Political Psychology, Cognition, and Foreign Policy

Analysis
Jerel Rosati and Colleen E. Miller
Subject International Studies Foreign Policy Analysis
Psychology Political Psychology
Key-Topics decision making, interdisciplinary research
DOI: 10.1111/b.9781444336597.2010.x

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Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed major developments and scholarly advances in
understanding the dynamics of cognition. This scholarship reflects an explosion in the literature
on cognition over the last decade in the fields of psychology, political science, and political
psychology; hence, a need for it to be reviewed and integrated within the larger study of foreign
policy and international relations. Yet, the literature has become so large and extensive that a
comprehensive review of the vast body of cognitive-oriented scholarship in foreign policy
accumulated over the years makes it a very difficult if not virtually impossible undertaking (see
Rosati 2004).
In an article published in International Studies Review, Rosati (2000) reviewed the literature on
human cognition and policy-maker beliefs, especially as applied to the study of foreign policy
and world politics. This essay is intended to be read as a supplement to the 2000 ISR article to see
to what extent progress has been made toward a new generation of scholarship.
The two articles can be recapped as follows. The first (Rosati 2000) cites and reviews the
literature extensively in terms of how beliefs and cognition matter for foreign policy and world
politics. We found that upon reviewing and citing the literature, a major contribution has been
made in five basic/substantive/theoretical ways (or patterns): (1) through the content of policymaker beliefs; (2) through the organization and structure of policy-maker beliefs; (3) through
common patterns of perception and misperception; (4) through cognitive rigidity and flexibility;
and (5) through its impact on policy.
This essay serves as a supplement to the previous one, focusing on the evolution of the study of
political psychology and cognition and addressing to what extent contemporary literature has
moved things forward, resulting in a new generation. Our answer is that it has not; that it is for
the most part a continuation and fine tuning of the research reviewed in the 2000 ISR article.
Hence, the essay recommends that six things need to occur to result in a real new generation of
scholarship.

This essay takes a complimentary but different approach to the literature from the Rosati (2000)
article. It does not simply update works of literatures that have already been cited. Instead, it
addresses three basic questions:

1 What is the basic thrust of a cognitive approach?

2 How has the study of political psychology and cognition, and its application to foreign
policy, evolved?
3 Most importantly, what would it take for there to be a new generation of scholarship?

This should provide the basis for clarifying and improving the foundation that political
psychology, and in particular a cognitive approach, has for contributing to a better understanding
of the dynamics of not only foreign policy, but also the larger study of world politics.
To be clear, there have been terrific advancements within political psychology and the study of
cognition over the years (and the first two generations of scholarship), together with increased
sophistication, but there is little evidence that over the past decade there has been much that
has been truly new or unique, or different from previous scholarship. It has now become a mature
and established field, where much of the work of the third generation is not substantially different
from earlier scholarship and more classic works. What once was a revolutionary science has
become increasingly normal science as Thomas Kuhn (1962) so powerfully explained in The
Structures of Scientific Revolutions. While the assertion that much contemporary scholarship is
old wine [or refined wine] in new bottles is controversial and provocative, hopefully it also
recognizes the great advances that have been made and will spur a thoughtful and constructive
dialogue with respect to the question of where we go from here.
More specifically, the essay arrives at the following conclusions:

It may be that the literature is simply getting to be overwhelming in quantity (number of

articles, chapters, books, diverse outlets, etc.).
It is probably increasingly difficult to be consistently creative, both within the same
scholar over time, as well as across generalizations.
Much that may appear new may simply be fashionable, where scholarship has
become more precise (sliced and diced?) and nuanced, where concepts and words such
as framing change in popularity to give it the appearance of freshness and newness.
Maybe there should be a growing recognition that most findings do not result in simple,
broad, and consistent generalizations, and that we need to learn to live and work with
scholarly contradictions that coexist (as it does within the mind).
It may be time to move beyond the heavily state-centric and national security-centric
nature of most scholarship numerous of other types of actors have foreign policies
across a variety of issue-areas, most obviously involving the international political
economy and globalization.
It may be an important time to pause and reflect on the considerable accumulation of
knowledge to become better aware of what we do and what we do not know, and engage
in greater synthesis within political psychology as well as with other fields and levels of
analysis, as Kenneth Waltz (1954) originally understood in his true classic entitled Man,
State & War.

Over 60 years and two generations of scholarship, the political psychological study of man is
no longer scientifically undeveloped (or underdeveloped) as it has been over the millennia and it
needs to become part of multi-level and multi-causal explanations of human and world politics.

All of this may complicate the study of cognition, political psychology, and world politics, but it
may also better represent the psychological environment and the objective environment that
we and the world must operate.
The remainder of the essay is organized along the following lines. First, the essay briefly reviews
what is the essence of a cognitive approach. Second, an overview is provided as to how political
psychology, cognition, and the study of world politics has evolved as a theoretically oriented
discipline over the course of basically two generations of scholarship. Finally, the essay discusses
the six elements that are believed to be necessary to provide the foundation for a new generation
of scholarship.

The Cognitive Approach

A cognitive approach assumes a complex and realistic psychology about human reasoning and
decision-making (see Boulding 1956; Simon 1957; Snyder et al. 1962; Steinbruner 1974; Holsti
1976; Jervis 1976; George 1980; Tetlock 1998). Where a rational process has tended to assume
individual awareness, open-mindedness, and adaptability relative to the objective environment,
a cognitive approach posits that individuals tend to simplify and be much more closed-minded
due to their beliefs and the way they process information; thus, they are not fully aware of, and
are much less adaptable to, changes in the objective environment. A cognitive perspective
emphasizes the importance of examining the individuals involved within the policy-making
process, for they are likely to view their environment differently to operate within their own
psychological environment (see Sprout and Sprout 1965). Such a cognitive approach has grown
in visibility, prominence, and sophistication since the 1950s, as social scientists have attempted to
be more systematic in identifying and explaining major patterns of foreign policy.
In fact, one may even speak of a cognitive paradigm Steinbruner (1974) and Tetlock (1998)
suggest the term cognitivism. Human beings and human thought are not simply random and
idiosyncratic. Human beings are creatures of habit, and general patterns exist in their images and
thought processes. A cognitive approach, as Robert Jervis (1976:3) has stated in Perception and
Misperception in International Politics, assumes that perceptions of the world and of other
actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand.
At the same time, it must be understood that specific cognitive dynamics are heavily influenced
by the time and the situation (as is the case within a more rational/analytic-oriented paradigm as
well).
A cognitive approach is ultimately premised on a mind that constantly struggles to impose clear,
coherent meaning on events (Steinbruner 1974:112). The mind reveals itself in all its activity as
a mechanism for resolving ambiguity, as an inference machine which actively manipulates the
information it receives (Steinbruner 1974:90). Or as stated by Jack Snyder (1978:363), who
applied a cognitive approach to failures of deterrence during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cognitive
theory argues that the mind craves certainty and will work to establish it even when it is
unwarranted by objective conditions. The process of cognition the dynamics of the mind
produces the beliefs and constructs (such as images and schemas) that allow humans to
make sense of their environment.
While the rational paradigm has tended to assume a deep, conscious, thoughtful thinker, the
reality is that much of the mental operations of the mind are relatively automatic and much more
subconscious. In fact, not only is this a necessary cognitive trait, it is also a very efficient and
powerful way of efficiently processing information and making decisions. Clearly, as one

becomes more expert or skilled, the less one has to consciously think and the more one can
operate automatically and intuitively based on certain cognitive processes such is the power of
the mind (Steinbruner 1974:924).

The Evolution of Political Psychology, Cognition, and the Study of World

Politics
It was during the 1930s, with the development of psychology as a discipline of study, that efforts
to apply psychological (and cognitive) approaches to the study of international relations that is,
to explicitly and systematically be informed by psychological theory and research really began.
Three periods of inquiry involving psychological approaches and their relevance to foreign policy
and international relations have evolved:

an early and largely failed effort prior to the 1950s;

a first generation of scholarship beginning in the 1950s; and
a second generation of scholarship beginning in the 1970s.

With each new period, the political psychological study of human beings and cognition has grown
tremendously in quantity and sophistication, impacting an understanding of the dynamics of
foreign policy and world politics.
Philosophers and individuals throughout the ages have been interested in understanding the
enigma of the human mind. But as Howard Gardner makes clear in The Mind's New Science: A
History of the Cognitive Revolution, it was not until the middle of the twentieth century that
contributions from a variety of fields especially philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence,
linguistics, anthropology, and neuroscience produced a cognitive revolution and the
development of a cognitive science. As Gardner (1985:45, 9) states, Armed with tools and
concepts unimaginable even a century ago, a new cadre of thinkers called cognitive scientists has
been investigating many of the same issues that first possessed the Greeks some twenty-five
hundred years ago. In fact, One might say that cognitive science has a very long past but a
relatively short history (on the history of cognitive psychology, see also Markus and Zajonc
1985; Anderson 2004).
The evolution of the political psychological study of international relations naturally has been
heavily influenced by developments in psychology. In Social Cognition, Susan Fiske and Shelley
Taylor (1991, ch. 1) highlight four general views of the thinker that have evolved within the
cognitive literature in psychology over the years:

1 The consistency seeker (people are motivated to maintain consistency and reduce
discrepancies among their beliefs).
2 The naive scientist (people are capable of making attributions about the causes of
behavior in a relatively sensible and fairly rational way).
3 The cognitive miser (people are limited in their capacity to process information, so they
tend to take shortcuts and simplify).
4 The motivated tactician (people have multiple cognitive strategies available and choose
among them based on their goals, motives, and needs sometimes wisely, sometimes
defensively).

Where the first generation of scholarship (which dominated the 1950s and 1960s) depicted a
relatively simple cognitive process based on people being consistency seekers, the second
generation of scholarship (basically since the 1970s) describes a much more sophisticated
cognitive process based on developments in cognitive psychology and social cognition, where the
human being acts more as a naive scientist and, in particular, cognitive miser. Given the
inevitability of time lags when it comes to cross-disciplinary fertilization, the motivated tactician
perspective is only beginning to be felt within the study of foreign policy and world politics. A
brief historical overview broken down into three time periods reflecting the growing
sophistication of the scholarship should allow us to have a discourse on what would be the key
characteristics for a new and third generation of scholarship (see Rosati 2000: see also Kelman
1965a; De Rivera 1968; Knutson 1973; Holsti 1976; Hermann 1977; 1986; Falkowski 1979;
Hopple 1982; Deutsch 1983; Tetlock and McGuire 1985; White 1986; Vertzberger 1990; Glad
1991; Singer and Hudson 1992; Rosati 1995).

Early Systematic Efforts

Early efforts were made beginning in the 1930s and continuing through the early 1950s to employ
explicitly psychological concepts so as to better understand the world of politics, especially the
nature of war and peace. Most of this research focused on national stereotypes, attitudes toward
war, and public opinion on foreign policy issues. Unfortunately, while most of these early efforts
were made by scholars and individuals who were well-versed in psychology, they usually lacked
an equally strong foundation in the study of international relations and world politics. This was
best exemplified by the work on individual irregularities and pathologies which were directly
projected on to the nation-state, the war begins in the minds of men approach, and national
character studies of the war-proneness of different societies (for an overview of this early
literature, see Klineberg 1950; Pear 1950; Kelman 1965b).
This well-intentioned effort by many psychologists to apply different psychological concepts and
knowledge about the individual directly to the complex arena of the state and world politics was
not well received by students of international relations (see Holsti 1976:1926; Jervis 1976:3
10). Most international relations scholars found these studies were not realistic and believed that
they were not relevant to the study of foreign policy and world politics. As Robert Jervis (1976:4)
cogently put it, this literature was guilty of over-psychologizing. Failure to address the levels of
analysis problem was clearly stated by Herbert Kelman (1965b:6) in International Behavior: A
SocialPsychological Analysis: Only if we know where and how these individuals fit into the
larger process, and under what circumstances they operate, are we able to offer a relevant
psychological analysis. Clearly, until political psychology was well grounded in politics and
international relations, such studies would likely remain naive and simplistic.

The First Generation of Scholarship

Despite the fact that the initial effort to incorporate psychological approaches into the analysis of
international behavior failed to influence the field, a number of scholars increasingly questioned
the lack of psychological input into the study of international relations and foreign policy. And
beginning in the mid-1950s, the contribution of psychological approaches to the study of
international relations grew in importance due to the interaction of the peace research
movement and the development of the behavioral revolution in the social sciences (see Kelman
1965b; Kelman and Bloom 1973). A number of psychologists, sociologists, economists,
anthropologists, and other scientists became interested in applying the knowledge and techniques
of their disciplines to the problems of war and peace. At the same time, many international

relations scholars became interested in making their field more empirical and scientific. Nowhere
was this interaction greater than among those who advocated a decision-making approach to the
study of foreign policy (see Snyder et al. 1962).
In comparison to the early efforts by psychologists, the late 1950s and 1960s represented the
beginning of a qualitative leap forward for psychological and cognitive approaches to the study of
international relations. Psychological approaches increasingly were applied from an international
relations and political perspective:
Writings have shown increasing theoretical and methodological sophistication, with greater
awareness of the complexities one encounters in moving across different levels of analysis. And,
most important, two groups of specialists have emerged and interacted closely with one another:
students of international relations, with a political science background, who are thoroughly
grounded in socialpsychological concepts and methods; and social psychologists (as well as
students of other disciplines outside of political science) who have systematically educated
themselves in the field of international relations.
(Kelman and Bloom 1973:263)
The result was that the systematic study of the beliefs and images of foreign policy makers grew
in popularity and significance during the 1960s and 1970s. The working assumption was that the
beliefs held by policy makers in general and the images that they formed relative to some
aspect of the environment affected the foreign policymaking process. Policy-maker images may
be partial or general. They may be subconscious or may be consciously stated. They may be
based on carefully thought-out assumptions about the world or they may flow from instinctive
perceptions and judgments. Regardless, all decision makers may be said to possess a set of
images and to be conditioned by them in their behavior on foreign policy (Brecher et al.
1969:867).
Much of this psychologically oriented research on foreign policy was influenced by the study of
attitudes and attitudinal change in psychology (see Calder and Ross 1973; Oskamp 1977). Most
of the work on attitudes and attitudinal change in psychology during this time was based upon
theories of cognitive consistency, especially cognitive dissonance and balance theory (see
Festinger 1957; Abelson et al. 1968; McGuire 1969; Oskamp 1977). The assumption behind
cognitive consistency is that individuals make sense of the world by relying on key attitudes (or
beliefs) and strive to maintain consistency between their attitudes (and beliefs). Under cognitive
consistency, individuals maintain coherent belief systems and attempt to avoid the acquisition of
information that is inconsistent or incompatible with their beliefs, especially their most central
beliefs. In other words, the argument is that individuals do not merely subscribe to random
collections of beliefs but rather they maintain coherent systems of beliefs which are internally
consistent (Bem 1970:13). It is interesting to note that psychologists, unlike political and social
scientists, were much more optimistic about the likelihood that people would change their beliefs
in response to discrepant information, which was often supported by laboratory (as opposed to
field research) studies which is why it was referred to as attitudinal change literature in
psychology (see Oskamp 1977; Milburn 1991).
The study of the impact of propaganda and communications on individuals reinforced the earlier
work on cognitive consistency (McGuire 1969; Sears and Whitney 1973; Oskamp 1977). The
literature on persuasive communications at the time indicated that most individuals are indifferent
to persuasive appeals, especially political propaganda, and when they are attuned they tend to be

surrounded by people and communications with which they sympathize. Even when a political
communicator breaks the barriers of low absolute exposure and de facto selectivity, he runs into
yet another and most formidable obstacle: resistance to change based on partisan evaluation of
information (Sears and Whitney 1973:8). Incoming information typically gets interpreted in
accordance with an individual's existing central beliefs and predispositions. Again, as with the
attitudinal change literature, the initial interest in the impact of propaganda and communications,
by social scientists and the government, was based on the assumption that people were highly
vulnerable to persuasive appeals, especially in light of the experience of Nazi Germany and the
rise of Adolf Hitler hence the nomenclature persuasive communications (see Sears and
Whitney 1973; Simpson 1994; Jones 1998).
The prevalence of cognitive consistency and the reinforcement tendency of most communications
found in the first generation of political psychological research provided the foundation for many
studies of foreign policy decision-making since the 1960s. This psychological literature and its
relevance for the study of foreign policy was brought together in Perception and Misperception
in International Politics by Robert Jervis (1976; an excellent earlier overview can be found in de
Rivera 1968). Jervis provided a significant service to the advancement of a cognitive approach to
foreign policy by providing a rich survey of the processes of perception for foreign policy
makers, including a discussion of how cognitive consistency affects decision makers, how
decision makers learn from history, and how beliefs change, and an analysis of common patterns
of misperception among policy makers. Not only did he illustrate the relevance of a cognitive
approach for foreign policy and international relations; he also used such a perspective to critique
the simplistic assumptions of both deterrence theory and a spiral model of state interaction to
better understand international conflict and USSoviet Cold War relations. As Jervis (1976:28)
concluded, It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to
the decision makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others.

Second-Generation Scholarship
Beginning in the 1970s, psychology underwent what has been referred to as a cognitive
revolution, resulting in a renewed emphasis in the study of attitudes and a close examination of
how individuals process information. According to Simon (1985:295), Cognitive psychology, in
the past 30 years, has undergone a radical restructuring, from a severe Behaviorism to a
framework that views thinking as information processing. It should be pointed out that such a
perspective was much less revolutionary within social psychology, which has consistently leaned
on cognitive concepts, even when most psychology was behaviorist (Fiske and Taylor 1991:9:
see also Markus and Zajonc 1985; Eagly and Chaiken 1993).
The so-called cognitive revolution involved a different conception of the individual and his/her
interaction with the environment: away from a more passive agent who merely responds to
environmental stimuli to a conception of the individual as more likely to selectively respond to
and actively interpret his environment; away from a simple-minded individual who strives for
consistency toward an individual viewed as a thinking organism who is more likely to act as a
naive problem solver (or naive scientist), if even a poor problem solver, in order to make sense
of a complex environment involving great uncertainty (George 1980:56: see also Lau and Sears
1986c; Fiske and Taylor 1991:914; 2007). According to Fiske and Taylor (1991:12), the naive
scientist model assumes that people are fairly rational in distinguishing among various potential
causes, whereas political scientists, unlike social psychologists, have tended to be much quicker
in assuming the role of cognitive impediments to rational analysis.

Due to these developments in cognitive psychology, attitudinal research increasingly moved

beyond the study of cognitive consistency to a more sophisticated study of attitudes and
information processing now commonly referred to as social cognition. According to Richard Lau
and David Sears (1986a:7), Social cognition began to dominate the study of attitudes in social
psychology only by the late 1970s, the central journal had incorporated the term by 1980, and the
first major textbook in the area had appeared by 1984 (Fiske and Taylor 1984).
The study of social cognition entails a fine-grained analysis of how people think about
themselves and others, and it leans heavily on the theory and method of cognitive psychology
(Fiske and Taylor 1991:2). But as Fiske and Taylor (1991:18) point out, cognitive psychology is
more concerned with individuals qua individual processing information about inanimate objects
and abstract concepts, whereas social psychology is more concerned with how individuals
process information about people and social experience as part of a larger social environment.
Therefore, those who study social cognition must adapt the ideas of cognitive psychology
accordingly (Fiske and Taylor 1991:20). Or as Milburn and Billings (1976:111) state,
Psychologists have less to tell political scientists about political decision-making because the
model of decision-making used by most psychologists is so simple. Therefore, a cautionary
note is that although it is appropriate for political scientists to learn the latest findings and
arguments of psychology, they should not be too quick to assume that older ideas are invalid
(Jervis 1976:321).
Social cognition theory assumes that individuals are not only active agents, but they tend to be
cognitive misers, who rely on existing beliefs and schemas for interpreting and processing
information. Schema (or schemas) refers to mental constructs that represent different clumps of
knowledge (or comprehension) about various facets of the environment. Although schemas
necessarily simplify and structure the external environment, they are the basis from which
individuals are able to absorb new information and intelligibly make sense of the world around
them. Attention and encoding, categorization and memory, and attribution and inference are the
cognitive processes that individuals necessarily employ as they perceive, learn, and reason. The
more complex and uncertain the environment, the more likely individuals will rely on schemas
and cognitive heuristics shortcuts in information processing to make sense of the world and
the situation at hand (Rokeach 1968; Bem 1970; Lau and Sears 1986b; Fiske and Taylor 1991;
2007; Milburn 1991; Oskamp 1991).
The social cognition and schema approach to attitudes and beliefs builds upon and extends the
previous work on cognitive consistency, but is based on a more complex and sophisticated
understanding of the nature of attitudes and how information is processed by the mind. Social
cognition and schema theory emphasize the dominant role of preexisting beliefs in interpreting
new information, much like cognitive consistency theory. Yet, where the theory of cognitive
consistency assumes the existence of a belief system with a high degree of coherence and
interdependence between beliefs which are extremely resistant to change, a social cognition
perspective depicts individual belief systems as much more fragmented internally, with different
beliefs or schemas being evoked under different situations for making sense of the environment,
suggesting a greater likelihood that some beliefs may change over time. From this perspective,
although the beliefs held by an individual may appear inconsistent and contradictory to an outside
observer, the overall belief system is likely to make plenty of sense and be quite functional within
the mind of the individual of concern, suggesting a rather complex and messy cognitive process.
More sophisticated than cognitive consistency theory about the workings of the human mind,
cognitive psychology and social cognition, despite some of the initial optimism within

psychology about the individual as naive scientist, nevertheless continued to represent an

alternative to the more rational views of human perception on the grounds that they are too
calculating, too precise (Lau and Sears 1986c:359). The two major works, already discussed, by
Robert Jervis (1976) and John Steinbruner (1974) that were published in the 1970s anticipated
many of these developments in the area of social cognition and schemas theory, integrating them
into the contemporary study of foreign policy and world politics.
How do images and cognition matter? How do they impact world politics? The literature suggests
at least five basic ways in which this occurs: first, through the content of policy-maker beliefs
(from general to specific images); second, through the organization and structure of policy-maker
beliefs (resulting in coherent versus fragmented images); third, through common patterns of
perception and misperception (such as the tendency to categorize and stereotype, simplify causal
inferences, and use historical analogies); fourth, through cognitive rigidity and flexibility (and its
impact for change and learning); and, finally, through its impact on policy (agenda-setting and
framing, formulation and choice, behavior and implementation). (See Table 1 for an overview.)
As discussed in the introduction, this literature has been extensively reviewed and analyzed by
others, including Rosati (2000), and there seems to be simply no need to further update the
literature with more current sites just for the sake of updating. Instead, given the evolution,
advancements, and maturity of the field as discussed above, this essay focuses on what a new
generation of scholarship would look like.
Table 1 The impact of cognition on foreign policy

Source: Rosati (2000).

I. Through the content of policy-maker beliefs Especially central beliefs
Identifying general images and foreign policy orientations For example, operational code
studies Identifying specific images and beliefs
For example, cognitive mapping and cognitive complexity studies
II. Through the organization and structure of policy-maker beliefs
Central beliefs are most consequential
Coherent versus fragmented images
Consistency theory versus schema theory
Key factors:
Level of knowledge and expertise
Role occupied
Situation and expectations involved
III. Through common patterns of perception (and misperception)
1 Tendency to categorize and stereotype
Such as through images of the enemy and mirror images
2 Tendency to simplify causal inferences:
To overestimate or underestimate dispositional or situational causes of behavior
To overestimate or underestimate one's importance
To overestimate the degree to which the behavior of others is planned and centralized
To overindulge in pessimistic and wishful thinking
Based on attribution theory
3 Tendency to use historical analogies

Depending on personal experiences, the times, and major events

Based on cognitive heuristics (shortcuts)
IV. Through cognitive rigidity and flexibility (and its impact for change and learning)
Cognitive consistency theory (and coherent images) versus schema theory (and
fragmented images)
Instrumental and constrained learning most likely
V. Through impact on policy-making
1 Agenda-setting and the framing (and priming) of issues Especially during crises
2 Formulation and choice Impact of crises and stress
3 Implementation and behavior
Process-tracing and congruence techniques
Importance of self-perception theory (and the impact of behavior on beliefs)
Bureaucratic constraints and slippage

What Would a New Generation of Scholarship Look Like?

In common with Margaret Hermann and Robert Woyach (1994:3), this essay shares the editorial
philosophy for the new journal International Studies Review, which highlights that the isolation
of the different specialties in international studies limits the cross-fertilization that could lead to
more integrative and synthetic perspectives. There are at least six areas that should receive
greater attention and need to be more explicitly addressed to fully capture the potential and
richness of the interplay of cognition and foreign policy for better understanding the dynamics of
world politics (see Table 2):
Table 2 Prerequisites for a new generation of scholarship

I Synthesize and integrate different cognitive theories

Tendency to highlight one cognitive theory (over others)
Cognitive theories often complementary and mutually reinforcing
II. Integrate affect and motivation with the study of cognition
The cognitiveaffectivemotivational nexus
The individual as motivated tactician
III. Sensitivity to context and multilevel explanations
Overcoming charges of reductionism
Policy-maker beliefs as a causal nexus
IV. Integrate individual cognition and within group decision-making
Through a predominant leader or policy maker
Through shared beliefs and images
Through collective decision-making
V. Communicate beyond academia and have policy relevance
VI. Sensitivity to cognition across individuals and cultures
Most of the cognitive literature Western, especially
American-oriented Variation in cognitive dynamics versus shared cognitive tendencies

the need to synthesize and integrate different cognitive theories;

the need to integrate cognition and motivation;

greater sensitivity to context and multilevel explanations;
the need to integrate individual cognition and policy-maker beliefs within political
decision-making;
the need to communicate beyond the scholarly community and for policy relevance; and
greater sensitivity to cognition across cultures.

This essay relies heavily on what are considered to be among the more significant works during
the first and second generations of scholarship (for an overview of the more contemporary
literature, see Hill 2003; Cottam et al. 2004; Breuning 2007; Fiske and Taylor 2007; Hudson
2007; Houghton 2008; Neack 2008).

Synthesize and Integrate Different Cognitive Theories

The tendency over the years in systematically studying human cognition and beliefs has been to
focus on one predominant cognitive theory or explanation (to the exclusion of others), or to
present (and test) multiple cognitive theories in a competitive format in order to find the best
theoretical explanation. For example, Deborah Larson (1985), in her study of the development of
policy-makers' Cold War beliefs, set up a research design where she attempted to test five rival
theories of attitude change: the Hovland attitude change approach (involving persuasive
communications), cognitive dissonance theory (the classic cognitive consistency approach),
attribution theory, self-perception theory (which makes the unique argument that individual
beliefs are derived from observing one's own behavior), and schema theory.
These, however, are not mutually exclusive cognitive theories. Despite her best efforts throughout
the book to demonstrate the prevalence of one theory of attitude change for each policy maker
(self-perception theory in particular), she nonetheless concluded that No one social
psychological theory, then explains the origins of American leaders' Cold War belief system and
that U.S. policymakers used different types of cognitive processes to interpret information about
Soviet behavior (Larson 1985:342). Ultimately, she found that self-perception theory, attribution
theory, and schema theory were the most important overall in explaining the change and
acquisition of strong Cold War beliefs by Truman, Acheson, Harriman, and Byrnes during the late
1940s.
This is clearly consistent with a more sophisticated understanding of the attitudinal change
literature and cognition. As Eagly and Chaiken (1993:500) state in their monumental review of
the literature in The Psychology of Attitudes, Investigators often behaved as if one theory was
right and the others were wrong. This combative atmosphere surely attracted attention and
inspired research. Nonetheless, proceeding in a largely competitive mode, researchers have
devoted too little effort to discerning the conditions under which various theories are valid, for
they illuminate different modes of processing. Or, in the recent view of Fiske and Taylor
(2007:557), No area of social psychology [] profits from being tied down to a single
theoretical perspective. In other words, more emphasis on determining under what conditions
different cognitive theories apply, and the complementarity of different theories, will produce
greater theoretical synthesis and coherence, and contribute to more powerful explanations of
policy-maker beliefs and behavior (see also Rosati 1987; 2000).

Integrate Affect and Motivation within the Study of Cognition

Lau and Sears (1986c:359, 365) have noted that the inability of information-processing theories
to handle affect with as much sophistication as they offer for memory and perception is, however,
the biggest shortcoming of political and social cognition []. It takes us into a realm for which
cognitive psychology does not appear to be well suited. Fortunately, as Fiske and Taylor
(1991:13) point out, views of the social thinker are coming full cycle, back to appreciating the
importance of motivation. In fact, Fiske and Taylor (1991:13) argue in their overview of social
cognition, that as the cognitive miser viewpoint has matured, the importance of motivations and
emotions has again become evident. Having developed considerable sophistication about people's
cognitive processes, researchers are beginning to appreciate anew the interesting and important
influences of motivation on cognition. They believe that the emerging view of the social
perceiver, then, might best be termed the motivated tactician, a fully engaged thinker who has
multiple cognitive strategies available and chooses among them based on goals, motives, and
needs. Sometimes the motivated tactician chooses wisely, in the interests of adaptability and
accuracy, and sometimes the motivated tactician chooses defensively, in the interests of speed or
self-esteem. The motivated tactician perspective integrates the importance of motivation, but
with increased sophistication about cognitive structure and process.
The first generation of scholarship in political psychology and attitudinal research recognized,
and integrated, the affective side of attitudes beliefs involving likes and dislikes as well as
the importance of motivation in the study of hot cognition (see Markus and Zajonc 1985; Fiske
and Taylor 1991; 2007; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). That the existence of enduring commitments
highly intense beliefs was a function of the needs that the beliefs fulfill was initially
popularized by psychoanalytic theorists such as Freud (1930), Lasswell (1930), and Fromm
(1941), culminating in The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950), which argued that
beliefs were dependent on ego-defensive needs. Developmental psychologists and other scholars
such as Piaget (1932), Erikson (1950), and Maslow (1954) have emphasized that beliefs also
fulfill more positive needs of individuals. The classic work highlighting the motivational
foundation of political beliefs and behavior was Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A
Personality Study, by Alexander and Juliette George (1956), which distinguished between the
power-seeker and power-holder in their personality study. In Wilson's efforts to gain power in
order to overcome his low self-esteem from his childhood days, he conformed to the dominant
beliefs of individuals who could significantly influence his rise. However, once Wilson
successfully gained a position of power, he would demonstrate incredible rigidity and closedmindedness after he took a stand.
The attitudinal change literature revolved around the study of cognitive consistency, which
assumed that once inconsistency is perceived, the person is presumed to feel uncomfortable (a
negative drive state) and to be motivated to reduce the inconsistency. Hence, motivation and
cognition both were central to the consistency theories, for reducing the aversive drive state is a
pleasant relief, rewarding in itself (Fiske and Taylor 1991:11). Holsti (1967:13), for example,
integrated the role of personality in examining Dulles's image of the enemy, recognizing that
certain personality types can be more easily persuaded than others to change their attitudes.
Individuals also appear to differ in their tolerance for dissonance and tend to use different means
to re-establish stable attitudes. Nevertheless, as explained by Vamik Volkan (1985), the need to
have enemies and allies appears to be quite powerful among the human species.
Although much of the second generation of cognitive scholarship has tended to be more focused
on cold cognition, a number of works have demonstrated the importance of integrating a
motivational perspective along with a more cognitive approach to better understand human
behavior and interaction. Walker (1990; 1995) reviewed how the operational code originally had

a broad conceptualization that included the integral role of personality, which, he argues, needs to
be reintegrated in future research. Janis and Mann's (1977) study of Decision Making: A
Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment is a classic in this regard on the
pervasiveness of defensive avoidance among decision makers, as is Lebow's (1981) study of
how the management of brinkmanship crises is heavily affected by both cognitive and
motivational characteristics of policy makers. Rosati (1987; 1990) explained the stability and
change of Carter's, Brzezinski's, and Vance's images over time by examining each individual's
personality and the needs that their beliefs fulfilled through a functional approach to attitudinal
change that both attitude formation and change must be understood in terms of the needs they
serve and that as these motivational processes differ, so too will the conditions and techniques for
attitude change (Katz 1960;167: for more on a functional approach to attitudes which was
prominent during the first generation and its recent revival in social cognition, see Sarnoff and
Katz 1954; Smith et al. 1956; Smith 1958; Tetlock and Levi 1982; Fiske and Taylor 1991:5037;
Eagly and Chaiken 1993:47990; 1998). Finally, studies of crises have noted that stressful
situations are particularly likely to trigger psychic discomfort and motivated biases.
Hopefully, as Fiske and Taylor (2007; see also Crawford 2000) concluded in their review of the
literature, the future will likely see the integration of cognitive and motivational explanations.
Mel Laucella (2004) provides a particularly powerful example of the cognitivepsychodynamic
foundation (emphasizing upbringing and the developmental process inside and outside of
government) for understanding Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Worldview. Likewise, Jerold
Post's (2005) edited volume has made some headway for better understanding Bill Clinton and
Saddam Hussein. Clearly, efforts to explore the cognitiveaffectivemotivational nexus of
motivated tacticians should be encouraged in order to more powerfully understand the human
mind and human behavior in foreign policy and world politics.

Contextual Sensitivity and Multilevel Explanations

If a cognitive approach is to provide a powerful understanding of foreign policy, the scholar also
must remain sensitive to the role of other causal factors that is, non-psychological dynamics
on the psychological predispositions of policy makers. This is especially important because
during the late 1960s and the 1970s, political psychologists became increasingly specialized and
systematic in their work in an effort to make a scientific contribution to knowledge, where the
context and the larger environment were increasingly ignored and unexamined. As Ben-Zvi
(19767:90) has observed, the cognitive literature in foreign policy has tended to de-emphasize
the multitude of interwoven factors.
Such a narrow perspective and specialized focus, although necessary to the creation of new
knowledge, makes psychological and cognitive studies vulnerable to the charge of reductionism
and irrelevance to world politics (see, e.g., Ferguson and Mansbach 1988, esp. ch. 7). Although
experienced early on, this would be based on a fundamental misperception and
misunderstanding of the power of a cognitive approach. This is why synthetic scholarship is so
important and why there is a need for periodic reflection and review as to what has been learned
and how it fits in the larger scope of foreign policy and world politics (see, e.g., Stein 1988;
Farnham 1997; 2004; Hudson 2007; Neack 2008).
Fortunately, a sensitivity to the need to integrate other relevant factors to better explain foreign
policy within a cognitive perspective has grown over the years. Jervis (1976), for instance, relied
upon a two-step model in which perceptions and beliefs served as the proximate cause of
foreign policy decision-making which was impacted by the role of bureaucracy, domestic

determinants, and the international environment. Likewise, Larson (1985:326) provided a

multilevel explanation in which theories at different levels of analysis systemic, domestic
political, and individual cognitive processes were applied to historical case material to provide
a rich explanation of the origins of American Cold War policies. Similarly, Rosati (1987)
examined how the role of personality, external events, and domestic forces impacted the beliefs of
Carter administration officials.
Such multi-causal approaches to the study of cognition are consistent with Waltz's (1954) classic
argument in Man, State and War that all three images must be integrated to explain war, or in
Lebow's (1981) language, that one must consider both immediate and underlying causes of
war. This also allows one to address where human images and cognitive style come from and how
they develop. Literatures on the importance of socialization and personal/professional/intellectual
development are particularly relevant in this regard (as they are relative to the relationship
between motivation and cognition).
In fact, one of the promises of a cognitive approach is that policy-maker beliefs are naturally
positioned between the environment (international and domestic) and behavior. In other words,
beliefs act as a causal nexus that is, as a filter through which other factors pass (see Rosati
1987:16870). Gordon Allport (1931:173), one of the founders of attitudinal research in
psychology, long ago recognized the potential of beliefs to serve as a causal nexus: Background
factors never directly cause behavior, they cause attitudes (and other mental sets) and the latter in
turn determine behavior. Or according to Rokeach (1973:3), attitudes more than any other
concept [] are an intervening variable that shows promise of being able to unify the apparently
diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behavior. It is, after all, humans who
act in a variety of domains throughout life, for presumably there is no one who would seriously
contest that the human brain is the ultimate locus of decision-making. When we speak of such
things as organizational process, political bargaining, and rational calculation, we tacitly know
that in the final analysis the phenomena involved are based upon human mental operations
(Steinbruner 1974:91).
But human beings also tend to be part of groups and organizations that operate in a larger
environment. Hence, in order to understand human action (and interaction) within a global
setting, a psychological and cognitive perspective must be embedded within an institutional and
decision-making context and be sensitive to the larger environment as Richard Snyder
consistently argued throughout his work on foreign policy decision-making (Snyder 1958; Snyder
et al. 1962; Robinson and Snyder 1965). In this way, human images and cognition can be treated
as a causal nexus for bringing together environmental, institutional, and psychological factors for
understanding foreign policy. And since the focus of a cognitive approach is on the
psychological environment of the policy maker, the scholar must remain sensitive to integrating
the direct influence of the objective environment to insure a more comprehensive and powerful
understanding of foreign policy and the dynamics of world politics (Sprout and Sprout 1965).

Integrate Individual Cognition and Policy-Maker Beliefs within Groups

and Collective Decision-Making
More work needs to be done on small group and collective decision-making to overcome the
logical gap between the individual level and the collective level of decision making which is
decidedly problematic to rigorous analytic models (Steinbruner 1974:367).

As stated above, countries (or international actors) do not act, people act. Hence, as Steinbruner
(1974:7) has stated, If an outcome of some consequence is being analyzed the outbreak of a
war [] etc. it is usually necessary to understand the interactions of a variety of men,
institutions, and basic social forces. The decision process then assumes unusual importance
because it is through such a process that many of the various causal factors exert their influence
on an outcome. But when do cognition and beliefs matter? The literature on decision-making
and foreign policy suggests in three basic ways (see Snyder et al. 1962; Allison 1971; Halperin
1974; Krasner 1978; Rosati 1981; 1984; Hermann et al. 1987; Stern and Verbeek 1998; Hermann
2001): (1) through a predominant leader or policy maker; (2) through shared images, or (3)
through collective decision-making.
First, most scholars who have systematically studied the foreign policy perceptions and beliefs of
political leaders from a cognitive perspective have tended to focus on one key leader, such as
Holsti's (1967) study of John Foster Dulles or Walker's (1977) study of Henry Kissinger. The
assumption or argument has been that a key leader or policy maker tends to dominate, or have
ultimate responsibility for, the policy-making process. For example, according to Morton
Halperin (1974:17), in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, the President stands at the
center of the foreign policy process in the United States. His role and influence over decisions are
qualitatively different from those of any other participant. In any foreign policy decision widely
believed at the time to be important, the President will almost always be the principal figure
determining the general direction of actions. At the same time, it must be recognized that
although the President is the principal decision maker on important foreign policy matters, he
does not act alone. He is surrounded by a large number of participants with whom he consults,
partly at his pleasure and partly by obligation. These other participants are arrayed around the
President at varying distances determined by the probability that they will be consulted by him.
Basically, this perspective assumes that the policy-making process tends to be relatively
centralized. This may be the case for a government (or nonstate actor) in general, or for a
particular situation. During a time of crisis, for example, the highest level of government
officials will make the decision(s) (Hermann 1969:416). Crises, in fact, tend to be times of high
stress when an individual's ability to cope with complex and ambiguous problems tends to erode
in favor of various psychological and cognitive predispositions (see Holsti 1971; 1990; Janis and
Mann 1977; Lebow 1981; Oneal 1988).
Second, sometimes the government, even the society, has been treated as a single actor such as
in the operational code of the Soviet politburo (Leites 1951; George 1969), White's (1968)
general discussion of mirror images during a time of war, or Heradstveit's (1979) analysis of the
ArabIsraeli conflict. Such an approach usually assumes the existence of shared images or the
development of a political consensus among policy makers. When participants share a set of
global images, these will decisively shape stands taken on particular issues, according to Morton
Halperin (1974:11). For example, from the onset of the cold war until quite recently, a majority
of American officials (as well as the American public) have held a set of widely shared images.
In addition, Janis (1982) has described how groupthink can occur in small groups that develop a
high esprit de corps, with the result being a high degree of individual conformity and group
consensus in thought and image. Another possibility is when an issue, usually less salient,
becomes localized or dominated by a bureaucratic organization with a strong, internal subculture
(Rosati 1981). In these ways, the resolution of a collective decision is handled by assuming that
the decision-making entity, whether a small bureau, a cabinet department, the executive branch,
or the entire government, acts as if it were a single person (Steinbruner 1974:37; see also Allison
1971).

Finally, foreign policy-making also involves multiple policy makers (from multiple
organizations) none of which may dominate who may not share similar images or arrive at
consensus. The literature on bureaucratic politics emphasizing competing interests, coalition
building, and bargaining highlights this perspective (Allison 1971; Allison and Halperin 1972;
Steinbruner 1974, esp. ch. 5). Such collective decision-making complicates the problem for a
psychologicalcognitive approach, for under such conditions it will not suffice to assume that
foreign policy decisions merely reflect the beliefs of any given leader, or even group of leaders.
Hence, research on belief systems must be embedded in a broader context (Holsti 1976:53).
Some of the more recent cognitive work has attempted to be more sophisticated in operating
within a collective decision-making context and examining the role of multiple policy makers,
such as Larson's (1985) study of Harriman, Truman, Byrnes, and Acheson within the Truman
administration, Rosati's (1987) study of Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance (and Muskie) within the
Carter administration, and Khong's (1992) study of Lyndon Johnson and his major advisers
during the Vietnam policy-making process. Such a perspective attempts to identify the
prevailing image, as well as competing images, within the collectivity (see Herrmann 1985;
Rosati 1987:1721). As suggested by Snyder and Diesing (1977:526), the operative values and
perceptions of the decision-making unit will depend on the balance of influence among its
constituent members []. If one or two persons are in complete control, the operational
interests of the state will reflect their perspectives (see De Rivera 1968; Bem 1970; Baron and
Byrne 1981; Vertzberger 1990; Sears et al. 1991; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Levine and Resnick
1993; Fiske and Taylor 1991; 2007).
More efforts along these lines are necessary in order to advance our understanding of the role of
individual and collective images (see, e.g., Bonham and Shapiro 1982; Shapiro et al. 1988;
Schraeder 1994; Kaarbo 1996; 't Hart et al. 1997). The special issues on Whither the Study of
Bureaucratic Politics (Stern and Verbeek 1998) and Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions
(Hermann 2001) are particularly important steps in the right direction. Recent scholarship has
taken this research further, as in the work of Jean Garrison (1999; 2001; 2007) on policy framing
and the inner circle of advisers.
In sum, more studies need to identify the key individuals within the decision-making process,
examine their images, and the dynamics between them so as to better understand the making and
conduct of foreign policy. Yet, what George (1980:11) stated 30 years ago still applies: Despite
advances in relevant portions of theories of individual psychology, small group dynamics, and
organizational behavior, the linkage and synthesis of these three theories is still primitive. This
has been particularly the case with regard to the collective nature of decision-making, as opposed
to highlighting a predominant leader or a shared image orientation. One must determine the
distribution of influence and authority among the players, the roles that they play in the process,
and the intra-group dynamics.

Communicate beyond the Scholarly Community and Have Policy

Relevance
Although this topic has been recognized for some time, not much has been accomplished (see,
e.g., Smoke and George 1973; Hicks et al. 1982; Herspring 1992; Lepgold 1998). Alexander
George, especially in Bridging the Gap: Theory & Practice in Foreign Policy (1993), has most
consistently and best addressed this problem, especially the cultural gap that exists between
academia and the policy world. Ironically, the study of cognition and beliefs is particularly useful

and relevant to those involved and interested (including students, observers, and the public) in
foreign policy and world politics.
According to William Fox (1986:36), We are not simply tourists on this planet [] Our
collective job is not to whisper in the ear of today's dictator, but it is to help those in and out of
government with present or future influence on the policy process understand some of the
expected middle-run and long-run consequences of alternative policy choices. Hermann and
Hagan (1998) provide a recent illustration of the type of broader communication that could be
accomplished, especially from theorists to practitioners. Yet, as Joseph Nye (2009) has recently
argued, scholars tend to stay on the sidelines, while Walt (2005) points out the gap between
theory and policy will only be narrowed if the academic community puts greater emphasis on
policy-relevant theoretical work. The importance of broader communication and policy relevance
deserve serious consideration by students of political psychology and cognition.

Considering Cognition across Individuals and Cultures

Considerable knowledge has accumulated over the years, and been reviewed, for the existence of
a powerful cognitive approach that results in certain cognitive predispositions and tendencies that
apply to most individuals most of the time. This having been said and highlighted throughout, at
the same time it must be understood that there will be individual variation in cognitive styles.
Although certain cognitive predispositions and tendencies are likely, similar cognitive patterns for
individuals do not automatically trigger similar outcomes and different individuals may not rely
on the same cognitive patterns. The likelihood of such idiosyncratic individual cognitive
dynamics is heavily a function of the characteristics of the individual, the times, and the situation.
Hence, there remains a need to be sensitive to variations in cognitive dynamics and styles across
individuals within the same culture.
More importantly, however, is the fact that the literature on cognition that has been reviewed has
been based predominantly on the study of the Western and, in particular, the American mind.
Therefore, one also must be sensitive to the implications of applying a Western, especially
American-oriented, cognitive orientation to different societies with different cultures. This is
consistent with a broader interdisciplinary approach to human behavior known as cultural
psychology that is growing in popularity (see Price-Williams 1985; Pye 1986; Shweder and
Sullivan 1993; Fiske et al. 1998). However, given that most of the scholarship being done in this
area is undertaken by American academics, this is both unsurprising and unlikely to be overcome.
Clearly, variations in content in other words, the beliefs and images held are likely to be
heavily impacted by cultural (and language) differences, as would be expected from a cognitive
perspective. As Steinbruner (1974:95) recognized, In terms of substantive content, the
perceptions, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions of human beings vary so enormously
over both individuals and cultural conditions that empirical generalizations are simply
overwhelmed. In a fascinating cross-cultural study of crises, for example, Bobrow et al. (1977;
1979) found that whereas Americans tended to view crises as fundamentally dangerous times of
great risk, the Chinese were more likely to view crises as times of opportunity as well as risk.
Post (2008) has analyzed the mind of terrorists (from different cultures and parts of the world). If
anything, cultural differences accentuate the likelihood for misperception and mis-communication
discussed above (see also Dower 1987; Schafer 1997).
But what impact do cultural differences have on cognitive structures and predispositions? The
cognitive paradigm is premised on the basis that the structure of human beliefs is far less varied

over individuals and cultures than is the fantastically diverse content of those beliefs
(Steinbruner 1974:14). Yet, as Fiske and Taylor (1991:177) acknowledge, There are cultural
differences in schema use. For example, in more traditional and non-Western societies that tend
to be less individualistic, people do not make trait attributions in the same way as in Western
society (see Miller 1984; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Heradstveit and Bonham 1996). Therefore,
some variation in patterns of perception and cognitive dynamics across cultures (and subcultures)
occur, as one would expect (see Hudson 1997; Fiske et al. 1998; Sampson and Hudson 1999).
Clearly, such variations in cognitive patterns across cultures need to be addressed if we are to
better understand the dynamics of foreign policy throughout the world, especially beyond the US
and the West. But this does not alter the fundamental reality that the human mind craves certainty
and actively provides meaning to the environment that makes sense to the individual, in
accordance with the cognitive paradigm. The paradigmatic assumption, supported by
considerable empirical reality across cultures, is that human beings acquire cognitive structures of
beliefs which tend to remain stable through selective memory, perception, and causal inference.
Although some specific cognitive dynamics may vary across individuals and cultures, people
nevertheless share basic cognitive predispositions and habits: images are acquired that may be
more coherent or fragmented; common perceptual patterns are acquired involving the tendency to
categorize and stereotype, simplify causal inferences, and use historical analogies; and limited
learning occurs due to cognitive rigidity and closure. Such is the nature of human beings and the
workings of the human mind, which has a consequential impact on foreign policy and world
politics.

The Future Study of Cognition and World Politics

It is time for international relations scholars to seriously examine and integrate a psychological
and cognitive perspective within their work to have theories be realistically grounded in the
realities of the nature of human beings and the regularized habits of the mind. As related by
James Goldgeier (1997:1645; see also Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001):
Because the existence of threats depends on the perceptions of individuals and societies, we need
to incorporate the psychological dimension of threat perception and identity formation into our
more structural analyses [] The growing attention given by neorealists to perceptual variables,
the examination by neoliberals of the role of ideas, and the focus of constructivists on identity, all
suggest, however, that models operating at other levels of analysis could be strengthened by
incorporating work operating at the psychological level.
It also allows one to transcend the level of analysis problem that has been endemic between
those who study foreign policy and those who theorize and operate more at the global systemic
level.
Maybe international relations theorists need to develop a phrase such as cognitivism that
will embody the cognitive paradigm that has been so well established over the decades to lay a
more realistic and powerful foundation for describing, explaining, and understanding the foreign
policies of individuals, states, and nonstate actors (replacing the old but still heavily used rational
actor model as the key working assumption). As Morgenthau (1978:7) realized, the contingent
demands of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weakness of intellect
and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course.
Or as Verba (1961:93) stated long ago, if models of the international system that either ignore or
make grossly simplifying assumptions about individual decision-making can explain international

relations only imperfectly, it may well be worth the additional effort to build variables about
individual decision-making into them.
At the same time, students of political psychology and of cognition and foreign policy need to
broaden their study and move increasingly to a third and more powerful generation of
scholarship. The last 60 years of scholarship has been impressive, but this essay takes the view
that political psychologists and students of foreign policy should be more explicit in order to fully
capture the potential and richness of the interplay of cognition and foreign policy for better
understanding the dynamics of world politics: through synthesize and integration of different
cognitive theories; through integration of cognition and motivation; by greater sensitivity to
context and multilevel explanations; by integration of individual cognition and policy-maker
beliefs within a political, decision-making environment; by the need to communicate beyond the
scholarly community for greater policy relevance; and through greater sensitivity to cognition
across cultures. This is a challenging (and controversial) agenda, but one that will hopefully result
in much greater cross-fertilization between scholars of foreign policy and international relations.

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About the Authors

Jerel Rosati is a Professor of political science and international studies at the University of South
Carolina. He has been a Fulbright Senior Specialist at the University of San Andreas in Buenos
Aires, a Visiting Scholar at China's Foreign Affairs College in Beijing, and a Visiting Professor at
Somalia National University in Mogadishu. He is the author of over 40 articles and chapters, as
well as five books, including The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs
and Their Impact on Behavior, Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to
Global Change, and The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (4th edn. and translated into
Mandarin Chinese, German, and Russian). In 2002, he was the original Program Director and
Academic Director of a six-week U.S. Department of State Fulbright American Studies Institute
on U.S. Foreign Policy for 18 scholarspractitioners from all over the world (which completed its
sixth and final year in 2007).
Colleen E. Miller is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Minnesota and a
research fellow at the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences in Arlington,
Virginia. She received her BA from Carleton College in 2004. Miss Miller's areas of
specialization include foreign policy analysis, international security, political psychology and
elite decision-making, and terrorism studies. She was a 20056 recipient of the US Department of
Education's Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship for Modern Standard Arabic, and was
selected as a participant for the 2007 Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism (SWOTT).


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Rosati, Jerel and Colleen E. Miller. "Political Psychology, Cognition, and Foreign Policy
Analysis." The International Studies Encyclopedia. Denemark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing,
2010. Blackwell Reference Online. 04 March 2010
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