Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
131282
January 4, 2002
trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial,
alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of
Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned
over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief
that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was
responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial
court denied the motion for new trial.1wphi1.nt
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative case
between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and
Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the Regional
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional
Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a
Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation
in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a
determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to
vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial
court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr.,
who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all
surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming
ownership of the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC
denied the motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the
Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration
of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only
P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal
he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This
motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on
appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him
in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from
judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for
reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the
denial of private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it
went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of
execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of
Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private
respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the
parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by
their express consent.19 Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction
of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in saying that the
RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the
action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still
be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the
action.21Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of
a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but
an issue of conferment as a matter of law.22 Also, neither waiver
nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring
highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.23 The Court of
Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision in Javier vs.
Court of Appeals, thus:
x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error
in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may
not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It
could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of
divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If
any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed
on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued
their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it
is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it
B.
D.
B.
E.
F.
G.
IV.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A
REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND
OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF
AT LEAST P10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST
PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE
SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE
ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.
V.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER
ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT
LEAST P20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.[18]
Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of
technical procedure is called for in view of the attendant
circumstances showing that the objectives of the rule on
certification of non-forum shopping and the rule requiring material
portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been
glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of
the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is
one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As
enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:[19]
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of
petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an
error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.[20] (Emphasis supplied).
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and
Morales, JJ., concur.
ESCOBAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON.
FRANCIS
GARCHITORENA,
Presiding
Justice
of
the
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez,
Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan,
Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N.
Nueca,respondents.
DECISION
45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him
serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death, and as a
consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the
deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the
amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency.[1]
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively
suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential
Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised
of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on
October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending
the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.[2]
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by
the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The
petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,[3] the petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on
December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash [4] the
Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No.
408,[5] in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and
Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and
officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June
25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He
alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for
only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be
reinstated. On September 23, 1993,[6] the PNP Region V
Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information
on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners
suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994,
the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of
suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive
suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC
denied the motion on March 9, 1994.[7] Trial thereafter proceeded,
and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:
(1)
The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended
Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the
Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to
his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
(2)
After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the
complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the
stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are
hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable
Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate
proceedings.[17]
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty.
Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case
No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It
reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975,[18] the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering
that the petitioner had a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the
prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had
commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule
on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with
the case and render judgment therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for
trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his
evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the
RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information
was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was
still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against
him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty
MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATAWINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIAEUREST SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT
SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES
CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS
CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court are the separate Motions for Reconsideration
filed by respondent Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), respondents-intervenors Jacinto V. Paras, Rafael P.
Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie Buyson Villarama, Prospero C.
Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and
Benasing O. Macaranbon, all members of the House of
Representatives (Respondent Congressmen),1 respondentsintervenors who are employees of PIATCO and other workers of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) (PIATCO Employees)2 and respondentsintervenors Nagkaisang Maralita ng Taong Association, Inc.,
(NMTAI)3 of the Decision of this Court dated May 5, 2003
declaring the contracts for the NAIA IPT III project null and void.
Briefly, the proceedings. On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging
Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Philippine Government through the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC) and Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) for the construction and development of the
NAIA IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement
pursuant to R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. No. 7718 (BOT
Law).4In accordance with the BOT Law and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules), the DOTC/MIAA
invited the public for submission of competitive and comparative
they stand to lose their jobs should the governments contract with
PIATCO be declared null and void."16 NMTAI, on the other hand,
represents itself as a corporation composed of responsible taxpaying Filipino citizens with the objective of "protecting and
sustaining the rights of its members to civil liberties, decent
livelihood, opportunities for social advancement, and to a good,
conscientious and honest government."17
The Rules of Court govern the time of filing a Motion to Intervene.
Section 2, Rule 19 provides that a Motion to Intervene should be
filed "before rendition of judgment...." The New RespondentsIntervenors filed their separate motions after a decision has been
promulgated in the present cases. They have not offered any
worthy explanation to justify their late intervention. Consequently,
their Motions for Reconsideration-In-Intervention are denied for
the rules cannot be relaxed to await litigants who sleep on their
rights. In any event, a sideglance at these late motions will show
that they hoist no novel arguments.
c. Failure to Implead an Indispensable Party
PIATCO next contends that petitioners should have impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party. It alleges
that petitioners sued the DOTC, MIAA and the DPWH in their own
capacities or as implementors of the PIATCO Contracts and not
as a contract party or as representatives of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. It then leapfrogs to the conclusion that
the "absence of an indispensable party renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment."18
PIATCOs allegations are inaccurate. The petitions clearly bear
out that public respondents DOTC and MIAA were impleaded
as parties to the PIATCO Contracts and not merely as their
implementors. The separate petitions filed by the MIAA
employees19 and members of the House of
Representatives20 alleged that "public respondents are impleaded
herein because they either executed the PIATCO Contracts or
are undertaking acts which are related to the PIATCO Contracts.
They are interested and indispensable parties to this
Petition."21 Thus, public respondents DOTC and MIAA were
impleaded as parties to the case for having executed the
contracts.
More importantly, it is also too late in the day for PIATCO to raise
this issue. If PIATCO seriously views the non-inclusion of the
Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party as fatal to
the petitions at bar, it should have raised the issue at the onset of
the proceedings as a ground to dismiss. PIATCO cannot litigate
issues on a piecemeal basis, otherwise, litigations shall be like a
shore that knows no end. In any event, the Solicitor General, the
legal counsel of the Republic, appeared in the cases at bar in
representation of the interest of the government.
II
Pre-qualification of PIATCO
The Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the
PBAC should apply to determine the financial capability of a
bidder for pre-qualification purposes: (i) proof of the ability of the
project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a minimum
amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from
reputable banks attesting that the project proponent and/or
members of the consortium are banking with them, that they
are in good financial standing, and that they have adequate
resources.22 The evident intent of these standards is to protect
the integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it
that the proponent has the financial capability to carry it out. As a
further measure to achieve this intent, it maintains a certain
debt-to-equity ratio for the project.
At the pre-qualification stage, it is most important for a bidder to
show that it has the financial capacity to undertake the project by
proving that it can fulfill the requirement on minimum amount of
equity. For this purpose, the Bid Documents require in no
uncertain terms:
The minimum amount of equity to which the proponents
financial capability will be based shall be thirty percent
(30%) of the project cost instead of the twenty
percent (20%) specified in Section 3.6.4 of the Bid
Documents. This is to correlate with the required debtto-equity ratio of 70:30 in Section 2.01a of the draft
concession agreement. The debt portion of the project
financing should not exceed 70% of the actual project
cost.23
In relation thereto, section 2.01 (a) of the ARCA provides:
allied undertaking, Paircargo Consortium, at the time of prequalification, failed to show that it had the ability to provide 30% of
the project cost and necessarily, its financial capability for the
project cannot pass muster.
III
Concession Agreement
amendment as these fees are not really public utility fees. In other
words, PIATCO justifies the re-classification under the 1997
Concession Agreement on the ground that these fees are nonpublic utility revenues.
We disagree. The removal of groundhandling fees, airline office
rentals and porterage fees from the category of "Public Utility
Revenues" under the draft Concession Agreement and its reclassification to "Non-Public Utility Revenues" under the 1997
Concession Agreement is significant and has far reaching
consequence. The 1997 Concession Agreement provides that
with respect to Non-Public Utility Revenues, which include
groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and porterage
fees,27 "[PIATCO] may make any adjustments it deems
appropriatewithout need for the consent of GRP or any
government agency."28 In contrast, the draft Concession
Agreement specifies these fees as part of Public Utility Revenues
and can be adjusted "only once every two years and in
accordance with the Parametric Formula" and "the adjustments
shall be made effective only after the written express approval
of the MIAA."29 The Bid Documents themselves clearly provide:
4.2.3 Mechanism for Adjustment of Fees and Charges
4.2.3.1 Periodic Adjustment in Fees and
Charges
Adjustments in the fees and charges
enumerated hereunder, whether or not falling
within the purview of public utility revenues,
shall be allowed only once every two years in
accordance with the parametric formula
attached hereto as Annex 4.2f. Provided that
the adjustments shall be made effective only
after the written express approval of MIAA.
Provided, further, that MIAAs approval, shall be
contingent only on conformity of the
adjustments to the said parametric formula.
The fees and charges to be regulated in the above
manner shall consist of the following:
....
c) groundhandling fees;
d) rentals on airline offices;
....
(f) porterage fees;
. . . .30
The plain purpose in re-classifying groundhandling fees, airline
office rentals and porterage fees as non-public utility fees is to
remove them from regulation by the MIAA. In excluding these
fees from government regulation, the danger to public interest
cannot be downplayed.
We are not impressed by the effort of PIATCO to depress this
prejudice to public interest by its contention that in the 1997
Concession Agreement governing Non-Public Utility Revenues, it
is provided that "[PIATCO] shall at all times be judicious in fixing
fees and charges constituting Non-Public Utility Revenues in order
to ensure that End Users are not unreasonably deprived of
services."31 PIATCO then peddles the proposition that the said
provision confers upon MIAA "full regulatory powers to ensure
that PIATCO is charging non-public utility revenues
atjudicious rates."32 To the trained eye, the argument will not fly for
it is obviously non sequitur. Fairly read, it is PIATCO that wields
the power to determine the judiciousness of the said fees and
charges. In the draft Concession Agreement the power was
expressly lodged with the MIAA and any adjustment can only be
done once every two years. The changes are not insignificant
specks as interpreted by PIATCO.
PIATCO further argues that there is no substantial change in the
1997 Concession Agreement with respect to fees and charges
PIATCO is allowed to impose which are not covered by
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 199333 as the "relevant
provision of the 1997 Concession Agreement is practically
identical with the draft Concession Agreement."34
We are not persuaded. Under the draft Concession Agreement,
PIATCO may impose fees and charges other than those fees and
charges previously imposed or collected at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal I, subject to the written
Such liability would defeat the very purpose of the BOT Law which
is to encourage the use of private sector resources in the
construction, maintenance and/or operation of development
projects with no, or at least minimal, capital outlay on the part of
the government.
The respondents again urge that should this Court affirm its ruling
that the PIATCO Contracts contain direct government guarantee
provisions, the whole contract should not be nullified. They rely on
the separability clause in the PIATCO Contracts.
We are not persuaded.
The BOT Law and its implementing rules provide that there are
three (3) essential requisites for an unsolicited proposal to be
accepted: (1) the project involves a new concept in technology
and/or is not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct
government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3)
the government agency or local government unit has invited by
publication other interested parties to a public bidding and
conducted the same.50 The failure to fulfill any of the requisites will
result in the denial of the proposal. Indeed, it is further provided
that a direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity provision
will "necessarily disqualify a proposal from being treated and
accepted as an unsolicited proposal."51 In fine, the mere inclusion
of a direct government guarantee in an unsolicited proposal is
fatal to the proposal. There is more reason to invalidate a contract
if a direct government guarantee provision is inserted later in the
contract via a backdoor amendment. Such an amendment
constitutes a crass circumvention of the BOT Law and renders the
entire contract void.
Respondent PIATCO likewise claims that in view of the fact that
other BOT contracts such as the JANCOM contract, the Manila
Water contract and the MRT contract had been considered valid,
the PIATCO contracts should be held valid as well.52 There is no
parity in the cited cases. For instance, a reading of Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM Environmental
Corporation53 will show that its issue is different from the issues
in the cases at bar. In the JANCOM case, the main issue is
whether there is a perfected contract between JANCOM and the
Government. The resolution of the issue hinged on the following:
(1) whether the conditions precedent to the perfection of the
contract were complied with; (2) whether there is a valid notice of
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., maintains his separate opinion in the main ponencia,
promulgated on 05 May 2003.
Panganiban, J., reiterate his separate opinion in the main case,
promulgated on May 5, 2003.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Azcuna,
JJ., joins J. Vitugs opinion.
Carpio, and Tinga, JJ., no part.
Callejo, Sr., J., joins J. Panganiban in his concurring opinion
We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty
of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicatain the other. For litis pendentia to exist,
the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or
at least such parties as are representing the same interests in
both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.20
In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the
parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases are
different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot be
said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five petitions
are indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of
Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action and issues
raised before those courts, considering that the respondents failed
to furnish this Court with copies of the said petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
BANKERS
LIFE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
WEI, respondent.
EDDY
INSURANCE
NG KOK
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution[2] dated August 5,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504, entitled
Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corporation.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean
businessman
who
ventured
into
investing
in
the Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter
of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation,
petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit
at Valle Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid
petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a
46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued
atP860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the
purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio
G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the
respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject
condominium unit shall substantially be completed and delivered
to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8,
1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no
substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date
specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by
respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).
1.
2.
3.
4.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March
26, 1999, affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in
favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated August 5,
1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner
contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant
case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the
delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential
Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][4] shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
xxx
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
x x x.
For reasons being, firstly, the said circular provides that all cases
involving justices and judges of lower courts shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action, whether or not such complaints
deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official
functions, and regardless of the nature of the crime, without any
qualification whether the crime was committed before or during his
tenure of office. Under the law on Legal Hermeneutics, if the law does
not qualify we must not qualify. Secondly, it would sound, to the mind of
the Court, awkward for a first level court to be trying an incumbent
judge of a second level court.
For reasons afore-stated, this Court can not and shall not try this case as
against Judge Hurtado, unless the Honorable Supreme Court would order
otherwise.
Wherefore, the foregoing premises duly considered, the name of Judge
Braulio L. Hurtado, Jr. is ordered excluded from the amended
information and the case against him is ordered forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to the afore-said Circular No. 3-89
of the Supreme Court, dated February 9, 1989.
Accordingly, Maxima S. Borja (Borja), Stenographer I and
Acting Clerk of Court II of the MTC-Koronadal, South Cotabato,
wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the criminal case
against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator for appropriate
action.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a
Memorandum dated 25 October 2000 pointing out that Circular
No. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP
against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not
apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts against such
justices and judges.
Thus, in the Resolution of 6 December 2000, the Court
directed that the letter of Acting Clerk of Court Borja be returned to
the MTC-Koronadal together with the records of the criminal
case. The Court directed Judge Sardido to explain in writing why
he should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for
excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information and for
transmitting the records of Judge Hurtados case to the Court.
Court has vested the IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute
administrative cases against erring lawyers. [8] However, under
Circular No. 3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action all administrative cases filed
with IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of the
lower courts. As mandated by the Constitution, the Court
exercises the exclusive power to discipline administratively
justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts.
Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against
erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. Trial
courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses
committed by justices of appellate courts [9] and judges of lower
courts. This is clear from the Circular directing the IBP, and not
the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed against
justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the
Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an
administrative case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed
with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law.
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the
same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense.
Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act
committed before or after he became a judge is of no moment.
Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC
judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney or
judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against
him. The dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the
dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of
facts. The quantum of evidence that is required in the latter is
only preponderance of evidence, and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt which is required in criminal cases.[10] As held
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:[11]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.
Vitug,
Ynares-
September 7, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause
of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court,
the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of
Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on
different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately
ends useless litigations.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision2and the
November 20, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has
the exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land
in question, it appears that his action is already barred by
laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost
23 years from the time the original certificate of title has
been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after
35 years from the time the land was certified as
agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the
annulment of patents or titles acquired through fraud is
the State; thus, the petitioners action is deemed
misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert
or protect. What he had during the time he requested for
the re-classification of the land was the privilege of
applying for the patent over the same upon the lands
conversion from forest to agricultural.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
In Aldovino v. Alunan,43 the Court has held that when the plaintiffs
own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such
action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has
not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,44 we also
explained thus:
"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to
dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the
parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be
indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954;
Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan.
28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets,
Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the
basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of
Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an
affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a
motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA
705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all,
No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to
office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered
that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be
threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she
hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the
corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public
office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence,
not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an
essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition,
petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of
this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to
their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt
that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his
office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any compensation
nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
June 5, 2013
The Facts
On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14year old second year high school student of the Antadao National
High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, tiled an affidavitcomplaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the
same school, before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).
For his defense, Pat-og offered the testimonies of his witnesses Emiliano Dontongan (Dontongan), a teacher in another school,
who alleged that he was a member of the Municipal Council for
the Protection of Children, and that, in such capacity, he
investigated the incident and came to the conclusion that it did not
happen at all; and Ernest Kimmot, who testified that he was in the
basketball court at the time but did not see such incident. Pat-og
fact that Pat-og applied for probation in the criminal case, instead
of filing an appeal, further convinced it of his guilt.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was
sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. It, however, found
the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh
under the circumstances. Thus, it adjudged petitioner guilty of
Simple Misconduct and imposed the maximum penalty of
suspension for six (6) months.
On December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by
Pat-og was denied for lack of merit.4
The Ruling of the CSC
5
In its Resolution, dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Patogs appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the
CSC-CAR as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal
is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the CSC-CAR is affirmed
with the modification that Alberto Pat-og, Sr., is adjudged guilty of
grave misconduct, for which he is meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, and forfeiture of
retirement benefits.6
After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CARs
conclusion that there existed substantial evidence to sustain the
finding that Pat-og did punch Bang-on in the stomach. It gave
greater weight to the positive statements of Bang-on and his
witnesses over the bare denial of Patog. It also highlighted the
fact that Pat-og failed to adduce evidence of any ill motive on the
part of Bang-on in filing the administrative case against him. It
likewise gave credence to the medico-legal certificate showing
that Bang-on suffered a hematoma contusion in his hypogastric
area.
The CSC ruled that the affidavits of Bang-ons witnesses were not
bereft of evidentiary value even if Pat-og was not afforded a
chance to cross-examine the witnesses of Bang-on. It is of no
moment because the cross- examination of witnesses is not an
indispensable requirement of administrative due process.
The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but, instead, fully
acquiesced in his conviction in the criminal case for slight physical
injury, which was based on the same set of facts and
circumstances, and involved the same parties and issues. It, thus,
considered his prior criminal conviction as evidence against him in
the administrative case.
On Jurisdiction
The CA also held that the CSC committed no error in taking into
account the conviction of Pat-og in the criminal case. It stated that
his conviction was not the sole basis of the CSC for his dismissal
from the service because there was substantial evidence proving
that Pat-og had indeed hit Bang-on.
and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board
of Professional Teachers.17
In CSC v. Alfonso,18 it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No.
4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise
and discipline all members of the civil service, including public
school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and
foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and
answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a
public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its
power to discipline public school teachers would negate the very
purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly
amend the Constitution itself.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body
charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil
service which embraces all branches and agencies of the
government.11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative
Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines)13 expressly provide that the
CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC,
as the central personnel agency of the government, has the
inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil
service, including public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over
administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
investigating committee constituted therein.14 Also, under Section
23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization
Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the
power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes
enumerated therein.15
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same
parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more
separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the
same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.16
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC
which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed
RULE 15
MOTIONS
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of Section 1
of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Based on the foregoing provisions, the "objection on jurisdictional
grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to
dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can
always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to
the principle of estoppel by laches."36
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party
to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed
waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked
when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent
a waiver of the defense.37 If the objection is not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction
over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived
by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.38
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping
pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that "issue on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for
the first time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent timely
raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not
estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. As the question
of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the
defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the
answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot
claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being
subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be
asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence."39
2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through
a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Manuel Toledo
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never
acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case
against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by
which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person."40
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of
summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even
before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial
court. The issues presented in this case are similar to those in the
case of Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te.41
In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision declaring that Patricio
Sereno was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering the
payment of his monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a truck in the
possession of Serenos employer was levied upon by a sheriff of
the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and his lawyer, Rogelio
Sarsaba, the petitioner in that case. A complaint for recovery of
motor vehicle and damages, with prayer for the delivery of the
truck pendente lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba, Sereno,
the NLRC sheriff and the NLRC by the registered owner of the
truck. After his motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court,
petitioner Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on, however, he filed an
omnibus motion to dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants, in view of the fact
that Sereno was already dead when the complaint for recovery of
possession was filed.
Although the factual milieu of the present case is not exactly
similar to that of Sarsaba, one of the issues submitted for
resolution in both cases is similar: whether or not a case, where
one of the named defendants was already dead at the time of its
filing, should be dismissed so that the claim may be pursued
instead in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased defendant. The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed,
as did respondent herein, that since one of the defendants died
before summons was served on him, the trial court should have
dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and the claim
should be filed against the estate of the deceased defendant. The
petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants,
considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
time the collection case was filed by petitioner. This being the
case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not
obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot
simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the procedure taken by
the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,52 whose facts, as mentioned
earlier, resemble those of this case, should be followed herein.
There, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court when it
resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
Sereno in this wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since
there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio
Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be
served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio
Sereno, one of the defendants herein, does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, x x
x, were validly served with summons and the case with respect to
the answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it
recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previously
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the
Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED
and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of
Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other
accused [sic] will proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)53
As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be dismissed.
In addition, the dismissal of the case against Manuel is further
warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
states that: only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil action." Applying this provision of
law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante,54 held:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to
maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an
actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in
law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. x x x
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator x x x.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his
person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28
February 2006 and the Resolution dated 1 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated 8
November 2004 and 22 December 2004, respectively, in Civil
Case No. 97-86672, are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Manila is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial
of Civil Case No. 97-86672 against respondent Lolita G. Toledo
only, in accordance with the above pronouncements of the Court,
and to decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the
death of one of the alleged offenders.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the
RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed
petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction
over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund,
which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied
it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
P
11,462,525.02
3,118,104.63
2,152,316.54
1,362,750.34
419,689.04
231,453.62
140,908.54
220,204.70
94,906.34
P
19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under
Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.10
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the
above Decision had already become final and executory per the
Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October
20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on
November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears
that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve
the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have
already become moot and academic considering that the trial
court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already
ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now
final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the
issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no
practical use or value.13
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on
jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for
future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a
procedural error which petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed
their petition filed with the said court and their motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the
assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases
where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant
case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court
has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the
15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and
because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court
deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the
central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this
Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil
action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA
1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction
over the following:
Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a court may issue
a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De
Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v.
Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction
over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the
CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter
precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the
orderly administration of justice.35 The Court cannot accept that
such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the
law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review
over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may
exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents'
complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same
court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where
one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court
rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude
that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local
tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders
of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal
from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in
and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of
certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of