1

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NURFRASIR

HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRANS," MAKDUL JAMAD y BUKIN (AL)
a.k.a. "MACKY," a certain "TAS," and a certain "JUN," Accused, BERNADETTE
PANSACALA a.k.a. "Neneng Awid," Accused-Appeellant.
G.R. No. 194255 | 2012-06-13
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00644-MIN promulgated on 20 July 2010, which affirmed the conviction of herein
accused-appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a Neneng Awid, together with coaccused Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban a.k.a Franz/Frans, Makdul Jamad y Bukin
a.k.a. Macky, a certain Tas and a certain Jun for the crime of illegal recruitment
as defined under Section 6 in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act. No. (R.A.) 8042
or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts
On 10 March 2004, accused-appellant was charged as follows:[2]
That on or about June 11, 2003 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting with one another without having previously obtained from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, license or authority to engage in
the recruitment and deployment of overseas workers, did then and there willfully
[sic], unlawfully and feloniously, illegally recruit for a promised employment abroad
particularly in Brunei and Malaysia, thus causing and prompting the persons of BBB
and AAA[3] to apply which employment however did not materialize because in
truth and in fact, the promised employment is non-existent, in flagrant violation of
the above-mentioned law and causing damage and prejudice to said complainants;
further, the commission of the above stated offense tantamount to economic
sabotage in that the same was committed by a syndicate.

On 13 June 2003, BBB, Macky and Jun met as planned. They proceeded to Shop-ORama, where they met with co-accused Nurfrasir Hashim, a.k.a. Franz (Franz), who
assured BBB that she would be easily hired because of her beauty and height. They
then agreed to meet at 3:00 p.m. that same day at Paseo de Zamboanga.
At Paseo de Zamboanga, BBB, accused-appellant, Macky, and Jun met with AAA, a
certain CCC (allegedly another recruit) and Arlene (allegedly AAAs employer). Then
at 7:00 p.m. of that same day, they all proceeded to the wharf, where they met
accused Franz and a certain Cristy, who was also allegedly invited by accusedappellant to work in Malaysia.
Thereafter, AAA, BBB, CCC, Cristy, Macky and Jun boarded the M/V Grand Flora and
were given pieces of paper containing a name. Franz, accused-appellant Bernadette
and a certain Titing did not board the boat. Accused-appellant informed private
complainants and their companions that she and Franz would follow and bring their
passports. We quote the Decision of the CA to describe the journey of the group
after boarding the M/V Flora bound for Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, at 10:00 p.m.:[4]
On June 14, 2003, they (BBB, AAA, CCC, Cristy, accused Macky) and Jun
disembarked at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, and then they proceeded to Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi
where they stayed for two days. On June 16, 2003, they went to Pundohan, which is
a terminal going to Lahad Datu, Sabah, Malaysia.
On June 17, 2003, at 6:00 oclock [sic] in the morning[,] they arrived at Lahad Datu
and soon thenafter [sic] they boarded a van going to Samporna, Malaysia where
they met accused Mackys cousin named Pat. They waited at Samporna until 5:00
oclock [sic] in the afternoon when accused Franz and Tash[,] who was allegedly their
financier[,] arrived. Accused Franz then distributed to AAA, BBB, CCC and Cristy their
respective passports.

Only accused-appellant and Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban were arrested, and both
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.

Thereafter, they boarded a bus going to Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and they arrived
thereat at 7:00 oclock [sic] in the morning of June 18, 2003. Later, they boarded
again a bus going to Minumpo, Malaysia and then a barge going to Labuan, Malaysia
where they stayed at a hotel [the Classic Hotel] for three nights or from the night of
June 18, 2003 until June 20, 2003.

Private complainants AAA and BBB, Police Chief Inspector Ronald Aonuevo, and
police officers Edmond Ranel Villareal and Renato Rabuya dela Pea were presented
by the prosecution to prove the following:

On June 21, 2003, accused Franz instructed BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear sexy
clothes because they were going to meet their supposed boss named Bunso at
Cape Imperial located at Labuan, Malaysia.

On 10 June 2003, accused-appellant approached AAA, who was then doing her job
as a waitress at a stall in Paseo de Zamboanga, Buenavista, Zamboanga City, to
encourage AAA to work in Malaysia, as accused-appellant knew certain persons who
would soon be leaving for that country.
On the next day, 11 June 2003, private complainant BBB was at her house in Talontalon Loop, Zamboanga City, when accused-appellant paid her a visit and invited her
to work as a saleslady in Brunei. After being assured that the prospective
employment was above board and that she would be well compensated, BBB
accepted the invitation.
The day after, accused-appellant, together with co-accused Makdul Amad y Bukin
a.k.a. Macky (Macky) and a certain Jun, returned to the house of BBB. Accusedappellant informed BBB that the latter would be escorted to Malaysia by the two
men, and that they would meet the next day at 1:00 p.m. at Plaza Pershing,
Zamboanga City.

When they arrived at Cape Imperial, accused Macky and Jun talked to Bunso but
they failed to reach an agreement on the purported compensation of the four girls.
So, accused Macky and Jun brought the girls to Golden Lotus Barber Salon (Salon for
brevity) where the latter were introduced to a certain person named Mommy Cindy,
the alleged owner of the salon, and their purported manager Hako who was called
Mommy Susan.
The prosecution also alleged that while the group was staying at the Classic Hotel in
Labuan, BBB was forced on numerous occasions to have sexual intercourse with
Franz at his bidding, even in the presence of other people. She followed his orders
for fear that he would inflict physical harm on her.
At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances surrounding their
employment at the Golden Lotus. It was only after they agreed to stay there for

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employment that they were forced to become sex workers to earn money and pay
off the debts they incurred from their travel from Zamboanga City to Labuan,
Malaysia.
Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13 July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted
women. Each of the girls would be booked to a customer for the whole night for 300
Ringgit at a certain hotel near the Golden Lotus. Meanwhile, during the day, they
would be hired by customers for a short time for 150 Ringgit in one of the rooms
of the Golden Lotus. The girls were told that they would be made to pay a fine of 150
Ringgit if they refused to have sexual intercourse with the customers.
On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota Kinabalu,
Malaysia. She sought his help for her return to the Philippines, and he agreed.
The following day, on 13 July 2003, the Golden Lotus was raided by the Immigration
Officers of Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and the prostituted Filipino women, including
AAA and BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police Department) in Labuan until
all the women were deported to the Philippines.
The defense, on the other hand, presented three witnesses: accused-appellant
Bernadette, her common-law partner Majujie Jailya Misuari, and co-accused Franz.
According to accused-appellant, she and BBB were friends and neighbors in Talontalon, Zamboanga City. Sometime in April 2003, when asked by BBB why accusedappellant returned to the Philippines from Malaysia, the latter said that she had been
made a prostituted woman in Malaysia.
Accused-appellant denied having offered BBB a job in Malaysia, a denial
corroborated by Majujie Jailya Misuari. Accused-appellant also denied knowing AAA
and Franz. She claimed that she only met AAA when the latter, together with BBB,
visited her in jail and offered to withdraw the case if accused-appellant would give
them money.
Co-accused Franz merely denied knowing AAA, BBB or accused-appellant.
On 27 June 2008, after trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City rendered a Decision,[5] the dispositive portion of which states:[6]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a
FRANZ/FRAS and BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a NENENG AWID GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT defined under Section 6
and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as principals by direct
participation, committed by a syndicate, against BBB and AAA, and SENTENCES
each of said accused to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine
of P1,000,000.00 each;[7] to pay each of the above victims P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court considered that, in the course of the trial, the prosecution and the
defense had entered into a stipulation that neither accused-appellant Bernadette
nor Franz had a license or an authority to recruit or deploy workers for overseas
employment.
Moreover, the trial court found that the crime was committed in conspiracy by the
accused and other persons. It painstakingly enumerated the overt acts of the
accused-appellant showing her direct participation in the commission of the crime.
These acts included inducing AAA and BBB to work in Malaysia; introducing Macky,
Jun and Franz to the victims; and escorting them to the wharf, where the victims
boarded the vessel that took them away from their families and their country and
brought them to Malaysia, where heretofore unbeknownst to them they were
made to work as prostituted women.

It further held that the credible and positive testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution prevailed over those of the defense of mere denial, absent any showing
that the witnesses for the prosecution had any ill motive to falsely testify and
implicate the accused in the commission of the crime charged.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the formers
assailed Decision, but modified the award of damages, to wit:[8]
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case No. 19921 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages in favor of
the private complainants be reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
In the present appeal, instead of filing a supplemental brief, both accused-appellant
and the Office of the Solicitor General opted to adopt their respective Briefs filed
with the CA.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the
following elements must occur:[9]
1.
The accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them
to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
2.
The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually
recruiting, deploying and transporting.
3.
Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and
confederating with one another.
As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a valid
license to recruit persons for overseas employment, consistent with her defense that
she did not engage in the recruitment of persons for employment.
Anent the second element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great detail how
they were induced by accused-appellant to accept an employment opportunity, and
how they were successfully transported from Zamboanga City to Malaysia where
they eventually worked as prostituted women.
On the third element, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove
that there were more than two persons involved in the alleged crime of illegal
recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the accused liable for the crime.
The prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other accused Macky, Jun,
and Tas also had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In the recent case People v. Lalli,[10] we affirmed the trial courts findings in which 2
of the 3 accused were convicted of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate,
even though the third accused was at-large. In so ruling, we took note of the fact
that the victim would not have been able to go to Malaysia were it not for the
concerted efforts of the three accused. We held thus:
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily
withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of an accused person
may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to
establish his guilt. Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still
at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.

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It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita
was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy
among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which
the crime was perpetrated each of the accused played a pivotal role in
perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC
Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate in Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000 imposed on each of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that accusedappellant Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had conspired to bring
the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least, through the
credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were the escorts of the
women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was their financier; (3) a certain Bunso
negotiated with Macky for the price the former would pay for the expenses incurred
in transporting the victims to Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution
house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of all these persons resulted
in the oppression of the victims.
Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant,
together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the
felony and decided to commit it. It is not necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement laying down the
details of how an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out. Conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or
from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.[11]
Findings of fact of the CA, when they affirm those of the trial court, are binding on
this Court, unless the findings of the trial and the appellate courts are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record, or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[12]
Likewise, we have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, just like an alibi, is a self-serving
negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declarations of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that has the ring of truth on the one hand and a bare denial
on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[13]
We, however, find it proper to modify the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the CA.
On 12 May 2003, Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.
This law was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically, only a few days after, private
complainants found themselves in a situation that this law had sought to prevent.
In Lalli, we increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages from P50,000 to
P500,000 and from P50,000 to P100,000, respectively, having convicted the accused
therein of the crime of trafficking in persons. In so doing, we said:

The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:

Art. 2217.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act for omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of
moral damages, by way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in
the Civil Code:
Art. 2229.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230.
In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages
for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219.
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1)
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2)
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3)
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4)
Adultery or concubinage;
(5)
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6)
Illegal search;
(7)
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8)
Malicious prosecution;
(9)
Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10)
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3
of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the
crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To
be trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to
five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no
doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of
Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of
exemplary damages is likewise justified. (Emphasis supplied.)

4
We find no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and exemplary
damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any logical reason why we should
differentiate between the victims herein and those in that case, when the
circumstances are frighteningly similar. To do so would be to say that we
discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have been the victims of
unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is true that
accused-appellant was not tried and convicted of the crime of trafficking in persons,
this Court based its award of damages on the Civil Code, and not on the AntiTrafficking in Persons Act, as clearly explained in Lalli.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 00644-MIN dated 20 July 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a. Neneng Awid is
ORDERED to pay AAA and BBB the sum of P500,000 each as moral damages and
P100,000 each as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174654
August 17, 2011
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA
ALONTO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana
could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution2 denying
the motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside the May
21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of
falsification of public document by a private individual because the Information
charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a public
document.4 However, the CA still adjudged him civilly liable.5
Factual Antecedents
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and
Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto),6 secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner
prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute
Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City
allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.8
Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots
to third persons.
On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document
consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square
meters executed before Notary Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No.

77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latter's Notarial Register showing that
spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo,
Cebu City, for a consideration of P130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating,
counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the signature[s]
of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten names in said
document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused very well knew that
spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed
property and that the signature[s] appearing in said document are not their
signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga
Alonto participated in the execution of said document when they did not so
participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused did then and there cause
the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said falsified document,
to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the
amount of P130,000.00, the value of the land .
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".12 After the termination
of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution
was whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found
that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter
failed to pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the
spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized
without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From
these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification
of a Public Document by a private individual under Article 172(1)14 in relation to
Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa through falsification
of public document as charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana
GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public document by private individuals under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and
possession of the real properties in question in favor of private complainants. After
private complainants shall have acquired full ownership and possession of the
aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay the accused the sum of
P130,000.00 [with] legal interest thereon reckoned from the time this case was
instituted.
Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the
private complainants [of] the real properties in question within a period of six (6)
months from the time this decision becomes final and executory, he is directed to
pay said complainants the sum of P1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the
properties of the private complainants.
He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:
1. P15,000.00 for nominal damages;

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2. P20,000.00 for attorney's fees;
3. P50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;
4. P30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;plus the cost of this suit.SO
ORDERED.16

appeal, the CA held that petitioner's conviction cannot be sustained because it

infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.24 The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of
petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of
the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not
specifically charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime
or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the
negative.17 It held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa
through falsification of public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be
convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed
in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric
while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear
in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such
person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the
petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily
included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.18 Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the
trial court's finding with respect to petitioner's civil liability. The dispositive portion of
the CA's February 22, 2006 Decision reads as follows:

We do not agree.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May
21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only
insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that charged
in the Information. The civil liability determinations are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution
dated August 15, 2006.
Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20 In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.21 When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the
civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.22 In other
words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist."23
Here, the CA set aside the trial court's Decision because it convicted petitioner of an
offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To
recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document.
However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document
although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization.
Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On

In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his
exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to
be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had
caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the
petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the
spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby
facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the
presentation of the parties' respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge
was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their
signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before
the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does
not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties' transaction.27 Such nonappearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the deed. "To overcome the presumption, there must be
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as
to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be
upheld."28 And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to
petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale,
petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto's title and the issuance of new
ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage
resulted to the spouses Alonto.
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner,
to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to
pay them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view
of the trial court's finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of
Absolute Sale are genuine and not forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the
alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in
the alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another
penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative.30 "He must fix positively and with
certainty the particular penalty."31

6
In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial
court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession
of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00
representing the value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are
AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of
falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil
liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the
payment of P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the payment
of nominal and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses, is
deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus EDWIN MALICSI, Appeellant.
G.R. No. 175833 | 2008-01-29
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:

AAA added that on 1 April 1998, appellant ordered AAA to meet him at a banana
grove. Out of fear, AAA went there because she knew appellant always carried a
knife. Again, appellant forced her to lie on the ground and inserted his penis inside
her vagina.
AAA alleged that three days later, appellant caught up with her while she was
gathering firewood. AAA was again forced to lie on the ground and appellant
inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA's cousin witnessed the incident and
informed AAA's mother. When AAA confirmed to her mother that appellant raped
her, they went to the police headquarters to file a complaint against appellant. AAA
testified that she was thereafter brought to the doctor for physical examination.
AAA's mother testified that appellant is her brother-in-law. Sometime in April 1998,
her nephew informed her that he saw appellant rape AAA. Thereafter, AAA
confirmed to her mother that appellant raped her on different occasions. AAA's
mother discussed the matter with her husband and they decided to report the rape
incidents to the police authorities. AAA's mother alleged that appellant's wife offered
to settle the case for P10,000 but she refused the offer because of the dishonor to
her daughter.
Dr. dela Rosa testified that he examined AAA and executed a Medical Certificate with
the following findings:

This is an appeal from the 18 August 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01368. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, finding
appellant Edwin Malicsi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape.

"P.E.
Vagina: nulliparous introitus with old hymenal lacerations at 1o, 7o and 5o
positions."[2]

In four separate Informations dated 28 May 1998, the prosecution charged appellant
with raping AAA, who was then alleged to be 13 years old when she was raped for
the first time and 15 years old during the succeeding rape incidents.

Dr. dela Rosa added that based on his findings, AAA had lost her virginity. On crossexamination, Dr. dela Rosa stated that the hymenal lacerations were inflicted
possibly by the insertion of a hard object.[3]

Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.

The defense presented appellant as its only witness. Appellant denied the
accusations of rape and alleged that he and AAA were sweethearts and they
mutually agreed to engage in sexual intercourse. Appellant claimed that AAA visits
their house about thrice a week when his wife is not at home. Appellant then
recounted the incidents of his sexual intercourse with AAA.

During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses namely, AAA, AAA's
mother, and Dr. Marlon dela Rosa (Dr. dela Rosa), the examining physician.
AAA testified that sometime in December 1996 at 7 o'clock in the evening, her
father asked her to buy wine from a store 10 meters away from their house. AAA
was only 13 years old then. The house of AAA's family is some 20 meters away from
appellant's house. On her way home, AAA chanced upon appellant who is her uncle,
her father being the brother of appellant's wife. Appellant placed AAA on his lap.
Appellant switched off AAA's flashlight and embraced her. Appellant ordered AAA to
bend over. AAA acceded because appellant threatened to kill her. Appellant removed
AAA's shorts and underwear. Appellant, while poking a knife at AAA's breast,
succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. AAA felt pain. Appellant warned
AAA not to say anything to her parents.
AAA further testified that sometime in March 1998, her mother asked her to gather
coconuts that have fallen off from the tree at the bamboo grove. Appellant followed
her and grabbed one of the coconuts she was holding. AAA tried to retrieve the
coconut but appellant forced her to lie on her back. Appellant removed her
underwear and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA struggled to no avail.
Appellant again threatened to kill her if she informed her parents about the incident.

Appellant claimed that sometime in December 1996, he arrived home from Manila
and he told his wife to go to the market. After she left, he slept. Then, he sensed
someone entering his house. Upon seeing that it was AAA, appellant asked her if she
needed something but she replied negatively. Appellant then stood up, held her
hands and kissed her. AAA told him that they might be seen by her mother as the
door was not closed. Appellant and AAA then entered the room and he embraced
and kissed her. AAA also embraced and kissed him. Then, he told her, "maghubo ka
ng panty (take off your underwear)." While taking off her underwear, appellant also
removed his briefs. While AAA was lying in bed face upward, she had no violent
reaction but merely closed her eyes when he inserted his penis inside her vagina.
After the sexual intercourse, AAA went home.[4]
Appellant contended that the second time they had sexual intercourse was in 1998
before AAA's graduation. It happened at the banana grove. He was urinating at the
creek when he called her by a whistle. AAA approached him. He held her hands and
they embraced each other. Then, they removed their undergarments. AAA lay on the
banana leaves while he placed himself on top of her. He inserted his penis inside her
vagina and while doing so, AAA was embracing him. Afterwards, she went home.[5]

7
Appellant alleged that the third sexual intercourse happened on 4 April 1998 at the
banana plantation where they agreed to meet. AAA arrived while appellant was
gathering "puso ng saging." When she approached him, they embraced each other
and removed their undergarments. AAA lay on the banana leaves while he placed
himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA was merely
looking at him while he was doing it. After the sexual act, she went home.[6]
Appellant also alleged that in these three occasions, AAA gave her consent since
they were sweethearts. Appellant attested that after he learned about the rape
charges, he did not have the opportunity to talk to AAA anymore.
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The
trial court took note of the fact that AAA was barely 13 years old when the first rape
took place while appellant was in his early 30's.[7] The trial court also noted that
appellant was AAA's uncle, thus he exercised some sort of moral ascendancy over
AAA.[8] The trial court was not persuaded by appellant's defense that AAA was his
girlfriend and that the sexual encounters were done with her consent due to the lack
of outcry, lack of tenacious resistance, and delay in reporting the rape charges to
the authorities. The trial court disbelieved appellant's testimony that they were
sweethearts because there was no sufficient proof to substantiate the alleged love
relationship. Appellant merely relied on his own uncorroborated testimony. The trial
court added that a love affair is not a license for sexual intercourse.[9]
The trial court ruled that the lack of outcry and tenacious resistance did not make
the sexual congress voluntary because being of tender age, AAA did not possess
discernment and was incapable of giving an intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Moreover, there is no standard form of human behavioral response to a startling or
frightful experience such as rape being perpetrated by the victim's uncle.
Furthermore, the resistance on the part of the victim need not be carried out to the
point of inviting death or physical injuries, it being sufficient that the coitus takes
place against her will or that she yields to a genuine apprehension of great harm.
[10]
The trial court acknowledged that there was delay in reporting the rape incidents.
However, the trial court believed that the delay was due to the death threats made
by appellant coupled with the victim's immaturity. The fact that appellant was
holding a knife is suggestive of the force or intimidation that would cause the victim
to conceal for sometime the violation on her honor.[11]
On 8 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, finding appellant guilty of
four counts of qualified rape. The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the
penalty of death for each count of rape, and to pay AAA P300,000 as civil indemnity
(P75,000 for each count), and P200,000 as moral damages (P50,000 for each count).
[12]
On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving weight and
credence to the incredulous testimonies of the prosecution witnesses especially
AAA's testimony. Appellant alleged that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant also questioned the imposition of death penalty
considering the attendant circumstances of the case.
In its 18 August 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision with modification, finding appellant guilty of four counts of simple rape
instead of qualified rape and reducing the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua.

The Court of Appeals stated that AAA was a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime and appellant was a family relative by affinity. The Court of Appeals
believed that the family relationship made AAA subject to appellant's moral
ascendancy. Moreover, it was clearly established during the trial that AAA exerted
efforts to free herself from appellant. AAA acceded to appellant's sexual urges
because appellant threatened to kill her and appellant actually poked a knife on her
breast during the incidents. The appellate court added that these circumstances
belie appellant's claim that AAA did not offer tenacious resistance. AAA's fear for her
life and safety made her conceal the fact that she was being molested by appellant.
[13]
The Court of Appeals did not believe appellant's "sweetheart" defense because it
was not supported by some documentary or other evidence of the relationship other
than his bare assertions. Such claim obviously deserves scant consideration.
Assuming arguendo that appellant and AAA were sweethearts, this relationship still
does not, by itself, make their sexual intercourse voluntary because even a lover can
be forced to engage in a sexual act against her will and consent.[14]
The Court of Appeals noted that from the time of the first rape incident, there was a
lapse of almost two years before AAA reported the rape incidents to the police
authorities. The appellate court explained that this delay is not an indication of a
false accusation. The fact of AAA's failure to disclose for two years that appellant
molested her was not unexplained. AAA had repeatedly testified during the trial that
appellant warned her not to say anything to her parents and appellant threatened to
kill her if she would tell them. The appellate court stated that it is even common for
young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of
threats on their lives. The Court of Appeals upheld the finding of the trial court on
AAA's credibility on the face of appellant's bare denials, more especially that
appellant had not adduced any evidence that AAA or her family had any ill-motive to
testify against him.[15]
However, the Court of Appeals agreed with appellant that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty on four counts of qualified rape and that
he should only be convicted of simple rape. The minority of the victim and the
offender's relationship to the victim, which constitute only one special qualifying
circumstance, must be alleged in the Information and proved with certainty. In this
case, the Informations filed against appellant merely stated that he is the "uncle" of
AAA. This is not the sufficient allegation required by law because the Information
must allege that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree and the same should be proven during the trial. The Court of Appeals further
held that since Republic Act No. 9346[16] now prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. This new law must be
given retroactive application because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, this
appeal.
We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming with
modification the ruling of the trial court that four counts of rape were clearly
established by the prosecution witnesses. The findings and observations of the trial
court on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses are binding and conclusive on
the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted,[17] which is not true in
the present case. Moreover, AAA's testimony is worthy of belief because she
categorically pointed to appellant as the person who sexually abused her.

8
AAA's testimony is entitled to great weight in contrast to appellant's bare denials.
"Denial is a negative, self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater weight
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence."[18] Besides, neither
AAA nor her family had any ill-motive to falsely testify and impute a serious crime
against the appellant who is a close relative.

P50,000 for each count of simple rape is automatically granted once the fact of rape
is established.[26]

Appellant's allegation that they were sweethearts is barren of factual support

because he failed to substantiate his claim by some documentary or other evidence
of the relationship. The "sweetheart defense" appears to be a fabrication to
exculpate himself from the rape he committed. Although appellant admitted having
carnal knowledge with AAA in three separate occasions,[19] he failed to discharge
the burden of proving the affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSAURO SIA y

DICHOSO, JOHNNY BALALIO y DEZA, JIMMY PONCE y TOL and JOHN DOE @
PEDRO MU?OZ (at large), accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 137457 | 2001-11-21
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Court is not persuaded by appellant's contention that the lack of outcry, lack of
tenacious resistance, and delay in reporting the incidents signify that the sexual
encounters were consensual.[20] First, appellant exercised moral ascendancy over
AAA, being AAA's uncle. Second, appellant had instilled fear upon AAA's young mind
during the sexual assaults by using a knife and threatening to kill her. These
circumstances have led AAA to keep her ordeals in secret until her mother learned of
the incidents from AAA's cousin. This Court declared in People v. Garcia:[21]

Christian Bermudez was beaten to death and the taxicab he was driving was taken
by the assailants. His lifeless body, wrapped in a carton box, was recovered several
days later in a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. For the felonies, the above-named
accused were indicted for violation of R.A. 6539, otherwise known as the AntiCarnapping Law, and Murder in two (2) separate Informations, to wit:

[R]ape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and this includes the
moral kind of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative term, depending on
the age, size and strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other. It
can be addressed to the mind as well. Moreover, the intimidation must be viewed in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear - fear that if the victim
does not yield to the lustful demands of the accused, something would happen to
her at the moment or thereafter.
AAA's tender age and appellant's moral ascendancy made AAA subservient to
appellant's sexual desires. This psychological predicament explains why AAA did not
give any outcry or offer any resistance when appellant was raping her. Moreover, the
physical differences between appellant, who was a man in his early 30's then, and
AAA, a 13 and 15-year-old girl during the rape incidents, afforded appellant the
greater advantage such that no amount of resistance from AAA could have
overcome the coercive physical force of appellant.
The appellate court was correct in finding appellant guilty of four counts of simple
rape. We have ruled that the special circumstance of relationship, that is, appellant
is the victim's uncle and they are related within the third civil degree of affinity,
must be alleged in the Information.[22] The fact that such relationship was proved
will not justify the imposition of the death penalty and appellant cannot be convicted
of qualified rape.[23]
We find that the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on appellant. The appellate court also correctly affirmed the award by the
trial court of P200,000 in moral damages. Moral damages are automatically granted
to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the commission of
the crime.[24]
However, we reduce the award of civil indemnity from P300,000 to P200,000 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[25] Civil indemnity in the amount of

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 August 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01368 finding appellant Edwin Malicsi guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four counts of simple rape with the MODIFICATION that the award of civil
indemnity is reduced to P200,000. SO ORDERED.

Criminal Case No. Q-95-63962 for Violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law:

That on or about August 23, 1995, in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, herein accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one (1) motor vehicle
described as Toyota Tamaraw FX; Motor No. 2C-2983302; Chassis No. CF50-0014375;
Plate No.NYT-243, owned by BIENVENIDO CRUZ, killing the driver Christian
Bermudez in the process, to the damage and prejudice of the registered owner
thereof and the heirs of Christian Bermudez.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Criminal Case No. Q-95-63963 for Murder:
That on or about 23 August 1995, in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
intent to kill qualified by treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense or of means of persons
to insure or afford impunity, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
use violence upon the person of CHRISTIAN BERMUDEZ by beating him on the head
and other parts of the body, thereby causing his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
At the arraignment, only Johnny Balalio y Deza and Jimmy Ponce y Tol appeared and
pleaded "Not Guilty."[3] The third accused, Rosauro Sia y Dichoso, escaped from
police custody while on the way to the hospital for treatment.[4] As a consequence,
the two (2) cases were subsequently consolidated and jointly tried against accused
Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce only.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment against both accused imposing upon
them the supreme penalty of Death, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as

9
principals by conspiracy of violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended and hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Accused are likewise adjudged jointly and severally [liable] to pay to Agripina
Bermudez, the mother of the deceased Christian Bermudez the sums of:
a. P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of Christian Bermudez;
b. P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses incurred in connection with the death
of Christian; and
c. P3,307,199.60 (2/3 x [80-27] x 300 per day x 26 days (excluding Sundays) x 12
months) representing the loss of earning capacity of Christian Bermudez as taxi
driver.
Costs against accused.
The cases of accused Rosauro Sia who escaped from custody before he was
arraigned and as against Peter Doe who was never apprehended and whose identity
has never been known are hereby ordered ARCHIVED, subject to activation when
they are arrested and brought before the bar of justice. SO ORDERED.[5]
On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellants raised the lone assigned
error that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR
VIOLATION OF RA 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW) SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED ROSAURO SIA AND JIMMY PONCE
(EXHIBITS C AND D, RESPECTIVELY) WHICH ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.[6]
The facts as summed up by the trial court are as follows:
The vehicle claimed as carnapped is registered in the name of complainant
Bienvenido C. Cruz of No. 1125 Primero de Mayo Street, Tondo, Manila[7] and
operated as a taxi being Unit 2 of KIRBEE TAXI and bearing the following description:
Make/Type : Toyota Tamaraw FX Wagon
Motor Number : 2-C 2983302
Chassis No. : CF 50-0014375
Plate No. : NYT-243
Color : Maroon
The said taxi was taken from the garage and driven by its regular driver, Christian
Bermudez, the alleged murder victim at about 6:00 a.m. on August 23, 1995. The
taxi was last seen at the vicinity of the Pegasus Night Club in Quezon City at about
10:30 p.m. on the said date with an unidentified passenger who surfaced later as
the accused Rosauro Sia, whose true name is allegedly Antonio Labrador (Mang
Tony) and who resides at San Francisco Del Monte. Accused Rosauro Sia appears to
have gypped driver Christian Bermudez to service him the following day (August 24,
1995) in the morning and to be paid P150.00 per hour which was apparently
accepted because Rosauro gave instructions to accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy
Ponce to wait for him (Christian) that following morning. When Christian returned to
Sia's residence in San Francisco Del Monte that morning, he was told to come back
in the afternoon because that was the instruction given him by accused Rosauro Sia.
When Christian returned in the afternoon in the Sia residence, he was asked to get
inside. As soon as he alighted from the Tamaraw FX taxi he was driving, his hands
were tied by Johnny Balalio and was handed to a certain "Pedro", the accused Peter
Doe who has not been arrested and who told Johnny Balalio and Johnny (sic) Ponce

"Ako na'ng bahala dito". Christian was taken to accused Rosauro and shortly
afterwards, the latter was seen lugging with him a big carton box from which blood
was dripping. Accused Jimmy Ponce saw Rosauro hand the carton-wrapped lifeless
body of Christian inside the carnapped FX taxi. Before leaving with the lifeless body
of Christian loaded in the taxi, accused Sia gave P3,000.00 each to Jimmy Ponce,
Johnny Balalio and "Pedro" and admonished them not to say anything about what
happened. The ring taken from Christian[8] was given to accused Jimmy Ponce by
Rosauro Sia.
On August 26, 1995, the lifeless body of Christian Bermudez was found and
retrieved from a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. This fact was broadcast over the
radio and, after hearing the same, Agripina Bermudez went to see the lifeless body
retrieved from the fishpond and confirmed it to be that of Christian, whom she
claims is her eldest son who was earning about P650.00 a day as a taxi driver.
Photographs were taken on the carton-wrapped body of Christian including one
position which shows the latter's body.[9]
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico Legal Officer of Bulacan, conducted a postmortem
examination of the deceased body of Christian and found that the latter's death was
due to shock caused by massive external and intracranial hemorrhage on account of
multiple lacerations on the head and fracture of the skull due to use of hard object,
possibly iron, for which he issued certificates of death and postmortem death
certificate.[10]
In the meantime, Bienvenido Cruz, the owner of the carnapped vehicle, reported to
the police authorities in Camp Crame the loss of his taxi.[11] On September 21,
1995, at about 10:30 p.m., the carnapped taxi was intercepted being driven by
accused Rosauro Sia, who was immediately placed in custody of the anti-carnapping
authorities. While in custody, Rosauro Sia managed to escape but he was recaptured
on November 15, 1995 by the manhunt team created for that purpose. As accused
Rosauro Sia claimed that he bought the hot car from his co-accused Johnny Balalio
and Jimmy Ponce, the latter were picked up from their residence in Baseco, Isla
Tawid, Port Area, Tondo, Manila and investigated. Sworn Statement of the accused
Rosauro Sia and Jimmy Ponce were taken[12]narrating their respective participations
such as Sia's instruction to Jimmy to guard his (Sia's) gate to deter passersby from
snooping around and describing what transpired inside Sia's residence at San
Francisco Del Monte when Christian was tied and killed. The Sworn Statement of
Bienvenido Cruz, owner of the missing vehicle, was likewise taken. On the basis of
the sworn statements of accused Rosauro Sia and Jimmy Ponce, Dr. Benito Caballero,
Provincial Health Officer of Bulacan, together with the Certificate of Registration of
the FX Taxi and the Death and Postmortem Certificates mentioned heretofore, the
Special Operations Unit, Traffic Management Command, PNP, Camp Crame, referred
the matter to the authorities of the Department of Justice who, after finding probable
cause in the preliminary investigation, filed these cases of Violation of R.A. 6539, as
amended, and of Murder against the above-named accused which were consolidated
together in this Branch for joint trial.[13]
In their lone assigned error, accused-appellants contend in sum that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Rosauro Sia and Johnny Balalio, which the trial court
heavily relied upon, are inadmissible in evidence since they were executed in
violation of their right to counsel. Specifically, accused-appellants argue that the
said extra-judicial statements are inadmissible because they were obtained without
compliance with the requirements of the law for their admissibility.[14]

10
The Solicitor General agrees, stating that during the custodial investigation, Ponce
and Sia were not assisted by counsel as required by the Constitution. The trial
court's finding that Sia and Ponce were assisted by Prosecutor Pormento when they
executed their extrajudicial confessions did not meet the requirement of the law. The
Solicitor General further contends that, during his testimony, Ponce vehemently
denied having voluntarily executed his alleged statement; rather, he maintained
that he was coerced to sign the same and that he did not even know its contents.
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to the requirements of the Constitution.[15]
Indeed, a suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-verbal when taken without the
assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the
absence of such coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given,[16] is
inadmissible in evidence,[17] even if appellant's confession were gospel truth.[18]
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial statements of Sia and
Ponce will not absolve accused-appellants from criminal liability because, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, there still is independent evidence to establish their
authorship of the victim's killing on the occasion of the carnapping. The Solicitor
General asserts that while there was no prosecution witness who positively identified
accused-appellants as particeps criminis, their culpability was nonetheless proven
through circumstantial evidence.
We agree.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[19] The rules on
evidence[20]and case law sustain the conviction of the accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.[21]
A circumspect scrutiny of the testimonies of the witnesses of both prosecution and
defense shows adequate evidentiary bases to establish the aforementioned
circumstances.
First, when the police apprehended accused Rosauro Sia while he was in possession
of the carnapped vehicle, he immediately pointed to accused-appellants as his
accomplices in taking away the victim's vehicle.[22] Notably, accused-appellants
claimed to have met Sia for the first time on August 24, 1995, when Sia supposedly
passed by them looking for a certain person. They saw Sia for the second time on
November 15, 1995, when Sia and some policemen came to their place to arrest
them. If accused-appellants did not actually participate in the perpetration of the
crime, it certainly defies reason why Sia would implicate them in so serious an
offense when they were practically strangers to him. In this regard, it must be borne
in mind that the fact that a witness may have been a co-conspirator in the
commission of the offense is not in itself sufficient to dilute the credibility of or,
much less, be a ground to disregard altogether his testimony.[23] Indeed:
By way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated,
be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because given unhesitatingly
and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details which by their nature could not
have been the result of deliberate afterthought.[24]

Second, defense witness Porferio Fernando testified that accused-appellants were

with Rosauro Sia from August 25-28, 1995.[25] When accused-appellants came back
on August 28, 1995, they informed him that they were to guard a bodega owned by
Sia, which contained a carnapped vehicle.[26] This testimony of Fernando confirms
the fact that accused-appellants were in the company of Rosauro Sia during that
critical period when the crime was perpetrated.
Third, upon his arrest, accused-appellant Jimmy Ponce voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities a ring,[27] admittedly belonging to the victim.[28] It is a wellsettled rule that when a person is found in possession of a thing taken in the doing
of a recent wrongful act, he is presumed to be the taker and doer of the whole act.
[29] Thus, when property stolen is found in the possession of a person who is unable
to give a satisfactory explanation of his possession thereof, he may be deemed to
have committed the crime of theft of said property.[30] More apropos to the peculiar
facts prevailing herein is the case of People v. Prado,[31] where we stated:
In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen
effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily
be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and of the
robbery committed on him.
The application of this presumption validly applies to a case of carnapping for,
indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same
and, had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or
robbery.[32]
All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quo insofar as
the crimes were committed. What remains to be determined is the propriety of the
penalty imposed on accused-appellants.
In connection with the penalty imposed, the Solicitor General invites the Court's
attention to the erroneous imposition by the trial court of death on the accusedappellants. He points out that while the sentence was meted upon a finding that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime, these were not duly
established in the case at bar.
The observation is well-taken. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances which are
taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty
imposed must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged
as criminal offense.[33]
With regard to alevosia, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[34]
Treachery is considered present when: (1) there is employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means or method of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the culprit.[35] For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and
seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.[36] Where no particulars are
known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be
supposed.[37]

11
In this case, there was neither a description of how the attack was commenced whether it was sudden, unexpected and whether the victim was caught totally
unaware - nor has there been a showing that the method of execution in the
commission of the crime was consciously or deliberately adopted by the
malefactors. To reiterate, alevosia cannot be established where no particulars are
known regarding the manner in which the aggression was carried out or how it
developed.[38] It must be based on positive or conclusive proof, not mere
suppositions or speculations,[39] and must be proved as clearly and as convincingly
as the killing itself.[40]
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal
certainty as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance.[41] These elements are: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to their
determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of their act.[42] The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[43]
In this case, there is no showing that the killing of Christian Bermudez was the
product of cool thought and reflection. There is absolutely no showing how and when
the plan was hatched or how long a time had elapsed before the crime was carried
out. On the contrary, what appears very much evident is that he was killed on the
occasion of the carnapping itself. Without such evidence, mere presumptions and
inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice to warrant the
appreciation of this qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.[44]
Abuse of superior strength cannot likewise be appreciated. In People v. Flores,[45]
this Court pointed out that this aggravating circumstance necessitates the showing
of the relative disparity in physical characteristics, usually translating into the age,
gender, the physical size and the strength of the aggressor and the victim. There is
no proof that accused-appellant utilized any notorious inequality to his advantage. In
other words, mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior
strength.[46]
To be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, what should be considered is not
that there were three or more assailants of one victim, but whether the aggressors
purposely took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense.[47] In this case, the prosecution did not present any direct proof that there
was a deliberate intent on the part of accused-appellants to take advantage of the
obvious inequality of force between them and the victim.
In the absence of any qualifying or aggravating circumstances which would merit
the imposition of death, the proper imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, viz:
Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as the term
is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment of not less than fourteen years and
eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence

against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Underscoring ours)
On the other hand, Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxxxxxxxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Anent the civil indemnity award, this Court finds the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity proper, following prevailing jurisprudence,[48] and in line with controlling
policy.[49] The award of civil indemnity may be granted without any need of proof
other than the death of the victim.[50] Though not awarded by the trial court, the
victim's heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages, pegged at P50,000.00 by
controlling case law,[51] taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the
victim's family[52]brought about by his death.[53]
However, the award of P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim must be deleted. The records are bereft of
any receipt or voucher to justify the trial court's award of burial and other expenses
incurred in connection with the victim's death. The rule is that every pecuniary loss
must be established by credible evidence before it may be awarded.[54] Credence
can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts or other credible
evidence.[55]
The trial court was correct in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity despite
the non-availability of documentary evidence.[56] Damages representing net
earning capacity have been awarded by the Court based on testimony in several
cases.[57] However, the amount of the trial court's award needs to be recomputed
and modified accordingly.
In determining the amount of lost income, the following must be taken into account:
(1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the
rate of the loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. The second variable is
computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased,
meaning total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income less living and other incidental expenses. Considering that there is no proof
of living expenses of the deceased, net earnings are computed at fifty percent (50%)
of the gross earnings.[58] The formula used by this Court in computing loss of
earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)][59]
In this case, the Court notes that the victim was 27 years old at the time of his death
and his mother testified that as a driver of the Tamaraw FX taxi, he was earning
P650.00 a day.[60] Hence, the damages payable for the loss of the victim's earning
capacity is computed thus:

12
Gross Annual Earnings = P650 x 261 working days in a year = P169,650.00
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80-27) x [P169,650.00 - P84,825.00] = 35.33 x
84,825.00 = P2,996,867.20
Based on the foregoing computation, the award of the trial court with regard to lost
income is thus modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, in
Criminal Cases No. Q-95-63963, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (The Anti-Carnapping Law) is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants are SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; and are ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of the
victim Christian Bermudez the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of P2,996,867.20 representing lost
earnings. The award of P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses is DELETED for
lack of substantial proof. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS DOCTOLERO,
SR., accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 131866 | 2001-08-20
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Carlos Doctolero Sr. appeals from the decision dated 10 September 1997 in Criminal
Case No. 14735-R of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch VI, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The information against Doctolero states"That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one VICENTE GANONGAN JR. with a gun, thereby inflicting upon the
latter gunshot wounds of the trunk which caused hemorrhage, and as a result
thereof, the said Vicente Ganongan, Jr. died.
"That in the commission of the offense the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the same considering that the accused suddenly attacked the
victim who did not have any means to defend himself because of the suddenness of
the attack.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
Upon arraignment, Doctolero entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Prosecution evidence showed that on November 20, 1996 at around 7:00 in the
evening, Vicente Ganongan Jr. and Roderick Litorco went to their friends' boarding
house on Honeymoon Road, Baguio City. Thereat, Vicente Ganongan, Roderick
Litorco, Regie Daodaoan, Rex Tabanganay, Jeffrey Alimani and Florencio Dagson
agreed to drink gin in Sangatan Store, which is about 20 meters from the boarding
house. After two (2) hours, the group decided to go home. They went down
Honeymoon road towards Rimando road to get a taxi for Litorco. Upon noticing that
Litorco could not carry himself, they decided to bring him to their boarding house.
Dagson assisted Litorco and walked ahead of Ganongan, Daodaoan, Tabanganay and
Alimani. As the latter four neared the Garcia store along Honeymoon road, Carlos

Garcia, with three companions, told them to stop, pointing a gun at them. Hearing
the commotion, Dagson who was walking about 5 to 7 meters ahead with Litorco
rushed to the boarding house and sought help. When Dagson came back, he was
with Oliver Alimani, Arman Alimani and Dexter Daggay. When they arrived, they saw
Garcia pointing a gun at the group of Ganongan, Daodaoan, Tabanganay and Jeffrey
Alimani. Oliver Alimani approached Garcia who in turn pointed his gun at Oliver and
identified himself as barangay kagawad. At this time, Carlos Doctolero Sr. was
standing at the edge of Honeymoon road. He then put his arm over Daodaoan's
shoulder. Daoadaoan shoved Doctolero's hand and retreated. Doctolero stepped
back and fired twice at Daodaoan but missed. Tabanganay asked Daodaoan if he
was hit and upon answering that he was not, Tabanganay shouted at his friends to
run. When Ganongan turned around to run, Doctolero fired at him, hitting him twice.
Oliver Alimani came to Ganongan's aid when the latter yelled that he was hit.
Thereafter, they hailed a taxi and rushed Ganongan to Saint Louis University
Hospital where he expired.
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He testified
that while he was in his house watching a television program, the telephone rang.
His wife answered the phone and it turned out that it was Carlos Garcia's wife asking
for help. When he opened his window and looked outside, he saw several men
running and shouting. Sensing trouble, he went out, took his licensed handgun and
tucked it in his waist. His wife followed. Arriving at the scene of the incident, he saw
the group of young men, drunk, shouting and holding stones poised to strike at the
group of Carlos Garcia. He tried to pacify the contending parties but the group of
young men did not heed his plea to stop the trouble and instead advanced towards
him with stones held in their hands. He then pulled his gun and fired a warning shot
directed upwards. The group of men continued to approach him. Thus, he was forced
to fire another warning shot directed towards the ground. As the group of young
men approached him, he retreated and his right foot slipped into the canal at the
edge of the road where he fell. The handgun that he was holding fell to the ditch. At
this juncture, he heard two (2) more shots coming from the direction of Carlos
Garcia. Thereafter, he declared that a taxi coming from upper Honeymoon road
passed by. Upon reaching the Garcia store, one of the passengers shouted and
blamed Garcia in shooting one of their companions. He claimed that he confronted
Garcia about what he heard from the passengers of the taxi but Garcia told him just
to ignore what he heard. After the incident, he proceeded to Garcia's house. After a
while, he went home and entered through the back door of his house. He cleaned his
gun, threw the spent shells, changed his soiled clothes and narrated to his wife what
happened. After some time, both he and his wife fell asleep.
As aforestated, accused-appellant was convicted of murder after appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Ganongan the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P227,808.80 as actual damages, and
P300,000.00 as moral damages plus costs, to wit"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Carlos Doctolero, Sr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the Information,
and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of deceased
Vicente Ganongan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death; the sum of
P227,808.80 as actual damages for expenses incurred for hospitalization, doctor's
fees, funeral expenses, vigil and burial as a result of his death, and P300,000.00 as
Moral damages for the pain and mental anguish suffered by the heirs by reason of

13
his death, all indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

witnesses were unanimous in identifying accused-appellant as the person who killed

Ganongan.

"The accused being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his

preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused-appellant avers that the trial court erred in not giving probative weight to
the testimony of defense witness Zoilo Estolas who testified that -

"The Court directs that the Prosecutor's Office of Baguio conduct a preliminary
investigation on the participation of Carlos Garcia in the shooting incident resulting
in the death of Vicente Ganongan, Jr. on November 20, 1996, informing the latter
accordingly of the same and if warranted by the evidence, to file the appropriate
Information. "SO ORDERED."[2]
In his appeal, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred - [3]
"I. in disregarding the physical, testimonial and documentary evidence which, if
appreciated, would have exonerated the accused.
"II. in anchoring its decision entirely on and giving full credence to the testimony of
the prosecution's purported eyewitness.
"III. in giving primacy to, and basing its decision, on supposed weakness of the
defense.
"IV. in disregarding the unrebutted evidence of part of res gestae.
"V. in completely disregarding the testimony of defense witness Zoilo Estolas.
"VI. in disregarding the unrebutted evidence on the character and reputation of the
accused.
"VII. in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
"VIII. in convicting the accused and disregarding the principle of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant professes his innocence and seeks an acquittal on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains
that it was Carlos Garcia who fired the fatal shots.[4]
Records reveal that Oliver Alimani[5] and Jeffrey Alimani[6] positively identified
accused-appellant as the one who shot Ganongan when the latter was about to run.
They were present at the incident and saw at close range when accused-appellant
fired his gun. Their testimonies are consistent with the findings of the medico-legal
officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver that Ganongan sustained four (4)
gunshot wounds, consisting of two (2) points of entry and two (2) points of exit[7]
such that the first gunshot wound was the one located at the back.[8] Notably, a
witness' testimony which is corroborated by the autopsy report is credible.[9]
Accused-appellant insists that the trial court erred in disregarding the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses who corroborated his defense. He stakes his appeal on the
assertion that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses were biased and inconsistent
which should not be relied upon. These allegations of inconsistent testimonies - that
it was impossible for Litorco, being so drunk to be carried by just one man; that
Litorco and Dagson, being so drunk, could not walk faster than the rest of his friends
who were following, about 5 to 7 meters, behind;[10] that Dagson was inconsistent
on the place where he left Litorco, whether in Sangatan store or in the boarding
house;[11] or the incompatible testimony that the boarding house was lighted or not
when Dagson arrived and woke up his friends[12] - merely refer to minor details
which do not negate the fact that the prosecution witnesses saw the fatal shooting.
Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the
credibility of the witness where there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.[13] As a whole, prosecution

"xxx he was in front of his store smoking cigarette at about 9:00 in the evening of
November 20, 1996. His store is between Garcia's Store and Annabel's Store. While
smoking, he heard chasing, shouting and stoning about 15 meters away from him.
They were familiar to him as the group of Kalinga students and they were chasing
two male persons who went down to the house of Engr. Genove. He did not
recognize the two male persons being chased. The group of Kalinga students were
stopped by Garcia, a barangay kagawad, and his three companions. Garcia shouted,
'You stop and raise your hands,' while pointing a gun at them. And the group of
young men answered back., 'Why? What is our fault? Why do you point your gun at
us?' And Garcia insisted saying he is a barangay official. At that time the young men
were noisy and in a drunken state. Suddenly, the 3 companions of Garcia engaged
the young men in a street fight using fists and feet. The rumble lasted about two
minutes when one of the group of Kalinga students ran away shouting, 'I will call the
police!' That was when the group of Garcia and the group of Kalinga students parted
ways. He saw again chasing and running. He ran back to his store and it was then
that he heard two successive gunshots. He did not see who fired the successive
gunshots. But he looked towards the source of the gunshots and saw Doctolero and
Garcia each holding a gun. And it was then that the group of young men advanced
towards Doctolero. The young men advanced towards Doctolero with their hands
poised to throw stones they were holding. Doctolero retreated and fell to the canal.
It was then that Garcia fired his gun. Apprehensive, Estolas returned to his house.
But while going towards his yard, he heard another burst of gunfire. He did not see
anymore who fired the last shot. He saw Garcia and Doctolero going near the store
of Garcia after which a taxicab came and one of the passengers shouted, 'Vulva of
your mother, Garcia. Why did you shoot one of our companions? We will be
back.'"[14]
Proceeding from Estolas' testimony, even if admitted, will not reinforce the defense
of denial advanced by accused-appellant considering that he admitted that he did
not see who actually killed Ganongan. Moreover, his testimony that he heard the
passenger of the taxi shouting at Garcia and blaming him for shooting Ganongan
suffers a fatal defect. It has been established that prosecution witnesses do not
know Garcia and accused-appellant by name but merely refer to them as barangay
kagawad. This, nonetheless, does not affect the admissibility of the identification
because one need not identify the assailant by name. What is important is that he is
positive as to the physical identification of the accused.[15] Prosecution witnesses
declared that they could identify the person responsible in the shooting incident if
ever they would see them again.[16] They were able to immediately identify
accused-appellant on the basis of the photographs shown to them at the Barangay
Affairs Office on November 21, 1996.
In sum, accused-appellant's appeal hinges on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. The trial court found the eyewitness account to be spontaneous,
consistent and credible.[17] Time and again, we have ruled that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on matters of credibility,
considering that the latter was in a better position to appreciate the same, having
heard and observed the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment, as
well as their manner of testifying, during the trial.[18] We see no reason to depart
from the well-entrenched doctrine that findings of facts of the lower court are

14
accorded due respect and weight unless it has overlooked material and relevant
points that would have led it to rule otherwise.[19] Accused-appellant's conviction
was grounded on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution positively
establishing his presence at the scene of the crime and identifying him as the one
who fired the fatal shots. It is true that the prosecution witnesses are friends of the
deceased. Even so, other witnesses, who are relatives and friends of the deceased,
would not just indiscriminately impute the crime to anybody but would necessarily
identify and seek the conviction of the real culprit to attain justice.[20] Relationship
by itself does not give rise to the presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it
ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of the witness.[21] No ill
motive was attributed to these witnesses that could make them falsely testify
against accused-appellant.
The trial court concluded that treachery attended the commission of the crime and
rationalizes in this wise "xxx, given the circumstances above discussed that at the time Ganongan was shot
he was already on the run with his back turned towards Doctolero, there was no
danger or risk to the latter when he fired at Ganongan. Nor was there any necessity
for it for Ganongan was drunk, unarmed and on the run and could not possibly harm
Doctolero. In that situation there was no way Ganongan could defend himself. He
was not armed. He was drunk. He was running away. He could not see who was
going to fire from behind him. He would not know to whom and what direction the
shots will be fired. He cannot dodge or avoid the shots which he cannot see nor
know when fired.
"And since Honeymoon Road is an ascending road, literally Doctolero and Garcia had
a turkey shot. Doctolero was like shooting turkey. Ganongan was a sitting duck.
Firing once at Ganongan and the Kalinga students may be considered accidental
even casual impelled by the moment's necessity. But firing at Ganongan once, twice,
thrice, four times and even five times would indicate already a method deliberately
adopted to pick anyone from the group to shoot at like in target practice. And if you
consider that Doctolero and Garcia both fired their guns simultaneously if not in
rapid succession as shown by the evidence, the treacherous manner in which
Ganongan was shot can readily be appreciated in that the Kalinga students running
away were being shot at like animals with the blazing guns of Doctolero and Garcia.
There was completely no reason to shoot them as they were simply drunk, noisy and
unruly but unarmed."[22]
After a close scrutiny of the records, we are not fully persuaded that treachery
qualified the crime. Circumstances qualifying a killing to murder such as treachery
must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.[23] For treachery to be
appreciated, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(2) the said means of execution be deliberately or consciously adopted.[24] In the
instant case, the victim was shot at his back while attempting to run. While the
initial shooting that hit Ganongan at his back appears to have been sudden and
unexpected, suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of
treachery, so long as the decision to kill was made at that instant and the victim's
helpless position was accidental.[25] In the instant case, prosecution witness
Florencio Dagson testified that he was walking ahead of his friends and he was not
able to witness how the altercation started. The failure of the prosecution to present
evidence as to the manner in which the altercation started precludes a finding that
the killing was qualified by treachery.[26] Here, Dagson's attention was caught by
the loud voices coming from behind and seeing his friends being stopped by a group

of men, he hurriedly sought the help of his friends in the boarding house. Arriving at
the scene, Jeffrey Alimani, Oliver Alimani and Florencio Dagson saw that both Carlos
Garcia and accused-appellant were holding their respective guns. Significantly, they
testified that accused-appellant fired at Ganongan. To establish treachery, the
evidence must show that the accused has made some preparations to kill the victim
in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or
hard for the person attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the
moment is not treacherous.[27] What was clear was the fact that prosecution
witnesses saw accused-appellant shot Ganongan. No more, no less. The prosecution
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that accused-appellant deliberately
adopted such means of execution to ensure the killing of Ganongan. Any doubt as to
the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[28] Hence,
absent clear and convincing proof of treachery, accused-appellant can only be
convicted of homicide.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion
temporal. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.[29] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and there being no modifying circumstance, the minimum of the
imposable penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or more
specifically prision mayor. Accordingly, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
years (14) years, 8 months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
With respect to the damages awarded by the trial court, we deem it proper to
reduce the award to P112,413.40 representing funeral expenses, which were duly
proven and covered by receipts. Expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st
year anniversaries cannot be considered in the award of actual damages as these
were incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim.[30]
With respect to the award of moral damages,[31] the same is reduced to P50,000.00
in accordance with existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that,
instead of murder the Court finds accused-appellant, Carlos Doctorlero, Sr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and imposes upon him an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen years (14) years, 8 months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and orders him to pay the heirs of Vicente Ganongan Jr., P112,413.40 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages
plus costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLLY ABULENCIA Y
COYOS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 138403 | 2001-08-22
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In the multitude of cases which passed this Court, we did not flinch in sending men
rapacious of the flesh to the gallows. Lamentably, there still remains such callous
men who commit unimaginable acts and even concoct tales, no matter how absurd,
just to exculpate themselves.
The case at bench is an illustration.

15
On August 4, 1998, a cold-blooded ravager, Rolly Abulencia y Coyos, preyed on tenyear old Rebelyn Garcia.
In the early morning of the following day, Rebelyn's lifeless, naked body was found
floating at the Colobong creek in San Manuel, Pangasinan, with marks of bruises,
burns and injuries manifesting that she was defiled and later drowned to death.
In an Information dated September 7, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. U-9777,
Abulencia was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City for
rape with homicide. The Information reads:
"That on or about August 4, 1998, between 5:00 o'clock P.M. to 8:00 0'clock in the
evening, at barangay San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloneously (sic) have carnal knowledge of one REBELYN GARCIA y
AGAPAY, a minor 10 years of age. That by reason thereof, to conceal his criminal act,
with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drown said
Rebelyn Garcia y Agapay in the San Juan River of said municipality. The body of the
victim was later retrieved at the Colobong Creek at Sitio Casilagan, Brgy. San Juan,
San Manuel, Pangasinan, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
"Contrary to Art.266-A, No. 1(d), Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Art.249,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."[1]
When arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, Abulencia pleaded not guilty. At the
trial, the prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, PO3
Avelino Sandi, PO3 Randy Bergado, Dennis Mojares, Reynaldo Garcia, Jr. and
Reynaldo Garcia, Sr. The defense presented, as lone witness, Abulencia himself.
The facts are not disputed:
Rebelyn Garcia, the victim, was a 10-year old[2] lass from Poblacion, Asingan,
Pangasinan and a fourth grader at the Narciso Ramos Elementary School. She is the
daughter of Reynaldo and Alicia Garcia.[3]
On August 4, 1998, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Rebelyn's brother,
Reynaldo Garcia, Jr., and a jeepney driver were at the Asingan jeepney terminal
waiting for passengers.[4]
After two (2) hours, accused Rolly Abulencia arrived and invited Reynaldo to a
drinking spree.[5] Reynaldo joined Abulencia and one Reynaldo Pascua in drinking
Red Horse beer at the Asingan jeepney terminal. At about 12 o'clock noon, each one
had consumed about four (4) bottles of beer.[6]
Thereafter, Reynaldo and Abulencia rode a tricycle and proceed to the former's
residence at Poblacion, Asingan where they again drank beer and later slept on a
bamboo bed (papag). Rebelyn was then inside the house. At that time, her parents
were not around.[7]
Reynaldo and Abulencia woke up at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that day.
Abulencia then asked permission to buy dilis from a nearby store. But Reynaldo,
noticing that Abulencia was drunk, advised the latter not to leave.[8] Abulencia
ignored Reynaldo and went out. Rebelyn tagged along.[9]

Abulencia and Rebelyn never returned, although the store where they were
supposed to buy dilis is merely 40 meters away from the house.[10] Thereupon,
Reynaldo and his family started looking for the two as far as Rosales, Pangasinan but
failed to find them.[11]
About 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of
San Manuel, Pangasinan. PO3 Randy Bergado, a PNP officer assigned in San Manuel
who was then in the mayor's house, was informed by Abulencia that "he had a small
girl companion that he accidentally bumped at the Aburido bridge" and who "might
have been dead because the flow of the river is so fast."[12]
PO3 Bergado immediately turned over Abulencia to the San Manuel police station.
Forthwith, PO3 Avelino Sandi entered the incident in the police blotter. Abulencia
was later detained.[13]
At about 6:00 o'clock the following morning (August 5, 1998), Rebelyn's lifeless,
naked body was found floating at the Colobong creek near the Aburido bridge at
Sitio Casilagan, San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan.[14]
Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, Municipal Health Officer, conducted an autopsy on the victim's
cadaver. The doctor's autopsy report states:
"A. External Findings:
Head - lacerated wound about 1 cm. in length at the corner of the left eye
(superficial)
- Multiple hematoma, contussion forehead;
- Lacerated wound about 1 1/4 inches in length at the frontal area;
- 2 lacerated wound about one inch + 0.5 inch. respectively, at the rt. temporal area.
- lacerated wound about 0.5 cm. In length at the rt. lower lip
Chest - hematoma at the upper portion of the sternum
Extremities - Multiple burn on both upper arms.
Genitalia - Multiple vaginal wall and hymenal laceration
NOTE:
Vaginal smear taken for the presence of spermatozoa. Result is negative.
"B. Internal Findings:
Lungs - presence of H2O in the lung tissues.
"CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-respiratory arrest 2 drowning; shock 2 rape."[15]
Dr. Tuvera further found that the multiple lacerations on the vaginal wall and hymen
of Rebelyn'sgenitalia indicate that a hard object, probably an erect penis, was
inserted therein;[16] and that the presence of a large amount of water in Rebelyn's
lungs indicates that she was submerged and droned.[17]
Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio, testified that on
August 6, 1998, when he interviewed Abulencia at the Municipal Jail of San Manuel,
Pangasinan, the latter admitted having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the
bridge.[18] The interview was tape recorded, which tape Mojares identified and
presented in court.[19]
In his defense, accused Rolly Abulencia denied the charge. In gist,[20] the following
is his story: After he left the Garcia residence at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of August 4, 1998 to buy dilis in the market, he noticed Rebelyn Garcia following

16
him. But he just ignored her. However, upon reaching the market, he decided not to
buy dilis anymore. Instead, he went home to Binalonan, Pangasinan. He then
proceeded towards San Manuel while Rebelyn continued to follow him closely.
Annoyed, he told her he was going to San Manuel, but she insisted on following him
because she wanted to go to his house. They then took the provincial road, but upon
reaching the Aburido bridge, he distanced himself from the girl. However, she ran
towards him. While she was running, he tried to tell her to go home, but in doing so
he accidentally tripped (napatid) her off, causing her to fall from the bridge. He got
nervous and proceeded to the house of his Auntie Deciang Delfin and asked her to
accompany him to the authorities so he could surrender. They approached Mayor
Sevilleja of San Miguel, Pangasinan.
After the trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its decision dated March 16,
1999, convicting accused Rolly Abulencia of the crime as charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds ROLLY ABULENCIA y COYOS, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of aggravated RAPE WITH HOMICIDE (punishable under Article
266-A, No. 1(d) and Article 266-B, paragraph 4 of republic Act No. 8353, in relation to
Article 249, Revised Penal Code and republic Act No. 7659) and the Court sentences
Rolly Abulencia to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner
provided for by law. Ordering the accused to indemnify the heirs of Rebelyn Garcia,
the sum of P75,000.00 damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 for exemplary
damages plus P6,425.00 as actual damages."
xxx xxx xxx"[21]
Appellant Rolly Abulencia bewails his conviction, asserting that the court a quo: "I
"x x x GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING (HIM) OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
PRINCIPALLY ON THE MEDICO-LEGAL FINDINGS (EXHIBIT "A") AND DESPITE THE
PAUCITY OF DIRECT EVIDENCE POINTING TO (HIM) AS THE CULPRIT IN THE X X X
INCIDENT.
"II
"x x x ERRED IN RELYING ON THE VULNERABILITY OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RATHER
THAN THE STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IN FINDING A VERDICT OF GUILT
AGAINST (HIM)."[22]
Appellant mainly contends that there is no direct evidence linking him to the
commission of the crime and that the findings of the medico-legal officer are not
sufficient to warrant his conviction by the trial court.
This Court does not agree.
Normally, the crime of rape - whether simple, qualified or complexed with other
crimes - is committed in seclusion, thereby rendering its prosecution difficult owing
to the absence of witnesses to its commission.
The prosecution of such crime becomes even more intricate and complex if homicide
is committed since the victim herself would no longer be able to testify against the
perpetrator. In most cases, only circumstantial evidence is available to prove its
commission.[23]
The absence of direct evidence, however, does not preclude the conviction of a
person accused of the complex crime of rape with homicide. Circumstantial evidence
can be as potent as direct evidence to sustain a conviction provided that there is a

concurrence of all the requisites prescribed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, thus:
"Sec. 5. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient.- Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
"(a) There is more than one circumstance;
"(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.[24]
Likewise this Court has held that an accused can be convicted based on
circumstantial evidence if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[25]
Admittedly, in the case at bar, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence
in finding that the appellant is guilty as charged - and it did so correctly.
It is established from the testimony of prosecution witness Reynaldo Garcia, Jr. that
he met the appellant in the morning of that fateful day of August 4, 1998 and later,
both engaged in a drinking spree; that they slept on the papag of Garcia's house in
the afternoon of that day; that the victim Rebelyn, was also in the same house at
that time; that after waking up, the appellant left the house at about 5:30 o'clock in
the afternoon to buy dilis in the nearby store located 40 meters away, the victim
tagging along; that the appellant and Rebelyn never returned; that in the evening of
the same day, the appellant surrendered to Mayor Sevilleja, reporting that he was
with the victim when the latter allegedly fell from the bridge after he "accidentally
tripped (napatid) her" off; that the appellant admitted having raped the victim in a
tape interview by Dennis Mojares, another prosecution witness; that the victim was
found dead the following morning floating at the Colobong creek near the Aburido
bridge; and that the autopsy conducted on her cadaver shows that she was sexually
abused and, thereafter, brutally killed.
The appellant himself admitted that he was alone with Rebelyn in the evening of
August 4, 1998. His only defense is that Rebelyn died because she accidentally fell
from the bridge. We find her tale so fantastic to be accorded any iota of credibility.
This is his incredible story:
"COURT: How about Rebelyn when you left the house?
"A I saw Rebelyn when I was on my way to the market, sir, she was at my back.
"Q On your way, Rebelyn was following you in the market?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: When did you notice Rebelyn to be following you?
"A When she was at my back, sir.
"Q And when you noticed that she was following you, what did you do?
"A I did not mind, sir.
"COURT: You just ignored her?
"A Yes, sir.
ATTY. FLORRENDO: And you were able to reach the public market?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Upon reaching the public market, what happened?
"A I decided to go home, sir.
"COURT: But you were able to buy dilis?
"A No more, sir, but I decided to go home.

17
"Q Whereat?
"A Binalonan, Pangasinan, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: Where was Rebelyn when you decided to go home?
"A She was at my back following me, sir.
"COURT: You said you decided to go home to Binalonan, Pangasinan did you take a
jeep?
"A No, sir, I just walked.
"Q From the public market of Asingan to Binalonan you just walked?
"A I walked but I was not able to reach Binalonan, sir.
"Q You decided to go home not to buy dilis anymore?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And yodu thought of going home?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you able to go home?
"A No, sir.
"Q From the public market where did you go?
"A San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan, sir.
"Q From the public market where did you go
"A I proceeded to San Manuel, Pangasinan.
"Q What did you take in going to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A I just walked, sir.
"Q You mean to say that you walked this distance from the public market of Asingan
to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q From the public market proceeding to San Manuel, where was Rebelyn?
"A She was at my back, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: While you were walking towards San Manuel, Pangasinan, did you
ever talk to Rebelyn?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean to tell us that Rebelyn was already walking with you side by side?
"A Yes, sir.
"COURT: Did you tell Rebelyn that you are proceeding to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Despite of that she is still following you?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: By the way, while you were at the public market at Asingan,
Pangasinan, did Rebelyn ever talk to you?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What else did she tell you?
"A She told me that she will go to our house, sir.
"Q She told you that she pay a visit to your house?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q While walking with Rebelyn what place were you able to reach?
"A Aburido, sir.
"COURT: What route did you take going to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A The provincial road, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: While you were at the Aburido bridge what were you doing with
Rebelyn?
"A I was running away from her, sir.
"Q You were running away from Rebelyn why?
"A Because I want her to be left, sir.
"Q And what did Rebelyn do when you tried to run away from her?
"A She ran following me, sir.
"Q By the way, what is that Aburido bridge?

"A A cemented bridge, sir.

"Q So, when she ran towards you, what happened, Mr. Witness?
"A I accidentally tripped (napatid) her, sir.
"Q When you said that you accidentally tripped Rebelyn what happened to her?
"A She fell to the bridge.
"Q When Rebelyn fell to the bridge what else happened?
"A I went home, sir.
x x x"[26]
We cannot accept as a valid defense such kind of tale which is highly preposterous
and obviously contrary to the common experience of mankind. Time and again, we
declared the legal truism that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. Human perception
can be warped by the impact of events and testimony colored by the unconscious
workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a
witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind."[27]
Appellant's defense is a mere denial which is intrinsically weak. To merit credence, it
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.[28] This, the appellant
failed to do.
Even granting that Rebelyn fell from the bridge, the autopsy report of Dr. Tuvera
does not support such incident.
As found by Dr. Tuvera, Rebelyn's body bore injuries not attributed to a fall. There
were multiple cigarette burns on both her upper arms.[29] Her genitalia showed
multiple lacerations on the vaginal wall and hymen extending to the upper part of
the urethra.[30]
Anent the injuries found in Rebelyn's genitalia, Dr. Tuvera observed:
"COURT: What does multiple vaginal wall laceration indicate?
"A It indicates that in he vaginal area, a foreign object was inserted, there is contact,
sir.
"Q What is your conclusion?
"A Probably a male genitalia or any hard object, sir.
"Q What does multiple laceration on the vaginal wall to the urethra indicate?
"A It indicates that there is a contact in the genitalia, it may be caused by erect
penis or genitalia of a male or maybe caused by a hard object, sir."[31]
And this fact is more revealing. Rebelyn's body was found naked. If she merely fell
from the bridge, as appellant wants us to believe, it is highly improbable that the
current of the river would totally undress her.
The appellant also contends that the absence of spermatozoa in Rebelyn's genitalia
and the failure of Dr. Tuvera to show that the lacerations were fresh do not prove
that the victim was raped.
This argument does not persuade us. The absence of spermatozoa does not negate
a finding of rape considering that its presence is not an essential element of the
crime.
The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, taken together with the condition of
Rebelyn's body when found, eloquently indicate that the appellant sexually
assaulted her before drowning her to death.

18
It bears stressing that appellant admitted having raped Rebelyn when he was
interviewed by Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares'
testimony lends support to our conclusion. We have held that "a confession to a
radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for
the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is
apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear."[32]
After considering all the evidence presented, this Court is constrained to affirm the
appealed decision of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon the appellant.
We, however, modify the same insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned.
Although this matter has not been raised by the parties, especially the Solicitor
General, it is a settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal to the Supreme Court
throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to
correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether they are
made the subject of assignments of error or not.[33]
With regard to the civil indemnity, the trial court awarded only P75,000.00 Current
jurisprudence has fixed at P100,000.00 the civil indemnity in cases of rape with
homicide, which is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of
that special complex crime.[34]
The trial court did not award moral damages to the victim's family. Based on
prevailing jurisprudence, however, moral damages may be awarded to the heirs of
the victim without need for pleading or proof of its basis for their mental, physical
and psychological sufferings are too obvious to still require their recital at the trial.
Hence, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 must be awarded.[35]
In People vs. Lagarto,[36] we held that attendant circumstances may be considered
to determine civil liability. Thus, in view of the evident cruelty inflicted upon Rebelyn,
as shown by the multiple burns and contusions on her body, we grant the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00[37]
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority members that the law is constitutional and that
the death penalty should be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting ROLLY ABULENCIA y COYOS of the
crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. Appellant is
thus ordered to PAY the heirs of Rebelyn Garcia P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P6,425.00
as actual damages.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25
of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the certified true copy of
the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power. SO ORDERED.
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ, petitionersappellants, vs. HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y
TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-32055 | 1988-02-26
DECISION

YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of
the Honorable Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the
defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffsappellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and
Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova
Ng Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffsappellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
The background facts of the case are as follows:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan,
bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was
riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case
No. 92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo
Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969
in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."
On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the
Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled
"Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action
"on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10,
1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already
elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right
to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the
dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend
the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order,
plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as their main reasons the following:
I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action
is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed
independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the
hearing of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismissed the civil case
against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal
case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court against
Domingo Pontino.
III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against
Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova
Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino for
homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly done
considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to
recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."
We find the appeal meritorious.
The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by
the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court
treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by

19
the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending
before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:

impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

"It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasidelict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No.
92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate
civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages
is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the
ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."

"Section 2.Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to
the instant case. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:

"Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant."

"The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his
employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even
while the criminal case against the employee is still pending?
To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasidelict. According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime. With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New
Civil Code provides:
'Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter
2, Preliminary, Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating
damages.'
xxx xxx xxx
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following
requisites must be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the
discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his
civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla,
Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964]).
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable."
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.
If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on
quasi-delict.1 The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file
an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, which provide:
"Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that

The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in

accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even
without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case
which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasidelict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:
"However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free
from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of
the trial court, dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for
further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN
RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45129 | 1987-03-06
DECISION
FELICIANO, J:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set
aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively,
quashing an information for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia
on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of
the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city
judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent

20
Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city
government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1 owned
by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the
allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of
electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold
storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted
in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices
"in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter." 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City
Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was,
under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos
(P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:
"The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation
of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1,
S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the
said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and
devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice
Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized
installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City
Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY
ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (41,062.16) Philippine
currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the
damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated
amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency."
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2
February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that
the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there
sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to
award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion
to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a
light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it
appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months
after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City
filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II, another information
against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in
relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information
read as follows:
"The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of
theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of
February, 1975, at Kumintang, Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate
electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO
PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by
the City Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16."
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been
previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the
filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By
Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to
Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the
following paragraphs:
"The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly
pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution
"accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and
Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City
Government of Batangas, etc." (emphasis supplied). The first case, as it appears,
was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of
P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived
the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric
installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which were done at one
instance on a particular date between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as
the information states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without
proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of
electric wirings and devices, etc." (italics supplied), it was meant to include the
P41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The
information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975,
he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the Civil
Court, he had already been exposed or he felt he was exposed to consequences of
what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 which had
allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16."
(Emphases and parentheses in the original).
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner was
denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in
this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of

21
conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information
filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an
ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements are needed to
constitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an
installation; and (2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the
Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer. The
petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance - which read as
follows:.

"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not
the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the
second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information." 8

"Section 3. Connection and Installation:"a) . . . .

(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their connection with
the Electrical System shall be done either by the employee of the system duly
authorized by its Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly authorized
by the District Engineer. Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of
installation or connection with the system to be undertaken by the persons not duly
authorized therefor shall be considered guilty of violation of the ordinance."

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." (Emphasis supplied;
Article IV (22),1973 Constitution) 9

would show that:

"The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical
installations on residences or buildings be done by persons duly authorized or adept
in the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is
primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of electric
fluid which is already covered by the Revised Penal Code." 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument
continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority from the
proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense under the city
ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the offender
generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric
fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal
Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. These elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things." 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be
effected even without illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by, for
instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual
electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of the
same." 7
The petitioner concludes that:

The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both
from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved - which reads as
follows:

and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the
same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or
prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of
acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the
Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series
of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The
information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive[n]
and operate[d]" an automobile - "recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby
endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street." Three months
later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal
Court, this time with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The
information charged him with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No.
3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating an
automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting
injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information
upon the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
act. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another
municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a
petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of
the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having reversed
the respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from continuing
with Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought the case to the
Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the decision appealed from and
holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was available to
petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
wrote:
"To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving - with
which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance - is a violation of the Revised

22
Penal Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act No. 3992,
as amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a
violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed
through reckless driving are punishable under different provisions of said Automobile
Law. Hence - from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or
Constitutional Law - they constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under
certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once placed
in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the
other, as in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original).
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act
is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first
sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not
included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second
sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact
that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a
statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the
plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be
availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been
neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the
information in case No. 16443, petitioner could - if he failed to plead double jeopardy
- be convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already
been acquitted. The information in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the
date and in the price therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without reasonable caution" an
automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand, the information in
case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place,
petitioner drove and operated the aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and
negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city
ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second information were not
established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in case No. 16443 of the
very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he
pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the
theory of petitioner herein."
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to
the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier
and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical

inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed
and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute
or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two
different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and
another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of
the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction
or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by
municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The
two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by
different rule-making authorities - though one be subordinate to the other - and the
plea of double jeopardy would never be. The discussions during the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for
the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the
essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set
out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of
identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a
municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance,
by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the
accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and
space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and
where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or
voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different
legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City
Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence under the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the same act or sets of acts - that is, the
operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional technical element of
serious physical injuries related to the physical consequences of the operation of the
automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the body of the
offended party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the
accused operated the automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence
permeated the acts of the accused throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from
November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia
installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant
without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal
authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing his electric power bill. This corrupt
intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation
began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the
inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding
recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

23
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to
be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown
need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the
"same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of
double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law
here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted
by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and
later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen, et al., 88 Phil.
51 (1951):
"While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense,
it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted
for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or
omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the
prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by
said act or omission by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the
theory of appellant the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by
merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended
girl from remaining a virgin." (88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied).
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion
and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a
moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many
different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an
enterprising prosecutor can find.
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such
offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is
one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court,
an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and
mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman
who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the community. Manuel
Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by
inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he
should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the
fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available
even to the private respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light
system, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before the City Court of
Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal
liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with
it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case,

as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police
investigation having stolen electric current through the installation and use of
unauthorized electrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty
before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric
power. However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the
electric power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having
been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which
dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17)
before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been
waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment
conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action
for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City
for further proceedings as indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs.SO
ORDERED.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 107125 | 2001-01-29
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George
Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence
without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment
in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable
and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria
Nicolas P104,400.00representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their
son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging
petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same
while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws,
regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to
sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of
Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

24
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio... decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him
that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also
from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but...said that the accused
also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the
accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they
proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they
consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home.
Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin
and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a
duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate
and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go
bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused
who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago,
Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley
they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley
became vacant the accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club.
They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left
the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo...and then they
decided to go home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the
accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back
seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at
a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to
Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours
on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when
they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately tried
to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but
he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with
each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the
side of the highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores
Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on
the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away
from the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon
the following morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal
Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside
the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away)
the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the
deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died
that night (Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and
legs.[2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same
as that of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared
that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed
that:

...The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the
center of the road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at
Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights
which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly
swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested
on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the center of
the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit "1") and a sketch
(Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on
the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and
Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they
were all brought for treatment.[3]
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court
decided Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioner's favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him. SO ORDERED.[4]
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the trial court's judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and
that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of
the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is
hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which
was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify
plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident
occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in
all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beer...between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m."[6] It
found that petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of
Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7] and
pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,[8] a statutory presumption of negligence
existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
"because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented
by the regulation."[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of
August 24, 1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following
issues for our consideration:
FIRST - THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE
AGAIN.

25
SECOND - THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD
DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE
NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE
PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY
INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF
THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD - THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND
MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE
REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS
VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of
Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his
civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the
Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have
disturbed the findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless
imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial
court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his
acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for
indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in
suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and
unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence,
impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there
was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding
indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act."[10] When a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense.[11] This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to
exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.[12] In the instant
case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No.
066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal

became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal
offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower
court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor
did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's
claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of
the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.[14] The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
[15] This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the
civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions
have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined,
even though both actions involve the same act or omission.[17] The reason for this
rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence
are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking
into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he
was neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil
liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any
civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows
that the judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the nonexistence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his
acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil
Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the
conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the
trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was
really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the
negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court" and since said
"hypothesis is consistent with the record...the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict
of conviction."[18] The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was
predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral
certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit
to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

26
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding
filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on
the amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.[19] He avers that since Manchester held
that "The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was
impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as
to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial
Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was
not then customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in
the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and
demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is
applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages
awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the
Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil
actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules
of Court.[20] As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was
not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the
complaint or information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way
of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil
action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except
in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at
the time private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to
the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment
applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action,
the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not
included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other
items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are
alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.[21] Recall that the information in Criminal Case No. 066
contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a
first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to

the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing
of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner's
allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the
appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January
31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102007
September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas
y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991
in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction,
Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently,
the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard
to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accusedappellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego
1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction
is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of
Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a
consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

27
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task
of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final
and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1.
Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto
a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no
haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is
only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the
accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained,
when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil
action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same
view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment"
in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to
one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal
Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to
be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also:
People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp.
234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death
of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out.
His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then,
if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will
be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And,
as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable
in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the
Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4
People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v.
Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending
appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971
Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v.
Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil
liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his
estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of
the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by

28
the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal
act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death,
ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the
civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil
contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who
was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal
liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations
remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the
accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death
pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on
the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires
the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior
to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that
actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death
of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case,
explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title
of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same
can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this
long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged
with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public
documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but
only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive
although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing
upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in
the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate
and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability
for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal
acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus
making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . .
and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10)
days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action
for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our
ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment

29
of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex
delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the
accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our
decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil
action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the
latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the
act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in
Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible
with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the
civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question
of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due
to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx
xxx
xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89.
It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though
no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had
the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of
the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which
does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard
put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be

determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the

guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of
the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of
accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The
claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the
criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This
is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil
Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its
life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however,
failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a
separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a
summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to
an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly
made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced,
was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged.
Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of
his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal
action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis
for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal.

30
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly
observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx
xxx
xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and
Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted
together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can
continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of
the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has
been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and
Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary
civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such
as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in
Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated
in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the
restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do
not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in
(1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred
to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against
whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the

separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the
estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate,
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in
recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on
Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under
Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral
expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we
stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their
source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to
Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Law 20
Contracts
Quasi-contracts
...
Quasi-delicts

3.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,

31
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the
act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
costs de oficio.SO ORDERED.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA
ALMARIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 48006 | 1942-07-08
DECISION
BOCOBO, J:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein,
Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon
and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis.
The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino
Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was
filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted
and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the
right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance
of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest
from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals
by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla's negligence was the cause of the mishap,
as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil
Code. This fact makes said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime
as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil
Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only
to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not
punishable by law.'"
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
". . . We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in article
1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of
his servant or employee."
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate
civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal
Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said
Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that
has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos,
or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth,
unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in
our inquiry by the luminous presentation of this perplexing subject by renown jurists
and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the considerations in several sentences of the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:

". . . It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is no proof that he

exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. (See p.
22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding
(Exhibit A) violations which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under
the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code."

CIVIL CODE
"ART. 1089. Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi- contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes."
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by
the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been
no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot
be held responsible in this case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:

"ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter II, Title XVI of this book."

". . . The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,
the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case article 1903 of the Civil Code.

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

32
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible.
"The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
"Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject
to their authority and living with them.
"Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
"The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but
not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
next preceding article shall be applicable.
"Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
"The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.".
"Art. 1904.Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover
from the latter what he may have paid.".
REVISED PENAL CODE
"Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.
"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4
of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced subject to the following rules:
"First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part.
"Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
"Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.

"The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for
which each one shall be liable.
"When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately,
or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the
inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in
the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
"Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be
no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that
part of their property exempt from execution.
"ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in
their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery
or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
"ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties."
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
"Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be
broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless
article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But
inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but
even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes
the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a

33
concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi- delitos
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors
being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this
responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to
the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code, for instance,
Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas el dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article
1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or
culpa extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa
o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be
governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:.
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it
should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant
4. "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.).
Let u now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts
and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsabilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
"El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas.Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente
dicha, que en ningun caso lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra
que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
"The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no

case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had
been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been
prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as
subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated.
The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil
action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
"Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los
trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede
confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en
este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan
sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la
pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido
desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad
originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
"Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian
a cuento y que tienen otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga
culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal,
atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos
separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa
civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal
paralelo se notarian.
"Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del
delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio
de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el
texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en
ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo
anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de
aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las
cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas,
sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se
observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas
criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito,
son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la
obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.

34
"Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose por aadidura,
abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se
reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los
daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del
Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de
21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del
proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de
delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el
motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para
pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada."
"As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications
which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this
means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to
seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
"Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which
are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in
which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every
day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and
the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of
civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common
law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent
of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between
the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of
civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
"Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distributing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide
because article 1903 says: `The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom another is responsible.' Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during
their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or

enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and
separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
"Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so
that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different
modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has
abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to
exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the
loses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the
Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when
the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved
till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the nonexistence of the felony and the non- existence of the responsibility arising from the
crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had
jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes
clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata."
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on
which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or
culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring
to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish
Civil Code:
"The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory
in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after
the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the
principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action." (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430),
declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He
writes:
"Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u
omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por
una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son
personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero
no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del cuasi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o
de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del
maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado
(menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley
presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay,
pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la

35
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad
sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible."
"Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another
person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and
to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for
those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on
the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the
cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of
the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father,
guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore,
only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible."
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo
Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
"Es decir, no se responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia
culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el
orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los
demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos
20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente por los
actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder.'"
"That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one
is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives
rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the
penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons
on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for
the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21);
but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility
should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that article, for precisely it
imposes responsibility 'for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has
upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi- delict or culpa extra-contractual
is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In
that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car
owned by the "Compaia Electrica Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was

prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a
civil action against the street car company, praying for damages in the amount of
15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the
Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
"Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto
de que el Tribunal a quo, al condenar a la Compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del
dao causado con la muerte de Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y
efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria dictada en la causa criminal que se
siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes aspectos, y como la de lo criminal declaro dentro de
los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no calificadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, entre otras personas, a los Directores
de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifiesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hecho bajo este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la Compaia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringir los
mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa."
"Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition
that the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the
damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and
juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted
on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken
cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction
declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a
felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the
only basis of acquittal, it does not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence
which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by
employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the
Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause." (Italics supplied.).
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the
street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver,
Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault
or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article
1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of

36
criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising
from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are
directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence - which he did not overcome - under article 1903. Thus, there were two
liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi
driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiffs chose the more
expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison,
or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which
might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer
was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor)
in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the
case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his
taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the
Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty
of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.).
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action
was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent,
employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain
articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action
was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
"Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que
consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones
facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas
vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a
sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales
mercancias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion
sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de
estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que
era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de
servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
"Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no
contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez
que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa
el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparacion de los daos y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada

como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de

jerarquia administrativa."
"Considering that the sentence in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and
liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery
to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with
fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were
demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the
consignors of the receptacles:
"Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of
error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from nonfulfilment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the
delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and,
therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed
from is based, is not applicable; but it limits itself to asking for reparation for losses
and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the
unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the
plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid
down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the
defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused
the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365
[year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the
defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway, in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught
the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:.
"It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through
negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible
must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him.
According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and
secondarily by his employer.
"This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not

37
punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902
of that chapter reads:
" 'A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
" 'SEC. 1903.
The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
" 'The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
" 'Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.'"
"As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to
point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure
to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is
one `not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal
jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under
any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is
proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would
shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of
their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal
offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by
the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the
penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the
penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had
been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a
crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
"An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
"Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence

of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law
and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of
the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing
out of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this
action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully
regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now
in force in the Philippines.
"The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears
from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of
article 1093, `fault or negligence not punished by law,' as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It
has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequences of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104
of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself."
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 or 9-yearold child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages
resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile
driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in
affirming the judgment, said in part:
"If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite
direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run
his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street
northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating
until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of
Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at
a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real
Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the
child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on
the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile
had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched
out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters,
this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from
Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused
the death of the child would not have occurred."

38
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted
in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In
Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327,
the parents of the five- year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to
recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After
the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along
Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.,
owned by defendant J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter
where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night
from the burns. The trial court dismissed the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no
contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V.
House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for
the electric plant. This Court said in part:
"Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart
from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right
to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along
a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled
with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil
Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages."
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915]), the action was for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by
the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared

that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant
Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be
used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this
Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that he
exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of
negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
"As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise
selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their
particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been
used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence
that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective
condition of the steering gear."
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:.
"Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence,
but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.'"
"From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.
"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant."
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33
Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's
servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant
as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's
motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs.
Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
"The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner"
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was
Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an
action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son
Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large
pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing

39
him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora,
an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of
homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
"The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant." (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30
Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year
1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf,
which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This
Court held (p. 526):
"The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any
tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as
a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that
the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain
Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited
above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability."
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is
negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to
article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study
first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision
between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took
place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to
pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain
payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
"With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that
the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction
of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code.
The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not
punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code
and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence."

xxx xxx xxx

"Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the
Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would
permit the master to escape scot- free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction
for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our
deliberations to the effect that article 1902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded
and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)"
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition,
because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his
subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the
case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a
criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of
the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been
convicted of homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code.
The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from
civil liability. But this Court held:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code."
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's
cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's
contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's
primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character
from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed
to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is
governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give due importance to the latter
type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case
need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil
liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above
discussed.

40
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasidelitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer - in this
case the defendant-petitioner - is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have
to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In
such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana?
We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and
that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method
of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant
is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have
sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order
to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right
that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, othersfor their poor selection and all
for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just
that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could
not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence
in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y
utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee
in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a
peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need
of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer
be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make
for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re- establishes an ancient
and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action,
not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petitioner.
G.R. No. 173870
April 25, 2012
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner, vs.
GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY
MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD,
KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B.
MONSALUD, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

41
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the registered owner of a motor vehicle
challenges the Decision2 dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67764 which held him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were
run over by the said vehicle.
Factual Antecedents
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her
spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their
way home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga
Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso
passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan
Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del
Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-103473 for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated
March 13, 1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.4
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy
(Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No.
96-20219,6 an independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside
from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses
Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and
the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for the
reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the award of attorneys
fees, moral and exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims,
and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public school
teacher at the time of her death.7
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred
that the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife
do not own the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan.8 For his part,
Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends9 stole
his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented house to take it for a joyride.
Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started
by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but
without any headlights on.10 And implying that this was the manner by which the
vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence
the statements11 of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The
two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared before the
investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were off. Because
of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case
against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380.12 The
case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.13
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters
brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver.14 In any
event, Allans employment as conductor was already severed before the mishap
occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served as such conductor only from the first
week of December until December 14, 1992.15 In support of this, Oscar Jr.
presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio "Junior" Baobao

(Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep
heading to Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor.
He also believed that Crecencio started to work as such at around December 15 or
16, 1992.16 Cresencio, for his part, testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor
from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was his driver.17 He
stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he never bothered to
verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his
brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.18
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would
be parked beside Rodrigos rented house19 for the next early-morning operation.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee
subsequent to December 14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses
Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he
would pay his fare to Allan every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave
and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He
also claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to
park the jeep at the yard of his house.20 Jose likewise attested that Allan was still
the jeep conductor during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times in
mid-December of 1992.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision22 dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen
from civil liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held
civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of a
defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury is shown to be under his
management and that in the ordinary course of things, the accident would not have
happened had there been an exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr.,
as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through his
driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and
Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even
without the ignition key, they should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent
the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus
concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight constitute
negligence making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage
caused by the same.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Allan Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering
1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of insolvency, for
defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda Monsalud;
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings.

42
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR.
and NORMA DEL CARMEN.
SO ORDERED.23
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration24 contending that the provision on vicarious
liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code25 requires the
existence of employer-employee relationship and that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even
assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a
conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove
the jeep.
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights
on at the time of the accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He
further alleged that the jeep could not have been taken by only one person. As
Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 (carnapping case), based on his
experience, the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person but by at least five
people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and the deep canal
which separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a
house.26
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order27 dated June 21, 2000
granted the Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It
cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to
be subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have
committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr.
that this condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the discharge of
his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the
property owner cannot be made responsible for the damages caused by his property
by reason of the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only Allan should
bear the consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby
absolved from all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted accused
ALLAN MAGLASANG.IT IS SO ORDERED.28
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its July 11, 2006 Decision,29 the CA granted the appeal.
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there
was an employer-employee relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of
the accident. It ruled in the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies
of Geronimos witnesses than to those of Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and
Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by Geronimo,
Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the place. His
testimony was also unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice30
during the last two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios testimony, the
appellate court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon
learning that the jeep was the subject of an accident when it was his bread and

butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Oscar Jr.s asseveration that
Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Cresencio testified that he replaced a
certain Sumagang Jr.31
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the
victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and
primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the
operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen
not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was
dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have
given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its
conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were
both employees assigned to the said jeep; after a days work, said vehicle would be
parked just beside Rodrigos house where Allan also lived; the jeep could easily be
started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced
or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even
without the ignition key.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed
Order dated 21 June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is
hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN MAGLASANG are held primarily
liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants:
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr.,
and Glenda Monsalud in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for
the total amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
each for the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
(collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of Seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00);
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for the
death of the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00);
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. 32
Issues
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari alleging that the CA erred in:
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings of the
trial court;
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the
disposition of the appeal and [in going] beyond the issues of the case.33
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000
Order which was in accord with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort
committed by an employee should have been done within the scope of his assigned

43
tasks for an employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA
never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans driving the subject
vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as conductor.
Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a
registered owner of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, should not apply to him. He asserts that although Allan and his companions
were not found to have committed the crime of carnapping beyond reasonable
doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken by them from
a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle was running without its
headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started without the
ignition key.
Our Ruling
Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan
and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the
Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of
the jeep from the parking area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and
concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles
surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already
dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as
correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of
evidence required was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was
unlawfully taken.
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared
before the police that when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already
driving the jeep:
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where were
you?
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,]
January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride
together with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and Joven Orot.34
xxxx
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on
December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,]
January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride
together with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.35
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched
by Allan who was driving the jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the

jeep contrary to Rodrigos testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be
pushed by at least five people so that it could start without the ignition key.
On direct examination,36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had
informed him about the accident on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned
over to him after the incident, viz:
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what did
he carry with him if any and turned over to you?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group,
the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps
possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it
is reasonable to expect that the driver should have also returned the key to the
operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably,
Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the police
for reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr.
never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on crossexamination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed
over to him by Rodrigo:
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang who
gave the key to Allan Maglasang. Is that correct?
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he turned it
over to the police.
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it was
driven by Allan Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily given by
Rodrigo Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
A: I was not there.
Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir, I was not there.38
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-accused x
x x [n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and
[Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992, your
jeep was carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is
that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the coaccused of Allan Maglasang, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was
carnapped, is that correct?

44
A: Yes Sir.39
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that
his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was
stolen. The reason why the headlights were not on at the time of the accident was
not sufficiently established during the trial. Besides, the fact that the headlights
were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting
the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, broken
headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the
defense of unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his
jeep was stolen. The evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut
answers.
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied because
he was vigilant in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well
secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if
those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by
defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of
care."40 Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of,
the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence."41 It "recognizes that parties
may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the
principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby
place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his
part."42 The doctrine is based partly on "the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident
or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms."43
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are
as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge
and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.44
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along
the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless
the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When
Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with
regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may not

drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has
the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the
victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of
negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he
exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep.
Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr.
gave his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s
failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured
and that he had expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he
entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep
could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already
mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on
matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the
absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow his
brother Allan to use it.
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the
deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee
drove the registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb,
Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an
employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code cannot apply to him.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,45 the
car of therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being
driven by its assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank
liable for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled
doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while
the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.46 We have already
ratiocinated that:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to
the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of
the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public
highways.47
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use48 or that the subject vehicle was
stolen49 which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot
escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.1wphi1

45
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA and
sustains the awards made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,50 an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts
awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the RTC is
rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount
upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby
AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum
on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April
17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this
Decision until the payment thereof.SO ORDERED.
LUDO AND LUYM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
GABISAN SHIPPING LINES, INC. and/or ANSELMO OLASIMAN respondents.
G.R. No. 125483 | 2001-02-01
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the decision[2] dated January 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
IX, and the resolution[3] dated June 11, 1996, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in copra
processing with plant and business offices in Cebu City. Private Respondent Gabisan
Shipping Lines was the registered owner and operator of the motor vessel MV
Miguela, while the other private respondent, Anselmo Olasiman, was its captain.
Petitioner owns and operates a private wharf used by vessels for loading and
unloading of copra and other processed products. Among its wharf's facilities are
fender pile clusters for docking and mooring.
On May 21, 1990, at around 1:30 P.M., while MV Miguela was docking at petitioner's
wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. Petitioner demanded damages
from private respondents. The latter refused. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
Petitioner's evidence during trial showed that on May 21, 1990, at 1:30 P.M., MV
Miguela came to dock at petitioner's wharf. Ireneo Naval, petitioner's employee,
guided the vessel to its docking place. After the guide (small rope) was thrown from
the vessel and while the petitioner's security guard was pulling the big rope to be
tied to the bolar, MV Miguela did not slow down. The crew did not release the
vessel's anchor. Naval shouted "Reverse" to the vessel's crew, but it was too late
when the latter responded, for the vessel already rammed the pile cluster. The
impact disinclined the pile cluster and deformed the cable wires wound around it.
Naval immediately informed the vessel's captain and its chiefmate of the incident,
and instructed the guard-on-duty, Alfredo Espina, to make a spot report. The
incident was reported to Atty. Du, petitioner's vice-president for legal and corporate
affairs. Atty. Du in turn sent formal demand letters to private respondents. Marine

surveyor Carlos Degamo inspected the damage on the pile cluster and found that
one post was uprooted while two others were loosened and that the pile cluster was
leaning shoreward. Degamo hired skin diver Marvin Alferez, who found that one post
was broken at about 7 inches from the seabed and two other posts rose and cracked
at the bottom. Based on these findings, Degamo concluded that the two raised posts
were also broken under the seabed and estimated the cost of repair and
replacement at P95,000.00.
Private respondents denied the incident and the damage. Their witnesses claimed
that the damage, if any, must have occurred prior to their arrival and caused by
another vessel or by ordinary wear and tear. They averred that MV Miguela started
to slow down at 100 meters and the crew stopped the engine at 50 meters from the
pier; that Capt. Anselmo Olasiman did not order the anchor's release and chief mate
Manuel Gabisan did not hear Naval shout "Reverse". Respondents claimed that
Naval had no business in the vessels' maneuvering. When Naval informed the
vessel's officers of the incident, Olasiman sent their bodega man, Ronilo Lazara, to
dive on the same afternoon to check on the alleged damage. Lazara told Olasiman
that there was no damage. However, during direct examination, Lazara testified that
he found a crack on the side of the pile cluster, one post detached from the seabed
at a distance of about 7 inches, and seashells and seaweeds directly underneath the
uprooted post. There were scattered pieces of copra at the place where MV Miguela
docked, which indicated the prior docking by other vessels. After MV Miguela left,
another vessel docked in the same area. Petitioner did not prevent MV Miguela from
departing. When chiefmate Gabisan went to Atty. Du, the latter told him not to mind
the incident.
On rebuttal, petitioner presented Atty. Du who testified that Gabisan never went to
his office after receiving the letter-complaint; that petitioner never received any
reply to its demand letters; and that the first time Atty. Du saw Gabisan was during
the pre-trial.
On May 14, 1993, the trial court disposed the case in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the
following:
1) Php 70,000.00 actual damages, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
the time the decision is received by defendants until fully paid;
2) Php 15,000.00 exemplary damages;
3) Php 15,000.00 attorney's fees;
4) Php 10,000.00 litigation expenses.
COSTS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.SO ORDERED.[4]
In finding in favor of petitioner, the trial court found that it was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that MV Miguela rammed and damaged the pile cluster;
that petitioner's witnesses, Naval and Espina, actually saw the incident; that
respondents failed to refute the testimony of marine surveyor Degamo and skin
diver Alferez on the damages; that the officers and crew of MV Miguela were
negligent; and that respondents are solidarily liable for the damages. Upon private
respondent's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on January 10,
1996, in its decision that reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered REVERSING and
SETTING aside the decision of the Court a quo, hereby entering a new one

46
DISMISSING the Complaint for lack of merit.No pronouncement as to costs.SO
ORDERED.[5]
The CA found that petitioner's eyewitness Naval was incompetent to testify on the
negligence of the crew and officers of MV Miguela; that there were other vessels that
used the wharf for berthing and petitioner's evidence did not positively prove that it
was MV Miguela that rammed the pile cluster; that the photographs of the pile
cluster taken after the incident showed no visible damages; that, as shown by
private respondents' witness, there were seashells and seaweeds directly under the
uprooted post, which indicated that the breaking happened a long time ago.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review
where petitioner assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT WENT
BEYOND THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
B. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS GROUNDED ON SPECULATION,
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE RULES ON EVIDENCE.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND ITS FINDINGS IS
TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE RULE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.[6]
The issues for resolution can be reduced into three:
1. Did the CA go beyond the issues raised?
2. Can this Court review factual questions in this case?
3. Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to this case?
On the first issue, petitioner argues that private respondents did not assign as an
error eyewitness Ireneo Naval's incompetence to testify on the negligence of MV
Miguela's officers and crew. Private respondent's brief contained nothing but general
statements and reproductions of excerpts of the transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) which could not pass for a valid assignment of errors.
We note that Naval's incompetence was not one of the assigned errors in private
respondents' brief.[7] However, private respondents raised it in connection with the
issue of their negligence, which appeared in the second assigned error. In
reproducing the portion of the TSN consisting of Naval's cross examination, private
respondents' counsel was indirectly attacking Naval's competence and invoking it
vis a vis the trial court's finding, based on Naval's testimony, that MV Miguela was
sailing at a speed unusual for a docking vessel.[8] The CA did not err in addressing
the matter. An appellate court can consider an unassigned error on which depends
the determination of the question in the properly assigned error.[9] The issue of
negligence of MV Miguela's officers and crew depends significantly on the
determination of whether Naval is competent to testify on the maneuvering of a
docking vessel.
The second issue is whether or not we can review questions of fact. Petitioner, in its
second and third assigned errors, claims that the appellate court relied on
speculations and conjectures when it ruled that MV Miguela could not have rammed
the pile cluster because of the presence of other vessels; that petitioner's evidence,
corroborated by those of private respondents, is positive and sufficient to prove

respondents' liability; that evidence on record showed the negligence and

recklessness of MV Miguela's officers and crew; and that the crew were grossly
incompetent and incapable to man the vessel.
Private respondents claim that the above are conclusions of fact which this Court
may not review.
While the rule is that this Court is limited only to questions of law in a petition for
review, there are exceptions, among which are when the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court conflict, and when the appellate court based its
conclusion entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. [10]
Our review of the records constrains us to conclude that indeed MV Miguela rammed
and damaged petitioner's fender pile cluster. Naval and Espina witnessed the
incident, saw the impact and heard cracking sounds thereafter. The trial court found
them credible. We respect this observation of the trial court, for in the appreciation
of testimonial evidence and attribution of values to the declaration of witnesses, it is
the trial judge who had the chance to observe the witnesses and was in a position to
determine if the witnesses are telling the truth or not.[11] Further, private
respondents' witnesses, Olasiman and Gabisan, acknowledged that Naval was at the
pier waving a handkerchief to direct them to their berthing place.[12]
Private respondents' claim that they could not have rammed and damaged the pile
cluster because other vessels used the same area for berthing is a mere speculation
unworthy of credence.
Petitioner's witnesses, marine surveyor Degamo and diver Alferez, confirmed the
damage. Degamo had eighteen years of experience as marine surveyor and
belonged to an independent survey company. Alferez was hired and directly
supervised by Degamo for the task.[13] The latter testified during trial that he
examined the pile cluster at the portion above the water line by going near it and
found that one cluster pile was moving, two were loose, and the whole pile cluster
was leaning shoreward and misalligned.[14] Alferez, under oath, testified that he
dived two or three times and saw one broken post and two slightly uprooted ones
with a crack on each.[15]
On the other hand, private respondents' evidence on this matter was contradictory.
As testified by Olasiman, when he asked Lazara on the result of his diving, the latter
said that there was no damage.[16] However, when Lazara testified in court, he said
he found a crack on the side of the pile cluster, with one pile no longer touching the
seabed and directly underneath it were seashells and seaweeds. Further, he said
that he informed the captain about this.[17] We find Lazara's testimony as an
afterthought, lacking credibility. In addition, Leonilo Lazara, was a mere bodegero of
MV Miguela. He could not possibly be a competent witness on marine surveys.[18]
Finally, is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to this case? Petitioner argues
that the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court for the latter's heavy
reliance on Naval's testimony. The appellate court overlooked the fact that aside
from Naval's testimony, the trial court also relied on the principle of res ipsa loquitur
to establish private respondents' negligence.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was explained in Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 334 (1996), thus:

47
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.
The doctrine recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without
direct proof and allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence.
This is invoked when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.[19]
In our view, all the requisites for recourse to this doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela
was under the exclusive control of its officers and crew. Petitioner did not have direct
evidence on what transpired within as the officers and crew maneuvered the vessel
to its berthing place. We note the Court of Appeals' finding that Naval and Espina
were not knowledgeable on the vessel's maneuverings, and could not testify on the
negligence of the officers and crew. Second, aside from the testimony that MV
Miguela rammed the cluster pile, private respondent did not show persuasively other
possible causes of the damage.
Applying now the above, there exists a presumption of negligence against private
respondents which we opine the latter failed to overcome. Additionally, petitioner
presented tangible proof that demonstrated private respondents' negligence. As
testified by Capt. Olasiman, from command of "slow ahead" to "stop engine", the
vessel will still travel 100 meters before it finally stops. However, he ordered "stop
engine" when the vessel was only 50 meters from the pier. Further, he testified that
before the vessel is put to slow astern, the engine has to be restarted. However,
Olasiman can not estimate how long it takes before the engine goes to slow astern
after the engine is restarted. From these declarations, the conclusion is that it was
already too late when the captain ordered reverse. By then, the vessel was only 4
meters from the pier,[20] and thus rammed it.
Respondent company's negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its
vessel. As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan
did not have a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere
elementary graduate[21] while the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience
in navigation[22]was only as a watchman and a quartermaster, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch IX, is hereby REINSTATED.Costs against private respondents.SO
ORDERED.
THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED and JEROME O. CASTRO, petitioners, vs.
LEONORA NAVAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 131541 | 2000-10-20
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This damage suit arose from a collision of vehicles based on the following facts:
"(O)n May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem[1] was driving
a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior
to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not
far from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a
U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the

Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta
collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab was hit
in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver to lose control of
the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop,
thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden,
sustained injuries as a result of the incident."[2]
Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner,
Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver,
petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro
negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of
Makati City dated September 25, 1995, reads:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of
2. The amount of
3. The amount of
4. The amount of
5. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]

P47,850.00
P45,000.00
P10,000.00
P10,000.00

as
as
as
as

actual damages;
compensatory damages for unrealized income;
exemplary damages;
and for attorney's fees; and

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court a quo.[4] Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari. The petition was denied on February 2, 1998 for
failure to submit an explanation why no personal service of copies of certain
pleadings was made as required by Rule 13, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[5] Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the petition was
reinstated and private respondent was required to file her Comment in a Resolution
dated June 22, 1998.[6] A copy of the said Resolution was sent by registered mail to
private respondent's counsel but the same was returned to sender.[7] In a separate
Resolution issued on the same date, this Court ordered that a copy of the June 22,
1998 Resolution be served personally on private respondent's counsel.[8] As the
said Resolution was also returned unserved, "the Court Resolved to consider the said
Resolution as SERVED."[9] After more than a year, no Comment has been filed.
Considering that private respondent was given only ten (10) days to file her
Comment, that period had already lapsed ten days after the June 23, 1999
Resolution which stated that the June 22, 1998 resolution as "served".
Service of notice or other pleadings which are required by the rules to be furnished
to the parties must be made on their last address on record. If they are represented
by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to the counsel's last given address on
record in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address,[10] unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.[11] It is
the party and his counsel's responsibility to device a system for the receipt of mail
intended for them[12] just as it is the duty of counsel to inform the court of a change
in his address. In the case at bar, private respondent's counsel never notified the
Court of any change of his address or whether he no longer holds office in his last
address of record. Neither was the Court informed if his ties with his client has been
severed. Insofar as the Court is concerned, the last address on record is the place
where all notices shall be served until the Court is officially informed to the contrary.
What is the effect of the failure of a private respondent to comply with a court order
to file Comment?

48
Courts are given the option to dispense with the filing of the Comment and consider
the case as deemed submitted for decision. Under Rule 46, Section 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure,[13] when the respondent in an original action filed with the
court fails to file its comment, the case may be decided on the basis of the evidence
on record without prejudice to disciplinary action against the disobedient party.
Concomitant thereto is the rule that pursuant to Rule 51, Section 1(B)(1),[14] where
no comment is filed upon the expiration of the period to comment in an original
action or a petition for review, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
Both provisions are applicable to a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court
as provided in Rule 56, Section 2(a) of the Rules.[15] Moreover, a lawyer who fails to
submit the required Comment manifests willful disobedience to a lawful order of the
Supreme Court, a clear violation of the Canon of Professional Ethics.[16] Counsel
must remember that his actions and omissions are binding on his client.[17] He
should not neglect legal matters entrusted to him as his negligence therefrom shall
render him liable.[18]
The petition lacks merit.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. It is a time-honored
precept that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts,[19] although it has authority
to review and reverse factual findings of lower courts if these do not conform to
evidence.[20] It is also settled that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is binding on the Supreme Court[21] and
generally conclusive,[22] especially if it has not been adequately shown that no
significant facts and circumstances were overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have altered the outcome of the disposition.
The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the
U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the
fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and
this should not relieve him of liability.[23] From petitioner Castro's testimonial
admissions, it is established that he was driving at a speed faster than 50 kilometers
per hour because it was a downhill slope coming from the Rosario bridge. But as he
allegedly stepped on the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the
left and consequently hit the taxicab. The sudden malfunction of the vehicle's brake
system is the usual excuse of drivers involved in collisions which are the result of
speedy driving, particularly when the road is downhill.
Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event. Between the owner and his
driver, on the one hand, and third parties such as commuters, drivers and
pedestrians, on the other, the former is presumed to know about the conditions of
his vehicle and is duty bound to take care thereof with the diligence of a good father
of the family. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the streets. As
petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since
a downhill drive would naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the
record shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision
occurred. This was a disregard of traffic safety rules. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in a man of ordinary diligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.[24] Even assuming arguendo that loss of brakes is
an act of God, by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became
humanized, rendering the Nissan driver liable for the ensuing damages.[25]
As mentioned earlier, the driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not
generally advisable particularly on major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which

means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi
ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill
slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily
liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during
the night when traffic enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In
driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the driver or
his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi,
the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of the taxi, should be reduced in half. All
other awards for damages are deleted for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision is MODIFIED. Petitioners
are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to private respondent the amount of
P23,925.00 as actual damages. All other awards are DELETED. SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus VIVIAN TAN LEE,
Respondent
G.R. No. 166869 | 2010-02-16
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70860, promulgated on August 17, 2004, affirming with modification
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102, dated
March 16, 2001, in Civil Case No. Q-91-9191, ordering petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and Margarito Avila to jointly and severally pay respondent Vivian Tan
Lee damages as a result of a vehicular accident.
The facts are as follows:
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint[2] against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant
Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident
that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The
accident resulted in the death of respondent's husband, Silvino Tan, and caused
respondent physical injuries.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint,[3] in her own behalf and
in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages against petitioner. Respondent
sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary
damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses,
the cost of the motorcycle's repair, attorney's fees, and other just and equitable
reliefs.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119.
The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being
driven by Margarito Avila.
In its Answer,[4] petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that
the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of
caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including
Margarito Avila.

49
On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued a Pre-trial Order[5] stating that the parties
manifested that there was no possibility of amicable settlement between them.
However, they agreed to stipulate on the following facts:
1. On March 17, 1991, in Bgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan
and her husband Silvino Tan, while on board a motorcycle with [P]late No. DA-5480
driven by the latter, and a Metro Bus with [P]late No. NXR-262 driven by Margarito
Avila, were involved in an accident;
2. As a result of the accident, Silvino Tan died on the spot while plaintiff Vivian Lee
Tan suffered physical injuries which necessitated medical attention and
hospitalization;

For the defense, Margarito Avila, the driver of petitioner's bus, testified that on
March 17, 1999, at about 4:30 p.m., he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour
on the Maharlika Highway. When they were at Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca,
Quezon, a motorcycle ran from his left side of the highway, and as the bus came
near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he turned the bus to the
right. He heard a loud banging sound. From his side mirror, he saw that the
motorcycle turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to help out of fear for his
life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped the
motorcycle.[13]
Avila further testified that he had previously been involved in sideswiping incidents,
but he forgot how many times.[14]

3. The deceased Silvino Tan is survived by his wife, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and four
children, three of whom are now residents of the United States; and

Rodolfo Ilagan, the bus conductor, testified that the motorcycle bumped the left side
of the bus that was running at 40 kilometers per hour.[15]

4. Defendant Margarito Avila is an employee of defendant Philippine Hawk.[6]

Domingo S. Sisperes, operations officer of petitioner, testified that, like their other
drivers, Avila was subjected to and passed the following requirements:

The parties also agreed on the following issues:

1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident causing physical injuries upon
the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and resulting in the death of the latter's husband was the
recklessness and negligence of Margarito Avila or the deceased Silvino Tan; and
2. Whether or not defendant Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its driver
Margarito Avila.[7]
Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on their motorcycle in
tandem with her husband, who was on the wheel, at a place after a Caltex gasoline
station in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon on the way to Lopez, Quezon.
They came from the Pasumbal Machine Shop, where they inquired about the repair
of their tanker. They were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when
they were about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward
them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and their motorcycle as
well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital in Gumaca, Quezon,
where she was confined for a week. She was later transferred to St. Luke's Hospital
in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered a fracture on her left chest, her left arm became
swollen, she felt pain in her bones, and had high blood pressure.[8]
Respondent's husband died due to the vehicular accident. The immediate cause of
his death was massive cerebral hemorrhage.[9]
Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing[10] and operating a
Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one million pesos a year in
revenue. They also had a copra business, which gave them an income of P3,000.00
a month or P36,000.00 a year.[11]
Ernest Ovial, the driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident, testified that
in the afternoon of March 17, 1991, his jeep was parked on the left side of the
highway near the Pasumbal Machine Shop. He did not notice the motorcycle before
the accident. But he saw the bus dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and
then the bus bumped his jeep and sped away.[12]

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Submission of NBI clearance;

Certification from his previous employer that he had no bad record;
Physical examination to determine his fitness to drive;
Test of his driving ability, particularly his defensive skill; and
Review of his driving skill every six months.[16]

Efren Delantar, a Barangay Kagawad in Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, testified that

the bus was running on the highway on a straight path when a motorcycle, with a
woman behind its driver, suddenly emerged from the left side of the road from a
machine shop. The motorcycle crossed the highway in a zigzag manner and bumped
the side of the bus.[17]
In its Decision dated March 16, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment against
petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, MARGARITO AVILA is adjudged guilty of simple negligence, and
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and h[er]
husband's heirs ordering the defendants Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito
Avila to pay them jointly and solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of
earnings and actual damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.[18]
The trial court found that before the collision, the motorcycle was on the left side of
the road, just as the passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was
in a running position moving toward the right side of the highway. The trial court
agreed with the bus driver that the motorcycle was moving ahead of the bus from
the left side of the road toward the right side of the road, but disagreed that the
motorcycle crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on the right side
of the road.[19]
The trial court held that if the bus were on the right side of the highway, and
Margarito Avila turned his bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the
motorcyle, then the bus would not have hit the passenger jeep, which was then
parked on the left side of the road. The fact that the bus also hit the passenger jeep
showed that the bus must have been running from the right lane to the left lane of
the highway, which caused the collision with the motorcycle and the passenger jeep
parked on the left side of the road. The trial court stated that since Avila saw the

50
motorcycle before the collision, he should have stepped on the brakes and slowed
down, but he just maintained his speed and veered to the left.[20] The trial court
found Margarito Avila guilty of simple negligence.
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed
to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.[21]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification in the award of damages. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed
decision dated March 16, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants
Philippine Hawk and Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally appellee
the following amount: (a) P168,019.55 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as
temperate damages; (c) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P590,000.00 as
unearned income; and (e) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.[22]
Petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1) The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in passing upon an issue, which had not been raised on appeal, and
which had, therefore, attained finality, in total disregard of the doctrine laid down by
this Court in Abubakar v. Abubakar, G.R. No. 134622, October 22, 1999.
2) The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its finding that the petitioner's
bus driver saw the motorcycle of private respondent executing a U-turn on the
highway "about fifteen (15) meters away" and thereafter held that the Doctrine of
Last Clear was applicable to the instant case. This was a palpable error for the
simple reason that the aforesaid distance was the distance of the witness to the bus
and not the distance of the bus to the respondent's motorcycle, as clearly borne out
by the records.
3) The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in awarding damages in total
disregard of the established doctrine laid down in Danao v. Court of Appeals, 154
SCRA 447 and Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 138296,
November 22, 2000.[23]
In short, the issues raised by petitioner are: (1) whether or not negligence may be
attributed to petitioner's driver, and whether negligence on his part was the
proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing
physical injuries to respondent; (2) whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent
for damages; and (3) whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of
Appeals are proper.
Petitioner seeks a review of the factual findings of the trial court, which were
sustained by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner's driver was negligent in driving
the bus, which caused physical injuries to respondent and the death of respondent's
husband.
The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record.[24] The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case, and found no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, thus:

The Court agree[s] with the bus driver Margarito that the motorcycle was moving
ahead of the bus towards the right side from the left side of the road, but disagrees
with him that it crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on the right
side of the highway.
If the bus were on the right side of the highway and Margarito turned his bus to the
right in an attempt to avoid hitting it, then the bus would not have hit the passenger
jeep vehicle which was then parked on the left side of the road. The fact that the bus
hit the jeep too, shows that the bus must have been running to the left lane of the
highway from right to the left, that the collision between it and the parked jeep and
the moving rightways cycle became inevitable. Besides, Margarito said he saw the
motorcycle before the collision ahead of the bus; that being so, an extra-cautious
public utility driver should have stepped on his brakes and slowed down. Here, the
bus never slowed down, it simply maintained its highway speed and veered to the
left. This is negligence indeed.[25]
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in stating that the bus
driver saw respondent's motorcycle "about 15 meters away" before the collision,
because the said distance, as testified to by its witness Efren Delantar Ong, was
Ong's distance from the bus, and not the distance of the bus from the motorcycle.
Petitioner asserts that this mistaken assumption of the Court of Appeals made it
conclude that the bus driver, Margarito Avila, had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, which was the basis for the conclusion that Avila was guilty of simple
negligence.
A review of the records showed that it was petitioner's witness, Efren Delantar Ong,
who was about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular accident.
[26] Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the finding of the trial court that
petitioner's bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed
by the appellate court. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence.[27] To
be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an
ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.[28]
In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already
saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did
not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the
motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing
that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle
and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees.[29] To
avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.[30]
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila,
for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on
the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and

51
physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved
in sideswiping incidents.
As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that it was the
only one that appealed the decision of the trial court with respect to the award of
actual and moral damages; hence, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding other
kinds of damages in favor of respondent, who did not appeal from the trial court's
decision.
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 8.Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors,
or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the
brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Philippine National Bank v. Rabat[31] cited the book[32] of Justice Florenz D.
Regalado to explain the section above, thus:
In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section, thus:
1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes
some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural
rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the
court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this
exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his
assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now be considered by the
court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court
of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held
that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely related to an
error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which
the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent,
will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs.
Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983).
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is
authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the
appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would be
sacrificing substance for technicalities.[33]
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded respondent
the sum of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity (P590,000.00) and
actual damages (P155,575.00 for funeral expenses), plus P50,000.00 as moral

damages. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as error the award
of damages by the trial court on the ground that it was based merely on
suppositions and surmises, not the admissions made by respondent during the trial.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and
actual damages, although the amount of the latter award was modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article
2206 of the Civil Code.[34] Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of
earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.[35]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity.[36] By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.[37]
In this case, the records show that respondent's husband was leasing and operating
a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband
earned an annual income of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a
Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990,[38] which
showed that respondent's husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It
is reasonable to use the Certificate and respondent's testimony as bases for fixing
the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before respondent's
husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was
presented regarding the income derived from their copra business; hence, the
testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings,
are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for
the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses.
[39] In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary
expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the
gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross
income less necessary expenses).
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Net Earning = Life Expectancy
xGross Annual Income - Reasonable and
Capacity [2/3 (80-age at the
(GAI)Necessary time of death)]
Expenses
(80% of GAI)
X
= [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 - P800,000.00
X
= 2/3 (15) x
P200,000.00 - P100,000.00 (Living Expenses)
X
= 30/3 x P100,000.00
X
= 10 x P100,000.00
X = P1,000,000.00
The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in
connection with the death, wake, and interment of respondent's husband in the
amount of P154,575.30, and the medical expenses of respondent in the amount of
P168,019.55.

52
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts,
in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim[40] or the
physical injuries sustained by the victim. A review of the valid receipts submitted in
evidence showed that the funeral and related expenses amounted only to
P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted only to
P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in actual damages.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of respondent's husband. Moral damages
are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.[41] They are
awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendant's
culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.[42]
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 for the damage caused on respondent's motorcycle. Under
Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty." The cost of the repair of the
motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence
presented was merely a job estimate[43] of the cost of the motorcycle's repair
amounting to P17, 829.00. The Court of Appeals aptly held that there was no doubt
that the damage caused on the motorcycle was due to the negligence of petitioner's
driver. In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage caused on the
motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the
appellate court in the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the
circumstances.[44]
The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded respondent moral damages for the
physical injuries she sustained due to the vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of the
Civil Code,[45] moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. However, the award of P50,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[46]
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil indemnity for the
death of her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00.
[47] The award is proper under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.[48]
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of
respondent's husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical
injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial
court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding the additional damages,
which were prayed for by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate
court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 17, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of One
Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Eighty-Five
Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the amount of Eighty Thousand

Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e) temperate damages in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC.,Petitioner, versus JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY
FOREST, INC. and CRESILITO M. LIMBAGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161803 | 2008-02-04
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and injuries in this case could have
been avoided if the stalled prime mover with trailer were parked properly and
equipped with an early warning device. It is high time We sounded the call for strict
enforcement of the law and regulation on traffic and vehicle registration. Panahon na
para mahigpit na ipatupad ang batas at regulasyon sa trapiko at pagpapatala ng
sasakyan.
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) modifying that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Butuan City finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito Limbaga
liable to petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. for damages.
Facts
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora,
was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the
National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. They
were delivering commercial ice to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana
Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between
the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.[3]
The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire
blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover
askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the
passenger bus. He parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road
with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand
and gravel shoulder of the highway.[4] The prime mover was not equipped with
triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device required under
Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with
leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming
motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the
front and rear of the trailer.[5]
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger
bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two
bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his
break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front
of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.[6]
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became
inoperable as a result of the incident. After the collision, SPO4 Teofilo Pame
conducted an investigation and submitted a police traffic incident investigation
report.[7]

53
On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages[8]
against private respondents prime mover owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan
City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the
complaint.
RTC Disposition
On August 7, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban
Trading, Inc. with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing, ordaining and ordering:
a) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga pay, jointly and
solidarily, plaintiff Dy Teban Trading, Inc. the amounts of P279,832.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses
of litigation;
b) That all money claims of plaintiff Rogelio C. Ortiz are dismissed;
c) That defendant Jose Ching is absolved from any civil liability or the case against
him dismissed;
d) That the counterclaim of all the defendants is dismissed; and
e) That defendants Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito M. Limbaga to pay, jointly and
solidarily, the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was
improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an
early warning device on the vehicle, thus:
The court finds that the proximate cause of the incidents is the negligence and
carelessness attributable to the defendants. When the trailer being pulled by the
prime mover suffered two (2) flat tires at Sumilihon, the prime mover and trailer
were parked haphazardly, as the right tires of the prime mover were the only ones
on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway while the left tires and all the tires
of the trailer were on the cemented pavement of the highway, occupying almost the
whole of the right lane on the direction the prime mover and trailer were traveling.
The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper
into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there were
banana plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture shows
that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was careful and
prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more distance
forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the
shoulder rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked. x x x The
court has some doubts on the statement of witness-driver Limbaga that there were
banana trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans with crude oil placed 3 strides in
front of the prime mover and behind the trailer because the testimonies of witnesses
Rogelio C. Ortiz, driver of the ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of the ice van, and
Police Traffic Investigator SPO3 Teofilo M. Pame show that there were no banana
trunks with leaves and lighted tin cans at the scene of the incident. But even
assuming that there were banana trunks with leaves but they were placed close to
the prime mover and trailer as they were placed 3 strides away which to the mind of
the court is equivalent approximately to 3 meters and with this distance,
approaching vehicles would have no sufficient time and space to make a complete
stop, especially if the vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there were lighted tin cans, it
was not explained by the defendants why the driver, especially driver witness Ortiz,
did not see them.

xxxx
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in managing and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it
failed to provide its prime mover and trailer with the required "early warning
devices" with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance and condition of the
prime mover and the trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided
with wornout tires and with only one (1) piece of spare tire. The pictures marked
Exhibit "3" and "4" show that two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two
(2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of
the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the location of
the 2 I-beams, it would have the other I-beam that would have suffered the flat tires
as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8 bulldozer. The bulldozer was not
loaded directly above the two (2) I-beams as 2 I-beams, as a pair, were attached at
the far rear end of the trailer.
xxxx
However, defendant Jose Ching should be absolved of any liability as there is no
showing that he is the manager or CEO of defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. Although in
the answer, it is admitted that he is an officer of the defendant corporation, but it is
not clarified what kind of position he is holding, as he could be an officer as one of
the members of the Board of Directors or a cashier and treasurer of the corporation.
Witness Limbaga in his testimony mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the Manager
but it was never clarified whether or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose Ching is one
and the same person.[10]
Private respondents appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated August 7, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City in Civil Case No. 4360 is hereby PARTLY
MODIFIED by absolving the defendants-appellants/appellees of any liability to
plaintiffs-appellants/appellees by reason of the incident on July 4, 1995.
The dismissal of the case against Jose Ching, the counterclaim of defendantsappellants/appellees and the money claim of Rogelio Ortiz STANDS.SO ORDERED.
[11]
In partly reversing or partly modifying the RTC decision, the CA held that the
proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give
way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on collision with the
truck, sideswept the parked trailer loaded with bulldozer.
Evidently, the driver of the Joana Paula bus was aware of the presence on its lane of
the parked trailer with bulldozer. For this reason, it proceeded to occupy what was
left of its lane and part of the opposite lane. The truck occupying the opposite lane
failed to give way or yield the right of way to the oncoming bus by proceeding with
the same speed. The two vehicles were, in effect, trying to beat each other in
occupying a single lane. The bus was the first to occupy the said lane but upon
realizing that the truck refused to give way or yield the right of way, the bus, as a
precaution, geared to its right where the trailer was parked. Unfortunately, the bus
miscalculated its distance from the parked trailer and its rear right side hit the

54
protruding blade of the bulldozer then on the top of the parked trailer. The impact of
the collision on its right rear side with the blade of the bulldozer threw the bus
further to the opposite lane, landing its rear portion on the shoulder of the opposite
lane.
xxxx
Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed to give the
Joana Paula bus the space on the road it needed, the latter vehicle scraped its rear
right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the impact threw the bus directly on
the path of the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude
that the Joana Paula bus occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck,
to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.
xxxx
The trailer was parked because its two (2) rear-left tires were blown out. With a
bulldozer on top of the trailer and two (2) busted tires, it would be dangerous and
quite impossible for the trailer to further park on the graveled shoulder of the road.
To do so will cause the flat car to tilt and may cause the bulldozer to fall from where
it was mounted. In fact, it appeared that the driver of the trailer tried its best to park
on the graveled shoulder since the right-front tires were on the graveled shoulder of
the road.
The lower court erred in stating that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the left of the
truck because it did not see the parked trailer due to lack of warning sign of danger
of any kind that can be seen from a distance. The damage suffered by the Joana
Paula bus belied this assessment. As stated before, the Joana Paula bus, with the
intention of passing first which it did, first approached the space beside the parked
trailer, veered too close to the parked trailer thereby hitting its rear right side on the
protruding bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on the rear right most of the bus,
it was clearly on the space which was wide enough for a single passing vehicle but
not sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. The bus was thrown right to the path of
the truck by the impact of the collision of its rear right side with the bulldozer blade.
[12]
The CA disagreed with the RTC that the prime mover did not have an early warning
device. The appellate court accepted the claim of private respondent that Limbaga
placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag
Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] may act as substitute early warning device. The
CA stated:
Likewise, it was incorrect for the lower court to state that there was no warning sign
of danger of any kind, most probably referring to the absence of the triangular
reflectorized plates. The police sketch clearly indicated the stack of banana leaves
placed at the rear of the parked trailer. The trailer's driver testified that they placed
kerosene lighted tin can at the back of the parked trailer.
A pair of triangular reflectorized plates is not the only early warning device allowed
by law. The Supreme Court (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals) held that:
"x x x Col. Dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any early warning
device at the scene of the accident. They were referring to the triangular
reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office.
However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or
torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early

warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34(g) of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code x x x
Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially comply
with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law clearly allows the use not only of an
early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates' variety but also parking
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away. x x x."
This Court holds that the defendants-appellants/appellees were not negligent in
parking the trailer on the scene of the accident. It would have been different if there
was only one flat tire and defendant-appellant/appellee Limbaga failed to change
the same and left immediately.
As such, defendants-appellants/appellees are not liable for the damages suffered by
plaintiffs-appellants/appellees. Whatever damage plaintiffs-appellants/appellees
suffered, they alone must bear them.[14]
Issues Petitioner raises two issues[15] for Our consideration, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITHOUT ANY AVAILABLE CONCRETE
EVIDENCE, ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE EARLY WARNING
DEVICES PLACED IN FRONT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS/APPELLEES' TRUCK
AND FLAT CAR TO WARN PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/APPELLEE ROGELIO ORTIZ OF THEIR
PRESENCE.
II. WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS HIGH TIME TO ENFORCE THE LAW ON EARLY WARNING
DEVICES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The meat of the petition is whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages
suffered by the Nissan van. The RTC ruled in the affirmative holding that the
proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking
the prime mover on the national highway without an early warning device on the
vehicle. The CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence of Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the
passenger bus.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff.[16]
There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered damage. That is borne by the
records and conceded by the parties. The outstanding issues are negligence and
proximate cause. Tersely put, the twin issues are: (a) whether or not prime mover
driver Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle; and (b) whether or not his
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway; he
failed to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists.

55
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[17] The
Supreme Court stated the test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v.
Smith[18] as follows:
The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
(Underscoring supplied)
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor
with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as
applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used
in the same situation.
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the
right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the
national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the
road with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the
sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed
parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that
risk, or at least minimize it.
We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion "it would have been dangerous and
quite impossible to further park the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the
road because the prime mover may tilt and the bulldozer may fall off." The
photographs taken after the incident show that it could have been possible for
Limbaga to park the prime mover completely on the shoulder of the national road
without risk to oncoming motorists. We agree with the RTC observation on this point,
thus:
x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer
deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there
were banana plants is contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture
shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was
careful and prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled
more distance forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far
more on the shoulder rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked.
Although at the time of the incident, it was about 4:45 in the morning and it was
drizzling but there is showing that it was pitch dark that whoever travels along the
highway must be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane on which
the "Nissan" ice van was properly traveling, as prescribed by Traffic Rules and
Regulations, it is because the driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked
prime mover and trailer on the bus' proper lane because there was no warning signs
of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance.[19]

Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the
improperly parked prime mover. He did not immediately inform his employer,
private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime mover suffered two tire
blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because he had only one spare tire.
Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place banana
leaves on the front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming
motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard
beside the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga was sleeping on the prime mover
at the time of the collision and that he was only awakened by the impact of the
Nissan van and the passenger bus on the prime mover.[20]
Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive the
prime mover with trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer.[21] We find that
private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice
driver, like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer,
which required highly specialized driving skills. Respondent employer clearly failed
to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the
prime mover in proper condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had
worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire. It was for this reason that
Limbaga was unable to change the two blown out tires because he had only one
spare. The bulldozer was not even loaded properly on the prime mover, which
caused the tire blowouts.
All told, We agree with the RTC that private respondent Limbaga was negligent in
parking the prime mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty Forest,
Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the
prime mover was in proper condition.
The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable; Limbaga did not
put lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover.
Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover, the CA erred in
accepting the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin cans on
the front and rear of the prime mover. The evidence on records belies such claim.
The CA reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[22] as authority for the
proposition that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device
is misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention any lighted tin cans on the prime
mover or within the immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana leaves were
placed on the prime mover. The report reads:
VIII - RESULT OF INVESTIGATION: A Joana Paula Bus, with Body No. 7788, with Plate
No. LVA-137, driven by one Temestocles Relova v. Antero, of legal age, married and a
resident of San Roque, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, while traveling along the
National Highway, coming from the east going to the west direction, as it moves
along the way and upon reaching Brgy. Sumilihon, Butuan City to evade bumping to
the approaching Nissan Ice Van with Plate No.PNT-247, driven by one Rogelio Cortez
y Ceneza. As the result, the Joana Paula Bus accidentally busideswept (sic) to the
parked Prime Mover with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer without early warning device,
instead placing only dry banana leaves three (3) meters at the rear portion of the
Trailer, while failure to place at the front portion, and the said vehicle occupied the
whole lane. As the result, the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left edge blade of the

56
Bulldozer. Thus, causing the said bus swept to the narrow shouldering, removing the
rear four (4) wheels including the differential and injuring the above-stated twelve
(12) passengers and damaged to the right side fender above the rear wheel.Thus,
causing damage on it. While the Nissan Ice Van in evading, accidentally swerved to
the left lane and accidentally bumped to the front bumper of the parked Prime
Mover with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer. Thus, causing heavy damage to said Nissan
Ice Van including the cargoes of the said van.[23]
Second, SPO4 Pame, who investigated the collision, testified[24] that only banana
leaves were placed on the front and rear of the prime mover. He did not see any
lighted tin cans in the immediate vicinity of the collision.
Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted tin cans on the front and rear of
the prime mover belatedly surfaced only during his direct examination. No allegation
to this effect was made by private respondents in their Answer to the complaint for
damages. Petitioner's counsel promptly objected to the testimony of Limbaga, thus:
ATTY. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing some word signs in front and at the rear of the
prime mover with trailer, will you please describe to us what this word signs are?
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin cans and filled them with crude oil. And these tin
cans were lighted and they are like torches. These two lights or torches were placed
in front and at the rear side of the prime mover with trailer. After each torch, we
placed banana trunk. The banana trunk is placed between the two (2) torches and
the prime mover, both on the rear and on the front portion of the prime mover.
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with wick placed in front of the prime mover.
ATTY. ASIS: At this point, we will be objecting to questions particularly referring to
the alleged tin cans as some of the warning-sign devices, considering that there is
no allegation to that effect in the answer of the defendants. The answer was just
limited to the numbers 4 & 5 of the answer. And, therefore, if we follow the rule of
the binding effect of an allegation in the complaint, then the party will not be
allowed to introduce evidence to attack jointly or rather the same, paragraph 5
states, warning device consisting of 3 banana trunks, banana items and leaves were
filed. He can be cross-examined in the point, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin cans are concerned, the plaintiffs are
interposing continuing objections. But the Court will allow the question.[25]
We thus agree with the RTC that Limbaga did not place lighted tin cans on the front
and rear of the prime mover. We give more credence to the traffic incident report
and the testimony of SPO4 Pame that only banana leaves were placed on the
vehicle. Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] thus finds no application to the
case at bar.
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate
cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable

result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.[27]
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[28]
Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and
the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no
liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of
the act or omission. In the precedent-setting Vda.de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this
Court discussed the necessary link that must be established between the act or
omission and the damage or injury, viz.:
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most
handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to
be expected and was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers' bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help.
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority
for the proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of
the act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the
Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime
mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a
serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk.
The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the
collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all damages that
resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those
damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorist in trying to
avoid collision with the parked prime mover. As We see it, the passenger bus
swerved to the right, onto the lane
of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover. The
driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to the left, onto the lane
of the passenger bus, hitting the parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not
have swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying his van's lane. The
passenger bus, in turn, would not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not

57
for the prime mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] this Court held
that a similar vehicular collision was caused by the skewed parking of a dump truck
on the national road, thus:
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that
private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying
home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew
and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable
relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly
different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
xxxx
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive
and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in all probability not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and, therefore, closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the Petitioner describes as an "intervening cause" was no
more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner
truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated
not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and
the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
We cannot rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the passenger bus, if
any, because it was not a party to the case; joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the vehicular collision. The appellate court
noted that the passenger bus was "aware" of the presence of the prime mover on its
lane, but it still proceeded to occupy the lane of the Nissan van. The passenger bus
also miscalculated its distance from the prime mover when it hit the vehicle.
We cannot definitively rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the Joana
Paula passenger bus vis- -vis the prime mover because it was not a party to the
complaint for damages. Due process dictates that the passenger bus must be given
an opportunity to present its own version of events before it can be held liable. Any
contributory or proportionate liability of the passenger bus must be litigated in a

separate action, barring any defense of prescription or laches. Insofar as petitioner is

concerned, the proximate cause of the collision was the improper parking of the
prime mover. It was the improper parking of the prime mover which set in motion
the series of events that led to the vehicular collision.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, it's fault will not necessarily
absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint
tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and
solidary. This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from
the collision. In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[31]
this Court held:
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of
each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to
a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone
might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tort-feasor x x x.
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that the
liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable
need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring
with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the
injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is
not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being
sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that
such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of
the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were
the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code. (Underscoring supplied)

58
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The CA erred in absolving private respondents from liability for the
vehicular collision.
Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been easily
avoided by following basic traffic rules and regulations and road safety standards. In
hindsight, private respondent Limbaga could have prevented the three-way
vehicular collision if he had properly parked the prime mover on the shoulder of the
national road. The improper parking of vehicles, most especially along the national
highways, poses a serious and unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other
motorists and passengers. Drivers owe a duty of care to follow basic traffic rules and
regulations and to observe road safety standards. They owe that duty not only for
their own safety, but also for that of other motorists. We can prevent most vehicular
accidents by simply following basic traffic rules and regulations.
We also note a failure of implementation of basic safety standards, particularly the
law on early warning devices. This applies even more to trucks and big vehicles,
which are prone to mechanical breakdown on the national highway. The law, as
crafted, requires vehicles to be equipped with triangular reflectorized plates.[32]
Vehicles without the required early warning devices are ineligible for registration.
[33] Vehicle owners may also be arrested and fined for non-compliance with the law.
[34]
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty to the public to ensure that all
vehicles on the road meet basic and minimum safety features, including that of
early warning devices. It is most unfortunate that We still see dilapidated and
rundown vehicles on the road with substandard safety features. These vehicles not
only pose a hazard to the safety of their occupants but that of other motorists. The
prime mover truck in this case should not have been granted registration because it
failed to comply with the minimum safety features required for vehicles on the road.
It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies and the LTO to strictly enforce all
pertinent laws and regulations within their mandate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated August
28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC decision dated August 7, 2001 is
REINSTATED IN FULL. SO ORDERED.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, Petitioners,

versus LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO
TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ
TANGCO, Respondents
G.R. No. 165732 | 2006-12-14 FIRST DIVISION D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency,
Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision[1] dated July
16, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to

Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise
of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed
firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled
out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo
shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly
causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal
case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and
assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil
action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted
Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.[3] On appeal to the CA,
the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision[4]
dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina
City, a complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and
alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to
Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a
compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,[7] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of
Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [8]
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim
that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim
that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident
since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police
authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by
asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly;

59
that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-9773806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally
liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had
perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo,
there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence
simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is
not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons
and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to
see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages
awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly
and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated
from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a
separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages
arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer
under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code[12] is subsidiary and the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not
available to it.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is
only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to
costs.[9]

The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable
provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasidelicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised
Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and
executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other;
that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of
the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict,
the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and
supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on
crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not
joint or solidary.

SECTION 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution
dated October 20, 2004.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with
petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money claims.

We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual
or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission or under both causes.[13]

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any liability.[10]

It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature

of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action.[14] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to
respondents for the payment of damages and other money claims.

The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the
same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of
homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence
thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

60
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in
his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief.[15]
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the
Ecology Bank - Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under
employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee
relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her
firearm out of her bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in
idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline
M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally
liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their
right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the
injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176,
Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already
held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that

culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of
Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which
is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The source of
the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the civil
action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the
reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No.
92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial
court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasidelict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No.
92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate
civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages
is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the
ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to
the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.
If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on
quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file
an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is
already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this
case.[21] It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause of action was
for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding
Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.[22]
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is
based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection
or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.

61
Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting
Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for
review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[23]
Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us
to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that
petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank
was to renew her time deposit.[25] On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that
Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting
instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about
one meter or one arm's length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his
gun and shot her.[27] It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still
make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement
could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere
apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is
befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw
Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the
bank[28] and saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that she left the man under the
fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare
testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen
roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting
incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head
guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the
same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have
already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed
with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank[30] manning the
entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she
would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a

bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after
surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the
bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[31]
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was
actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly
shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review
where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling
a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear
and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of
pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of
whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that
the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline
Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely
reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34]
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's
claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which
was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a
bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank
robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded
unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although
she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such
establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had
Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun
and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the
bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who
mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was
seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the
shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in
shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately
shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of
its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary
training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the
RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not
exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further
claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein
supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards
which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with
proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees' performances;

62
that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating
procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing
to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by reason of
one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasidelict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the
selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may
be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service records.[35] On the other hand,
due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to
their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the
employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on
their supervisory functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the
selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological
and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center
where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Prelicensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard
presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the
issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who
Will Be Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38] Safeguard Training Center

Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,[39] Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,[40] it had

also been established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not
aware of such rules and regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on
his re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans
as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and not
necessary to give students copy of the same,[42] the records do not show that
Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous
evaluation of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an inservice training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first
assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with
Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on
security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees.
[43]
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had
ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a
bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo
testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory
since a bank is a very sensitive area.[44]
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm
for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no
training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go
around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards
assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In
fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of
Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in
the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in
connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the
spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is
aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] The intensity of the pain
experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.[46]
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's
death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six
children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47]
we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-yearold girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[48] we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the

63
parents of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest child
who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives.
Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million
pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor
children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.

Per Traffic Accident Report prepared by Traffic Investigator Pfc. Patrocinio N. Acido,
Renato dela Cruz Ocfemia was driving with expired license and positive for alcoholic
breath. Hence, Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Oscar A. Pascua recommended the
filing of information for reckless imprudence resulting to (sic) damage to property
and physical injuries.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00.

Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.[50]

The original complaint was amended twice: first, impleading Auto Palace Car
Exchange as commercial agent and/or buyer-seller and second, impleading Albert
Jaucian as principal defendant doing business under the name and style of Auto
Palace Car Exchange.

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when,
as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award
of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of
petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.
NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, versus PRISCILLA R. DOMINGO
and LEANDRO LUIS R. DOMINGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 144274 | 2004-09-20
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52203 affirming in turn the decision of the trial court finding petitioner liable to
respondent for damages. The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED except the award of
attorney's fees including appearance fees which is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
[Respondent] Priscilla R. Domingo is the registered owner of a silver Mitsubishi
Lancer Car model 1980 bearing plate No. NDW 781 '91 with [co-respondent] Leandro
Luis R. Domingo as authorized driver. [Petitioner] Nostradamus Villanueva was then
the registered "owner" of a green Mitsubishi Lancer bearing Plate No. PHK 201 '91.
On 22 October 1991 at about 9:45 in the evening, following a green traffic light,
[respondent] Priscilla Domingo's silver Lancer car with Plate No. NDW 781 '91 then
driven by [co-respondent] Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising along the middle
lane of South Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south. Suddenly, a
green Mitsubishi Lancer with plate No. PHK 201 '91 driven by Renato Dela Cruz
Ocfemia darted from Vito Cruz Street towards the South Superhighway directly into
the path of NDW 781 '91 thereby hitting and bumping its left front portion. As a
result of the impact, NDW 781 '91 hit two (2) parked vehicles at the roadside, the
second hitting another parked car in front of it.

Except for Ocfemia, all the defendants filed separate answers to the complaint.
[Petitioner] Nostradamus Villanueva claimed that he was no longer the owner of the
car at the time of the mishap because it was swapped with a Pajero owned by Albert
Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange. For her part, Linda Gonzales declared that her
presence at the scene of the accident was upon the request of the actual owner of
the Mitsubishi Lancer (PHK 201 '91) [Albert Jaucian] for whom she had been working
as agent/seller. On the other hand, Auto Palace Car Exchange represented by Albert
Jaucian claimed that he was not the registered owner of the car. Moreover, it could
not be held subsidiary liable as employer of Ocfemia because the latter was off-duty
as utility employee at the time of the incident. Neither was Ocfemia performing a
duty related to his employment.[3]
After trial, the trial court found petitioner liable and ordered him to pay respondent
actual, moral and exemplary damages plus appearance and attorney's fees:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, ordering Nostradamus
Villanueva to pay the amount of P99,580 as actual damages, P25,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the amount of
P10,000.00 plus appearance fees of P500.00 per hearing with legal interest counted
from the date of judgment. In conformity with the law on equity and in accordance
with the ruling in First Malayan Lending and Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(supra), Albert Jaucian is hereby ordered to indemnify Nostradamus Villanueva for
whatever amount the latter is hereby ordered to pay under the judgment. SO
ORDERED.[4]
The CA upheld the trial court's decision but deleted the award for appearance and
attorney's fees because the justification for the grant was not stated in the body of
the decision. Thus, this petition for review which raises a singular issue:
MAY THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
ARISING FROM A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING HIS MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE
BEING OPERATED BY THE EMPLOYEE OF ITS BUYER WITHOUT THE LATTER'S
CONSENT AND KNOWLEDGE?[5]
Yes.
We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and
primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated.[6]
The rationale behind such doctrine was explained way back in 1957 in Erezo vs.
Jepte[7]:
The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles
registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or
presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be

64
difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused
to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required
to prove who the actual owner is. How would the public or third persons know
against whom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfers of the vehicles?
We do not imply by his doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not
recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from
the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a
public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or
streets. The members of the Court are in agreement that the defendant-appellant
should be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter
because of the negligence of the driver, even if the defendant-appellant was no
longer the owner of the vehicle at the time of the damage because he had
previously sold it to another. What is the legal basis for his (defendant-appellant's)
liability?
There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the defendantappellant as he is the registered owner in the Motor Vehicles Office. Should he not
be allowed to prove the truth, that he had sold it to another and thus shift the
responsibility for the injury to the real and actual owner? The defendant holds the
affirmative of this proposition; the trial court held the negative.
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that no vehicle
may be used or operated upon any public highway unless the same is property
registered. It has been stated that the system of licensing and the requirement that
each machine must carry a registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of
the precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury to pedestrians and other
travelers from the careless management of automobiles. And to furnish a means of
ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances, regulating the
speed and operation of machines upon the highways (2 R.C.L. 1176). Not only are
vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or operated
without being properly registered for the current year, but that dealers in motor
vehicles shall furnish thee Motor Vehicles Office a report showing the name and
address of each purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous month and the
manufacturer's serial number and motor number. (Section 5(c), Act No. 3992, as
amended.)
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which
ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the
administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the
contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil.
888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway
(section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended). The main aim of motor vehicle
registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility
therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers,
or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is
primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways:

One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identification of the

vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge
that means of detection are always available may act as a deterrent from lax
observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe operation. Whatever
purpose there may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary
purpose of rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules of safety
shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him. The purpose of the
statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a "share and delusion," if
courts would entertain such defenses as that put forward by appellee in this case.
No responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the most outrageous
acts of negligence, if they should be allowed to pace a "middleman" between them
and the public, and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense
servants. (King vs. Brenham Automobile Co., Inc. 145 S.W. 278, 279.)
With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant poses is:
should not the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and
real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility by
and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? We hold with the trial
court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in
mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places
upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner
allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is,
it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses
no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim
of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or
identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other
than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who
is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become
illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by
disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out,
the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of
the person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has become the
owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured person.
The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would seem
to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner who has
already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in
the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done,
against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no
justification for relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for
failure to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.
In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is
primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee,
but he (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual
owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury
caused to the plaintiff-appellant.[8]
Petitioner insists that he is not liable for damages since the driver of the vehicle at
the time of the accident was not an authorized driver of the new (actual) owner of
the vehicle. He claims that the ruling in First Malayan Leasing and Finance
Corporation vs. CA[9] implies that to hold the registered owner liable for damages,
the driver of the vehicle must have been authorized, allowed and permitted by its
actual owner to operate and drive it. Thus, if the vehicle is driven without the

65
knowledge and consent of the actual owner, then the registered owner cannot be
held liable for damages.
He further argues that this was the underlying theory behind Duavit vs. CA[10]
wherein the court absolved the registered owner from liability after finding that the
vehicle was virtually stolen from the owner's garage by a person who was neither
authorized nor employed by the owner. Petitioner concludes that the ruling in Duavit
and not the one in First Malayan should be applicable to him.
Petitioner's argument lacks merit. Whether the driver is authorized or not by the
actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability of the registered owner who the
law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused
by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways. To require the driver of
the vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner before the registered owner can be
held accountable is to defeat the very purpose why motor vehicle legislations are
enacted in the first place.
Furthermore, there is nothing in First Malayan which even remotely suggests that
the driver must be authorized before the registered owner can be held accountable.
In First Malayan, the registered owner, First Malayan Corporation, was held liable for
damages arising from the accident even if the vehicle involved was already owned
by another party:
This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner is of a
motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the operator of the same with
respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and
employer being considered merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation vs.
Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10, citing Vargas vs. Langcay, 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs.
Aquino, 105 Phil. 949).
'We believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by
the operator of record. It is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the
vehicle and the employer of the driver is. Granting that, in this case, the father of
the driver is the actual owner and that he is the actual employer, following the wellsettled principle that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third person, and as such
is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, we must hold and
consider such owner-operator of record as the employer, in contemplation of law, of
the driver. And, to give effect to this policy of law as enunciated in the above cited
decisions of this Court, we must now extend the same and consider the actual
operator and employer as the agent of the operator of record.'[11]
Contrary to petitioner's position, the First Malayan ruling is applicable to him since
the case involves the same set of facts ?the registered owner had previously sold
the vehicle to someone else and was being driven by an employee of the new
(actual) owner. Duavit is inapplicable since the vehicle there was not transferred to
another; the registered and the actual owner was one and the same person.
Besides, in Duavit, the defense of the registered owner, Gilberto Duavit, was that
the vehicle was practically stolen from his garage by Oscar Sabiano, as affirmed by
the latter:
Defendant Sabiano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the jeep
from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent and authority of the latter.

He testified further that Duavit even filed charges against him for the theft of the
jeep but which Duavit did not push through as his (Sabiano's) parents apologized to
Duavit on his behalf.[12]
As correctly pointed out by the CA, the Duavit ruling is not applicable to petitioner's
case since the circumstance of unauthorized use was not present. He in fact
voluntarily delivered his car to Albert Jaucian as part of the downpayment for a
vehicle he purchased from Jaucian. Thus, he could not claim that the vehicle was
stolen from him since he voluntarily ceded possession thereof to Jaucian. It was the
latter, as the new (actual) owner, who could have raised the defense of theft to
prove that he was not liable for the acts of his employee Ocfemia. Thus, there is no
reason to apply the Duavit ruling to this case.
The ruling in First Malayan has been reiterated in BA Finance Corporation vs. CA[13]
and more recently in Aguilar, Sr. vs. Commercial Savings Bank.[14] In BA Finance,
we held the registered owner liable even if, at the time of the accident, the vehicle
was leased by another party and was driven by the lessee's employee. In Aguilar,
the registered owner-bank answered for damages for the accident even if the
vehicle was being driven by the Vice-President of the Bank in his private capacity
and not as an officer of the Bank, as claimed by the Bank. We find no reason to
deviate from these decisions.
The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who
can be held responsible for any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle.
Easy identification prevents inconvenience and prejudice to a third party injured by
one who is unknown or unidentified. To allow a registered owner to escape liability
by claiming that the driver was not authorized by the new (actual) owner results in
the public detriment the law seeks to avoid.
Finally, the issue of whether or not the driver of the vehicle during the accident was
authorized is not at all relevant to determining the liability of the registered owner.
This must be so if we are to comply with the rationale and principle behind the
registration requirement under the motor vehicle law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26, 2000 decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 122039 | 2000-05-31
D E C I S I ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 [Per Justice Artemon D.
Luna and concurred in by Justices Hector L. Hofilena and B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz.] of
the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to
private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of
contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente

66
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door
at the rear end of the vehicle.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As
a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her
confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she
would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in
crutches during said period.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No.
3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37
of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the
ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasidelict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under
the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva
and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiffappellant:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
SO

P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

P50,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
to pay the costs.
ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that
the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his
liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer
of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the
truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of
moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.

Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established

because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination.2 [See B. Balderrama, The Philippine Law on Torts And Damages 20
(1953).] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to
a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety
of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.

67
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had
to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so.
Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway,
and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the
R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
provides:
Sec. 54.Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging
or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It
provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater
than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for
the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing
that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning
by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A
caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable.3 [CIVIL CODE, Art. 1174.] This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's
will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.4 [Juan F. Nakpil & Sons
v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 (1986); Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA
553 (1985); Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 128 Phil. 313 (1967).] Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is
excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that
school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that
school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major
in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she
cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She
likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject,
because "my left leg x x x has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under
Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 [Fores v. Miranda, 67 105 Phil. 267 (1959); Mercado v.
Lira, 3 SCRA 124 (1961).] As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art.
1764, in relation to Art.2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art.2220.6 [Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Esguerra, 117 SCRA 741 (1982); Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Court
of Appeals, 171 SCRA 620 (1989); China Airlines, Ltd. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 169 SCRA 226 (1989).]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the
performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's
admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to
a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it
was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that
petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral damages is DELETED. SO ORDERED.
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, jr., defendantappellee.
G.R. No. L-12219 | 1918-03-15
DECISION
STREET, J .:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank
Smith, jr., the sum of P31,100, as damages alleged to have been caused by an
automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has
appealed.

68
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears
that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is
shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.08 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright,
and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we
believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood
between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one
and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention
for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering
his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to
a civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so
liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done;
and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross
with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this
moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down
by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the
horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not
yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles,
he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.

When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our
opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here
be of much value but his much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are
not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road.
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.(7 Phil. Rep., 359)
should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to
recover, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant
company had there employed the plaintiff, a laborer, to assist in transporting iron
rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The

69
rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At a certain
spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of
the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence
upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of a typhoon which had dislodged
one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff
was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at
the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while the
defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to
keep the track in proper repair, nevertheless the amount of the damages should be
reduced on account of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. As will be seen
the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of
the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In
a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually present and
operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to
attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the
damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the
negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause
of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more
remote factor in the case.

A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded
in the defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had
been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection
it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused
criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the
defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings
were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at a trial upon the
merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata
upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence - a point upon which it
is unnecessary to express an opinion - the action of the justice of the peace in
dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no such
effect. (See U.S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant
the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of both instances. The sum here
awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest
on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff
are remote or otherwise of such characters as not to be recoverable. So ordered.