Assigned Cases for Rights of A Person under Custodial Investigation and Right

Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

A. People Vs Mahinay
GR NO. 122485
Feb. 1, 1999
Facts:
Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his
tasks was to take care of Isips house which was under construction adjacent to the
latters residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of
Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her
mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and
disappeared. The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day.
She was found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy
showed that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims mother

to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as
that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three arms length away from the septic tank
were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court
convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death. The case was forwarded
to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issues:
1. WON the appellants extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance
with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights?
Held:
Yes. The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted,
warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and
custodial rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However,
the Court ruled otherwise.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that
provided the rights of suspects under custodial investigation in detail.
A person under custodial investigation should be informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent
and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided
for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence
of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient
means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or
minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be
visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government

organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is

accomplished;
7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he
must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to
speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not
wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased
if it has already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his
rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of
whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence.

B. Miranda vs Arizona
384 US 436

1966
Facts:
On March 2, 1963, Patricia McGee (not her real name) was kidnapped and raped while
walking home after work in Phoenix, Arizona. She accused Ernesto Miranda of the crime
after picking him out of a lineup. He was arrested and taken to an interrogation room
where after three hours he signed a written confession to the crimes. The paper on which
he wrote his confession stated that the information was given voluntarily and that he
understood his rights. However, no specific rights were listed on the paper.
Issue:
In arresting and interrogating suspects, is it a requirement to notify the arrested party of
the Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they
interrogate the defendants?
Ruling:
Miranda was found guilty in an Arizona court based largely on the written confession. He
was sentenced to 20 to 30 years for both crimes to be served concurrently.
Ratio Decidendi:
MIrandas attorney attempted to argue that his rights had been violated since he was not
provided an attorney during the confession, citing the Sixth Amendment, particularly of
his right to have an attorney represent him or that his statement could be used against
him. He appealed the case in the Arizona State Supreme Court, which did not agree that
Mirandas confession was coerced, and therefore upheld the conviction. The case was
raised to the United States Supreme Court. However, the Court focused on the rights
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment including that of protection against selfincrimination. Ernesto Miranda was arrested after a crime victim identified him, but
police officers questioning him did not inform him of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, or of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney. The
Supreme Court agreed, deciding that the police had not taken proper steps to inform
Miranda of his rights. The Majority Opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren
stated that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would otherwise do so freely." ". . . the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Chief Justice
Earl Warren also wrote that The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our
system of constitutional rule.[that] an individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation. . . Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance
that the accused was aware of this right.
Miranda was not released from prison,
however, because he had also been convicted of robbery which was not affected by the
decision. He was retried for the crimes of rape and kidnapping without the written

evidence and found guilty a second time.

Significance of Miranda vs Arizona:
"[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."

C. People vs Almanzor
GR NO. 124916
July 11, 2002
Facts:
Rene Almanzor y Roxas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with
rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty.
On March 11, 1994 Almanzor allegedly abducted Sally Roxas while walking along Makati
Avenue Ayala Center, Makati, Metro Manila, near the Landmark Department Store, on her way
to the Greenbelt Branch of Jollibee, where she works as a service crew. Almanzor allegedly
introduced himself to Roxas as a member of the Marikina Police while poking a handgun on the
left side of Roxas body. He then forced her to board inside the front passenger seat of his car
and threatened to shoot her. Almanzor then brought Roxas to a secluded area within Makati.
He then pointed a gun at her and ordered her to undress by taking off her t-shirt, pants, and
panty; and by means of force, violence, and intimidation he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her against her will.
On March 12, 1994, Roxas underwent a physical examination and also gave a physical
description of the suspect for a cartographic sketch to be made.
On March 22, 1994, policemen fetched Roxas and informed her that a man who looked similar
to the one in the cartographic sketch was arrested. Five men stood in front of Roxas in a police
line. She positively identified Almanzor.
Almanzors defended by saying that he was a trainor at a 2-day seminar conducted by his
company at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, and that he had been there since March 10, 1994.
Issue:

Is the identification of Alamanzor ina police line-up inadmissible in evidence being a

fruit of an illegal arrest and violative of his constitutional right to counsel?
Ruling:
Rene Almanzor is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and the penalty imposed is
reduced to reclusion perpetua plus damages.
Ratio Decidendi:

Almanzor claimed that the absence of his attorney at the police line-up renders the
line-up irregular and invalid. The Court does not agree with him. According to the
Court, the guarantees of Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, or the socalled Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to

the person to elicit incriminating statements. A police line-up is not part of the
custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel cannot yet be invoked at this
stage. In this case, Almanzor was not under custodial investigation when he was
brought to the Makati Police Station, since they did not interrogate him or elicit
incriminating statements from him. Instead, he was brought to the police station to
be presented, along with other men, to Roxas to be identified by her. During this
stage, the presence of an attorney is not necessary.

D. People vs Ordono
334 SCRA 673
Facts:

On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the
bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was identified as
15 year old Shirley Victore, who was reported missing for the past three days. Postmortem examination, conducted by the NBI, revealed that Victore was raped and
strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as
the authors of the crime. The police invited the two suspects and brought them to the
police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence , they were allowed to go
home.
On 10 August 1994, Ordoo and Medina returned to the police station and
acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. The police immediately
conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. They, however, could
not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two accused in the course of the
investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality. Be that as it
may, the statements of the two accused were taken. Both accused were apprised in their
own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
counsel of their choice. Ordono and Molina both said that they understood their rights
and that they did not require the services of a lawyer, because of this the investigation
was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police, other
police officers and the suspects wife and mother, in attendance to listen to and witness
the giving of the voluntary statements of Ordona and Molina, who both admitted their
participation in the crime. Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer, visited and
interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both accused, again,
admitted their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events
surrounding their commission thereof.

A couple of days later, the police brought the two to the office of the PAO lawyer in
Balaoan, LaUnion, for assistance and counseling. PAO lawyer apprised each of the
accused of his constitutional rights and explained to them each of the questions and
answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the
consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/ thumb mark thereon. After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to
Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumb
marks for the second time in their respective confessions. They assured that their
statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not
been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the
accused to affix their signatures/ thumb marks on their respective confessions, and to
subscribe the same before him.
Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as
their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the
signing.On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not
guilty.The accused are now assailing their conviction on the ground that constitutional
infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack
of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation thereby making their confessions
inadmissible in evidence.Issue
Issue:
1. Does the absence of a lawyer during Ordono and Molinas custodial
interrogation, render their statements inadmissible in court as evidence?
Ruling:
If there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from
the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him.
Ratio Decidendi for #1:
The Constitution lays down rules, pursuant to law and jurisprudence, that in order
for a confession to be admissible in evidence, it must satisfy 4 fundamental
requirements, which are:

(a) the confession must be voluntary;

(b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel;
(c) the confession must be express; and,
(d) the confession must be in writing.
Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the
otherwise condemning nature of a custodial investigation.
The person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no
counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from the
accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is premised on
the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.

In this case, custodial investigation began when the Ordoo and Medina
voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer
started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such
point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly,
after informing the accused of their rights, the police sought to provide them with
counsel. However, none could be furnished to them because of the non-availability
of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next
adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At
that stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the
interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed
with the investigation.
It should further be recalled that the accused were not effectively informed of their
constitutional rights when they were arrested, so that when they allegedly admitted
authorship of the crime after questioning, their admissions were obtained in violation of
their constitutional rights against self-incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill of
Rights.
Issue:
2. Does the presence of a parish priest, municipal mayor, and relatives of
the accused cure the defect of the custodial investigation, which is the
absence of the lawyer?
Ruling:
To the credit of the police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the
Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the
possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their
statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of
a lawyer during the investigation.
Ratio Decidendi:
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's
parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused
may be present. RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a
substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that
before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met:
(a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and,
(b) a valid waiver must be executed.
RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity
of counsel but underscores its importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel
with the above-mentioned persons be made with caution and with the essential
safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the
Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The

apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no
moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating
from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding.

Issue:
3. Will the assistance of the PAO lawyer, acquired five days later, remedy
the omission of both the absence of a lawyer and the absence of a lawyers
valid waiver during the custodial investigation?
Ruling:
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy
this omission either.
Ratio Decidendi:
Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the
rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their admissions,
and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by
counsel still came several days too late. It could have any palliative effect. It could
not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the
extrajudicial statements were being taken.
The second affixation of the signatures/ thumb marks of the accused on their confessions
a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with
the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not
make their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later
signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the lawyer's
role is diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III,
Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the
constitutional rights of the accused in the instant case therefore fell short of the standards
demanded by the Constitution and the law.
C. People vs Bravo
318 SCRA 812
November 22, 1999

Facts:

This is a case of the complex crime of statutory rape with homicide.

On January 12, 1994, in the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, Philippines,

Benito Bravo, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design
and by means of violence and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with Juanita Antolin,
a 9year old girl, against her will and consent. On the occasion of the said rape, Bravo,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assaulted, attacked and hit
Juanita with a blunt instrument causing a fracture on the skull, which directly caused her
death.
On January 15, 1994, Alexander Mico, Chief of the Intelligence section of the
Santiago Police Department, received a report that a dead body was found in a vacant lot
along the road leading to Patul Rosario, Santiago City. It was later identified to be the
decomposing body of 9year old Juanita Antolin, known to her neighborhood as Len-Len.
Her body was found between two concrete fences. She was half naked and shirtless with
her skirt pulled up and her panty stuffed in her mouth. Juanitas body was found about
700 meters from her house in Rosario, Santiago City. It was putrid and in rigor mortis.
The scalp on the left side of her head was detached exposing a fracture on the left
temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh laceration at 2:30 oclock
and old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock and easily accepts two fingers. The cause of
death was cerebral hemorrhage.
Mico found Bravo at his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at Sinsayon,
Santiago City. Mico informed Bravo he is a suspect in the killing of a girl in Rosario,
Santiago City and asked him to come with him for questioning. Bravo agreed.
According to Mico, Bravo admitted that he was with Juanita and that he carried her on his
shoulder, but was too drunk to remember what he did to her.
On cross-examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of his right against self-incrimination
before the appellant made the said admission because according to Mico he was only
informally interviewing the accused when he made the admission and that custodial
interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned investigator.
Issue #1:
Can a testimony of an accused, received by a police officer, after being told that he is
a suspect in a rape and murder case be admissible as evidence in court?
Ruling: Bravo was acquitted by the Supreme Court.
Ratio Decidendi:
No. The testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the
victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, but the latter was too drunk to remember what
happened, should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of the
policemans own admission in court that although he informed the accused that he is a
suspect in the rape and killing of one Juanita Antolin he did not inform the accused of his
constitutional rights before he asked him of his participation in the crime under
investigation.

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection
afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative
duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It states:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(1) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(3) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the
time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission
of a crime although not yet in custody. The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition
that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and
psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It
was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to
admit although untrue.
Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively
communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully
understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial of such right.
Courts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial
investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any information or
admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or
innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel
should be struck down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission
made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the
exclusionary rule.
Issue #2: Is an admission of a crime made by the accused to an arresting officer
during an informal talk be admitted as evidence in court?
Ruling: No. The policemans apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that
the admission was made during an informal talk prior to custodial investigation proper
is not tenable.
Ratio Decidendi:
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written

extra-judicial confession; the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer
during an informal talk at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the
rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not
inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. The
accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement
allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior
notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policemans
apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made
during an informal talk prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The
appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible
lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged
admission was made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime
suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that
the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of
such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and
the appellants denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission
should be struck down as inadmissible.
D. People vs Pavillare
329 SCRA 684
Facts:
Eduardo Pavillare together with Sotero Santos were charged with kidnapping for
ransom.
On February 12, 1996 Pavillare, conspired with Santos to kidnap Sukhjinder
Singh, and Indian national, at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue in Quezon
City and brought him at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston Street, still in
Quezon, for the purpose of extorting ransom money in the amount of P20, 000.00. The
two detained Sing for 3 hours.
Pavillare was positively identified by Sukjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir
Sing, who paid the ransom to Pavillare, in a police line-up. Sanots, on the other hand was
acquitted as he was not positively identified by the victim and his cousin. Pavillare, was
held guilty by the lower court and given the penalty of death.
The case was submitted to the SC for automatic review. Pavillare submitted in
an appeal that he should be free since the identification of the victim of him in a police
line-up was improper since it was made without the assistance of a lawyer.
Issue:
Can an identification of an accused in a police line-up without the presence of a lawyer
be held inadmissible in evidence in court?
Ruling:
No. The accused-appellants defense that the identification made by the private
complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the lineup without the assistance of counsel is without merit.

Ratio Decidendi:
Section 12 (1) Art III of the Commission states that "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Thus the prohibition for
custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel. Any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The
prohibition however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of
an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has been repeatedly held
that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers
begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission. The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police
line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in
nature.[13] It has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up
does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court identification. The identification made
by the private complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his
abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by
counsel.

E. Republic vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 104768
July 21, 2003
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG), through
the AFP AntiGraft Board (the Board), investigated reports of unexplained wealth
involving Major General Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos.
Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary raiding team served a
search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress Elizabeth
Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included
in the warrant, particularly, communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and
several thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized.
In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have
used the said equipment without Ramas consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the
owner of the money because she has no visible source of income. The Board then
concluded with a recommendation that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of R.A.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379,
otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.
Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (the Republic or Petitioner) filed a Complaint against Ramas and
Dimaano.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that (1) the
PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2) the search
and seizure conducted was illegal.

Issue:
Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaanos house were illegally seized
and
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under
the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure
government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the
Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant. Under
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being
only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
right of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the Interregnum.
Thus, during the interregnum when no
constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government
officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted
them by the revolutionary government. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not
repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the
items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles confiscated. The raiding team had
no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the
subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom
the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these
items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
F. People vs Estrada
296 SCRA 383
Facts:

On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal,
Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD),

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City, for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer
Act of the Philippines). In her request, she stated that the reason for such is the
knowledge that Lanuza sold various drug products to Officer Cabiles worth P7, 232.00 on
May 29, 1995, and that she did this without any license to operate, distribute, sell, or
transfer drug products from BFAD. The warrant was produced. During the search,
members of the team discovered that the address 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a 5 thousand square meter compound containing at least
15 structures which are either leased residences, offices, factories, workshops or
warehouse. The policemen, however, proceeded to search the residence of Lanuza,
which was found at Lot. No. 41 of said address. No drugs were found there. They
proceeded to search the area and found a warehouse at Lot. 38, which yieled 52 cartons
of different drug products.
On August 22, 1995, Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant based on
the grounds that the search warrant is illegal.
Issue: Is a search warrant that fails to specifically describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized be considered as a violation of Lazunas right against unreasonable
searches and seizures?
Ruling:
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that
the application for its issuance suffered from a grave defect, "which escaped Atty.
Cabanlas attention," considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen
Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence
of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City.
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.
Ratio Decidendi:
There are two serious grounds to quash the warrant.
First, the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not
convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant
to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no
license to sell drugs. Applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have submitted
documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such license in order to
establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search
warrant. The applicant must show facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the
issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the
absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within
the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the
best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of

requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalties. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is
not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Second, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at
Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different
person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In
the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied
by a sketch[29]of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City.
With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential
house of private respondentwith sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the
other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not
pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description
of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the
questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional
requirement.

G. Stonehill vs Diokno
20 SCRA 383
Facts:

Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners

personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to
search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,

typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including

disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on
the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and
other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were
constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted
the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in
both premises?
Ruling:
No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation
has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said
corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been
impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot
be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st
group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).
Important Points:
1. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus,
illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not
particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to
avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
2. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as
a fruit of a poisonous tree. However, they could not be returned, except if
warranted by the circumstances.
3. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those
taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as
personality different from that of the corporation.