ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.

09-94 June 14, 1994

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691. ENTITLED "AN ACT EXPANDING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE 'JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980."
For the guidance of the bench and the Bar, the following guidelines are to be followed in the implementation of Republic Act No. 7691,
entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the 'Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980":
1. The new jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in civil and original cases, and in cadastral and land registration cases, under Section 19, 32, 33 and 34 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691. Was effective on April 15, 1994, fifteen (15) days after the publication in the Malaya and in the Times Journal on
March 30, 1994, pursuant to Section 8 of the R.A. No. 7691.
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33
(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
3. The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, has been increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of the fine. As a consequence, the Regional Trial Courts have no more original jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where the offense is punishable by more than four (4)
years and two (2) months up to six (6) years.
4. The provisions of Section 32 (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, apply only to offenses punishable by imprisonment or
fine, or both, in which cases the amount of the fine is disregarded in determining the jurisdiction of the court. However, in cases where
the only penalty provided by law is a fine, the amount thereof shall determine the jurisdiction of the court in accordance with the original
provisions of Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 which fixed original exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over offenses punishable with a fine of not more than four thousand pesos. If the amount of
the fine exceeds four thousand pesos, the
Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction, including offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
where the amount of the fine does not exceed six thousand pesos.
However, this rule does not apply to offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence which are under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, irrespective of the amount
of the imposable fine.
Manila, June 14, 1994.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167181

December 23, 2008

SPS. CARLOS MUNSALUD and WINNIE MUNSALUD, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent.
D E C I S I O N REYES, R.T., J.:

INSUFFICIENCY in form and substance, as a ground for dismissal of the complaint, should not be based on the title or caption,
especially when the allegations of the pleading support an action.
In pursuit of a reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the order of dismissal2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in a complaint for mandamus,3 petitioners-spouses Carlos Munsalud and Winnie Munsalud lodged before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari.
The Facts
Laid bare from the records are the following facts:
Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of the compulsory heirs of the late Lourdes Bulado (Bulado) who died on
December 8, 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a lot located at 942 R.
Higgins St., CAA Compound, Bgy. 185, Pasay City. The award was made pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" program of
respondent. She resided at the said property until her death.
When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly amortizations. Respondent NHA recognized petitioner
spouses assumption of obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts. They were allowed to occupy the lot up to the present.
To prove their occupancy over the lot, petitioners offered as evidence the following documents, viz.:
1. Tag Card No. 77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta and then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias;
2. Application and Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of Bulado but the same was signed by petitioner Winnie;
3. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27566 over the land issued by the Assessors Office of Pasay City in the name of defendant recognizing
its beneficial use in favor of petitioners;
4. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27667 over the residential structure erected on the land and issued by the Assessors Office of Pasay City
in the names of petitioners;
5. Pagpapatunay dated September 5, 1989 signed by neighbors and acquaintances of petitioners attesting to their long time residence
in the property;
6. Deposit Receipt No. 286444 dated September 27, 1989 issued by the Manila Electric Company attesting to the installation of electric
service in the name of petitioner Winnie on the property.4
On September 14, 1989, petitioners completed the payments of the amortizations due on the property. Reflected on the left side portion
of the official receipt evidencing full payment is the annotation "full payment." Consequently, petitioners demanded that respondent NHA
issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the property. Respondent, however, refused.
On January 28, 2003, petitioners, by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed of sale and title. Despite receipt, respondent did
not issue the requested documents. On March 6, 2003, respondent wrote petitioners informing them that petitioner Winnies name does
not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that Winnie was representing her mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not
respond to the reply.
Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus before the court a quo.
RTC Order
On April 22, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint for mandamus, disposing thus:
Considering that the petition is insufficient in form and substance, there being no reference to any law which the respondent by reason
of its office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform or any allegation that respondent is unlawfully excluding
petitioners from using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to, the above-entitled petition is hereby
DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus, petitioners seasonably appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 23, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC dismissal of the mandamus petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Order of Dismissal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.6
In agreeing with the court a quo, the appellate court rationalized as follows:
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It is a command to exercise a power already possessed and
to perform a duty already imposed.
It well settled that the legal right of petitioner to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and
complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of the rule means a right which is clearly founded in, or granted by law; a right which is
inferable as a matter of law. Likewise, mandamus refers only to acts enjoined by law to be done. The duties to be enforced must be
such as are clearly peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. However, appellants failed to point out in their petition
the specific law by which defendant is duty bound to perform the act sought to be performed, as well as the law which would grant them
the clear legal right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Foregoing discussed, we find no error on the part of the court a quo in dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by plaintiffsappellants.
On September 20, 2004, petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on February 22, 2005. Hence, the present
recourse.
Issues
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY DATED APRIL 22, 2003 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 WHERE THE LATTER COURT
RELYING UPON THE APPELLATION AND/OR LABEL THAT PETITIONERS GAVE THEIR COMPLAINT (I.E., MANDAMUS) IN CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-03-492 DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT THEREIN PURPORTEDLY BECAUSE THE SAID COMPLAINT FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 3, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION DATED AUGUST 23, 2004.7 (Underscoring supplied)
Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is whether in giving due course to an action, the court is fenced within the
parameters of the title given by plaintiff to the case without regard to the averments of the pleading.
Elsewise stated, does the trial court have absolute discretion to dismiss an action on the ground that it is insufficient in form and
substance based alone on its designation when, from the body and the relief prayed for, it could stand as an action sufficient in form
and substance?
Our Ruling
Petitioners action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance.
This begs the question: when is an action sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance?
To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules of practice and procedure.8 It is the order or method of legal
proceedings.9 It relates to technical details.10 It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance.11 It is an established method of expression or
practice. It is a fixed or formal way of proceeding.12
A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following:
1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action indicating the names of the parties, and the docket number which
is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket number;
2. The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the partys claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the
pleading;
3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel;13
4. Verification. This is required to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and
not merely speculative;14

5. A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which although not jurisdictional, the same is obligatory;15
6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court. Likewise, for pleading subsequent to the complaint, if the
same is not served personally to the parties affected, there must also be an explanation why service was not done personally.16
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be:
A Proof of Service, which consists in the written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the
party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall
consist of an affidavit of the person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt
issued by the mailing office.17
In case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional requirements that go into the form of the pleading should be incorporated,
viz.:
1. The Roll of Attorneys Number;
2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; and
3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime Membership Number.18
4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue (effective January 1, 2009).19
In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q03- 49278 designated by petitioners as mandamus
reveals that it is sufficient in form. It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the docket number. The
complaint contains allegations of petitioners claims. It has a prayer and the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the
signature and name of petitioners counsel, the counsels IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorneys Numbers. The complaint was also verified and
accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the
clerk of court.
Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?
Substance is that which is essential and is used in opposition to form.20 It is the most important element in any existence, the
characteristic and essential components of anything, the main part, the essential import, and the purport.21 It means not merely subject
of act, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial elements, though it may be stated without recital of any
details.22 It goes into matters which do not sufficiently appear or prejudicially affect the substantial rights of parties who may be
interested therein and not to mere informalities.23
As used in reference to substance of common-law actions, substance comprehends all of the essential or material elements necessary
to sufficiently state a good cause of action invulnerable to attack by general demurrer.24
Substance is one which relates to the material allegations in the pleading. It is determinative of whether or not a cause of action exists.
It is the central piece, the core, and the heart constituting the controversy addressed to the court for its consideration. It is the
embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The court a quo anchored the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of Rule 65, Section 325 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It found that there was no reference to any law which respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust or station, is specifically
enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in the petition below that respondent is unlawfully excluding
petitioners from using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to.
Although the complaint was captioned as Mandamus, petitioners averments, as well as the relief sought, called for an action for
specific performance. Pertinent portions of the complaint for mandamus provide:
3. Plaintiff Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the late Lourdes Bulado, and as such is one of Bulados compulsory heirs. x x x;
4. During the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a parcel of land at a "land for the landless" program of the defendant;
xxxx
6. When Bulado died in 1985, Plaintiffs assumed her obligations over the aforesaid property, particularly the payment of the
amortizations therein;

7. Defendant recognized this assumption of Bulados obligations by the Plaintiffs considering that in the receipts covering the
amortizations, the names of the Plaintiffs as the ones paying the Defendant were indicated therein;
8. In fact, Defendant also allowed Plaintiffs to move into, and occupy, as they continue to occupy up to now, the above described
premises;
xxxx
10. On September 14, 1989, Plaintiffs completed the payment of the amortizations due over the property in question, and this is
evidenced by an official receipt, numbered 19492, which Defendants cashier, Yasmin D. Aquino, issued to the Plaintiffs themselves,
although the official name of the payor indicated therein was still that of the deceased Lourdes Bulado;
xxxx
12. Significantly, that receipt contained the annotation appearing on the left side thereof, that the amount paid thereon constituted "full
payment";
13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been demanding from the Defendant the issuance of the deed of sale and the title over the property in
question, but, inexplicably, and without any legal justification whatsoever, Defendant has refused to issue that deed of sale and title;
14. On January 28, 2003, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent a letter to the Defendant seeking the issuance of that deed of sale and title
but, despite receipt thereof, Defendant again refused and failed [to] act favorably thereon;
xxxx
20. At this point that the lot in question had already been fully paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a need to compel the Defendant to
comply with its duty to issue a deed of sale in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and
Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title over the same property in favor of the same heirs.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered commanding the Defendant, after due notice and hearing, to
issue a deed of sale and/or a title, in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and Winnie
Munsalud, over the property subject of this action.26 (Underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner Winnie Munsalud assumed the obligations of her deceased
mother, the original awardee of respondents "Land for the Landless Program." One of the obligations of an awardee is to pay the
monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied with said obligation and religiously paid the amortizations until these were fully paid.
Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the program. Hence, it is now the turn of respondent to
comply with what is incumbent upon it.
In a letter dated February 21, 2003,27 respondent informed petitioners counsel that per its records, the name of petitioner Winnie
Munsalud does not appear as a beneficiary. For the guidance of respondent, Winnie Munsalud is not actually a beneficiary. The
beneficiary of its program is Lourdes Bulado, her deceased mother. This fact was made known to respondent when another letter dated
March 6, 200328 was sent by the counsel of the heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In the same letter, respondent was informed that petitioner
Winnie is representing her deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado, viz.:
In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to notify you that Ms. Munsalud is actually representing her deceased mother,
Lourdes Bulado, who, on September 14, 1989 completed her payment for Lot 12, Block 79 of the Maricaban Estate. A copy of the
receipt evidencing that completed is attached hereto as Annex B for your easy reference.
In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the title over the aforesaid property in the name of Lourdes Bulado.29
(Underscoring supplied)
The letter was received by respondent on March 12, 2003. On account of this second letter, respondent could have easily verified if the
name of Lourdes Bulado appears as a beneficiary and awardee of its "Land for the Landless Program." However, respondent never
responded to the second letter. This left petitioners with no recourse but to bring the action to the trial court.
Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although designated as mandamus, is in reality an action to
perform a specific act. The averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as to apprise the court of
the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title
over the property awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance.

The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of the
complaint.
Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus should contain, the court a quo should have proceeded to examine the essential
facts alleged in petitioners complaint. For what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.30
The cause of action in a complaint is not determined by the designation given to it by the parties. The allegations in the body of the
complaint define or describe it. The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is not even an
indispensable part of the complaint.31
There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondents
duty arose from its contractual obligation under the "Land for the Landless Program."
The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.32 The caption of the
pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action, because even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint and the evidence introduced.33
All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity as a compulsory heir of the awardee, becomes a beneficiary of the program is
a question best ventilated during trial on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the program in case an awardee dies are
evidentiary and should be presented for determination of the court. Even the effect and the consequence of the assumption of
obligation of the awardee as well as the presence of other compulsory heirs are issues that should be addressed for the courts
evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid down before its eyes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is
ORDERED to reinstate the case and to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch.
No costs.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136325. July 29, 2005]

MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. EUGENIO C. DELICA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated September 30, 1998 and Resolution dated November 13,
1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46632, entitled Manuel M. Serrano, petitioner, vs. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, and Eugenio C. Delica, respondents.
The petition stemmed from the following facts:
On June 30, 1997, Eugenio C. Delica, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided by Judge
Alberto L. Lerma, a complaint for cancellation of Deeds of Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, Joint Venture Agreement, and damages,
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-120.
Impleaded as defendants were Manuel M. Serrano, now petitioner, Manuel P. Blanco, MBJ Land, Inc., and MARILAQUE Land, Inc.
The complaint alleges inter alia that respondent is the registered owner of ten parcels of land situated in Bagbagan, Muntinlupa City,
with a total area of 2,062,475 square meters, more or less, covered by ten Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. S-12619 to S-12628
of the Registry of Deeds, same city. On August 10, 1995, after having been promised with financial bonanza by petitioner and Manuel
Blanco, respondent executed in favor of the latter a special power of attorney. Blanco then sold to MBJ Land, Inc. respondents three
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. S-12625, S-12626 and S-12628. Thus, these titles were cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos.
207282, 207283 and 207284 were issued in the name of MBJ Land, Inc.
On December 4, 1996, MBJ Land, Inc. entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with MARILAQUE Land, Inc. involving the three parcels
of land.
On December 23, 1996, petitioner Serrano again unduly influenced, coerced and intimidated respondent into executing an affidavit
wherein he confirmed that he sold his remaining seven parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. S-12619 to S-126124 and S-12627, to
petitioners. Later, respondent found that these seven titles were cancelled and new titles (TCT Nos. 209636 to 209642) were issued in
petitioners name based on a spurious Deed of Absolute Sale.

Respondent thus prayed in his complaint that the special power of attorney, affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of petitioner
and MBJ Land, Inc., and contracts of sale be cancelled; and that petitioner and his co-defendants be ordered to pay respondent, jointly
and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00, as well as attorneys fee of P200,000.00 and costs
of litigation. Respondent likewise prayed that, pending trial on the merits, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued ordering the defendants to immediately restore him to his possession of the parcels of land in question; and that
after trial, the writ of injunction be made permanent.
Petitioner then filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim, denying the material allegations of the complaint.
Respondent later amended his complaint.
On August 5, 1997, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and on September 8, 1997, a preliminary injunction directing
petitioner and his co-defendants to immediately restore respondent to his possession.
Petitioner then filed consolidated motions for reconsideration praying that the complaint be dismissed for respondents failure to pay the
required docket fee; and that Judge Lerma be directed to inhibit himself from hearing the case.
The trial court, in its Order dated January 7, 1998, denied petitioners consolidated motions.
Petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order assailing the trial courts twin Orders dated September 8, 1997 ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction; and denying his consolidated motions dated January 7, 1998. Petitioner raised three issues: (a) whether
respondent paid the correct docket fee; (b) whether the trial courts issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is in order; and (c)
whether Judge Lerma should inhibit himself from hearing the case.
On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision partially granting the petition by: (1) affirming the trial courts ruling
that the docket fee was correctly paid; (2) setting aside the trial courts Order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction;
and (3) leaving the matter of inhibition to the discretion of Judge Lerma.
Petitioner then filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Court of Appeals ruling that respondent correctly paid the docket fee and
that the motion for inhibition should be addressed to Judge Lermas sound discretion.
In a Resolution dated November 13, 1998, the Appellate Court denied the motion.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The core issues for our resolution are:
1.

Whether respondent paid the correct docket fee when he filed his complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120; and

2.

Whether the matter of inhibition should be addressed to Judge Lermas discretion.

On the first issue, we cannot overemphasized the importance of paying the correct docket fees. Such fees are intended to take care of
court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc.,
computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent on the
result of the action taken, without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular.[3]
Thus, the rule is that upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed
therefor shall be paid in full.[4] However, a litigant who is a pauper is exempt from the payment of the docket fees. But the fees shall
be a lien on the judgment rendered in favor of said pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.[5]
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.[6]
In the case at bar, petitioner impugns the Court of Appeals ruling that respondents complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120 is not capable of
pecuniary estimation and that, therefore, the docket fee is fixed at P600.00 pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in issuing such ruling. It should have considered the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought, the criteria in determining the nature of an action.[7]
A careful examination of respondents complaint is that it is a real action. In Paderanga vs. Buissan,[8] we held that in a real action,
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court,[9] a real action is

one affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on a real property.
Obviously, respondents complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the
titles thereto.
Considering that respondents complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.[10]
We note, however, that neither the assessed value nor the estimated value of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by
respondent in both his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a
BIR zonal valuation of P1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged BIR zonal valuation is not the kind of valuation required by
the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty.[11] Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege
in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his
complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for
failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondents complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.
Since the complaint is dismissible, the second issue on whether Judge Lerma should inhibit himself from hearing the case has become
moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46632 are
hereby REVERSED. The complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120 is ordered DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

THIRD DIVISION
BARANGAY PIAPI, herein represented by its chairman ANDRES L. LUGNASIN and LIBERATO LARGO, RITA LARGO, SABAS
MONTECALBO, SR., CARLOS ZAMORA, DONATA SESICAN, DIZAR CASTILLO, ALEJANDOR GICALE, SALVACION SALE, PABLO
MORASTIL, JOSE JAVELOSA, ISIDRA BERNAL, FELIX EGHOT, CORAZON EGHOT, ROSALINA REMONDE, ROA EGHOT,
CEFERINA LAGROSA, MARIO ARANEZ, ALBERTO CAMARILLO, BOBBY DULAOTO, NOEL ZAMORA, MARTINO MORALLAS,
DANILO FAILAGA, MARITA BRAGAT, NATIVIDAD LAGRAMON, RAQUEL GEROZAGA, SHIRLY CESAR, PIO ZAMORA, ANDRES
LUGNASIN, ELPIDIO SESICAN, CRESENTA BORJA, CARLITO TANEZA, JR., MARCIAL RELLON, JEANILITO SUMALINOG,
ALBERTO ZAMORA, and LUISITO LAGROSA, Petitioners,
versus IGNACIO TALIP representing the
HEIRS OF JUAN JAYAG, Respondent. G.R. No. 138248
Present:*PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona,**Carpio Morales, and GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: September 7, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Orders dated January 12, 1999[2] and April 20, 1999[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3715 filed by the above-named petitioners against respondent
Ignacio Talip representing the heirs of Juan Jayag.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
On August 28, 1998, petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for reconveyance and damages with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 3715.
The complaint alleges that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open
possession for more than 30 years of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur. It is
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of Deeds, same province, issued in the name of Juan
Jayag and has a market value of P15,000.00. The same land was subdivided into lots consisting of 100 square meters each, where

the individual petitioners built their houses. On the remaining portion were constructed their barangay center, multi-purpose gym and
health center. Respondent fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in his name. In
1998, he paid real estate taxes and subsequently, he threatened to build a barb-wire fence around the land.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the land is only P6,030.00. Respondent, citing Section 33 (3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691,[4] maintains that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan,
Davao del Sur.
In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total assessed
value of the property is P41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued
by Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.[5]
On January 12, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 20, 1999.
Hence, petitioners directly filed with this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the trial courts Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for
reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous to Huguete vs. Embudo.[6] There, petitioners argued that a complaint for
annulment of a deed of sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
However, we ruled that the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations
of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[7]
Let us examine the pertinent allegations in petitioners complaint below:
x x x

xxx

2. Plaintiffs by themselves and/or thru their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual possession, in the concept of an owner, in
good faith and in a manner that is open, peaceful, uninterrupted, public, adverse and continuous, for more than 30 years, the following
described parcel of land, viz:
A parcel of land containing an area of 3.2 hectares, more of less, covered by OCT No. P-(3331)-4244, in the name of Juan Jayag and
situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur.
2a.

The market value of the above-described land is Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

3.
The respective areas that private plaintiffs occupy consisted of an average of 100 square meters on which their homes and
houses are built while a large chunk of the above-described property has been used or set aside for the barangay site of and other
infrastructures for Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur.
xxx

xxx

5.
Defendant or his predecessor-in-interest has never been in possession, of the land in suit and except for the year 1998, has not
paid taxes thereon nor declared the same for taxation purposes a clear index that defendants title over the same is not genuine.
6.
Defendant, in procuring title to the land in suit did so by fraud, mistake and/or misrepresentation, hence, he holds the title for the
benefit and in trust of the landowner that is, herein plaintiffs.
7.

Defendant is by law under obligation to reconvey the land in suit in favor of herein plaintiffs, x x x.

It can easily be discerned that petitioners complaint involves title to, or possession of, real property. However, they failed to allege
therein the assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what they stated is the market value of the land at P15,000.00.

Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx

xxx

(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest thereon, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the
claimant.[8] It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
Petitioners complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in real
property, they should have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value,
which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of PadadaKiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders dated January 12, 1999 and April 20, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3715 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED
THIRD DIVISION
AMANTE SIAPNO, CRISTINA LOPEZ and MINDA GAPUZ,Petitioners, - versus -MANUEL V. MANALO, Respondent, G.R. No.
132260 Promulgated: August 30, 2005
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N GARCIA, J.:
As far back as 1987, in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,[1] this Court has made it clear that any
complaint, petition, answer and other similar pleading that does not specify in its body and prayer the amount of damages claimed
should not be accepted or admitted or otherwise expunged from the records. It is unfortunate that to this date, there are still those who
failed to hearken to our teaching in Manchester. The present case exemplifies one.
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the decision dated 13 January 1998[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. SP No. 45434, dismissing, for lack of merit, the earlier petition for certiorari and prohibition thereat filed by the
petitioners against the Hon. Eudarlio B. Valencia, Presiding Judge, RTC, Quezon City, Branch 222, and the herein respondent, Manuel
V. Manalo.
The underlying facts are not disputed:
As then Administrator of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA), petitioner Amando Siapno, thru a special order dated 12 April
1995, created a negotiating panel with the responsibility of undertaking the disposal of NTAs 31,159 square-meter real property at
Barrio Prinza, Las Pias City, and accepting offers relative to the purchase thereof by interested party/parties. As constituted, the panel
was composed of Ricardo Briones, as chairman, and petitioners Cristina Lopez and Minda Gapuz, as members.
Thru a letter dated 02 June 1995, respondent Manuel Manalo offered to buy the real property in question, which offer was accepted
and approved by the NTA Board of Directors in its Resolution No. 336-95 bearing date 15 June 1995, of which respondent Manalo was
duly informed by the NTA Corporate Secretary.
In yet another Resolution dated 19 June 1995, the NTA Board of Directors directed the Corporate Secretary to assist the negotiating
panel in the preparation of the necessary document for the final disposition and transfer of ownership of the subject real asset in favor
of Manalo.
Accordingly, there was prepared a format of a Deed of Sale to be entered into by and between NTA and Manalo, which format was duly
approved by the NTA Board of Directors in its Resolution No. 341-95 dated 23 June 1995.
On 27 June 1995, Manalo signed the prepared Deed of Sale, with one NTA Board member acting as a witness. However, the
chairman of the negotiating panel Ricardo Briones, deferred affixing his signature thereon unless and until Manalo shall have paid
twenty percent (20%) of the agreed purchase price, as downpayment.

The next day - 28 June 1995 - Manalo paid NTA the sum of P4,424,598.00 by way of downpayment, and, on 24 July 1995, he sent a
letter to NTA attaching thereto the original of the domestic letter of credit he established in NTAs favor for the balance.
However, despite the above, petitioners refused to implement NTA Board Resolutions No. 336-95 and 431-95, hence the sale to
Manalo of the subject real property was never consummated.
Such was the state of things when, on 20 August 1995, in the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Manalo filed against petitioners a
petition for Mandamus with Damages, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24792 which was raffled to Branch 222 of the court. In
it, Manalo prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1.
Immediately upon filing of this petition, an order be issued requiring Corporate Secretary Lino Eugenio, Jr. or anyone acting in his
behalf, to turn over to the Court all the minutes --- and other documents/vouchers including the partially signed Deed of Sale allied
thereto --- of the meetings of the NTA Board of Directors wherein Resolutions Nos. 336-95- 339-95 and 341-95 were adopted, in order
to insure preservation of their integrity;
2.
After hearing, to compel respondents [now petitioners] to honor, respect [and] implement NTA Board Resolutions Nos. 336-95,
339-95 and 341-95 by signing in behalf of NTA the prepared Deed of Sale covering the Prinza, Las Pias property.
Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed, just and equitable in the premises.[3]
On 25 August 1998, or before the petitioners could have submitted their responsive pleading, Manalo filed directly with the Branch
Clerk of Branch 222 instead of with the Clerk of Court an Amended Petition for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages,[4]
thereunder impleading Stanford East Realty Corporation (Stanford), as additional respondent, it being alleged in the same amended
petition that herein petitioner Amante Siapno as NTA Administrator, unlawfully executed a deed of sale over the same NTA property in
favor of Stanford, on the basis of which the Register of Deeds of Las Pias issued in Stanfords favor TCT No. T-4948 for said property.
Manalo thus prayed in his amended petition for a judgment declaring the sale to Stanford and the latters title as null and void and
adjudging the petitioners liable to pay him P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; P2,000,000.00 by
way of actual damages; and P500,000.00 as and for attorneys fees. We quote Manalos prayer in his amended petition:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court that
IMMEDIATELY UPON FILING OF THIS PETITION
1.
A temporary restraining order be issued to all the respondents to stop and desist from making any transaction involving the
subject property;
2.
An order be issued requiring Corporate Secretary Lino Eugenio Jr. or anyone acting or substituting in his behalf to turn over [to]
the court all the minutes --- and other documents/vouchers including the partially signed Deed of Sale allied thereto -- of meetings of
the NTA Board of Directors wherein Resolutions Nos. 336-95, 339-95 and 341-95 were adopted, in order to ensure preservation of their
integrity;
AFTER NOTICE AND HEARING
3.

A writ of preliminary injunction of the same tenor as in first prayer be issued;

4.

A decision rendered:

4.1 Compelling the respondent NTA officials to honor, respect and implement NTA Board Resolutions Nos. 336-95, 339-95 and 34195 by signing in behalf of NTA the prepared Deed of Sale covering the Prinza, Las Pias property;
4.2 Declaring as null and void the Deed of Sale executed by the NTA in favor of respondent Stanford and TCT No. 49418 issued in
the latters name on the basis thereof;
4.3 Ordering the respondents to jointly and severally pay the petitioner: P1 million as moral damages; P1 million as exemplary
damages; P2 million as actual damages and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just equitable in the premises.[5]
On 29 November 1995, petitioners filed their Answer With Counter-claim and Crossclaim, thereunder raising the defense, inter alia,
that the suit filed by Manalo involves a conveyance of real property, hence the docket fee therefor should be based on the value of the

real asset involved in the suit but which is not stated in Manalos amended petition. And since Manalo has not paid the proper amount
of docket fee for his amended petition, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
On 24 April 1996, petitioners filed a third-party complaint, which the trial court admitted in open court on 23 May 1996. Manalo,
however, moved to strike out petitioners third-party complaint, arguing that the docket fees therefor were not paid.
To Manalos motion to strike, petitioners interposed an opposition with an accompanying motion for preliminary hearing on their
affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction based on Manalos deficient filing fee for his amended petition.
On 08 June 1996, Manalo paid the sum of P15,150.00 as additional docket fee, followed by his manifestation to that effect.
In an order dated 08 August 1996, the trial court deemed the question of inadequate filing fee as having become moot and academic by
reason of Manalos subsequent payment of the additional filing fee.
In yet another order dated 09 August 1996, the trial court denied petitioners prayer for a preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense
of lack of jurisdiction, explaining that Manalo has already paid the additional docketing fee. In the same order, the trial court set the
case for pre-trial.
In time, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the trial courts two (2) aforementioned orders, which motion was likewise denied by
the court in its subsequent order of 08 August 1997.
Therefrom, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
45434, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in issuing its three
(3) aforementioned orders of 08 August 1996, 09 August 1996 and 08 August 1997.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its assailed decision of 13 January 1998, denied petitioners recourse for lack of
merit.
Hence, petitioners present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it being their submission that the
appellate court erred:
I. IN HOLDING, PER THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 13 JANUARY 1998, THAT RESPONDENTS PETITION IN THE COURT
OF ORIGIN IS A PERSONAL ACTION, NOT A REAL ACTION, THEREBY SANCTIONING THE COGNIZANCE BY THE COURT A QUO
OF WHAT IS IN ESSENCE A REAL ACTION WITHOUT THE PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED AND CORRECT DOCKET FEES
THEREFOR, WHICH IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON TO THE COURTS ACQUISITION AND EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION.
II. IN SANCTIONING AND APPROVING, IN CONTRAVENTION OF APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND IN CLEAR DEPARTURE
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, THE DELIBERATE PLOY OF RESPONDENT IN
STATING THE DAMAGES HE CLAIMS ONLY IN THE BODY BUT NOT IN THE PETITORY (PRAYER) PORTION OF THE PETITION
TO EVADE PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET/FILING FEES THEREFOR.
Simply put, the issue is: whether or not the trial court acted with or without jurisdiction in its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791. Upon the
resolution of this issue rests the corollary question of whether or not the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in
excess of jurisdiction in coming out with its challenged decision of 13 January 1998, sustaining the trial courts three (3) orders in the
basic case for Mandamus With Revocation of Title and Damages in Civil Case No. Q-95-24791.
We rule for the petitioners.
Consistent with our ruling in Manchester, supra, that the amount of damages claimed must be alleged not only in the body of the
complaint, petition or answer but also in the prayer portion thereof, the lower court should have outrightly dismissed respondents
original petition for mandamus with revocation of title and damages in its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791, or, if already admitted, should
have expunged the same from the records.
We note that while paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of Manalos original petition somehow alleged the amount of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees, all in the aggregate amount of P4,500,000.00, which he claimed to have sustained by reason of
petitioners inaction/refusal to implement the NTA Board Resolutions relative to the sale of the questioned property to him, the prayer,
supra, embodied in the same original petition made no mention whatsoever of the same damages. In fact, there was not even a prayer
for the payment thereof.
The requirement that the amount of damages claimed has to be specified not only in the body of the pleading but also in its prayer
portion came about to put an end to the then prevailing practice by counsels of reciting the damages prayed for only in the body of the
complaint to evade payment of the correct filing fees. To quote from Manchester:

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint
in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had
taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting
all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this
Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners'
counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record. (Emphasis supplied)
The irrelevant circumstance that respondent Manalo subsequently paid additional filing fees in connection with his amended petition is
of no moment. For, with the reality that his original petition suffered from the defect in its prayer vis a vis the amount of damages
claimed, and, therefore, should not have been admitted, or, if already accepted, should have been ordered expunged from the records,
the amended petition could have served no valid purpose because in law, there is, in the first place, no existing petition to be amended.
Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to have entertained and assumed jurisdiction over the same by issuing the orders assailed in
CA-G.R. SP No. 45434.
There is more.In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTAs sale of the property in dispute to Standford East Realty
Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended
petition is styled as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages, it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from Standford the
realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action
in res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[6] is instructive. There, we said:
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to
recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property.
(Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz
v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950).
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for
annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is
considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the
annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the
case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of filing fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his
amended petition, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated
value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon, as
required under Section 7 of this Courts en banc resolution of 04 September 1990 (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 141 on Legal
Fees).[7]
Even the amended petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the records.
In fine, we rule and so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791. It follows that the
appellate court itself acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, when it sustained the unlawful orders of the trial court, subject of petitioners petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 45434.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. Q-95-24791 of the trial court is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge volume of cases filed each year and the slow and
cumbersome adversarial syste1n that the judiciary has in place;
Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that complainants simply give up con1ing to court after
repeated postponements;
Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines because its courts are unable to provide ample and
speedy protection to their investments, keeping its people poor;
Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases under litigation, on February 21,
2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in place of the
direct testimonies of witnesses;
Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about two-thirds the time used for presenting the
testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding up the hearing and adjudication of cases;
Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, headed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules on Civil Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, have
recommended for adoption a Judicial Affidavit Rule that will replicate nationwide the success of the Quezon City experience in the use
of judicial affidavits; and
Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the following:
Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the reception of evidence before:
(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and
the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not apply to small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the Shari'a Appellate Courts;
(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence, including the Integrated Bar of the
Philippine (IBP); and
(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are subject to disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as
their existing rules of procedure contravene the provisions of this Rule.1
(b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or investigating officers shall be uniformly referred to here as the
"court."
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve
on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the
scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C,
and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same has
been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such
affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original document or object
evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter
shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed by existing rules.

Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to the witness and, if not in English
or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the witness and the place where the
examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does so under oath, and that he may
face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents; and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer
who conducted or supervised the examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the corresponding answers that the witness gave; and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness regarding the latter's answers.
(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse party
nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books,
documents, or other things under his control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party
may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules
governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking
of a judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party presenting the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of
direct testimony shall state the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the witness. The adverse party may move to
disqualify the witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly
rule on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets under the initials of an
authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. - The adverse party shall have the right to cross-examine the witness on
his judicial affidavit and on the exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the witness may also examine him as on redirect. In every case, the court shall take active part in examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth of his
testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his last witness, a party shall
immediately make an oral offer of evidence of his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order, stating the
purpose or purposes for which he offers the particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for his objection, if any, to its admission, and the
court shall immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that describe and authenticate them, it is sufficient that
such exhibits are simply cited by their markings during the offers, the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each
exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:
(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;

(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days before the pre-trial, serving copies if the
same upon the accused. The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he
may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted
at the trial.
(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the prosecution, he shall have the option to
submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy
of each on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and
so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and
exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the
same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not
less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the scheduled hearing of the case as required.
Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's right to confront by crossexamination the witnesses there present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content requirements of Section 3 and the
attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court may, however, allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant
replacement affidavits before the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not unduly prejudice the opposing
party and provided further, that public or private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less than P
1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of Court and the rules of procedure governing
investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar as these are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.1wphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby disapproved.
Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its publication in two newspapers of general circulation
not later than September 15, 2012. It shall also apply to existing cases.
Manila, September 4, 2012.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice