Then propose
35Cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2).

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RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
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357

N0 & N,; the question is then whetherN0, N, N0 & N, is a valid consequence. Obviously,it is, so N0 & Nj must be grantedas a pertinent
proposition,which followsfromthe positura
togetherwithwhat has been
So the consistentset r2 = {N0, N1?N0 & Nj} is formed.
granted.36
2. Now supposethat,in a different
the same propoDisputation
disputation,
sitionsare proposed,but in a different
order.We startwiththe falseposituraN0,and then the conjunctionN0 & Nj is proposed (N, alone has not
been proposed yet).At this stage, the conjunctionis clearlyimpertinent;
moreover,it is false,since one of the conjuncts(namelyN0) is false. So
it is denied. Then N, is proposed, and the question is: is it a pertinent
proposition?Yes it is, namelya repugnantproposition,because the consequence N0,i- (N0 & Nj) ' N, is valid. So N, mustbe denied, and the
consistentset r2. = {No,1-^ & N^r-N,} is formed.
As for a disjunction,the situationis even simpler.
3. If the positumis a disjunctionand one of the disjunctsis
Disputation
denied in the next round,then wheneverthe otherdisjunctis proposed,
it must be accepted as a pertinentproposition,since N0 v Nb ""Nq |" Nl
is a valid consequence. (If the disjunctfirstproposed is accepted, then
the second disjunctremainsan impertinent
proposition,whichthusshould
be judged accordingto its own quality).
So what guaranteesthatthe behaviorof conjunctionsand disjunctionsin
a Burley-style
obligationdoes not generateinconsistenciesis the notion
of pertinent/ impertinent
propositions,and the influenceof the orderin
which propositionsare proposed.
Strode proposesyet a different
Interestingly,
way of avoidingthiskind
of inconsistency.
One wonderswhy he does so, since the Burleyrules as
to avoid the problem.Strode's proposal is essentheystand are sufficient
to
consider
as true.37If one does so, Disputation2 above
the
tially
positum
has a different
outcome,even if played accordingto the antiquaresponsio
canon: if one considersthepositum
N0 as true,then the conjunctionN0 &
Nj, proposed just after the positum
, becomes an impertinentbut true
and
therefore
must
be
the same response
proposition,
granted.Incidentally,
would be given by someone playing the game according to the nova
36Bycomparison,
forSwyneshed
theconjunction
in thiscaseis an impertinent
proposition
becausetheconsequence
N0-* N0& N,is notvalid.
37Strode
Obi, 6; cf.Ashworth
1993(n. 14),381.

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CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

canon (the difference

between the two canons would appear in
responsio
the next round: accordingto the antiquaresponsio
, Nt would be a pertinent proposition,while according to the novaresponsio
it would be an
impertinent
proposition,since it does not followfromthe positum
alone).
Notice thoughthat stipulatingthat the positum
is true does not seem
to solve the inconsistency
createdin Disputation3 if played accordingto
the novaresponsio
: if a disjunctionis taken to be true,then one of its disjunctsis takento be true,but Respondentstilldoes not disposeof enough
information
to determinewhich disjunctit should be, and thereforemust
still deny both disjunctsif they are proposed and happen to be false
propositions.
be viewed as true to avoid
Why does Strode propose that the positum
inconsistencies
relatedto conjunctions?As argued,the usual Burleyrules
already guaranteethat therebe no such inconsistencies.One possibility
is that Strode is proposingan amendmentto the novaresponsio
, so that
such inconsistencies
would not occur even ifone played the game accordcanon. Strode was probably aware of the fact
ing to the novaresponsio
that the antiquaresponsio
as it was avoided the generationof such inconsistencies,but the puzzle remainsas to whetherhe thoughtthat considas truewas a necessaryamendmentto the antiquaresponsio
,
eringthepositum
or onlyto the novaresponsio.
It is also possiblethatStrodewas not defending this positionas his own, but only proposingit as a possible way of
handlingthe positum.
III. Focuson Epistemic
/ Pragmatic
Elements
of theDisputation
As already mentioned,many scholars have argued that, in the second
halfof the 14thcentury,especiallyin England,an epistemicturnin logic
in thetheoriesof consequences,40
tookplace.39This is to be seen in particular
38According
toE.J.Ashworth,
thisposition
wasexplicitly
heldbytheanonymous
Merton
cf.Ashworth
1993(n. 14),375.
author,
39Butit hasalsobeenarguedthatan epistemic
notion
ofconsequence
is alsoto be
andLiars
foundin Boethius
andAbelard
, in: M. Yijnsuuri
(cf.C.J.Martin,
Obligations
Formal
, Dordrecht
2001,63-94),andin some13thcentury
(ed.),Medieval
Logic
logicians,
Review
ofM. Yijnsuuri
suchas Kilwardby
(ed.),Medieval
formal
logic:
(cf.E.J.Ashworth,
andPhilosophy
ofLogic,23 (2002),
insolubles
andconsequences
, in:History
296-97).
obligations,
ofthesecondhalfofthe14thcentury
were
So itwouldseemthattheEnglish
logicians
toan old
novelwayofapproaching
notintroducing
an entirely
logic,butrather
returning
theBurley-Ockham-Buridan
whichhadlostitspredominance
period.
during
approach,
40I. Boh,Four
in:Theoria,
56(2000),129-44,
Phases
Logic,
esp.129-30:
ofMedieval
Epistemic

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
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359

and one of its main signsis the recastdefinition

of 'formalconsequence'.
While in the firsthalf of the 14th centurythe notion of formalconsequence was usuallydefinedin termsof Topical, semantic,logical or substitutionalcriteria,in the decades followingthis period many authors
startedto formulateit in epistemicterms:a formalconsequence is such
that the consequent is understoodin the antecedent,so that whoever
understandsthe antecedent(as true) will understandthe consequent (as
true).In otherwords,a formalconsequence is thus definedwith respect
to the knowledgeand understandingof a hypotheticalagent, and not
anymorepurelyon the basis of featuresof the consequenceitself.Strode's
own definition
of a formalconsequence runsverymuch along theselines:
A consequenceis called soundby formwhen,if the way in whichfacts
are adequatelysignifiedby the antecedentis understood,the way in
which theyare adequatelysignifiedby the consequentis also underthatyou are a man, he will
stood;forinstance,if anyoneunderstands
understandalso thatyou are an animal.41
The same focus on the knowingagent is noticeablein Strode's treatise
on obligationes
, as I will tryto show in this section. Simultaneously,his
focuson the agent also outlineswhat we could call the pragmaticnature
of obligationaldisputations(and of logic in general)as an actual activity,
takingplace in space and time,and the issues that mustbe dealt withas
a resultof this approach.42These include the issue of the actual logical
verbalnatureof thesedisputations,
knowledgeof Respondent,the essentially

andperhaps
themostimportant
"Thefourth
logic]arose
phase[inmedieval
epistemic
within
thetheory
ofconsequences;
cameto seethatnotonlythemostgenPhilosophers
butalsothoseinvolving
eralrulesofpropositional
modalities,
logicandalethic
epistemic,
needto be recognized
as themostbasicprinciples
of
andothermodalities
obligational
in 1360s,is certainly
in various
Strode's
realms.
, written
Consequences
reasoning
probably
ofthisstage."
thebestrepresentative
41W. Seaton,
AnEdition
andTranslation
deConsequentiis"
Strode,
ofthe"Tractatus
byRalph
Fourteenth
andFriend
Chaucer.
Ph.D. Dissertation,
of
Logician
ofGeoffrey
University
Century
andRulesofConsequence
in the
1973,quotedin I. Boh,Consequences
California,
Berkeley
Post-Ockham
Period
Formal
, in:M. Yrjnsuuri
, Dordrecht
2001,147-81,
(ed.),Medieval
Logic
esp.156-57.
42A similar
is noticeable
Buridan's
staunch
comin,forinstance,
pragmatic
approach
mitment
toproposition-tokens
as thebearers
oftruth-value,
andintheamendments
made
to hislogicalsystem
as a result
ofthiscommitment.
Cf.G. Klima,Consequences
necessary
TokenBasedSemantics:
TheCaseofJohn
Buridan
andPhilosophy
of
, in: History
ofa Closed,
Buridan's
andinference
Logic,25 (2004),95-110;C. DutilhNovaes,
consequence
consequentia:
within
a token-based
semantics
andPhilosophy
ofLogic,26 (2005),277-97
.
, in:History

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CATARINA

and how to handle propositionsreferring

to the very circumstancesof
the disputationas well as to the verymoves taken withinit.
a. Epistemic
clauses
Both in Burley'sand Swyneshed'streatises,epistemicelementswere present in the rules of how to respond to impertinent
these
propositions:43
propositionsshould be respondedto on the basis of Respondent'sactual
knowledgeat the momentof the disputation.If he knew an impertinent
propositionto be true,it should be granted;if he knew it to be false,it
shouldbe denied,and if he did not knowwhetherit was trueor whether
it was false,then it should be doubted. But the epistemicclause was not
extendedto the evaluationof the positum
, nor to the assessmentof inferential relationsbetweenthe positum
and the proposita.
a te esse
By contrast,in Strode's treatise,phrases such as 'falsumscitum
'verum
'
scitum
a teesseveruni(cf.firstconclusion),possibile
scitum
esse
falsum'
'
4
essepositum'(cf. second supposition)
possibile(cf. firstsupposition),scitum
'scitumesse uerumnon
'scitumessefalsumnonsequent(cf. second
repugnans'
are
abundant.
Indeed, such epistemicclauses were characconclusion),
teristicof Oxford logic.44
At firstsight,these seem harmlessand in factconceptuallyinteresting
additionsto the obligationalframework,
relatedto Strode's generalepistemic penchant and to the focus on Respondent as an actual, nonomniscient
thisepistemicapproach
agent.But,undera giveninterpretation,
also
be
seen
as
a
confusion
betweenthe normight
problematic,yielding
mativeand the descriptivecharactersof the obligationalrules.
It has been stressedby many scholars45
that the rules of obligationes
are
; commentatorshave expressedthisnormativecharacessentiallynormative
ter in different
ways, such as pointingout theirconnectionwith deontic
or
problems,46
stressingthe importanceof the notion of 'correctness',47
as
But
Strode's
clauses
viewingobligationesrule-governed
games.48
epistemic
43Burley
andSwyneshed
hadthesameruleonhowtorespond
toimpertinent
propositions,
onwhich
wereimpertinent.
but,as I havestressed
times,
many
they
disagreed
propositions
44I owethisremark
Ashworth.
toJennifer
45Cf.Yrinsuuri
1993(n.8), 302.
46S. Knuuttila
andActions
inObligational
& M. Yijnsuuri,
Norms
, in:O. Pluta
Disputations
im14. und15.Jahrhundert
, Amsterdam
1988,191-202.
(ed.),DiePhilosophie
- Rekonstruktion
47Cf.H. Keffer,
De Obligationibus
einer
,
sptmittelalterlichen
Disputationstheorie
Leiden2001,123-7,147-50.
48DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).

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RALPHSTRODE'S0BUGATI
ONES

approach to those rules,and thiscreates

appear to introducea descriptive
difficulties.
of some of the obligationalrules,
Consider the followingformulations
in the spiritof the phrases containingthe term 'sturi quoted above:
(Rl) Respondent grantsthe positumif he knows it to be a possible
proposition.
if he knows it to be a true,not
(R2) Respondentgrantsa propositum
repugnans
proposition.
if he knows it to be a false,not
(R3) Respondentdenies a propositum
sequensproposition.
Accordingto this formulationof Rl, if Respondentdenies a givenpositumthat is in factpossible,but that he does not know to be possible,he
Rl. Similarly,suppose that a proposiis properlyspeakingnotinfringing
tumis in factrepugnant,besides being true,but that Respondentfailsto
and thepositum
thislogicalrelationbetweenthispropositum
(together
identify
to
withotherpreviouslygranted/ denied propositions,
according the antithis
proposition;again, prop), and that he thereforegrants
qua responsio
R2, given the failureof the epistemic
erlyspeaking,he is not infringing
clause. The same holds for R3.
Hence, if Respondent'slogical knowledgeis deficient,given the epistemicclause, he is properlyspeakingnot respondingbadly. But the point
of obligationaldisputations(or at least one of them) is preciselyto test
Respondent'slogical abilitiesand knowledge;he will respondwell if he
knowshis logic well. A situationin which Respondentmakes logical mistakes and can stillbe said to have respondedwell in some sense (perhaps 'to the best of his abilities')is againstthe whole spiritof the game.
So the epistemicclauses, albeit realistic,jeopardize the normativecharacter of obligationes.
Indeed, one way to make sense of the obligationalrules thus formulated is to view themas descriptiverules;in reality,Respondentwill only
as following
if he knows it to be possible, a propositum
accept a positum
such etc . . .
if
it
to
be
he
knows
fromor repugnantto the positum
only
of
that
is
treatises
But the purposeof obligational
spellingout
presumably
rules of how to respond correctly
(how to win the game) and not that of
how
such
of
as
a
disputationsactuallytake place.
description
serving
Anotherway to interpretsuch clauses is to view them as related to
- as
of the propositionsbeingput forward
the explicitformulation
opposed
to their 'mental' formulation.As will be discussed below, Strode was

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CATARINA
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againstthe view that some propositionswere implicitly

grantedduringa
if
'I
the
was
to
disputation;similarly,
positura
posit
you the proposition
that I am thinkingabout', Respondent could neitheraccept nor deny
such a positura
, since he didn'tknowthe (unuttered)
propositionto be possible or impossible.But if this is so, a perhaps more intuitiveformulation of this clause would have been somethinglike ^falsum
scituma te'
insteadof 'falsum
scitum
a teessefalsum' stressingthus thatthe proposition
in questionmustbe knownto Respondent,but not necessarilyknownto
be such-and-such.
Thus, one wondersto whichextentStrodewas only reproducingsome
of the standardOxfordformulations
of theserules,or whethertherereally
was an epistemic-descriptive
componentin his conceptionof the obligational rules.
b. Onlyexplicitly
base
proposed
propositions
belongto theinformational
Although Strode's main opponent in this treatise really seems to be
Swyneshed,in chapter III he also criticizesa particularview on obligationesnot defended by the latter. Indeed, this view was defended,for
example, by the anonymousauthor of the so-called Merton treatise.49
The specificview in questionwas that some propositions,even if not
proposed, are implicitlygrantedduringan obligationaldisputation,and
thereforeshould be takeninto account by Respondentwhen grantingor
The typicalexample illustrating
this view goes as
denyingthe proposita.
follows:the positum
is 'Every man is running'.The firstpropositum
is then
'You are running':accordingto both Burleyand Swyneshed,Respondent
must deny thispropositum
as impertinent
and false (Respondentis in fact
not runningat that moment). But according to the Merton author,50
Respondentis tacitlycommittedto the truthof the proposition'You are
a man', even thoughit has not been explicitly
proposedin the disputation,
and therefore
must
'You
are
Respondent
grant
running'as followingfrom
thepositum
with
the
together
tacitlygrantedproposition'You are a man'
Strode
Obi
, 6).
(cf.
49Cf.N. Kretzmann
andE. Stump,
TheAnonymous
De arteobligatoria
inMerton
College
MS. 306, in: E.P. Bos (ed.),Medieval
Semantics
andMetaphysics
: Studies
Dedicated
toL.M.de
andMediaeval
attheUniversity
ontheOccasion
, Ph.D.}Professor
Ryk
ofAncient
Philosophy
ofLeiden
, Nijmegen
1985,239-80,andE.J.Ashworth
ofHis 60thBirthday
1993,RalphStrodeon
in Obligational
in: K. Jacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie,
Inconsistency
Disputations,
Leiden1993,363-86,
esp.375-9.
50Kretzmann
andStump1985,246(Latintext),
255(translation),
266/7(comments).

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TIOMES

363

Strode is radicallyopposed to this view. He startshis counter-argumentationby noticingthat 'granting'can be understoodin two ways,
verballyand mentally,and that accordingto some (the Merton author,
for instance),it is not more reasonable to grant a propositionthat follows fromthe positum
togetherwith a verballygrantedpropositionthan
it is to granta propositionthat followsfromthe positum
togetherwith a
Obviously,thispositionputs at riskmany
mentallygrantedproposition.51
of the crucial aspects of Strode-styleobligationes
, such as the importance
of the order in which propositionsare proposed,and the fundamentally
pragmaticcharacterof a disputation,seen as an actual deed performed
by those involvedin it. One could add the objection that, since those
are onlyaccessibleto Respondent,it becomes
mentallygrantedpropositions
to
virtuallyimpossible judge objectivelywhetherhe has respondedwell
or not at the end of the disputation,as the total set of denied / granted
propositionsis not publiclyavailable.
Strode's argumentagainst this view, if I understandit correcdy,runs
is 'Everyman is running',to whichmenroughlyas follows:ifthepositum
tal propositionsis Respondent actually committed?To the proposition
that he is a man or to the propositionthat he is not running?They are
both true propositions,but if they are both granted(mentallyor otherset of propo, then clearlyan inconsistent
wise) togetherwith the positum
sitionshas been granted.
Thus, if mentallygrantedpropositionsare included in the informationalbase of the disputation(theset of propositionson the basis of which
pertinenceis judged), then the rules of the game no longer determine
the correctresponse(s)to a proposition.Given the positum
'Every man is
one
can
eitherdeny
is
'You
are
if
the
first
running',
propositum
running',
it
as
else
or
and
false
is
an
as
it
it,
following
grant
proposition,
impertinent
and the mentallygrantedproposition'You are a man'.
fromthe positum
, then it can eitherbe
Similarly,if 'You are a man' is the firstpropositum
as
and
or
denied
as
true,
repugnantto the positum
granted impertinent
are not running'.52
'You
the
with
mentallygrantedproposition
together

51Strode,
essemaiorratioquaredebetaliquaproposiObi, 6: "Nonenimeisuidetur
ex positocumscitoesseuerouelbeneconcesso
ti concedi
vocaliter,
quam
que sequitur
mentaliter."
ex positocumscitoesseuerouelbeneconcesso
quandosequitur
52I havearguedthat,withrespect
seemsto
to impertinent
Respondent
propositions,
in howto respond
to them.Butherewhatis at stakeis indetermihavesomefreedom
or impertinent.
a proposition
is pertinent
nancyevenofwhether

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CATARINA
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Strodealso noticesthatgrantingmentalpropositions
the fourth
infringes
that
the
order
of
and
is
conclusion,namely
granting
denying crucial.
While verballygrantingand denyingtakes place in time, and therefore
the order of responsesis well-established,
mentallygrantingand denying
subvertsthe order principle,since presumablyill mentallygranted or
denied propositionsare grantedor denied at the same time.So the order
principlecan no longerbe applied.53
Strode's critiqueof thispositionindicatesthat he is well aware of the
essentially
pragmatic(as opposed to abstract)characterof obligationaldisputations.Such disputationsare dependenton elementsof the actual situation in which they take place, such as the actual state of knowledge
of thosepresent,thepropositionsthatare actuall- i.e. verbally
proposed,
and the order in which they are proposed. Here, the game metaphor
comes in handy, as it stressesthe role of the participantsplaying the
game and the specificmoves made by each of them,in a certainorder.
A 'mental move' is simplynot a move in the game- intersubjectivity
is
a fundamentaltraitof any game. In obligationaldisputations,all moves
are and must be verbal,explicitmoves.
c. Self-contradictory
posita
to the situationof the very disputationin which
Propositionsreferring
are
are
discussedin virtuallyall obligationes
treatisesof the
they
proposed
14th century.This fact has led to the hypothesisthat obligationes
were
and self-referential,
Liaressentiallya frameworkto deal with sophismata
like paradoxes.54Even if one does not agree with this hypothesis,55
one
muststillprovidean explanationforthe abundantpresenceof sophismata
in obligationaltreatises.I have argued56thattheseseem to be limitcases,
which serve to test the soundnessof the obligationaltheorybeing procases withoutbecoming
posed; if the theorycan deal with such difficult
incoherent(forexample,withoutyieldingconflicting
instructions
on how
should
then
it
is
a
sound
Respondent
reply),
theory.
53Strode,
Obi, 6: "[.. .1videtur
uerum
ordinem
quodistapositio
transponit
respondendi."
54Cf.E. Stump,
A. From
theBeginning
totheEarly
Fourteenth
1982,Obligations:
, in:
Century
N. Kretzmann,
A. Kenny,
Medieval
J.Pinborg
(eds),TheCambridge
History
ofLater
Philosophy,
1982,315-34.
Cambridge
55Asforexample
M. Yrjnsuuri,
andLogical
Coherence
, Obligations
, in:Theoria,
Disputations
56 (2000).205-223.
esD.216.
56Cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n.2).

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RALPHSTRODE'S0BUG
ATI
ONES

365

In any case, the discussionof self-referential

propositionsin Strode's
treatiseis not a particulartrait of this text. What is perhaps novel in
Strode'streatise(withrespectto his predecessorssuch as Swyneshedand
Burley)is thathe formulatesspecificrules on how to deal withthem (for
instance,in the firstsuppositionand in the second and thirdconclusions),
in such a way thatthesesophismata
are no longerdiscussedas limitcases.
of the theory.
seem
to
be
at
the
core
Rather,they
were
But instead of viewingthis fact as a indicationthat obligationes
in
I
tend
to
believe
Strode's
to
meant
solve
that,
case,
,
sophismata
really
it is a sign of the general epistemic' pragmaticfocus of his treatise.
Worthconsideringis Strode'sdiscussionofpositathatlead to what can
contradictions:
be called performative
positathat contradictthe very act
of positingby Opponent,thepositio('Nothingis positedto you'), or posita
that contradictthe veryact of acceptingthe positum
by Respondent,the
Strode's
third
admissio('You are sleeping now') (cf.
conclusion). Even
though these positaseem to create contradictions(of the performative,
pragmatickind),Strode statesveryclearlythat theyshould be accepted
as posita.He remarksthat denyingthese as positaon the basis of the first
supposition(accordingto which impossiblepositashould not be accepted)
is nothingbut an escape for the miserable,who do not know the force
of this art.57
- i.e. the
But if a propositiondescribingthe paradoxicalpositio
veryact
of positingthe givenpositum is proposed as a propositum
, then it should
That is,
be denied, since (althoughtrue) it is repugnantto the positum.
should
be
is
is
to
It
that
the
granted,
positum 'Nothing posited you'.
suppose
as it is not impossible.Then, if '"Nothing is posited to you" is posited
to you' is proposed,it should not be granted,even thoughit is true in
the disputationalsituation,because it is repugnantto thepositum
(it is an
instantiationof 'Somethingis posited to you'). Therefore,since inferential relationstake priorityover truthin the case of pertinentpropositions,
it should be denied.
Also worthnotingis Strode'ssecond conclusion:Respondentcan grant
thathe is respondingbadly and yet not lose the game (noticethatit follows fromthe fourthsuppositionand the firstconclusion:if denyinga
truepropositiondoes not necessarilymean respondingbadly,Respondent
57Strode,
Obi, 3: "Ex quibuspatetquodtalescasusnegarenonestnisifugamiseroistius
artisuigorem."
rum,nescientium

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CATARINA
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can grantthathe is respondingbadly even thoughhe is in factresponding well). Consider the following(hypothetical)disputation:
N0: 'Every man is respondingbadly.' Granted,possible.
and true.
Nj: 'You are a man.' Granted,impertinent
fromN0 and N1#
'You
are
follows
N2:
respondingbadly.' Granted,
What is paradoxical about this situationis that the veryact of granting
'You are respondingbadly' correspondsto Respondent'srespondingwell,
whereasdenyingit would correspondto his respondingbadly.58But again
Strode does not considerthese performative
contradictions
to be vicious
to
be
excluded
from
the
framework.
contradictions,
obligational
How can we make sense of these paradoxical situations?I propose
here to consider the distinctionbetween the contextof utteranceof a
propositionand its contextof evaluation,familiarfromtwo-dimensional
semantics.59
It is as if all grantedor denied pertinentpropositions(includcontext,
) were being evaluated with respectto a different
ing the positura
not that of the disputation.Impertinentpropositions,on the otherhand,
are evaluated with respect to the very context of the disputation.So
Respondentcan grant that nothingis posited to him, that he is dead,
that he is respondingbadly etc, because it is as thoughthese referredto
a different
situation,not to the verydisputation.
is also helpful:in the case
the
Here,
thought-experiment
hypothesis60
of pertinentpropositions,one should replyto them as if one were crein which theposisituation,a thought-experiment,
atinga counterfactual
turais true. These pragmatic' performative
paradoxes are thus resolved
with
one
to
if,
respect pertinentpropositions,
supposes that Respondent
- in which he is
is not referring
to the very situationof the disputation
situation.
utteringtheseperformative
paradoxes but ratherto a different
From this point of view, such performative
contradictionsare not very
falsepropositions.61
different
fromplain contingent
Indeed, in the example

58Something
'I am notspeaking
now'.
likeuttering
59Cf. D. Chalmers
Semantics
, availableat
2004,TheFoundations
ofTwo-Dimensional
http://consc.net/papers/foundations.html
60Somescholars,
thatan
in particular
2000(n. 55),219 havecontended
Yijnsuuri
framework
is toviewitas a technique
oftheobligational
modern
interpretation
adequate
to buildthought-experiments.
61A similar
toBuridan's
withtheapplication
ofthisdistinction
conclusion
wasreached
timeitis uttered,
itis impossibly'No proposition
is negative':
true,sinceitis falseevery

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367

'"Nothing is positedto you" is posited to you' is falsein the situationin

which that nothingis posited to you is the case.62
But it remainscrucial to identifycorrectlywhethera propositum
is perifit is impertinent,
tinentor impertinent;
it shouldbe respondedto accordto
the
context
of
utterance
ing
very
(and in thiscase thereis no distinction
betweencontextof utteranceand contextof evaluation),but if it is pertinent,it should be responded to according to the relevantinferential
relations.These responsesprogressively
create a counterfactual
situation
that is, as it were, the contextof evaluationof pertinentpropositions.63
An issue that stillmustbe addressedis whetherStrode would be willor
inconsistencies,
ing to accept all kindsof pragmaticand performative
only those discussedso far. E.J. Ashworthargues that he mightbe seen
as rulingout positaof the kind 'You are in Rome and no conjunctionis
differsso much
posited to you'.64I am not sure whethersuch a positum
from'Nothingis positedto you' or similarposita.On the basis of the distinction
betweencontextof utteranceand contextof evaluation,Respondent
could then simplyconsidera situationin which he is in Rome (participatingin a disputationor not), and eithernothingis posited to him, or
a positum
is posited but it is not a conjunction.But if explicitreference
is made to the verydisputationtakingplace- 'You are in Rome and no
conjunctionis posited to you in this very disputation' , then it seems
that we would have a real paradox, similarto Liar-likeparadoxes with
explicitself-reference
('This propositionis false').

- it is in facta
butit is notimpossible,
sincethesituation
it describes
is notimpossible
possible
proposition.
62Thegistofthisdistinction
canalsobe found
in thefollowing
remark
byAshworth:
'Ashe [Strode]
toprevent
theresponout,there
is,after
all,nothing
subsequently
pointed
dentfrom
onthelogical
ofwhathehasadmitted.
He has
following
through
consequences
todenythathe himself
is speaking,
ordebating,
orgranting,
ordenying
orengagsimply
which
is incompatible
withhisbeingnon-existent,
ormerely
inginanyaction
asleep.This
ona careful
distinction
between
andmaking
a statement
about
approach
depends
uttering
theconditions
ofutterance.
It is all right
fortherespondent
to reply,
buthe mustnever
thathe is replying.'
1993(n. 14),367).
grant
(Ashworth
63It is worth
thatRespondent
doesnotstart
outwitha givenmodelto
noting
though
serveas thecontext
ofevaluation
forpertinent
thismodelis created
rather,
propositions;
as thedisputation
Cf.DutilhNovaes2005(n.3);Yijnsuuri
2000(n.55),220
progresses.
'semantic
ofobligations).
(against
interpretations'
64Ashworth
1993(n. 14),366.

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d. Somerulesthatdo nothold
In his influential
treatiseon consequences,65
Strode presentsrulesof convalid
within
the
realm
of
These basically
sequence specifically
obligationes.
to
the
issue
of
whether
the
pertain
consequentor antecedentof a consequentiaknown to hold should be granted' denied ' doubted once the
antecedentor consequenthas been granted' denied ' doubted.66
There are however a few obligational'consequences' that mightbe
expected to hold, given the intuitivecharacterof theircounterpartsin
contextsotherthan obligationes
, but whichfailto hold withinStrode'sobligational framework.Interestingly,
the counterexamplesto these invalid
schemataare oftenrelatedto the self-referential
phenomena and performativecontradictions
just discussed.
Anothersource of counterexamplesare propositionsthat referto the

verymoves being made in the game, for example as in p ought to be

granted'(wherep is any proposition);in such cases, the meta-evaluation
of a given move takes place withinthe verydisputation,and can prima
facie be iteratedas many timesas one wishes.It is as if therewere var- the
ious layers of disputationwithinthe disputation
disputationitself,
talkingabout the disputation,talkingabout talkingabout the disputation
etc . . . These different
layers are particularlyconfusingwhen they are
'tossed' togetherin the same proposition,for example in the case of a
disjunctionor conjunctionwhose membersreferto different
layers '/>or
to
be
back
and
forth
the different
p ought
granted'.Going
layersmay
create what Ashworthhas termed'obligationalinconsistencies',67
but still
several authors,includingStrode, seemed to be prepared to deny the
validityof schemata that would otherwisepreventobligationalinconsistenciesfromarising.
In what follows,I shall representsome of these schemataby means of
basic propositionallogic and some modal-likeoperators.So 'T[/?]' correspondsto the statementthat propositionp is true; 'G [/>]'to the statement that propositionp is granted,and 4OG[/?]' to the statementthat
propositionp ought to be granted(square bracketsrepresentthe nominalizationof p). Iterationof these operatorsis possible.Withinthe obligational context, G[/?] is in fact equivalent to />,insofar as statinga
propositionis in this contextthe same as grantingit.
65Seaton1973(n.41).
66See Boh2001in.4l. 162-3fora formal
reconstruction.
67See below,
pp. 372-73.

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RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
HONES

369

The firstschema that,in otherdisputationalor argumentative

contexts,
is usuallyexpected to hold is that which associatesthe dutyof granting
a propositionwithits truth.Indeed, as shownby Yijnsuuri,68
originally
in the Aristoteliantheoryof disputationsas well as in earlier medieval
treatiseson the topic- , Respondent'smain commitment
is withthe truth,
or at leastwithhis knowledgeof what is true(Respondentis not expected
to know all truthsas true).The schema can be representedas:
(Sci) OG [p] <==> T [p'
In otherwords,ifp is true it ought to be granted,and if it ought to be
granted,it is true. But, as argued by Yijnsuuri,69the significantturn
introducedby obligationaltreatisesof the late 13th centuryis precisely
that Respondent'sduty towardstruthbecomes overriddenby his commitmentto the recognitionof certain inferentialrelations.Not only is
Respondentcommittedto acceptingfalsepositain the contextof obligationes
, but he is also committedto grantingall propositionsthat follow
fromthe positura
, regardlessof theirtruth-value.Indeed, Strode is very
much aware of this subversionof the originalpurposes of disputations,
and states clearly in his firstconclusion that one does not necessarily
respondbadly when one grantsa falsepropositionor denies a true one.
Anotherschema that does not seem to hold in a Strode-style
obligational disputationis the one associatingthe grantingofp withthe granting thatp is true.
(Sc2) G[p] <==>

OG[T [p]]

Prima facie,thisappears to be a variationof the TarskianT-schema and,

in effect,withinmost medieval logical systems,the T-schema would not
hold. This is relatedto the medievalview thattokensare the truth-value
bearers:"p iffT[/>]" does not hold because, fora propositionto be true,
it must exist (it must be formed);so this schema holds only under the
provisoof the token'sexistence.70
But here we seem to encountera different
situation,insofaras the reason why (Sc2) does not hold withinStrode's (and otherauthors',such as
seems to be of a different
nature.Recall
Burley's)obligationalframework
68Yrjnsuuri
2000(n.55),207.
69Yrjnsuuri
2000(n.55),209.
70Cf.Ashworth
1993(n. 14),368.

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the distinctionbetween contextof utteranceand contextof evaluation;

or a propositum
havingbeen accepted as persuppose thatp is thepositum
but
that
tinentand followingfromthepositum
,
p is actuallyfalse.Because
it is a pertinentproposition,its contextof evaluationis not that of the
disputation,which is its contextof utterance.But T [p' is an irrelevant
proposition,and thereforeshould be evaluated accordingto the context
of utterance;now, in this context,p is false,thus T [p] is also false,and
thereforeshould be denied.71
We obtain thus the awkwardsituationof having grantedp and having denied T 'p]. DiscussingBurley'scontentionthat (Sc2) does not hold,
of obligaYijnsuuri takes this to be a sign that semanticinterpretations
forthe analysisof counterfactuals,
tiones(as a framework
thought-experimentsor beliefrevision)are not adequate, as it seems absurd that,in the
same situation,p holds and T[/?] does not hold.72But perhaps the problem is withthe view that only one situation(or one class of situations)is
at stake duringan obligationaldisputation;what may be needed is the
distinction
betweenthe fictionalsituationprogressively
being constructed,
- or
and the actual situationof the disputationtakingplace73
similarly,
'between utteringand any metalinguisticassessmentof the speech act
involvedor of the utteranceitself'.74
to Yijnsuuri'ssuggestion
This being said, I am extremelysympathetic
consistentsets of senthat 'obligationaldisputationsaim at constructing
tences',75takingplace thus essentiallyon a linguisticratherthan semantic level.76While it may seem absurd that in a sensibledescriptionof a
possible state of affairsw, p holds and T [p] does not hold, a set containingboth p and ""Tfjb] is not necessarilyinconsistent(in particularif
the T-schema does not hold).
71Admittedly,
thethesis
that
thepositum
tobedefending
Strode
seems
atsomepoint
, once
in section
II.e.
as discussed
as true(evenifactually
be considered
should
false),
accepted,
in virtue
ofbeingsequens,
thataregranted
is saidaboutfalseproposita
Butnothing
and,
as true.
thesearenotto be considered
presumably,
72Yrinsuuri
2000(n.55),220.
73In DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3),I haveargued(following
a suggestion
byChristopher
ofconstructing
to theprocess
an obligational
thatplaying
gameis equivalent
J. Martin)
wouldcorwhich
Lindenbam's
setofpropositions,
a maximal
consistent
lemma,
following
setsof
consistent
as
maximal
worlds
are
defined
if
a
to
world,
possible
respond possible
propositions.
74Ashworth
1993(n. 13),368.
75Yrinsuuri
2000(n.55),221.
76Thispointis alsorelated
ofobligational
verbalnature
to theessentially
disputations
III (pp.359-60).
in section
discussed

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'S0BUG
ATI
ONES

371

The last two schematathatI would like to discuss,whichdo not seem

to hold in Strode's theoryof obligationes
, have also been discussedin with
to
in
respect sophismata
proposed Burley'sand Sherwood's (?) treatises.77
They both concernthe evaluationof moves of the disputationwithinthe
4
and
verydisputation,by means of normativetermssuch as concedendurr
'
in
or
as
negandur
occurring propositionsproposed (as posita
).
proposita
Properlyspeaking,such 'deontic operators'can be iteratedad infinitum,
creatingthe confusingeffectof different
layers of discoursewithinthe
same.
Consider the followingschema:
(Sc3) OG [p' <==> G [p]
An obligationaldisputationwhere this schema holds is clearly a fully
determinedgame, in the sense that whateveris correctlygrantedought
to be granted.In otherwords,in such disputationsRespondenthas no
space for maneuver,and thereis at each turnonly one move that will
avoid him losingthe game. As alreadymentioned,I have argued in that
there are elementsin Burley'streatisesuggestingthat the deterministic
is not the onlyone possible,and thatsome space formaneuinterpretation
ver and strategicplaying seems to be leftwith respect to impertinent
propositions(since in such cases grantingit as well as denyingit allow
Respondentto keep consistency).78
In some passages, Strode seems to defend preciselythis non-deterministicview of the game: Respondentwould have the dutyto grantpertinentpropositionsthatare sequens
and to denypertinentpropositionsthat
are rpugnons
, but as for impertinentpropositionsno such duty would
, a clear counapply. In chapter XI, he presentsthe followingsophisma
to
terexample (Sc3):79
N0: '"Nothing is posited to you" is posited to you.' Granted (as
possible).
and true).
N,: 'Somethingis positedto you.' Accepted(as impertinent80
77Knuuttila
andYrjnsuuri
1988(n.46),197-9.
78DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).
79Strode,
Obi, 27: "Respondeo
admitiendo
casum['nihil
esttibipositum'
sittibiposita
eta tebeneadmissa];
etcumproponitur:
etnegoquod
concedo,
'aliquidesttibipositum',
illasita meconcedenda,
ex mihipositoetbeneadmisso."
quiadicoquodnonsequitur
80Strode,
Obi.
ex mihiposito
..
, 27: . . nonsequitur

11:15:36 AM

372

CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

N2: '"Something is posited to you" ought to be granted.' Denied

('Somethingis posited to you' does not followfromN0).81
That is, the reason he gives fordenyingN2 is that 'Somethingis posited
to you' is impertinent;so even though Respondenthas grantedNl5 he
was under no obligationto do so. (Sc3) is also relatedto the normative'
descriptivedichotomydiscussedin sectionIILa.82 If this schema is supthat
posed to be descriptive,then obviouslyit fails,since not everything
oughtto be grantedis in factgranted namely,when Respondentactually respondsbadly. But in Strode'stheory,(Sc3) seems not to hold even
thatis grantedought
undera normativereading,insofaras not everything
that
are granted,under
to be granted(namely,impertinent
propositions
the non-deterministic
By contrast,under the normative
interpretation).
left
to right)of the schema obviously
the
other
direction
(from
reading,
holds: if Respondentdoes not grantwhat ought to be granted(a pertinent sequens
proposition),then he respondsbadly.
Moreover, in special cases (for example, when the positurais a disin one of the disjuncts:'/?or p
junction featuringthe term concedendum
a propositionp oughtbe granted
that
it
can
occur
be
to
granted'),83
ought
to
be
granted' must be denied as repug(as sequens
), but that '/?ought
nant,even thoughit is true(it describesa truefactabout the disputation).
In sum, in such cases p oughtto be granted,but '/>oughtto be granted'
- in
does not have to be granted
fact,since Respondent'scommitment
to truth,it
has
relations
towardsinferential
priorityover his commitment
oughtto be denied. Thus, the schema (Sc4), where the deonticoperator
'OG' is iterated,was oftenrejected.84
(Sc4) OG[p] <==> OG[OG[/>]]
In a recent and yet unpublished article,85E.J. Ashworthargues that
therewere basicallytwo trendsamong the authorsof obligationaltreatises
81Strode,
Obi, 27: . . negoquodiliasita meconcedenda,
quiadicoquodnonsequitur
ex mihipositoet beneadmisso."
82See p. 360;alsodiscussed
1988(n.46),197.
andYijnsuuri
in Knuuttila
83Gf.Knuuttila
1988(n.46),198.
andYrjnsuuri
84'Neither
"Yououghtto grantP ifandonlyifyououghtto grantT oughtto be
an obligas principles
nor"P ifandonlyifP is true"wereaccepted
governing
granted"'
1993(n. 14),368).
ational
(Ashworth
disputation.'
85E.JAshworth,
d'unsophisme
l'histoire
esttibipositura":
estasinus3)
"cTuamis'(vel'homo
Conference
oftheSophismata
intheproceedings
surlesObligationes,
dans
lestraits
forthcoming
(Geneva,
June2003).

11:15:36 AM

RALPHSTRODE'SOBLIGA
TIOJVES

373

concerning(Sc4), namelythose who rejectedit as a valid principlegoverningthe disputation,and thosewho accepted it, presumablyunder the
argumentthat denyingthis principlewould generateobligationalincon- for
sistencies
example, if Respondentdenies p but grantsthatp ought
to be granted.Possibily,according to the firstgroup of authors,such
'inconsistencies'
would not be verydifferent
fromotherpragmaticinconsuch as 'Nothingis positedto you5,whichmanyauthors,among
sistencies,
whom Strode, were glad to accept as possibleposita.So one may conjecture that Strode would tend to deny the validityof (Sc4), but in his
textI have not foundconclusiveelementsas to which trendhe belonged
on thisparticularissue.
The questionis of course,once thesedifferent
layersof discourseabout
the disputationare introduced,whetherthe veryrulesof obligationforce
Respondent to grant inconsistencies.I have proved in (Dutilh Novaes
2005) that,if one sticksto the object-levelof discoursewithinthe dispuBut withthe different
tation,Respondentcan alwaysmaintainconsistency.
in
of
discourse
this
not
be
layers
may
possible, any case if obligational
If theyare viewed as
'inconsistencies'
are viewed as real inconsistencies.86
then there is no real
mere pragmaticand performative
inconsistencies,
if
But
are
more
than
and
inconproblem.
they
pragmatic
performative
then
a
dedicated
which
remains
for
sistencies,
discussion,
they require
now a subject forfutureresearch.
IV. Conclusion
One of the most interesting
aspects of the studyof the obligationalliteratureis the fact that the medieval authors really seemed to be conversingwithone another,yieldinga livelydebate. Indeed, an authorsuch
as Swyneshedwas clearlyreactingto Burley,whereassomeonelike Strode
is clearlyreactingto Swyneshed,not to mentionthe other,less known
participantsof this debate. The resultwas that the discussionspresented
in the obligationes
treatiseswere oftenprogressively
sharperand deeper.
I have attemptedto show that Strode's contributionto this debate
revolvesmostlyaround his criticismof the novaresponsio
and his epistemic
and pragmaticversionof the antiquaresponsio.
The rulesof the game presentedby Strode,properlyspeaking,differverylittlefromBurley'srules,
86DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).

11:15:36 AM

374

CATARINA
DUTILHNOVAES

but the conceptualanalysisaccompanyingthe presentationof his theory

flavor.His goal is, in any case, clearlythat
seems to have a different
of re-establishing
consistencyas the main principleguidingobligational
disputations.
are disIn Strode's treatise,objections to Swyneshed'snovaresponsio
cussed in a compellingway, in particularwith respectto the notion of
consistency,but some of his argumentsseem to be slighdymiscast.In
I have arguedthatone of Strode'sargumentsagainstSwyneshed
particular,
but not necshowsat best thatthe novaresponsio
producesco-inconsistency,
also
defends
a
to
Strode
position be foundin
essarilyplain inconsistency.
some 13th centurytreatises,but which is not to be found in Burley,
namelythat all responsesduringthe disputationbe givenwithrespectto
is put forone and the same moment,i.e. the momentwhen thepositum
which threatenedconsisward. An importantfeatureof the novaresponsio
tency,the behaviorof conjunctionsand disjunctions,is also discussedby
Strode, and, as a remedyto it, he seems to propose that the positabe
viewed as true.
Moreover,Strode discussesin detail some pragmaticaspects involved
in obligationaldisputations.While many of these aspects were already
presentin previous treatises,such as Burley's,in Stode's treatisethey
occupy an eyen more prominentposition. In this paper, some of his
analyses have served as inspirationfor a discussionof certain foundational issues concerningobligationes
, such as its normativevs. descriptive
nature (relatedto Strode's demand
character,its essentiallyperformative
that only explicitlyproposed propositionsbe taken into account), and
contradictionsthat are or are not allowed duringa
some performative
disputation.Also inspiredby Strode'sremarks,I have discussedsome rules
that one mightexpect to hold withinthe obligationalframework,but
which do not simplyhold.
In sum, my goal withthe presenttextwas to divulgea hithertorather
unknownbut conceptuallyvery interesting
obligationaltreatise that of
Ralph Strode , and to take thistextas a startingpoint fora discussion
of some foundationalissues withinthe obligationalframework.
Universityof Leiden
Instituut
Filosofiseli

11:15:36 AM

LorenzoValla and Quattrocento

Scepticism
LODI NAUTA

Abstract
to be a sceptic.Equipped
LorenzoValla (1406-1457)has oftenbeen considered
withan extremely
and
critical
his
whole
oeuvreseemedto
mind,
polemical
aim at undermining
receivedphilosophicaland theologicaldogmas. More
he has been associatedwiththe burgeoninginterests
in ancient
specifically
in
In
the
fifteenth
this
in
article
the
century.
scepticism
arguments support
will be critically
of thisinterpretation
examinedand evaluated.Based on a
discussionof two of his major works,De verobonoand the Dialctica
, it will
be shownthatValla was not a sceptic.Even thoughthe firstworkbetrays
the techniquesof theAcademyas employedby Cicero,the appropriation
of
thesestrategies
servedan agenda whichcan hardlybe called 'sceptical'.The
second work containshis reformof Aristotelian
dialectic,which seems to
to
a
in
interest
which
and
testify
sceptical
arguments
relyon verisimilitude
dubiousvaliditysuch as soritesand paradox. But ratherthan reflecting
an
endorsement
of Academic scepticism,this work,on closer reading,shows
Valla to be highlycriticalon such arguments.This raisesthe questionof
how scepticismis relatedto rhetoric.Their similarities
and differences
will
be discussedin the finalsection:Valla the Christianoratorwas no proponentof doubt,uncertainty
and a suspensionofjudgement,even thoughat
timeshe used strategies
derivedfromAcademicscepticism.
Like all "-isms","scepticism"is a termwithrathervague semanticalcontours.1It means different
thingsto different
people, and because historians do not always make clear in which sense they are using the term,
debatesabout whethera particularthinkerwas a scepticor not are bound
to arise. Some scholarswould only speak of scepticismif the main tenets
- the
of ancient
are explicidymentionedand endorsed
scepticism
equipollence
1 Earlier
versions
ofthisarticle
werereadat a conference
on scepticism,
organized
by
Henrik
inUppsala(May2005)andattheannualconference
oftheRenaissance
Lagerlund,
ofAmerica
in San Francisco
to theaudiences
Society
(March2006).I am grateful
presentat theseoccasions
forstimulating
discussions
on thehistory
ofscepticism,
inparticularJohnMonfasani,
BrianCopenhaver,
DavidLinesandDominik
Perler.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
44,2-3

11:15:51 AM

376

LODI NAUTA

of beliefs,the suspensionofjudgement,and the tranquillity

of the mind.
In a broader,less historically
determinedsense, it can mean the conviction that the human mind is principallyincapable to grasp the truthof
things.On this view, certaintyand truthare out of reach for human
beings,who should thereforebe contentwith probability,verisimilitude
or mere plausibility.
This convictioncan easilylead to fideism,and some
thinkersin the past have used scepticismas a preparationfor faithor
have even regardedit as basicallycongruouswithit.2In an even broader
sense it means any formof questioning,doubtingand underminingtraditionalbeliefs,arguments,opinions or conventions.Used in this sense,
historiansmay caillany thinkerin the past a scepticwho problematised
or criticisedestablishedopinionsand practices.And these are just some
of the meaningswhich have been attachedto the term.
It is clear that an historianusing the term,for instance,in the first,
strictsense distinguishedhere, will come up with a different
historyof
scepticismthan someone who uses it in the last, much broader sense.
The firsttype of historywill probablypass over the Middle Ages, since
- Sextus
the principal texts of ancient scepticism
Empiricus5Outlinesof
, DiogenesLaertius'livesofthePhilosophers
, and Cicero'sAcadmica
Pyrrhonism,
did not, or hardly,circulatethen and were virtuallyunknown.3The latter type of historywill focus on those periods when traditionalsystems
of beliefswere criticised,forexample late-medievalnominalism,humanIt is therefore
ism, the Reformation,and the French Enlightenment.4
to
be
clear
about
one's
and
use
of
the term,for
important
understanding
otherwiseone is bound to talk at cross-purposes.In this articleI shall
2 The rehearsal
ofsceptical
inthedefence
offaith
cantakedifferent
forms.
arguments
It is one thing
to use sceptical
and sceptical
to giveexpression
to
language
arguments
one'sreligious
as Montaigne
did whenhe thought
thatthesceptical
and the
beliefs,
Christian
arebasically
thesceptic's
to comply
with
positions
compatible,
linking
precept
thecustoms
andlawsofsociety
withhisownpreservation
of"theancient
beliefs
ofour
It is an another
to employ
as a preparation
forfaith
religion".
thing
sceptical
arguments
as Gianfrancesco
PicodellaMirandola
didinhisExamen
in 1516.See
vanitatis,
completed
T. Penelhum,
andFideism
Tradition
, in: TheSkeptical
, ed. M. Burnyeat,
Skepticism
Berkeley
1983,287-318on 296-97.
3 However,
thecirculation
ofSextusEmpiricus
wassomewhat
widerthanhashitherto
beensupposed;
seeR. Wittwer,
Sextus
Latinus.
Dieerste
lateinische
von
Sextus
bersetzung
Empiricus'
ForCicero's
Acadmica
in theMiddleAgessee
eis,Leiden(forthcoming).
fyrrneioi
Hy
polyps
C. B. Schmitt,
Cicero
The Hague1972,33-42(e.g.pp.39-41onHenry
ofGhent's
Scepticus,
useofit).
4 Seenowonmedieval
forms
ofscepticism
Dominik
undGewissheit.
Perler,
Zweifel
Skeptische
Debatten
imMittelalter,
amMain2006.
Frankfurt

11:15:51 AM

SCEPTICISM
VALLAANDQUATTROCENTO
LORENZO

377

argue thatthe debate on the so-calledscepticismof Quattrocentohumanism, in particularthe scepticismof one its most famousrepresentatives,
Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), has sufferedfromthis vaguenessor equivoItalian humancationof the term.This is not surprising.
Fifteenth-century
ism saw the rediscoveryand slow disseminationof ancient sources of
termed"sceptical"in the more
scepticism,but it has also been frequently
general sense of doubting,questioningand underminingtraditionalsystems of beliefs.5Humanism defineditselfin oppositionto scholasticism,
attackingscholastic modes of thinkingand writingwhereverit could.
Humanistsproclaimed intellectualfreedom,rejectingwhat they saw as
the ipse/m/attitudeof the scholastics.Their rediscoveryof ancient litrhetoric
and philosophysuggestedto them that the truthof
erature,
Aristotlewas just one truthamong many others,and that therewas an
intellectuallife beyond the confinesof what theysaw as the rigid,dogmatic and closed-offworld of the scholastics.
To many historians,these tendenciesfindno betterexpressionthan in
the work of Lorenzo Valla.6 Equipped with an extremelypolemical and
criticalmind, his whole oeuvre seemed to aim at underminingreceived
philosophicaland theologicaldogmas. He famouslyexposed as a forgery
the Donation of Constantine,one of the pillars of the papal claim on
worldlypower. He approached criticallythe vulgate text of the Bible,
comparingit,forthe firsttime,withthe Greektextof the New Testament,
and drawingsome theologicallydaring conclusionsfromit. He attacked
Aristotelian-scholastic
metaphysicsand dialecticsalmosttoutcourt.He was
5 The term
in e.g.V. Kahn,Rhetoric,
features
andSkepticism
inthe
Prudence,
prominently
Renaissance
andC. Schmitt,
Renaissance
, IthacaandLondon,
1985;B. Copenhaver
,
Philosophy
TheConfessionalization
Oxford
inReformation
1992,ch.4; ErikaRummel,
ofHumanism
Germany.
Oxford
2000,50.
6 See e.g.M. Fois,Il pensiero
cristiano
diLorenzo
Vallanelquadro
storico
culturale
delsuoambiente
In OurImage
andLikeness.
andDivinity
inItalian
, Rome1969;C. Trinkaus,
Humanity
Humanist
Valla.
2 vols.,1970,vol.1, 103-50;S. I. Camporeale,
Lorenzo
, London,
Thought
Umanesimo
e teologia
Vallatrail Concilio
diBasilea
e quello
Lorenzo
1972;R. Fubini,
, Florence
diFirenze,
e ilprocesso
dell'
in Conciliarismo,
stati
. Atti
del
inizidell'umanesimo
nazionali,
Inquisizione,
XXVConvegno
storico
Todi... 1988,Spoleto1990,287-318;R. Fubini,
Due
internazionali,
contributi
suLorenzo
Valla
e Rinascimento,
8 (= n.s.,voi.5) (1994),101-16;
, in:Medioevo
B. Copenhaver
and C. Schmitt,
Renaissance
, Oxford1992,209-27;W. Scott
Philosophy
Thenegative
dialectic
Valla:a study
in thepathology
Blanchard,
, in:
ofLorenzo
ofopposition
Renaissance
14 (2000),149-89;
T. Izbicki,
Valla:TheScholarship
inEnglish
Lorenzo
Studies,
1992, in:Humanity
andDivinity
inRenaissance
andReformation.
inHonor
Through
Essays
ofCharles
Trinkaus
See n. 11belowformorestudies
, eds.J. O' Malleyetal.,Leiden1993,287-301.
on Valla.

11:15:51 AM

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LODI NAUTA

highly"sceptical"about some religiouspractices,attackingthe validityof

with
vows of the clergy.Other scholarsassociateValla, more specifically,
in ancientscepticism.7
Influencedby theAcademic
the burgeoninginterests
scepticismof Cicero, Valla was highlysceptical,accordingto thesescholof certainknowledgeand the attainmentof truth.
ars, about the possibility
This is lisobelieved to be the reason why he pays considerableattention to formsof argumentationwhich rely solely on probabilityand
- formswhich had no
verisimilitude
place in the "sterile"scholasticstudy
of Aristoteliansyllogistics.
These argumentsfor Valla's scepticismhave not gone unchallenged.
It has been pointed out that thereis no reason to call Valla a sceptic.8
There is forinstancenothingscepticalin his interestin topical invention
and typesof argumentswhich seem to destroycertainty.9
Indeed, Valla
was highlycriticalof such captiousreasonings.Valla's appeal to freedom
of inquiry,withoutadheringto one particularsect of philosophy,does
not necessarilyreflecta scepticalmind either.Lastly,Valla expressedhis
own opinionswitha vehemenceand self-confidence
(notto say arrogance)
which would have caused a scepticto blush.
So, was Valla a sceptic afterall or not? In this articleI propose to
examine the debate in more detail. The argumentsin themselvesare
interestingenough and raise deeper questions,for instance,about the
betweenfideismand scepticism,
and scepticism,
betweenrhetoric
relationship
uses of the termand how thissemanticambibut also about the different
And it may lead to a betterappresuch
controversies.
can
lead
to
guity
- a task which seems
ciation of Valla's achievementsand limitations
to me long overdue in view of the almost hagiographietone of much
scholarshipon Valla.10
7 See esp.L. Panizza,Lorenzo
andOratorical
De verofalsoque
Valla's
bono,Lactantius
L.Jardine,
41 (1978),76-107;
Institutes
andCourtauld
oftheWarburg
, in:Journal
Scepticism
of
oftheHistory
Dialectic
VallaandtheIntellectual
Lorenzo
, in:Journal
ofHumanist
Origins
andtheNew
Valla:Academic
15 (1977),143-64;L. Jardine,
Lorenzo
Scepticism
Philosophy,
1983(n. 2),253-86.
in:Burnyeat
Humanist
Dialectic,
8 See esp.J. Monfasani,
of
oftheHistory
VallaandRudolph
Lorenzo
, in:Journal
Agricola
inRenaissance
inhisLanguage
andLearning
28 (1990),181-200,
(repr.
esp.192-200
Philosophy,
VallaandAgricola
1994,no.V); P. Mack,Renaissance
Argument.
, Aldershot,
Italy
Hampshire
andDialectic
intheTraditions
, Leiden1993,83 and 109n. 35 (onValla).They
ofRhetoric
Panizza's
do notdiscuss
though.
interpretation
9 We shallcomebackto thisbelow.
10I hopetofulfil
Sense.
bookonValla:InDefence
thattaskinmyforthcoming
ofCommon
andMedieval
Humanist
Valla's
Lorenzo
Philosophy.
ofAncient
Critique

11:15:51 AM

VALLAANDQUATTROCENTO
LORENZO
SCEPTICISM

379

De verobono
I shall brieflydiscuss two works which have been seen as embodying
Valla's scepticalposition.The firstone is his De voluptate
, a brilliantpiece
of forensicoratory,which revealshis indebtednessto the scepticalworks
of Cicero and Lactantius.It is a dialogue,publishedin 1431 when Valla
was stillin his mid-twenties,
between a "Stoic", an "Epicurean" and a
"Christian"on the highestgood.11The firstversionis entitledDe voluptate
?;laterversions,whichdifferin castingand setting(thoughnot in argument),bear the titleDe verobonoand also De vero
falsoquebono.The result
of this confrontation
between pagan and Christianmoral thoughtis a
combinationof Pauline fideismand Epicurean hedonism,in which the
Christianconceptsof charityand beatitudeare identifiedwith hedonist
pleasure,and in whichthe philosopher'sconceptof virtueis rejected.No
reader can fail to notice the highlyrhetoricalcharacterof the De vero
bono
cannot
, and the positions,therefore,defendedby the interlocutors,
be automaticallytaken at face value. Appealing to Cicero's declaration
of the orator'seclecticfreedomto use argumentsfromwhateverprovenance, the interlocutorsremind each other and the reader that their
speeches are developed forthe sake of debate ratherthan as defencesof
accuratepositions.Fromtheway "Stoicism"and "Epicureanism"
historically
are used, it is clear that theyare simplylabels which have hardlyanything to do with the historicalsystemsof ancient thought."Stoicism"
designatesany kind of abstractrationalism,conveyedin dialecticalargumentation,of the philosophers(includingAristotle);"Epicureanism"stands
fora realisticview of human nature,based on empiricalobservationand
exemplifiedby individualcases.12The oratoricalstrategiesare explicitly

11The literature
on De vero
bono
is vast.Fordiscussions
see forinstance
G. Mancini,
VitadiLorenzo
Valla
Valla.Filologia
e storia
nell'u, Florence
1891,ch. 2; F. Gaeta,Lorenzo
manesimo
italiano
H.-B.Ger,Rhetorik
alsPhilosophie.
Valla
Lorenzo
, Naples1955,15-53;
, Munich
Valla.
e religione
nell'umanesimo
italiano
Lorenzo
1974;G. Di Napoli,
, Rome1971,137Filosofia
G. Radetti,
La religione
diLorenzo
Valla
e Rinascimento.
246;Fois1969(n.7),95-167;
, in:Medioevo
Studi
inonore
diBruno
Nardi
Trinkaus
1970(n. 7), 103-50;
, Florence
1955,voi.2, 171-83;
B. Vickers,
Valla's
Ambivalent
Praise
Rhetoric
intheService
ofPleasure.
, in:Viator
ofChristianity
17(1986),271-319;
M. de PanizzaLorch,
A Defense
Valla's
Lorenzo
,
ofLife:
Theory
ofPleasure
Munich1985;M. de PanizzaLorch,TheEpicurean
inLorenzo
Valla's
On Pleasure,
in:Atoms,
andTranquillity.
andStoicThemes
inEuropean
Pneuma,
Epicurean
, ed. M. J. Osler,
Thought
1991,89-114.
Cambridge
12Cf.Geri1974(n. 11),97-118andD. Marsh,Quattrocento Classical
Tradition
Dialogue.
andHumanism
Innovation
Stoicabstract
, Harvard
1980,esp.74:"Valla'sEpicureanism
opposes

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They frequentlystate that theyact and

recognisedby the interlocutors.
thattheyspeak under falseprein
manner
oratorical
{oratorio
more),
argue
and
that
and
use
tences{simulate
theyknow thatthe position
irony,
loqui)
of the speakerdoes not reflecthis actual views.13
to disThe highlyrhetoricalnature of the work has made it difficult
tractValla's own position.Today most scholars are inclined to accept
Valla's own point of view,which does
the Christianpositionas reflecting
not mean, however,thatthe "Stoic" and "Epicurean"positionsare entirely
rejected.They can be consideredas stagesof the plot or necessarysteps
- ratherlike thesis
in a dialecticalmovement
("Stoicism")and antithesis
in
of
("Epicureanism") resulting the synthesis the Christianposition.14
This Christianpositionis given an highlyoratoricalpresentationin the
formof an imaginaryvoyage of the soul to heaven whereit enjoysbeatitude as ultimatepleasure.Adoptingthe Epicurean notionof pleasure as
the universalmotivationof human behaviour,the Christianinterlocutor
the themeof earthlypleasuresinto that of heavenlypleasure.
transforms
Withoutenteringinto a fulldiscussionof the contentsof Valla's diastrategiesadopted betraythe
logue, it is evidentthat the argumentative
techniquesof the Academy as employedby Cicero in severalof his diawhich
examan inductive
method
anditsdialectical
rationalism
empiricism
byproposing
ofrhetoric".
andflexible
methods
ofmenbythepractical
inesthelivesandbehavior
13Valla,De vero
De
Bari1970,22 and107;OnPleasure/
bono
, ed.M. de P. Lorch,
falsoque
A. KentHieattandMaristella
Lorch,NewYork1977,90 and261.In
, transi.
Voluptate
andthe1977translation,
ofthe1970edition
I refer
to pagenumbers
whatfollows
sepintheintroduction
musttherefore
aratedbya slash,e.g.3/53,14/75.WhatVallawrites
menwhoare
on thesubject
as interlocutors
be ironical
veryeloquent
(3/53):"I introduce
andposito hischaracter
to eacha discourse
alsomygoodfriends,
according
assigning
heldamongthemselves".
withtheconversations
tionandconsistent
theyrecently
14See L. Nauta,ThePrice
Fideism
Valla's
Problems
inLorenzo
, in:
Epicurean
ofReduction:
- Wissenschaft
biszurNeuzeit
vonderAntike
derNormenbegrndung
Modelle
oder
Lebenskunst?
Ethik
,
disA muchlonger
Mnster
& E. Kessler,
eds.S. Ebbersmeyer
2006/07).
(forthcoming,
book(n. 10).
in chapter
5 ofmyforthcoming
is found
cussion
15Eventhough
dialecac platonicus"
Vallarefers
to Ciceroas "academicus
(Repastinatio
to Cicero's
ticeetphilosophie
, ed. G. Zippel,Padua1982,2 vols.,362 and 3), references
inthefirst
veris onlyonequotation
there
In theRepastinatio
arescarce.
Acadmica
(absent
intheElegantiae
onp. 311.Thereis,as faras I know,
, inbookIII,
justonequotation
sion),
Vallae
Laurentii
fromBookI (I checked
sentence
66 whereValla quotestheopening
In
Hildesheim
Pinilla
and
M.
I.
Garcia
eds.
concordantiae
1997).
,
J.
Pareja,
J.
Elegantiarum
Academicorum
about"quatuor
from1447Vallaasksforinformation
to Tortelli
a letter
ValleEpistole
foundin Siena[Laurentii
to havebeenrecently
Ciceronis"
, eds.
reported
tobe a falsereport
Padua1984,312);itappeared
andM. Regoliosi,
O. Besomi
(seethe
wefindfour
oratoria
Institutio
toQuintilian's
editors'
301-2).In Valla'sglosses
commentary,
and"inAcadmica"
"Hortensius"
to"Lucullus",
direct
references
(Valla,LePostille
(twice)

11:15:51 AM

SCEPTICISM
VALLAANDQUATTROCENTO
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381

are scarce,15Valla drew in

logues. Though referencesto the Acadmica
the
Tusculanae
De
Oratore
on
, and the De naturadeo,
Disputationes
particular
to Cicero's ideal of an oratorwho argues the quesrum
, which all testify
tion on both sides (in utramque
partemdisserere),withoutdrawingdogmatic
conclusionsor claimingto attaincertaintyand truth;forthe functionof
, is to elicit what is probable in
philosophy,Cicero writesin De Oratore
everyquestion.16The presentationof opposing argumentsoftenleads to
a compromise(e.g. De Finibusand De NaturaDeorum
). Before this comand
often
various
is
conflicting
pointsof viewsare develpromise reached,
devil's
advocate. Sometimes,
the
freelyplay
oped and the interlocutors
in typicallyscepticalvein, theydeliberatelypronounceopinionswhich do
not reflecttheirown actual views; Socratic ironyis used and explicitly
acknowledgedas an importanttool forthe orator.Seeing the matterfrom
various angles, withoutcommittingoneselfto one particularphilosophical school,is essentialto Cicero's Academic outlook:thislibertas
disserend%
hallthe
"a
true
called
has
been
mentioned
him,
rightly
by
frequently
All thesefeaturesrecurin Valla's De vero
markof Academic scepticism".17
bono
, and in thissense of employingCiceronian strategiesValla's method
may indeed be termeda brand of scepticaloratory.
But does this turnValla into a sceptic?If one focusessolelyon these
rhetoricaldevicesand argumentative
strategiesthe answerwould perhaps
be yes, but then we should call Descartes a sceptic too, since he too
kind).But of
employedscepticalarguments(thoughof a whollydifferent
was
to refutethe
in
his
radical
doubt
aim
Descartes'
course,
developing
of
the
And
absolute
certainties.
history philosophy
sceptics by finding
provides several other examples of the use of sceptical argumentsfor

andA. Perosa,
Padua1996,
Martinelli
oratoria
diQuintiliano
all' Institutio
, eds.L. Cesarmi
doesnotappearto have
withtheAcadmica
75, 104,135and243).Valla'sacquaintance
of
drewin hisstudies
in linewiththepicture
Charles
Schmitt
beendeep,whichis fully
inModern
Times
See hisTheRediscovery
oftheAcadmica.
thereception
,
ofAncient
Skepticism
in:Burnyeat
1983(n. 2),225-51.
16Deoratore
theTroublemaker:
seeW.Grler,
Academic
3.79.On Cicero's
Silencing
scepticism,
VeriSimile,
andJ.Glucker,
1.39andtheContinuity
De Legibus
Probabile,
ofCicero's
Scepticism
Oxford
the
Twelve
Terms
andRelated
1995,
, ed.J.G.F.Powell,
, bothinCicero
Papers
Philosopher.
andPhilosophy
in
is cited;J.E.Seigel,Rhetoric
wheremoreliterature
85-113and 115-43,
andWisdom
to Valla
TheUnion
Renaissance
Humanism.
, Petrarch
, Princeton,
N.J.
ofEloquence
andArgument.
Studies
in
Forrecent
studies
on Cicero'sAcadmica
see Assent
1968,16-30.
'Academic
books'
Leiden1997.
Cicero's
, eds.B. InwoodandJ. Mansfeld,
17Grler1995(n. 16),103.

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non-scepticalpurposes; one may thinkof Kant. A similarcase can be

made forValla. The argumentative
strategiesclearlyservean agenda that
can hardlybe called sceptical.This wider agenda can be distilledmore
dialectice
etphilosophie.
easily fromanotherwork of Valla's, the Repastinatio
In thiswork,much of the argumentationof the De verobonorecursin a
Valla here speaks in his own voice, and
long chapter on the virtues.18
form.
the argumentationis couched in a non-dramaticand non-literary
This strongly
suggeststhatValla's positionof a Christianhedonismcould
In otherwords,Valla
also be developedwithouttheseAcademicstrategies.
has a positivedoctrineto teach.
dialectice
etphilosophie
Repastinatio
Valla, however,not only put into practice the dialecticalprocedure of
Academic scepticism,he is also said to have made it the heart of his
reformof dialecticsin his critiqueof Aristotelian-scholastic
philosophy,
his Dialctica.
He
etphilosophie
dialectice
the so-calledRepastinatio
, or briefly,
startedthisworkin Pavia in the early 1430s, and continuedto workon
it throughouthis life; threeversionsare extant,the last of which Valla
was stillworkingon by the time of his death. Valla envisagedit as a
comprehensivework of philosophyand dialectic,correspondingroughly
with the AristotelianOrganon. The firstbook of the Repastinatio
, which
deals withthe categoriesand transcendentais,
;
correspondsto the Categories
the second book, which deals withthe combinationof termsinto propothe Topicaand the
sitionsand withcommonplaces,to the De Interpretationen
of proposiwith
the
combination
deals
third
which
the
book,
Rhetorical
Prioraand, to
to the Analytica
tions into various formsof argumentation,
elenchis.
a lesserextent,De sophisticis
Indeed, his projectis only intelligible
withinthe limitsof thisAristoteliancorpus of textsand Porphyry's
Isagoge
18Thisis discussed
in Nautaforthcoming
in Nauta2006/07(n. 14)and morefully
(n. 10).
19The workis extant
contains
edition
vol.1 (pp. 1-356)ofZippePs
in three
versions;
from
the
whichlistsvariant
a critical
Valla'sthird
version,
readings
apparatus
including
ca. 1438).On this
version
thefirst
contains
Vol.2 (pp.357-598)
second
version.
(finished
Milan1968,28-77;Mack1993
e la retorica
workseeC. Vasoli,La dialettica
dell'Umanesimo,
Valla
efilosofia
inLorenzo
Dialettica
, Milan1999;L. Nauta,William
of
(n.8); M. Laffranchi,
Reduction
andOntological
Semantics
andLorenzo
Valla:FalseFriends.
Ockham
, in: Renaissance
oftheentire
andexegesis
discussion
critical
A philosophically
56 (2003),613-51.
Quarterly,
in Nautaforthcoming
workwillbe found
(n. 10).

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383

While
(all in Boethius'translations)
alongsideBoethius'own commentaries.
Valla utterlyrejectedscholasticmodes of thinkingand writing,his knowledge of late-medievallogic was verymeagre.20
By farthe longestbook is the firstone whereValla aims to cut at the
some of its funrootsof Aristotelian-scholastic
metaphysicsby criticising
terms
damentalnotions,such as the ten categories,the six transcendental
as
the
such
"one"
and
genus,species
"true"),
predicables
(such as "good",
and differentia
by which we can definea thingand allot it a place in the
so-calledtree of Porphyry.Further,he rejectsthe Aristotelianaccount of
formand matterand act and potency.Accordingto Valla, these terms,
couched in a ungrammaticalor even rbarbaconceptsand distinctions,
tive Latin, complicateand confuseratherthan enlightenand clarifyour
picture of the world, which should be based on common sense and
expressedin good, classical Latin. The principaltask he has imposed on
of techniis to cut throughthis useless superstructure
himself,therefore,
cal jargon and void conceptsby reducingthem to what he considersas
the basic elementsof a common-senseworld view. These basic elements
are thingswe perceive eitherphysicallyor mentally,and they may be
describedas qualifiedsubstances,thatis substancescharacterizedby their
qualities and actions. These three categories substance, quality and
action are the only threefromAristotle'sten which Valla admits.The
other accidental categoriescan be reduced to these three: fromValla's
grammaticalpointof view thereis no reason to keep the othercategories:
a thingis qualifiedby size, its relations,its place and time no less than
is
by its qualitiesproper. The centraltermin Valla's picture,therefore,
also
to
and
but
we
see
to
refer
to
the
it
is
used
feel,
things
"thing"(res):
its elements(substance,qualityand action)out of whicha thingconsists.21
Apart from metaphysics,Valla deals with a host of other issues in
the firstbook of the Repastinatio
, such as the soul, the virtuesand natural
philosophy.

20A. R. Perreiah,
Dialectic
Humanist
, in:Sixteenth-Century
Journal,
ofScholastic
Critiques
13 (1982),3-22,on 7-8;Nauta2003(n. 19),esp.617,623-25,and644-48.
21See myLorenzo
to
Dialectic
VallaandtheRiseofHumanist
, in: TheCambridge
Companion
Renaissance
, ed.J. Hankins,
2007),andmoreextensively
Cambridge
(forthcoming
Philosophy
ofthispaperI shallrefrain
from
Nauta2003(n. 19),esp.625-36.Giventhepurpose
in anydetailhere;itmustsuffice
to givean indication
ofthe
Valla'sposition
explaining
in orderto assesstheclaimwhether
Vallacan be calleda
ofhisprogramme
outlines
or not.
"sceptic"

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Book II and III containValla's reformof dialectics.The main topics

here are propositionsand theirsigna(indicatorsof quality and quantity
such as omnis,aliquis
, and non),the square of contraries,proofand argument, and various formsof argumentation.It is especiallythese books
which are believed to embody Valla's "distinctively
skepticaldialectic",
thatis, his "coherentantidogmatist
ratiodisserendi"
.22Even thoughValla's
endorsementof scepticismcan onlybe inferredfrom"loaded quotation",
Jardinebelievesthat thisworkis "packed with argumentsborrowedand
citedfromthe keyavailable workson Academic skepticism".23
She argues
thatValla's dialecticswas aimed at makingan inventoryand analysisof
a much broaderrange of argumentsthan the formadsyllogismwhichwas
the centralcore of the scholasticstudyof logic. Stimulatedby the rediscoveryof ancientliterature,philosophyand rhetoric,Valla and his conas a vehiclefordebate,persuasion,
temporaries
regardedlanguageprimarily
communicationrather than as a formalisedscientifictool, studied in
abstractionfromits living contextof speech and discussion.So in his
analysis of formsof argumentationValla wanted to "shiftaway from
syllogismand formalvalidity,and towarda surveyof the varied and varInstead
iouslyreliableactivetechniquesforsettlinga matterin dispute".24
of studyingformadvalidityand rulesof inferencein abstracto
, Valla wanted
to studyand assess argumentsin termsof persuasionand usefulness,
thus
to
the
all
kinds
of
which
on
adding
syllogism
arguments
rely probability
and even problematicvalidity.The basic source forthisreorientation
of
dialecticswas Academic scepticism,and this- so the argumentgoesentailedthat forValla "the pursuitof truthis an elusiveif not impossible undertaking"
and that"any studyof ratiocinationwhichrestricts
itself
to, or even concentrateson, objectivetruthand techniquesfor arriving
at it must be inadequate".25What Valla sought was "a dialectic rich
enoughto allow him to explorethe relativeprobabilityof conflicting
dogoverallassent".26
This is whyhe was so interested
mas,whilewithholding
again, still according to this interpretation in dilemmaticarguments,
paradoxes,soritesand similartypesof argumentswhich undermine"the
Moreover,thisthemeof doubt is
possibilityof certaintyin knowledge".27
22Tardine
1983(n. 7), 265.
23Eadem.
, 268.
24Eadem,
257.
25Eadem,
259.
26Eadem,
259.
27Eadem
, 273.

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VALLAANDQUATTROCENTO
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385

underscored,Jardine argues, by Valla's rehearsalof ancient philosophical schools in the prefaceto his work and his defenceof freeinquiry.
is based on arguto see that thisinterpretation
Now it is not difficult
mentswhich to use the terminologyof our theme are doubtfuland
of dubious validity.First of all, there is no textualevidence that Valla
of knowlendorsedthe scepticalpositionof doubt and the impossibility
of
the
In
he
atqueindubi"firma
edge and certainty. fact, explicidyspeaks
"
tata principia which "Hippocrates, Euclides and some others" have
Nor does he ever suggest,paceJardine,suspendingjudgeestablished.28
ment. Further,in the prefacewhere he praises Pythagorasand enumerates a numberof ancientsschools and philosophers,he aims at criticising
of Aristoteliansby showingthat in Antiquitythere
the ipse/mi-attitude
were more positionsavailable and that Aristotlewas not consideredthe
philosophicalgodhead as he is in Valla's time.29This is also the context
of his referenceto Socrates' famousdictumthat the only thinghe knows
- an attitudewhichis contrastedto the
is thathe knowsnothing
ipsedixit

28Repastinatio
whoclearly
onFreeWillthefictional
6. In theDialogue
Lorenzo,
, ed.Zippel,
withtheirpointofview,who
the"Academics
dismisses
fortheauthor,
stands
explicidy
owndoubts;
couldnotdoubtoftheir
wouldputallindoubt,
and,
certainly
although
they
zealforinvesnevertheless
is known,
theydidnotlosetheir
nothing
theyargued
although
addedmuchto whatwaspreviously
we knowthatlaterthinkers
Furthermore,
tigation.
also"
otherthings
andexample
found
out;their
oughtto spurus to discovering
precept
P. O. Kristeller
in TheRenaissance
C. Trinkaus
ofMan, eds.E. Cassirer,
Philosophy
(transi.
itisasserted
thattheAcademics
andJ.H. Randall,
Jr.,Chicago1948,159).Buteventhough
endswitha strongly
thetreatise
deniedthatmancan attainknowledge
(ibid.),
wrongly
noteofPaulinestamp.
fideistic
29Repastinatio
whowrites
, ed. Zippel,2-4.Veillamayhavebeeninspired
byQuintilian
code"(varare
to anyphilosophic
"toswearallegiance
thatthereis no needforan orator
In his
oratoria
here(.Institutio
thesceptics
includes
12.2.24).
explicitly
), andQuintilian
leges
further
without
VallaquoteshereAulusGelliuson thePyrrhonists
to Quintilian,
glosses
to Aulus
Martinelli
andPerosa(n. 15),246,referring
Le Postille
comment;
, eds.Cesarini
Atticae
Noctes
, II, 5. 1-4andII, 5, 8.
Gellius,
30Ed. Zippel,2.Jardine
but
a passagefrom
Valla'spreface,
1983(n.7), 266translates
in theLatintextofthesecondversion
andsentences
sheomitscertain
(present
phrases
statesthathe doesnotbelongto any
in whichVallaclearly
whichshetranslates)
from
onFreeWill,
from
theDialogue
that
sect,including
(Andsee thequotation
oftheAcademics.
citedabovein n. 28.) Thussheomitsthephrase"quantomagisiis qui nullisectese
and also "qui nulliussectehominum"
addixerunt"
(whichis Valla'sownapproach),
sherefers
ed. Zippel,2). Moreover,
sectehomini";
version:
(inthethird
"quimihinullius
e teoloin hisLorenzo
Valla.Umanesimo
ofthefirst
version
to S. Camporeale's
transcription
aut
si me stoicum
passage:"Nuncigitur
gia(n. 6), butshedoesnotcitetheimportant
. . ."
aut academicum
aut,quod maiusac verumest,nulliussectedixero
epicureum
note.
407;ed. Zippel,362).See alsotheprevious
(Camporeale,

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attitudeof the Aristotelians.

He frequently
claims forhimselfthe rightto
and
think
without
himselfto any school.30This
speak
freely,
committing
of
proclamation philosophical libertyis certainlyinspired by Cicero's
libertas
disserendi
but as Valla explicitlymentionsthe Academics as one
school out of many,he clearlydoes not professhimselfto be an Academic
sceptic.31
Apart fromthe absence of an explicitexpressionof supportfor scepticalphilosophy,thereis anotherreasonwhythisinterpretation
is implausible. Valla's project in general is not only to criticisewhat he sees as
perfidiousdevelopmentsin philosophyand theology,but also to repair
and renew their foundations. The titles of the successive versions
are significant:
or retilling)dialectice
etphilosoRepastinatio
(the re-ploughing
Reconcinnatio
totius
dialectice
et
universalis
,
phie
(refabrication)
fiindamentorum
and
Retractao
or
totius
dialectice
cum
philosophie
(repair restructuring)
fitndamentis
universe
.32In otherwords,farfromadvocatingsuspenseof
philosophie
beliefor carefullybalancing different
positionsin order to elicitwhat is
most probable, Valla forciblyproclaimswhat he sees as the truthon a
host of issues.33As he says at the beginningof the Repastinatio
: the aim
of his critiqueof Aristotleand the Aristoteliansis to recall recenttheologiansfromtheirmistakenengagementwithAristotelian
philosophyand
to lead themto "correcttheologising"{ad veretkeohgandum
).34And his own
of
dialectic
and
to
the
commonlanguage
programme recalling
philosophy
of the greatauthors,rejectingall kindsof specializedidiom,is invariably
couched in termsof the truth.35
If he were a sceptic,he disguisedthe
factratherwell.
- a theme
It is thereforeinstructive
to look at his notionof truthitself
which would certainlyhave elicitedcommentsfromsomeone with scep31Cicerocriticised
theipsedixit
ofthePythagoreans
inDe natura
deorum
1.5.10,
approach
referred
to byVallain hispreface
to hisRepastinatio
, ed. Zippel,360.
32See Zippel'sintroduction
ot hisedition,
xii-xvi.
33See myLorenzo
Valla's
41 (2003),120-43.
, in:Vivarium,
ofAristotelian
Critique
Psychology
On natural
issuesVallaexpresses
a number
of"dogmatic"
even
philosophical
opinions,
at times
he embraces
a quasifideistic
natural
notto
though
position,
urging
philosophers
aboutthings
thatreally
existbutaboutwhich
itis impossible
toknowanything,
speculate
at leastin thislife,suchas thesubstance
ofthestarsandheavens
(422and98ff.).
34Repastinatio
, ed. Zippel,7.
35See e.g.thepreface
to thethird
book(ed.Zippel,277-78):
nonpos"Ergovincere
nisiVeritas
hisenemies
are"veritatis
hostes".
Theprefaces
totheElegantiae
sumus,
vincat";
Latinae
offer
instances.
linguae
manyother
36See Nauta2003(n. 19),242-44andmorefully
in Nautaforthcoming
(n. 10).See
, ed. Zippel,378-79and 19-20.
Repastinatio

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387

tic inclinations.Without going into details, Valla's eclectic account of

truthcombinesan adaequatiotheorywithan Augustininnotionof divine
illumination.36
Truth is firstregarded as "knowledge or cognition of
- a notion which
whateverthing"
goes back to Aristotleand was later
in
at
Thomas
Aquinas. Valla howeverdevelops it into
developed length
truth
with"the lightof the mind extenda different
direction,comparing
senses".37
This
of
light the mind comes fromwithin,not
ing itselfto the
fromwithoutlike solar light,thoughthe sun in makingvisionpossibleis
like God who makes intellectualvision possible: "Yet, as the sun shows
and exhibitsthe colours of bodies to the eyes, so too God shows and
exhibitsthe qualities of thingsto the mind. Plato proposed this theory
in the Republic
somewhatdifferently
, when he said that
diverse)
(nonnihil
truthis like the sun, knowledge and cognition like authentic vision
.38 Having defined truthin terms of knowledge or
aspectum)"
(sincerum
cognition,Valla goes on to apply true and falseto spokenwords.A verbal expression,he holds, is false when "someone, while his mind is not
fromwhat he thinks"(falsityout of wickedness)
erring,speaks differently
or "when someone,while his mind is erring,misleadshimselfratherthan
Whateverwe may thinkof Valla's
another" (falsityout of ignorance).39
discussionof truth,it is clear that it does not show any tracesof a sceptical mind,which doubts whetherwe can arriveat the truthof things.
What remainsthereforeof the claim that Valla's reformof dialectic
reflectsan endorsementof Academic scepticismis his interestsin arguor even dubiouslyinferential
mentswhichrelyon verisimilitude
techniques
and dubious validity.This claim seems to come in two parts: (1) Valla's
37Repastinatio,
et orationi"
and
estque sensuimentis
ed. Zippel,378: "qualitas
inest,
estproprie
scientia
sivenotitia
19:"verum
siveVeritas'
rei,etquasiluxanimi,
cuiuscunque
quoquese porrigit".
que ad sensus
38Repastinatio
It is interesting
to
to Republic
6.19,508C-509B.
, ed. Zippel,19 referring
toPlato'sRepublic
notice
thatValla'sreferences
("Derepublica
") occuronlyinthelaterverDecembrio
had translated
theworkin thelate1430s(seeJ. Hankins,
sions.His friend
Renaissance
PlatointheItalian
, 2 vols.,Leiden1990,vol.1, 126),andtherewasobviously
fortranslation
becauseofits
muchdebateaboutPlato'stextwhichBrunideemedunfit
ofPlatosee Zippel'sintroduction
On Valla'sknowledge
andappreciation
basemorality.
vol.1,xcvii,
n. 1.
to hisedition,
39Repastinatio
version
thisdistinction
is expressed
, ed.Zippel,
20,lines11-14.In thefirst
in terms
and"imprudence,
thatis injustice"
of"ignorance,
thatis wickedness"
(378,lines
In thefirst
adds
from
thelaterversions.
version
Vallafurther
25-7),whichareomitted
after
thetruth
ofan issueonlywhena controversy
aboutit hasarisen.
thatwe inquire
thecognition
ofa disputed
theignorance
ofit (Veritas
est
Truthis therefore
falsity
thing,
notitia
reicontroverse,
vero
eiusdem
inscitia,
378:16-19).
/abitas

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interestsin topical invention,that is, findingplaces fromwhich one may

draw argumentsconcerninga particularcase, and (2) his interestin various kindsof argumentssuch as dilemmaand sorites(the so-called"heap
argument":if 100 grainsconstitutea heap, 99 certainlyalso constitutea
heap. But if we go on subtractinggrains,we may arriveat the conclusion thatjust one grainconstitutes
a heap. The argumentdiscreditsideas
of limit).Now, it is certainlytrue- and has in fact been widely recognised- that Valla rhetoricisedthe studyof dialectics.For him dialectics,
and refutation,
is merelya part
being definedas a speciesof confirmation
of one of the five parts of rhetoric,namely invention.40
Compared to
- a resbreuis
dialectics
is
an
etfacilis- since it
rhetoric,
easy subject
prorsus
considersand uses the syllogismonly in abstracto
; its aim is only to teach.
The rhetorician,on the other hand, uses not only syllogisms,but also
in perenthymeme,epicheireme,example, and has to clothe everything
suasive argument,since his task is not only to teach but also to please
and to move. As long as an argumentis persuasiveor constitutes
a good
move in a disputation,dialogue or debate- whetherin courtor in philosophical discussionof moral and politicalissues it should be admitted
to the armouryof the debater or orator.Valla's remarkthat dialecticis
an almostpuerile art is, of course,a polemical sneer at the elevatedstatus of dialectics among the scholastics,but in his actual treatmentof
and otherformsof argumentsValla's tone becomes less polemsyllogisms
ical, and he pays serious attentionto syllogismsin theirvarious figures
and modes.
In his discussionof topics he reliesheavilyon Quintilian.As he says,
he himselfhas nothingnew to say on thistheme,so he is happy to quote
Quintilian'sdiscussionof enthymeme,
epicheireme,inductionand deduction and the topicsbased on thingsand person(resatquepersonas
, 5.10.23).
from
the
fifth
book
of
Institutio
oratoria
amounts
to 30
(This quotation
in
critical
For
the
whole
the
modern
edition.)
Quintilian
point of
pages
is
to
what
is
not
certain
means
of
what is
argumentation
prove
by
certain:41

40Repastinatio
1990(n.8), 183.Valla'sformulation
, ed.Zippel,175.Gf.Monfasani
may
Institutio
oratoria
havebeenindebted
to Quintilian's
5, prooem.2.
41Quintilian,
D. A. Russell,
Mass.2001,
transi.
Institutio
oratoria
5.10.11-12;
Cambridge,
vol.2, 371-73.

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VALLAANDQUATTROCENTO
SCEPTICISM
LORENZO

389

is proof-giving
sinceArgument
reasoningby whichone thingis inferred
fromanother,and which confirmswhat is doubtful,there must be
in the Cause whichdoes not need Proof;forunlessthereis
something
whicheitheris or seemsto be true,and fromwhichassurance
something
may be givento what is doubtful,therewill be nothingby whichwe
can proveanything.
As certaintiesQuintilianlistssense perceptions,"thingsabout whichcommon opinionis unanimous","provisionsof law", "whathas been accepted
as moral custom","whateveris agreed betweenboth parties","whatever
has been proved",and "whateveris not contradictedby our opponent".42
On the basis of these certaintieswe may renderdoubtfulthingscredible
or probable. Quintilian elaborates on this notion of probabilityby disthreedegrees:(1) "the strongest"{firmissimum
), "because almost
tinguishing
"the
); (3) "the merelycompropensius
highlylikely"(velut
alwaystrue"; (2)
Beforeembarkingon his own discussionof
nonrepugnans).
patible" (itantum
for its "carefulstudyof
the topics, Quintilianpraises Aristode'sRhetoric
all
to
that
thingsand persons,and what
commonlyhappens
everything
has
made
friendlyor hostileto other things
thingsand persons Nature
or persons".43But he warns the reader not to thinkthat he has a perfectand absoluteknowledgeof the subjectifhe has learntall theserules.44
Argumentswere already used before theirkinds were being noted and
collectedforpublicationby writersof rhetoric.And thisqualificationwas
certainlynot lost on Valla, whose own position on the topics and the
formsof argumentis much indebtedto Quintilian.
The oratoricalcontextof Valla's treatmentof the topics and formsof
withdifferent
of arguments
involvesa consideration
naturally
argumentation
degrees of probability,
just as we have seen in Quintilian.Valla distinwith
certainand truepremises,leading to certainconguishessyllogisms
those
from
clusion,
syllogismswith premiseswhich are not so certain,
ac semicerta
that is, half true and half certain(.semivera
, with a conclusion
For instance:A motherloves her son; Orestes is
which is seminecessaria).
it is probable or credible,or at least posson.
Therefore,
Clytemnestra's
- a
that
loves
Orestes
sible,
likelythoughnot certainpropoGlytemnestra
is
the
case
that
a motherloves her son. Having
for
it
not
sition,
necessarily
425.10.12-14,
vol.2, 373.
transi.
Russell,
435.10.17,transi.
vol.2, 375.
Russell,
445.10.119-120.
45Repastinatio
from
Mack1993(n.8), 82.
, ed. Zippel,243;I quotethetranslation

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dividedkindsof proofinto necessaryand credibleones, Valla writesthat

"all proofarisesthroughtruethingswhich are certainand throughthese
thingstruthitselfmakes some otherthingwhichwas previouslyuncertain
As we
appear certain,and it does this eithernecessarilyor plausibly".45
have seen, thisis basicallythe same as Quintilian'sview. Unless we want
to call Quintiliana sceptic (and even Aristotlewould come in for such
a label in that case), there is no reason to thinkthat the distinction
betweendegreesof credibility
is the hall-markof Academic scepticism.
The second featureof Valla's alleged scepticismis his interests
in types
of captiousreasoningssuch as sorites,paradoxesand dilemmas.46
In bringing about aporiaand the suspenseofjudgementtheserhetoricaltechniques
are gristto the sceptic'smill,but Valla interestingly
thinkstheseand similar argumentssophisticaland fallacious.Their forceis easily brokenif
we examinethe case carefully,
payingattentionto itswidercircumstances
and its chronology,and take notice of the normal meaning of words.
Such an approach will dispel theirair of insolubility.
The dream parafor
in
which
a
dream
tells
the
dreamer
not to believe
dox,
instance,
dreamsis characterisedas a dream which assertssomethingwhich defies
Valla is particularly
interestedin what the Greekscall
properverification.
and
Cicero
that
the
conversion
is,
manoeuvre,taughtmainlyby
antistrephon
a
which
dilemmatic
rhetoricians,
by
argumentcan be counteredby another
one. Valla extensivelydiscussesthe famous dilemma reportedby Aulus
Gellius about a lawsuitbetweenProtagorasand his pupil Euathlus.47
The
has
to
the
second
of
instalment
the
fees
after
pupil
promised pay
having
won his firstcase. However,he refusesto pay, and Protagorasbringshim
to court. If Euathlus loses the case, he will have to pay the rest of the
fee because of thejudges' verdict,if he wins,he will have to pay as well
but now on account of his agreementwithProtagoras.Euathlushowever
convertsthe argument:in either case he will not have to pay. Aulus

46Repastinatio
Dilemmatic
Towards
, ed.Zippel,306-28.See esp.G. Nuchelmans,
arguments.
a history
andrhetoric
Vallaon
Lorenzo
, Amsterdam
1991,88-94;G. Nuchelmans,
oftheir
logic
MediiAevi,eds.B. Mojsischand O. Pluta,
theDream
Paradox
, in: Historia
Philosophiae
1990
Amsterdam
1991,771-85;cf.Mack1993(n. 8), 90-92,98-100,105-8,Monfasani
e la retorica
dell'Umanesimo
Vasoli,La dialettica
(cit.aboven. 19),68-74.For
(n.8), 194-98;
an extensive
discussion
seechapter
8 ofNautaforthcoming
(n. 10).
47Repastinatio
himself
an oration
on Protagoras's
, ed. Zippel,312-21,
making
imagining
about
be noticed
thatVallais notnegative
seeMack1993(n.8), 105-8.It should
behalf;
ofantistrephon
dilemma
butaboutthistechnique
itself,
(seeed. Zippel,312).

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VAT
JA ANDQUATTROCENTO
SCEPTICISM
LORENZO

391

Gellius thinksthat thejudges should have refrainedfrompassingjudgement because any decision would be inconsistentwith itself.But Valla
rejectssuch a rebuttalof dilemmaticargumentsand thinksthatan answer
may be formulatedin responseto such a dilemma. So while not denying thattheseargumentsmay deceptivelyappear to be convincingin creatingan aporeticsituation,he considersthe genusmore cunning,amusing
ac lepand wittyratherthan sincereand valid (genusmagisargutum
,festivum
in
corroboration
ac validum
idumratherthan sincerum
), finding
proargumento
it.48
about
silence
Quintilian's
Yet, it should not be overlookedthat Valla is one of the firstin the
Latin West who dealt withtypesof dilemmaticarguments,a genrewhich
had been forgottenduringthe Middle Ages. As Nuchelmanswrites:"A
remarkablefeatureof medievalstandardtextson logic (. . .) is the absence
of reflectionsabout dilemmaticreasonings".49Valla's discussion,then,
to the slow recoveryof "forgotten
testifies
parts of ancient dialecticand
rhetoric".Furthermore,having narratedthe law suit between Euathlus
and Protagoras,just mentioned,Valla writesthat there are others{sunt
qui) who thinkthiswas said by Corax and Tisias ratherthan by Euathlus
and Protagorasand that thejudges drove them out of court shouting"a
bad egg froma bad crow" (citedby Valla in Greek).FromthisNuchelmans
whichhe musthave obtained,directlyof indiconcludes:"an information
mathematicos
, II, 97-9), since thatis
rectly,fromSextus Empiricus{Adversus
the only source reportingthat the judges drove both Corax and Tisias
out of court,shoutingat them'a bad egg froma bad crow'".50It is however unlikelythat Sextus Empiricuswas Valla's source. Pace Nuchelmans
Sextus gives only the name of Corax, and, more generally,there is no
textualevidence at all that Valla was familiarwith Sextus.
The importantquestion,however,is whetherthis enlargementof the
restrictedscope which dialectics may have had in medieval times, or
48Repastinatio,
about
Cicerotoois negative
ed.Zippel,332-34and322.In hisAcadmica
Vallato citethis
Antiochus
forusingit.One wouldexpect
histeacher
sorites,
criticizing
placetoo,ifhe hadaccessto it.Cf.n. 15 above.
49Nuchelmans,
Valla
Lorenzo
, 1991(n.46),79.
50Valla,Repastinatio
Dilemmatic
, 1991(n.46),90,
, ed.Zippel,314.Nuchelmans,
arguments
andthesendofthesaying
listsothersources
butseealso68 n. 24 whereNuchelmans
lexicon
, ed. A. Adler,
Leipzig1933,vol.3, 14,
ingawayofCoraxandTisias(e.g.Suidae
reference
toCicerois lessrelevant.
lines16-23).
(ThenamesofCoraxandTisias,
Zippel's
oratoria
Institutio
thestory,
alsooccure.g.inQuintilian,
without
3.1.8.).I do notknowfrom
thisinformation.
whomVallaobtained

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ratherthis subordinationof dialecticsto rhetoric,based on the rhetorical writingsby Cicero and especiallyQuintilian,is sufficient
for calling
Valla an Academic sceptic.Let me therefore
of
conclusion
address
by way
the more general question of the relationshipbetween scepticismand
sensesof sceporatory.This will also allow me to returnto the different
ticismand theirapplication.
Conclusion:
and Rhetoric
Scepticism
Historicallyspeaking,thereis much reason to associaterhetoricand scepticism.Cicero feltattractedby the argumentative
strategiesof Academic
scepticism.The oratoricalmethod is well suited to the explorationof
philosophicalissues,since it does not expressits conclusionsin any dogmatic way but franklyacknowledgestheirprovisionalstatusas the most
likelyposition.As one of the interlocutors
says in De Fato: "there is a
close alliance betweenthe oratorand the kind of philosophyof which I
am a follower,since the orator borrowssubdy fromthe Academy and
repaysthe loan by givingto it a copious and flowingstyleand rhetorical ornament".51
And the other interlocutortoo bringsthem into close
harmonywhen he answers: "I am acquainted with the rhetoricaldiscoursesof yourschool (rhetorica
vestra),and have oftenheard and also often
shall hear you in them;moreoveryour Tusculan Disputationsshow that
you have adopted thisAcademic practiceagainsta thesisadvanced".52In
disserere
,
definingitselfas speech and counterspeech,as in utramque
partem
rhetoriclooks uncannilyclose to scepticism,for scepticismis, to quote
Sextus' canonical description,"an abilityto set out oppositionsamong
thingswhich appear and are thoughtof in any way at all", followedby
sides of the matter,
and ataraxia
.53Moreover,in opposing different
epoche
both rhetoricand scepticismdo not aim at teachingany positivedoc-

51De Fato3, transi.

III, De Fato
Stoicorum
inCicero,
De oratore
H. Rackham
, De
, Paradoxa
Mass.1982,195(slightly
artitione
oratoria
, Harvard,
adapted).
52De Fato4, transi.
ofthesceptics'
terminoltheborrowing
197.Ofcourse,
Rackham,
andprobsuchas verisimile
included
crucial
terms
the(Greek)
rhetorical
tradition
ogyfrom
abile
1995(n. 16),esp.136.
; seeGlucker
53Outlines
1.8,transi.
2000,4. Forthe
Cambridge
J. AnnasandJ. Barnes,
ofScepticism
theLanguage
TheRhetoric
Sextus
I am indebted
to I. Sluiter,
ofScepticism:
against
following
Tradition
andtheSceptical
2000,
, ed.J. Sihvola,Helsinki
, in: Ancient
Scepticism
Specialists
93-123,
esp.106-13.

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SCEPTICISM
VALLAANDQUATTROCENTO
LORENZO

393

with the
trines.As a method of discourse,rhetorichas strongaffinities
close
that
comes
it
has
been
said
works.
Indeed,
scepticism
way scepticism
to a discoursestrategy,and one may even speak of a "sceptic rhetoric
as long as its statusas usefulpracticalguidelineswithoutepistemological
This suggestsanother resemblancebetween
claims is acknowledged".54
the two. Both concern our linguisticrepresentationof the appearances
ratherthan the appearances themselves.This is evidentin the case of
rhetoric,but also the sceptics"say what is apparent to themselvesand
nothingabout
reporttheirown feelingswithoutholdingopinions,affirming
externalobjects": "When we investigate",Sextus writes,"whetherexisting thingsare such as theyappear, we grantthattheyappear, and what
we investigateis not what is apparent but what is said about what
from investigatingwhat is apparent
is apparent- and this is different
to notice that Sextus himselffoundthe proximitself".55It is interesting
itybetweenrhetoricand scepticismso disturbingthathe soughtto refute
it, hardlyconvincingly,
by redefiningrhetoricas the productionof useless and incomprehensiblespeech.56Nonetheless, there is an obvious
differencebetween the two: the orator argues one side of the case in
order to win, while the sceptic only opposes the dogmatistin order to
balance the case; or he may argue both sides of a particularcase himthat is, on the
self.Oratorydoes not thriveon doubt but on credibility,
and
as
to
forward
strongas possible in
arguments persuasive
ability put
.57
order to renderdoubtfulthingscredible -facereadfidem
By now it should be clear that Valla cannot be called a sceptic. In
we do not see a balancing of opinions, an arguing in
the Repastinatio

54Sluiter
2000(n. 53), 120n. 6 whoaddsthatSextushimself
speaksaboutskeptikoos
theMathematicians
11.19).
legein
(Against
55Sextus
AnnasandBarnes2000
1.15and 1.19,transi.
Outlines
ofScepticism
Empiricus,
"Pistis
andapistia
2000(n. 53), 107argues:
, andthewhole
(n. 53),7 and8. As Sluiter
to boththesceptic's
and
ofpeithein/
is alsoonethatis in a senseessential
peith
concept
as an artofpersuasion
It is central
to rhetoric
therhetorician's
(...) Forthe
enterprise.
is central
tothetheory
ofepoche
theproblematization
ofpeith
(...) Sincethesyssceptic,
form
ofpeith
will
thatareequally
togenerate
temis toopposethings
, neither
peith
likely
s poweris broken
clinch
thematter,
andhencepeith*
byitsuse".
56See Sluiter
2000(n.53),110.
- -which
57Within
theforensic
oforatory
divide
setting
onlycasesaboutwhich
opinions
- areto be discussed
materia
andsettled;
thesetdubia
butit is precisely
maybe termed
matters
doubtful
credible
thatis theorator's
aim.
byrendering
things
tlingofdoubtful
InJardine
materia
should
notbe confused
withthedoubtofthesceptic.
Hence,thedubia
1977(n. 7),thetwoseemsto be conflated
(e.g.p. 262).

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What we see is a debunkingof all kindsof philosophical

utramque
partem.
doctrinesin a highlypolemical, self-confident
and frequentlyaggressive
style.As such it is no less than the dialogue De verobono the work of
an orator,but an orator with a message, which, in the Repastinatio
, is
broadcastin a styleutterlyalien to the Academic probingof diversepositions. The dominantrole allottedto rhetoricentails a wideningof the
scope of formsof argumentationto be examined and employedby the
rhetorician.The drive behind this developmentis to do morejustice to
the multipleway in which argumentsare used in actual speakingand
writingthan the formalisedstudyof the Aristoteliansyllogismcould do.
And since the issues,discussedin court,in daily lifeor in the houses of
men of lettersin leisuredretreat,do not usuallyfall under the category
of absolute necessity,certaintyand indisputabletruth,it is only natural
thatthisentailsan examinationof the less certainarguments.This however need not reflecta scepticalattitudeat all.
There is a sense howeverin which the term"scepticism"may rightly
be applied to the humanistsof the Quattrocentoand theirsuccessors.58
The overall effectof the study of classical antiquityin all its aspects,
includingof course the studyof the classical languages,was a widening
of perspectives,and this could easily lead to feelings of doubt and
trauncertainty an erosionof the confidencepeople had in authorities,
in
It
is
the
of
the
and
so
forth.
ditions,customs,
hardly
Vulgate
reliability
- contributed
to thisprocess
thatanyonewho- perhapswilly-nilly
surprising
of dislocatingold certaintieswas branded a sceptic,or, worse, an atheist. These termsof abuse oftentellus more about the accuserthan about
the accused. It is importantthereforeto distinguishbetween intention,
aim, strategy,effect(intentionalor unintentional)when calling someone
a scepticor somethingsceptical.The overall effectmay be the dissemination or even encouragementof a scepticaloutlook,but this does not
mean that this was the originalintentionor the aim of the thinkerin
significance
question.In otherwords,we should not let the retrospective
interfere
withthe perspectiveof the historicalagent. To do so is to genof prolepsis",that
erate what Quentin Skinnerhas called "the mythology
58Cf.Rummel
andinformal
2000(n. 5),50 whospeaksof"crypto-skepticism
expresofa preferto her,"thesetooktheform
frame
ofmind".
sionsofa Skeptical
According
and rhetorical
enceforcertain
dialogue,
paradox,
literary
genressuchas open-ended
onbothsidesofa questopresent
theauthor
thatallowed
forms
declamation,
arguments
tionor toplaythedevil'sadvocate".

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LORENZO
VALLAANDQUATTRO
CENTOSCEPTICISM

395

an observer
betweenthe significance
is, "the conflationof the asymmetry
in
a
the meanclaim
to
find
historical
and
given
episode
mayjustifiably
ing of that episode itselP.59In the case of Quattrocentohumanismwe
may be especiallyprone to generate such a type of mythology,since
ancientsourcesof scepticismdid slowlybecome available at thistime. It
is all the more expedientthen to examine our sourcescriticallyand ask
what our writerwas doingin presentinghis contribution.
Well, what Valla
certainlywas notdoing was to subscribeto or propagatea scepticalposition, even though as a defenderof Christianoratoryhe at times used
strategiesderivedfromCicero's Academic scepticism.
Universityof Groningen
FacultyofPhilosophy

59Meaning
andunderstanding
inthehistory
Vol. 1: Regarding
, in hisVisions
ofideas
ofPolitics.
Method
revised
version
ofhisarticle
thatappeared
, Cambridge
2002,73. (A thoroughly
underthesametitlein History
andTheory,
1969.)

11:15:51 AM

9
of Freedomof the Will
Juan Luis Vives Conception
and Its Scholastic
Background
LORENZO CASINI

Abstract
The aim of thepresentpaper is to approachJuan Luis Vives' conceptionof
freedomof the willin lightof scholasticdiscussionson will and freechoice,
similarities
withtheanalysisof freechoiceconand pointto someinteresting
ad
librosEthkorum
Aristotel
tained in Jean Buridan's Quaestiones
superdecern
Nicomachum.
1. Introduction
The SpanishhumanistJuan Luis Vives (1493-1540)is perhapsbestknown
as an educationaland social theorist,as well as forhis spiritedattackon
scholasticlogic.1His contributionto philosophicalpsychology,however,
is also worthyof consideration.On account of his insightsinto human
natureand conduct,he has occasionallyeven been called "the fatherof
on the human soul
Vives5philosophicalreflections
modernpsychology".2
are mainlyconcentratedin De animaet vita(1538).3 This treatise,which
1 Fora general
see CarlosG. Norea,
ofVives'thought,
, The
JuanLuisVives
study
Hague1970.
2 The first
Watson.
to Vivesseemsto havebeenFoster
one to ascribethisepithet
22 (1915),
TheFather
See Foster
Review,
, in: Psychological
Watson,
Psychology
ofModern
ofmodern,
"Viveswasnotonlythefather
toGregory
333-53.
empirZilboorg,
According
cenofthetwentieth
ofthedynamic
butthetrueforerunner
icalpsychology,
psychology
A History
See Gregory
, NewYork1941,194.Fora
ofMedical
Psychology
Zilboorg,
tury".
e
Ludovico
Vives
seeAdolfo
ofVives'originality,
assessment
morebalanced
Faggi,Giovanni
e letterari
la psicologia
, Torino1938,210-23.
, in:Adolfo
Faggi,Studi
filosofici
3 Thereis stillno critical
used
etvita.The mostcommonly
ofVives'De anima
edition
omnia
inJuanLuisVives,Opera
textis theoneincluded
, ed. Gregorio
Mayansy Siscr,
arepreceded
tothisedition
London1964.References
8 vols.,Valencia1782-90;
reprinted
in thelimited
sensethatit
whichcanbe calledcritical
M. Foran edition
bytheletter
etvita
De anima
of1538,seeJuanLuisVives,
edition
textwiththefirst
,
Mayans'
compares
arepreceded
to thisedition
Padova1974.References
ed. MarioSancipriano,
bytheletOn the
edition.
etvitaaretakenfrom
De anima
from
terS. Allquotations
Sancipriano's
derWerke
Edition
kritischen
seeJozef
ofVives'works,
editions
lackofcritical
%ueiner
IJsewijn,
Vivarium
44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,
2006
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

11:16:05 AM

OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL
VIVES'CONCEPTION

397

and maturestage
belongsto the late and philosophicallymore interesting
of his intellectualcareer, representsa mixtureof old materialand new
ideas. Vives' originalitylay above all in the importancehe attached to
observationand experience.For that reason, he is sometimesregarded
as initiatingthe empirical study of the mind, and contributingto the
developmentof modern psychology,that is psychologybased on observation and experienceratherthan on the traditionalAristoteliancategoriesso centralto scholasticism.In the opinion of WilhelmDilthey,for
example, Vives' approach marks the transitionfrom metaphysicalto
descriptiveand analyticpsychology.4
In spiteof the relativeoriginality
of his approach,Vives also pays considerable tributeto tradition.A briefreview of De animaet vitareveals
that he was a man of encyclopaedicknowledge.His account adduces
knowledgefroma varietyof sources, such as Aristotle,Cicero, Galen,
Plato, Pliny, Plutarch,Quintilian and Seneca.5 Vives' indebtednessto
to assess. Not
the scholastictraditionis, on the otherhand, more difficult
a single medieval author is mentioned or quoted in De animaet vita.
This fact is perhaps not particularlysurprisinggiven Vives' ambitionto
replace the scholasticcurriculumwithone more appropriateto a classical

in:August
Buck(ed.),
LuisVives:
inderHerzog
Bibliothek
desJ.L. Vives,
Juan
Arbeitgesprch
August
vom6. bis8. November
1980, Hamburg
1981,23-34.
Wolfenbttel
4 Wilhelm
undAnalyse
desMenschen
stRenaissance
undReformation
Weltanschauung
Dilthey,
in hisGesammelte
see also
II, Leipzig1914,423.On Vives'descriptive
Schriften
approach
MarioSancipriano,
G.L. Vives
e la descrizione
delle
dellaAccademia
, in:Attie memorie
passioni
44 (1981),131-37.
di lettere,
artie scienze,
Petrarca
5 A systematic
ofVives'sources
is stilllacking.
Fora discussion
ofVives'attitreatment
tudetowards
PlatoandAristotle,
seeNorea1970(n. 1), 164-73;
Vives,
J. C. Margolin,
lecteur
etcritique
dePlaton
etd'Aristote
onEuropean
, in: R. R. Bolgar(ed.),Classical
Influences
Culture
A.D.1500-1700
e la
, Cambridge
1976,245-58;andIsabelTrujillo,
JuanLuisVives
aristotelica
nell'umanesimo
24-25(1993),267-278.Foran
tradizione
, in: Schedemedievali,
account
ofVives'physiological
which
ismainly
approach,
inspired
byGalen,seeRaymond
D. Clements,
inJuanLuisVives
oftheHistory
, in:Journal
Physiological-Psychological
Thought
A Humanistic
oftheBehavioral
3 (1967),219-35;A. A. Travili,
Sciences,
JuanLuisVives:
ofMedicalHistory,
4 (1987),53-76;andSimone
Medical
Educator
, in:CanadianBulletin
de Angelis,
inderRenaissance
mitBlickaufdieAnthropologie
von
ZurGalenRezeption
JuanLuis
"
" inderFrhen
Vives.
einer
vom
Menschen
zuderkonfiguration
Neuzeit
, in:
Wissenschaft
berlegungen
ManuelBaumbach
etInventa:
derAntike
zurRezeption
, Heidelberg
2000,
(ed.),Tradita
Beitrge
91-109.ForQuintilian's
influence
on Vives'philosophical
see LouisJ. Swift
psychology,
'
andStanley
L. Block,Classical
Rhetoric
in Vives
oftheHistory
ofthe
, in:Journal
Psychology
Behavioral
10 (1974),74-83;andMatilde
CondeSalazar,Presencia
deQuintiliano
Sciences,
enlas "teorias
deJuanLuisVives,
in:TomsAlbaladejo
et al. (eds.),Quintiliano:
psicolgicas"
Historia
dela retrica,
3 vols.,Logroo
1998,III, 1209-1218.
y actualidad

11:16:05 AM

398

LORENZOGASINI

education.6It is also in light of this fact that Vives' constanteffortto

understandhuman naturenot as a metaphysicianbut as a moralistand
a pedagogue should be understood.
But thisdoes not necessarilymean thatVives was unfamiliarwiththe
naturalphilosophyof the scholastics,especiallygiven that he spentsome
of Paris.According
yearsas a studentof thefacultyof artsat the University
to the receivedview,Vives enrolledas a freshmanin 1509 and leftParis
in 1512. During those threeyears he devoted himselfalmost exclusively
to the study of logic withoutpublishinganything.Carlos Norea, for
example,providesthe followingassessment:
Those who believein a revolutionary
progressof nominalistic
physicsin
the fifteenth
will
be
not
to
find
a
century certainly surprised
singlereferenceto thatmovementin the books ofJuan Luis Vives,a man with
in thepragmaticside ofhumanknowledge.
a greatinterest
The omission
is especiallyintriguing
because Vives [. . .] did encouragethe inductive
observation
of Natureas a remedyagainstthe speculative
physicsof the
School; and also, because one of his most respectedteachers,John
on Buridanus.However,ifwe keep
Dullaert,was a recognizedauthority
in mind that the Parisianstudenthad only one year formetaphysics,
we willnotfindit strangethathe completely
ethics,and physics,
ignored
theveryspecializedquestionselaboratedby Albertof Saxony,Domingo
de Soto, Buridan,and othernominalistic
physicists.7
Enrique Gonzlez y Gonzlez, however,has shownthatVives spentmore
time in Paris than was previouslythought.In fact, he remained there

6 Vives'reformational
ofIn Pseudodialecticos
withthepublication
(1519)
program
begins
work
is divided
inDe disciplinis
andis elaborated
atgreat
(1531).Thisencyclopaedic
length
of
to a thorough
in three
artium
(sevenbooksdevoted
critique
corruptarum
parts:De causis
Vives'
bookswhere
De tradendis
thefoundations
ofcontemporary
(five
education),
disciplinis
with
treatises
De artibus
andfiveshorter
educational
reform
is oudined),
mainly
dealing
De
De censura
De explanatione
Deprima
essentiae,
veri,
cuiusque
philosophia,
logicandmetaphysics:
seeWilliam
On Vives'reformational
andDe disputatone.
instrumento
program,
probabilitatis
intheRenaissance,
10(1963),
Arts
Treatises
onthe
, in:Studies
Sinz,TheElaboration
ofVwes's
3nella
cultura
e *metodo
dell'umanesimo:
e la retorica
'Invenzione*
68-90;CesareVasoli,La dialettica
inVives:
efilosofia
andValeriodelNero,Linguaggio
delXVeXVIsecolo
, Milano1968,214-46;
93
ofVives'
delsapere
nel"Dedisciplinis
(1531),Bologna1991.Fora discussion
L'organizzazione
MuozDelgado,
see alsoVicente
andscholastics,
humanists
rolein thedebatebetween
SaudoandCiracoMornArroyo
Nominalismo,
, in: ManuelRevuelta
logica
y humanismo
TheHumanistandErikaRummel,
enEspaa
1986,109-74;
, Santander
(eds.),El Erasmismo
Ma. 1995,153-92.
andReformation
Debate
intheRenaissance
Scholastic
, Cambridge,
7 Norea1970(n. 1),47f.

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

399

until1514, theyear in whichhe startedhis publishingcareer.8This means

thatthe questionof Vives' scholasticbackgrounddeservesmore attention
than it has receivedso far. As Cesare Vasoli has pointed out:
even the most obsessiveadvocatesof a returnto the pure springsof
classicallearningand the studiahumanitatis
could not be unawareof the
textsgeneratedby Buridanand Swinesheadwhichhad spreadas faras
the Italian universities.
Nor were theyunawareof the disputations
on
under
the
the
and
influence
of
cakulatores
or
other
which,
physics
logic
teacherslike Oresme,had come to be the principalactivityin many
scholasticcircles.9
In this respectit mightperhaps be sufficient
to examine brieflyVives'
introduction
to a course on Francesco Filelfo's(1398-1481) Convivia
mediolanensiathat was printedin October 1514. The last paragraph of this
is an invectiveagainstscholasticphilosophers,personifiedby the
praelectio
name of Swineshead:
Do you thinkthen,mygood man,thatnaturalphilosophy
consistsmerely
of Swineshead'snonsenseand thoseuselesssophisticaldiscourseson the
'intension'and 'remission'of qualities,on 'uniformmotion',on 'motion
deformed'and 'deformedly
whileit reallyis in fact
deformed',
uniformly
I
like
do
not
deformed', you?
denythatthislearnsomething
'deformedly
but
it
is
was
transmitted
ing
by veryloftyminds,
certainlynot worth
so
much
time
on.10
spending
In thispassage, Vives mentionsthe intensionand remissionof qualities,
as well as uniformmotionand uniformly
deformedmotion.These terms
do not belong to the subjectoflogic,but as Vives himselfpointsout- to
8 See EnriqueGonzlezy Gonzlez,
De la escolastica
al humanismo
,
JoanLlusVives:
' in1512-1517:
Valencia1987.ForVives'earlycareer,
seealsoJozefIJsewijn,
J. L. Vives
A Reconsideration
26 (1977),82-100;andMarcus
, in: Humanistica
Lovaniensia,
ofEvidence
De Schepper,
inParis(1514):J. L. Vives
B. Guarinus,
in:DirkSacrandGilbert
April
Editing
onNeo-Latin
Literature
inMemory
, Leuven
2000,
(eds.),
Tournoy
Myricae:
ofJozef
Essays
IJsewijn
195-205.
9 CesareVasoli,TheRenaissance
B. Schmitt
etal. (eds.),
, in:Charles
ofPhilosophy
Concept
TheCambridge
, Cambridge
1988,60.
ofRenaissance
History
Philosophy
10JuanLuisVives,
Praelectio
inConvivia
: "Etputas,
virbone,naturalem
Philelphi
inquam,
totam
in Suisethicis
inperditissimis
cavillationibus
de
philosophiam
quisquiliis,
quibusdam
intensione
ac remissione
de motuuniformi,
de motuuniformiter
difformi
et
qualitatum,
difformiter
et beneprofecto
resut tu difformiter
consistere?
Noneo
difformi,
difformi,
infidas
remessea summis
sedindignam
sanein qua plurimum
temingeniis
proditam,
2, ed.JozefIJsewijn
porisconsumatur".
Quotedfrom
JuanLuisVives,EarlyWritings
etal.,Leiden1991,149.

11:16:05 AM

400

LORENZO
GASINI

naturalphilosophy.The intensionand remissionof qualitiesconcernthe

controversyamong natural philosophersabout the motionsof increase
and decrease in the intensity
of a qualitativeform.Uniformmotionand
deformedmotionrefer,on the otherhand, to what is known
uniformly
as the Merton mean-degreeor mean-speedtheorem,accordingto which
difform,
i.e., linearlyincreasingor decreasing,qualitiescorreuniformly
to
their
mean
spond
degrees.11ApparentlyVives became (pace Norea)
fairlyfamiliarwithSwineshead's"thornyand uselessquibbles" about the
of qualitiesthroughhis teacherJan Dullaert (d.1513) who
quantification
used to quote him frequently
in his lectureson physics.12
Moreover,as
Rita Guerlac has noted, "Vives demonstratedin his treatiseon metaphysicsthat he had absorbed Dullaert's teaching,and the theoriesof
Albertof Saxony and Marsiliusof Inghen".13
A scholasticinfluencemightperhaps also be foundin Vives' descriptive approach to the philosophicalstudyof the soul. In one of the most
, he asserts:
frequently
quoted passages fromDe animaet vita

11Foranoverview
ofthese
Medieval
debates,
see,e.g.,EdithSylla,
ofQualities:
Quantification
theMerton
forHistory
ofExactSciences,
8 (1971),9-39;EdithSylla,
School,in:Archive
Medieval
: theOxford
Calculators
d'histoire
doctri, in:Archives
Concepts
oftheLatitude
ofForms
naletlittraire
du moyen
andEdithSylla,TheOxford
Calculators,
ge,40 (1974),223-283;
in:Norman
Kretzmann
etal.(eds),TheCambridge
Medieval
, Cambridge
ofLater
History
Philosophy
1982,540-63.
12See M, VI, 201.JanDullaert
wasbornin Ghentin Flanders
andarrived
in Paris
around
thebeginning
ofthesixteenth
wherehe studied
with
century
JohnMajor(1469He taught
a classat Collgede Montaigu
between
1506
1558)at Collgede Montaigu.
and 1509andthenmovedto Collgede Beauvais
where
Vivesattended
hislectures.
See
Hubertlie,Quelques
matres
del'universit
deParisvers
Van1500, in: Archives
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
et Littraire
du MoyenAge,18 (1951),222-224;and Gonzlezy Gonzlez
1987(n.8), 148-54.
Attherequest
ofFrancisco
a fellow
student
from
Cristbal,
Valencia,
a short
Viveswrote
ofhismaster
whenhediedon September
10,
biography
JanDullaert
inthesecondandposthumous
1513.Thisobituary
wasprinted
edition
ofDullaert's
comonthefirst
bookofAristode's
SeeJuanLuisVives,Vita
Ioannis
Dullardi,
mentary
Meteorology.
in:JuanLuisVives,
etal.,Leiden1991,10-15.
2,ed.Jozef
Early
Writings
IJsewijn
According
to IJsewijn,
thetopographical
ofthecityofGhentdisplayed
in thisshort
bioknowledge
sketch
thatViveshadseenthetown.SinceDullaert
returned
toGhent
graphical
suggests
in 1512itis possible
thatVivesaccompanied
him.SeeJozef
Vives
andPoetry
, in:
IJsewijn,
Roczniki
26 (1978),24. Gilbert
maintains
thatVivesconsidered
Tournay
Humanistyczne,
ithisduty
tocarry
onhismaster's
work
andbesidehaving
thesecond
edition
ofDullaert's
on thefirst
bookofAristotle's
he alsotookoversomeof
commentary
Meteorology
printed,
hiscourses.
See Gilbert
andtheWorld
, in:GutenbergTournay,
JuanLuisVives
ofPrinting,
69 (1994),129.
Jahrbuch,
13RitaGuerlac,
thePseudodialecticians:
A Humanist
Introduction
, in:JuanLuisVives,
Against
Attack
onMedieval
ed. andtrans.
RitaGuerlac,
Dordrecht
1979,22.
Logic,

11:16:05 AM

OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL
VIVES'CONCEPTION

401

in knowingwhatthe soul is, but ratherhow it is

We are not interested
and what its operationsare. Neitherdid he, who exhortedus to know
ourselves,referto the essenceof the soul,but to the actionsthatmould
our morals.14
tend to stressthe noveltyof Vives'
In thiscontext,moderncommentators
in
view
their
by the progressiveeliminationof the
approach,represented
of
the
structureof the soul in favourof
of
analysis metaphysicalaspects
But it mightalso be observedthat
its phenomenologicalmanifestations.15
one can discern in late medieval psychologya developmentfrom the
demonstrationof the real nature of the soul on the basis of its evident
operationsto the simple explanationof the disparatefunctionsof those
operations.In this process, the philosophicalstudyof the soul became
and the questionof the real nature
graduallyseparatedfrommetaphysics,
of the soul, which was viewed as beyond the mandate of naturalphilosophy,was eventuallyabandoned.16
This development,whichhad its rootsin the naturalisticapproach initiatedby William of Ockham and was carriedthroughbyJean Buridan
and several of his numerousfollowers,is perhaps best exemplifiedby
de anima}1The organizingprinciPierre d'Ailly's(c.1350-1420) Tractatus
ple of this treatiseis indebtedto the approach of facultypsychology,in
which the soul is describedas being composed of a numberof different
facultiesor powers,each directedtowardsa different
object and responThe conceptof the soul in d'Ailly'saccount,
siblefora distinctoperation.18

14S, 188;M, III, 332:"Anima

nostra
scire:qualisautemetquae
quidsit,nihilinterest
animae
sed
de essentia
necqui iussit
utipsinosnossemus,
eiusopera,permultum;
sensit,
morm".
ad compositionem
de actionibus
15See,e.g.,ValerioDel Nero,Pedagogia
di Vives,
in:JuanLuis
e psicologia
nelpensiero
Valencia1992,211.
I: Volumen
Introductorio
Omnia
Mestre,
, ed. Antonio
Vives,Opera
16See Katherine
A. Weisheipl
onLateMedieval
Albert's
, in:James
Park,
Psychology
Influence
is theScience
andtheSciences
1980,510-22;
, Toronto
JackZupko,What
(ed.),Albertus
Magnus
110
A CaseStudy
intheEvolution
Natural
, in:Synthese,
ofLateMedieval
Philosophy
oftheSoul?:
Modern
Substance
andSoul:TheLateMedieval
andJackZupko,
Origins
ofEarly
(1997),297-334;
Medieval
and
: TheRelations
between
F. Brown
, in:Stephen
(ed.),Meeting
oftheMinds
Psychology
Modern
Classical
European
Philosophy
, Turnhout
1998,121-39.
17Thistreatise,
works
on philosophical
whichis oneofthemostimportant
systematic
readwellintothesixteenth
cenin thefourteenth
waswidely
written
century,
psychology
ofthiswork,
with
tentimes
between
1490and 1518.Fora recent
andprinted
study
tury
EinBeitrag
desPeter
vonAilly:
seeOlafPluta,Diephilosophische
critical
zur
edition,
Psychologie
desspten
Mittelalters
1987.
Geschichte
derPhilosophie
, Amsterdam
18See,e.g.,d'Ailly's
in Pluta1987,3.
offaculties
scheme
diagrammed

11:16:05 AM

402

LORENZOGASINI

however,is, as Jack Zupko has pointedout,merely"an emptyplaceholder,

whose real natureis not even relevantto psychology".19
of scholasticpsychologywas also a consequence
This transformation
of the parsimoniousway of doing philosophyconnectedto the ontology
endorsed by Ockham and Buridan, according to which there are only
as menindividualentitiesin the worldand universaisshouldbe identified
Vives shares the view
tal items that representmany thingsin reality.20
that the only universalentitiesit makes sense to talk about are universal
are singularentitieslike all others,when
concepts,which metaphysically
he writesthat "thereis no universalin imagination,nor in nature;but
it is attained throughdiscursivereason as a very indistinctand thin
image when the mind stripsitselfoff,as best it can, fromthe cognitions
of fantasy".21
The aim of the presentpaper is to show that also Vives' account of
the will,whichis containedin chapterXI of the second book of De anima
et vita
, is best viewed in lightof scholasticdiscussionson will and free
withthe analysis
similarities
choice. It is argued that it shows interesting
decern
librosEthicorum
of freechoice containedin Buridan's Quaestiones
super
Aristotelis
ad Mcomachum.
2. JeanBuridanon FreeChoice
arbitrium
Scholasticdebateson freewill and freechoice (liberum
) were domstands.22The firstof
inated by two traditionsthat took ratherdifferent
and associatedwiththe posithemis oftenreferredto as 'intellectualism'
tion of Thomas Aquinas and his followers.Accordingto thisview, "the
root of all freedomis found in reason".23Human freedomcomes from
19Zupko1998(n. 16),137.
20See,e.g.,PaulVincent
MainThemes
Some
s Nominalist
, in:
Metaphysics:
Spade,Ockham'
toOckham
PaulVincent
1999,100-17;
, Cambridge
Companion
Spade(ed.),TheCambridge
totheProblem
Solution
andPeterKing,JeanBuridan's
, in:J. M. M. H. Thijssen
ofUniversais
andNatural
andJackZupko(eds.),TheMetaphysics
, Leiden2001,
ofJeanBuridan
Philosophy
1-27.
21S, 222;M, III, 344: "Universale
sicutinecin natura:
estin imaginatione,
nullum
dum
ac tenuissima,
confusissima
subimagine
a ratione
discurrente
tantummodo
attingitur,
se notisexuit".
efficere
mens,
quantum
potest,
phantasiae
22Foran overview
FreeWilland
B. Korolec,
seeJerzy
ofthesemedieval
discussions,
Medieval
et al. (eds.),TheCambridge
Kretzmann
FreeChoice
ofLater
History
, in: Norman
1982,629-41.
, Cambridge
Philosophy
23ThomasAquinas,
De ventate
2.
, q.24,art.

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

403

followingthe intellect,and the will can never act directlyagainst the

intellectin choosing which goods it should pursue or which evils it
should avoid.24
The second traditionis usuallycalled 'voluntarism'and identifiedwith
the movementthat arose withinthe Franciscanorder afterBonaventure.
These thinkers,
who, althoughtheyconsideredthemselves
good Aristotelians
were unwillwere also influencedby Augustineand Anselmof Canterbury,
ing to accept the Thomisticaccount of the relationshipbetweenintellect
and will,and maintainedinsteadthatthe will is an independentand selfdetermining
power. Accordingto theirview,the will is freeto act against
reason's dictates.The will is entirelyundeterminedone way or another
untilit makesa choice, and it determinesitselfin the directionit chooses.
In arguingthat the will determinesitself,voluntaristsheld that the will
in need of no efficient
cause otherthan itself.25
is a self-mover,
In his account of the contrastbetween these two different
ways of
thinkingabout will and free choice Calvin Normore has pointed to a
numberof key claims. He characterisesthe Aristotelianmodel, championed by Aquinas and his followers,in the followingway: a) everything
whichchangesis changedby another;b) deliberationis alwayswithrespect
to means ratherthan with respectto ends; and c) everything
soughtis
it
is
to
because
the
of
under
perceived be) good.
sought
aspect (thatis,
on the otherhand, came to hold a ratherdifferent
Voluntarists,
position,
accordingto which: a) the will is a self-mover;b) there is deliberation
with respectto ends as well as means; and c) the will has no necessary
orientationtowardsthe good.26
Vives' account is to a large extentvoluntarist,but shows also interoppositioestingsimilaritieswith Buridan's analysisof free choice [libertas
ad
in
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
his
contained
Quaestiones
,
super
ns)
as
a
media
between
the
introduced
its
author
and
Mcomachum
,
opinio
by
24See,e.g.,ThomasAquinas,
is
Summa
, I-II,q.17,art.l:"Therootofliberty
theologiae
as itscause.Forthewillcantendfreely
butitis thereason
thewillas thesubject
thereof;
becausethereasoncan havevarious
notions
ofgood.
towards
various
objects
precisely
define
freechoiceas beinga free
reason
Hencephilosophers
, implying
judgement
from
arising
Thomas
thatreason
is thecauseofliberty".
BasicWritings
, ed.
Aquinas
ofSaint
Quotedfrom
Anton
C. Pegis,2 vols.,NewYork1945.
25Fora detailed
inmedieval
account
ofthevoluntarist
tradition
discussions
ofwilland
freechoice,see BonnieKent,Virtues
in theLate
oftheWill:TheTransformation
ofEthics
Thirteenth
D.C. 1995.
, Washington,
Century
26SeeCalvinG. Normore,
Anselm
andChoosing:
andOckham
onChoice
, in:Vivarium,
Picking
36 (1998),23-39.

11:16:05 AM

404

GASINI
LORENZO

two opposed traditionsmentionedabove. Vives mighthave become familiar with this work duringhis years in Paris, where Buridan was highly
renownedin the early sixteenthcenturyand many of his works were
As we have alreadyseen,one ofVives5mostrespected
editedand reprinted.
on Buridan.
teachers,the FlemingJan Dullaert,was a recognisedauthority
Moreover,theworkin question whichwas, togetherwithAquinas' expomedievalcommentaryon Aristotle's
Mcomachean
sition,the mostinfluential
- was
27But it
in
in
Paris
15
13.
also
be
the
case that
Ethics
might
printed
Vives became acquainted with Buridan's account throughone of his
numerousfollowers.28
Buridan's mediaopinioconsistsin the idea that the will, althoughit is
determinedby the intellectto the extentthat it can only choose what
the intellecthas judged as good, can nonethelessdeferits choice whenever the goodness of the object is in some way doubtfulor uncertain.
Since the intellectcan err in its judgement,the will is not invariably
moved by the greatergood perceivedby the intellect,but can- at least
- deferitsact of
in the absenceof evidentknowledge
acceptance.According
to Buridan,wheneverthe intellectpasses judgementon the goodness or
badness of an object, the object appears to the will as good {subratione
boni)or bad {subratione
mali).This judgementgeneratesin the will a certain agreement{complacentia)
or disagreement(<iisplicentia
) in relationto the
is
a
and passive incliThis
first
act
of
the
natural
will, however,
object.
nation. If an object has been presentedto the will as good, then the
arisein thewill.Therefore,
aforementioned
act of agreementwillnecessarily
as Buridan readilyconcedes, the will is not freewith regardto its own
firstact. Freedom of choice residesinsteadin the second act of the will,
in whichthe will freelyelicitsfromitsfirstact an act of acceptance{accep-.
If thereis no obstacle,these elicitedacts are
tatio)or rejection{refiitatio).
or avoidance (faga:).29
immediatelyfollowedby actual pursuit{prosecutio)
27On thisworkanditsauthor,
Studien
Buridan:
see BerndMichael,
zu seinem
Johannes
Mittelalters
sdner
Theorien
imEuropa
desspten
Werken
undzurRezeption
Leben
, 2 vols.,
, seinen
Leser
undBenutzer
ihre
Buridans
Berlin1985;andBerndMichael,
Schriften,
moralphilosophische
Theorie
im14.Jahrhundert
Miethke
imspten
Mittelalter
,
, in:Jrgen
(ed.),DasPublikum
politischer
Mnchen
1992,139-51.
28Henrik
onMarsilius
hadan influence
hassuggested
thatBuridan's
analysis
Lagerlund
Buridan's
BielandJohnMajor.See Henrik
Pierre
Gabriel
ofInghen,
Lagerlund,
d'Ailly,
and MikkoYijnsuuri
andItsInfluence
, in: Henrik
(eds),
Lagerlund
ofFreeChoice
Theory
Boethius
toDescartes
Emotions
andChoice
2002,200,n. 54.
, Dordrecht
from
29JeanBuridan,
Aristotelis
adMcomachum
libros
Ethicorum
decern
, Paris1513;
Questiones
super
Frankfurt
am Main1968,X, q.2,205v.Henceforth
QNE.
reprinted

11:16:05 AM

OF THE WILL
OF FREEDOM
VIVES'CONCEPTION

405

Crucial to Buridan'saccount,however,is the idea that,besides acceptance and rejection,thereis deferment(<iifferre

), which mightbe described
state
and which consistsin the
in
a
as the activityof the will
passive
does not result
choice not to followthe inclination.Deferment,therefore,
in an externalaction. Through the defermentof its act of volition,the
will is able to not will (nonvelie)thatwhich the intellecthas judged to be
good. Freedom of choice, Buridan explains:
is not
has been givento us forour good in thisway,thatif something
should
we
or
to
be
and
bad,
simply
good
simply
clearlyjudged
steadily
as bestwe can
deferacceptanceor rejectionuntilwe have investigated
whetherthe seeminggood or bad is simplygood or simplybad, so that
we may finallyaccept the simplygood and not the bad and rejectthe
simplybad and not the good.30
Buridan appropriatessome terminologythat is clearlyvoluntaristin his
theory,such as the notion of not willing.Furthermore,his distinction
with
betweenthe firstand the second act of will shows some similarities
toward
inclination
betweena natural,passive
JohnDuns Scotus' distinction
the good or happiness,and an activepower to elicitor not elicitit.31But
whetherhis mediaopiniois best understoodas an attenuatedformof voluntarism,an attemptto providea doctrinallyacceptable defenceof intellectualist principles, or a kind of genuine middle position between
intellectualismand voluntarism,is a matterof debate among modern
commentators.32
30QNE,X, q.2,207v:"Sedsicad bonumnostrum
nobisdataestutde eo quodnon
differamus
bonumvelsimpliciter
essesimpliciter
et clareiudicatum
estfirmiter
malum,
an illud
ad
nostram
donee
vel
refutationem
inquisiverimus
possibilitatem
acceptationem
utfinaliter
velsimpliciter
bonum
sitsimpliciter
velmalum
bonum
malum,
accepteapparens
malumet nonbonum".
bonumet nonmalumet refutemus
mussimpliciter
simpliciter
McGrade
X oftheEthics
onBook
, in:Arthur
Stephen
Questions
JeanBuridan,
Quotedfrom
and
Two
: Ethics
Texts.
Volume
Translations
et al. (eds.),TheCambridge
Philosophical
ofMedieval
Political
2001,531.
, Cambridge
Philosophy
31Foran illuminating
seeJohn
ofDunsScotus'thought,
oftheseaspects
discussion
ontheTwoAffections
DunsScotus
theNatural:
, in: American
oftheWill
Boler,Transcending
"Buridan's
to RistoSaarinen,
67 (1993),109-126.
Catholic
descripAccording
Quarterly,
theStoic-Augustinian
tosomeextent
actofthewillresembles
and'second'
tionofthe'first'
Weakness
SeeRistoSaarinen,
and'consent'".
modelof'desire'
Thought:
oftheWillinMedieval
2002
From
toBuridan
, Leiden1994,170. On thispoint,see also Lagerlund
Augustine
on Aristode's
in hiscommentary
use of Seneca'sworks
(n. 28), 198,n. 35. Buridan's
of the
andSeneca
inJames
Ethics
is discussed
Nicomachean
, in:Journal
J. Walsh,Buridan
ofIdeas,27 (1966),23-40.
History
32Forsomeofthemostrecent
Human
see Edward
contributions,
Liberty
J. Monahan,

11:16:05 AM

406

LORENZOGASINI

Accordingto Fabienne Pironet,Buridan'stheoryis based on threeprinciples:a) the will cannotwill somethingbad as such,or will againstsomethinggood as such; b) the will cannot will that which the intellecthas
notjudged to be good in some way or other;c) the will can neverchoose
a lesser good while a greatergood is taken into consideration,because
the lessergood is bad in comparisonto the greatergood.33As we shall
see, Vives subscribesto all threeof these principles.
9
3. JuanLuis Vives
ofFreedom
oftheWill
Conception
Vives maintainsthat all knowledgeis givenforthe sake of the pursuitof
the good, so that when the good is known it will be desired and pursued. The facultythat seeks to attainthis end in animals is the sensitive
appetite;in human beings it is the will,which is definedas "the faculty
or power of the soul to seek what is good and turnaway fromwhat is
evil under the guidance of reason".34Accordingto Vives, thereare two
and disapproval(reprobatio
different
acts of the will: approval (approbatio)
),
fromwhich our externalactionsfollow.Approval,which pertainsto the
to obtain it; and disapproval,whichpertainsto
good, producesthe effort
evil, produces eitherthe reactionto overcomeit or the retreatand the
flightin order to avoid it.35
in: MediaevalStudies,16 (1954),72-86;Jerzy
andFreeWillaccording
toJeanBuridan,
etleproblme
dulibre
arbitre
la lumire
desCommentaires
B. Korolec,
Nicomaque
L'thique
Zimmermann
duXIIIesicle
etla philosophie
dela libert
deJeanBuridan
, in:Albert
parisiens
an derPariser
Universitt
imXIII.Jahrhundert
, Berlin1976,
(ed.),Die Auseinandersetzungen
Buridan
andDonald
Davidson
onAkrasia,
in:Synthese,
96 (1993),
RistoSaarinen,
331-48;
John
A. Vos,Buridan
onContingency
andFreeWill,in: E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop
133-154;
A Master
Freedom
, Nijmegen
1993,141-55;
ofChoice
(eds.),
ofArts
JackZupko,
JeanBuridan:
The
57 (1995),75-99;Fabienne
inBuridan's
Moral
in:Mediaeval
Studies,
Pironet,
Psychology,
"
"
Ethics
andJackZupko(eds.),The
Notion
, in:J. M. M. H. Thijssen
of nonvelieinBuridan's
Leiden2001,199-220;
andLagerlund
andNatural
2002
Buridan,
ofJean
Philosophy
Metaphysics
(n.28),173-203.
33Pironet
2001,202f.
34S, 340;M, III, 382:"Cognitio
esttributa,
senomnispropter
bonumexpetendum
utcognitum
bonumexpetat,
sualispropter
mentalis
mentale,
sensuale,
expetendo
propter
etcongruat;
sicenim
fieri
autemsequatur
doneese illiadiungat,
quidem
possit,
quantum
aversetur
et defugiat,
illieritbonum,
malum
necaliter;
vero,quodbonositcontrarium,
in brutis
est
Facultas
ne se illiapplicet,
appetitus
quaeid exequitur,
quo fiatei malum.
seuvisanimi,
in homine.
seuvoluntas
Estigitur
voluntas,
facultas,
sensualis,
qua bonum
animantes
ducenatura,
nammutae
malum
duceratione:
aversamur,
quaesenexpetimus,
susextimulat".
35S, 352;M, III, 386f.:"In volntate
ex
et reprobatio,
actussuntduo,approbatio

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

407

like Buridan and most scholastics,between

HerebyVives distinguishes,
elicitedacts, i.e., approval and disapproval,which the will bringsabout
in itself,and commandedacts, i.e., the pursuance,avoidance or reaction
againstsome given object, which followupon the will's elicitedacts and
are broughtabout externallyif no hindranceis present.Approval and
disapprovalclearlycorrespondto what Buridan calls acceptance (accepta
in
difference
tio)and rejection(refiitatio
). There is, however,an interesting
Vives' analysis of the actions that follow upon the act of disapproval.
With regardto an object that appears evil, Buridan only discussesavoidance. Vives, on the otherhand, introducesa new aspect,by distinguishkindsof commandedacts in relationto something
ingbetweentwo different
that appears evil: the avoidance of or flightfromthe evil, and the reaction that aims at subduingit.36
Accordingto Vives, the will is the rulerand commanderof all things,
but since it has no lightof its own, it is illuminatedby the mind,which
has been paired with it not in order to rule and forceit, but to advise
and guide it. The will does not tryto pursue or avoid anythingthat has
not been pointed out beforehandby reason. Thus, accordingto Vives,
an act of will can be describedas "conceived by reason, but delivered
by the will".37The human will has been declared free by God, and
althoughit submitsitselfto reason, it is never bound to anythingparto will (velie)or
ticular.It is freebetween activityand privation{orbatio),
not will, to will against (nolle)or not will against.Vives seems herebyto
with willing,and the act of disidentifythe act of approval (approbatio)
with
approval (reprobatio) willingagainst.Moreover,Vives also holds,with
ad
proficiscuntur.
Approbatio,
quaeestde bono,paritexecutionem
quibusactusexteriores
ad illudsuperanilludconsequendum;
autem,
reprobatio
quaede malo,velinsurrectionem
et fugam
ad evitandum".
dum,velcontractionem
36Although
credited
forhaving
abandoned
thedistinction
Vivesis sometimes
between
andconcupiscible
motions
ofthesoul,thedistinction
between
irascible
motions
thathave
andmotions
theformal
thathavetheforobject"sensible
goodoreviltakenabsolutely"
or arduous",
malobject"sensible
is nevertheless
echoedin
goodor eviltakenas difficult
hisdistinction
between
motions
offlight
or avoidance
from
evil(a malo)
andthosethat
aimat subduing
evil(inmalum).
37S, 340and342;M, III, 382:"Voluntas
estomnium
et imperquidem
ipsadomina
sedperse nihilhabetlucis;illuminatur
a mente,
hocesta ratione
ac iudicio,
atrix,
quae
estillivelutconsultrix
nonut regatauttorqueat,
sedut dirigat,
et
apposita
ductrixque,
meliorum
admoneat.
autdevitat,
nisia ratione
Itaquenihilvoluntas
apptit,
praemostratum.Quocirca
a volntate
actusvoluntatis
a ratione
autemiudicatur,
quidem
producitur,
et suadetur;
a volntate
estigiatque,utsicdicam,a ratione
gignitur,
paritur.
Magistra
voluntatis
nondomina".
tur,etpraeceptrix
ratio,

11:16:05 AM

408

LORENZOGASINI

Buridan,that the will is not freein relationto opposingacts, because it

can neitherwill anythingthat does not in some way appear good, nor
will against anythingthat does not somehow appear evil. If something
which appears good is presentedto it, it is in the will'spower to not will
it, but it is not in its power to will againstit, i.e., to reject and hate it.
And, vice versa, if somethingthat appears evil is presentedto it, it is in
the will's power not to will against it, but it is not in its power to will
it, i.e., to embrace and love it.38Thus Vives subscribesto the firstof the
principlesin Buridan'stheoryoutlinedby Pironet,i.e., that the will cannot will somethingbad as such, or will againstsomethinggood as such.
When the will does not incline to eitherthe acceptance of the good
or the rejectionof evil,thereis whatVives calls 'privation'(iorbatio
).39From
his description,
it wouldseem as ifhe had in mindsomekindofindifference,
due to which the will is not inclinedone way ratherthan another.This
mightcorrespondto the passive state about which Descartes writes:
I feelwhen thereis no reasonpushingme in one
But the indifference
directionratherthan anotheris the lowestgrade of freedom;it is evibut ratherof a defectin knowlof freedom,
dence not of anyperfection
a
kind
of
or
negation.40
edge
In the voluntaristtradition,however,there was another conceptionof
to thepositivefacultyof choice betweenoppowhichreferred
indifference,
sites. This positive indeterminacy,which Duns Scotus describes as "a
of the will, consistsin the capacity,when all
superabundantsufficiency"
conditionsfor acting are met, eitherto act or deliberatelyto refuseto
38S, 342;M, III, 382f.:"Voluntatem
liberam
iussit
esseautorsuus,et
enimhumanam
sednulliuniestallirationi,
obtemperat
quidemiliasemper
quasisuiiurisac mancipij;
Liberam
ex propositis.
libuerit
autem,quamcunque
quidemanimointer
gata:sequitur
velienonvelie,nollenonnolle,noninterduosactuscontrarios;
actumet orbationem,
velie,nisisubaliquabonifacie:nihilnollenisisubmali:
quandoenimvishaecnihilpotest
nonvelie,sednonpotest
nonmali:potest
ostensa
bonispecie,
nolle,hocestaverquidem
nonnolle,sednon
sariet odisse;vicissim
quoqueobiectamalispecie,nonboni,potest
et amare".
potest
velie,hocestamplecti
39S, 340;M, III, 382:"Suntergoinvolntate
seuamplexus
actusduo,propensio
boni,
inclint".
in partem
estutriusque,
et aversatio
mali;orbatio
quumillaociosaneutram
40RenDescartes,
autemilla,
Meditationes
deprima
, AT VII, 58: "IndifFerentia
philosophia
est
in
alteram
in
me
ratio
unam
nulla
cm
impellit,
magis
qum
partem
quamexperior,
in cognitione
sed tantummodo
& nullamin e perfectionem,
infimus
graduslibertatis,
ThePhilosophwal
from
RenDescartes,
testator".
sivenegationem
defectum,
Quoted
quandam,
etal.,Cambridge
1984,40. Fora thor, vol.II, eds.JohnCottingham
ofDescartes
Writings
seeLilli
ofthewillanditsscholastic
ofDescartes'
background,
conception
oughdiscussion
ch.
7.
Ma.
Mind
Descartes'
s Concept
2003,
,
Alanen,
of
Cambridge,

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

409

act. The will,by virtueof being a rationalpower, is such that it can, at

the verymomentat which it acts, act otherwise.41
Vives' remarkthatthe will is freebetweenactivityand privationseems
to implythat,in his view, it is possible to refrainactivelyfromwilling
what one is naturallyinclined to will, by not elicitingany act of will.
This, in turn,suggeststhat it is a conceptionof the latterkind he has
in mind, and that privationcould thereforebe compared to the act of
defermentin Buridan's account. As the latterpoints out:
the power of not acceptingan apparentgood, or of not rejectingan
apparentevil,is forour ultimatebenefitnot so thatwe mightstandfirm
but so that,before
in this mode of non-acceptanceor non-rejection,
we
or
an
mightinquire into everygoodaccepting rejecting object,
ness or evil whichfollowsupon thatobject,or is annexedto it, so that
at last we would accept what is absolutelygood and reject what is
absolutelybad.42
It seems thatwhat Vives is tryingto capturewiththe term'privation'is
similarto what Buridan describesas the "mode of non-acceptanceor
non-rejection".
There are severalreferencesto thismode in Vives' account. The will,
he writes,can impose a furtherdeliberationand inquire whethersomethingbetteror more favourablecan be found.43He also observesthat,
in the processof deliberation,the will is freeto deferthe issue or to turn
the mind's attentionto somethingelse, like a sovereigncan command
thatthe decisionon some matterbe put underadvisementor postponed.44
The view that the will can always turn the intellectaway fromconsideringa givenobject,however,is also put forwardby Aquinas, who writes
that "no object moves the will necessarily,forno matterwhat the object

41JohnDunsScotus,Quaestiones
libros
Aristotel,
IX, q.15. See also
super
metaphysicorum
McCordAdams
DunsScotus
ontheWillas a Rational
in:Marilyn
AllanB. Wolter,
Potency,
DunsScotus
(ed.),ThePhilosophical
Theology
ofJohn
, Ithaca1990,163-80.
42QNE,VII, q.8, 145va.Quotedfrom
Portrait
JeanBuridan:
ofa FourteenthJackZupko,
Arts
Master
, NotreDame2003,256.
Century
43S, 344;M,III, 383:"Potest
itemvoluntas
ulteriorem
deliberationem
etquasi
indicere,
ne ibisistatur,
an quicquam
inveniri
sedinquiratur,
et
amplius
pronunciare,
queatpotius,
conducibilius".
44S, 342and344;M, III, 383:"Tuminipsadeliberatione
licetveliubere
remdifferii,
velinuniversum
silentium
aliorsum
mentis
convertere:
nonaliter
indicere,
intentionemque
taride negocio
velomitti
velreijci".
quamprinceps,
quiconsul
quopiam
imperat,
prorsum,

11:16:05 AM

410

GASINI
LORENZO

be, it is in man's power not to thinkof it".45But since Aquinas maintains that the will is to be consideredas rationalappetite,it would seem
that the will is able to avertthe intellectonly if the intellectjudges that
thiscourse of action is best. The issue of whetherthe will is necessitated
to choose the greatergood is, as far as I can see, also one of the bones
of contentionamong moderninterpreters
of Buridan. Invokingthe principle that "the will cannot will thatwhich the intellecthas notjudged to
be good in some way or other",Pironethas argued that defermentis
possible "if and only if the intellecthas judged that not-willingis the
greatergood at the moment".46Henrik Lagerlund,on the other hand,
maintainsthat "we may in factchoose the lesser,since we may deferon
the highergood and then accept the lessergood".47
In his characterisation
of what we have called the voluntarist
position,
Buridan mentionsan argumentwhich maintainsthat the will can, all
other thingsbeing equal, choose the lesser of two incompossiblegoods
presentedto it by the intellect:"For even if the intellectjudges that one
should go to church, the will can, nevertheless,while thisjudgement
stands,not will to go indeed it can also will not to go therebut to the
pub".48This is, however,somethinghe opposes,since "because of itsfreedom, it cannot be that the will is able to will what is less good, since
the will's freedomto choose has not been given to it- whetherby God
or by nature- because thisis a bad thing,but because it is a good thing,
since it is a conditionpertainingto nobilityor excellence,as everyone
concedes".49But thismeans onlythat"if the will shouldchoose, it chooses
the greatergood by necessity",which correspondsto the thirdprinciple
mentionedby Pironet,accordingto which the will can never choose a
45Thomas
Summa
a nulloobiecto
exneces2: "voluntas
, I-II,q.10,art.
theologiae
Aquinas,
sitatemove
obiectononcogitare".
tur,potestenimaliquisde quocumque
Quotedfrom
BasicWritings
G. Pegis,2 vols.,NewYork1945.
, ed. Anton
ofSaintThomas
Aquinas
46Pironet
2001(n. 32),207.
47Lagerlund
2002(n.28),188and200,n. 51.
48QNE,X, q.l, 203r:"Namquamvis
intellectus
iudicaverit
eundum
essead ecclesiam,
voluntas
tamenhoc stante
potestnonvelieire,immoet nolleire,sed ad tabernam.".
onBook
X oftheEthics
McGrade
Questions
, in:Arthur
JeanBuridan,
Quotedfrom
Stephen
et al. (eds),TheCambridge
Translations
Texts.
Volume
Two:Ethics
and
ofMedieval
Philosophical
Political
2001,502.
, Cambridge
Philosophy
49QNE III, q.4, 43vb:"ex sua liberiate,
nonpotest
haberequodpossetvelieminus
nonestsibidata,sive
bonum,
probatur
qiaillalibertas
oppositionis
quamhabetvoluntas
a deosivea natura,
suummalum,
sedpropter
suumbonum,
cumiliasitcondipropter
tiopertinens
et excellentiam,
ut omnesconcedunt".
ab nobilitatem
Quotedfrom
Zupko
2003,397,n. 50.

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

411

lesser good while a greatergood is taken into consideration,since the

lesser good, in this case going to the pub, is bad in comparisonto the
greatergood, i.e., going to church.50
Buridan also asserts,and thismightbe exactlywhat he meant by pre, that it is "in the power of the will to
sentinghis view as a mediaopinio
command the intellectto desistfromconsiderationsof the greatergood,
and in that case, it could accept what is less good".51In other words,
thewillis free(pacePironet)to avertthe intellectfromconsidering
whether
to go to church or to the pub, and considerinstead whetherto go to
the pub or not. And since the latteris not somethingbad as such, the
will can in fact choose what initiallywas the lesser good, namelyto go
to the pub.
Vives holds the same view and explains that,when severalthingsare
presentedto us, even if reason recommendsone that is rightlythe most
, to prefer
worthy,the will is free,afterhavingsetthemostworthy
thingaside
anotherone, even if the latterappears good only in the slightestway.52
This seems to be an expressionof the thirdprinciplein Buridan's theory mentionedby Pironet. In other words, Vives agrees with Buridan
that the will cannot choose a lesser good while a greatergood is taken
in consideration.They both appear to think,however,that the will is
freeto deferits act of volitionwheneverwe lack absolutecertaintyabout
the goodnessof an object. This is somethingwhich,at least accordingto
Vives maintainsthat
Vives, seems always to be the case in human life.53
50QNE,III,q.4,44ra-rb:
"sivoluntas
debeat
maius
bonum".
eligere,
ipsanecessario
eliget
"ifthewillis ableto choose,
readsas follow:
it chooses
thegreater
Zupko'stranslation
See Zupko2003,397,n. 50.
goodbynecessity".
51QNE III, q.4,44ra:"inpotestate
voluntatis
intellectui
utdsistt
a considimperare
eratione
illiusbonimaioris,
et tuncpoterit
minus".
acceptare
Quotedfrom
Zupko2003,
397,n. 53.
52S, 344;M, III, 383:"Multis
etiamsi efficax
etvalida
quoquepropositis
ostensisque,
ratiounumaliquodprobet,
ac suadeat,
si quodaliudtarnen
faciem
bonialipraese fert
tenuissima
hueseseflectere,
et ex solasuspiciuncula
hocsumere,
quam,quamvis
potest
in quo insitpermagna
alterorepudiato,
boniet species
etessentia".
53S, 344;M,III, 383:"quaminremmagnam
ei ansampraebet,
omnes
quodresnostrae
mistae
suntbonisac malis,tumex nobisipsis,qui ex rebusdiversissimis
constamus;
suntnobiscircumspicienda
et respicienda
in animo,in corpore,
in externis".
multaque
Cf.alsoDescartes'
inMeditations
remark
onFirst
: "Butsincethepresconcluding
Philosophy
sureofthings
to be donedoesnotalways
allowus to stopandmakesucha meticulous
itmustbe admitted
thatinhuman
lifeweareoften
liabletomakemistakes
about
check,
and we mustacknowledge
theweakness
of ournature".
See Ren
particular
things,
ThePhilosophical
vol.II, eds.John(Nottingham
etal.,Cambridge
Descartes,
ofDescartes,
Wrtings
1984,62.

11:16:05 AM

4 12

LORENZOGASINI

it is even possible to refrainfrompursuinga clearlyperceivedgood, if

for no otherreason than wantingto demonstrateone's freedom:
To show thatit is the ruler,the will oftenrejectsand dismisseseverything,just like a prince,who in ordernot to seem governedby someone else, excludesand rejectsall the good advices of his counsellors,
and it ends up as withthe one in the satirewho says:'This I will,thus
I command,let arbitrariness
be the reason'.54
Vives adds, however,that not even thisis done withoutany formof the
good, since the will cannot pursue or act withoutan intentionwhich
some reason has consideredgood.55This last point is in agreementwith
the second of the principlesin Buridan's theoryoutlined by Pironet,
namely,that the will cannot will that which the intellecthas notjudged
to be good in some way or other.
There are also tracesof Buridan'snotionof the firstact of the will in
Vives' account. These are most evidentin his discussionof the emotions
siveajfectiones
{affectus
), which he definesas "the acts of those facultiesthat
nature gave to our souls to follow good and avoid evil, by means of
which we are led to the good and move away fromor against evil".56
Accordingto Vives, the acts of the emotionalfaculty,"no matterhow
54S, 344;M, III, 384:"Saepeedam,utse ostendat
voluntas
essedominam,
ac
reijcit
haudaliter
a quoquam
salutaria
omnia
omnia,
spernit
quamprinceps,
quinevideatur
regi,
consiliariorum
suorum
mnita
excludit
etrespuit,
Sicvolo,
fitque
(quoddicitillein satyra)
siciubeo,
sitproratione
libido
". Vives'quotefromtheSatires
is notcompletely
accurate.
textreadsas follows:
"Hocvolo,siciubeo,sitproratione
voluntas".
SeeJuvenalis,
Juvenalis'
TheSatires
itsactforno otherreasonthan
, 6.V.223.The ideathatthewillcansuspend
to experience
itsfreedom
is to be found
alsoin Bartholomaeus
Arnoldi
de Usingen.
See
2002(n.28),190.Cf.alsowith
whoina letter
toMesland
Descartes,
Lagerlund
(9 February
that"itis always
a clearly
known
1645)declares
opento us to holdbackfrom
pursuing
a clearly
we consider
it a goodthing
truth,
good,or from
admitting
perceived
provided
todemonstrate
thefreedom
ofourwillbyso doing".
See RenDescartes,
ThePhilosophical
et al.,Cambridge
, vol.Ill, eds.John(Nottingham
1991,245.
Writings
ofDescartes
55S, 346;M, III, 384:"Tametsi
nihilenimpotest
volunequehocsineboniforma,
tasexpetere,
autagere,nisieo proposito,
quodratioaliquabonumessecensuerit".
56S, 456;M, III, 422:"Ergoistarum
a natura
facultatum,
quibusaniminostri
praediti
suntad sequendum
velvitandum
actusdicuntur
affectus
siveaffectiones,
bonum,
malum,
velcontra
vela malorecedimus".
On Vives'analysis
milium,
quibusad bonumferimur,
oftheemotions,
seeCarlosG. Norea,
andtheEmotions
Carbondale
,
1989;
JuanLuisVives
3De animaet vita,
LorenzoCasini,Emotions
inRenaissance
Humanism:
in:
JuanLuisVives
Henrik
andMikko
andChoice
Boethius
toDescartes
,
Lagerlund
(eds),Emotions
from
Yijnsuuri
Dordrecht
andAnti-Stoicism
inJuanLuis
2002,205-28;and LorenzoCasini,Aristotelianism
Vives*
s Conception
on
, in:JillKrayeandRistoSaarinen
oftheEmotions
(eds.),Moral
Philosophy
theThreshold
, Dordrecht
2005,283-305.
ofModernity

11:16:05 AM

OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL
VIVES'CONCEPTION

413

quick and hastythey mightbe, always followthe conclusionsof judgeof the

ment".57As he stresses,the terms'goo and 'evil' in his definition
what
each
rather
or
but
what
is
not
emotionsmean,
evil,
really good
personjudges to be good or evil.58Vives5classificationof the emotions
between
and distinguishes
is expoundedin accordance withhis definition,
movementstowardthe good, and movementsaway fromor againstevil:
All the motionsof the soul are about the good or the evil,as faras it
is the oppositeof the good. These motionsare towardthe good, away
fromevil or againstevil. Good and evil can be present,future,
past or
possible.The absence of good is evil and the absence of evil is good.
The good as soon as it becomesknownto the mindpleasesus at once.
This feelingis firstlike the gentlebreeze of a risingmotion,whichis
The
it becomeslove {amor).
called liking(<allubescentia
). If it is confirmed
is
motionpertainingto a presentgood thatwe have attained joy (latiand falls
to a futuregood is desire(cupiditas)
the motionpertaining
tici),
is called
to
evil
motionpertaining
withintheboundariesoflove.The first
If
it
it
is
confirmed
vexation(iojfensio
), which is the oppositeof liking.
becomeshatred(odium).59
the structureof
With the exceptionof some terminological
modifications,
resemblesthe account found in Buridan's Quaestiones
Vives' classification
:
ad Nicomachum
Aristotelis
Ethicorum
libros
decern
super
or disfavorto the will is favoring(complacentia)
The firstact attributed
of
arises
from
which
an
apprehension the object
)
object,
ing (idisplicentia
as good or bad, suitableor unsuitable.[. . .] Then, upon theact offavortheresometimesfollowsanotheract whichwe are
ing or disfavoring
This act
or rejection(refiitatio).
accustomedto call acceptance(acceptatio)
is properlyspeakingcalled volitionor nolition,because whatI accept I
57S, 456;M, III, 422:"reliqui
senetpraerapidi,
celeres
omnesquantumcunque
iudicij
sitbonumesse,aut
nisipraeiudicatum
nonenimmovetur
tentiam
animus,
sequuntur;
id quodestobiectum".
malum,
58Ibid.:"Bonum
taleest,quam
id voco,nontamquodrevera
inpraesentia
etmalum
quodquisquesibiesseiudicat".
59S, 466;M, III, 426:"Motusomnisanimide bonoest,autde malo,quatenus
conmalum.
Bonumautemet
vela malo,velcontra
estbono;estquevelad bonum,
trarium
bonipromalo
velpossibile;
absentia
veltransactum,
velpraesens
est,velfuturum,
malum,
allubescit
continuo:
estmenti
priest,maliautem
cognitum,
simulatque
probono.Bonum
ea veroconfirmata,
motus
aurula,
nuncupatur;
quaeallubescentia
surgentis
maqueestea velut
debonofuturo,
debonopraesenti
fitamor.Motusautem
assecuti,
laetitia;
cupidquodsumus
Primus
motusde maloestoffensio,
includitur.
limites
itasnuncupatur,
quaeintraamoris
fitodium".
contraria:
allubescentiae
quaeconfirmata,

11:16:05 AM

414

LORENZOGASINI
will,and whatI rejectI willagainst,and vice versa.And upon thisact
followsactual pursuit(prosecutio
thereimmediately
),
) or avoidance(fuga
if it [the thingaccepted or rejected]is apprehendedas pursuableor
avoidable and thereis no obstacle. [. . .] And, third,fromthe act of
acceptance,or, properlyspeaking,of volition,therenecessaryfollows
or perhapsthe
love {amor)and fromthe act of rejectionhate {odium);
love and the rejectionhate.60
acceptanceis, formally,

It mightbe objected that no mentionof the will is made in the passage

fromVives' accountoftheemotionsquotedabove. But as Mario Sancipriano
has pointed out, Vives seems to thinkthat the emotions"act inside the
to distinguish
will, so that,in some passages of the treatise,it is difficult
an emotionfromthe will itself".61
The tendencyto describeemotionsas motionsof the will is most evident in Vives' discussionof love. "The will",he writes,"as soon as somethingthatis judged to be good is presentedto it, is moved and attracted
This motionis called
to it by means of a sort of naturalconformity".62
if
love
it
becomes
confirmed,
and,
{amor).In his view,
liking{allubescentia)
love is thereforebest understoodas an inclinationor movementof the
will towardsthe good.63Althoughthe will is the rulerand leader of the
whole soul, it is in its turnled and draggedtowardits own good by love.
This motion,accordingto Vives, is the most impetuous,since it is the
60QNE, X, q.2, 206v:"Proquantoergoibidictum
actus
est,ponamus
quodprimus
in obiecto,
ex apprevoluntati
sitcomplacentia
veldisplicentia
attributus
que consurgit
veldisconvenientis;
de quo
illiusobiecti
subratione
bonivelmali,convenientis
hensione
intertia
nonse habetad istum
actudeterminatum
fuit
tertii
libri,
questione
quodvoluntas
et libertate
et hocibi requiris.
actumlibere,
necesteiusdominadominio
oppositionis;
veldisplicentie
aliusactusqui solet
Deindeistum
actumcomplacentie
sequitur
aliquando
dicitur
volitio
velnolitio,
velrefutatio,
etilleproprie
vocari
quiaquod
loquendo
acceptatio
statim
hocnoloet econtra.
Et ad istum
actumsequitur
hocvolo,et quodrefuto
accepto
velfugibilis
actualis
velfugasi illudsitapprehensum
prosequibilis
permodm
prosecutio
estin primaquestione
tertii
Et de ilioactudeterminatum
et si nonsitimpedimentum.
se habetlibere
voluntas
libriet in duabussequentibus
quodad eiusactusproductionem
Tertio
et hocetiamibi requiratur.
et estdominaeiusdominio
et libertate
oppositionis;
amornecessario,
dietevolitionis,
seu proprie
autemex ilioactuacceptationis,
sequitur
amoret refutatio
illa acceptatio
estformaliter
et ex acturefutationis
odium,vel forte
onBookX oftheEthics
odium".
, in:Arthur
Questions
Stephen
JeanBuridan,
Quotedfrom
Two:
Texts.
Volume
Translations
McGradeet al. (eds),TheCambridge
ofMedieval
Philosophical
Ethics
andPolitical
, Cambridge
2001,518.
Philosophy
61Sancipriano
1981(n.4), 132.
62S, 472; M, III, 428: "Quodbonumesseiudicatur
simulac
voluntati
estoblatum,
as sesecongruentia
earncontinuo,
et allicit
movet
quadamnaturali".
63Ibid.:"Allubescentia
siveinclivoluntatis
estamor;hunclicetintelligere
confirmata
ad bonum".
siveprogressum
nationem,

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

415

voluntatis
quickestand "on the verge of the will" (in precipiti
), which, as
he explains,means that it originatesand developswith its complacence,
so thatit almostseems as it was fallingoffa slope. Love is thereforethe
strongestand most powerfulof all the emotions.Moreover,it is also the
originof all emotions,since we followand desirewhat we love, and shun
and hate what is contraryto what we love.64
Traces of Buridan's notion of the firstact of the will are discernible
also in Vives' chapteron the will. In connectionwithsome remarksconcerninganimal behaviour that reflectssome kind of dissimulation,such
as the cautiousnessshown by the cat when it hunts the mouse, Vives
points out that the firstmotion, consistingin the impulse towards the
object,is keptback by a contrarymotion,comingfromthefearof suffering
or of losingthe prey.In his view, however,thisis not to be regardedas
some kind of deliberation,but ratheras the obstructionof the firstact.65
Vives' wordingin thispassage is verycareless,since he seems to suggest
that animals also have a second act in which a higher facultycorrespondingto the human will elicitsan act of acceptance or rejection.His
point,however,is thatanimals,althoughtheyact on the basis of the sensitiveappetite,can nonethelesshave contraryimpulses.
4. Conclusion
As we have seen,Vives subscribesto all the threeprinciplesthatFabienne
Pironetidentifiesas the basis of Buridan's theoryof free choice, maintainingthata) the will cannot will somethingbad as such, or will against
somethinggood as such; b) the will cannot will that which the intellect
has not judged to be good in some way or other;c) the will can never
64S, 504;M, III, 440f.:"Primum
voluntas
estanimiuniversi
dominatrix
etrectrix,
voluntatis
incitatisamor;rapitenimillamamorad suumbonum,
qui motusestomnium
simus:
celerrimus
nascitur
enimetgliscit
volente
voluntatis;
quoniam
perse,etinprecipiti
ut tanquam
videatur
affectionum
omnium
ipsaac libente,
impelli
perpronum;
quocirca
amorfortissima
utmerito
sitilludconsensu
totseculorum
est,et potentissima;
approbatum:Amoricedereomniatanquam
victori.
Et alioquisi quissubtilius
ex
perscrutetur,
amore
anteadicebam,
affectus
omnes
etconinveniet,
quemadmodum
profluere;
sequimur,
et odimus
contraria
videlicet,
cupiscimus
quaeamamus:
fugimus
ijs,quaeamamus".
65S, 348;M, III, 384f.:"Suntquaedam
ammalia
ad simulationem
et dissimulationem
a natura
utvulpes,
etfelisquumvenatur
murem:
ex metu,
ne
facta,
quaecautionascitur
autamittat;
namin brutoquumad suumobiectum
ruenti
offertur
quidpatiatur
pericuab aliter
nonestea consultatio,
sedimpedimenlum,retardatur
contrario;
priorimpetus
tumprioris
motus".

11:16:05 AM

416

LORENZOGASINI

choose a lesser good while a greatergood is taken into consideration,

because the lessergood is bad in comparisonto the greatergood.
In spiteof theseclear structural
similarities
withBuridan' theory,howvoluntarist.
ever, the spiritof Vives' account is more straightforwardly
For example,one of the analogies employedby late medievalvoluntarists
is the image of the soul as a kingdomin which the will has supreme
power. The will can command all the otherpowers of the soul as a sovRoland Teske has argued that the
ereignwould command its subjects.66
source of the image of the will as king and ruleramong late thirteenthIn his De
centuryvoluntaristsis the writingsof William of Auvergne.67
anima
, forinstance,he maintainsthat
thehumansoul bearsthelikenessof a well-ordered
and wellestablished
city,because the will is presentin it as kingand ruler{rexet imperator
),
the intellectiveor reasoningpower is its counselor,while the lower
powers,namely,the irascible,concupiscible,and movingpowers,that
is to say, those whichcarryout movement,are like ministers,
whose
officeit is to carryout the ordersof the willthatreignsoverand commandsthem.68
There are severaltracesof thisimageryin Vives' account. He describes
the will as ruler{domina)
and commander{imperatrix).
The mind,i.e., reason and judgement,is, on the other hand, characterisedas counsellor
and guide {consultrix
). He also compares the role of the will in
ductrixque
the processof deliberationto thatof a sovereign{ princeps
) who can command thatthe matterbe put under advisementor postponed.Moreover,
in order to show the supremacyof the will,Vives comparesit to a sovereignwho, in ordernot to seem governedby someoneelse,oftenexcludes
and rejectsall the good advice of his counsellors.In De primaphilosophia
(1531), he also mentionsthe motivepowers, sayingthat the will is the
ruler,reason is the counsellorand the motivepowers are the body of
servantswho carryout the commandsof the will.69
66On theanalogy
between
civilpolity
andthesoulamongst
latemedieval
voluntarists,
seeErnst
DieSeele
als "minor
mundus"
undab "regnum".
EinBeitrag
der
zurPsychologie
Stadter,
mittleren
undPartikularismus
imMittelalter
Franziskanerschule
, in:PaulWilpert
,
(ed.),Uniuersalismus
Berlin1968,56-72.
67Roland
thePowers
over
J.Teske,TheWillas King
oftheSoul:UsesandSources
ofanImage
intheThirteenth
32 (1994),62-71.
, in:Vivarium,
Century
68William
ofAuvergne,
De anima
Teske1994,64f.
, c. II, pt. 15.Quotedfrom
69M, III, 227:"Habetergohomo,ad Dei quandam
voluntatem,
consilium,
imaginem,
siverationem,
etvires,
utconsilum
autdissuadeat
voluntati
suadeat,
quaeestimperatura,

11:16:05 AM

VIVES'CONCEPTION
OF FREEDOM
OF THE WILL

417

Reaching a betterunderstandingof Vives' philosophicalstudyof the

soul and providinga more accurate basis for the assessmentof its originalityand influenceon early modern conceptionsof the human mind
require a carefulanalysisof extensivetextualmaterialand an examination of theoriesand conceptsthatwere influential
in the formationof his
account. To achieve a definitive
of
the
intellectual
picture
backgroundof
Vives' conceptionof freedomof the will is, of course,beyond the scope
of the presentstudy.I hope, however,thatthe reader has come to share
my view on the significanceof Vives' scholasticbackgroundand that
what has been presentedhere will turnout to be a valuable clue to some
of the importantmissingpieces.70
Uppsala University
Department
ofPhilosophy

voluntas
viribus
utse exerant
ad opus,virescapessant
imperet
jussa;voluntas
ergodominaest,ratioconsultrix,
viresmancipium".
70Workon thispaperwasbegunwiththesupport
ofa Frances
A. YatesResearch
at theWarburg
in London.An earlier
Institute
draft
waspresented
at the
Fellowship
annualmeeting
oftheRenaissance
ofAmerica
heldin Cambridge,
in
Society
England
DavidA. LinesandLodiNauta,whoorganized
thepanelon
April2005.I wishtothank
Renaissance
ethics
as wellas theparticipants
andmoralpsychology,
in thediscussion
for
their
I amparticularly
andsuggestions.
to LilliAlanen,
Martin
helpful
questions
grateful
Henrik
andRistoSaarinen
fortheir
valuable
comments
andcriticism.
Gustafsson,
Lagerlund

11:16:05 AM

Reviews
IsabelIribarren,
Durandus
A Dominican
in theShadow
ofSt Pourain.
Theologian
ofAquinas.
Oxford
Oxford
2005(Oxford
xiv+ 311pp.
Press,
University
Theological
Monographs)
ISBN0-19-928231-5
DurandofSt.Pourain
haslongbeenrecognized
as oneoftheleading
intellectual
figures
at theUniversity
ofParisin theopening
decadesofthefourteenth
often
century,
placed
PeterAureolas representative
ofa turntoward
a morecritical
alongside
philosophical
in theyearsimmediately
after
Durandwasthesubject
ofa
approach
JohnDunsScotus.
Kochin 1927andwellas numerous
in
booksandarticles
majorworkbyJosef
byothers
thelastcentury.
Iribarren's
work
concerns
thedocAlthough
onlyoneareaofDurand's
thought,
namely
oftheTrinity
trine
andthedebatewiththeThomist
HervNedelec(Hervaeus
Natalis),
sheplacesbothHervandDurandin a newandmorenuanced
context.
The opening
section
examines
conciliar
andscholastic
on theTrinity
from
theFourth
Lateran
teaching
Council
withparticular
attention
toAquinas
andtheories
on relation,
the
Scotus,
through
divineprocessions,
and thePersons,
whichform
thethreeareasofTrinitarian
doctrine
discussed
at eachpointin thebook.The secondpartexamines
in thecontrothestages
between
ofDurandand headoftheDominican
Herv,as theleadingopponent
versy
commission
toexamine
hiswritings,
andDurand.
Thisdoctrinad
withHerv's
partbegins
ontheTrinity
inhisSentences
Durand's
comteaching
(1302-03),
commentary
pre-Parisian
on theSentences
thecriticisms
andresponses
ofeachtheologian
intheir
mentary
(1307-08),
of Durand(1314),hisresponse
thecensure
in his
quodlibetal
disputations
(1308-13),
Herv's
inhisReprobationes
corrective
Excusationes,
, thesecondcensure
(1317),andthefinad
redaction
ofDurand's
on theSentences.
commentary
Iribarren
notessignificant
differences
between
viewsandwhatcametobe the
Aquinas'
Thomistic
accepted"common"
opinionin theearlyfourteenth
century
amongHerv
de la Palud,
andother
Dominicans.
Nedelec,
JohnofNaples,Pierre
JamesofLausanne,
Shealsobrings
tolight
theshaping
effect
Franciscan
hadonthediscussion
ofthe
thought
evenamongDominicans,
in theperiodafter
Scotus.The traditional
Trinity,
interpretationthatsawHervas a defender
ofThomasagainst
a non-Thomist
Durandis replaced
witha picture
ofconflicts
within
twodifferent
Franciscan
currents
ofthought.
byIribarren
Sheuncovers
Scotistic
inHerv's
elements
andseesinDuranda return
toelements
views,
intheteaching
inplaceofa picture
ofBonaventure
on theTrinity.
ofDurand
Moreover,
inthedirection
histeaching
ofThomasin response
topressure
from
hisorder,
modifying
Iribarren
shows
thatDurandadopted
ofhisopponents
thetechnical
without
abanwording
mostoftheprincipal
elements
ofhisposition.
alsocallsattention
to the
Iribarren
doning
historical
ofthedoctrinad
ofDurandin 1317,
significance
agendaofthesecondcensure
which
aimedatestablishing
theauthority
ofThomas
as thecommon
oftheorder
teaching
andtheschools.
ofhisepiscopal
from
thesafety
to reshape
throne,
Durandus,
preferred
inkeeping
thefinal
redaction
ofhisSentences
withwhathefeltwastheteachcommentary
enriched
andclarified
debate.
ingoftheFathers
byopenscholastic
anditsphilosophical
Iribarren
theintricacies
ofthedoctrinad
foundations,
Beyond
dispute
and historians
intended
herbookto be ofinterest
bothto theologians
byplacingthe
BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl/viv
Alsoavaiilable
online

Vivarium
44,2-3

11:19:34 AM

419

REVIEWS

The twoprotagonists,
andcontext.
in botha historical
discussions
sequence
theological
ofSt.Jacquesin 1303,albeit
at theconvent
wereresident
HervandDurand,
together
at
on theSentences
whileScotuswaslecturing
in their
academic
at different
careers,
points
hadcensured
Dominican
convent.
theFranciscan
him,
theologians
Bythetimehisfellow
V andJohnXXII. Iribarren
ofpopesClement
withthesupport
DurandwasinAvignon
toassert
their
Parisian
between
as a conflict
characterizes
thissituation
masters,
attempting
in such
itssuperior
in doctrinal
andthepapacyreasserting
matters,
authority
authority
the
to successive
whichled to Durand'sappointment
matters.
bishoprics,
Papalsupport,
thefullreachof
lastofwhichwasMeauxto theeastofParis,placedDurandbeyond
shouldnotbe overstressed,
contrast
thisParis-Avignon
Dominican
Although
jurisdiction.
of
the
seconddecadeofthefourcontroversial
that
the
other
itisworth
theologian
noting
thatledtohisappointfrom
alsobenefited
PeterAureol,
teenth
papalpatronage
century,
hisdeath.HervNedelec,
ofAixshortly
before
ment
as archbishop
participated
bycontrast,
le Bel:thecallfora
initiated
or condoned
in manyofthejudicialactions
byPhilippe
in 1307,andthe
oftheTemplars
Boniface
VIII in 1303,theconfessions
council
against
theTemplars.
in 1308to theking's
ofParisian
concerning
questions
theologians
response
andsubject
author
anda thorough
withan extensive
Thebookconcludes
bibliography
Thomisiic
School
thatFrederick
index.It is surprising,
however,
(Dubuque
Early
J.Roensch's
it
in fairness
to Iribarren,
or notes,
in thebibliography
although
1964)wasnotincluded
or conclusions.
heranalysis
wouldnothavealtered
HowdidHervat Parisin 1308cometo knowor would
remain.
Certain
questions
in 1307-08
studium
at a provincial
delivered
witha commentary
evenbother
bya student
hiscontemDurandinformed
oftheology?
evena bachelor
whowasnotyettechnically
butby
hispermission,
without
wascirculated
exercise
thatthetextofthisfirst
poraries
maintains
whomand amongwhom?
Koch,thisfirst
Moreover,
if,as Iribarren
against
and
master
andattacked
workwascomposed
byHervin 1308and 1309whileregent
how
was
it
Sentences
at
Durand
read
the
France
before
of
master
Paris,
possiprovincial
to readat Parisin
General
bleforDurandto be appointed
Chapter
bytheDominican
inadvance
andrequired
tookplacetwoyears
thatnormally
1309or 1310,an appointment
as
ofhislectures
wastheresult
lectura
Koch'sviewthatDurand's
annualapproval?
prima
andthusis still
oftheseevents
thepolitics
oftheology
at Parisbetter
bachelor
explains
worth
considering.
of
contributions
toourknowledge
recent
bookis oneofthemostimportant
Iribarren's
andto
in thatperiod,
ofThomism
to thedevelopment
thought,
earlyfourteenth-century
ofDurandandhis
ourknowledge
advances
It clearly
inTrinitarian
thedebates
theology.
in
much
her
debt.
we
are
for
which
contemporaries,
Wisconsin
Madison,

William
J. Courtenay

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vol.2).Clarendon
ofWestern
Medieval
Philosophy,
(ANewHistory
Philosophy
Anthony
Kenny,
Oxford
2005,xvii+ 334pp. ISBN0 19 875275X
Press,
whoknowmoreandmoreaboutlessandless.The study
We livein a worldofexperts
ofan
efforts
to thesustained
no
to thisrule.Thanks
is
ofmedieval
exception
philosophy
anddebates
ofscholastic
sources
a largenumber
ofmedievalists,
international
community
scholars
tendto havean increasin recent
havebeenrediscovered
years.Butindividual
othoftopics:
someworkontwelfth-century
ofa decreasing
number
ethics,
ingknowledge
author
ora
andstillothers
focuson a single
erson earlyfourteenth-century
metaphysics,
in articles
andbooksthat
school.
intellectual
research,
mostly
presented
single
Specialized
to recognize
makesit difficult
foroutsiders
forotherexperts,
arewritten
anycoherence
to geta vague
in thescattered
field.Non-professional
readers
mayevenhaveproblems
inthehistorical
conis aboutandhowithasdeveloped
ideaofwhatmedievali
philosophy
anda solidintrowhoseekorientation
ofnon-specialists,
thisaudience
text.It is precisely
in
thatAnthony
duction
to morethana thousand
Kennyaddresses
yearsofphilosophy,
to
fromAugustine
book.He chartsthestoryof medieval
thisambitious
philosophy
familiar
students
thechancetobecome
thusgiving
andfocuses
onmajortexts,
Pomponazzi
in thesea ofscholarly
literature.
without
withthemostimportant
drowning
topics
overview
Thefirst
Thebookis divided
intotwoparts.
1-2)givesa short
part(chapters
from
thefourth
to theearlysixteenth
andsketches
thedevelopment
ofthemainauthors
a
"mustinclude
ofWestern
outthata history
philosophy
century.
Kennyrightly
points
inanymodern
sense"(p. xiv),andthereofphilosophers
whoarenot'Western'
treatment
in hispanorama.
Thisis a wisedeciAverroes
andMaimonides
foreincludes
Avicenna,
in theLatinWest
from
thestartthatmanytheories
sion;becauseit makesclearright
from
Muslim
and
without
theintellectual
couldnothavebeendeveloped
inputstemming
as a Christian
to seemedieval
authors.
It wouldbe erroneous
merely
philosophy
Jewish
forMuslim
andJewish
to problems
philosophers
posedbypaganphilosophers.
response
todealwiththem.
anddeveloped
a number
ofproblems,
mulated
strategies
sophisticated
usedthese
Christian
thewaysinwhich
Thatiswhyitis important
toexplore
philosophers
thatthey
borandcombining
them
withother
strategies
transforming
strategies,
eventually
Whatmakesmedievali
orinvented
themselves.
ancient
authorities
rowedfrom
philosophy
andtheinnovation
thatdevelofdifferent
traditions
is theamalgamation
so fascinating
focuses
Muslim
andJewish
cultures.
between
Christian,
Kenny
opedduetotheencounter
He nicelyshowsthatthirteenthit withmanyexamples.
on thisaspectand illustrates
andAverroes'
relied
andimagination
aboutintellect
debates
heavily
uponAvicenna's
century
andattributes
aboutGod'sexistence
debates
andhe explains
thatmedieval
psychology,
to emphasize
sources.
It is important
from
IslamicandJewish
borrowed
manyelements
nowthatit seemsto be in
thismulti-cultural
especially
philosophy,
aspectofmedieval
to speakabouta "clashofcivilizations."
vogue(evenamongintellectuals)
to
an introduction
muchlonger
The second,
3-9)provides
partofthebook(chapters
oflogicand language,
crucialtopicsand sub-disciplines:
knowledge,
physics,
questions
listtakesthe
ofGod.Thisbalanced
andthestudy
mindandsoul,ethics,
metaphysics,
medieval
ofreducing
thedanger
intoaccount.
Itavoids
areasandproblems
philosophy
major
committed
is thecase in handbooks
of religion
and philosophy
to metaphysics
(which
tobe found
oflanguage
ortologicandphilosophy
toContinental
(a tendency
philosophy)
showsthatmedieval
in theolderschoolof analytic
Kennysuccessfully
philosophy).
about
offreewilltoquestions
from
theproblem
hadwideinterests,
ranging
philosophers
to highlight
divineomnipotence.
three-valued
Anyattempt
logicandpuzzlesconcerning
is boundtofail.If
medieval
theone"essential"
ortoemphasize
a single
interest
problem
anda vastnumofproblems
markat all,itis thefactthata plurality
is an essential
there
listof
theMiddleAges.Kenny's
werediscussed
berofsolutions
longanddetailed
during
Vivarium
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2006
Koninklijke
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42 1

REVIEWS

illustrates
thisin an admirable
discussion
oftheseproblems,
way.His diligent
problems
andbasedon first-hand
oftherelevant
enablesevery
texts,
knowledge
alwaysaccurate
- a flavour
theflavour
ofscholastic
debates
forclarity,
andthe
reader
todiscover
subtlety
ofphilosophical
serious
ambition
to getto thebottom
problems.
on political
Dante'sMonarchia
thevolumelacksa chapter
Unfortunately,
philosophy.
andMarsilius
ofPadua'sDefensor
referred
tobutnotdiscussed,
Ockham's
pacisarebriefly
areleftout.A
andGilesofRome'sextensive
works
areonlymentioned,
writings
political
inpolitical
ofjustice,
ofthemajordebates
philosophy
(e.g.aboutthenature
presentation
ofmonarchy)
wouldhaveshownthatthis
ofjustwar,or thelegitimacy
thepossibility
buta crucial
ofmedieval
ofphilosophy
is notjusta modern
branch
invention,
ingredient
"Goldenage" of Spanish
theso-called
Furthermore,
Kennytotally
ignores
philosophy.
ofjustice,
nor
whowrote
an important
Neither
Francisco
de Vitoria,
scholasticism.
theory
northeConimbricenses,
whomadesignificant
aninfluential
Francisco
Surez,
metaphysician,
Ofcourse,
ofnature,
arediscussed.
itisimposcontributions
topsychology
andphilosophy
in onebook,anddrawing
a sharpline
latemedieval
author
sibleto include
every
single
No periodhas
is hardly
latescholastic
andearlymodern
between
philosophers
possible.
is sucha thing
as a definite
It is evendubious
thatthere
clearboundaries.
periodin the
who
as a historical
ofphilosophy:
eachperiodis constructed
entity
byauthors
history
earlier
andschools.
Yetoneshouldnot
to distance
themselves
from
intend
philosophers
andtheories
werepromiofargumentation
thefactthatscholastic
methods,
styles
ignore
Latescholastic
authors
didnotsimply
andseventeenth
centuries.
nentfarintothesixteenth
andtransformed
Scotusor Ockham,
butcriticized
theories
byAquinas,
repeat
developed
bookdoesnotaddress
themin significant
anyof thesetransformations.
ways.Kenny's
in a subsequent
volumethatdoesnotstart
theywillbe takenintoaccount
Hopefully,
and earlyseventeenth-century
to sixteenth
butpaysparticular
attention
withDescartes
scholastic
authors.
to
theright
who,in hisview,"retains
Aquinas
Kennyis at hisbestwhenhe presents
ofthehighMiddleAges."(p. xvi)Thismaysound
be classedas thegreatest
philosopher
narracredo.YetKennyis farfrom
likean old-fashioned
Thomistic
beingan uncritical
he points
outboththeir
Whenhe reconstructs
histheories,
torofAquinas'philosophy.
In the
to form
their
ownopinion.
andweaknesses,
thusstimulating
thereaders
strengths
an
showsthatAquinasis neither
forinstance,
he convincingly
on knowledge,
chapter
forintellectual
is byitself
sufficient
whothinks
thatsensory
cogniexperience
empiricist
ofinnate
whoassumes
thatthere
isa stock
nora rationalist
Rather,
tion,
Aquinas
concepts.
needsto abstract
holdstheviewthattheintellect
(so-called
concepts
intelligible
species)
In lightofthiscombination
of
information
on thebasisofsensory
(so-called
phantasms).
toa famous
Kantian
dictum:
andrationalism,
states,
alluding
"Thought
Kenny
empiricism
to themind."
are empty;
without
without
phantasms
speciesare darkness
phantasms
ofAquinas'
But
clearandconcise
characterization
keythesis.
(p. 165)Thisis a perfectly
himself
to reconstructing
thisthesis.
He critically
outthat
points
Kennydoesnotconfine
howtheacquisition
ofconcepts
andcognition
work.
enables
to explain
itsimply
Aquinas
In orderto explain
it doesnothelphimto givean accountofknowledge.
However,
in thestrict
forAquinasto
Aristotelian
sense,it wouldhavebeennecessary
knowledge
- principles
totheformation
offirst
that
yields
process
principles
spellouthowa cognitive
butnevertheless
true.Kenny
concludes:
aresomehow
basedonsensory
infallibly
experience
is thatitleavesquiteunclear
whatis therole
"Theserious
withAquinas'
theory
problem
in science."
for
ofexperience
andexperiment
(p. 169)Thisis indeeda serious
problem
hasnoclearsolution.1
onthisweakspot,thusencourwhich
Aquinas
Kenny
putshisfinger
to lookfora satisfying
solution.
aginghisreaders
1 Forrecent
toprovide
a solution,
seeS. MacDonald,
ofKnowledge,"
attempts
"Theory
in:TheCambridge
toAquinas
& E. Stump,
, ed.byN. Kretzmann
1993,
Companion
Cambridge

11:19:43 AM

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REVIEWS

doesnotonlyreconstruct
healsoshows
howitdiffers
Kenny
theory
concisely,
Aquinas'
from
earlier
andlaterones.Thus,hepoints
outthat"forAquinas
wasa conthespecies
in question,
oftheintellect
forScotusit is theimmediate
cept,thatis to sayan ability
thespecies
intoan inner
Scotuspavedthe
objectofknowledge."
(p. 172)Turning
object,
Forwhatis immediately
to theintellect
is not
wayfora representational
theory.
present
theexternal
buttheinternal
thatis onlycausally
linked
totheexternad
thing,
species
thing.
willseethatthisis a decisive
in thehistory
reader
moment
ofphilosophy
Anyattentive
ofmind:a realist
thatstresses
theimmediate
relation
between
intellect
theory
cognitive
andmaterial
worldwastransformed
intoa theory
thatpostulates
innerrepresentations.
thisissueandthusenableshisreaders
to becomeawareofa change
Kennyemphasizes
thatproved
to be important
notjustformedieval
butformodern
philosophy,
epistemologyas well.
forAquinas
hasa drawback:
itleadshimtounderUnfortunately,
Kenny's
highesteem
estimate
otherphilosophers.
One ofthemis Ockhamwho,according
to Kenny,
holds
A closer
someimplausible
orevenabsurd
examination
ofthetexts
howreveals,
positions.
canonlybe dueto a misunderstanding.
In thechapter
on lanever,thatthisaccusation
states
thatOckham
toa mental
guage,forinstance,
Kenny(nodoubtcorrectly)
appealed
ofmental
wordswithgrammatical
features.
Buthe is notimpressed
language
consisting
to language.
In hisview,it is hardly
to assume
bythismentalistic
approach
convincing
thattherearemental
wordssuchas theconnective
'and'or thequantifier
'all':". . . we
readiness
totransfer
ofmedieval
idiomatic
features
Latin
maysmileat his[sc.Ockham's]
intotheuniversal
iniofthemind."
language
(p. 145)Thisis an echooftheoldcritique,
formulated
thatOckham's
mental
is nothing
buta faint
tially
byJ. Trentman,
language
andwritten
Latin.Yeta closer
lookat Ockham's
texts
reveals
thatthisis
copyofspoken
notthecase.2First,
he emphasizes
thatthemental
doesnotcomprise
allwords
language
and grammatical
butonlythosethatare necessary
features,
"propter
significationem".
he points
outthatquantifiers
like'all' arerequired
becausetheyexpress
crucial
Second,
Forinstance,
we needa quantifier
on themental
levelbecause'All
logicaldifferences.
menarerunning'
'A manis running'.
differs
from
Mentallanguage
is notsimply
clearly
a copyofthespoken
that(a) enablesus to endowspoken
sounds
one,buta language
witha meaning
andthat(b) includes
thebasicelements
fora logicalstructure.
necessary
Another
concerns
Ockham's
ofthesoul.Unlike
Ockham
holds
theory
critique
Aquinas,
thattheintellectual
soulis abletograspindividual
underan individual
But
things
aspect.
whatthen,Kennyasks,is thedifference
theintellectual
and thesensory
between
soul?
inparticular
Thesensory
sensation
andimagination,
alsograspindividuad
faculties,
things
underan individual
ofOckham's
razorto
aspect."Ifthatis so,thenitseemsa violation
twodifferent
faculties
withexactly
thesamefunction."
postulate
(p. 247)Thisconclusion
ifonetakesintoaccount
is notcompelling
thattheintellectual
soulis a linguistic
faculty:
mental
andsentences.
itforms
terms
The sensory
takes
soul,on theotherhand,merely
insensory
andcomesupwithsensory
a tree,I simThus,whenI imagine
inputs
images.
andgreenpatches.
WhenI think
abouta tree,I
plyvisualize
something
bigwithbrown
form
term'tree'andI amabletomakepredications
like'Thetreeis brown'
thementad
or'Thetreehasleaves'.It is therefore
toposittwopsychological
notsuperfluous
faculties:
in different
ways.
theydealwithindividual
things

a foundationalist
andE. Stump,
whopresents
, London& New
solution,
160-95,
Aquinas
whooptsfora reliabilist
one.
York2003,217-43,
2 See Quodlibeta
N.Y.
IX, StBonaventure,
V, q. 8-9,ed.byJ.C.Wey,Operatheologica
Ockham
onConcepts
Fora detailed
seeC. Panaccio,
2004.
, Aldershot
1980,508-518.
analysis,

11:19:43 AM

REVIEWS

423

ofKenny's
theoverall
arenotintended
to question
Theseexamples
exposition
quality
toengage
thereader
On thecontrary,
showthatheinvites
andphilosophical
they
analysis.
andto tryoutdifferent
in a critical
to lookat theoriginal
texts,
discussion,
interpretaa philosophical
introduction
to theMiddleAgesis notjusta
from
tions.
Whatoneexpects
evaluation
ofolddebates,
buta critical
andtexts,
nora mereparaphrase
listofauthors
- an evaluation
and
andarguments
theses
thattakesmedieval
ofthesedebates
seriously
It is exactly
thisphilosophical
intojudging
their
thereader
engagement
validity.
provokes
tomedieval
hiscomprehensive
andlucidintroduction
stimulates
with
thatKenny
philosophy.
Berlin

Perler
Dominik

11:19:43 AM

BooksReceived
Actesdu XIe
etlittrature
au XIIesicle.
universel.
AlaindeHile,le docteur
thologie
Philosophie,
de la SocitInternationale
pourl'tudede la Philosophie
Colloqueinternational
A.Vasiliu
etA. Galonnier.
23-25octobre
2003,dits
Paris,
Mdivale,
parJ.-L.Solre,
de Philosophie
Turnhout
2005[Rencontres
Mdivale,
12]XIV & 495pp.
Brepols,
etlenoplatonLescrits
A. Niederberger,
ISBN2 503 520154 - contents:
dionysiens
etla pluralit
Alaindelille,la mtaphysique
deLille;C. Erismann,
isme
d'Alain
rignienne
Alain
deLille
deChartres
Alain
deLilleetl'cole
des
, Hritier
; D. Poirel,
; M. Lemoine,
formes
Polemic
TheAnti-Jewish
deSaintdel'cole
; F. Hudry,
Victor?-,
ofLille
ofAlain
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nadeNatura
dansleDe planetu
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AlaindeLille*
Maisquitait
donc
J.Jolivet,
lments
surlesquatre
chrtienne
deLille:unemythologie
turaed'Alain
; I. Caiazzo,Discussions
dela nature
etconnaissance
V. Rodrigues,
Nature
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chez
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dansleSermode sphaera
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etrhtorique
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sensitive
chez
; L. Catalani,
Kilani,
diLille,
leGlosesuperTrismegistum
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eAlano
diLille
diPoitiers
traGilberto
; I. Parri,
e sanzalodo:Moral
dell'anima
e l'immortalit
fiom
; M. Colish,Sanza'nfamia
Neutrality
di
Alano
diLillae Amalrico
AlanofLilletoDante
Dialettica,
; P. Lucentini,
teologia,
filosofia:
Una
e laprassi.
Trala teoresi
Alano
diLillae la teologia
Bne
; C. Chiurco,
; G. D'Onofrio,
AlaindeLilleetPrvostin
inAlano
diLilla
dellateologia
; L. Valente,
interpretazione
possibile
conexio.
dulangage
surl'quivodt
deCrmone
Unitas,
; C. Trottmann,
aequalitas,
thobgique
. . . ratiotrinitaires
desanalogies
AlaindeLilledansla tradition
; M. Dreyer,
arithmtiques
Alain
in publicum
deducere.
infirmare
et. . . rationes
nabiliter
quibusfides[innitur]
sainte
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L'criture
delafoi; J.Longre,
avec
lesadversaires
deLilleetleconflit
dela Bible.
deLille
uariid'Alain
; G. Dahan,AlaindeLilleetl'exgse
e del Tractatus
dellaLoyca
di Francesco
da Prato
La logica
Fabrizio
, conl'edizione
Amerini,
SISMEL - Edizionidel Galluzzo,Firenze2005 [UnioneAccadedevoceunivoca.
MediiAevi,Testie studi,19]V & 646pp.
micaNazionale.
CorpusPhilosophorum
ISBN88 84501377
d'ancien
dePrmont
dansla France
del'ordre
AnneBondelle-Souchier,
, II.
rgime
Bibliothques
tudeset rpertoires,
Paris2006[Documents,
CNRS ditions,
desinventaires.
dition
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et d'Histoire
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parl'Institut
publis
ThomeBraduardini,
circaTractatum
Biaisede Parme,
magisti
proportionum
Questiones
Vescovini.
de G. Federici
ditparJolBiardetSabineRommevaux,
Vrin,
prface
du Moyen
Paris2005[Textes
Age,22] 240pp.ISBN2 711617904
philosophiques
Press
Tusculanum
76 (2005)282pp.Museum
etlatin,
duMoyen-ge
del'Institut
Cahiers
grec
De memoonAristotle's
Metochites
D. Bloch,Theodoros
ISBN87 63504766 - contents:
IssuesV; H.
andPhilosophical
Trinitarian
Theology
ria;C. Schabel& R.L. Friedman,
'
Master
onBoethius
AnEarly
Brito,
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Topics;WJ.Courtenay,
Commentary
1-3
Elenchorum
libri
Bur
Walter
M.
von
and
Arts
ley's
Quaestiones
Perger,
Theology;
of
Elenchos
4-12.
Gualterus
& 13-18;S. Ebbesen,
Burleus,
superSophisticos
Quaestiones
A revised
edition.
Collected
2006 [Variorum
inScholasticism.
MarciaL. Colish,Studies
Variorum,
Ashgate
Studies
Series]

Vivarium
44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,
2006
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

11:19:52 AM

BOOKSRECEIVED

425

Conrads
de Mure,Fabularius
Turnhout
2006
, curaet studioT. vande Loo. Brepols,
Continuatio
Mediaeualis,
210] XCVI & 648 pp. ISBN 2
[CorpusChristianorum,
503051014
DunsScot Paris1302-2002.
Actesdu colloquede Paris,2-4septembre
2002.Editspar
O. Boulnois,
Turnhout
E. Karger,
2004[FIDEM,
J.-L.Solre,G. Sontag.
Brepols,
Texteset tudes
du Moyenge,26] XXIV & 683pp. ISBN 2 503 5181109
CcileFabris,
tudier
etvivre
ParisauMoyen
deLaon(XIVe
-XVe
cole
sicles).
ge.Le collge
deschartes,
Paris2005 [Mmoires
et documents
de l'Ecoledeschartes,
81] V &
504pp. ISBN 2 90079176 6
Florian
Das Siegel
derEwigkeit.
undKonziliarismus
beiHeymericus
Hamann,
Universalwissenschaft
16]
Aschendorff
Mnster
derCusanus-Gesellschaft,
deCampo.
2006[Buchreihe
Verlag,
369pp. ISBN 3 402 031701
Passions
in William
Ockham
's Philosophical
KluwerAcademic
Vesa Hirvonen,
Psychology.
in theHistory
ofPhilosophy
of
Dordrecht-Boston-London
2004[Studies
Publishers,
Mind,2]
beiNicolaus
Cusanus.
Intellectus
und
und
sinnlicher
Erkenntnis
Imaginatio.
Aspekte
geistiger
Herausgegeben
vonJ.M.Andr,
G. Krieger,
H. Schwaetzer.
B.R. Grner,
Amsterdam-Philadelphia
G. Krieger,
Studien
zurPhilosophie,
2006[Bochumer
44]VIII & 157pp. contents:
vonOckham
Buridan
und
absolutus.
Parallele
Wilhelm
zwischen
,Johannes
%ueiner
Conceptus
inderCusanischen
Formel:
Cusanus
Intellekt
Nicolaus
Sistutuus
; J.Machetta,
Kontemplativer
" unddie
des
etegoerotuus";
DieMetapher
derMauer
desParadies
J.M.Andr,
Kartographie
'
undImagination
inCusanus
Erkennens
beiNikolaus
vonKues
; D. Thiel,Intellekt
Trialogus
de possest;
H. Schwaetzer,
Die methodische
derCusanischen
Begrndung
Symbolphilosophie.
von
alsKreativitt
Verhltnis
und
visio;M. Thurner,
Imagination
Zumsystematischen
imaginatio
und
Cusanus.
WalterHaugzum75. Geburtstag;
K. Yamaki,Funktion
nachNicolaus
- einkonkretes
derimaginatio
beiCusanus
war
ImAnfang
; K. Reinhardt,
Tragweite
Beispiel
vonKues
derMagnetismus
". EinBeispiel
imSermoCCXII desNikolaus
; M.S.
frImagination
Marinho
DieMetapher
desSehens
beiNikolaus
vonKues
; F.-B.Stammktter,
Nogueira,
vonKuesber
Musik
Nikolaus
A Dominican
IsabelIribarren,
Durandus
in theShadow
ofAquinas.
ofSt Pourain.
Theologian
Oxford
Oxford
xiv+311 pp.
2005(Oxford
Press,
University
Theological
Monographs)
ISBN0 19 9282315
andCultural
andUseofLanguage
intheLater
Middle
oftheStudy
Ages
Language
Change.
Aspects
MA 2006[Groningen
andtheRenaissance
, ed.L. Nauta.Peeters,
Leuven-Paris-Dudley,
in Cultural
Studies
24] XV & 224pp. ISBN90 429 17571 - contents:
Change,
inFifteenth-Century
ViaModerna;
S. Mller,
and
C.H.Kneepkens,
LariguageReality
Theology,
A Conflict
Scholasticism
versus
Humanism:
LateFifteenth-Century
on
ofInterests?
Reflections
Grammar
inNorthwestern
Nicholas
; I. Bocken,TheArtofSpeaking.
Europe
ofCusaas a
ortheHolyTongue?
Imitation
andAuthenticity
; I.E. Zwiep,Hebrew
Philosopher
ofLanguage
inMedieval
Hebrew
Between
andLikemindedness:
Some
; A.A.Robiglio,
Writing.
Language
Civilis
toGuazzo
The
; J. Hankins,
Aspects
oftheConcept
ofConversado
from
Aquinas
intheFifteenth
Bruni
inLatin
TheWritings
Popularization
ofHumanism
ofLeonardo
Century:
andtheVernacular,
E. Chayes,
andImages
intheRimedegliAcademici
Language
ofWords
Occulti
1568:Reflections
PreL. Nauta,
andthe
Humanist
ofthe
Conceptual?;
linguistic
Relativity
Imitation
Latin
CanChange
Minds
; A. Moss,Language
ofClassical
Charles
H. Lohr,Latin
Aristotle
Commentaries
Literature.
SISMEL/
, V. Bibliography
ofSecondary
Edizionidel Galluzzo,Firenze2005 [UnioneAccademica
Nazionale.Corpus
MediiAevi.Subsidia
XV] XIV & 567pp. ISBN88 8450 1458
Philosophorum
Melanchthon
undderCalvinismus.
vonG. FrankundH.J.Selderhuis,
unter
Herausgegeben
Mitarbeit
vonS. Lalla.Frommann-Holzboog,
Cannstatt
2005[MelanchthoStuttgart-Bad
Schriften
derStadtBretten,
G. Frank
9] 375pp.ISBN3 772822363 - contents:

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426

BOOKSRECEIVED

P. Metzger,
Geleitwort
; R. Faber,TheHumanism
Vorwort,
HJ.Selderhuis,
ofMeianchthon
andofCalvin;
L.D. Bierma,
TheStructure
Catechism:
Melanchthonian
or
oftheHeidelberg
IllePhoenix:
Meianchthon
undderHeidelberger
Cahinism
1583Cabinisti
H.J.Selderhuis,
1622; K. Maag,Higher
education
andCalvinism:
a comparative
;
forMeianchthon
approach
Methodik
unprotestantische
VonMeianchthon
zu Zabarella
;
J. Rhls,Aristotelische
Theologu.
M. Becht,Pia Synodus.
Die Lehre
vomKonzil
in derTheologie
Melanchthons
und
Philipp
Calvins
in derEthik
desfrhen
Calvinismus
; C. Strohm,
;
Johannes
Melanchthon-Rezeption
G. Frank,
GottesundTrinittslehre
beiMeianchthon
undCalvin;
T. Mahlmann,
Meianchthon
%ur
als Vorlufer
desWittenberger
M. Engammare,
Thehoroscopes
,
Kryptocalvinismus;
ofCabin
Meianchthon
andLuther.
Anunexpected
W. Janse,Die
post-tridentine
polemical
argument;
desNonkonformisten
Wilhelm
W.van't Spijker,
Kiebitz
(ca.1533-1568);
Melanchthonrezeption
DieDwersitt
derreformierten
Scholastik.
Dietheologische
Methode
Melanchthons
undCabins
im
undbeider
Scholastik;
Vergleich
Auswirkungen
aufdiereformierte
A.J.Beck,ZurRezeption
Melanchthons
beiGisbertus
Voetius
namentlich
inseiner
Gotteslehre
(1589-1676),
Moral
ontheThreshold
EditedbyJ.KrayeandR. Saarinen.
ofModernity.
Philosophy
Springer,
Dordrecht
Historical
TextsandStudies
intheHistory
2005[NewSynthese
Library.
ofPhilosophy,
and
Scholastics
57] VI & 340pp.ISBN 1 402030002 contents:
Neo-Scholastics:
D. Lines,
Sources
andAuthorities
inthe
Italian
Renaissance:
forMoral
Philosophy
Thomas
andJeanBuridan
onAristotle's
T. Pink,Action
, WillandLawin
Ethics;
Aquinas
LateScholasticism;
Michael
M.W.F.Stone,
Baius(1513-89)
andthe
Debate
onePure
Nature3:
andMoral
Grace
inSixteenth-Century
R. Schlssler,
OntheAnatomy
Scholasticism;
Agency
of
S.K. Knebel,Casuistry
andtheEarly
Modem
intheNotion
Probabilism;
Paradigm
Shift
of
- Theories
ofHumanRights
andDominion:
R. Lambertini,
andPower:
Charity;
Poverty
Franciscans
inLater
Medieval
Political
V. Mkinen,
TheFranciscan
Thought,
Background
of
Modem
Discussion:
andSubsistence;
Rights
Rights
ofProperty
J. Varkema,
Early
Justification
Conrad
Summenhart
onNatural
R. Saarinen,
Ethics
inLuther's
:
through
Being:
Rights;
Theology
- Reformers
TheThree
andHumanists:
G. Frank,
TheReason
Meianchthon'
s
Orders',
ofActing:
andtheQuestion
andConsistency
oftheUnity
Concept
ofPractical
ofHisPhilosophy;
Philosophy
D. Bellucci,
andEthics
inMeianchthon;
C. Strohm,
Ethics
inEarly
Natural
Philosophy
L. Casini,
andAnti-Stoicism
inJuanVwes's
Aristotelianism
Emotions'.
;
Cabinism;
ofthe
Conception
as MoralPhilosopher:
Marc-Antoine
Mures
1585Edition
J. Kraye,TheHumanist
ofSeneca
alsAkt
beiThomas
von
Leiden-Boston
2006[Studien
Brill,
Hanns-Gregor
Sprache
Aquin.
Nissing,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
87] XIV & 827 pp. ISBN 90 04
146458
AJournal
ofEarlyandMedieval
44 (2005),
Sacris
Erudiri.
on theInheritance
Christianity,
orprotreptic?
D. Rankin,
Audiences
490pp.ISBN2 50351796X - contents:
Apologetic
andProtrepticus;
M. Elsakkers,
Gothic
andstrategies
inClement
Stromateis
ofAlexandria's
Gothic
Version
Vetus
Latina
andVisigothic
Law:Evidence
Bible,
fora Septuagint-based
ofExodus;
etrsuldesaintAthanase
methodes
B. Gain,L'dition
(1698).Gense,
parMon
faucon
SecundaofAthanasius',
Three
Historical
Problems
intheApologia
tats;P. Van Nuffelen,
surDaniel
deJrme
dansl'Occident
mdival
chrR. Courtray,
La rception
duCommentaire
Freiheit
radikal
Liberum
securitas
und
tien
K. Bracht,
arbitrium,
sicle);
(Vir-Xir
gedacht.
attribu

P. Van Deun,Le De animaet angelis

derUrsprung
desBsen
beiAugustin;
M. De Groote,
Alttestamentische
Eustrate
deConstantinople
(CPG7523):untexte
fantme?',
R. Kottje,
EinFragment
des"Paenitentiale"
indnem
Vatikaner
Codex;
Passionsprophezeiungen
R.B.C.Huygens,
der"Institutionen"
vonCambrai
auseinem
Frhdruck
Justinians;
Halitgars
selon
C. Wollin,
etsonexplication
del'vangile
propos
deChristian
ditdeStavelot
Matthieu;
"Kein
La
deBourgueils
carm.
Wein
zuBaudri
202;G. Partoens,
Marginalien
furdieNormannen".
deGuillaume
deSaintad Romanos
dans/^Expositio
d'Augustin
superepistolam
prsence
onPeter
Comestor's
Historia
scholastica
ofStephen
M.J.Clark,TheCommentaries
Thieny;
andHughofSt.Cher,
PseudoTh, Marschler,
praedicare.
Disputando
Langton
Langton,

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427

inderscholastischen
des13.Jahrhunderts
amBeispiel
ZurPrsenz
theologischer
Systematik
Predigt
vonOstersermones
desOdovonChteauroux
codicum
(fi273);Index
imUmkreis
Universitten
um1400.Lateinische
undvolkssprachige
Texte
Schriften
mitteleuropischer
ausPrag,WienundHeidelberg:
Unterschiede,
Gemeinsamkeiten,
, herausWechselbeziehungen
vonF.P. Knapp,J. Miethke
undM. Niesner.
2004
Brill,Leiden-Boston
gegeben
in theMiddleAgesandRenaissance,
andSociety
XXIX & 310pp.
[Education
20]
ISBN90 04 140530 - contents:
F.P.Knapp,EinFragenkatabg
derTagung,
zumThema
Konrad
von
Soltau
: ,Lectura
D. Walz,Konrad
vonGelnhausen:
Firmiter'
J.Nechutov,
super
caput
Leben
undPredigt
undMoral:Schuften
an mitteleu; M. Nuding,
,De contractibus'
Geschft
Universitten
imspten
14.und
15.Jahrhundert,
F. mahel,
DieVerschriftlichung
ropischen
frhen
derQuodlibet-Disputationem
anderPrager
bis1420; C. Fleler,
Ethica
inWien
Artistenfakultt
anno1438.DieKommentierung
derAristotelischen
anderWiener
,Ethik'
; W.E.
Artistenfakultt
litteratus
autilliteratus?
Frsten
um1400
Wagner,
Princeps
Sprachfertigkeiten
regierender
realen
undpdagogischen
Humanismus
zwischen
; D. Schmidtke,
Anforderungssituatationem
Texte
desMatthus
vonKrakau
unddeutsche
; C. Roth,Lateinische
Pastoraltheologische
Predigten
imUmfeld
vonUniversitt
undHofinHeidelberg
um1420;V. Boku. F. Lser,
DerWiderruf
desPeter
vonUniov
vorderPrager
,DieWyclifsche'.
Universittsgemeinde
(1417);A. Thomas,
Frauen
inderHussitenbewegung,
F.P. Knapp,Liebeslieder
imUniversittsmilieu;
J. Miethke,
Rckblick
eines
Historikers
aufeineinterdisziplinre
Tagung
La Sophistria
deRobertus
Etudeet dition
etI. RosierAnglicus.
critique
parA. Grondeux
avecla collaboration
de Ch.Brousseau-Beuerman
etM. Sirridge.
Catach,
Vrin,Paris
2006[Sicet Non]428pp. ISBN 2 71161820X
KlausWriedt,
Schule
undUniversitt.
innorddeutschen
Stdten
desSptmittelalters.
Bildungsverhltnisse
Gesammelte
Aufstze.
Leiden-Boston
intheMiddle
andSociety
2005[Education
Brill,
23] IX & 267pp. ISBN90 04 146873
AgesandRenaissance,
to Vivarium,
XLIV / 1 (2006)
Corrigenda
Twoerrors
inthelastissueofVivarium.
On p. 1,line3 from
the
inadvertently
appeared
read"Marchia's
entire
oeuvre"
instead
of"Marchia's
French
oeuvre".
On
bottom,
"1" superscript.
the"a" should
havea number
criticus,
p. 61,line46 oftheapparatus

11:19:52 AM

BOOKSRECEIVED

427

inderscholastischen
des13.Jahrhunderts
amBeispiel
ZurPrsenz
theologischer
Systematik
Predigt
vonOstersermones
desOdovonChteauroux
codicum
(fi273);Index
imUmkreis
Universitten
um1400.Lateinische
undvolkssprachige
Texte
Schriften
mitteleuropischer
ausPrag,WienundHeidelberg:
Unterschiede,
Gemeinsamkeiten,
, herausWechselbeziehungen
vonF.P. Knapp,J. Miethke
undM. Niesner.
2004
Brill,Leiden-Boston
gegeben
in theMiddleAgesandRenaissance,
andSociety
XXIX & 310pp.
[Education
20]
ISBN90 04 140530 - contents:
F.P.Knapp,EinFragenkatabg
derTagung,
zumThema
Konrad
von
Soltau
: ,Lectura
D. Walz,Konrad
vonGelnhausen:
Firmiter'
J.Nechutov,
super
caput
Leben
undPredigt
undMoral:Schuften
an mitteleu; M. Nuding,
,De contractibus'
Geschft
Universitten
imspten
14.und
15.Jahrhundert,
F. mahel,
DieVerschriftlichung
ropischen
frhen
derQuodlibet-Disputationem
anderPrager
bis1420; C. Fleler,
Ethica
inWien
Artistenfakultt
anno1438.DieKommentierung
derAristotelischen
anderWiener
,Ethik'
; W.E.
Artistenfakultt
litteratus
autilliteratus?
Frsten
um1400
Wagner,
Princeps
Sprachfertigkeiten
regierender
realen
undpdagogischen
Humanismus
zwischen
; D. Schmidtke,
Anforderungssituatationem
Texte
desMatthus
vonKrakau
unddeutsche
; C. Roth,Lateinische
Pastoraltheologische
Predigten
imUmfeld
vonUniversitt
undHofinHeidelberg
um1420;V. Boku. F. Lser,
DerWiderruf
desPeter
vonUniov
vorderPrager
,DieWyclifsche'.
Universittsgemeinde
(1417);A. Thomas,
Frauen
inderHussitenbewegung,
F.P. Knapp,Liebeslieder
imUniversittsmilieu;
J. Miethke,
Rckblick
eines
Historikers
aufeineinterdisziplinre
Tagung
La Sophistria
deRobertus
Etudeet dition
etI. RosierAnglicus.
critique
parA. Grondeux
avecla collaboration
de Ch.Brousseau-Beuerman
etM. Sirridge.
Catach,
Vrin,Paris
2006[Sicet Non]428pp. ISBN 2 71161820X
KlausWriedt,
Schule
undUniversitt.
innorddeutschen
Stdten
desSptmittelalters.
Bildungsverhltnisse
Gesammelte
Aufstze.
Leiden-Boston
intheMiddle
andSociety
2005[Education
Brill,
23] IX & 267pp. ISBN90 04 146873
AgesandRenaissance,
to Vivarium,
XLIV / 1 (2006)
Corrigenda
Twoerrors
inthelastissueofVivarium.
On p. 1,line3 from
the
inadvertently
appeared
read"Marchia's
entire
oeuvre"
instead
of"Marchia's
French
oeuvre".
On
bottom,
"1" superscript.
the"a" should
havea number
criticus,
p. 61,line46 oftheapparatus

11:19:59 AM

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11:20:07 AM

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