Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 22:419445, 2001

Copyright 2001 Taylor & Francis

0163-9625/01 $12.00 1 .00

the role of presidential

rhetoric in the creation of a
moral panic: reagan, bush,
and the war on drugs
James E. Hawdon
Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina
Although it is known that state initiatives can help
produce moral panics, the role policy rhetoric assumes
in creating, sustaining, and terminating moral panics
has not been theoretically addressed. This article offers
a typology of drug policies and illustrates how each is
used at varying stages of a moral panic. It is argued that
moral panics begin when proactive and punitive
statements are used in combination. Moral panics
subside when reactive and rehabilitative rhetorical
statements are issued concurrently. The argument is
empirically tested by analyzing the presidential
addresses of the Reagan and Bush administrations for
drug-related statements. Regression analysis, analysis of
variance, and crosstabular analyses are used to test
several hypotheses derived from the theoretical
discussion. The empirical evidence supports the
theoretical discussion and the constructionist
perspective of social problems.

By 1986 Americans were convinced that drugs were sweeping the

nation like a white plague. Yet, based on governmental gures,
drug use declined during the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1985 the
Received 6 June 2000; accepted 23 November 2000.
I thank Rebecca Ewing and Suzanne Carr for their assistance with this manuscript. I also
thank J. Scott Brown, Donna Sedgwick, and John Ryan for their comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
Address correspondence to James Hawdon, 123D Brackett Hall, Department of Sociology, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634. E-mail: hawdonj@clemson.edu

419

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J. E. Hawdon

number of young adults who had ever used marijuana and cocaine
decreased by 12% and 11%, respectively. This trend continued
throughout the decade and into the early 1990s (National Institute
of Drug Abuse [NIDA] 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994).1 Why did Americans believe drug use was increasing when the available evidence
suggested otherwise?
Such phenomena are well understood by sociologists; the United
States was in the middle of a moral panic. Guseld (1963, 1981),
Ben-Yehuda (1986), Hawdon (1996), and others have discussed
how drug use has led to moral panics in the past. These accounts,
however, fail to consider the role policy rhetoric assumes in the
life-course of a moral panic. Yet it has been demonstrated that
state initiatives regarding drugs often precede public opinion and
create concern independently of the objective extent or seriousness of the problem (Beckett 1994). Similarly, policy rhetoric
inuences the medias framing of problems (see Beckett 1995;
Sharp 1992) which, in turn, inuences public opinion (Jernigan
and Dorfman 1996; Iyengar 1991; Orcutt and Turner 1993). Policy
rhetoric, therefore, is an important factor for understanding moral
panics. The current paper details the specic type of policy
rhetoric that helps produce the concern associated with moral
panics.
DRUG USE AND MORAL PANICS
To argue there was a moral panic about drug use during the 1980s
is not meant to imply the issue was irrelevant or not serious. A
moral panic is the widespread feeling on part of the public that
something is terribly wrong in their society because of the moral
failings of a specic group of individuals (Goode 1989:26). This
denition does not imply a sense of irrational hysteria.2 The claims
makers involved in the panic may truly believe the threat is real
and serious. And, indeed, the threat may be real and serious.
To be sure, drug use was a serious problem in a number of
neighborhoods and caused the untimely death of many users.3 The
drug panic was therefore more than simply a scare. Nevertheless,
1
Between 1979 and 1990, the number of marijuana, cocaine, and hallucinogen users
decreased by 23%, 32%, and 52% respectively (based on NIDA 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994).
2
See Best (1990:160) for a discussion of the difference between concern and fear.
3
Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) statistics, for example, show that the number
of cocaine overdoses increased ve times, and lethal overdoses two-and-half times between
1984 and 1988 (Adams et al. 1989).

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421

the concern over the drug issue meets the crucial elements of a
moral panic.4
First, instead of using systematic evidence, the drug wars claims
makers used arguments that logically exceeded the available facts
(see Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a; Beckett 1994). Moreover,
no measure of seriousness adequately explains the increase in
public concern. Beckett (1994:442) argues, [neither] the reported
incidence of drug use nor the severity of drug abuse is consistently related to levels of public concern about drugs.5 Next, the
fact that the public listed drug use as the number one problem
in the country when the objective harm caused by drug use
was far from being the leading harmful condition illustrates the
disproportionality of the concern over drugs (see Goode 1989).
Finally, as will be demonstrated in the analysis, the drug issue
was highly volatile. Therefore, while the American drug panic
of the late 1980s was not a classic or perfect case of a moral
panic, it was a moral panic nonetheless (Goode and Ben-Yehuda
1994a:223).
But what role, if any, did presidential rhetoric play in this
moral panic? Does a specic type of policy rhetoric correspond
to different stages of panic? Although the specic content of the
rhetoric will obviously change depending on the topic of the panic,
can a relationship, potentially a general one, be found between
presidential policy statements and moral panics?
POLICY RHETORIC AND MORAL PANICS
Policy, the purposive course of action followed by an actor or a set
of actors in dealing with a problem or concern (Anderson 1979:3),
is inherently rhetorical (see Throgmorton 1991).6 Moreover, policy
and its underlying rhetoric determine politics and political action
(Lowi 1972). Policy rhetoric is therefore the arguments used to
persuade an audience to support a particular political course of
4
The ve elements of a moral panic are (1) an increased concern over the behavior
of a certain group; (2) increased hostility toward the group engaging in the behavior;
(3) widespread consensus that the behavior poses a threat to the society; (4) an exaggeration
of the numbers of individuals engaging in the behavior and of the threat posed by the
behavior; and (5) volatility (see Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a:33 41).
5
See Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a), Jensen, Gerber, and Babcock (1991), Levine
and Reinarman (1988), Reinarman and Levine (1989), and Goode (1990) for supporting
evidence.
6
Rhetoric is the craft of persuasion through communication (Boxill and Unnithan
1995:65).

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J. E. Hawdon

action (Majone 1989). Although present in all stages of policy,

policy rhetoric is most evident during the denitional process
when particular policy meanings are developed and disseminated.
These policy meanings include, at least implicitly, a description of
the causes and consequences of the problem or concern the policy
addresses (see Weiss 1989; Steinberger 1995; Anderson 1979).7
Once framed, claims makers must campaign to have their denition
of reality accepted since a policys survival depends, to a large
extent, on policy makers constructing and selling a problem and
policy to deal with the problem (Boxill and Unnithan 1995:74;
also see Foss et al. 1985; Carmines and Stimson 1993). Thus, the
acceptance of a policy, at least those that indicate the general
direction of political action, depends on public opinion (Anderson
1979).
Public opinion also is involved in, and is necessary for, moral
panics (see Blumer 1971). Although it is debated where the public
concern originates, public opinion can be, and often is, manipulated by elites (Hall et al. 1978; Chambliss and Mankoff 1976;
Gerassi 1966). While widespread fears almost necessarily preexist
moral panics, these fears must be articulated and given direction (see Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a). Presidents can obviously
provide the necessary outlet for public concern. As Kieve (1994:16)
states, presidents are image makers. As such, they seek the opportunity to dene situations and construct the reality they want the
public to accept (see also Campbell and Jamieson 1990; Windt
1973; Majone 1989). Given the exposure and compelling position of presidents (Hertsgaard 1988), their rhetorical messages can
popularize issues that may have otherwise never surfaced (see
Elwood 1994). A president is therefore an excellent politico-moral
entrepreneur (see Reinarman 1996).
A presidents policy rhetoric can help create a vision of reality
that breeds widespread concern about an issue, hostility toward
a group, and disproportionality. Policy rhetoric can provide the
authority that is necessary to legitimate the publics belief that
a threat from a moral deviant is real (see Victor 1998). Thus,
presidential policy rhetoric can indirectly induce moral panics by
inuencing public opinion. Once legislation is issued, however,
a predictable change in policy will expedite the moral panics
dissolution.
7

Guseld (1996:248) makes this point when he states that, the designation of problems
as drinking problems is therefore both a theory of causation and a strategy of attack on
them.

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

423

Thus, it is argued that specic types of policy correspond to

different stages of a moral panic. It is necessary to outline the
various types of drug policies and the ideological positions upon
which they are based. Once this typology is developed, distinctive policy rhetoric and styles can be related to the emergence,
sustainment, and demise of moral panics.
THE NATURE OF DRUG POLICIES
In general, there are two types of policy (Anderson 1979): (1) policy
that indicates the general direction of political action (i.e., the
objective of policy), and (2) the routine decisions about day-to-day
operations (i.e., the implementation of policy). The objective of
drug policies tend to be regulative since they focus on individual
conduct and have an immediate likelihood of coercion (Lowi
1972).8 Yet the objective of drug policies vary in terms of how
an individual is to be coerced. Drug policies can seek to either
punish or rehabilitate the individual. For example, the policies of
the 1950s that resulted in the Boggs and Narcotic Control Acts
exemplify punitive-oriented policy. Conversely, the National Drug
Rehabilitation Act of 1966 epitomizes a rehabilitative policy (see
Morgan 1981 for a discussion of these acts).
Similarly, policy implementation, or how the policys objective is to be achieved, can be either proactive or reactive.9
Proactive policy requires law enforcement agents to search for
transgressions or actively deter future transgressions. Employing
radar to track smugglers planes and educational programs such
as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) are proactive implementations of policy. Reactive policy, when law enforcement
agents do not target specic criminals or potential criminals, is
more common. Requiring drug treatment for users convicted of
a nondrug related offense or imprisoning those caught possessing
controlled substances during routine police work exemplies reactive implementation strategies. By combining these dimensions we
can identify four general types of policies. Figure 1 presents these
types.
8
More specically, drug policy is a social regulation that uses authority to modify
social values and norms of interpersonal behavior and relies on increasing involvement of
courts, ideology, and single issue groups (Spitzer 1995:238).
9
The implementation types correspond to the types of police work discussed by Reiss
(1971).

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J. E. Hawdon

FIGURE 1 Types of drug policies

American presidents have used all four types of policy in their

ongoing war on drugs. Yet, following Weaver (1953), we should
recognize the connection between the source of the argument and
the philosophical position of the speaker. That is, the type of policy
a president pursues ows from the discrete ideological positions
he holds concerning that specic issue. 10
The Ideology of Drug Policy Objectives: Punishment versus
Rehabilitation
Drug policy objectives logically follow from the two dominant
models of drug etiology: the criminal and medical models. The
criminal model regards drug use as an individuals choice. Users,
according to this model, are presumed to be in control of their
behavior and willing participants in the drug using lifestyle. Since
use is dened as a conscious decision, users can and should
be held accountable for their transgressions of normative standards. Consequently, drug use, according to this logic, deserves
punishment.
The medical model of drug use, in contrast, considers use a
disease. Drug users, according to this model, cannot control their
habits; therefore, users are patients and not accountable for their
actions. Those aficted with the disease are victims deserving
sympathy, not punishment. For example, dening alcoholism as a
10

Savelsberg (1994) makes a similar claim about crime and criminal punishment.

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

425

disease is an attempt to shift the moral character of the drinker

toward public acceptance and of the excessive drinker toward that
of a sick person (Guseld 1996:250). From this line of reasoning,
abstinence can be achieved only through treatment, and punishing
drug users is ineffective and morally questionable (see, especially,
Conrad and Schneider 1980).
The rhetoric of policy objectives can therefore be understood as
a function of how the politicians who promulgate policy express
their understanding of drug use. If use is believed to be, or
expressed through rhetoric as, the result of a conscious choice,
policy will typically be more punitive than when use is dened as
a disease.
The Ideology of Implementation: Proactive versus Reactive
Rhetoric that advances a given style of implementation also
conveys, at least implicitly, the ideology upon which the policy
is based.11 Specically, the implementation of policy reects two
distinct ideologies concerning the relationship between individuals and their society: communitarianism and individualism. 12
Communitarianism, at least in its extreme, emphasizes the group
over the individual and argues that the collective has rights independent of, and sometimes opposed to, the rights of individuals
(see, for example, Audi 1995; Vauvenargues ([1746] 1968; MacIntyre 1981; Hegel [1821] 1942). Moreover, social problems are
often dened as the moral failings of individuals (e.g., Sandel
1982, 1984; Taylor 1979; MacIntyre 1981). From this logic, the
governments primary function is to assure the well-being of the
group. As Cladis (1992:4) argues, in [the communitarian] view,
the common good takes precedence over justice, that is over
individual rights.
Proactive policy implementation logically follows from communitarian arguments. The rhetoric used to profess communitarian
logic constructs a reality that supports decisive, aggressive action. If
the group is indeed threatened by the action of individuals, aggressive interdiction becomes necessary to protect the group from the
trespasses of those individuals. Law, under these conditions, is
used to protect the group.
11
These policies are similar to the socialist and conservative categories of legal knowledge (Savelsberg 1994).
12
What follows is a caricature of these ideologies. Philosophers have attempted to
reconcile these perspectives (see Avineri and De-Shalit 1992); political rhetoric is rarely so
sophisticated.

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J. E. Hawdon

Conversely, reactive policy corresponds to an individualistic

ideology.13 Individualism contends that the individual is fundamentally good, and the corrupt and dysfunctional group is the
source of evil (e.g., Nietzsche [1887] 1964; Rousseau [1762]
1979). Individuals must therefore be protected from corruptive
groups, and the enabling of individuals to pursue their own
interests is the only true basis of government (Paine [1795]
1945:577; also see Locke [1690] 1947; Jefferson [1823] 1956).
Thus, the governments primary function is to protect individuals
from intrusive groups (e.g., corporate capitalism, religious institutions, and the state itself). That is, law must protect the civil
liberties of the individual, even at the groups expense (e.g., Rawls
1971).
Under an individualistic model of law, policy tends to be
implemented reactively. The state is often legally prohibited to
implement proactive policies. For example, the American constitutional tradition, which reects an individualistic orientation,
requires state agents to provide probable cause before they
can intrude into ones private life to search for legal transgressions. Thus, policy rhetoric that professes individualism typically
constructs a reality that supports reactive policies and the protection of individuals from proactive policies.
RHETORIC AND MORAL PANICS
Stage I: Communitarianism and the Call to Action
It is possible to relate policy rhetoric to moral panics. The emergence of a moral panic will likely be marked by the frequent
use of communitarian rhetoric expressed in proactive policies.
As noted earlier, the public must be convinced that something
is terribly wrong with their society for a moral panic to occur.
To accomplish this objective, a condition, episode, person or
group of persons emerges to become dened as a threat to societal
values and interests (Cohen 1972:9). Proactive policy statements
are well suited for generating the sense of threat that moral panics
require. Communitarian rhetoric individualizes social problems by
focusing blame away from the group and toward some individual
or group of individuals. By absolving society of responsibility
for the problem, communitarian arguments glorify the group and
13
Individualism is the belief in the inherent dignity and, indeed, sacredness of the
human person (Bellah et al., 1985:334).

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

427

allow the problem to be exaggerated. Any threat to the group must

therefore be addressed with dispatch.
Yet a threat alone will not stir a moral panic. The public also
must be convinced that collective action can solve the problem.
It is unlikely that individuals will zealously support a cause if
they believe it cannot succeed. To provide hope for a solution, an
enemy, or folk devil, must be dened (see Cohen 1972; Goode and
Ben-Yehuda 1994a). By identifying some malevolent group that
can be attacked, the collective can be convinced their actions will
be successful. Communitarian rhetoric, by individualizing social
problems, also excels at identifying folk devils.
Finally, communitarian rhetoric promotes the collective solidarity needed for social movements to emerge. By cultivating the
belief that the group is threatened, appeals for collective action
provide opportunities to strengthen the collective conscience
(Durkheim [1915] 1964). By glorifying the group and individualizing the problem, feelings of pride in and concern for the group
are simultaneously generated. Often, and certainly in the case of
drug use, this threat is presented rhetorically by way of a war
metaphor that conveys [the] image of [a] threatening other that
will destroy freedom and other sacred rights (Elwood 1994:23).
If this language is successful, the group solidarity necessary for a
moral panic will emerge.
Was the use of communitarian arguments to exaggerate the
threat, dene the folk devil, and promote group solidarity evident
in the early stages of the drug war? Although President Reagan
cannot in any general way be classied as a communitarian,14
his discussion of the drug issue frequently relied on collectivistic,
or communitarian, rhetoric. He frequently highlighted the threat by
arguing that drug trafckers were harming our people, especially
our young people and exploited innocent children (Reagan
1986:226; 1987:220). Similarly, he often evoked a war metaphor
(e.g., drugs were as a much a threat to the United States as
14
Presidents Reagan and Bush were not classic communitarians, per se. Their economic
philosophies, in particular, were clearly individualistic in orientation. Yet on many social
issues, including the drug issue, their rhetoric, if not their actual beliefs, reected communitarian logic. The argument herein is not meant to imply that there is any degree of rhetorical
consistency across issues. Both the traditional Democratic and Republican platforms contain
internal inconsistencies. For example, Republicans typically argue against big government
when discussing economic policy. However, they espouse an increased governmental role
in issues such as abortion (i.e., the complete outlawing of abortion). Conversely, Democrats
profess individualism with respect to the abortion issue (i.e., a persons right to choose and
government must protect this right), but call for big government on most economic issues.

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J. E. Hawdon

enemy planes and missiles [Reagan 1988:629]). Mrs. Reagan,

appearing on national television with her husband, also used
communitarian arguments to individualize the problem, dene the
folk devils responsible for it, and exaggerate the extent of the drug
problem:15
Today, theres a drug and alcohol abuse epidemic in this
country, and no one is safe from it not you, not me and
certainly not our children.
Now you can see why drug
abuse concerns every one of us, all the American family.
(New York Times 1986, Sept. 15:3, emphasis added)
The First Ladys use of the term epidemic and collective
pronouns is not accidental. By dening the problem as an epidemic, the rst lady evoke[d] listeners to seek culpability in
specic individuals rather than blame societal structures (Elwood
1994:25). Equating social problems with a societal illness subjugates a portion of citizens as enemies (Elwood 1994:41). That is,
it helps dene the folk devil. Mrs. Reagans rhetoric created an
us/them distinction and polarized groups of people (Elwood 1994).
Thus, communitarian rhetoric dened the them, the folk devils,
all moral panics need.
Next, by using blatant appeals to the collective identity (e.g.,
our children, all the American family), the threat was exaggerated to include the entire group, even those who did not use illegal
substances, know a drug user, or live in high-use areas. Despite the
decline in use, drug abuse was threatening the American family,
and no one was safe from the danger.
Finally, communitarian rhetoric was used in the war on drugs
to promote group solidarity and call for immediate action to solve
the problem. President Reagan excelled at appealing to traditional
American values (Campbell and Jamieson 1990), and he often
congratulated the group (e.g., together, we can keep up the good
work [Reagan 1986:225]) while calling for collective action to
seek out the evil before it destroyed the public (e.g., they can
run but they cant hide [Reagan 1987:226]). It was in a September
1986 television speech that he most obviously evoked images of
the collective ghting the enemy. President Reagan, appealing
15
Mrs. Reagans speech was included in this study because she appeared with the
president to introduce his drug policy. Her other drug-related speeches were not analyzed.

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

429

to the collective identity by referencing the mores of American

culture, stated:
My generation will remember how America swung into action
when we were attacked in World War II. Now, were in
another war for our freedom, and its time for all of us to pull
together again.
As we mobilize for this national crusade,
please remember this when your courage is tested: you are
Americans. Youre the product of the freest society mankind
has ever known. (New York Times 1986, Sept. 15:3)
The collective was being gloried, applauded for its hard work,
and reminded that still more was needed. The skillful use of
communitarian arguments and the promotion of proactive policies
verbalized the demand for action. If the group did not act quickly,
America could lose its most cherished value: freedom. All moral
group members should therefore understand the threat and support
the policy.
As noted, the President used proactive policy statements to
help dene the folk devil. Yet, at least with respect to drug use,
dening folk devils also requires that drug use be described as a
choice, not a disease. If users are to be held accountable, a choice
model should be adopted since we cannot, in good consciences,
consider diseased users responsible for their transgressions. Indeed,
the Reagan administrations drug eradication efforts were based on
a choice model of use (see Inciardi 1992). For example, during
the Presidents television address, he argued that the government
would continue to act aggressively, but nothing would be more
effective than for Americans simply to quit using drugs (New
York Times 1986, Sept. 15:3, emphasis added). Thus, when moral
panics emerge, a punitive tone usually accompanies the call for
proactive policies. Accordingly, during the early stages of a panic,
politicians and legislators become vindictive, condemnatory, and
punitive (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a:28). Such political anger
was evident in the states depiction of the drug issue (Beckett 1995)
and in the presidents rhetoric (Elwood 1994).
It is through the promotion of proactive and punitive policies, with their communitarian rhetoric and choice model of drug
use, that a moral panic is nurtured. President Reagan skillfully
used communitarian arguments to dene drug use as a problem.
He frequently dened drug use as a choice and identied the
folk devil responsible for the problem. By 1987, the media had

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J. E. Hawdon

popularizing this punitive position (Merriam 1989; Beckett 1995),

and, once accomplished, public opinion and political rhetoric
reinforced each other.16 The consensual validation of reality that
moral panics require (see Victor 1998) was established. The panic
began.
Stage II: Adopting a Dualistic Model of Use
To inuence a societys institutions and collective conscience, the
panic must be sustained. To sustain the panic the public must
be convinced that the problem still exists but some success has
been made in curtailing it. That is, they must believe that the
collective action taken to solve the problem has produced mixed
results. If action is too successful, there is nothing left to ght. If
not successful enough, public support for the crusade will likely
erode (Becker 1963).
Consequently, once a panic begins, policy objectives may
change. Policy will likely remain proactive to maintain a sense of
urgency; however, the model of drug use promoted by the policies
becomes dual as use is dened as both a choice and a disease. To
individualize the problem so some can still be blamed, a criminal
model is used. Yet punitive policies excel at dening the problem,
not highlighting success at solving it. If increasing numbers are
being punished, the problem must be growing, not subsiding.
Consequently, policy makers often dene a group who has been
cured of the disease to avoid creating too many outsiders. Some
people engaged in the objective behavior are dened as victims
who can be helped. Therefore, a rehabilitative objective is often
added to the proactive/punitive policy statements. The rhetoric of
the policy makers remains predominantly punitive but begins to
include references to prevention as the key to success. This bifurcated image of drug use sends the message that current users will
be deterred from choosing drugs and nonusers will be protected
from contracting the drug-disease. Consequently, moral panics are
created by aggressively punishing the enemy; they are sustained
by aggressively helping the victims.
Again, the Reagan administration provides an example. One
week after the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was signed, and one month
after his television appearance urging aggressive action, Reagan
16
This pattern occurs where public knowledge is not controlled by neo-corporate organizations and the public is frequently monitored through public opinion polls (Savelsberg
1994).

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

431

modied his rhetoric. As if to warn the public of the recent legislations imminent failure, the President argued that law enforcement
alone [could] not signicantly reduce drug abuse and that the
national crusade [should be] directed at education (Brinkley
1986:18). Although still proactive, rehabilitative policies were
being combined with punitive ones.
If policy statements become both proactive-punitive and
proactive-rehabilitative, the moral panic will likely escalate. The
panic diffuses as ties among local police forces are established
and various law enforcement agencies work together to deal more
effectively with the problem (Cohen 1972). As the panic escalates,
punitive and overly zealous actions
are justied on the basis of
the enormity of the threat (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994a:27; also
see Cohen 1972). As a result, a proactive policy is implemented
that often results in the suspension of individual rights and liberties
(see Cohen 1972; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). However, the
implementation of a proactive policy typically marks the moral
panics zenith.
Stage III: Implementation and the Ending of Moral Panics
Although policy can be implemented either proactively or reactively, American law is reactive in nature. The implementation
of proactive policy is usually limited by constitutional restraints.
For proactive policies to be codied into law and implemented,
compelling reasons must be offered to justify suspending constitutional rights. Hence, proactive policy will be employed only
under extraordinary circumstances, such as during a moral panic.
However, when proactive policies are implemented, the moral
panic usually begins to subside.
Once proactive policies are installed, constitutional constraints
on law enforcement often lead to more reactive policy rhetoric.
Aggressively seeking evidence and ignoring due process rarely
remain popular with the individualistic American public, nor the
Supreme Court, for long. In general, once the reactive nature of
the American constitution limits the implementation of proactive
policies, the government tends to ght the campaign defensively.
As policy turns increasingly reactive, the gravity of the situation
is lost and the moral panic dissipates. The issue begins to fade
from the public agenda as fewer proactive-punitive policies are
promoted. Reactive policies simply cannot create the sense of
urgency needed to sustain a moral panic.

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J. E. Hawdon

Again the war on drugs provides an example. With public

concern growing, the wars most proactive piece of policy was
enacted. Expanding the enemy to include occasional users, the
Reagan administration launched the Zero Tolerance Policy (ZTP).
ZTP, being punitively oriented and based on a criminal model
of use, called for the conscation of all property on which any
amount of a controlled substance was found. Within weeks of
implementing the ZTP, however, citizens began to complain about
the policys disregard for probable cause and the severity of the
punishment. Not surprisingly, the policy quickly became unpopular. By May 1988, the constitutionality and effectiveness of the
ZTP was being questioned and the policy was relaxed (Inciardi
1992 provides a discussion of ZTP).
Once the ZTP was abandoned, public concern over drug use
began to wane (see Kagay 1990; Oreskes 1990). Although the drug
issue was central in the 1988 presidential election, by 1990 public
concern about drugs had dwindled. In President Bushs rst year
in ofce, more than 30% of Americans considered drug abuse
to be the most important problem facing the nation; however,
by mid-1990, this gure had dropped to 8% (Gallup 1991:47).
Despite the Presidents attempts to resurrect the issue, the moral
panic died.
The dissolution of the moral panic may have been due, in
part, to the Presidents increased use of rehabilitative rhetoric. For
example, President Bush, in an April 1989 speech, referred to drug
users as a generation of youth, of children who have fallen victim
to a seductive, nightmarish new form of dependency and slavery
(Bush 1990:485, emphasis added). Rehabilitative policy cannot
by itself sustain a moral panic; folk devils cannot be dened as
victims. The public had grown weary; users were now the victims.
The moral panic was over.17
17
The argument is not meant to negate the public arenas model of social problems
(see Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). A slowing economy and growing tensions in the Persian
Gulf undoubtedly helped crowd out the drug issue from the popular press. However, these
events cannot explain the changes in rhetorical style used by the president. Moreover, as
Hilgartner and Bosk (1988:64) note, political biases and trends in the political culture affect
the selection of social problems. This argument supports my contention that a change from
punitive to rehabilitative arguments would make it more difcult to frame a story in a way
that would make it newsworthy (see Lester 1980 for a discussion of how stories are framed).
Finally, if the elite-engineered model of moral panics (see Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994b)
is correct, once the publics attention was focused elsewhere (i.e., the economy and the
Persian Gulf), there was no longer the need to sustain the moral panic over drug use.

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

433

AN EMPIRICAL TEST
Hypotheses, Data, and Methods
The above discussion generates several hypotheses. The argument
implies that the publics perception that a problem exists is directly
related to the use of communitarian rhetoric and the use of punitive
rhetoric. Conversely, the use of individualistic rhetoric and rehabilitative rhetoric is inversely related to the publics perception that
a problem exists. A second set of hypotheses deal with the timing
of rhetorical arguments: communitarian and punitive arguments
are used most frequently during the beginning and middle stages
of a moral panic; rehabilitative arguments are used most frequently
in the middle and last stages of a moral panic; and individualistic
arguments are used predominately toward the panics end.
To test the above hypotheses, 167 drug-related speeches, broadcasts, and addresses of Presidents Reagan and Bush were analyzed.
These data were collected from the Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States. For the years 1981 through 1992,
all public correspondence concerning drugs, alcohol, the
drug problem, drunk driving, drug smuggling, or drugs and
crime were analyzed. The content of these speeches was coded
for communitarian rhetoric (e.g., we must pull together), individualistic rhetoric (e.g., individual rights must be protected), punitive
arguments (e.g., users must be punished), and rehabilitative arguments (e.g., we must educate or cure). The number of each policy
type per speech was analyzed. Three researchers coded the data
(alpha reliability
871).
The publics perception of the drug problem was derived from
Gallup and New York Times/CBS polls that asked respondents to
name the most urgent problems facing the nation. For each case
(i.e., speech), the perception of the problem was considered the
percent of the population that listed the drug issue as a concern in
the poll that followed the speech. If a poll was not conducted within
two months of the speech, public perception was extrapolated from
the most recent polls conducted before and after the speech.18 This
procedure provides only a proxy measure of public perception;
however, if these procedures err, they should underestimate the
18

The extrapolation was based on the assumption of a linear change between the two
time points. So, if six months passed between two surveys reporting that 20% and 32% of
the population considered drug use as the number one problem, each month is considered
as attributing 2% to the overall increase (32 20/6). Thus, if a speech was given in the third
month after the rst poll, concern would be coded as 26%.

J. E. Hawdon

434

inuence of the speech since a speechs effect would most likely

be greatest immediately following its presentation. Thus, these data
provided a conservative measure.
A proxy measure of the number of illicit drug users was included
in the analysis to control for the objective extent of the problem.
The annual National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA; 1986, 1988,
1990, 1994) gures of lifetime illicit drug use were used as estimation points for each year. Monthly estimates were extrapolated from
these gures. Each speech was coded using these monthly estimates. Again it is recognized this measure is not optimal; however,
it is the best available measure and should sufce as a proxy.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Table 1 lists the number of speeches containing each policy type
by year. Changes in the use of collectivist and individualistic
arguments over the life-course of the moral panic are evident in
TABLE 1 Policy Rhetoric in Presidential Speeches 1984 1992

Year

Speeches

1984

1985

12

1986

15

1987

13

1988

12

1989

65

1990

12

1991

12

1992

18

Collective/
Proactive
Arguments
5
(63%)
10
(83%)
10
(66%)
10
(76%)
6
(50%)
36
(55%)
6
(50%)
5
(41%)
6
(33%)

Individual/
Reactive
Arguments
0
(00%)
0
(00%)
1
(06%)
1
(07%)
0
(00%)
2
(03%)
1
(08%)
2
(16%)
3
(17%)

Punitive
Arguments
4
(50%)
8
(67%)
5
(33%)
3
(23%)
9
(75%)
41
(63%)
11
(92%)
10
(83%)
4
(22%)

Rehabilitative
Arguments
1
(13%)
4
(33%)
4
(26%)
3
(23%)
5
(41%)
17
(26%)
2
(17%)
4
(33%)
12
(67%)

A speech can include both collective and punitive arguments. Therefore,

percentages do not equal 100%.

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

435

the table. The use of rehabilitative arguments is apparent toward

the end of the panic. Although the patterns are not linear, general
trends can be detected.
OLS Regression was used to test the rst set of hypotheses.
The publics perception of the drug problem was predicted by
the number of illicit drug users and the number of each policy
type mentioned per speech. This equation, which met adequately
the assumptions of OLS regression, explained 18.5% of the total
variance in the publics perception of the drug problem. Table 2
reports these results.
Table 2 shows that the inuence of each variable was in the
predicted direction, and all variables except protection of the individuals rights were statistically signicant at the .05 level. The
use of individualistic rhetoric, which argues for the protection of
the individuals rights, was signicant using a one-tail test. Interestingly, the objective use of illicit drugs was inversely related to
the perception of drug use as a problem. This variable was the
strongest predictor of public perception (
332). Communitarian (
230) and punitive (
196) arguments were the next
best predictors. Rehabilitative arguments were inversely related to
the publics perception of the problem (
186). Thus, even
when controlling for the objective problem, presidential policy
rhetoric inuenced the level of popular concern.
To test the second set of hypotheses, those dealing with the
timing of various policy types, analysis of variance and crosstabular
TABLE 2 Regression Analysis: Public Perception
of Problem by Types of Policy Statements
Variable
Objective use
Rehabilitative
Individualistic (reactive)
Punitive
Collectivist (proactive)
(Constant)
R2 .185
F 7 32

p
001

05 (one-tail);

SE B

Beta

1.005
3.761
8.729
2.662
3.894
55.444

.226
1.581
5.34
1.03
1.36
8.39

.332
.186
.119
.196
.231

05 (two-tail);

01;

J. E. Hawdon

436

analyses were performed.19 To test if the use of communitarian arguments decreased over the life-course of the moral
panic, time was recoded into three periods, 19841986 (TIME 1 ),
1987 1989 (TIME2 ), and 19901992 (TIME3 )20 and used to
predict the percentage of speeches in each year that contained
communitarian arguments. Based on the analysis, there was a
signicant difference in the use of communitarian arguments over
time (F 5 04, p
051).21 The difference emerged between
Mean
TIME1 (
70 73) and TIME3 (M 41 66). This relationship remained signicant using a one-tailed test even when
controlling for the number of drug users in each year (F 4 44,
p one-tail
039). The variable TIME accounted for 62.7% of the
variance in communitarian arguments.
A crosstabular analysis, coding communitarian arguments as
either present or absent, also illustrates the changing use of
communitarian arguments over the panics life-course. The use
of communitarian arguments decreased over time (
365;
2
7 602df; p
022). Whereas 71.4% of the speeches given in
the rst period made communitarian arguments, only 57.8% of the
speeches in the second period did so. This percentage decreased
to 40.5% in the third period. Table 3 presents these results.
Next, ANOVA also supports the assertion that the use of reactive,
or individualistic, arguments increases over the course of a moral
TABLE 3 Communitarian Arguments by Stages of a Moral Panic
Stages of moral panic
TIME1
TIME2
TIME3
Communitarian arguments: absent
Communitarian arguments: present
Column total
Percent
2

19

7 60; degrees of freedom

10
28.6%
25
71.4%
35
100.0%
2; probability

38
42.2%
52
57.8%
90
100.0%

25
59.5%
17
40.5%
42
100.0%

022; Gamma

Total
73
43.7%
94
56.3%
167
100.0%
365.

ANOVA is used to test the hypotheses. However, given the small sample (eight years),
crosstabular analyses also are performed to provide additional evidence.
20
These periods roughly correspond to the beginning (TIME1 ), middle (TIME2 ), and end
(TIME3 ) of the panic (Norton-Hawk 1995). TIME2 overlaps Reagans and Bushs tenure.
These differences cannot therefore be attributed solely to differences in presidential style.
21
The variances were equal (Bartletts F
225, p
799).

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

437

TABLE 4 Individualistic Arguments by Stages of a Moral Panic

Stages of moral panic
TIME1 & TIME2
TIME3
Individualistic argument: absent
Individualistic argument: present
Column total
Percent

121
96.8%
4
3.2%
125
100.0%

36
85.7%
6
14.3%
42
100.0%

6 86; degrees of freedom 1; probability

009; Fishers exact p
Gamma
668 (Gamma tends to be inated in small tables); Phi
202.
2

Total
157
94.0%
10
6.0%
167
100.0%
017;

panic (F 6 22, p
034). According to the theoretical discussion,
reactive policies should typically occur after legislation is passed.
Thus TIME1 and TIME2 were contrasted against TIME3 . The mean
number of individualistic arguments made during these times (3.41
and 13.90, respectively) were signicantly different (T 3 46,
p
013). Again, the relationship remained signicant even when
controlling for the number of drug users in each year (F 5 29,
p
058). The three stages of the moral panic accounted for 67.5%
of the variance in individualistic arguments.
The crosstabulation of individualistic arguments by time is
presented in Table 4. As in the ANOVA, Time periods here were
dichotomized to test this hypothesis (1984 1989, 1990 1992). As
shown in Table 4, individualistic arguments were almost nonexistent until the last stage of the panic when the frequency of their
occurrence more than tripled, from 3.2% to 14.3% (
669).
Next, as predicted, rehabilitative arguments increase over time
(F 4 81; p
009). Again, TIME1 and TIME2 were contrasted
against TIME3 . The mean number of rehabilitative arguments
made during these times (.317 and .710, respectively) were signicantly different (T 2 41, p
020). The three stages of the moral
panic accounted for only 6.5% of the variance in rehabilitative
arguments.
The crosstabulation of rehabilitative arguments by time is presented in Table 5. Again, time periods were dichotomized to
test this hypothesis (19841989, 19901992). Only 27.2% of the
drug-related speeches made between 1984 and 1989 made any
reference to rehabilitation. Conversely, 42.9% of the speeches
made in the last stage of the panic made rehabilitative arguments.

J. E. Hawdon

438

TABLE 5 Rehabilitative Arguments by Stages of a Moral Panic

Stages of moral panic
Early
Late
Rehabilitative argument: absent
Rehabilitative argument: present
Column total
Percent
2

tail
Phi

91
72.8%
34
27.2%
125
100.0%

24
57.1%
18
42.9%
42
100.0%

Total
115
68.9%
52
31.1%
167
100.0%

3 59; degrees of freedom 1; probability

058; Fishers exact p (1
046; Gamma
335 (Gamma tends to be inated in small tables);
147.

This relationship is signicant using a one-tail test ( 2 3 592df;

p
058; Fishers exact test, one-tail p
046).
The nal hypothesis concerning the use of punitive arguments
during different stages of a moral panic was not supported. The
use of punitive arguments was typical throughout the moral panic
with the exception of 1987 and 1988.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
President Reagan masterfully incited the public and helped create
a moral panic. The use of communitarian arguments rallied support
for an aggressive war on drugs. Reagans successor was less gifted
at stirring public emotion. Despite Bushs efforts to revive the drug
issue, the moral panic had run its course. The Bush administration
adopted a more reactive implementation style. ZTP gave way to
funding drug prevention and education efforts (Akers 1992), and
the drug issue slowly faded from the public agenda. The drug issue
was barely mentioned in the 1992 presidential campaign, despite
candidate Clintons admission to experimenting with marijuana.
By 1992, less than 6% of the population considered drug use to be
a pressing social problem (Gallup 1992:11).
In general, the theoretical discussion was supported by this
study. However, the hypothesis regarding the use of punitive
policies appears to be inaccurate even though punitive arguments
declined substantially in the middle of the panic. The relative
absence of these arguments during this stage could have been an
attempt to redene drug use as both a choice and a disease. The use
of rehabilitative arguments is relatively constant during these two

Presidential Rhetoric and Moral Panic

439

stages. Thus, presidential policy went from using a criminal and

rehabilitative model to a predominantly rehabilitative model. It is
possible that drug use was so successfully dened as a crime during
the rst stage that presidential rhetoric adopted a rehabilitative tone
to assure the panic would continue. The nal stage of the panic
sees a resurgence of punitive arguments coupled with an increase
in the use of rehabilitative arguments. It is worth noting that during
the last year of the panic, after a substantial resurgence of punitive
arguments, the percentage of speeches making punitive arguments
reaches its lowest point while the percentage of speeches making
rehabilitative arguments reaches its peak. Thus, the theoretical
argument is supported.
Although other factors are obviously involved in the creation of
moral panics:22 policy rhetoric appears to play a role. The rhetoric
of proactive-punitive policies helps generate an atmosphere of
concern, and proactive-rehabilitative policies help sustain the
moral panic. Once the moral panic results in legislation, however,
the nature of the legal system tends to emphasize a reactive style
of implementation. The moral panic will then typically wane. We
already know the importance of state initiatives in creating moral
panics (see Beckett 1994, 1995). This works contribution is more
modest. It species how the underlying logic of policy rhetoric can
create an atmosphere conducive to moral panics. Although more
work is needed, these insights may furnish a better understanding
of the role policy rhetoric plays in creating moral panics.
Although the analysis focused on one panic, it supports the
constructionist perspective of social problems which emphasizes
the subjective nature of how behaviors are selected to become
problems.23 Given the success of constructionism in explaining
other moral panics (e.g., Beckett 1994; Cohen 1972; Guseld
1963; Reasons 1974; Victor 1998), the perspective appears accurate despite the era in which the panic occurred, the political
administration involved, or the content of the issue. This research
also supports the elite-engineered model of moral panics (e.g.
Bennett 1980; Edelman 1988; Hall et al. 1978), which argues
22
See Shoemaker, Wanata, and Leggett (1989) or Merriam (1989) for a discussion of the
role the media played in creating public concern about drugs.
23
The constructionist perspective emphasizes the subjective, social, and political
processes by which phenomena are dened as social problems. Interpretations of reality are
framed to give meaning to events and are subject to social inuences beyond the objective
condition. Conversely, for objectivists, social problems are those events that are objectively
problematic for social well-being (see Beckett 1994).

440

J. E. Hawdon

that public opinion is shaped by political elites. If elites carefully

choose their rhetorical devices, they can help stir a moral panic.
The nding that public concern over drug use increased when
actual rates of use decreased also supports the constructionist
perspective of deviance. This nding can be explained with
Hawdons (1996) theory of deviance cycles. According to this
theory, moral boundaries are more intensely enforced when rates
of social mobility slow and the deviance structure is altered so
that once tolerated behaviors are dened as deviant. Given the
permissive attitude toward drugs during the late 1970s and early
1980s (see Akers 1992; Musto 1987), the war on drugs can be
seen as a governmentally sponsored attempt to redene Americas
moral boundaries. As rates of social mobility slowed in the early
1980s, the deviance structure was altered (Hawdon 1996). As this
occurred, although the number of people engaging in the objective behavior may have actually decreased, the rate of deviance, as
a socially constructed denition, [increased] (Hawdon 1996:188).
Thus, the increased public concern was, in part, a function of
the reconstruction of drug use as a deviant behavior. The current
research demonstrates that a combination of proactive and punitive
rhetoric was used to reestablish those stricter moral boundaries.
Finally, this research, in conjunction with Savelsbergs (1994),
can help explain the relative frequency of moral panics in the
United States. The rise of public issues such as crime and drugs
cannot be accounted for solely by increasing crime rates or
increased public concern. Instead, the manner in which public
and political knowledge is created shapes these issues. The relatively free exchange of knowledge between public, private, and
academic sources in the United States creates considerable variation in the nature of macro-level punishment decisions (Savelsberg
1994, also see Iyengar 1991). The war on drugs, the rhetoric used
in it, the medias coverage of it, and the intense public opinion
in support of it reinforced each other to promote a law-and-order,
conservative reaction to crime and drugs.

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