LLorente v.

Ca
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted
United States Navy. On February 22,
petitioner Paula Llorente, married in
Sur. Lorenzo departed for the US and
conjugal home.

serviceman of the
1937, Lorenzo and
Nabua, Camarines
Paula stayed in the

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was naturalized as a US

citizen. Lorenzo visited the Philippines. He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. 1951,
Lorenzo filed for divorce in the US and on December 4,
1952, the divorce decree became final.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia

and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2
share in the conjugal.
1987 Decision RTC: divorce decree granted is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato is likewise void.
Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the
estate even if the will especially said so her relationship
with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which
is under Art. 739 (1).
Paula, entitled to 1/2of their conjugal properties, and as
primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled
to 1/3 of the estate and then one-third should go to the
illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and

Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children.

Alicia filed with the RTC an MR. RTC modified the decision
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him,
declaring Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of
Lorenzo.

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly

executed, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.

CA: Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties

she and the deceased may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over

Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that
she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various
property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that

ISSUE: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo

N. Llorente?
HELD: Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Llorentes will

and determination of the parties successional rights

allowing proof of foreign law
Ratio: Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death
As a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
Art. 16:
However, intestate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

theory hence, Philippine law applies when

determining the validity of Lorenzos will
---- and it may refer to to no other than the
law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident
SC: The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of Foreign Divorce:
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality.

Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction

and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them, they must be alleged and proved

Divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first

wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction
as a matter of comity.

CA and rtc error:

Therefore, the ruling in Van Dorn would become

applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from him.

America has no national law/ each state has their

own,
there is no such thing as one American law
Renvoi doctrine, case was referred back to the
law of the decedents domicile:
there is no
showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine
is called for or required by New York State law
It also made an equally unproven statement
that American law follows the domiciliary

Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to

the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals.
Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights
to the decedent's national law.
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass
upon the other issues raised

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia
Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers,
hamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi
nationals, were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia. an
Arab co-worker, Al, tried to rape her in a hotel room.
Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of
her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in
Indonesia.
Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their
Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines
advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in
Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a

Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually

sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes;
she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with
males.
Private respondent sought the help of her employer,
petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in
Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.
Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the
domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah
continued to serve in the international flights.[
The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the
Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted
hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the
Philippines.
Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada without being
informed of the cause. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines
for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country manager.
Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
the applicable law should be the law of Kingdom Saudi
Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi
rule. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under
the premises

SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any

substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case,
and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the

existence of a foreign element, the problem could
present a conflicts case.

The MTD was denied hence they filed for MR, but was
also denied.

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are

many. The foreign element may simply consist in
the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an
alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign
element may assume a complex form.

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court denied SAUDIAs Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary .
It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
considering that the Amended Complaints basis for
recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court.
It further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a
denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner
should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse
ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
ISSUE:
1. IWHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT
OF
QUEZON
CITY
HAS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P.
MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.
2. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THE CASE
PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted

in the fact that private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire
during her many occasions of travel across
national
borders,
particularly
from
Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice
versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case
is purely domestic, imprecise.
A conflicts problem
presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction
confronts the court a quo
ISSUE #1 as to Jurisdiction:
1. We find that the (RTC) of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its
authority to try and hear the case is provided for
under Section 1 of Rep Act No. 7691 Judiciary

reorganization act of 1980, RTC has exclusive

jurisdiction over cases of exclusive interest or
damages
2. RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines
when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with
petition for other reliefs. The asking for other
reliefs effectively asked the court to make a
determination of Saudia Airliness rights hence a
submission to the courts jurisdiction.
3.
RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case
because as alleged in the complaint of Morada,
she is bringing the suit for damages under
the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the
Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it
in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a
plaintiff may elect whether to file an action
in personam (case at bar) in the place where
she resides or where the defendant resides.
Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case
here because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will
be very disadvantageous for her (and of course,
again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
ISSUE #2 as to applicable law :
one important test factor to determine where to
file a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is
the so called locus actus or where an act has
been done.
In the case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila
when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi
Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was
not informed that she was going to appear in a

court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into

appearing before a court trial which led to her
wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is
tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her
humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
The handing over or turning over of the person of
private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may
have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner
thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of
petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of
the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the connecting factor or point
of contact could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complaint of and the place having the
most interest in the problem, the Philippine law on
tort liability should have paramount application to and
control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of
this case.

Private respondent, has no obligation to plead and prove

the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of
action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent
appellate court in upholding the trial courts denial of
defendants (herein petitioners) motion to dismiss the
case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue
properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously
available, and the expeditious trial itself indicated by the
nature of the case at hand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED.
DOCTRINE:
Two questions: (1) What legal system should control a
given situation where some of the significant facts
occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to
determine under what category a certain set of facts or
rules fall.
This process is known as characterization, or the
doctrine of qualification.
It is the process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of
characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.

Our starting point of analysis here is the factual situation,

event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict
rules is the indication of a test or connecting
factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules
invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be
present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. These test
factors or points of contact or connecting
factors could be any of the following:
(1)
The nationality of a person, his domicile, his
residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is,
or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus
actus, such as the place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a
tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into
effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual

duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be

exercised;

Respondent left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived

in the Philippines on May 1, 1999.

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law

that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;

Dupo informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs

to extend his vacation because his son was hospitalized. He
also sought a promotion with salary adjustment. In reply,
MMG informed respondent that his promotion is subject to
managements review; that his services are still needed;
that he was issued a plane ticket for his return flight to
Saudi; and that his decision regarding his employment must
be made within seven days, otherwise, MMG will be
compelled to cancel [his] slot.

(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings

are instituted or done. The lex forithe law of the forum
is particularly important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance
of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the
lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a
given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.

LWV CONSTRUCTION v. DUPO

Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino
workers, hired respondent Marcelo Dupo as Civil Structural
Superintendent to work in Saudi Arabia for its principal,
Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG).
In 1992, Dupo (respondent) signed his first overseas
employment contract, renewable after one year. It was
renewed five times. The sixth and last contract stated
that respondents employment starts upon reporting
to work and ends when he leaves the work site.

On July 6, 1999, respondent resigned and claimed for a long

service award under the Saudi law for more than seven
(7) [years] services which he said, was offered to him before
he left for vacation. However, petitioner informed him that
MMG did not respond.
In 2000, Dupo filed a complaint in or payment of service
award against petitioner before the (NLRC),
Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at
least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of
Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award
which is known to others as longevity pay

of at least one half month pay for every year of

service.
In excess of five years an employee is entitled to
one month pay for every year of service. In both
cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances.

PETITIONERS DEFENSE: petitioner offered payment and

prescription as defenses. Petitioner maintains that the
benefit granted by Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law is

service award which was already paid by MMG each time

respondents contract ended

Petitioner added that under Article 13[10] of the

Saudi Labor Law, the action to enforce payment of
the service award must be filed within one year
from the termination of a labor contract for a
specific period.
Petitioner
concluded
that
the
one-year
prescriptive
period
had
lapsed
because
respondent filed his complaint on December
11, 2000 or one year and seven months after
his sixth contract ended.

LABOR ARBITER: ordered petitioner to pay respondent

longevity pay of US$12,640.33 or P648,562.69 and
attorneys fees of P64,856.27 or a total of P713,418.96

respondents seven-year employment with MMG had

sufficiently oriented him on the benefits given to
workers;
that petitioner was unable to convincingly refute
respondents claim that MMG offered him longevity
pay before he went on vacation
Dupos claim was not barred by prescription since his
claim on July 6, 1999, made a month after his cause
of action accrued, interrupted the prescriptive period
under the Saudi Labor Law until his claim was
categorically denied.

NLRC: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the LA and ruled

that The NLRC ruled that respondent is entitled to longevity
pay which is different from severance pay.

CA: affirmed NLRC. Service award is the same as

longevity pay, and that the severance pay received
by respondent cannot be equated with service award.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that respondent is

entitled to a service award or longevity pay of
US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi
Labor Law. Related to this issue are petitioners defenses
of payment and prescription.
HELD: respondents service award under Article 87
of the Saudi Labor Law has already been paid. Our
computation will show that the severance pay
received by respondent was his service award.
RATIO:
AS TO PAYMENT:

Article 87 clearly grants a service award.

DUPO, has called the benefit other names such as
long service award and longevity pay.
Petitioner claimed that the service award is the
same as severance pay.
Notably, the Labor Arbiter was unable to specify
any law to support his award of longevity pay.
Respondents position paper mentioned how his
long service award or longevity pay is computed:
half-months pay per year of service and onemonths pay per year after five years of
service. Article 87 has the same formula to
compute the service award.
The payroll submitted by petitioner showed that
respondent received severance pay of SR2,786 for

his sixth employment contract covering the period

April 21, 1998 to April 29, 1999
Service Award = (SR5,438)[20] + (9
days/365 days)[21] x (SR5,438) Service
Award = SR2,786.04

Respondents service award for the sixth

contract is equivalent only to half-months
pay plus the proportionate amount for the
additional nine days of service he rendered
after one year.
Respondents employment contracts expressly
stated that his employment ended upon his
departure from work.

AS TO PRESCRIPTION

We cannot agree with petitioner that respondents

action has prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi
Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our
Labor Code which reads:
ART. 291. Money claims. All money claims
arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall
be forever barred.
Art 291- It is not limited to money claims
recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also
to claims of overseas contract workers

The following ruling in

Administrator is instructive:

Cadalin

v.

POEAs

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not

be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such
as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on
the characterization given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant
when the country of the forum has a borrowing
statute.
A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to
apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law.
While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes,
one form provides that an action barred by the laws
of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced
in the forum even though the local statute has not
run against it Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure
is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippine Islands.

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48

[of the Code of Civil Procedure] cannot be enforced ex
proprio vigore(By their or Its own force) insofar as it
ordains the application in this jurisdiction of [Article] 156
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forums public policy x x x. To enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

Thus, in our considered view, respondents

complaint was filed well within the threeyear prescriptive period under Article 291 of
our Labor Code.
This point, however, has
already been mooted by our finding that
respondents service award had been paid, albeit
the payroll termed such payment as severance
pay.