Francis Fukuyamas The End of History?

: A Summary
Francis Fukuyamas essay is another useful resource for us as it represents a
different aspect of the civilization exclusivity question. The End of History?
concerns the rise and fall of major ideologies such as absolutism, fascism and
communism, and suggests that human history should be viewed in terms of a battle
of ideologies which has reached its end in the universalization of Western liberal
democracy. He argues that although its realization is still in process in the material
world, the idea of Western liberalism has triumphed, as evidenced by the worldwide
growth of Western consumerist culture and the gradual movement towards
democratic or liberal reforms in countries that previously embraced alternate
ideologies.

To further explore the idea of history with a beginning, middle and end, Fukuyama
discusses the work of the philosopher who proposed the concept, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, and the more recent interpretations of Hegels work by Alexandre
Kojve. While his idea has been used to support other ideologies, Hegel saw the
French Revolution in 1806 as the event that signalled the triumph of the liberal and
democratic system. While the real world had yet to reach that state, the ideas of
mans universal right to freedom and of government by consent had been realized
in the form of an ideology that could not be improved upon. When they became
embodied in the world, Kojve argued that conflict over the type of large issues
that characterized history would cease and mostly economic activity would remain.
(Learn more about Kojve and his arguments here)

In order to appreciate Hegels theory, Fukuyama explores his assertions of ideas as

the driving force of history. Hegel described these ideas as ideology,
encompassing not just political doctrines, but the religion, culture and moral values
of society as well. Unable to change the material world, these ideologies would still
have affects on its future direction. According to Hegel, ideology is the cause in
the long run, of the real worlds direction. This means that to properly view current
events one must consider the history of ideology. The modern economic policy that
views the world only in terms of needs and wants and rational maximizing
behaviour cant completely explain lifestyle choices by itself. To consider economic
success in Asia as evidence of free market viability without considering societal
aspects of work ethic, frugality and other moral qualities is to ignore the part
ideology plays in all current world events. Fukuyama reveals the importance of this
argument as it means that economic liberalism does not produce liberal politics
itself, or vice versa, but that both of them are the result of a previous
consciousness. (Learn more about Hegel and his arguments here)

To evaluate whether, considering these specifications, history really has ended,

Fukuyama looks next at whether any core conflicts of human life remain that could
only be resolved by a political-economic structure other than modern liberalism. In
terms of mankinds common ideological heritage, two such alternatives have
been fascism and communism. The seemingly self-destructive nature of fascism
was revealed during World War II, and its failure has deflated further fascist
movements. As communisms case against liberalism has weakened with the rise of
equality in the legal and social structure of the classless West, so has support for
communism in the West, and elsewhere. By extent of the Hegelian view, world-wide
embracing of consumer culture can be seen as a move towards economic
liberalism, and political liberalism must follow. Those countries still under
communism are only an anomaly on the international front, and the important fact
is that very few still believe in the ideology. Fukuyama expects this will result in a
mounting pressure for change as alternatives to Western liberalism are exhausted.

Finally, Fukuyama explores what the end of history would mean for international
relations. While the ideology has arrived, for the foreseeable future much of the
world will continue to cause conflict as they move there. With the leading countries
in a post-history state it is commonly thought there will still be little result because
national interest is always a much stronger force than ideological theory. But as
Fukuyama expressed with materialism and economics, international relations are
also the result of preconceived ideologies. Nationalist inspired expansionism similar
to that seen in nineteenth century Europe is what we are supposed to expect from
de-ideologized countries. But the fact that they believed in imperialism
disqualifies them from being considered truly liberal, and Fukuyama argues it was
different forms of ideology that they used to justify their imperialism. Since
fascisms defeat in World War II all expansionism has been done in establishment of
defence against others with overtly-expansionist ideologies. After liberalisation of
market and economy, expansionism disappears.

Communism is losing its power as a truly excepted ideology, and without a

significant alternative a common market will continue to grow and large scale
ideological conflict will fade away. But Fukuyama suggests that conflict will continue
on another level. Those areas that have not reached the end of history will continue
to be in conflict with those that have. Nationalist conflict and ethnic conflict have
not played themselves out yet, and Fukuyama predicts they will result in increases
in terrorism. As we move to economic conflict and environmental issues instead of
the powerful and inspiring conflicts of history, Fukuyama supposes a state of
tediousness may even serve to get history started once again.