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The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to
our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on
fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to
emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next
2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic
power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and nonhegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict
that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the
United States should adopt a grand strategy of investment, building legitimacy and
capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of
the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of
enlargement,2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules
and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions
(i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed
to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a
benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's
Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: (i) (providing) significant investments in
economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect
economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments. 4 China has already
solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more
ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political
scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He
contends that China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to
become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth
century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population,
and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek
a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has
historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare the emergence of China
to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century .7
Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately
threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its
ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the
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these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of
unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will
rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address
ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into
regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the
greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one core nation's involvement in a conflict between
another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in
South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations.
Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national
power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the
principal catalysts of future global conflicts .11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the
internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States
should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to
this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The
Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN)
charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself
and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a
precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act
within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if
done under the auspices of a UN mandate. Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct
requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous
administration: preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of
unilateralism,14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim
nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance,
viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately ,
any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish
consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a
threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since
the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that the post-9/11 doctrine of
national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force,
coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.15 American foreign policy has
within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders want the
protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty ,21
from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if
China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest,
the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific
region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic
expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this
threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and
immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that
will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower .
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The embargo is the symbol of failed American democratization- a full repeal is key to send
an international signal of willingness to engage non-democratic states
Hinderdael, 2011 (Klaas, M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources,
and Environment, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, 6/11/2011,
http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true)
The two countries histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American
belief that it would become the hemispheres protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castros revolution, Cuba provided a testing
ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies . In the context of Ral shifting course in
Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a
foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its
legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more
willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The United States should not wait
for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has
succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look
closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the
islands political structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of
the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban
economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America
have shifted, as commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.51 Clearly, public opinion also
favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the countrys approach to its neighboring island.52 At this
particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations.
In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential.
American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring
democracy to Cuba for over 50 years. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the
political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic
embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly
willing to extend his hand once Americas traditional adversaries unclench their fists.
U.S.
presence in Iraq are greater threats to world peace than Kim Jong-Il and the Iranian nuclear
program, and view Beijing more favorably than Washington.41 In order for the United States to improve its image
in the world, the next president will have to offer new policies that demonstrate a commitment
to working with allies and a pragmatic, engagement-oriented approach to foreign policy
challenges. Cuba policy offers this opportunity. Embargo politics have kept the United
States from pursuing easily attainable changes to policy. With the stroke of a pen, the next
president could unilaterally demonstrate that he is willing to try a different approach by
allowing greater freedom of travel for U.S. citizens to Cuba. A diplomatic approach to Cuba would
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signal that the president is willing to pursue peaceful solutions to difficult problems , even if
those initial efforts do not bear fruit immediately. Multilaterally, overtures to U.S. allies to promote rule of law,
economic development, and human rights in Cuba would be a welcome change from the unproductive criticism that
has become the hallmark of recent U.S. policy . Compared with difficult challenges such as stabilizing
Afghanistan or containing Iran, Cuba is an easy place to showcase change. The next
administration needs to have an early win, says former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Peter Romero. 42 Romero, who was a key player in the Clinton administrations second-term efforts to increase
people-topeople exchanges, adds, Weve been on a losing streak for so long, something that breaks
the paradigm and shows bold strokes would have an enormous impact. I think you
can do that with Cuba.
Many American strategists recognize the inevitability of a more level global playing field , but
they have arrived at an illusory response: that the United States and its democratic allies
should dedicate the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing the Western o rder.
According to G. John Ikenberry, a political scientist at Princeton University, The United States global position may
be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twentyfirst century. The West should sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible to ensure that the world
continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. Such confidence in the
universality of the Western order is, however, based on wishful thinking about the
likely trajectory of ascending powers, which throughout history have sought to adjust the prevailing
order in ways that favor their own interests. Presuming that rising states will readily take their
seats at the Wests table is unrealistic and even dangerous, promising to alienate
emerging powers that will be pivotal to global stability in the years ahead. Instead, the
West will have to make room for the competing visions of rising powers and prepare for an
international system in which its principles no longer serve as the primary anchor. Sinking
the roots of the West, founding a league of democracies, and turning NATO into a global
alliance of democratic states would be admirable visions in a politically homogeneous world.
But the Western model does not command widespread acceptance . If the next
international system is to be characterized by norm-governed order rather than competitive anarchy , it will have
to be based on great-power consensus and toleration of political diversity rather than
Western primacy and the single-minded pursuit of universal democracy. To that end, the United
States should take the lead in fashioning a more diverse and inclusive global order . Call it the
Autonomy Rule: the terms of the next order should be negotiated among all states , be they
democratic or not, that provide responsible governance and broadly promote the
autonomy and welfare of their citizens. The West will have to give as much as it gets in shaping the world
that comes next. This approach does not constitute acquiescence to illiberalism, but rather a more progressive
understanding of Americas liberal tradition. Just as it does at home, the United States should welcome
diversity abroad, accepting that liberal democracy must compete respectfully in the
marketplace of ideas with other types of regimes. Indeed, toleration of reasonably just
alternative political systems will promote U.S. interests far more effectively than the hubris of
neoconservatism or the narrow idealism of the current liberal consensus. Respect for responsible governments,
toleration of political and cultural diversity, balance between global governance and devolution to regional
authorities, and a more modest brand of globalizationthese are the principles around which the next
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American military will maintain its primacy well beyond the next decade, and Washington's
diplomatic clout will be second to none for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the stability
afforded by Western predominance will slip away in step with its material and ideological
primacy. Accordingly, the West must work with emerging powers to take advantage of
the current window of opportunity to map out the rules that will govern the next world. Otherwise,
multipolarity coupled with ideological dissensus will ensure balance-of-power competition
and unfettered jockeying for power, position, and prestige . It is far preferable to arrive at a new rulesbased order by design rather than head toward a new anarchy by default. The goal should be to forge a
consensus among major states about the foundational principles of the next world. The West
will have to be ready for compromise; the rules must be acceptable to powers that adhere to very different
conceptions of what constitutes a just and acceptable order. The political diversity that will characterize the next
world suggests that aiming low and crafting a rules-based order that endures is wiser than aiming high and coming
away empty-handed. What follows is a sketch of what the rules of the next order might look like a set of
principles on which the West and the rising rest may well be able to find common ground.
Defining Legitimacy Under American leadership, the West has propagated a conception of order that
equates political legitimacy with liberal democracy. If a new rules-based order is to emerge,
the West will have to embrace political diversity rather than insist that liberal democracy is
the only legitimate form of government. To be sure, nondemocracies currently have their say in global
institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the G-20. But even as the West does business
with autocracies in these and other settings, it also delegitimates them in word and action .
The United States leads the charge on this front. In his second inaugural address, George W. Bush
stated that, "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.... So it is the policy of the United States
to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture." Although of
different political stripes, Barack Obama told the UN General Assembly in 2010 that "experience shows us that
history is on the side of liberty; that the strongest foundation for human progress lies in open economies, open
societies, and open governments. To put it simply, democracy, more than any other form of government, delivers
for our citizens."- Obama also made clear his commitment to democracy promotion in outlining
the U.S. response to the Arab Spring: The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights
include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under
the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders.... Our support for these principles is not a
secondary interest... it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of
the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal.2 Europe generally shares this outlook. Catherine
Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief, declared in 2010 that, "democracy, human rights,
security, governance and sustainable development are intrinsically linked. Democratic principles
have their roots in universal norms and values."- Such statements affirm Robert Kagan's observation that elites in
the West "have operated on the ideological conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of
government and that other forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory.'' This stance is
morally compelling and consistent with values deeply held among the Atlantic democracies.
But the equation of legitimacy with democracy undermines the West's influence among
emerging powers. Even countries like Brazil and India, both of which are stable democracies,
tend to view the West's obsession with democracy promotion as little more than uninvited
meddling in the affairs of others. The backlash is of course considerably harsher in
autocracies such as China and Russia, which regularly warn the United States and
the EU to stay out of the domestic affairs of other countries . In Putin's words, "We are all
perfectly aware of the realities of domestic political life. I do not think it is really necessary to explain anything to
anybody. We are not going to interfere in domestic politics, just as we do not think that they should prevent
practical relations ... from developing. Domestic politics are domestic politics." For the West to speak out against
political repression and overt violations of the rule of law is not only warranted but obligatory. But to predicate
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constructive relations with rising powers on their readiness to embrace a Western notion of
legitimacy is another matter altogether. Senator John McCain is off course in insisting that "It is the
democracies of the world that will provide the pillars upon which we can and must build an enduring peace." On
the contrary, only if the West works cooperatively with all regimes willing to reciprocate
democracies and nondemocracies alikewill it be able to build an enduring peace .
Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security, water and food
security, financial crisisthese challenges are global in nature and can be
effectively addressed only in partnership with a wide array of countries . It makes
little sense for the West to denigrate and ostracize regimes whose cooperation it needs to
fashion a secure new order; the stakes are too high. Western countries only harm their own
interests when they label as illegitimate governments that are not liberal democracies .
Recognizing the next world's inevitable political diversity and thereby consolidating
cooperation with rising powers of diverse regime type is far more sensible than insisting on
the universality of Western conceptions of legitimacyand alienating potential partners . The
West and rising rest must arrive at a new, more inclusive, notion of legitimacy if they are to agree
on an ideological foundation for the next world.
effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species
extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands. At a
warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of
rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina's outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle
of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in
Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow.86 Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States
alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of
GDP.87 But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of
water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10
degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of
carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that "humankind's continuing enhancement of
the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth's climate and humanity's life -support
system."88 At worst, says physics professor Marty Hof-fert of New York University, "we're just going to burn everything up; we're
going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous, when there were crocodiles at the poles. And then everything will
collapse."89 During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between
the United States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet.90 Global warming is the
post-Cold War era's equivalent of nuclear winter, at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically.
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Over the long run, it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It
And Nuclear terrorism invokes a massive nuclear superpower war that can only
culminate in extinction
Ayson, 2010 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging
Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33 Iss. 7, July)
But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not
necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate
a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess
them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state
possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers
started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the socalled n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear
terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack
on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because
they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to
be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do
suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used
in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for
nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation
by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its
radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its
analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came
from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to
believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state
possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in
Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and
possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular,
if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia
and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders
not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was
already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a
proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack
occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing
resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the
attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an
unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the
immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed
forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment , when careful planning runs up
against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions
might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial
response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or
nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that
group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as
being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their
sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and
abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents
long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that
might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the
question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be
expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to
Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support
of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its
right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China
deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the
group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some
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connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway,
and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw
about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China
would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear
terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be
one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in
the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options
would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of
the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even
offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and
that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow
places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group
and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias use of nuclear
weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington
have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the
United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how
would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare they tell us what
to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the
terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Critics from the right will see this call for toleration of political diversity as moral relativism,
while critics on the left will label it as abandonment of a progressive agenda . For
neoconservatives, non-democracies must be defeated; for liberals, they must be seduced. Both believe that
Western values should be universal valuesand that their dispersal represents the most important form of
progress. Policies of impatient democratization, however, will do much more to
impede than impel historys advance. From the Balkans to Iraq to the Palestinian
territories, a rush to the ballot box has undercut moderates and stoked sectarian and
ideological cleavages, not furthered the cause of political stability . Washington should continue to
promote democracy by example and incentive. But if the United States insists on universal adherence
to the Western order it oversees, it will only compromise its persuasive appeal and its ability
to help ensure that liberal democracy ultimately wins the long struggle against alternative
systems of government. Instead, the United States should take the lead in constructing a more
pluralist international order. Were Washington to orchestrate the arrival of this next order, it would not
denigrate the accomplishments of democracy, but rather demonstrate an abiding confidence in the values the West
holds dear and in the ability of liberal forms of government to outperform and ultimately prevail against
authoritarian alternatives. Cultivating new stakeholders, carefully devolving international
responsibility to regional actors, and placing the international economy on a more stable
footing will also allow the United States the respite needed to focus on rebuilding the
foundations of its own prosperity. The United States will be better off if it gets ahead of the curve and helps
craft a new order that is sustainable than if it fights a losing battle against tectonic shifts in global politics. As
Kissinger observes, America needs to learn to discipline itself into a strategy of
gradualism that seeks greatness in the accumulation of the attainable . The United
States can steward the onset of this more diverse and inclusive world in a manner that remains consonant with the
deepest American values. Doing so would help restore Americas moral authority as a leading
member of the community of nations, in the end making it more likely that other nations would
be as respectful of Americas preferences as America should be of theirs .
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2AC
Ext. Engagement W/ Non-dems. key
Cross-regime-type cooperation causes broad global normative
consensus---makes every power a stakeholder with an incentive to
maintain stability
Kupchan and Mount, 2009 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University
and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of
Government at Georgetown University, The Autonomy Rule, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2009,
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf)
An order that welcomes political diversity would constitute a stark departure from
the norms and practices that have governed international politics since World War II . Western
norms would no longer enjoy pride of place; authority would not be concentrated in Washington, nor
legitimacy derived solely from a transatlantic consensus . Instead, Western concepts of
legitimacy would combine with those of other countries and cultures , distributing responsibility to
a wider array of states. By casting the net widely, a more inclusive order would encourage
stability by broadening consensus, producing new stakeholders, and further marginalizing states
that are predatory at home or abroad.
of its own failure to comply with the institutions and rules that Washington took the lead in
crafting after the close of World War II. But in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that began in 2008
and amid the ongoing ascent of China, India, Brazil, and other rising states, change in ordering norms may well be
driven by the preferences and policies of emerging powers, not by those of the United States. Moreover, the
impressive economic performance and political staying power of regimes that practice nondemocratic brands of capitalismsuch as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabiacall into question
the durability of the normative order erected during Americas watch. Well before emerging powers
catch up with Americas material resources, they will be challenging the normative commitment to
open markets and liberal democracy that has defined the Western order. The substantive gap between the
norms of the Western order and those that inform the domestic and foreign policies of rising powers has not gone
unnoticed (Kupchan and Mount 2009). Nonetheless, many scholars have offered an illusory response:
that the United States and its democratic allies should dedicate the twilight hours of their
primacy to universalizing Western norms. According to G John Ikenberry (2008, 37, 25), the United
States global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the
dominant order of the twenty-first century. The West should sink the roots of this order as deeply
as
possible to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material
preponderance wanes. Such confidence in the universality of the Western order is, however, based on
wishful thinking about the likely trajectory of ascending powers, which throughout history have sought to adjust
the prevailing order in ways that advantage their own interests. Presuming that rising states will readily
embrace Western norms is not only unrealistic, but also dangerous, promising to alienate
emerging powers that will be pivotal to global stability in the years ahead (Gat 2007). Brooks and
Wohlforth do not address this issuepresumably because they believe that US preponderance is so durable that
they need not concern themselves with the normative orientations of rising powers. But facts on the ground
suggest otherwise. China is, as of 2010, the worlds second largest economy , holds massive amounts
of US debt, and is strengthening its economic and strategic presence in many quarters of the globe; the G-8 has
given way to the G-20; the prime minister of democratic India has called for new global rules of the game
and the reform and revitalization of international institutions (Mahbubane 2008, 235); the International
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Monetary Fund and the World Bank have increased the voting weight of developing
countries; and the United Nations Security Council is coming under growing pressure to enlarge the voices of
emerging powers. All of these developments come at the expense of the influence and
normative preferences of the United States and its Western allies. By the numbers, Brooks and
Wohlforth are correct that unipolarity persists. But rising powers are already challenging the pecking order and
guiding norms of the international system. If the next international system is to be
The Princeton Project on National Security envisages a world of liberty under law in which
the spread of democracy and open markets combines with the reform of international
institutions to globalize the Western order. This vision is an attractive one. And it may well be that
China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other influential non-democracies will follow the Wests
model of development and sign up to its notion of international order. As their middle classes grow
in size and wealth, their material affluence could well prompt them to demand a greater political voice. But even if
this is the case, the transition to liberal democracy will be a gradual one. For now, these
countries are succeeding in consolidating capable authoritarian systems which, while not
democratic, do enjoy considerable popular support. A poll conducted last year, for example, revealed
that over 80 percent of Chinas citizens are content with their countys direction. According to both neoconservative
and liberal proponents of a league of democraciessuch as Robert Kagan and Ivo Daalderautocracies should be
effectively sidelined until they embrace democracy and take their place in the current international order. But the
global distribution of power is changing far more quickly than the nature of
governance in rising non-democracies. Economic, demographic, and military trends
favor ascending authoritarian states, and these trends provide their leaders few incentives
to gamble on political liberalization. The global financial crisis notwithstanding, growth rates in China
should outpace those of mature democracies for years to come. And despite the recent drop in oil prices, Russia,
the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Iran, and other states rich in oil and gas reserves will continue to use their energy
revenues to strengthen their domestic control and underwrite their challenge to the Wests vision of international
order. As rising states seek influence commensurate with their wealth and power, they will
recast, rather than embrace, the Western order. Maintaining a consensus on the terms of order is
difficult enough among great powers that share a commitment to democracy at home. Manmohan Singh, Prime
Minister of a democratic India, recently called for new global rules of the game and the
reform and revitalization of international institutions. Discord exists even within the West; the United
States and many of its European allies have of late parted ways over the role of international institutions, issues of
international justice, and the rules determining when the use of force is necessary and legitimate. Such differences
will be muted, but by no means eliminated, by new leadership in Washington . Divergent approaches to the
conduct of statecraft tend to be even more pronounced among great powers that part
company on matters of domestic governance. Washington and Moscow have locked horns of
late over a long list of issues, including the enlargement of NATO, missile defense, the independence of
Kosovo, and the conflict in Georgia. These differences stem not just from narrow conflicts of interest, but
from contrasting conceptions of sovereignty, security, and other institutions of order. Political
diversity among the worlds major players does not mean that a stable international order will prove
unattainable. But it does mean that if a stable order is to emerge, its terms will have to be the
product of consensus, not Western fiat. As Henry Kissinger cautions, America will have to learn
that world order depends on a structure that participants support because they helped bring
it about. Policymakers in Washington will have to rethink the foundations of U.S. statecraft and generate
principles that can ground a more diverse, tolerant, and sustainable order .
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the human rights issues with China. But U.S. diplomacy on the issue should be cognizant of
the relatively limited impact that outside pressure will have on China's evolution and the broader
context to the relationship-a balance admirably struck by President Obama during President Hu Jintao's January
2011 visit to Washington. President Hu's acknowledgment that China had "issues" with human rights was a mild
opening, but certainly one worth pursuing. More broadly , using human rights standards or issues of
democracy promotion as a yardstick for cooperation will backfire . On both issues, emerging
power behavior combines a defense of sovereignty (fundamental to their security) with a tradition
of resisting western interventionism. Democratic India, Brazil and South Africa routinely vote with their
NAM friends and against the West in the Human Rights Council. Moreover, while issues like "the
responsibility to protect" are presumed to divide the "West from the rest," and do so in
rhetoric, reality is more complex. India and South Africa spoke out strongly against NATO's action in Kosovo,
which was supported by the Organization of Islamic Countries; France, Russia and Germany banded
together to block U.S. action in Iraq. So, contentious, yes; neatly dividing the west from the rest, no. There
is complexity not cleavage here. And an effort to use human rights or democratic criteria to drive
hard cleavages in the international system would likely provoke more serious banding
together by the emerging powers-against, not in favor of, our strategy. CONCLUSION America has
rebounded from dips in its influence before. An oil price rise before economic downturn, a brewing crisis in Iran, a
rising competitor, domestic divides and a Democratic president facing a resurgent right-welcome to 1978. Still,
absent dramatic change, an economic shift to "the rest" will continue, and political influence
will follow. If we foster cooperation where interests allow, and devote serious resources to
global economic and energy diplomacy, we can balance the contentious dynamics of
regional security and human rights. Preparing for crises by investing in management tools
can help de-escalate them when they arrive.
The plan signals U.S. acceptance of alternate forms of governance--key to global cooperation across regime type and U.S. credibility
Kupchan, 2012 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations, No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, Kindle
edition (no page numbers)
As a starting point, responsible governance, rather than liberal democracy, should be adopted
as the standard for determining which states are legitimate and in good standingand thus
stakeholders in the next order. Put simply, a state would be in good international standing if it
is dedicated to improving the lives of its citizens and enables them to pursue their aspirations in a
manner broadly consistent with their preferences. States that fall short of this standard would be those that aim
primarily to extract resources from their citizens, wantonly expose them to widespread privation and disease, or
carry out or enable the systematic persecution or physical abuse of minorities. Beyond these strict
prohibitions, however, societies should have considerable latitude in how they organize their
institutions of government and go about meeting the needs of their citizens . As long as they
are committed to improving the welfare and dignity of their people, states should enjoy the
rights of good standing. It is true that equating good standing with responsible governance
would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of states that do not adhere to Western conceptions
of rights and liberties. But the globe's inescapable political diversity necessitates this
relaxation in standards; different kinds of polities take different approaches to furthering the material and
emotional needs of their peoples. In liberal states, citizens pursue their aspirations individually and privately. Other
types of politiesChina, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore, for exampleput less emphasis on
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Peoples with
communitarian political cultures or a long history of deprivation may prefer a state-led brand
of governance to a laissez-faire one that risks exposing them to political strife and poverty. Muslim
individual liberties in favor of a more collective approach to promoting the welfare of their citizens.
societies may view a separated mosque and state as alien, and deem a fusion of the sacred and secular as not only
acceptable, but obligatory. In patrimonial cultures, loyalty to tribe, clan, and family regularly take precedence over
individual rights. To acknowledge that different kinds of polities can practice different forms of
responsible governance is to respect diversity. In contrast, to compel other societies to
embrace a certain form of government would be to impose a type of un- freedom . Clearing
the way for a more inclusive global order entails recognizing that there is no single form of
responsible government; the West does not have a monopoly on the political institutions and
practices that enable countries to promote the welfare of their citizens. As long as other countries adhere
to reasonable standards of responsible governance, the West should respect their political
choices as a matter of national discretion and as a reflection of the intrinsic diversity of political life.
These same standards should also apply to the conduct of foreign policy. States in good standing must safeguard
not only the welfare of their own citizens, but also those of other countries. They must respect the
sovereignty and political preferences of other states in good standing, and they must refrain
from actions that compromise the security and well-being of other states and their citizens.
Countries that commit aggression or engage in prohibited actions, such as systematically
sponsoring terrorism or exporting weapons of mass destruction, should not be considered in
good standing and should be denied the rights enjoyed by responsible states . Consistently
abiding by these standards for inclusionin rhetoric as well as in policywould increase the number of
stakeholders in the international system. It would also allow for the clear demarcation of those
states that do not deserve such rights, and therefore facilitate the delegitimation and
isolation of the world's most dangerous actors. The West would enjoy the backing of
democracies and nondemocracies alike in taking a principled stand against regimes that prey on their own
citizenssuch as Sudan, North Korea, and Zimbabwe. So too would a broad coalition likely form to
confront any state or non-state actor that consistently breaches international norms and
commits acts of aggression against other states. With membership in the community of nations
inclusively defined, a consensus might well emerge on how to deal with states that are predatory at home and
abroad, providing legitimacy and widespread support for humanitarian and preventive intervention. So too would
this recasting of the notion of legitimacy encourage the United States to moderate its over- zealous promotion of
democracy. Rushing to the ballot box in places like Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan has done more harm than good. In
societies that lack experience with constitutional rule, expedited transitions to democracy often
produce civil war. In immature democracies, winners usually take all, leading to the
majority's exploitation and persecution of the minority. It is worth keeping in mind that the
West's own transition to democracy was long and bloody. Promoting responsible and
responsive governance promises to yield better results than insisting on a hurried transition
to democracy. To be sure, some will legitimately question whether the moral authority of liberal democracies
would be tarnished by this more pragmatic approach. But the costs of moral compromise would be more
than offset by the likely gains in international security. Moreover, the West need not abandon efforts
to promote democracy as it embraces a broader definition of legitimacy. On the contrary, it should continue to
speak out against repression and use political and economic incentives to encourage
democratization. Citizens in democratic societies have every reason to be confident that liberal democracy,
from both a moral and material perspective, is superior to the alternatives. Nonetheless, the spread of
democracy should be one component of a long-term vision rather than serve as a
defining objective. If the West is right about the strengths of liberal democracy, it
will spread of its own accord as a consequence of its appeal and effectiveness . In
the meantime, promoting responsible governance and respect for alternative approaches to
providing it offers the most promise of advancing the international stability needed for
democracy to demonstrate its virtues. This redefinition of international legitimacy does not violate
Western values, but instead draws heavily on the West's own experience. Compromise, tolerance, and
pluralism were all vital to the West's rise. Along the way, regimes of differing types lived
side-by-side, more often than not respecting each other's political, religious, and ideological choices. The West
has long celebrated and benefited from pluralism at home, and should do the same in
approaching the rest of the world. As Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson recognize, acknowledging the
heterogeneity of political life "takes hold of the great diversity of human experience to turn it
into a virtue not a vice, a source of new and recombinant ideas, not fear and hatred ."1 It is also
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the case that focusing more on eradicating tyranny than spreading democracy is entirely consistent with the
Western experience. As John Gaddis notes, "the objective of ending tyranny ... is as deeply rooted in American
history as it is possible to imagine.... Spreading democracy suggests knowing the answer to how
people should live their lives. Ending tyranny suggests freeing them to find their own
answers." in short, the West's own liberal tradition recognizes the diverse pathways available for promoting
human dignity and well-being. As the world's dominant power , the United States should take the lead in
constructing this more pluralist approach to legitimacy. The United States will be better off if it gets
ahead of the curve and helps craft a new order that enjoys support in most quarters of the globe than if it clings to
an outmoded vision backed primarily by its traditional Western allies. Working with states that govern
responsibly rather than haranguing those who fail to govern democratically would
ultimately elevate America's moral authority and enhance its credibility abroad ,
important assets as it works with rising powers to manage the global turn.
The starting point for formulating the foundational principles of the next order is to select
appropriate criteria for determining which are those states in good standing and thus
stakeholders in the new order. Membership in the community of nations should require that a state
in good standing seek to improve the lives of its citizens in a manner consistent with their
preferences, and in so doing, promote the autonomy of those citizens to pursue their aspirations. In a liberal polity,
the state allows its citizens to pursue their aspirations individually and privately. However, other types of
responsible polities put less emphasis on individual liberties and instead promote the welfare
of their citizens through more collective and paternalistic means. The Autonomy Rule
acknowledges that health, prosperity, security, and dignity represent the universal desires of
all peoples, but it simultaneously recognizes that liberal democracy does not
represent the only vehicle for furthering these objectives . The idea that government should
be dedicated to improving the lives of its citizens is hardly foreign to the American experiment. Indeed, the
Founding Fathers made clear that one of the defining purposes of union was to enable the state to enhance the
welfare of its citizens. The American solution to attaining these ends was the compound republic. By endowing
federal institutions with the power to govern while also limiting their authority through checks and balances, the
citizenry could be protected against threats from without and from tyranny within. The compound republic would
provide for the security and material needs of its citizens while leaving the states considerable discretion over
social policy and the individual broad latitude for privacy and personal aspiration . Even within the West,
however, there is disagreement about how best to construe this liberal tradition. Classical
liberals, such as Friedrich Hayek, maintain that autonomy is best ensured by freedom from
government action. This school of thought manifests itself in a strong libertarian tradition, which holds that
minimal government most effectively allows citizens to determine their own destiny. In contrast, left-leaning
liberals like Karl Polanyi and Amartya Sen recognize that deprivation in the material capabilities
of people represents a major constraint on autonomy. Sen, for example, sees education, social
welfare, and other government-sponsored programs as the best way to encourage autonomy; poverty represents a
form of un-freedom that is at least as oppressive as tyranny. In short, there is no single political formula for
promoting human autonomy. Clearing the way for a more inclusive global order entails
recognizing that Americas brand of liberal democracy does not exhaust the modes of
governance that satisfy the Autonomy Rule. Just as there is no universal form of democracy, there is
no universal form of responsible government. Peoples with communitarian political cultures
or a past of economic deprivation may prefer social democracy to a laissez-faire economy
that risks again exposing them to instability, inequality, and poverty. A deeply religious society may view a
separated church and state as alien, and deem secular education by itself insufficient to instill in children the values
that community holds dear. A patrimonial culture may privilege clan or familial ties over individual rights. Put
simply, the requirements of human autonomy vary for different peoples, and the threats to
autonomy vary by circumstance. In some cases, personal autonomy requires negative protectionfor
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To
acknowledge that autonomy takes different forms in different societies is to respect
diversity; to push a certain form of government on other societies would be to impose a type
of un-freedom. All societies have winners and losers, and minority populations often fare less well than the
majority. But as long as a government acts to promote the general welfare of its citizens in a
way broadly commensurate with their aspirations, respecting the Autonomy Rule means
treating that country as a member of international society in good standing. Of course, any
example, against coercionwhile in others it requires positive public effortagainst privation, for instance.
country that perpetrates or tolerates genocide, enables or allows the systematic persecution and physical abuse of
minorities, or exposes its citizens to widespread privation and disease will fall well short of meeting the Autonomy
Rule. But beyond such obvious prohibitions, societies should have considerable latitude in how they
organize their institutions of government. Implementation of the Autonomy Rule admittedly means
including some states that, though they govern responsibly, do not safeguard the full political rights of all their
citizens. However, such a rights-based approach to governance is unique to liberal democracies. Countries such
as Singapore, China, and Russia maintain that forgoing full individual rights allows for
alternative means of national progress and enhances personal welfare for the greatest
number of their citizens. To treat these countries as states in good standing is not to condone such
infringements on individual rights. It is instead to acknowledge the reality of political diversity and to
recognize that no country or system has a monopoly on providing good governance.
embargo, most have resisted even seriously discussing it. This U.S. commitment to a failed
policy has given Washington a "special stake in the islands so-called independent sector whose goals
appeal to Americans. But tragically, paraphrasing journalist Scotty Reston, Americans will do anything for these
dissidents except listen to them. My talks with many in Cuba and abroad suggest that most oppose the embargo
and three have co-authored articles with me saying so. If these dissidents come under focused government fire in
the years ahead, many Americans will feel compelled to intervene even more directlyperhaps militarilyon their
behalf. Two points stand out: Cuba is not the security threat that our current policy treats
it as; and our sanctions do not advance the desirable political, economic, and
humanitarian improvements that we say we seek on the island . The bottom line is that
we must base our policy on national security interests and realities, not unattainable
dreams, however noble those dreams may seem. During his second and final term, and after having
drawn unprecedented electoral support as a Democrat from Cuban-Americans in Miami, President Obama is
in a position to make serious reforms, if he has the will to do so . He might begin by
resurrecting a 1998-99 proposalthen endorsed by former secretaries of state Kissinger and George Shultz, but
killed by President Clintonfor convening a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to seriously examine the
pros and cons of the policy. It would certainly see the need for change and its findings would give
Obama cover for action. Many significant changes can be made now without the support of Congress, though
since 1996 the latters backing has been necessary to fully lift the embargo. Immediate reforms should
include: securing the release of Alan Gross, the American contractor arrested in 2009 for doing his proactive
U.S. government-funded job; ending provocative proactive programs; allowing more visits to
Cuba by all Americans, not just largely Cuban-Americans; expanding trade beyond the foods
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and medicines now allowed; bringing our Cuba immigration policy into line with our policies
toward immigrants from other countries; increasing discussions with Cubas political and military leaders
on affairs of mutual interest; and looking objectively at the reforms under way today and deciding how Washington
can promote change while defusing rather than stoking domestic conflict and tensions.
both countries were undermined by reconciliation, clearing the way for the ascent of
liberalizing coalitions: Brazil and Argentina were democracies by 1985. In none of these cases was
in
rapprochement the only factor that helped bring about a change of government, but the more benign strategic
environment that accompanied reconciliation certainly strengthened the hand of reformers. Over the long run,
working with recalcitrant autocrats may undermine them far more effectively than
containment and confrontation.4.3 Diplomacy, Not Economic Interdependence, Is the
Currency of Peace Third, and again contrary to conventional wisdom, diplomacy, not economic
interdependence, is the currency of peace. In only one of the twenty historical cases
examined in How Enemies Become Friends the gradual unification of Germany between 1815 and 1871 did
economic integration clear the way for political integration. In all the other cases, only after
political elites succeeded in taming strategic competition did the pacifying effects of
economic interdependence make a major contribution to the onset of stable peace. Flows of trade and
investment have consequences, but the diplomats must first lay the groundwork through
negotiations and the practice of reciprocal restraint. From this perspective, only after the diplomats
have resolved the bulk of the disputes at issue can economic integration between rivals Japan and China,
Palestinians and Israelis, Bosnias Serbs and Muslims help consolidate rapprochement. In similar fashion, the
If one were to study the history of American sanctions empirically, he would conclude, quite
reasonably, that they have failed. The embargo began in earnest in 1962 with the purpose
forcing Cuba to liberalize and move away from Communism. As the Cuban Democracy Act, which codified the
embargo in 1992, puts it, America will maintain its sanctions until Cuba moves towards
democratization and greater respect for human rights. Sixty-one years of restricted trade and
diplomatic relations with the worlds greatest economic, political, and military power, and Cuba has
refused to change. It is both communist and repressive. Cuba is virtually the only nation left in Latin America
where there is violent, state-sanctioned political repression. The state has a media-monopoly, restricts access to
information, and subjects non-state journalists and bloggers to arbitrary, short-term arrest. The embargo has
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more than failed. If the purpose of the embargo is to help the Cuban people, it is selfdefeating because it has made life worse for them. One example is food shortages. The state farms are terribly
inefficient and some years produce only 20% of the food necessary for the Cuban people. Thus, Cuba must import a
large quantity of its food. But because of the American embargo, imports are extremely
expensive, making life unnecessarily difficult for the Cuban people. Such is the case with all
embargos though. They rarely affect the people in power and instead, their weight is passed down to the everyday
men and women, whom the sanctions are put in place to help. Sanctions, therefore, are not corrective but punitive,
and punitive only towards the people. Why keep the sanctions? Some will argue that removing them will
reward Cuban intransigence on democratization and human rights. But should we combat intransigence with
obstinacy? Instead, the United States should change course and not only open up relations and
trade with Cuba, but embrace the Cuban people. America must be careful to distinguish between the
Cuban people and the Cuban state. It would be easy for the Cuban government to spin any change in American
policy as a sign of approval. America, then, should explicitly explain that its shifted posture is the result of its desire
to help the Cuban people. It aims to ease the strain on the food-market and bring in new technology, technology
that the Cuban people can use to share information and protest the government. New relations with the
United States will also catalyze and cultural/political shifts away from communism, and
precipitate new ones. In other words, renewed relations with Cuba will 1) help the Cuban
people, which in the process will 2) improve Americas standing , both in Cuba and Latin America,
and 3) support democrats. I harbor no allusions that ending sanctions immediately topple communism in
Cuba, but in the long run, it may turn out to be the needed silver bullet.
Cubas economy in the wake of recent hurricanes, and the governments resistance to
sudden change, Havana may not be in a rush to engage vigorously with the United States. Pickering
speculates that a dramatic shift would be resisted by Ral, who wants to keep any changes gradual.97 Still,
presidents from John F. Kennedy to Reagan have demonstrated a willingness to engage with the Cuban government
even at times of immense tension. Great presidents recognize that talking to the United States
enemies is not appeasement. Part of [a diplomats] job is to maintain contact with
people you wouldnt want to invite to dinner, advises Davidow.98 The United States
should reengage to support its interests on issues such as migration and counternarcotics
while laying the groundwork for more substantial discussions later. Even if a breakthrough is not possible today,
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The communist government of the ruling Castro brothers, Fidel and Raul, is in the midst of a
slow experiment to promote economic entrepreneurship. Late last year, Cuba instituted reforms to its
immigration policies that allow Cubans to travel abroad freely and allow those who have emigrated or fled to return
home. These changes, and the beginning of Obamas second term, create an
For the 21st year, the assembly's vote was overwhelming, with 188 nations - including most
of Washington's closest allies - supporting the embargo resolution , a result virtually unchanged
from last year. Israel, heavily dependent on U.S. backing in the Middle East, and the tiny Pacific state of Palau
were the only two countries that supported the United States in opposing the non-binding resolution
in the 193-nation assembly. The Pacific states of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia abstained. President Barack
Obama further loosened curbs last year on U.S. travel and remittances to Cuba. He had said he was ready to
change Cuba policy but was still waiting for signals from Havana, such as the release of political prisoners and
guarantees of basic human rights. But Obama has not lifted the five-decade-old trade embargo, and
the imprisonment of a U.S. contractor in Cuba has halted the thaw in Cuban-U.S. relations.
Havana's Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez told the assembly that Cuba had high hopes for Obama
when he was first elected in 2008 and welcomed his calls for change. But he said
the result had been disappointing. "The reality is that the last four years have been
characterized by the persistent tightening of ... the embargo ," he said. 'EXTERNAL SCAPEGOAT'
Rodriguez said the "extraterritoriality" of the blockade measures - the fact that Washington pressures other
countries to adhere to the U.S. embargo - violates international law. He added that the blockade is not in
U.S. interests and harms its credibility. "It leads the U.S. to adopt costly double standards," he said,
adding that the embargo has failed to achieve its objectives of pressuring the government to
introduce economic and political freedoms and comply with international human rights standards.
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"There
resolute and principled stand against the few remaining predatory regimes such
as Sudan, North Korea, Myanmar, and Zimbabwethat evince no apparent concern for the
welfare of their citizens and expose them to brutality, famine, illiteracy, and systematic
repression. The United States would also be able to isolate any state or non-state
actor whose breach of international norms endangers regional or global security .
Moreover, having affirmed the rights of all responsible states, Washington would be more likely to enjoy
the backing of many of the worlds statesdemocracies and non-democracies alikein confronting such
predators. With membership in the community of nations well-defined, a great-power consensus might well
emerge on how best to deal with predatory states, making humanitarian and preventive
intervention a more realistic prospect. Honoring the Autonomy Rule would therefore
legitimate a new and more inclusive order while de-legitimating and isolating the worlds
most dangerous actors. Far from representing an abandonment of American ideals, this approach draws
heavily on the foundational principles of Americas own experience to shape the parameters of a new international
order. John Gaddis, a Yale historian, agrees that the United States should focus on eradicating
tyranny rather than spreading democracy, observing that the objective of ending tyrannyis as
deeply rooted in American history as it is possible to imagine . . . Spreading democracy suggests knowing
the answer to how people should live their lives. Ending tyranny suggests freeing them to
find their own answers. Moreover, as citizens in a pluralist society, Americans have a tradition of valuing the
preservation of intellectual, cultural, racial, and religious difference. Celebrating pluralism not only
ensures that the uniqueness of the individual will be valued; such tolerance also produces a
vibrant society capable of bringing multiple perspectives to bear on common problems.
These principles are equally applicable to international politics: There can be no good justification
for the United States to celebrate pluralism at home but fail to do so abroad. Just as pluralism and tolerance help
resolve some of the most difficult challenges of domestic governance, they should do the same for matters of
international politics. As long as other countries adhere to the Autonomy Rule, the United States should
respect their political preferences as a matter of national discretion and a reflection of the
diversity that is intrinsic to political life.
Enhancing the efficacy of international institutions will also require the devolution of greater
responsibility and capability to regional actors. Deliberations at the global level are certainly required to
set broad policies as well as coordinate responses to crises. But global governance has its limits; as the UN and G20 have made clear, reaching consensus and taking effective action do not come easily. The diffusion of global
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globe. A new distribution of power necessitates a new distribution of responsibility, and effectively tackling
many of today's challenges requires broad cooperation across region and regime type .
Proposals that envisage the world-wide extension of Western institutionssuch as a global
NATO or a League of Democraciesare destined to fall woefully short. Important rising
powers would be excluded and Western democracies have little appetite for such an expansion of
commitments. Instead, Western institutions should serve as a model, not a substitute, for regional governance
elsewhere. In the same way that NATO and the European Union helped bring security and prosperity to the Atlantic
community, similar institutions can do the same in other areas. Regional devolution makes sense for a
number of reasons. Countries closest to a crisis are those most likely to take effective action,
if only for reasons of proximity. And with the West likely to be more focused on its own problems in the
coming years, tapping the potential of other states increases the likelihood of timely diplomatic
and military initiatives. Finally, the West's intervention beyond the Atlantic zone always invites resistance and
resentment. In contrast, action by local states is more likely to enjoy support and legitimacy
within the region in question. The devolution of authority to regional bodies has already been occurring,
aided by the evolving capacities for governance and engagement at the regional level. The Association of Southeast
Asian States (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the defense union taking shape in South America (UNASUR) as these and other
unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would
be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser,
Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway
increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting
of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic
warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years
captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene
Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the
atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to
100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn
that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us
towards a similar hothouse Earth.
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale
nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before
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proceeding.
also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist
incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former
weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, We would never accept a
situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear
terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we cant live in a world where its anything but extremely lowprobability. [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar
found a median estimate of 20 percent for the probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion
occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years, with 79 percent of the
respondents believing it more likely to be carried out by terrorists than by a
government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism,
but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential
trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include
estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or
both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever
risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the
U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear
terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce
only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, societys almost total neglect
of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important .
The cost of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure
and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is
concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence
to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be
termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War IIs
fatalities were double or triple that numberchaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases
humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many
people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of
the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity
may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to
assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress,
General Douglas MacArthur, stated, Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you
lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the
chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide . Former
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: If deterrence fails and conflict develops,
the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed
[McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4
echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that nuclear weapons were totally
irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.
[Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that
World War III would exact: The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent . Executive
branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) a change
in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These
calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would
eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people might starve or freeze during the following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. further millions might eventually die of latent
radiation effects. [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage
[OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983]
proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant
fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of
the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from
an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report
produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a
full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear
exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have
devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be
generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be,
prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from
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option.
the spread of democracy should remain one component of a long-term vision, and
not serve as a central objective defining Americas approach to international
governance. If Americans are right about the merits of liberal democracy, it will spread of
its own accord as a consequence of its superior attributes and performance . In the meantime,
observation of the Autonomy Rule, humility about the strengths and weaknesses of the
Western way, and respect for alternative systems of government offer the most promise of
providing the favorable international conditions in which democracy will be able to demonstrate its
virtues.
A2 Heg Good
Attempts to revive American primacy alienate rising powers by
signaling the U.S. wont treat them as equal stakeholders
Kupchan, 2012 (Charles, Professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney
Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century,
Foreign Policy, February 6, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/06/it_won_t_be_an_american_century?page=full)
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China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. The World Bank predicts
that the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi will become co-equals in a "multi-currency" monetary system by 2025.
Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing countries -- Brazil, China,
India, and Russia -- to match that of the G-7 countries by 2032 . The United States will no doubt exit
the current slump and bounce back economically in the years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global
playing field is inevitable. To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for
decades to come. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made amply clear, though, military primacy hardly
ensures effective influence. And with the U.S. defense budget poised to shrink in the service
of restoring the country's fiscal health, the United States will have to pick its fights carefull y.
Shrewd and judicious statecraft will be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security. To
acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not,
as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It
is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires
seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial . Adjusting
to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers . That process
is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the
aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF.
The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing. But
making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the
ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power .
Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy
may well prove to be the exception, not the rule. In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the
Persian Gulf, state-led brands of capitalism are holding their own -- and may well do so for
the foreseeable future. The Arab Spring could finally bring democratic rule to at least some countries in the
Middle East, but it is also breeding political Islam; democratization should not be mistaken for
Westernization. Even emerging powers that are already democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Turkey, are
charting their own paths. They regularly break with the United States and Europe on trade, Middle East diplomacy,
military intervention, the environment, and other issues, preferring to side with other ascending states, whether
democratic or not. Romney's paeans to American power are no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage
these complexities. Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers
bring to the table their differing conceptions of order and governance . The United States
has a key role to play in managing such diversity and channeling it toward
cooperative ends. Overheated proclamations of American preeminence, however, will do more harm than
good. If a new, consensual international order is to emerge, rising powers must be treated as
stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power. Shepherding the transition to
this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney
appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's
policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership." Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to
let his opponents hide behind the veil of American exceptionalism. Democrats no longer need to feel vulnerable on
national security; Obama has demonstrated smarts and strength on many issues, including the
degradation of al Qaeda, the pivot to Asia, and the isolation of Iran. He understands that
agile, firm diplomacy backed by American power will do much more for the United States
than congratulatory talk of American primacy. A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in the
world would not only help the United States get its own house in order, but also give rising powers the wider berth
they seek. And good policy would also be good politics; Americans are keen to share with others
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White, 13 [3/7/13, Robert E. White, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, was the United States
ambassador to Paraguay from 1977 to 1979 and to El Salvador from 1980 to 1981, After Chvez, a Chance to
Rethink Relations With Cuba, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighborsin-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all]
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with
Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, thepostwar treaty that pledged the
United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our
southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed
opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela who along with Fidel Castro of
Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western
Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the
American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a wedge with which
to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters . His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral,
Cubas current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end
it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to
the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new,
warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas . I joined the State
Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F.
Kennedys creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel
Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish
and Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic
change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall
Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions
of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even nave, but Kennedys focus on Latin America rekindled the promise
of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after
Kennedys assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and la noche mas larga the longest night began for the
proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders
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were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States
abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported
dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state,
Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran militarys responsibility for the murders of four American
churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service. The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving
the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped
expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes. After
our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND
Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the
insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to
the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest. Over the subsequent quarter-century, a
series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them,
longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which
excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chvez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States which excludes the United States and Canada as an alternative. At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United
States, Mr. Chvez said that the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of
empire. Mr. Chvez was masterful at manipulating Americas antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the
United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a
source of cheap commodities and labor. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of
these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin Americas leading statesman at the time, Luiz
Incio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally known, correctly
identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro
regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had
failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States
and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Ral Castros announcement that he will
retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American
members of the Senate Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the
potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other
examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest
merely by staying alive? The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chvez, give America a chance to
reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades . The president and his new
secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Jos
Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared
to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a
bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba
achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments. If,
however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United
States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries
like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters
of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.
Latin American relations are key to solving warming, amazon deforestation and promoting
alternative energy production
Zedillo et al, 8 [2008, Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico Thomas R.
Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n
e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas Commi ssi o n Mauricio Crdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and
Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political
Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings , Rethinking U.S.Latin American Relations A
Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america
%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.pdf]
The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the worlds climate is now well established, and the
consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity remains
unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural
yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and destructive storms in the
Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central America, the Caribbean, and the
southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of
replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructurealong with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore
rigs are damagedwill be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of energy security will require
making energy consumption more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge
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of climate change will require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbonintensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these
problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership. Latin
America has enormous potential to help meet the worlds growing thirst for energy, both in terms of
hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves.
Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazils oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if
recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential
in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more
hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States
is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and the
Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemispheres energy capacity, massive infrastructure
investments will be required. Major investments in oil productionespecially deep offshore), refining, and distribution
will be needed to achieve the regions potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70240
billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are
made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity
networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexicos. Mexico also plans to
connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central
America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and
distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel
imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of
obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in
South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the
energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and
electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior
elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized
and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners.
In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play
in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon
emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the
LAC regions future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent
of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the worlds three most important
rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is
pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.
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6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs
and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It
appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be
analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.
and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger
rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human
beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the
Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished . And if our species is very
unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war , which could extinguish civilization.""
Strong Latin American Relations is key to stop escalation in the region and solve
international security and democracy
Sabatini and Marczak, 10 [January 2010, As Senior Director of Policy, Christopher Sabatini oversees the
Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS/COA) research and publishing programs. In his capacity at the
AS/COA, he chairs the organizations working group on rule of law which recently published a report on rule of law
in the hemisphere titled Rule of Law, Economic Growth and Prosperity, which in 2008 appeared in Spanish. Dr.
Sabatini also chairs the AS/COAs Cuba Working Group. In April 2007, Dr. Sabatini created and launched the
AS/COAs policy journal, Americas Quarterly (AQ). He is now the Editor-in-Chief of AQ and oversees the AQ
website (www.americasquarterly.org) on which he has a regular blog on policy in the Americas, Jason Marczak is
director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas and senior editor of the AS/COA policy journal
Americas Quarterly, Obamas Tango, Restoring U.S. Leadership in Latin America,
http://www.unc.edu/world/2010Seminars/LANC%20reading%202.pdf]
Since he took office, U.S. President Barack Obama has articulated a policy toward Latin America that is centered on
the idea of partnership. As he said last April, there would be no senior or junior partner to this new engagement. The United States,
in other words, would be but one actor on the regional stage, not its director. But recent crises -- from the coup in
Honduras to simmering tensions in the Andes -- have revealed a fundamental weakness in the Obama administrations nascent
Latin America policy. Without strong U.S. leadership, partnership in the Americas risks inertia or, even worse, an
escalation of tensions on many of the hemispheres critical issues, such as transnational crime, democracy, and
security. Although some countries -- including Brazil and Chile -- have been willing to take on diplomatic responsibilities
commensurate with their economic status, they remain averse to conflict with neighbors, even to the point of
willfully downplaying existing disagreements. Such an approach may have served Latin American governments well in the past, when
a unified front helped to push issues such as debt relief and alternative thinking on antinarcotics policy. But the failure of any one country
to assume a larger regional profile especially with regards to protecting norms and security -- has allowed
problems to fester.
Canada
possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.
Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable
divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic
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and economic interests, and so on were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central
American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region .
Analysts at the time worried that in a worst case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central
America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United
States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena a concern
expressed by the director of research for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament
could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led
Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the
1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020.
Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with
expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable
development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by
country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in
this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will
compromise progress elsewhere in the world.
Extinction
Diamond 95 - Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In
the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs
intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian
regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these
new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The
experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to
threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they
offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to
their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international
treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in
secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law,
democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
Argentina or Brazil could have global ramifications. So would a political confrontation in oil-rich Venezuela and or
an intensification of the armed conflict in Colombia. Greater regional integration and political cooperation could
benefit all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, as they have in Europe. But the United States and Latin
America have demonstrated neither the will nor the ability to travel that road together.
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become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an
economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military
presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries
about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external
powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type
of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle
East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an
unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The
close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable
Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an
impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight
times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading
to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge,
particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed
energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result
in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential
for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important
geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as
Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns
inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could
lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational
cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation
to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a
more dog-eat-dog world.
Uniqueness
Relations Low
US-Latin American Relations are low
Lehmann, 5/30 [5/30/13, Catalina Lehmann is a reporter for Talk News Radio Service, Officials: Obama Has
Yet To Improve U.S.-Latin America Relations, http://www.talkradionews.com/us/2013/05/30/officials-obama-hasyet-to-improve-u-s-latin-america-relations.html#.Udnf9jvqn80]
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Latin America, particularly South America, has experienced unprecedented political change in the past 15 years said
officials who discussed the issue during a briefing held by the Center for Economic Policy and Research . The briefing
analyzed how the Obama administration has responded to the regions leftward shifting of political dynamics. In the past, during the Bush
administration, efforts were made to isolate and suppress left-leaning political movements in Latin America, said the
officials. When President George W. Bush attended the Summit of the Americas in Argentina, his lecture was received with protests against his
administrations polices. When President Barak Obama attended the Summit in Columbia, he spoke about the need for
equal partnerships and a new chapter of engagement with the countries that make up Latin America. Leaders
such as President Hugo Chavez had a new sense of hope instilled after President Obamas remarks , said CEPR CoDirector Mark Weisbrot. When Latin Americas left presidents watched the campaign of Barack Obama for president in 2008, they thought
that they might finally see a U.S. president who would change Washingtons foreign policy in the region, said
Weisbrot. However, panelists claimed that up to this point in time, little has been done to improve U.S.-Latin
America relations. The Obama administration, like that of President Bush, does not accept that the region has
changed, Weisbrot stated. That goal is to get rid of all of the left-of-center governments, partly because they tend to be
more independent from Washington.
Solvency
Embargo Key
Removing the embargo sends strong signal to the rest of Latin America- now is the key
time
Trani, 6/23 [6/23/13, Eugene P. Trani is president emeritus and University Distinguished Professor at Virginia
Commonwealth University, Trani: End the embargo on Cuba, http://www.timesdispatch.com/opinion/theiropinion/columnists-blogs/guest-columnists/end-the-embargo-on-cuba/article_ba3e522f-8861-5f3c-bee9000dffff8ce7.html]
My own trip to Cuba reinforced the call for such actions. We spent four days visiting with many different kinds of
groups in Havana, community projects, senior citizens, a health clinic, youth programs, artist and recording facilities, musical ensembles,
historic sites such as Revolution Square and the Ernest Hemingway house and an environmental training facility, and not once did we hear
anger toward the United States or the American people.What we heard was puzzlement about the embargo and strong feelings that
it was hurting the people of Cuba. In fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the absolute poverty rate has increased significantly in Cuba. It
was also evident that there is visible decline in major infrastructure areas such as housing. Today, there seem to be both humanitarian
and economic factors, particularly with the significant growth of the non-governmental section of the economy that
could factor in a change in American policy. There is also a major diplomatic factor in that no other major country,
including our allies, follows our policy. What a positive statement for American foreign policy in Latin America
and throughout the world it would be for the United States to end its embargo and establish normal
diplomatic relations with Cuba. We would be taking both a humanitarian course of action and making a smart
diplomatic gesture. The time is right and all our policy makers need is courage to bring about this change.
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Lifting the embargo reverses Latin American dissent- Cuba will cooperate
Sweig, 13 [July/August 2013, Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America
Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are
Transforming the Island, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991]
The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift
on Cuba. For five years now, Obama has ignored Latin America's unanimous disapproval of Washington's position
on Cuba. Rather than perpetuate Havana's diplomatic isolation, U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era,
contributing to Washington's own marginalization. Virtually all countries in the region have refused to attend another
Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table. Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American
and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington. The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a
serious second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration
in the Americas. But the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively
lead U.S.Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its
Cuba policy. To make such a shift, however, Washington must move past its assumption that Havana prefers an
adversarial relationship with the United States. Ral Castro has shown that he is not his brother and has availed
himself of numerous channels, public and private, to communicate to Washington that he is ready to talk . This does not
mean that he or his successors are prepared to compromise on Cuba's internal politics; indeed, what Castro is willing to put on the table remains
unclear. But his government's decisions to release more than 120 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 and allow a
number of dissident bloggers and activists to travel abroad this year were presumably meant to help set the stage for
potential talks with the United States. Meanwhile, the death of Hugo Chvez, the former Venezuelan president, and the narrow
margin in the election of his successor, Nicols Maduro, have made it clear that Havana has reasons of its own to chart a path
forward with the United States. In the last decade or so, Cuba came to depend on Venezuela for large supplies of subsidized oil,
in exchange for a sizable brigade of Cuban doctors staffing the Chvez government's social programs. Political uncertainty in Caracas
offers a potent reminder of the hazards of relying too heavily on any one partner. Havana is already beginning to
branch out. In addition to financing the refurbishing of Mariel Harbor, the Brazilians have extended a line of credit to renovate and expand five
airports across the island and have recently signed a deal to hire 6,000 Cuban doctors to fill shortages in Brazil's rural health coverage. Even
so, in the long run, the United States remains a vital natural market for Cuban products and services. Of course, as the
1990s proved, even a huge financial setback may not be enough to drive Havana to Washington's door. Half a century of U.S. economic warfare
has conditioned Cuban bureaucrats and party cadres to link openness at home or toward the United States with a threat to Cuba's independence.
Some hard-liners might prefer muddling through with the status quo to the uncertainty that could come from a wider opening of their country.
Sweig, 13 [1/25/13, Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and
Director for Latin America Studies, Talking to Cuba, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/talking-cuba/p29879]
Stripping this whole thing bare, as far as I can tell, there is really no foreign policy reason why the United States
does not have a normal, or least more natural, diplomatic and economic relationship with Cuba. In fact, there is a
serious foreign policy downside for not having that. In Latin America, we just saw the president earlier in 2012
attend the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, where there was a full court, unanimous message from the
center, center-left, right, center-right, and every single country in the region, including Washington's closest allies,
telling Washington to get it together with Havana, it is time to move forward. Take Colombia, where President [Juan
Manuel] Santos has a great relationship with Washington and with Havana, which is hosting talks between his government and the FARC [rebel
group] right now. Yet Washington keeps Havana on its terrorist list. Another moment we are living through right now:
President Hugo Chavez is very, very ill in Havana, and it seems to me that the shuttle diplomacy that is taking place
doesn't involve anybody from Washington. It involves Cubans, Venezuelans, Argentines, and Brazilians. The fact is that
with events in Venezuela, the United States is sitting on the margins of one of the biggest political moments in Latin
America, [which] runs through Havana. So there are geostrategic reasons within the region, leaving apart the
bilateral relationship, why it makes a great deal of sense for a strategy of rapprochement with Cuba.
Failing to lift the embargo now splits the hemispsheres and dooms relations forever
White, 13 [3/7/13, Robert E. White, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, was the United States
ambassador to Paraguay from 1977 to 1979 and to El Salvador from 1980 to 1981, After Chvez, a Chance to
Rethink Relations With Cuba, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighborsin-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all]
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with
Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, thepostwar treaty that pledged the
United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our
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southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed
opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela who along with Fidel Castro of
Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western
Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the
American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a wedge with which
to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters . His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral,
Cubas current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end
it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to
the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new,
warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas . I joined the State
Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F.
Kennedys creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel
Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish
and Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic
change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall
Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions
of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even nave, but Kennedys focus on Latin America rekindled the promise
of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after
Kennedys assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and la noche mas larga the longest night began for the
proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders
were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States
abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported
dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state,
Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran militarys responsibility for the murders of four American
churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service. The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving
the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped
expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes. After
our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND
Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the
insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to
the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest. Over the subsequent quarter-century, a
series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them,
longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which
excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chvez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States which excludes the United States and Canada as an alternative. At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United
States, Mr. Chvez said that the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of
empire. Mr. Chvez was masterful at manipulating Americas antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the
United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a
source of cheap commodities and labor. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of
these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin Americas leading statesman at the time, Luiz
Incio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally known, correctly
identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro
regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had
failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States
and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Ral Castros announcement that he will
retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American
members of the Senate Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the
potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other
examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest
merely by staying alive? The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chvez, give America a chance to
reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades . The president and his new
secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Jos
Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared
to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a
bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba
achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments. If,
however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United
States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries
like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters
of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.
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Fitzgerald, 12 [11/12/12, Denis Fitzgerald is reporter for the UN, UN to (Again) Call on U.S. to End Cuban
Embargo, http://untribune.com/post/35579300349/un-to-again-call-on-u-s-to-end-cuban-embargo]
The United Nations General Assembly will vote Tuesday on a resolution calling on the United States to end its 52-year embargo against Cuba,
but theres little reason to believe the outcome will alter the Obama administrations Havana policy. The U.S. bans its citizens from
travelling to or doing business in Cuba. Ending the embargo is seen as a move that could strengthen Obamas
relationship with his Latin American neighbors who are unanimously against el bloqe o. The resolution has been
approved every year since first introduced in 1990. Brazils representative said after the vote last year that the embargo went
against international law and inhibited regional relations while Argentinas said it went against the principles of
international law and the UN charter. After Mondays success in the General Assembly vote for election to the Human Rights Council,
which the U.S. topped with 131 votes in the Western Group, Tuesdays vote is likely to see the U.S in the tiniest minority when the votes are
tallied. Last year, 186 countries voted for the text while only Israel joined the U.S. in voting against it. Even Canada, normally a staunch ally of
the U.S. and Israel, voted for lifting the embargo. While President Obama has laxed some of the travel restrictions - making it easier for
students and religious groups to visit and allowing Cuban-Americans to visit Cuba as much as they want - he has renewed the trade ban
each year of his presidency. Cuba is the only country placed on the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 after
the removal of North Korea in 2008. Theres speculation that Obamas strong showing among Cuban-Americans in last weeks election
will harbor a change in policy but thats unlikely to include a lifting of the trade embargo.
Goodman, 9 [4/3/09, Joshua Goodman is a reporter for Bloomberg, Latin America to Push Obama on Cuba
Embargo at Summit (Update1), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk]
When Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of the U.S.
relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century . While Latin American leaders
split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to
Mexicos pro-business Felipe Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving
U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades. Obama, born six months before President
John F. Kennedyimposed the embargo, isnt prepared to support ending it. Instead, hell seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in
Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and
remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush. That would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception of U.S. arrogance
that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last May. All of Latin America and the Caribbean are
awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba, Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American
States, said in an interview. They value what Obama has promised, but they want more. The policy changes unveiled today also
include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses
in Cuba. Symbolically Important Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is
symbolically important to the regions leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to
Cuba and its longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and
his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the
island. Cuba represents a 50-year policy failure in Latin America and thats why its so important for Obama
to address it now, says Wayne Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the State
Departments Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. Unless Obama wants to be booed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas.
The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be unfortunate if Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead
on the economy, poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White Houses top adviser for the meeting. Obama also understands that
he cant control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders as partners, Davidow told reporters on April 6. Past Protests That should
be enough to avoid a repeat of the circus atmosphere surrounding the previous summit, held in 2005 in Argentina, when 30,000 protesters led by
Chavez and Argentine soccer legend Diego Maradona burned an effigy of Bush. Obama will also benefit from the U.S.s decision to take off the
table its earlier proposal for a free-trade area spanning the Americas, an issue that divided countries at the four previous summits starting in 1994.
Still, Obamas meeting with Chavez, who last month called the U.S. president an ignoramus when it comes to Latin America, has the potential
to generate a few sparks. To defuse the tension, Obama may say the U.S. is seeking good relations with governments across the political
spectrum, says Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based research group. Chavez, 54, joined Bolivian
President Evo Morales, an ally, in expelling the U.S. ambassadors to their countries in September for alleged interference in domestic politics.
Unpredictable Chavez The main concern at this point for the U.S. is the unpredictability of Chavez, Hakim says. U .S. influence in Latin
America waned under Bush as the war on terror diverted attention to the Middle East while the region expanded
economic and diplomatic ties with Russia, China and other outside-the-hemisphere powers . In December, Brazil
hosted the first-ever, region-wide summit of Latin American and Caribbean nations that excluded the U. S. The summit
reinforced other initiatives such as the Union of South American Nations, which was formed by 12 countries to mediate regional conflicts,
bypassing the OAS. Taking the minor step of easing travel restrictions to Cuba, a campaign pledge Obama made almost a year ago, may not
satisfy the regions increasingly assertive leaders, Julia Sweig, director of the Latin America program at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in
an interview from Washington. A Lot on the Table The Cubans are putting a lot on the table, says Sweig, the author of two books on Cuba,
including the forthcoming Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know.
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that the Bush administration has wrought on US-Latin American relations. Moreover, there is now a window
of opportunity to push through significant changes and lay the foundation for implementing Obamas vision for
renewing US leadership in the Americas. Indeed, Obamas election ushered in a welcome honeymoon period for his administration
in a region that is strategically important for US interests and the challenge was to prolong this moment and
harness it to rebuild some semblance of hemispheric cooperation. The path ahead will not be easy, but Obama has
already substantially recalibrated US-Latin America policy in the direction of engagement in small but important
ways. President Obama and members of his cabinet have frequently met with their counterparts throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
and emphasized multilateral diplomacy as the central instrument for addressing the regions concerns. The US supported a resolution
backed by Latin American countries to lift Cubas suspension from the Organization of American States, and has
stood with Latin American countries in calling for the restoration of democratic rule in Honduras. Under Obama, US
relations with Latin America appear to be on the mend, but the progress to date is fragile and by no means
irreversible. The political situation in Latin America and the Caribbean has shifted considerably in recent years and the new assertiveness of
many regional countries, especially Brazil, has created an increasingly complex situation. Although the early hopes for momentous change have
begun to dissipate, the presidency of Barack Obama still has the potential to bring about an important restructuring
of inter- American relations. In retrospect, the initial warm glow of good feelings was always destined to give way to a more pragmatic
understanding on both sides of the relationship regarding the possibilities and limits of what the US and Latin America can expect of each other.
But throughout the Americas, the desire remains that Barack Obama will be attentive and respectful to the regions concerns. The 44th president
of the United States has already pledged to keep an open mind and demonstrate a willingness to listen. The next step is to advance the
strategy of substantive, issue-oriented engagement that can sustain the goodwill that so much of the hemisphere felt
upon his election to the White House.
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well as for the downtrodden around the world. During the visit, a Cuban official stated to staff that ``U.S. foreign policy
towards Latin America goes through Cuba.'' With the end of the Cold War, however, the GOC does not represent
the security threat to the U.S. that it once did. The USG still has significant grievances with the GOC--mostly, its
human rights practices and the stifling of political pluralism and property rights as well as the lack of adequate
compensation for expropriated assets of U.S. firms and individuals. The remaining security issues, on the other hand, are limited
to the potential for a migration crisis provoked by political or economic instability on the island. While Cuba's alliance
with Venezuela has intentions of influencing regional affairs, the GOC has not been positioned to ably export its Revolution since the collapse of
the Soviet Union forced an end to Cuba's financial support for Latin American guerrilla movements. The GOC's program of medical diplomacy,
which exports doctors to developing countries, bolsters the island's soft power, but does not represent a significant threat to U.S. national security.
Given current economic challenges, any revenue gained from economic engagement with the United States
would likely be used for internal economic priorities, not international activism . For these reasons, the United
States' relationships with Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, have taken priority in Latin America. Cuba, too, has
demonstrated that relations with the United States, though advantageous, are not necessary to its survival, having
forged closer relationships around the globe. Venezuela, China, and Canada are Cuba's top three trading partners, and recent economic
agreements with Brazil and Russia are examples of Cuba's resourcefulness in this regard. As one GOC official told staff, ``We've endured much
harsher conditions during the Special Period. We can survive with or without the United States.'' \17\ In hindsight, the U.S. embargo has not
served a national security agenda since Cuba ceased to be an effective threat to the security of the United States. In the immediate post-Cold War
era, the cost of maintaining this policy was negligible in comparison to the domestic political benefit derived from satisfying Cuban-American
groups in the United States. The USG justified the embargo policy as an incentive or inducement for negotiations with the Cuban government, the
rationale being that the U.S. would lift the embargo, or parts of it, in response to reform on human rights and democracy. This narrow approach,
however, has not furthered progress in human rights or democracy in Cuba and has come at the expense of other direct and regional strategic U.S.
interests. Today it is clear that a reform of our policy would serve U.S. security and economic interests in managing
migration effectively and combating the illegal drug trade, among other interests. By seizing the initiative at the
beginning of a new U.S. Administration and at an important moment in Cuban history, the USG would relinquish a
conditional posture that has made any policy changes contingent on Havana, not Washington. Reform of U.S.Cuban relations would also benefit our regional relations. Certain Latin American leaders, whose political appeal
depends on the propagation of an array of anti-Washington grievances, would lose momentum as a centerpiece of
these grievances is removed. More significantly, Latin Americans would view U.S. engagement with Cuba as a
demonstration that the United States understands their perspectives on the history of U.S. policy in the region
and no longer insists that all of Latin America must share U.S. hostility to a 50-year-old regime. The resulting
improvement to the United States' image in the region would facilitate the advancement of U.S. interests. If reform in
U.S.-Cuba policy were to occur in the direction of sequenced engagement, the impact on the region would be swift and to the
benefit of the security and prosperity of the United States. In due order, we must correct the failures of our current
policy in a way that enhances U.S. interests.
soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin
America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would
view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American
military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on
the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors .
The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense
of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this
legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage . A good
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reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it
tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4 In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America,
the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders,
but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America . Many of the
problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations
to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image . Although
this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to
not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas
and solutions, not lectures." n5 When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms
that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and
isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy
toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [*192] in
the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments
that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the
Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its
own. n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example.
To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and
would go a long way toward creating goodwill.
how the administration, in an attempt to bolster its position as the worlds leader, has relied primarily upon soft
power to develop its ties with other countries. In light of Ral Castro2 charting a new course for Cuba, recent US policy
initiatives have been aimed at a limited engagement and an easing of tensions with Cuban leadership. While these
efforts constitute a vital first step in the transformation of US-Cuban relations, it is in Americas best interest to more
firmly extend a hand. In fact, Cuba provides President Obama an opportunity to highlight the potential benefits of
Americas foreign policy of engagement. In 2002, Cuban American scholar Louis Prez Jr. noted that the US embargo policy has been
derived from assumptions that long ago ceased to have relevance to the post-Cold War environment, designed as a response to threats that are no
longer present, against adversaries that no longer exist.3 to be sure, American policymakers have been unable to sufficiently adjust Cuba policy
to the realities of post-Cold War relations with the island. The economic embargo, which has been in place for half a century,
coupled with either diplomatic isolation or limited engagement, has failed to force democratization on the island. If
anything, it has taught that democracy cannot be imposed or coerced, but must grow from within . In this light, ending the embargo
and engaging Cuba will allow the united States to better influence a process of political reform on the island .
Conversely, as America stalls, other countries are playing a larger role in what traditionally has been considered Americas
backyard. Fortunately for American policymakers, recent and drastic shifts in the realities of US-Cuban relations show
that there is much to gain, and surprisingly little to lose, from transforming US-Cuba policy . Though for too long
domestic politics has trumped international security goals, pragmatic leaders will soon grasp the full extent of these new realities. At a time
when the United States runs a large trade deficit and holds a rising national debt, President Obamas foreign
policy of engagement could provide essential political, economic, and strategic gains for America. In order to
capitalize on these opportunities, the administration should end the embargo and open diplomatic relations
with Cuba.
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More Solvency
Birns and Mills, 13 [1/30/13, Larry Birns is the COHA Director and Frederick B. Mills is a COHA Senior
Research Fellow, BEST TIME FOR U.S. CUBA RAPPROCHEMENT IS NOW, http://www.coha.org/best-timefor-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/]
The Obama Administration should be prepared to take, in quick progression, three important initial steps to trigger a
speedy rapprochement with Cuba: immediately phase out the embargo , free the Cuban five, and remove Havana from the
spurious State Department roster of nations purportedly sponsoring terrorism. These measures should be seen as indispensable if
Washington is to ever mount a credible regional policy of mutual respect among nations and adjust to the increased
ideological diversity and independence of the Latin American and Caribbean regions. Washingtons path towards an
urgently needed rehabilitation of its hemispheric policy ought to also include consideration of Cubas own pressing
national interests. A thaw in USCuba relations would enhance existing security cooperation between the countries,
amplify trade and commercial ties, and guarantee new opportunities for citizens of both nations to build bridges of friendship
and cooperation. For this to happen, the Obama Administration would have to muster the audacity to resist the anti-Castro
lobby and their hardline allies in Congress, whose Cuba bashing has no limits. Nevertheless, it is time to replace
belligerency with dtente. This essay argues that the embargo against Cuba is blatantly counterproductive, immoral, and
anachronistic. If the initial purpose of this measure was to punish Havana for expropriating U.S. property and to bring about
fundamental political and economic reforms, Washington has had more than 50 years to see that the status quo is flawed. Over
the years, invasion, embargo, and covert psychological operations against Cuba have only served to reinforce a circle
the wagons mentality in Havana. The island also has been subject to a relentless barrage of propaganda and terrorist assaults organized
by militant anti-Castro zealots to advance their cause. These attacks include the 1997 bombing of three hotels in Havana which resulted in the
death of Italian tourist Fabio Di Celmo, and the deadly 1976 downing of a Cuban civilian jet. Rather than succumbing to pressure, all
of these incidents have given the majority of Cuban nationals good reason to raise defensive barricades in the face of
repeated threats to the survival of their homeland. Besides being counter-productive, there are also strong moral
arguments for ending the embargo. From a utilitarian point of view, the policy is objectionable because it has brought
about needless suffering without convincing evidence of praiseworthy results. One illustration of this is what happened during
what Havana calls the special period in time of peace. This refers to the economic crisis, hydrocarbon energy shortages, and
food insecurity that followed the collapse of Soviet Bloc (1989 1991) which was Cubas main trading partner and the
source of vital subsidies. The embargo took an especially harsh toll during the special period. According to a 1997 report
Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact of the Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba by The American Association for
World Health: the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of
ordinary Cuban citizens. The report also observed that the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and
even deaths-in Cuba. The special period, including a serious food shortage in 1993, did not lead to the countrys
surrender, but to the decisive restructuring of the agricultural sector, a number of economic reforms, and the
diversification of trade. A more recent report by Human Rights Watch also points to the needless suffering caused by the embargo: The
United States economic embargo on Cuba, in place for more than half a century, continues to impose indiscriminate
hardship on Cubans, and has failed to improve human rights in the country. (2012 Report on Cuba) The embargo, then, has
harmed those whom it purportedly meant to benefitthe average Cuban. A benevolent foreign policy towards Cuba would
collaterally seek to benefit the Cuban people, not bring hunger, hardship, and in some cases death to an innocent
civilian population. Since it is unlikely that the majority of Cubans would willingly impose such adversity on themselves or their kith and kin
for over fifty years, such a punitive and coercive measure fails another important test of moral acceptability. In addition to being counterproductive and immoral, U.S. policy towards Havana is also anachronistic. During the excesses of the cold war, the U.S.
sought to use harsh and unforgiving measures to isolate Cuba from its neighbors in order to limit the influence of the
Cuban revolution on a variety of insurgencies being waged in the region. That narrative did not sufficiently recognize the
homegrown causes of insurgency in the hemisphere. Some argue that it inadvertently drove Cuba further into the Soviet camp . Ironically, at
the present juncture of world history, the embargo is in some ways isolating the U.S. rather than Cuba . Washington is
often viewed as implementing a regional policy that is defenseless and without a compass. At the last Summit of the
Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, member states, with the exception of Washington, made it clear that they unanimously want
Cuba to participate in the next plenary meeting or the gathering will be shut down. There are new regional organizations,
such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), that now include Cuba and exclude the U.S. Not even
Americas closest allies support the embargo. Instead, over the years, leaders in NATO and the OECD member nations have visited
Cuba and, in some cases, allocated lines of credit to the regime. So it was no surprise that in November of 2012, the United Nations General
Assembly voted overwhelmingly (188 3), for the 21st year in a row, against the US embargo. Finally, while a slim majority of Cuban
Americans still favor the measure, changing demographics are eroding and outdating this support. As famed Cuban
Researcher, Wayne Smith, the director of the Latin America Rights & Security: Cuba Project, at the Center for International Policy, points
out, There are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba
(Washington Post, Nov. 9, 2012).
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Much will depend on the threats and opportunities to national and sectoral interests generated by the changing
situation on the Island.
Normalizing relations improves Relations and gives Credibility to Obama and Kerry
Rausnitz, 6/13 [6/13/13, Zach Rausnitz is an Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets,
Cuba's inclusion on State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists say,
http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/cubas-inclusion-state-sponsors-terrorism-list-bad-us-panelistssay/2013-06-13]
Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the
United States in leaving it there, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11.
Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust which the Obama administration claimed
it wanted to overcome," said Toms Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study Group, which promotes human
rights and the rule of law in Cuba. But the country could undergo some reform in the coming years, and the continued
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inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity" to influence changes,
Bilbao said. Cuba's inclusion on the list also costs the United States credibility and drains some of the meaning from
designating a country as a state sponsor of terrorism, said Robert Muse, a Cuba expert who also spoke on the panel. He called the
refusal to de-list Cuba "arbitrary and capricious." But while designating a country for the list requires evidence, keeping it there "requires little
more than a lack of political will to de-list it," Bilbao said. And the burden is on those who favor improved relations with Cuba to show officials
that it's worth the backlash that will come from certain anti-Cuba lawmakers, Muse added. The panelists voiced optimism that
President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry might see improved U.S.-Cuba relations as a significant
accomplishment to add to their legacies. No other administration has been able to normalize relations with
Cuba in the past 50 years, and doing so could improve relationships between the United States and other
Latin American countries, Bilbao said. Muse said Kerry had relatively few concrete achievements from his time as a
senator and might want to be remembered for opening up the U.S. relationship with Cuba much in the same way former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger changed the relationship with China during the Nixon administration.
Keeping Cuba on the terror list destroys our cred on the issue
Metzker, 6/13 [6/13/13, Jared Metzker is a reporter at the Inter Press Service News Agency, Pressure Building
for U.S. to Remove Cuba from Terror Sponsor List, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/pressure-building-for-u-s-toremove-cuba-from-terror-sponsor-list/]
Both Muse and Bilbao concluded that Cubas continued presence on the State Departments terrorism list arises less
from these shaky legal justifications than from political calculations. Others have arrived at similar conclusions for years. In
2002, a former advisor to President Bill Clinton suggested that maintaining Cuba on the list keeps happy a certain part of
the voting public in Florida a politically important state with a large Cuban exile population and it doesnt cost anything.
Muse disagreed with the latter part of that statement, however. He noted that by behaving arbitrarily in what should
be a strictly legal matter, the United States was damaging its credibility on the issue of international terrorism and
diminishing its seriousness of purpose in using the term terrorism in a meaningful manner.
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Impacts
Relations Good---Laundry Lists/Misc
Relations are key to solve a laundry list of existential threats---the brink is now
Shifter 12 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. Remaking the Relationship: The United States
and Latin America, April, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf
There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties. Every
country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved
access to each others markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems,
the United States $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and
technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the regions economic performance. For its part,
Latin Americas rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States
economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by
more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and
human rights. With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of
the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership Despite the
multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If
new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation
persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require
urgent attentionboth from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.
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promote U.S. objectives of fostering stability, prosperity, and democracy throughout the hemisphere.
Latin American relations are key to solving warming, amazon deforestation and promoting
alternative energy production
Zedillo et al, 8 [2008, Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico Thomas R.
Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n
e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas Commi ssi o n Mauricio Crdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and
Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political
Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings , Rethinking U.S.Latin American Relations A
Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america
%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.pdf]
The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the worlds climate is now well established, and the
consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity remains
unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural
yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and destructive storms in the
Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central America, the Caribbean, and the
southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of
replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructurealong with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore
rigs are damagedwill be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of energy security will require
making energy consumption more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge
of climate change will require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbonintensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these
problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership. Latin
America has enormous potential to help meet the worlds growing thirst for energy, both in terms of
hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves.
Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazils oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if
recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential
in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more
hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States
is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and the
Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemispheres energy capacity, massive infrastructure
investments will be required. Major investments in oil productionespecially deep offshore), refining, and distribution
will be needed to achieve the regions potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70240
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billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are
made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity
networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexicos. Mexico also plans to
connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central
America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and
distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel
imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of
obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in
South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the
energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and
electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior
elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized
and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners.
In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play
in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon
emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the
LAC regions future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent
of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the worlds three most important
rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is
pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.
US-Latin American Relations key to Democracy, Climate change, alternative energies, and
S&T
Bitar, 11 [September 2011, Sergio Bitar, a long-time member and now non-resident senior fellow of the InterAmerican Dialogue. Bitar served as senator as well as minister of energy and mines, education, and public works
under three separate administrations in Chile, Latin America and the United States: Looking Towards 2020,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/LAtheUS2020.pdf]
New opportunities for US-Latin America Relations: Which Partnerships? To prepare new partnerships it is
important to have in mind the three processes already reviewed: prevailing global trends, US government policies
and the status of the US economy, and priorities that Latin American governments are ready to carry out. The United
States faces years of constraints. It will have to devote greater resources to preserving the competitive and technological edge that is critical to
maintaining its influence. It is likely that Latin Americaespecially South Americawill continue to multiply its exchanges with Asia over the
next five years. Rates of investment and the expansion of the middle class in China, India, and other middle-income countries will drive global
growth through expanded domestic consumption. Latin America will account for a larger share of the demand for products than industrialized
countries. In this global context, the United States will be closely following events in Latin Americaas a market, an energy supplier, and a
region with which it shares problems and opportunities. Most US attention will focus on Mexico and Brazil, albeit for different reasons and with
different emphases. Mexican markets, oil resources, and migrants have a strong impact in the United States. Mexico and the United States need
to work closely together in combating drugs and organized crime. Brazil will draw high levels of US attention because of its rising global role,
expanding market, industrial progress, and the production of oil, food and biofuels. Immigration will continue to be necessary for the
United States to sustain its growth. Negative aspects of immigration tend to grab the spotlight, but the fact remains
that Latin American immigrants make a major contribution to the US economy. A recent report5 projects that the US
population will increase from 310 million in 2010 to 370 million in 2030, half of it as a result of immigration. This would make the United
States the only industrialized country to have population growth through 2030. Leaving aside Brazil and Mexicowhose size
will make them increasingly important actorsthe rest of the countries should cooperate and coordinate with one another
more effectively to have some influence on global political and economic trends . The expanding role of Brazil and Mexico
is guaranteed by their sheer size. But smaller Latin American countries must seek closer cooperation and coordination to
enhance their influence. Each will take the initiative and seek mutually beneficial arrangements with the United
States. As a start, three areas are worth pursuing: democracy strengthening; energy and climate change; and
education, science, and technology. Democracy Strengthening a) In Central America, collaboration could bolster the
fight against organized crime, improve citizen security, and strengthen democratic institutions. The United States has
proposed a Central America Citizen Security Partnership. High levels of drug consumption and arms sales to countries south of the border give
the United States a special responsibility in this regard. Mexico and Colombia can also make an important contribution, while South America
can cooperate in security, crime investigation, police training, and other initiatives. b) South American nations should get more
involved in providing assistance to Haiti. c) The region should also offer support to help facilitate a transition to
democracy in Cuba. Despite the steps taken by the Obama administration regarding visits and remittances, the ineffective US
embargo continues with no end in sight. For Latin Americans, it will be important to have conditions in place for a peaceful
transition when Cuban leadership changes. It is helpful to encourage some processes underway in Cuba, such as the release of political
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prisoners, improved freedom of expression, and economic reforms, which could pave the way for a democratic opening. Energy and
Climate Change Although President Obama has spoken about an Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, its content, priorities,
goals, and resources remain unclear. a) There are opportunities for collaboration in developing renewable energy sources,
especially solar, and assisting with nuclear plant safety and ethanol, cleaner coal, and natural gas research. b)
Partnership with the United States could also help Latin America reduce CO2 emissions, protect tropical and
temperate forests, and safeguard glaciers and water resources. Latin America abounds in natural resources and must
take measures to protect them. c) Climate change and increasing concentration of the population will intensify the
impact of natural disasters. Emergency preparedness requires effective institutions, first responder training, equipment
acquisition, public education, and improved land use and construction standards. Latin American countries can take the initiative in these areas.
Education, Science, and Technology Education, science, and technology help increase productivity and drive
growth. Collaboration in these areas could focus on goods and services, with an emphasis on the use of information
and communications technology. Latin American countries should propose innovative initiatives and explore areas
of potential agreement, including: a) President Obamas only quantitative proposal was to increase the number of US graduate students
studying in Latin America to 100,000 and the number of Latin Americans studying in the United States to 100,000. To date, Asia has taken better
advantage than Latin America of the academic excellence offered by US universities. New proposals designed to stimulate and fund these
exchanges are needed. Chiles 2008 Becas Chile student aid program is a good example with much potential. b) Joint research in areas of
importance to Latin America should be expanded. These include renewable energy, especially solar, biotechnology, and collaboration between
Latin American and US businesses and research centers. A Rand Corporation report6 identifies 16 technology applications that will
change living conditions in this decade and notes that some Latin American countries will be able to adopt them if
they carry out certain policies and make a sustained effort. And it is important to remember that proficiency in English is an
essential tool in a knowledge-based society. c) With respect to trade, the United States should move to eliminate barriers and open
its market to Latin American products, especially foods. If WTO talks remain deadlocked, free trade agreements
between the United States and Latin America should be expanded. There are serious political obstacles given the concern that
such an approach would result in less employment in the United States. A more open global economy helps small and mediumsized countries whose development depends on exporting goods and services with increasing value-added. The 24
references to partner and partnership in President Obamas Santiago speech should not remain empty talk. While some may interpret
Obamas logic of partnership as a sign of disinterest, I believe it reflects the new reality within which the United States will
have to function. It falls to all Latin Americans to take a more active role in pursuing opportunities and demanding
that the United States make a firm commitment to its proposed new partnerships. Are Latin Americans prepared for this? Is
there enough will in the United States to seek such partnerships? It is worth making a serious effort to see if this can work.
Relations are mutually beneficial to both sides- democracy, energy production, drugs,
crime and stability
Hakim, 06 [January/February 2006, Peter Hakim is the President of the Inter-American Dialogue, Is
Washington Losing Latin America?, http://www.chileconsult.com/Is_Washington_Losing_Latin_America.pdf]
So far, Washington's tattered relations with Latin America have mainly translated into a series of lost opportunities
for both sides. At a time when the Bush administration needs partners and allies across the globe, the United States and its
international agenda are discredited in Latin America. Democratic progress is faltering in the region, in large part
because of the dismal economic and social performance in country after country. The United States still has a big
market in Latin America, with U.S. exports to the region valued at more than $150 billion a year, almost as much as the value of its exports
to the European Union. But two-thirds of that goes to Mexico, while Brazil and other South American markets remain relatively untapped in the
absence of more productive hemispheric trade arrangements. The burgeoning Hispanic population in the United States is already providing
important new links to countries throughout Latin America, but its potential contribution is constrained by Washington's muddled and unworkable
immigration rules. U.S. interests in the region are endangered in other ways, too. Oil and natural gas supplies from
politically troubled Venezuela and other energy-rich Andean nations are less secure than ever. Several small and
weak states in the Caribbean and Latin America are at risk of becoming permanent centers of drug activity, money
laundering, and other criminal operations. Stability is threatened by the upsurge of crime and violence almost
everywhere in Latin America. The United States could end up paying a stiff price for the region's economic reversals and unsettled
politics. Unfortunately, there are few prospects for a turnaround in U.S.-Latin American relations anytime
soon.
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nations of the hemisphere. Latin American countries, divided among themselves, are by no means clamoring for a renewal of hemispheric
cooperation. Chvez's antics at the Summit of the Americas in November 2005 obscured the real tragedies of the gathering -- that is, how little the
leaders accomplished, how badly the hemispheric agenda has unraveled, and how deeply divided the countries of the Americas are. Despite
enthusiasm in the region for economic partnership, Latin Americans' fundamental ambivalence toward the United States' foreign policies has
forcefully reemerged. The costs of this impasse may be high for both the United States and Latin America. Another financial crisis in
Argentina or Brazil could have global ramifications. So would a political confrontation in oil-rich Venezuela and or
an intensification of the armed conflict in Colombia. Greater regional integration and political cooperation could
benefit all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, as they have in Europe. But the United States and Latin
America have demonstrated neither the will nor the ability to travel that road together.
Latin American Cooperation key to regional security and controlling migration and drug
flow
Noreiga, 08 [January 2008, Roger Noreiga is a visting fellow for American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, The Americas and the 2008 Elections: Ideas for Renewed Engagement,
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Noriega_LatAm_Policy_Paper.pdf]
We should embrace willing partners in Chile and Uruguay, up through the Andes and Central America, and into North
America, including those countries with which we already have trade agreements . However, free trade agreements are not the
only tools for breaking down barriers to commerce, integrating economies and empowering entrepreneurs. The United States should look
at its previous efforts in North America to expand its partnerships with Canada and Mexico beyond NAFTA, such as the Security
and Prosperity Partnership for North America, and deploy similar programs in the rest of the hemisphere . Furthermore, trade facilitation
agreements can serve as multilateral roadmaps that countries can follow to retool their economies to stimulate
broad-based growth within national economies as well as among them. We must also find ways to facilitate trade and
investment with Colombia in the months ahead, even if we must do so without a trade accord. Our words and deeds should emphasize that the
first and last goal of free market policies is to propel sound microeconomic reforms to attack the structural poverty in which 200 million of our
neighbors live today. The United States should encourage reforms to make it easier to start a small- or medium-sized enterprise or access credit so
that individuals can improve their own lot in life rather than have to rely on corrupt and inefficient governments. Eventually, government will
catch up, but poor people should not be expected to wait. We should work with our neighbors to identify best practices for educating at-risk
youth, helping the poor, and retraining workers displaced by trade agreements. Mexico's housing credit initiative and Brazil's "Bolsa Famlia" (a
stipend for families) are examples of home-grown initiatives that help the poor help themselves.11 At the same time, the small island
states of the Caribbean also deserve special attention. While Chvez has offered aid in the form of subsidized oil
loans (which saddle these most indebted states with even more debt), the United States has a real opportunity to play a
constructive role in the Caribbean. A new administration could help forge an agreement that combines permanent
preferential access to markets for goods and services with political and technical support for economic and political
integration among its small island states. We could reverse the "brain drain" by mobilizing the Caribbean diaspora to expand its vital
but scarce middle-management corps and incentivize trade and investment among the small but growing economies of the Caribbean basin. Such
an international plan might encompass the Caribbean states plus the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Central America and others with an
interest in the sub-region. Promoting stability of these small states will enhance their ability to work together (and with
us) to control migration and drug trafficking. Our cooperation should have a security component: transnational
cooperation and information-sharing to attack drug syndicates and gangs that operate with virtual impunity across
borders. We should reinforce existing international programs to strengthen the capacity of governments to attack the acute threat of
gang violence and to cooperate with one another in an integrated strategy to bust up the drug-trafficking organizations that produce,
transport and distribute deadly drugs in our countries.
Latin America key to US economic competiveness (and a bunch of other impact stuff)
Noriega, 12 [10/22/12, Roger Noriega is a Mexican-American, visiting fellow at the conservative think tank
American Enterprise Institute. He has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latinamerica-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/]
A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. However, the US economic
and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and
undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other
economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the United States is not the only partner to choose from
with Chinas influence growing. The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to
restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth . The
security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking,
transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuelas petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a
daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement, assessing and addressing threats is an
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indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership . Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and
Trade Integration An aggressive trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in todays hypercompetitive
globalized economy are imperatives. Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their
economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since 2003, an estimated 73
million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than
30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the regions one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years,
regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for
US business. Already the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the worlds crude oil, one-third of the worlds natural gas,
nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development
of renewable energy technologies. Three of the United States top four foreign sources of energy are in the
Americas. The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities.
relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized,
relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild
vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attentionboth from the United States and from Latin
America and the Caribbean
Strong Latin American Relations is key to stop escalation in the region and solve
international security and democracy
Sabatini and Marczak, 10 [January 2010, As Senior Director of Policy, Christopher Sabatini oversees the
Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS/COA) research and publishing programs. In his capacity at the
AS/COA, he chairs the organizations working group on rule of law which recently published a report on rule of law
in the hemisphere titled Rule of Law, Economic Growth and Prosperity, which in 2008 appeared in Spanish. Dr.
Sabatini also chairs the AS/COAs Cuba Working Group. In April 2007, Dr. Sabatini created and launched the
AS/COAs policy journal, Americas Quarterly (AQ). He is now the Editor-in-Chief of AQ and oversees the AQ
website (www.americasquarterly.org) on which he has a regular blog on policy in the Americas, Jason Marczak is
director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas and senior editor of the AS/COA policy journal
Americas Quarterly, Obamas Tango, Restoring U.S. Leadership in Latin America,
http://www.unc.edu/world/2010Seminars/LANC%20reading%202.pdf]
Since he took office, U.S. President Barack Obama has articulated a policy toward Latin America that is centered on
the idea of partnership. As he said last April, there would be no senior or junior partner to this new engagement. The United States,
in other words, would be but one actor on the regional stage, not its director. But recent crises -- from the coup in
Honduras to simmering tensions in the Andes -- have revealed a fundamental weakness in the Obama administrations nascent
Latin America policy. Without strong U.S. leadership, partnership in the Americas risks inertia or, even worse, an
escalation of tensions on many of the hemispheres critical issues, such as transnational crime, democracy, and
security. Although some countries -- including Brazil and Chile -- have been willing to take on diplomatic responsibilities
commensurate with their economic status, they remain averse to conflict with neighbors, even to the point of
willfully downplaying existing disagreements. Such an approach may have served Latin American governments well in the past, when
a unified front helped to push issues such as debt relief and alternative thinking on antinarcotics policy. But the failure of any one country
to assume a larger regional profile -- especially with regards to protecting norms and security -- has allowed
problems to fester.
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Canada
possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.
Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable
divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic
and economic interests, and so on were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central
American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region .
Analysts at the time worried that in a worst case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central
America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United
States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena a concern
expressed by the director of research for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament
could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led
Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
competitiveness, accelerating innovation, achieving energy security and expanding U.S. exports all require robust
engagement with Latin America. She said the regions combined economies grew 6 percent in 2010, and called the expansion good
news for the people of Latin America as well as for the United States. Growth in Latin American markets will benefit American workers and
companies more than growth anywhere else in the world. Its the power of proximity geographic proximity, and also the proximity of our
global economic interests, she said. Clinton said strengthening U.S.Latin American economic relations benefits the
people of every country involved and leads to the rise of capable partners who can help us accomplish our
strategic objectives, from fighting climate change to improving security. She commended Mexico for its crucial contribution
to the fight against climate change through its remarkable leadership of the Cancn Climate Summit in 2010. Obamas second stop will be in
Chile, where he will emphasize our fundamental values and shared commitment to democracy and point to the
importance of Latin Americas broad commitment to democratic development, Clinton said. Clinton commended the
regions commitment to democratic progress. Latin America has undergone a profound democratic transformation, and now
it can be a model and even a mentor for those fighting to create and protect democracy everywhere, she said.
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Amherst, where she held tenure and was associate professor. She is currently an adjunct associate professor at
Georgetown University and teaches courses in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Health in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Engagement, http://csis.org/publication/healthlatin-america-and-caribbean]
The United States geographic proximity to Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as its extensive trade,
migration, and border relationships with countries in the hemisphere, make addressing health issues in the
Americas a matter of national interest. Challenges include the persistence of high maternal and infant mortality rates; diarrheal
and respiratory diseases; and vaccine-preventable infections in some countries, along with the emergence of noncommunicable
chronic diseases as an increasing cause of disability and death among aging populations across the region. Drug
resistant infectious agents; an inadequate food and drug safety system; and the emigration of health personnel undermine the
regions efforts to promote disease surveillance and prepare for emergencies. By updating its foreign assistance health priorities for
Latin America and the Caribbean; expanding technical cooperation activities; and working with host countries,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other partners to reach underserved communities, the United States can
better promote health, security, development, and good will in the region.
Cuba Advantage
1AC
Cuba---1AC
Cuban growth is low- reforms fail
Tamayo, 7/1 [7/1/13, Juan O. Tamayo is a reporter for the Miami Herald, Cuban economy stalls despite
government reforms, http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/07/01/3004326/cuban-economy-stalls-despitegovernment.html]
Cuba said Monday that its economy will grow by no more than 3 percent this year, about the same as in 2012 but far
short of the 3.6 percent goal and another indication that President Raul Castro's reforms are generating little new
economic activity. Castro, nevertheless, seemed pleased with the reports on his reforms submitted Friday to a meeting of the Council of
Ministers and detailed in a story Monday in Granma, the official newspaper of the ruling Communist Party. "We continue advancing and the
results can be seen. We are moving at a faster pace than can be imagined by those who criticize our supposed slow pace and ignore the difficulties
that we face," he was quoted as saying at the meeting. Since succeeding older brother Fidel in 2008 , Castro has allowed more private
enterprise and cut state payrolls and subsidies. But many economists have dismissed his reforms as too slow and
too weak to rescue Cuba's Soviet-style economy.
Cuban Stability is key to prevent drug trade and terrorism- plan solves
Ashby, 3/29 [3/29/13, Dr. Timothy Ashby is Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The Importance of Trading with
State-Owned Enterprises, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/]
Cuba under Ral Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted
within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of
residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased
to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for
most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the gradual transfer of key roles to new generations, President Ral Castro
announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time
of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy
makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process.
The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban
economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid . This could bring social chaos, especially
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among the islands disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and
regional security. To maintain Cubas social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United
States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and
state-owned. The collapse of Cubas tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring
countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to
tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today,
the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: Avoid one or more mass migrations;
Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; Prevent Cuba from
becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; Avoid Cuba becoming a state with
ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2] All
of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.
act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons
between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the
place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early
1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an
especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event
of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be
brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist
groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as
well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered
that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any
responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction
given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny
fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the
efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively,
if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully
responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the
United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list
consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely
ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of
existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these
major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring
would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they
were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might
well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the
United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator
or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the
possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and
confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the
countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning
runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions
might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial
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response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear)
retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the
identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for
their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but
perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action
resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all
things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of
advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nucleararmed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a
nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would
work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is
less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against
groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply
underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group,
increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in
Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were
placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to
use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of
avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially
heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state
actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system,
to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to
dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear
weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to
contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads
and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In
response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation
against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias use
of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would
Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind,
would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear
terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond
in kind? The phrase how dare they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as
to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of
nuclear restraint. Nuclear Terrorism Against Smaller Nuclear Powers There is also the question of what lesser powers in the international
system might do in response to a terrorist attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in sympathy or support of their attacked
colleague. Moreover, if these countries are themselves nuclear armed, additional possibilities for a wider catastrophe may lie here as well. For
example, if in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, a nuclear armed ally such as Israel might possess special information
about the group believed to be responsible and be willing and able to take the action required to punish that group. If its action involved threats
of the use of nuclear force, or the use of nuclear force itself (perhaps against a country Israel believed to be harboring the nuclear terrorists), how
might other nuclear armed countries react? Might some other nuclear powers demand that the United States rein in its friend, and suggest a
catastrophic outcome should this restraint not take place? Or would they wait long enough to ask the question? Alternatively, what if some
states used the nuclear terrorist attack on another country to justify a majorand perhaps even nuclearattack on other terrorist groups on the
grounds that it was now clear that it was too dangerous to allow these groups to exist when they might very well also be planning similar
nuclear action? (Just as Al Qaedas attacks on 9/11 raised some of the threat assessments of other terrorist groups, the same and more might
occur if any terrorist group had used a nuclear weapon,) If a nuclear armed third party took things into its own hands and decided that the time
for decisive action had now come, how might this action affect the nuclear peace between states? But it needs to be realized that a catalytic
exchange is not only possible if the terrorists have exploded a nuclear device on one of the established nuclear weapons states, including and
especially the United States. A catalytic nuclear war might also be initiated by a nuclear terrorist attack on a country that possesses a nuclear
arsenal of a more modest scale, and which is geographically much closer to the group concerned. For example, if a South Asian terrorist group
exploded a nuclear device in India, it is very difcult to see how major suspicions could not be raised in that country (and elsewhere) that
Pakistan was somehow involvedeither as a direct aider and abetter of the terrorists (including the provision of the bomb to them) or as at the
very least a passive and careless harborer of the groups perpetrating the act. In a study that seeks to reduce overall fears of nuclear terrorism,
Frost nonetheless observes that if one of the nuclear powers in South Asia was thought to be behind a terrorist
nuclear attack in the region, the risks of the incident escalating into a full nuclear exchange would be high. 43
Kapur is equally denite on this score, observing that if a nuclear detonation occurred within India, the attack would be undoubtedly blamed
on Pakistan, with potentially catastrophic results. 44
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days are over. Fidel Castro is gone, his brother Raul has loosened restrictions on Cuban citizens operating and
owning businesses and more-freely travelling to the United States. Raul Castro has said that this term in office will be his last.
The Cuban Embargo is an antiquated law that seems more like an adolescent grudge than an effort to protect the
United States national security. Cuba is a non-threatening, impoverished nation whose citizens lives have been
maliciously affected by an archaic embargo. Cuba has not been a legitimate danger to the United States for decades,
yet it remains one of the four countries that the State Department lists as State Sponsors of Terrorism along with Iran, Sudan and Syria. In this
era of hyper acuity concerning terrorism, Cuba is never mentioned. Every year since 1992, the United Nations has voted in favor of the U.S.
lifting its embargo against Cuba. In 2012, the vote was held again and passed 183-3 in favor of lifting the embargo. The UN Secretary Generals
office provided a report on Cuba that stated, The economic damage accumulated [by the embargo] over more than 50 years,
until 2011, amounted to one trillion, six billion dollars. The report added that the blockade [was] one of the
main causes of Cubas economic problems and the major obstacle to its economic and social development.
The embargo against Cuba is an outdated remnant of the Cold War and shows an inconsistency of American political
doctrine towards other nations. One of Americas leading trade partners is China a communist country that is riddled with environmental
and human rights violations. As a purported shining light of world liberties and freedom, the United States image is
tarnished by the treatment of an island nation that threatened our shores when President Barack Obama was three
years old. Every American ally except Israel supports and trades with Cuba, making the United States look like the petulant child
of world politics. The issues that caused the embargo were relevant and pressing in 1960 but no longer hold up.
The embargo against Cuba is no longer warranted.
Cuban instability causes Caribbean instability, democratic backsliding, and refugee flows
Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC
CRISIS? 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)
Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cubas problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In
addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants
of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of
order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current
government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period,
which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S.
maintains the wait and see approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this
chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number
could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative
containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drugtrafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cubas actions have
shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs 7.5 tons in
1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of
drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the
Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If
there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation
and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to
operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout
the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct
attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding
throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to
Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater antiAmerican sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political
support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these
exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be
flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the CubanAmerican community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity
for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what
happens then? The
U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the
not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis
management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These
present state of world affairs, does
warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is
justifiable concern that Africa
and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure.
North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China
resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be
the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or
many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo
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and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or
should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?
anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.
Solvency/Embargo Key
Embargo Bad---Cuban Economy/Stability
Embargo undermines Cuban economy and stability
Griswold, 05 [10/12/05, Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,
Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba, http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/fourdecades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba]
Its centrally planned economic system has turned Cuba into one of Latin Americas poorest nations and kept 11
million people from enjoying the fruits of private property, free enterprise, and global trade. As much as anyone here
tonight, I look forward to that day when the people of Cuba step into the sunlight of liberty. A Half-Century of Failure The real dividing line in
U.S. policy toward Cuba is how best to undermine the Castro regime and hasten the islands day of liberation. For almost half a century, the
U.S. government has tried to isolate Cuba economically in an effort to undermine the regime and deprive it of
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resources. Since 1960, Americans have been barred from trading with, investing in, or traveling to Cuba. The embargo had a national
security rationale before 1991, when Castro served as the Soviet Unions proxy in the Western Hemisphere. But all that changed with the
fall of Soviet communism. Today, more than a decade after losing billions in annual economic aid from its former
sponsor, Cuba is only a poor and dysfunctional nation of 11 million that poses no threat to American or regional
security. A 1998 report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that, Cuba does not pose a significant military threat to the U.S. or
to other countries in the region. The report declared Cubas military forces residual and defensive. Some officials in the Bush administration
have charged that Castros government may be supporting terrorists abroad, but the evidence is pretty shaky. And even if true, maintaining
a comprehensive trade embargo would be a blunt and ineffective lever for change. As a foreign policy tool, the
embargo actually enhances Castros standing by giving him a handy excuse for the failures of his homegrown
Caribbean socialism. He can rail for hours about the suffering the embargo inflicts on Cubans, even though the damage done by his domestic
policies is far worse. If the embargo were lifted, the Cuban people would be a bit less deprived and Castro would have
no one else to blame for the shortages and stagnation that will persist without real market reforms. If the goal of U.S.
policy toward Cuba is to help its people achieve freedom and a better life, the economic embargo has completely
failed. Its economic effect is to make the people of Cuba worse off by depriving them of lower-cost food and other
goods that could be bought from the United States. It means less independence for Cuban workers and
entrepreneurs, who could be earning dollars from American tourists and fueling private-sector growth . Meanwhile,
Castro and his ruling elite enjoy a comfortable, insulated lifestyle by extracting any meager surplus produced by their captive subjects. Lost
Opportunities for Americans Cuban families are not the only victims of the embargo. Many of the dollars Cubans could earn from
U.S. tourists would come back to the United States to buy American products, especially farm good s. In 2000, Congress
approved a modest opening of the embargo. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 allows cash-only sales to Cuba of
U.S. farm products and medical supplies. The results of this opening have been quite amazing. Since 2000, total sales of farm products to Cuba
have increased from virtually zero to $380 million last year. From dead last in U.S. farm export markets, Cuba ranked 25th last year out of 228
countries in total purchases of U.S. farm products. Cuba is now the fifth largest export market in Latin America for U.S. farm
exports. American farmers sold more to Cuba last year than to Brazil. Our leading exports to Cuba are meat and poultry, rice, wheat, corn, and
soybeans. The American Farm Bureau estimates that Cuba could eventually become a $1 billion agricultural export market for products of U.S.
farmers and ranchers. The embargo stifles another $250 million in potential annual exports of fertilizer, herbicides,
pesticides and tractors. According to a study by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the embargo costs
American firms a total of $700 million to $1.2 billion per year. Farmers in Texas and neighboring states are among the biggest
potential winners. One study by Texas A&M University estimated that Texas ranks fifth among states in potential farm exports to Cuba, with rice,
poultry, beef and fertilizer the top exports. Compounding our Failures Despite the success of our farm exports, U.S. policy toward Cuba
has if anything been sliding backwards. In 1996, Congress mistakenly raised the embargo to a new level with passage of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Known as the Helms-Burton act, it threatens to punish foreign-based companies that allegedly engage in
the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime. The law is legally flawed because it allows U.S. courts to rule on actions
of parties who were not U.S. citizens and were not in the United States when the alleged offense took place. As a foreign-policy tool, the
law perversely punishes, not the Castro regime itself, but some of our closest commercial allies such as Canada and
the European Union. The Bush administration has compounded our failed policies by turning the screws even tighter on travel to Cuba. The
administration has dramatically ramped up the number of Americans cited for violating the travel ban compared to the Clinton administration.
Among the people caught in the governments dragnet have been a 75-year-old retired schoolteacher from Wisconsin who was fined $1,000 for a
bicycle tour through rural Cuba, and man from Washington state who was fined for taking his fathers ashes to Cuba, where the family had served
as Assembly of God missionaries in the 1950s. Double Standard on Sanctions Economic sanctions rarely work. Trade and investment sanctions
against Burma, Iran, and North Korea have failed to change the behavior of any of those oppressive regimes; sanctions have only deepened the
deprivation of the very people we are trying to help. Our research at the Cato Institute confirms that trade and globalization till
the soil for democracy. Nations open to trade are more likely to be democracies where human rights are respected.
Trade and the development it creates give people tools of communication-cell phones, satellite TV, fax machines, the
Internet-that tend to undermine oppressive authority. Trade not only increases the flow of goods and services but
also of people and ideas. Development also creates a larger middle class that is usually the backbone of democracy. President Bush seems
to understand this powerful connection between trade and democracy when he talks about China or the Middle East. In a speech on trade early in
his first term, the president noted that trade was about more than raising incomes. Trade creates the habits of freedom, the president said, and
those habits begin to create the expectations of democracy and demands for better democratic institutions. Societies that open to commerce
across their borders are more open to democracy within their borders. And for those of us who care about values and believe in valuesnot just
American values, but universal values that promote human dignitytrade is a good way to do that. The president has rightly opposed efforts in
Congress to impose trade sanctions against China because of its poor human rights record. In sheer numbers, the Chinese government has jailed
and killed far more political and religious dissenters than has the Cuban government. And China is arguably more of a national security concern
today than Castros pathetic little workers paradise. Yet China has become our third largest trading partner while we maintain a blanket embargo
on commercial relations with Cuba. President Bush understands that economic engagement with China offers the best hope for encouraging
human rights and political reforms in that country, yet he has failed to apply that same, sound thinking to Cuba. In fact, the Venezuelan
government of Hugo Chavez is doing more to undermine Americas national interest today than either Cuba or China. Chavez shares Castros
hatred for democratic capitalism, but unlike Castro he has the resources and money to spread his influence in the hemisphere. Chavez is not only
bankrolling Cuba with discounted oil but he is also supporting anti-Americans movements in Nicaragua and other countries in our neighborhood.
Yet we buy billions of dollars of oil a year from Venezuelas state oil company, we allow huge Venezuelan investments in our own energy sector,
and Americanslast time I checkedcan travel freely to Venezuela. The one big difference between Venezuela and Cuba is that we dont have
half a million politically active Venezuelan exiles living in a swing state like Ohio. This is not an argument for an embargo against Venezuela, but
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for greater coherence in U.S. foreign policy. In
our policy toward Cuba. The most powerful force for change in Cuba will not be more sanctions, but more daily
interaction with free people bearing dollars and new ideas. How many decades does the U.S. government need to
bang its head against a wall before it changes a failed policy?
Embargo creates stability in cuba and is key to national and regional security
Ashby, 3/29 [3/29/13, Dr. Timothy Ashby is Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The Importance of Trading with
State-Owned Enterprises, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/]
The complete dismantling of the Cuban economic embargo will undoubtedly require congressional legislation;
however, the president has broad powers to modify policy towards Cuba, particularly in an emergency situation that
could affect U.S. national security. [15] For example, imports of Cuban origin goods are prohibited under the Cuban Asset Control
Regulations (CACRS) except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions,
licenses or otherwise. [16] Such authority could allow the president to argue for the modification of 31 C.F.R. 204s
complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods by stating that Cuban exports to the United States help
the Cuban people by creating employment and thereby maintaining the islands social stability . Considering the
domestic political constituency and the political obduracy of U.S. Congress, a more realistic presidential rationale for allowing
Cuban imports from all types of enterprises could be the protection of U.S. borders during an era of grave concerns
about homeland security. Some policy analysts suggest that bilateral trade with Cuba should be restricted to businesses and individuals
engaged in certifiably independent (i.e. non-state) economic activity. [17] While well-intentioned, such a policy would likely have
a negligible impact on Cubas economic development and fails to recognize that commercial enterprises that the
U.S. government would classify as SOEs are actually co-ops or other types of quasi-independent entities that are in
the early stages of privatization. Restrictions such as this also fail to address larger national and regional security
concerns which are the primary responsibility of the president. Although ultimately the Cuban people must freely choose their
own political and economic systems, President Obama should be seen as having legal authority to support the transition
taking place on the island by opening U.S. markets to Cuban imports. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the
Cuban people and help to provide economic and social stability that is in turn vital to U.S. national and
regional security. Such trade must include both the islands small, yet growing, private sector and State-Owned
Enterprises. In this regard, it would be both unfair and strategically unwise to treat Cuba differently from its stated models, China and Vietnam.
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changes within its macroeconomic policy framework, with numerous liberalization measures. This paper will
attempt to analyze the socio-economic implications of lifting the United States embargo on Cuba, particularly in the
area of maintaining Cubas wide-spread social welfare programs such as free education and health care. I provide
several measures in order for the island to maintain these programs, as well as the promotion of economic stability in conjunction
with open market policies and exchange rate adjustments.
Keeping the embargo in place gaurentees human rights abuse- lifting the embargo gives
way to reform
Bandow, 12 [12/11/12, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to
former US president Ronald Reagan, Time to End the Cuba Embargo,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo]
The regime remains a humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime
jailed a State Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in C uba. But Havana is not the only
regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is virtually impossible for outsiders to
force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such
programs, mostly to little effect. The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power. Indeed, it has
consistently used the embargo to justify its own mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. O bserved Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton: It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization
with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasnt happened in Cuba in the last 50 years. Similarly, Cuban exile
Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group argued that keeping the embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is
strengthen and embolden the hardliners. Cuban human rights activists also generally oppose sanctions. A decade ago I
(legally) visited Havana, where I met Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, who suffered in communist prisons for eight years. H e told me that the
sanctions policy gives the government a good alibi to justify the failure of the totalitarian model in Cuba. Indeed,
it is only by posing as an opponent of Yanqui Imperialism that Fidel Castro has achieved an international reputation. If he had
been ignored by Washington, he never would have been anything other than an obscure authoritarian windbag. Unfortunately, embargo
supporters never let reality get in the way of their arguments. In 1994, John Sweeney of the Heritage Foundation declared
that the embargo remains the only effective instrument available to the U.S. government in trying to force the
economic and democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over three decades. Maintaining the
embargo will help end the Castro regime more quickly. The latters collapse, he wrote, is more likely in the near term than ever
before. Almost two decades later, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, retains faith in the embargo:
The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered. One of the best definitions of insanity
is continuing to do the same thing while expecting to achieve different results. The embargo survives largely because of Floridas political
importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine States electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant
voting bloc. But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is
coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in
policy. And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba. Support for the Republican
Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving
little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States. Barack
Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without
Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically. Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican
vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the
years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably
justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for
Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo. There is essentially
no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to explore improving relations with
Havana. Spains Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move
forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba. The administration should move now, before congressmen are
focused on the next election. President Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen)
the embargo. He also could use his authority to relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses to visit the island. Ending the
embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S. International
Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2 billion annually .
Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic reform. So far the
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regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting more Americans into Cuban society could help
undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castros decline, Cuban politics remains largely static.
restrictions (impossibility to renegotiate the external debt, interdiction of access to the dollar, unfavourable impact of
the variation of the exchange rates on trade, "risk-country", additional cost of financing due to US opposition to the
integration of Cuba into the international financial institutions); v) the pernicious effects of the incentive to emigration,
including illegal emigration (loss of human resources and talents generated by the Cuban educational system); vi) social damages affecting the
population (concerning food, health, education, culture, sport). 5. If it affects negatively all the sectors3 , the embargo directly impedes
- besides the exportations - the driving forces of the Cuban economic recovery, at the top of which are tourism,
foreign direct investments (FDI) and currency transfers. Many European subsidiaries of US firms had recently to break off
negotiations for the management of hotels, because their lawyers anticipated that the contracts would be sanctioned under the provisions of the
"Helms-Burton law". In addition, the buy-out by US groups of European cruising societies, which moored their vessels in Cuba, cancelled the
projects in 2002-03. The obstacles imposed by the United States, in violation of the Chicago Convention on civil aviation, to the sale or the rental
of planes, to the supply of kerosene and to access to new technologies (e-reservation, radio-localization), will lead to a loss of 150 million dollars
in 2003. The impact on the FDI is also very unfavourable. The institutes of promotion of FDI in Cuba received more
than 500 projects of cooperation from US companies, but none of them could be realized - not even in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry, where Cuba has a very attractive potenti al. The transfer of currencies from
the United States is limited (less than 100 dollars a month per family) and some European banks had to restrain their commitment under the
pressure of the US which let them know that indemnities would be required if the credits were maintained. In Cuba, the embargo
penalizes the activities of the bank and finance, insurance, petrol, chemical products, construction, infrastructures
and transports, shipyard, agriculture and fishing, electronics and computing, but also for the export sector s (where
the US property prevailed before 1959), such as those of sugar, whose recovery is impeded by the interdiction of access to the
fist international stock exchange of raw materials (New York), of nickel, tobacco, rum.
until 2011, amounted to one trillion, six billion dollars. The report added that the blockade [was] one of the
main causes of Cubas economic problems and the major obstacle to its economic and social development.
The embargo against Cuba is an outdated remnant of the Cold War and shows an inconsistency of American political
doctrine towards other nations. One of Americas leading trade partners is China a communist country that is riddled with environmental
and human rights violations. As a purported shining light of world liberties and freedom, the United States image is
tarnished by the treatment of an island nation that threatened our shores when President Barack Obama was three
years old. Every American ally except Israel supports and trades with Cuba, making the United States look like the petulant child
of world politics. The issues that caused the embargo were relevant and pressing in 1960 but no longer hold up.
The embargo against Cuba is no longer warranted.
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US
economic embargo are long overdue. The embargo has been a failure by every measure. It has not changed the
course or nature of the Cuban government. It has not liberated a single Cuban citizen. In fact, the embargo has made
the Cuban people a bit more impoverished, without making them one bit more free. At the same time, it has deprived
Americans of their freedom to travel and has cost US farmers and other producers billions of dollars of potential
exports. Congress and President Barack Obama should act now to lift the embargo to allow more travel and farm exports to Cuba. As a tool
of US foreign policy, the embargo actually enhances the Castro governments standing by giving it a handy excuse
for the failures of the islands Caribbean-style socialism. Brothers Fidel and Raul can rail for hours about the suffering the
embargo inflicts on Cubans, even though the damage done by their communist policies has been far worse. The
embargo has failed to give us an ounce of extra leverage over what happens in Havana. In 2000, Congress approved a modest opening of the
embargo. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act allows cash-only sales to Cuba of US farm products and medical supplies.
The results of this modest opening have been quite amazing. Since 2000, total sales of farm products to Cuba have increased from virtually zero
to $691m in 2008. The top US exports by value are corn, meat and poultry, wheat and soybeans. From dead last, Cuba is now the number six
customer in Latin America for US agricultural products. Last year, American farmers sold more to the 11.5 million people who live in Cuba than
to the 200 million people in Brazil. According to the US international trade commission, US farm exports would increase another $250m if
restrictions were lifted on export financing. This should not be interpreted as a call for export-import bank subsidies. Trade with Cuba
must be entirely commercial and market driven. Lifting the embargo should not mean that US taxpayers
must now subsidise exports to Cuba. But neither should the government stand in the way. USITC estimates do not
capture the long-term export potential to Cuba from normalised relations. The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and
Guatemala spend an average of 2.8% of their GDP to buy farm exports from the US. If Cuba spent the same share of its GDP on US farm
exports, exports could more than double the current level, to $1.5bn a year. Advocates of the embargo argue that
trading with Cuba will only put dollars into the coffers of the Castro regime. And its true that the government in Havana,
because it controls the economy, can skim off a large share of the remittances and tourist dollars spent in Cuba. But of course , selling more
US products to Cuba would quickly relieve the Castro regime of those same dollars. If more US tourists were
permitted to visit Cuba, and at the same time US exports to Cuba were further liberalised, the US economy could
reclaim dollars from the Castro regime as fast as the regime could acquire them. In effect, the exchange would be of
agricultural products for tourism services, a kind of bread for beaches, food for fun trade relationship . Meanwhile, the increase in
Americans visiting Cuba would dramatically increase contact between Cubans and Americans. The unique US-Cuban
relationship that flourished before Castro could be renewed, which would increase US influence and potentially hasten the
decline of the communist regime. Congress and President Barack Obama should act now to lift the embargo to allow more travel and
farm exports to Cuba. Expanding our freedom to travel to, trade with and invest in Cuba would make Americans better
off and would help the Cuban people and speed the day when they can enjoy the freedom they deserve.
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him a handy excuse for the manifest failures of his oppressive communist system. He can rail for hours about the suffering
the embargo inflicts on Cubans, even though the damage done by his domestic policies is far worse. If the embargo were lifted, the
Cuban people would be a bit less deprived and Castro would have no one else to blame for the shortages and
stagnation that will persist without real market reforms.Congress mistakenly raised the embargo to a new level in 1996 with the
passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Known as the Helms-Burton act, it threatens to punish foreign-based companies
alleged to engage in the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime. The law is legally flawed because it allows U.S.
courts to rule on actions of parties who were not U.S. citizens when the alleged offense took place. As a foreign-policy tool, the law perversely
punishes not the Castro regime itself, but some of our closest allies, such as Canada and the European Union. Economic sanctions rarely
work. Trade and investment sanctions against Burma, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have failed to change the behavior
of any of those oppressive regimes; sanctions have only deepened the deprivation of the very people we are trying to
help. President George W. Bush and Republican leaders in Congress understand that economic engagement with China offers
the best hope for encouraging human rights and political reforms in that country, yet they fail to apply that same
thinking to Cuba.
Impacts
Cuban Stability Impacts---Misc
Cuban Stability is key to prevent drug trade, terrorism, and increased tensions
Ashby, 3/29 [3/29/13, Dr. Timothy Ashby is Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The Importance of Trading with
State-Owned Enterprises, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/, We do not endorse
Ableist Language]
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Cuba under Ral Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted
within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of
residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased
to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for
most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the gradual transfer of key roles to new generations, President Ral Castro
announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time
of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy
makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the
process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional
Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid . This could bring social chaos,
especially among the islands disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S.
national and regional security. To maintain Cubas social and economic stability while reforms are maturing,
the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both
private and state-owned. The collapse of Cubas tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and
neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy
which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental
patients.
Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: Avoid one or more mass
migrations; Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; Prevent
Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade ; Avoid Cuba becoming a state
with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States . [2]
All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.
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1AC (China)
Chinese and Russian engagement in Latin America have allowed
them to take over the American sphere of influence, engaging Cuba
is key to reverse the trend
Llana , 2012 (Sara, staff writer for Christian Science Monitor news service, 50 years after Cuba missile
crisis, US influence in hemisphere waning, 10/14/2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning)
It was not only the containment of communism that drove US attempts to oust Fidel Castro from the helm of Cuba
in the early 1960s, says Mr. Brenner. The US was also concerned about Latin American countries emulating Cuba,
particularly its geopolitical stance in the cold war, and thus undermining American leadership in the Western
Hemisphere. Some 50 years later, the US faces the same situation, just a more modern
iteration. What the US feared the most in 1962 has come to pass, says Brenner, who wrote "Sad and Luminous
Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis." We were concerned about our sphere of
influence that we had taken for granted. [Today] we cannot dominate this region
anymore. They do not look to us for leadership. Countries look within the region, and to some extent to
Cuba still. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US turned its attention from Latin America as it
focused on terrorism and threats from the Middle East. At the same time, over the past decade Latin
American democracy has flourished and the global economy shifted, with Latin America no longer
looking just north to the US for leadership and investment, but to India, China,
and Russia. China surpassed the US as Brazils biggest trading partner in 2009. Most of
these relationships are economic in nature among emerging economies. If Russia, for example,
once eyed Cuba to buoy its political project close to the American border, today it is inking energy
deals and selling arms in Latin America because it finds willing partners and purchasers there. Russia is
going to sell all kinds of arms to Venezuela, not because [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chvez is saying
he is socialist. Its because he has money to pay for it, says Alex Sanchez, a senior research fellow at the Council
on Hemispheric Affairs. The flurry of investment in countries ranging from Venezuela to Bolivia
helps to further undermine US global dominance in the region, a scenario that many
leaders welcome today. Chief among them is Mr. Chvez, who just won another six-year term in office, and his allies
including President Evo Morales in Bolivia and President Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Indeed, the anniversary of
the Cuban missile crisis will likely provide an opportunity for the extreme left in Latin
America to express support for Cuba, says Johns Hopkins Latin American expert Riordan Roett. They
will be in solidarity about the survival of the Castro brothers, Mr. Roett says. 'A linchpin' in the region That kind of
defiance showing respect for a nation that for so long the US has considered a thorn in its side would have been
unthinkable 50 years ago. Before the Cuban missile crisis, after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the US
pressured Latin American countries to suspend Cubas membership from the Organization of
American States (OAS). At the same time, Cuba signed onto the nonaligned movement, and Brenner says it was
that move that the US feared other countries in Latin America might follow. At the time, US thinking on the
movement was, you are with us or you are against us. The politics surrounding Cuba at the OAS
highlights the declining influence of the US in the region. Fifty years ago, the US advocated Cubas
suspension and was successful; but during the groups summit in April, leaders across political spectrums said they
would question attending another summit without Cuba at the table. This comes from [Colombian President Juan
Manuel] Santos, our most loyal ally in the region," says Brenner. " Cuba was once the pariah state; it
The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russ ias
and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States - CUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade
partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past
decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba
discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban
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infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a
sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of
leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the
newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of
natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence
signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an
important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China.
A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year
old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be
the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize
Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is
vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba
would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a
beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in
Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over
sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the
traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone!
[4] Re-establishing normal relations with Cuba is a win-win situation and we should not allow inflexibility in our
foreign policy to stand in the way. The road is clear, Soviet and then Russian domination in Cuba was a massive
violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a geostrategic mistake of Kennedy not to forcibly remove Castro at the time. It
is then no question that allowing the Chinese to supplant the Russians, (who now have a weak presence in Cuba in
any case) needs to be stopped. In conjunction with the LUKO DOCTRINE (containing global Chinese expansion) [5]
America needs to take the OFFENSIVE for a good DEFENSE of our close perimeter security- CUBA.
of hard
and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported
military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American
citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3
One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and
governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors. The key to soft power is not simply a
strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected
across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a
reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and
image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S.
when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4 In order to effectively employ soft
power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and
reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the
important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing
Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation .
Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and
repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin
America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the
region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5 When analyzing
ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small
size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability . Cuba, despite its size and
Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For
fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus
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and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair
America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own . n8 In
short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow
our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating
effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.
test." But now the tables have turned,
Scenario 1 is hegemony
An American resurgence now is key to prevent China from using
Latin America as a hegemonic powerplay
Hilton, 2013 (Isabel, a London-based writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The
Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?,
NOREF,
http://peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf)
The United States is Latin Americas traditional hegemonic power, but Chinas influence in
the region is large and growing. How far does Chinas presence in the U.S. backyard
represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin
American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured
goods. The impact of Chinas activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries
local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese
demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the
regions infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development
and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards .
Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and
diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic
activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and
Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather
than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have
repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its
own East Asian backyard.
Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy
and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an
international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel
constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is
rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is
among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century bc the great Greek historian
Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple
observation that the wars deepest, truest cause was the growth of Athenian power and the
fear which this caused in Sparta. The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply
no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers : Since the end of the Cold
War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is,
by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still
number one, but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get,
and the potential for conflict particularly fraught. At least insofar as the dominant powers are
concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nations capabilities grow, its leaders
generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over
what is going on around them. This means that, taking steps to ensure those in ascendance typically
attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them access to markets,
materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and
allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their
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As they begin to assert themselves,
ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries,
international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were
rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world.
still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn of the twentieth, rising
powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the
established great powersthe so-called status quo stateswho are the architects, principal
beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system . The resulting clash
of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully . Recognizing
the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to
attack and destroy a competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Othershoping to avoid war
have taken the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to satisfy their
demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing international order. But however
sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the
demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitlers Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions that are so
extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning themselves to
servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less
onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling
the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and
triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory but in
practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a
new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so
often been marked by war.
Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the
hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success
in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track
to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to
establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal
American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate
with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis . Such an entity would present
a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very active American
intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating the underlying conditions for a massive,
and probably nuclear, great power war. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on
American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the
role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of
a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.
Nobody doubts the resource potential they all hold, but turning that into money needs major
capital and technological skills, most of which sits with international oil companies rather than national
entities farming out work to service companies on the cheap. Like it or not, IOCs still have lucrative (some would
say larger) unconventional oil and gas plays they can go for in North America, Russia, East Africa, Australasia and
even distinctly conventional MENA and Caspian regions. The Americas is now a nice to have location in
their portfolios, not a make or break region for corporate survival. Ironically Chavez
understands that, which is why the vast bulk of his hydrocarbon investment over that past
five years has all come from China. In ball-park terms, Beijing has sunk $40bn into Caracas
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coffers, mostly as loan for oil agreements. Thats been very good news for the likes of China
Petrochemical Corp and CNPC, with China receiving around 640,000b/d from Venezuela (200,000 barrels of
which services the debt), but whether thats really in Venezuelan interests rather than selling
most its oil on open markets is at best, dubious. Given Chinas vast capital, its not surprising
that theyre now a key player in the Venezuelan market, or that theyre following up with
similar investments in Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia . But selling oil into Asia is one thing, letting
China own the entire value chain from Latin American fields to Chinese ports is clearly a
less wise proposition. It merely adds to the list of Chavez resource blunders, and looks an
increasingly likely trap for other Americas producers to fall into. Raking in (cheap) Renminbi for chimerical output
gains will favour Beijing in the long run, especially if China controls the taps with oil deliveries
merely paying down debt. No matter what the wager, its simply not a plausible model for the Americas
However, Chinese economic expansion for resources floods the Latin American markets
and is massively detrimental to their economies
Kelly, 2011 (Annie, writer on global development, human rights and social affairs for the Guardian and Observer, Who really benefits
from China's trade with Latin America?, 2/16/2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/feb/16/china-latinamerica-trade-benefit)
In the past decade, Latin America has taken great strides in lifting millions out of poverty. Yet in a continent with the
most unequal income distribution in the world, and where, according to UN figures, 189 million people still live on
less than $2 a day (about 34% of the population), who is really benefiting from the Chinese economic boom?
Instead of working towards better wealth distribution, a 2004 report by the Latin America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific
Economics and Business Association warned that Chinese expansion could actually have a detrimental impact on the
vulnerability and exclusion of the poor from economic activity. It argued that China's expansion into the region has
been fuelled by the need for agricultural and extractive resources energy oil reserves, iron ore, copper and soy
mostly non-labour intensive products that are unlikely to have a big positive impact on the poor. In fact, the report
concludes that the most vulnerable could have been negatively affected as a result of the Chinese-led expansion. The
soy industry is a case in point. While China has helped South America's soybean industries expand their access to
global markets, few benefits have gone to rural communities. Despite rising production, employment and wages
have decreased with the proliferation of high-volume monoculture farming. For example, while Brazilian soy
production quadrupled between 1995 and 2009, employment in the sector actually shrank. Soy production has also
been linked to the deforestation of 528,000 sq km of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest. A research project backed by
the Institute of Development Studies and the British Academy is looking into the links between Chinese business in
Latin America and the knock-on impact on poor communities. Researchers in Peru have found that Chinese
companies running state or private enterprises have little meaningful or positive engagement with local communities
or labour organisations. Neil Renwick, a university professor of global security at Coventry University, is one of the
researchers leading the project. He says that Beijing's approach in Latin America is indicative of its domestic
approach to development. "In many ways, the Chinese approach [in Latin America] reflects the high price the
[Chinese] people have paid for development, for example, with regard to poverty, inequality, corruption or the
environment," he says. China's determination to take advantage of the spending power of Latin America's emerging
middle classes through flooding local markets with cheap Chinese goods could also affect the growth of domestic
manufacturing, often vital to growing local employment and income opportunities and to reducing poverty.
Empirics prove -Latin American economic crises lead to massive instability and regime
change
Brower and Carothers, 2009 (Julia, junior fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Thomas, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this capacity, he oversees the
Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Program, and Carnegie Europe, Will the International Economic Crisis Undermine
Struggling Democracies?, The Carnegie Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/economic_crisis_political_change_2.pdf)
Economic crises can magnify the destabilizing political impact of all of these factors (Pei and Adesnik 2000).
Deciding on an appropriate policy response to economic crisis can be an intensely divisive process for ruling elites.
Economic crises can also prove a useful mobilization tool for segments of the population that already have
grievances with the regime. Haggard and Kaufmans (1995) examination of the political effects of the debt crisis in
Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s illustrates how these factors can interact with an economic crisis to
trigger regime change. The debt crisis exacerbated existing schisms within the ruling elites of many authoritarian
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countries by undermining the basis of these regimes legitimacy and stimulating the defection many business elites
from the ruling coalition who questioned the regimes ability to cope with the crises. Combined with increased
popular protest as opposition movements used the deteriorating economic conditions to recruit new followers, the
debt crisis helped prompt softliners within these regimes to conclude that the costs of further coercion outweighed
the benefits of such coercion and to look for a way to negotiate their withdrawal. The presence of moderate
opposition movements solidified the decision of softliners to negotiate, since presumably these movements would
agree to more favorable terms for the outgoing regime.
Latin American instability creates a breeding ground for the drug trade
Ellis, 2004 (R. Evan.,professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The Impact of Instability
in Latin America, http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2003/proceed/PAPERS/119.pdf)
The growing disorder in the nations of the Andean ridge highlights a dangerous new phenomenon with significant
national security implications for the United States: Criminal organizations and armed groups in the region have
fallen into new forms of collaboration that allow them to finance their own operations without reliance on outside aid and its associated
strings. The military and self-financing activities of groups, in turn, creates dynamics that ultimately could break down the economic and
sociopolitical fabric of the countries in which they operate. As illustrated by the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia, these
organizations leverage the weakness of the states in which they operate to survive and grow. Their activities are
financed, in part, by taxing or directly engaging in criminal activity such as narcotrafficking, embezzlement, and extortion [11]. These
criminal enterprises, in turn, leverage a unique combination of global commerce and information flows and the compromised character of the
institutions within their own country. In short, criminal organizations conduct operations involving global shipments of
narcotics and other goods, leveraging international banking, the international transportation infrastructure, and the
ability to purchase specialized human expertise for certain operations on global markets [12]. At the same time, the criminal activities depend
on safe havens that they have created within compromised states to conduct key stages of their operationssuch as money laundering and
narcotics production. Within their compromised societies, criminal organizations have enormous manpower needs, both to perform the daily
physical labor required by their operations and to provide protection from the state (and from rivals) for their activities. Armed groups on
both the left and right serve the interests of criminal enterprises by physically protecting them in exchange for
revenue. This loose partnership between criminal organizations and armed political groups thus generates
capabilities and promulgates incidents that contribute to the weakness of the statethus sustaining the space in which criminal activity
can take place [13]. Both criminal organizations and armed groups thus are nourished byand systematically destroy
the socioeconomic fabric of the state in which they grow. As the host state weakens, the activities of these
organizations also infects and destabilizes neighboring states through flows of guerillas and refugees, and the violence and
human suffering associated with them. Although a great deal has been written about narcotrafficking, the spread of insurgency, and
socioeconomic problems in Latin America [14], the current confluence of events is new and different with respect to the
way in which multiple phenomenon reinforce each other to produce a potential escalating spiral of violence
and economic malaise in the region. The individual perpetratorssuch as drug cartels, terrorist cells, and insurgent
groupsmay not be coordinated, yet the combination of their individual goal-directed actions produces
systemic effects that could ultimately destabilize the region and undercut the basis for U.S. global power .
The drug trade funds Hezbollah and Iranthese funds lead to Iranian prolif
McCaul, 2012 (Michael, Rep. A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST
BORDER: MAJORITY REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-theSand.pdf)
Hezbollah remains especially active in the TBA. 25 With an estimated $12 billion a year in illegal commerce, the TBA
is the center of the largest underground economy in the Western Hemisphere.26 Financial crimes are a specialty of the area and include
intellectual property fraud, counterfeiting, money laundering and smuggling. Moreover, lax customs enforcement in the area allows these crimes
to continue largely unabated from one country to the other.27 The TBA has been described as one of the most lucrative sources
of revenue for Hezbollah outside of state sponsorship.28 The evidence to suggest Hezbollah is actively involved in
the trafficking of South American cocaine to fund its operations is mounting as well. In 2008, U.S. and Colombian
authorities dismantled a cocainesmuggling and money-laundering organization that allegedly helped fund Hezbollah
operations. Dubbed Operation Titan, the enforcement effort uncovered a money laundering operation that is suspected of laundering hundreds of
millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds a year and paying 12 percent of those profits to Hezbollah.29 Operation Titan has led to more than 130
arrests and the seizure of $23 million.30 One of those arrests was of Chekri Mahmoud Harb (also known as Taliban or Tali) who is a
Lebanese national suspected of being a kingpin of the operation. In 2010, Harb pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine knowing the drugs would ultimately be smuggled into the United States.31 In another example, the Treasury
Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed Ayman Junior Joumaa, a Lebanese national and Hezbollah supporter, as a
Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker based upon his involvement in the transportation, distribution and sale of multi-ton shipments of
cocaine from South America along with the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds from Europe and the Middle
East.32 Federal prosecutors in Virginia also charged Joumaa for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and money laundering charges. The indictment
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alleges Joumaa shipped thousands of kilograms of Colombian cocaine to the United States via Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. Specifically
mentioned in the indictment was 85,000 kilograms of cocaine that was sold to the Los Zetas drug cartel from 2005 to 2007.33 The indictment
further substantiates the established relationship between Hezbollah, a proxy for Iran, and Mexican drug cartels, which control secured smuggling
routes into the United States. This nexus potentially provides Iranian operatives with undetected access into the United States. Joumaa allegedly
laundered in excess of $250 million of cocaine proceeds from sales in the United States, Mexico, Central America, West Africa and Europe.
Joumaa would typically receive these proceeds in Mexico as bulk cash deliveries. Once the proceeds were laundered, they would be paid out in
Venezuelan or Colombian currency to the cocaine suppliers in Colombia. Joumaas fee for laundering the currency would vary from eight to 14
percent.34 A recent civil complaint filed by the U.S. Department of Justice states that Joumaa relied heavily upon the Lebanese Canadian Bank
(LCB) and the Lebanese exchange houses Hassan Ayash Exchange Company (Hassan) and Ellissa Holding (Ellissa) to conduct the money
laundering operation described above.35 The complaint also alleges these businesses partnered with Hezbollah in various other money laundering
schemes. One such scheme involved LCB allowing Hezbollah-related entities to conduct transactions as large as $260,000 per day without
disclosing any information about the transaction.36 According to the 2011 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the Barakat
Network in the TBA is another example of drug money being funneled to Hezbollah. Although the total amount of money
being sent to Hezbollah is difficult to determine, the Barakat Network provided, and perhaps still provides, a sizeable amount of the
money sent annually from the TBA to finance Hezbollah and its operations around the world. Another scheme that took place from
2007 to early 2011 involved LCB, Hassan and Ellissa transferring at least $329 million of illicit proceeds to the United States for the purchase of
used cars through 30 car dealerships that typically had no assets other than the bank accounts which received the overseas wire transfers. Once in
receipt of the wired funds, these dealerships would purchase used vehicles and ship them to West Africa to be sold. The cash proceeds would then
make their way to Lebanon under the security of Hezbollah and its illegitimate money transfer systems.37 Hezbollah has also involved
itself in the trafficking of weapons, which fuels the violence so intrinsic to drug trafficking and terrorism in Latin
America. On July 6, 2009, Jamal Yousef, also known as Talal Hassan Ghantou, was indicted in New York City on federal narco-terrorism
conspiracy charges. According to the unsealed indictment, Yousef is a former member of the Syrian military and an international arms trafficker
who was attempting to make a weapons-forcocaine deal with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia or FARC).38 What Yousef did not know was that he was actually negotiating with an undercover operative of the Drug Enforcement
Administration who was posing as a representative of the FARC. Yousef had agreed to provide the FARC military-grade weapons that included
100 AR-15 and 100 M-16 assault rifles, 10 M-60 machine guns, C-4 explosives, 2,500 hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades. In exchange
for the weapons, the FARC was to deliver 938 kilograms of cocaine to Yousef.39 While negotiations progressed, Yousef stated that the weapons
had been stolen from Iraq and were being stored in Mexico by Yousefs cousin who is an active member of Hezbollah. To establish their bona
fides for the trade, Yousefs cousin videotaped the weapons cache on location in Mexico. Towards the completion of the transaction, it was
learned that the weapons cache was actually larger than had been first reported. The deal was amended to include the additional weapons in
exchange for 7,000 to 8,000 more kilograms of cocaine that would be delivered to the coast of Honduras.40 The transaction was never
completed because Yousef was arrested and imprisoned in Honduras on separate charges beforehand. In August 2009, Yousef was extradited to
New York where he awaits trial. The explanation for Iranian presence in Latin America begins with its symbiotic
relationship with Hezbollah.41 United in their dedication to the destruction of Israel, Iran has helped Hezbollah grow from a small
group of untrained guerrillas into what is arguably the most highly trained, organized and equipped terrorist organization in the world.42 In
return, Hezbollah has served as an ideal proxy for Iranian military force particularly against Israel which affords Iran
plausible deniability diplomatically.43 Hence wherever Hezbollah is entrenched, Iran will be as well and vice-versa. The primary reason
for Irans increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its growing ideological and economic relationship
with Venezuela. Ideologically speaking, both regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the
United States.44 Economically speaking, the two countries have partnered together in an attempt to survive and thrive
despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its financial and trade systems.45 On the latter score one would be
hard pressed to find a country that has been more successful at overcoming sanctions and embargoes levied by the
United States and international community than Iran. In spite of ever-increasing economic constraints dating back to the Carter
Administration, Iran has managed to fight an eight year war with Iraq, become the worlds biggest sponsor of terrorism,
vigorously pursued its own nuclear program and become the prime destabilizing factor in the Middle East .46 This
impressive adaptability relies in no small part on Irans creativity in exploiting unscrupulous businesses, criminal
networks and other corrupt regimes for economic survival. For rogue leaders like Venezuela President Hugo Chavez, who see
embargoes and sanctions as just another manifestation of American oppression and imperialism, Iran has become their champion and welcomed
ally.47 This sentiment has developed into a cooperative understanding that, to the extent they can be successful at overcoming economic
sanctions and creating their own economy, Iran and Venezuela can continue to pursue their ideological agendas beyond the reproach of their
Western first-world oppressors. In their efforts to achieve this independence, neither Iran nor Venezuela has ignored the pecuniary
and political benefits of participating in the illicit drug trade. For example, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General
Gholamreza Baghbani has been working in conjunction with the Taliban to oversee the trafficking of opium and heroin
from Afghanistan through Iran in order to generate revenue to support Hezbollah.48 General Baghbani is a commander in the IRGC
Qods Force which is the Iranian Special Forces unit that works closely with Hezbollah in conducting terror operations throughout the world. In a
similar fashion to Irans ideological relationship with Hezbollah, Venezuela and the FARC often work together in the trafficking of cocaine for
mutual benefit. Numerous Venezuela government officials have been designated by the OFAC as providing assistance to the FARC in the
trafficking of cocaine and the purchasing of weapons.49 In addition to participating in cocaine trafficking, Venezuela affords the FARC respite
from United States and Colombian pursuit via safe havens within the country.50 Venezuela extends this assistance in part because the socialist
regime of Hugo Chavez aligns well ideologically with the FARCs Marxist underpinnings. Pragmatically speaking, Venezuela provides support to
the FARC insurgency because it believes it helps mitigate the perceived threat of United States intervention in the region.51 The FARC in turn
has provided reciprocal support of the Chavez regime by such actions as training pro-Chavez militants and assassinating anti-Chavez politicians
within Venezuela.52 Given their own individual propensities in the trafficking of illicit drugs to further ideological interests, it should come as no
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surprise that the
activity is so intrinsic to the ongoing VenezuelanIranian enterprise in Latin America.53 Each country
brings valuable infrastructure to drug trafficking that can be used to help expand and supply a worldwide cocaine market. Assets such
as state-owned airlines, shipping companies, airports and sea ports can operate beyond the watchful eyes of the legitimate world. This can be
seen in the regularly scheduled flights between Caracas and Tehran that continue despite Venezuelan-owned Conviasa Airlines claims they ended
in September 2010.54 Even though it was described as a regular commercial flight, there was no means by which to purchase a ticket to travel
onboard. Moreover, the flight would depart Caracas from a secluded non-public terminal without the normal manifests associated with legitimate
air commerce.55 Another example that also illustrates the ingenuity of Iran in circumventing international sanctions involves the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is responsible for moving almost one-third of Irans imports and exports. The IRISL has been
under OFAC economic sanction since September 2008 for providing logistical services to Irans Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics.56 In order to stay one step ahead of OFAC and United Nations regulatory efforts, the IRISL regularly reflags and changes the owners
of its ships. Between September 2008 and February 2012, there were 878 changes to the IRISL fleet including 157 name changes, 94 changes of
flag, 122 changes of operator and 127 changes of registered ownership. This simple tactic has allowed Iran to continue shipping goods to and
from Venezuela and all over the world despite the best efforts of the international community to prevent it.57 Being able to control major modes
of transportation that operate from one safe port to another beyond the watchful eyes of legitimate immigration and customs authorities is a
fundamental advantage that is very difficult to counter. While Iran and Venezuela may be much more interested in using this advantage for
commercial, military and nuclear purposes, there is no reason to doubt they would use it in the trafficking of drugs to finance covert terrorist
activities for themselves and their allies. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY Iran and Hezbollah have been
involved in the underworld of Latin America long enough to become intimately familiar with all of its inhabitants and capitalize on their
capabilities. Former DEA executive Michael Braun has an interesting way of describing this dynamic: If you want to visualize ungoverned
space or a permissive environment, I tell people to simply think of the bar scene in the first Star Wars movie. Operatives from FTOs (foreign
terrorist organizations) and DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are frequenting the same shady bars, the same seedy hotels and the same
sweaty brothels in a growing number of areas around the world. And what else are they doing? Based upon over 37 years in the law enforcement
and security sectors, you can mark my word that they are most assuredly talking business and sharing lessons learned.58 Braun says as Europe's
demand for cocaine continues to grow and TCO's operate in West and North Africa to establish infrastructure to move the drugs: "These bad
guys (cartels) are now routinely coming in very close contact with the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, who are vying for the same money,
the same turf and same dollars. It's really a nightmare scenario. And my point being is if anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah
and Qods Force, the masters at leveraging and exploiting existing elicit infrastructures globally, are not going to focus on our southwest
border and use that as perhaps a spring board in attacking our country then they just don't understand how the real
underworld works."59 Iran attempted to leverage this capability in October 2011 with the foiled plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to
the United States. According to a federal arrest complaint filed in New York City, the Qods Force attempted to hire a drug cartel (identified by
other sources as the Los Zetas) to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir for a fee of $1.5 million. The terror attack was to take place at a
popular restaurant in Washington, D.C. without regard to collateral deaths or damage.60 The Qods Force made this solicitation because it knows
drug traffickers are willing to undertake such criminal activity in exchange for money. Moreover, if this terror attack had been successful, the
Qods Force intended to use the Los Zetas for other attacks in the future.61 Had it not been for a DEA informant posing as the Los Zetas
operative, this attack could have very well taken place. It has been suggested that this assassination was directed by the Iranian government in
retaliation for a Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain against an Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim majority that was protesting a Saudi-backed
Sunni Muslim minority government.62 There are also indications that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has ordered the Qods Force
to intensify terror attacks against the United States and other Western countries for supporting the ousting of Syrian President and Iranian ally
Bashar al-Assad.63 How all of this plays into the Iranian nuclear threat leaves troubling possibilities for the U.S. and
our ally Israel. We know that Hezbollah has a significant presence in the United States that could be utilized in terror
attacks intended to deter our efforts to curtail Irans nuclear program. 64 For this same reason, Israelis in the United States
and around the world have gone on high alert to prevent a repeat of deadly Hezbollah terror attacks against Israeli
facilities that occurred in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. These increasingly hostile actions taken by the Iranian government
would be alarming enough without Iran and Hezbollah having well-established bases of operations in Latin
America. While Latin American bases serve as a finance mechanism for Hezbollah , it is believed the ability exists to turn
operational if the need arises. There is no doubt that the enemy is at our doorstep and we must do something about it now.
While a very aggressive foreign policy to counteract these threats is in order, we must not forget that a secure Southwest border is always our first
and last line of defense.
Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would
be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation . Heres one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah,
Irans Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by
invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and
leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand. Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obamas Iran point
man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollahs political importance to Tehran. The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported
the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ross told me. If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and
they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like Guns of August on steroids. Imagine that Israel
detects a mobilization of Irans rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are
not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no
reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? Bruce Blair, the cofounder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an
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Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards, making an accidental exchange more likely. A
confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their
forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice, he said. Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously
increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.
Then comes the problem of misinterpreted data, Blair said. Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false
impression that the other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike. Cognitive Bias Blair notes that in a crisis it
isnt irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into incomplete
intelligence. This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of
incorrect information, he said. Ross told me that Irans relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two countries
-- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesnt recognize is far-fetched -- make the situation even
more hazardous. This is not the Cold War, he said. In this situation we dont have any communications channels. Iran and Israel
have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized. The answer to this predicament
is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. The liabilities of preemptive attack on
Irans nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits, Blair said. But certainly Irans program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons
delivery capability.
Uniqueness
China/Russia high now/US low
China is the new presence in Latin America, shoring up formerly
American influence
Ellis, 6/6/13 (R. Evan Ellis is associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies, China's New Backyard Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag in Latin America?,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america?page=0,1)
For the past decade, Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing interest in
Latin America. But while Beijing's diplomats bulked up on their Spanish and Portuguese, most U.S.
policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United States still held a dominant position in
the minds of its southern neighbors. In April 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere held a hearing on China's influence in the hemisphere and concluded that the U.S. position in
the Western Hemisphere was much stronger than China's and, moreover, that Beijing's economic engagement in
the region did not present a security threat. But that was 2005 . In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice
President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was
hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas
Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times
brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from
the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's
itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all
the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between
the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership
that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United
States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's
not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one
to the United States. Make no mistake: China is now a presence in the region . Xi's trip to
Trinidad and Tobago is only the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao,
visited communist Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political
ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10
Caribbean countries and Costa Rica. Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a
"shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California,
sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States
globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in
countries close to its borders. Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United
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States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground . Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's
engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City,
allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming
the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries
(Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively
independent of the United States. The challenges arising from China's global engagement should not,
however, be confused with the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that characterized the Cold
War, in which each side actively promoted different, competing concepts for a global order. China does not
seek to impose a new ideology on the world, yet the mercantilist way in which it promotes
its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international norms
that it didn't create, makes it more difficult for the United States to conduct business and
pursue policy goals in Latin America and other parts of the world.
increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st
century. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish its friendship with Cuba . It
would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party
exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust, deepen
mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own development and common
prosperity, Xi said. China would like to work more closely with Cuba on international and regional
issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community, Xi said. Xi said he
witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region during his visit earlier this month. China
would like a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean countries, featuring political trust, economic
cooperation and cultural mutual learning, Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation
between China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with
China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core. China appreciates Cuba's efforts to promoting
China-Latin America relations and expects growth of relations during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community
of Latin American and Caribbean states. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and
former leader Fidel Castro to Xi. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with
Argentina and Mexico recognised the PRC, followed by Brazil two years later and, later still,
Bolivia in 1985. This period of relative indifference was now at an end. President Hu Jintaos visits,
towards the end of 2004, to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba and, a year later, to Mexico
attested to Beijings interest in the region3. While numerous studies have focused on Chinas policy
towards Africa, its role in Latin America is less frequently touched upon. Yet, its growing presence there
is of the greatest economic and geostrategic significance; and raises concerns
and anxieties both in Latin America and in the United States , where Beijings interference
in the region has aroused something less than enthusiasm. In media and political circles, periodic alarms
have been sounded over the Chinese presence in Americas back yard 4.
Washingtons fears have been strengthened over the past year with the electoral triumphs of Michelle Bachelet in
Chile, Alan Garca in Peru and then Lula da Silva in Brazil, all of whom are openly seeking closer relations with
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Beijing. China in Latin America: a growing influence Chinas influence in Latin America can be evaluated in two
ways. From the outset, one objective consideration must be noted: so far, Chinas presence is limited. As a
proportion of Chinas overall trade, Latin America represents only 3.55%a modest total as yet5. According to
Chinese government data, in 2004 less than 18% of all Chinas Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), that is US$8.2
billion6 worth was placed in Latin America. And Chinas share of the incoming flow of FDI amounted to only 6%7. Yet
this data has to be treated with caution. On a careful reading of the MOFCOM statistics, it appears that
Chinas investment in the region is mainly concentrated on the Cayman Islands and the Virgin Islands, both of which
are notorious as tax havens. In all probability, this capital is sent back to mainland China for
reinvestment, qualifying now for the benefits accorded to foreign investors . When this
investment in the Caymans and the Virgin Islands is excluded, Latin America receives no more than 1.5% of Chinas
overall FDI. And a comparable figure is suggested by UNCTAD8: in 2002, China invested US$653 million overall,
1.5% of its total outward investment. But these figures do not reflect the rapid expansion of financial
relations between Beijing and Latin America. Chinas total foreign investment in 2005 is put
at US$6.9 billion, bringing the cumulative figure for its investment across the world to US$50
billion. And, since 2003, China has signed public and private investment projects in Latin
America, detailed below, worth nearly ten billion dollars in all. In November 2004, in Brasilia, President Hu
addressed members of the National Congress promising that China would be investing
US$100 billion in the region over the next ten years. The promise is in the process of being fulfilled. At
the same time, the volume of bilateral trade is increasing exponentially , from US$12.6 billion
in 2001 to US$40 billion in 2004, settling at over US$50 billion in 2005 (see Table 1). By 2010 the figure of
US$100 billion should have been reached. Chinas main trading partners are Brazil, Mexico
and Chile, who between them represented 62.2% of all exchanges9 in 2004 (charts 1 and 2). Data provided by
MOFCOM is set out in Tables 1 and 2; it is used as reference material for the international institutions. But most
Latin American countries reject these figures, putting Chinas exports to them at lower levels. And the gap may be
significant. There is a simple reason for this underestimate. A large proportion (12%) of Chinas exports to the
region are officially destined for Panamarather surprisingly, considering Panamas small population (3 million) and
the fact that it does not maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing. The truth is that Panama performs on the
American continent a role comparable to that of Hong Kong in Asia (an area where industrial products are
assembled and Chinas exports are packaged) and is in reality no more than a point of transit. It is also worth noting
that Mercosur or, in English, the Southern Common Market (linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and
Venezuela) allows for Chinese goods to be circulated far from its initial destination10. Chinas interest in Latin
America may be explained in terms of three imperatives: oil supplies, minerals and
agricultural products.
most Latin American countries elected governments of the populist left, with mostly hostile
attitudes to American policy; their leaders include Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabar Vasquez in
Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005) and Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2005). In particular, the victory of
Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua last November perplexes the United States, which dreads even
the thought of any lessening of its influence in the Latin American continent. US fears are all
the more justified because, since September 11th 2001, the United States has paid scant attention
to Latin America. On the political front, Chinas presence erodes the influence of
Washington, whose growing isolation is evident. Only Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican
Republic and Salvador joined the United States-led coalition to fight in Iraq27. Latin American countries
are no longer afraid to defy Washington; and they see in China a more conciliatory
partner than the IMF. The point is illustrated by Bolivias decision to follow Ecuadors example in nationalising
its hydrocarbon sector. China will be taking over the American and European
investments. On the oil front, Latin America provides more than a quarter of US imports28;
but they have had to reduce their purchases from Venezuela because of President Chvez
policies. Relations between Caracas and Washington are on the slide. Chvez is seeking to create a common front
against what he calls North American imperialism. His rhetoric is reflected in closer relations with governments
condemned by Washington, such as Belarus and Iran. China, being a major investor, may enable
Venezuela to rid itself of US influence29. But Chvez looks well beyond the function of supplying
hydrocarbons. He sees a political role for himself on the international stage. In October 2006, Venezuela made a
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bidwith Chinas supportfor one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Councilin vain, however.
Venezuela fought a bitter battle with Guatemala (which had support from Washington)and Panama won the
election. And China will probably be asked to deliver arms to Caracas, following in the footsteps
of Spain (due to supply transport aircraft and corvettes ) and Russia (Sukhoi fighter planes). Chvez selfconfidence has been rewarded by the links forged with China. His project, the Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas is designed to strengthen co-operation between economies in the region. In June 2005, Venezuela
concluded an alliance known as Petrocaribe30 with 13 Caribbean states, enabling it to support socialist
municipalities in Salvador and Nicaragua31 and to contribute to the popularity of left-wing movements. Similarly,
Cuba has achieved oil independence thanks partly to its own production (which covers half the
islands needs), and partly to deliveries from Venezuela. Meanwhile, the regions two other
powers, Mexico and Brazil, are the focus for real attention from Beijing.
China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money
while they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted
access to credit. In recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund
in Venezuela to $12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with
access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazils national oil company $10 billion.
The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come.
Chinas trade with Latin America has grown quickly this decade , making it the regions second
largest trading partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper
engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to
address the erosion of Washingtons influence in the hemisphere. This is how the
balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis , said David Rothkopf, a former
Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. The loans are an example of the
checkbook power in the world moving to new places , with the Chinese becoming more
active. Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the economic crisis,
including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of clout that has
suffered losses from the financial crisis. Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected to push
Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba . Meanwhile, China
rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to
commodities like soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes.
is
Allowing Chinese influence in Cuba is a strategic disaster-a full repeal of the embargo is
necessary to crowd them out
Luko, 2011 (James, Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European Research, the Smithsonian Institute and
two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defense, China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped, 6/29/2011,
http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html)
The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russ ias
and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States - CUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade
partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past
decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba
discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban
infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a
sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of
leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the
newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of
natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence
signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an
important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China.
A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year
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old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be
the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize
Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is
vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba
would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a
beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in
Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over
sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the
traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone!
[4] Re-establishing normal relations with Cuba is a win-win situation and we should not allow inflexibility in our
foreign policy to stand in the way. The road is clear, Soviet and then Russian domination in Cuba was a massive
violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a geostrategic mistake of Kennedy not to forcibly remove Castro at the time. It
is then no question that allowing the Chinese to supplant the Russians, (who now have a weak presence in Cuba in
any case) needs to be stopped. In conjunction with the LUKO DOCTRINE (containing global Chinese expansion) [5]
America needs to take the OFFENSIVE for a good DEFENSE of our close perimeter security- CUBA.
hydrocarbon sector remains modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin
American oil, but lags far behind the United States in terms of volume12. By 2005, the region provided 3.1% of
Chinas oil supplies, 107,000 barrels per day (bpd). This may seem a small amount, but these exports
were up by 28% on the previous year (83,000 bpd) and were nearly twenty times more than in
2001. An undeniable rise in importance is taking place, with Latin Americas contribution to
Chinas oil imports estimated to have doubled last year . China has established particularly
close relations with Venezuela, an oil producer in the first league. Venezuela has 6.6% of the worlds oil
reserves (putting it in sixth place) and 68% of Latin Americas reserves (as against Mexicos 11.3%). As a producer
it ranks in seventh place, with 4% of world production. In December 2004 and again more recently in August last
year, President Hugo Chvez paid an official visit to Beijing, where he and President Hu signed several
agreements on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the two
countries rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 b illion in 2004 and US$2.14 billion in
2005. Chinas Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, visited Caracas in January 2005, attesting Beijings interest in
Venezuela. On that occasion, several new contracts were signed. China plans investments worth US$350
million in the development of 15 oilfields (which might contain up to one billion barrels of oil) and US$60
million towards infrastructure costs (building a rail network, refineries . . .). The China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have also signed
agreements on offshore gas exploration. Then, at the end of August 2005, the two countries formed a
joint company to develop the Zumano oilfield in Anzotegui State, which promises an output of 50,000 bpd. China
has also created a US$40 million credit line for Venezuelas purchase of agricultural equipment from China. The
volume of Venezuelas oil exports to China rose between 2004 and 2005 from 12,300 bpd to 70,000 bpd. Last year
it reached 160,000 bpd13, a figure likely to double over the year ahead, on course to reach 500,000 bpd by 2010.
By the second half of 2006, Venezuela was supplying about 5% of Chinas oil imports. China is its second biggest
customer, after the United States, purchasing about 15% of its oil exports.
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Nobody doubts the resource potential they all hold, but turning that into money needs major
capital and technological skills, most of which sits with international oil companies rather than national
entities farming out work to service companies on the cheap. Like it or not, IOCs still have lucrative (some would
say larger) unconventional oil and gas plays they can go for in North America, Russia, East Africa, Australasia and
even distinctly conventional MENA and Caspian regions. The Americas is now a nice to have location in
their portfolios, not a make or break region for corporate survival. Ironically Chavez
understands that, which is why the vast bulk of his hydrocarbon investment over that past
five years has all come from China. In ball-park terms, Beijing has sunk $40bn into Caracas
coffers, mostly as loan for oil agreements. Thats been very good news for the likes of China
Petrochemical Corp and CNPC, with China receiving around 640,000b/d from Venezuela (200,000 barrels of
which services the debt), but whether thats really in Venezuelan interests rather than selling
most its oil on open markets is at best, dubious. Given Chinas vast capital, its not surprising
that theyre now a key player in the Venezuelan market, or that theyre following up with
similar investments in Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia . But selling oil into Asia is one thing, letting
China own the entire value chain from Latin American fields to Chinese ports is clearly a
less wise proposition. It merely adds to the list of Chavez resource blunders , and looks an
increasingly likely trap for other Americas producers to fall into. Raking in (cheap) Renminbi for chimerical output
gains will favour Beijing in the long run, especially if China controls the taps with oil deliveries
merely paying down debt. No matter what the wager, its simply not a plausible model for the Americas
Latin America has 45% of the worlds copper reserves, a quarter of its silver reserves and a
third of its pewter reserves: for China it represents an invaluable source of raw materials to
draw upon. Chile and Peru between them produce 44% of world copper output and for China,
the worlds biggest consumer, half its imports. It is hardly surprising that China is building up its
investments in the mining sector. Its giant steel-maker, Shougang Group, via its subsidiary
Shougang Hierro Peru, has since 1992 been working several Peruvian iron ore mines , including the
one at Marcona to the south of Lima. In Chile, in June 2005, the Chinese company Minmetals Corporation joined
forces with Codelco (Corporacin Nacional del Cobre)18 to secure annual deliveries of 55,000 tons of copper for 15
years. China may also take a share in developing the Gaby copper mine with its expected yearly production (from
2008 onwards) of 150,000 tons. Among Cubas trading partners, China now ranks third after Spain
and Venezuela. The relationship is being extended. The island is the worlds third largest
producer of nickel19 and has significant reserves of copper and cobalt. In November 2004, on the
occasion of President Hus visit to Havana, Minmetals and Cubaniquel agreed jointly to
develop the nickel deposits at Las Camariocas in Holgun Province , 800 kilometres east of Havana:
production has reached 22,500 tons a year. This collaboration is expected to push Cubas annual
copper production, currently 75,000 tons, up to nearly 132,000 tons. A further deal has been
signed between the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) and Cubaniquel to develop the
nickel deposit at San Felipe in Camaguey Province. Chinese investments look likely to swell still further
in the years ahead. On September 9th 2005, a colloquium was held in Xiamen on Chinas
opportunities for investment in Cuba. The Cuban delegation proposed 12 projects including building sugar
houses and tourist infrastructure. Brazil is also one of the main targets for Chinese investment. After India and
Australia, Brazil ranks as Chinas third biggest supplier of iron ore, providing a quarter of all its imports. In five
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China moved up from fifteenth place among Brazils trading partners to being
its third biggest customer. In October 2001, the Brazilian firm Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the
years, 2000-2005,
worlds leading producer and exporter of iron ore, undertook to deliver six million tons of ore per year to the steelmaker Baosteel, Chinas leading producer. From 2010 onwards the annual order will increase to 20 million tons. In
spring 2004, Baosteel, CVRD and Arcelor decided jointly to build a steel-making complex in
Brazil, near the port of So Luis in Maranhao state. The plant is designed to produce 3.7 million tons of steel plate
per year, from 2007 onwards. It is no further than a days journey by rail from the mine at Carajas and a few days
by sea from Panama. The total investment came to US$2.5 billion, of which Baosteel put up 60%. CRVD has also
concluded agreements with Shougang to deliver iron ore. But Latin America represents not just a source
Chinas presence has upset the economic and geostrategic balance in the region. These
massive investments have provoked a real debate21 across Latin America, where
governments fear their countries may be confined to the role of providing agricultural and
mineral raw materials. The figures speak volumes: three quarters of Argentinas exports to China consist of
agricultural products. China is the main customer for soya beans, buying 45% of the total exported;
Thailand comes next with 13% and Spain with 7%. And when it comes to Brazils exports to China, 37% consist of
agricultural products. The dependence of the Latin American countries is undeniable. China is
the destination for 70% of the iron ore, 47% of the lead and 37% of the copper exported by
Peru, 33% of the pewter exported by Bolivia and 16% of the copper leaving Chile. Far from allowing development,
trade with China tends over the long term to weaken the Latin American economies. China
reinforces the rentier attitude in these countries. The appreciating prices for raw materials22
and the growth rates in Chile (5.9% in 2004 and then 5.1% in 2005) or Argentina (9.2% in 2005) do little to
encourage people to diversify their production. The opening up of trade is the root of many
disappointments. Imports from China swamp the local markets, a situation that might be
aggravated by the creation of a bilateral free-trade area. The sometimes unfair competition from
Chinese goods has also been denounced. In 2005, several governments including Brazil and Argentina23
did not hesitate to employ anti-dumping measures against textiles and toys. Beijings trading deficit with Latin
America is fairly quickly absorbed. Brazils trading surplus with China has been considerably reduced, falling from
US$5 billion in 2004 to US$1.48 billion the following year. On top of everything, Latin American countries
are up against Chinese competition in foreign markets , especially in the United States. Between 2003
and 2005, with the end of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA), Chinas share in US textile imports doubled, increasing
from 25% to 56%.
WASHINGTON ALSO worries about China's growing presence in Latin America, a concern that
has already been the subject of congressional hearings. In fact, some members of
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Congress view China as the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They cite the huge financial resources China is promising to
bring to Latin America, its growing military-to-military relations in the region, and its clear
political ambitions there all as potential threats to the long-standing pillar of U.S. policy in
the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine. China's interest in Latin America is significant and
expanding. The region has become a vital source of raw materials and foodstuffs for China. In the
past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than sixfold, or by nearly 6o
percent a year. Beijing also faces a major political challenge in the region: of the 26 countries that recognize Taiwan,
12 are in Latin America or the Caribbean. China is intent on reducing that number through aggressive diplomacy
and increased trade, aid, and investment. Bush administration officials have watched China's growing commercial
and political engagement in the region closely. Chinese President Hu Jintao traveled to Latin America
twice in the past two years, spending a total of 16 days there. The White House could not
have missed the warm welcome he received in the five Latin American countries he visited, the
concessions the host governments offered him (such as the quick granting of "market-economy status" to China),
and the enormous expectations his presence created of major Chinese investments in roads,
ports, and other infrastructure. Hu's trips have been reciprocated by a long series of visits to
China by Latin American heads of state, economic officials, and corporate leaders. Many people in
Latin America look to China as an economic and political alternative to U.S.
hegemony. Although officials in some of these countries are concerned that China, with its lower manu
facturing costs, will cut into their sales, profits, and investment, others (mainly South Amer ica's food- and mineralproducing nations) largely see China as a major potential partner for new trade and investment.
Brazilian leaders, including President Lula, have said they want to establish a strategic
relation ship with Beijing that might involve trade in high-tech products, mutual support in international
organizations, and scientitic and cultural collaboration. Interestingly, the recent advances of China (and India
as well) have prompted some Latin Americans to examine their own economic and political
development, producing a new wave of self-criticism about the region'stumbling performance in recent years
and intense discussion about what can be learned from the success of some Asian countries.
Add-Ons
Trade
Trade Add-On---2AC
Repealing the embargo provides boost for US trade
Ediger, 12 [9/19/12, Don Ediger is a veteran journalist who has worked for The Miami Herald, Associated Press,
BusinessWeek and the International Herald Tribune, among other publications, Cubas Post-Castro Future,
http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/19/cubas-post-castro-future/]
The stakes are high for post-embargo trade. Cuba has a gross domestic product (in purchasing power parity) of about
$114 billion, putting it in a league with Ecuador and New Zealand. Companies from dozens of countries including Spain, France, Venezuela
and Canada are already profiting by trade with Cuba. Miami attorney Zamora, who gives legal advice to companies in the U.S. and
throughout Latin America, said these are some of the major opportunities for American companies: Construction.
Many houses, for example, are in need of repair. Resorts, including retirement communities, golf courses and other
sports facilities. Oil refineries (assuming the success of continued oil exploration). Infrastructure, especially highways, ports
and power plants. (Earlier this month, some five million residents of western Cuba were without electricity after a massive blackout.)
Biotechnology and health-care facilities. Travel to, from and on the island. Many businesses, especially in Florida, are
already preparing for trade and investment in post-embargo Cuba, and several Cuba trade groups have started up in Miami and
Tampa, among other cities. Trade advocates point out that if U.S. companies dont start doing business in Cuba, foreign
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corporations are almost certain to step up their activities there . The French, for example, pulled back their investments when
European economies tanked several years ago. They now hope to increase investment in Cuba from a recent level of 150 million
euros (about $196 million) to 250 million euros (about $327 million) a year.
explanation has to do with an absence of motive. Modern states find little incentive to bicker over tangible
property, since armies are expensive and the goods that can be looted are no longer of considerable value.
Ironically, this is exactly the explanation that Norman Angell famously supplied before the World Wars. Yet, today the evidence is
abundant that the most prosperous, capable nations prefer to buy rather than take. Decolonization, for
example, divested European powers of territories that were increasingly expensive to administer and which
contained tangible assets of limited value. Of comparable importance is the move to substantial consensus
among powerful nations about how international affairs should be conducted. The great rivalries of the twentieth
century were ideological rather than territorial. These have been substantially resolved, as Francis Fukuyama has
pointed out. The fact that remaining differences are moderate, while the benefits of acting in concert are large
(due to economic interdependence in particular) means that nations prefer to deliberate rather than
fight. Differences remain, but for the most part the capable countries of the world have been in consensus,
while the disgruntled developing world is incapable of acting on respective nations dissatisfaction. While this version of events
explains the partial peace bestowed on the developed world, it also poses challenges in terms of the future.
The rising nations of Asia in particular have not been equal beneficiaries in the world political system. These
nations have benefited from economic integration, and this has proved sufficient in the past to pacify them.
The question for the future is whether the benefits of tangible resources through markets are sufficient to compensate the rising powers
for their lack of influence in the policy sphere. The danger is that established powers may be slow to accommodate or give way to the
demands of rising powers from Asia and elsewhere, leading to divisions over the intangible domain of policy and politics. Optimists
argue that at the same time that these nations are rising in power, their domestic situations are evolving in a way
that makes their interests more similar to the West. Consumerism, democracy, and a market orientation all
help to draw the rising powers in as fellow travelers in an expanding zone of peace among the developed nations.
Pessimists argue instead that capabilities among the rising powers are growing faster than their affinity for western values, or even that
fundamental differences exist among the interests of first- and second-wave powers that cannot be bridged by the presence of market
mechanisms or McDonalds restaurants. If the peace observed among western, developed nations is to prove
durable, it must be because warfare proves futile as nations transition to prosperity . Whether this will happen
depends on the rate of change in interests and capabilities, a difficult thing to judge. We must hope that the optimistic view is
correct, that what ended war in Europe can be exported globally. Prosperity has made war expensive,
while the fruits of conflict, both in terms of tangible and intangible spoils have declined in value. These forces
are not guaranteed to prevail indefinitely. Already, research on robotic warfare promises to lower the cost of conquest. If in addition,
fundamental differences among capable communities arise, then warfare over ideology or policy can also be resurrected. We must all
hope that the consolidating forces of prosperity prevail, that war becomes a durable anachronism.
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Economy/Competitiveness
Economy/Competitiveness Add-On---2AC
Embargo Boosts US Economy and competitiveness
Safran, 12 [8/14/12, Brian Safran has a Master of Science in Global Affairs , End the Cuban Embargo - Brian
Safran, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran]
Those that support the embargo often make the claim that as such a small Caribbean country, the economic advantage to be gained by
the United States in lifting its embargo on Cuba would be negligible. This assertion is simply without merit, and the
evidence proves it. A committee of former Department of Transportation economists recently noted that eradicating the
embargo would add 1.6 billion dollars in revenue to the U.S. economy and establish approximately twenty
thousand additional jobs in the U.S. (Weinmann, 2004, 29) Analysts have asserted that had the embargo been lifted, the
Cuban people would have been able to use revenues derived from tourism to purchase significant amounts of
machinery and agricultural products from the United States. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In fact, the American Farm Bureau has stated that
the embargo has caused U.S. businesses to lose out on a major potential export market in agriculture which could
have led American farmers to profits upwards of one billion dollars, and to an additional quarter million dollars per
year in the exportation of farming machinery and accessories. (Griswold, 2005, 2) The passage of the 1992 Cuban Democracy
Act, which banned all trade in foodstuffs to Cuba through U.S. subsidiaries, effectively deepening the Cuban depression, further served to
damage U.S. agricultural business interests abroad. (Weinmann, 2004, 24; 29) In addition, the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which allowed U.S.
citizens, including those Cuban-Americans who had not been citizens at the time, to commence lawsuits against
companies that had engaged in indirect business transactions with the Castro regime has had a crippling affect on a
multitude of U.S. businesses. (Vanden, 2006, 360-61) In addition, the maintenance of the embargo requires a significant utilization of
national security resources that can clearly be put to better use in protecting America from substantive terrorism threats rather than by using them
to enforce an inconsequential ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Thus, from an economic standpoint, the United States
does indeed have the potential to benefit from a liberalization of trade with Cuba.
get China's political and military leadership to focus more clearly on economic and technological
performance than on military power alone in its quest for Great Power status.5 While China's impressive economic
performance, and the consequent rise in China's global profile, has forced strategic analysts to acknowledge
this link, the recovery of the US economy in the 1990s had reduced the appeal of the Kennedy thesis in Washington, DC. We must
expect a revival of interest in Kennedy's arguments in the current context. A historian of power who took Kennedy seriously, Niall
Ferguson, has helped keep the focus on the geopolitical implications of economic performance. In his masterly survey of the role of
finance in the projection of state power, Ferguson defines the 'square of power' as the tax bureaucracy, the parliament, the national debt,
and the central bank. These four institutions of 'fiscal empowerment' of the state enable nations to project power by mobilizing and
deploying financial resources to that end.6 Ferguson shows how vital sound economic management is to strategic
policy and national power. More recently, Ferguson has been drawing a parallel between the role of debt and financial crises in the
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decline of the Ottoman and Soviet Empires and that of the United States. In an early comment on the present financial crisis, Ferguson
wrote: We are indeed living through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the
story of how an over-extended empire sought to cope with an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors.
The empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US. It
remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in
favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for America's
quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just sell
shares to satisfy their creditors. as in the 1870s the balance of financial power is shifting. Then, the move was from the ancient
oriental empires (not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to western Europe. Today the shift is from the US - and other
western financial centres - to the autocracies of the Middle East and East Asia. 7 An economic or financial crisis may not trigger the
decline of an empire. It can certainly speed up a process already underway. In the case of the Soviet Union, the financial crunch caused
by the Afghan War came on top of years of economic under-performance and the loss of political legitimacy of the Soviet State. In a
democratic society like the United States, the political legitimacy of the state is constantly renewed through periodic elections. Thus, the
election of Barack Obama may serve to renew the legitimacy of the state and by doing so enable the state to undertake measures that
restore health to the economy. This the Soviet State was unable to do under Gorbachev even though he repudiated the Brezhnev legacy
and distanced himself from it. Hence, one must not become an economic determinist, and historic parallels need not
always be relevant. Politics can intervene and offer solutions. Political economy and politics, in the form of
Keynesian economics and the 'New Deal' did intervene to influence the geopolitical implications of the Great
Depression. Whether they will do so once again in today's America remains to be seen.
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gave DEBKAfile's earliest readers advance notice of 9/11 and its target, the World Trade Center, John Kerry Loses
Clout for Middle East Diplomacy, http://www.debka.com/article/22973/]
Kerry and peace diplomacy out on a limb His bosss troubles directly affect Secretary of State John Kerry and leave him
out on a limb. After meeting President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on May 7, Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
announced they were convening an international conference to jointly resolve the Syria crisis. But behind this show of
accord, US and Russian officials agreed on nothing. Kerry has since moved the conference timeline from late May to June. But the
chances of a meeting this summer are fading. In Moscow, the Secretary sensed that the mayhem in Washington had cut the
ground from under his feet. Putin, meanwhile, could hardly hide his smiles as US, British, German and Israeli
leaders made pilgrimages to Moscow in the past two weeks to try and crack his solid support for the Assad regime and slow his
Middle East momentum. On Monday, May 13, the Russian leader staged a scene bearing the hallmarks of a Cold War spy thriller. He
ordered the arrest then expulsion - of Ryan Christopher Fogle, a career diplomat serving as third secretary in the Political Section of the US
Embassy in Moscow. The Federal Security Service-FSB accused him of trying to recruit a Russian intelligence officer for the CIA. It was clear
that he had fallen victim to an FSB sting operation and the wide publicity was aimed at humiliating the CIA and the State Department. Kerry is
being brought up short on the diplomatic initiatives he started rolling in the past five months by the loss of steady
direction from Washington. His efforts for a breakthrough on the Syrian impasse have run aground and he is losing
momentum for getting the ball rolling for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on which he focused heavily - when he
arrives in the Middle East next month.
Disease
Disease Add-On---2AC
US-Latin America Coop key to prevent disease spread
Bliss, 09 [3/20/09, Katherine E. Bliss is senior associate with CSIS Global Health Policy Center. Before joining
CSIS, she was a foreign affairs officer at the U.S. Department of State, where she led work on environmental health
for the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science, focusing on water, sanitation, and hygiene; indoor air
pollution; and climate change adaptation challenges in developing countries. In 2006, she received the Bureaus
Superior Honor Award for her work on environmental health, as well as avian and pandemic influenza preparedness.
As a 20032004 Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow, Bliss served as a member of the State
Departments Policy Planning Staff, covering issues related to global health, international womens issues, Mexico,
and the Summit of the Americas. Previously, she served on the faculty at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, where she held tenure and was associate professor. She is currently an adjunct associate professor at
Georgetown University and teaches courses in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Health in Latin
America and the Caribbean: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Engagement, http://csis.org/publication/healthlatin-america-and-caribbean]
The United States geographic proximity to Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as its extensive trade,
migration, and border relationships with countries in the hemisphere, make addressing health issues in the
Americas a matter of national interest. Challenges include the persistence of high maternal and infant mortality rates; diarrheal
and respiratory diseases; and vaccine-preventable infections in some countries, along with the emergence of noncommunicable
chronic diseases as an increasing cause of disability and death among aging populations across the region. Drug
resistant infectious agents; an inadequate food and drug safety system; and the emigration of health personnel undermine the
regions efforts to promote disease surveillance and prepare for emergencies. By updating its foreign assistance health priorities for
Latin America and the Caribbean; expanding technical cooperation activities; and working with host countries,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other partners to reach underserved communities, the United States can
better promote health, security, development, and good will in the region.
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33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. Some
people think I am being hysterical, he said, referring to pandemic influenza, but there are catastrophes ahead.
We live in evolutionary competition with microbesbacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee
that we will be the survivors.3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen
hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the
pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other .3148 The
name is taken from Lewis Carrolls Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, Now, here, you see, it takes all
the running you can do to keep in the same place.3149 Because the pathogens keep evolving, our immune
systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who stop
running go extinct. So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is
that given the current rate of disease emergence, the human race is losing the race.3150 In a Scientific
American article titled, Will We Survive?, one of the worlds leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then,
reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to
the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an
utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections]. 3151 The research team
who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than
two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be
remarkable.3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society
itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between
bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio
goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent.
That level of mutationtwo percent of the genomehas taken the human species eight million
years to accomplish. So whos going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition,
Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up may be dismissed as almost
totally inconsequential.3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away
a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human
species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. Such a
long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as
the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism, wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the
University College of London, might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard .3154
U.S.-Canada Relations
Uniqueness
US-Canada Relations are not resilient and are at a crossroads action now is key
Burney and Hampson, 12 [6/21/12, Derek H. Burney was Senior Strategic Advisor of Norton Rose, former
Chief of Staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, and Canadian Ambassador to the US, and Fen Olser Hampson is
the Chancellors Professor & Director of NPSIA, Professor of International Affairs, How Obama Lost Canada,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada?
page=show]
Of course, the U.S.-Canadian relationship has had its rocky moments before. In the 1970s and 1980s, in response to
public concern over the United States economic domination of Canada, Ottawa enacted a wide variety of
protectionist measures that irritated Washington. Eventually, the two countries recognized their mutual interests and resolved what
differences they had, ratifying the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement in 1987 and its successor, NAFTA, seven years later. Back then,
Canada had little choice but to find a way to fix its relationship with the United States, the only game in town.
Ottawa is in a different position now. Today, it enjoys a respectable platform of self-confidence, having weathered
the financial crisis and ensuing recession far better than the United States. And unlike in the past, Canada can
now look beyond its own neighborhood for economic opportunities -- especially to the rising economies of
Asia.Indeed, Canada has made a full-court press in the Asia-Pacific region. It is wooing countries such as China,
India, Japan, and South Korea, which are eager to invest and trade in Canadian minerals, energy, and agricultural
products. Harper has announced Canadas intention to explore free-trade negotiations with China, and talks with Japan, Thailand, India, and
South Korea are under way. As Harper put it during a visit to China in February, We want to sell our energy to people who want to
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buy our energy. To be sure, Canadian companies will never abandon the U.S. market. Nevertheless, the U.S. recession and the
rise of Asia have allowed Canada to diversify its economic relations. In 2010, only 68 percent of Canadian exports were destined
for the United States, down from 85 percent in 2000. Canadians are accustomed to benign neglect from a neighbor preoccupied
with more urgent global flashpoints, but since that neglect has grown so much as to be malign, they have begun to
reappraise their relationship with the United States. As Canada develops closer ties with China and finds more receptive outlets
for its exports, the United States may find itself with a less obliging partner to the north . The Keystone XL pipeline
will probably be approved eventually -- the economic consequences of not building it are simply too great -- but it will take a long
time to undo the damage its delay has done to U.S.-Canadian relations. Obamas mishandling of an ordinarily
routine pipeline permit awakened Canadians to the problems with depending exclusively on the United States as an
export market. Already, Ottawa has shifted toward alternative options that include exporting oil from the west and east coasts of Canada later
this decade. To that end, the Harper government introduced legislation that will speed regulatory approval of such projects. In May 1961, U.S.
President John F. Kennedy gave a speech before the Canadian parliament in which he celebrated the deep ties between the United States and
Canada. Geography has made us neighbors, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies, he
said. What Kennedy stated then is still true today, and the two countries, linked by shared values and a network of individual contacts, will
continue to cooperate for their mutual security and prosperity. Yet none of the truths he listed should excuse neglect . Even
relations between close allies require constant care. And when the worlds most powerful country allows narrow
political considerations to trample the high-priority interests of its immediate neighbor, it raises questions not only
about its ability to maintain an entrenched alliance but also about its capacity for steady global leadership.
Solvency
Latin American Economic Engagement key to US-Canada Relations
Von Hahn, 09 [February 2009, Anatol von Hahn is Executive Vice
President, Latin America, at Scotiabank, Obamas Americas Policy,
http://www.focal.ca/pdf/focalpoint_february2009.pdf, pg. 4]
The current economic challenges require a collective and coordinated response. This is an opportunity to build on
past successes in the region. It is also an opportunity to advance Canadas relationships within the Americas,
including the U.S. The United States needs to move forward with an engagement plan for the Hemisphere that
incorporates these elements into its strategy. Canada can strengthen its bilateral relationship with the U.S. by
helping it achieve these goals, while at the same time pursuing its own national interests in the hemisphere.
Impacts
General
Canadian relations solve global nuclear war
Lamont, 94 [Lansing, national political correspondent for Time Magazines Washington bureau from 1961-1968,
chief Canada correspondent and United Nations bureau chief from 1971-1975, member of the Council on Foreign
Relations Breakup: The coming end of Canada and the stakes for America, 1994, p. 233-5]
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Of graver import would be the will and capability of Canada itself to continue supporting the North American
defense structure. With its ongoing debt crisis, its traditional aversion to U.S. military initiatives, and the fading of the Soviet threat, Canada might
reduce even further its NORAD and NATO commitments. It might choose to believe that through its control of territory crucial to the Western
alliance, plus its vital natural resources, it could continue to wield disproportionate influence on international and continental security planning. More likely, if
Ottawa continued to stint on its defense spending and became increasingly unable to patrol or secure its own borders, the United States would feel compelled to
step in and do the job itself. In that event America would rekindle all the deepest passions about Canadian sovereignty, especially in the Arctic. Its development
in the late 1980s proved a signal advance in continental security, although some Canadians believed that new radar technology would render the network obsolete
by the end of the century. Others feared it would draw Canada further into the Star Wars strategizing of Pentagon planners. Paved Paws did not assuage the larger
separation and the emergence to Americas north of a fragmented Canada, neither event enhancing the continents security; Canadas military inadequacies and
an erosion of Canada-U.S. relations, which might send signals inviting aggression by the Western alliances
adversaries; or a political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, which would precipitate an international crisis.
Any prolonged crisis, as security analysts know, involves not only heightened tensions and escalating suspicions but a
shift in emphasis to preparing for a very rapid response if hostilities erupt. In such situations the usual safeguards
are sometimes apt to be disregarded or even removed.
Cyber-Terror
Relations key to cyber threat management
Carafano et al 2010 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a
division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Jena Baker McNeill is Policy Analyst for Homeland
Security and Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Allison Center at The Heritage
Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for PoliticalMilitary Analysis at
Hudson Institute (Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/expand-norad-to-improve-security-in-north-america)
Addressing the wide range of threats confronting Americas security interests in North America will require
NORADs involvement. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallabs failed attempt to blow up a U.S.-bound jetliner was al-Qaedas most recent
effort to cause mass casualties in America.[22] In addition, threats to energy, communication, and computer networks persist.
Malicious third parties can attack the United States through vulnerable intermediaries, such as Canada, which offers
a huge backdoor into the U.S. computer networks. Much of the infrastructure of the two nationsfrom railroads to
aviation to pipelines and electrical systemsis inextricably intertwined. Canada is also Americas largest trading partner, accounting
for many links in U.S. supply chains. NORAD and NORTHCOM have partnered with a number of agenciesincluding the U.S. Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Strategic Command to protect U.S. networks. This
cooperation will help NORAD to secure U.S. systems against potential attack, but NORAD does not currently have a lead cyber-security
role.[23] The United States needs to deepen cooperation with its North American partners on cyber security. Both
the Canadian and U.S. economies depend on a secure and functioning cyberspace. Computer systems and infrastructure
in both countries are linked and a substantial amount of bilateral trade is conducted through the Internet. Since cyber terrorists and
criminals can operate from anywhere, integration of cyber-security efforts is essential to protect computer
infrastructure. Integration is especially necessary for Canada because its 200 law enforcement and 2,500 military personnel dedicated to
cyber security are insufficient to prevent cyber attacks effectively. Through NORAD, Canada and the United States could coordinate cyber
security with the various military commands and civilian agencies.[24] Cooperation with Mexico as its economy and cyber infrastructure
develop is also vital, as the U.S. and Mexican governments acknowledged by creating the Working Group on Cyber-Security in 2004.[25]
Nuke war
Tilford 12 Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, "Cyber attackers could shut down the
electric grid for the entire east coast" 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shutdown-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa
To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military.
The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors
also power "every military base in our country." "Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage
with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out", he said. Which means military command and
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control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.
"Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without
either fuel or electric power", said Senator Grassley. "So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left
scrambling to maintain base functions", he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is
something very real. Top national security officialsincluding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National
Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director have said, "preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation~s
electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country" (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon
taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY%26feature=relmfu ). A cyber attack today against the US could very well be
seen as an "Act of War" and could be met with a "full scale" US military response. That could include the use of "nuclear
weapons", if authorized by the President.
Arctic
Canada relations are key to Arctic stability
Evan T. Bloom 7, Deputy Director for Polar and Scientific Affairs, US Dept of State, April 20, 2007, The Arctic,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/85350.htm
U.S. Arctic policy is first and foremost, in a foreign policy sense, focused on cooperation with the eight
states that have territory in the Arctic, and there is no more important bilateral relationship in that
context for us than Canada. The United States has exceptionally good cooperation with Canada on a tremendous range of issues, as
befits two countries that share a border of thousands of miles. Ill mention just one example out of many. In 2003, the U.S. National Ice Service,
the Canadian Ice Service and the International Ice Service formed a special partnership, the North American Ice Service that combines the
strengths and resources of all three organizations. The NAIS provides integrated ice service planning and operations for both governments, and
the services combined efforts avoid duplication and promote maritime safety and environmental protection. Of course, the U.S. and Canadian
Coast Guards work closely on shared missions to promote safety and protect the environment. U.S. and Canadian scientists are also working
together on numerous projects related to the International Polar Year. We have much Arctic business with Canada, but of
course we have important relationships with the other Arctic States as well. Russia is a key example, where there is an important long-term need
to maintain bilateral cooperation. There are many facets to that relationship, including efforts to assist Russia with environmental protection and
remediation in the Russian Far East. Security Issues There is, naturally, a security dimension to U.S. interests in the
Arctic as with many other places. And when I speak of security, I am referring to a broad range of economic, energy, defense and related
security interests. This fits in with close U.S.-Canada cooperation on related issues. For example, the U.S.
and Canada have been partners in the common defense of North America for over 60 years, including through NORAD.
There is no more important trading partner for the U.S. than Canada , measured in volume or value, goods or
services. Energy is also a critical part of our bilateral relationship. Canada is our single largest supplier of imported crude oil and petroleum
products, natural gas, electricity and uranium, and it is a stable supplier. Although there are no longer Cold War tensions in the region, the
U.S. continues to have strong national security interests in the Arctic. We have a strong interest in
maintaining peace and stability, controlling our borders, carrying out military exercises in the region, and
moving ships and aircraft freely under customary international law rights and freedoms as reflected in the Law of
the Sea Convention. Security issues in the Arctic play a key role in determining whether and to what extent the US Government will invest in
new icebreakers, which is a matter under active consideration. The Arctic is an area rich in natural resources, and the
U.S. promotes sustainable development in that region. Transportation is a matter of considerable interest. Thus, with
respect to commercial shipping, Canada and the U.S. are leading a major effort in the Arctic Council to
estimate future shipping activity and needs in the Arctic Ocean as a consequence of predicted sea
ice melting. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) will use 2004 as a baseline, and will extrapolate to 2020 and 2050, while
taking into consideration impacts on indigenous people, the environment and the regional economy. The Assessment will be the largest and most
comprehensive effort to look at current and future
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attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. In January 2009, on the eve of Obamas inauguration,
President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S.
military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to
protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. The Bush administrations disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to
withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe,
have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned
deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward
new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military
training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should
create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops
anywhere. Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35
fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000
soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. The manoeuvres prompted a protest from
Russia which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About
12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for
disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: From those in the international peace and security sector, deep
concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states the United States and the Russian
Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world converge on the Arctic and have
competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and
Norway could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Many will
no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military
confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low for now, according to Rob Huebert of
the University of Calgary, [the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the
Air Pollution
US Canadian relations key to environment and stopping air pollution
US Department of State, 08 [2008, US Department of State, Canada (03/06),
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/canada/63660.htm]
The U.S. and Canada also work closely to resolve transboundary environmental issues, an area of increasing
importance in the bilateral relationship. A principal instrument of this cooperation is the International Joint Commission (IJC),
established as part of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to resolve differences and promote international cooperation on boundary waters. The
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 is another historic example of joint cooperation in controlling transboundary water pollution. The
two governments also consult semiannually on transboundary air pollution. Under the Air Quality Agreement of 1991, both
countries have made substantial progress in coordinating and implementing their acid rain control programs and
signed an annex on ground level ozone in 2000. In June 2003, Canada and the U.S. announced a new border air quality
initiative designed to increase cooperation in combating cross-border air pollution, including particulate matter
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Solvency
Say Yes/Solves Relations
Cuba Says Yes/Lifting Embargo Solves Relations
Cubans want the Embargo Lifted, makes their lives to difficult and frustrated at their
Government
Jeff Franks, Feb 7, 2012, Cubans say U.S. embargo a failure at 50, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-cuba-usa-embargoidUSTRE81700M20120208, Writer/ Reporter for Reuters
(Reuters) - The 50th anniversary of the U.S. trade embargo
things are and we would have the possibility to say to the government 'now what are you going to do? How are
you going to fix it?" she said. Dissident economist Oscar Espinoza Chepe said the embargo had only served "to
give the Cuban government an alibi to declare Cuba a fortress under siege, to justify repression and to (pass) the
blame for the economic disaster in Cuba."
United States around the world, he said, adding that it would also end what he called a "massive, flagrant and
systematic violation of human rights." That violation includes restrictions on U.S. travel to the island that require most Americans
to get U.S. government permission to visit and a ban on most U.S. companies doing business in Cuba, he said. "The prohibition of travel
for Americans is an atrocity from the constitutional point of view," Rodriguez said. Cuba has its own limits on travel that make it difficult
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for most of its citizens to leave the country for any destination. Rodriguez
Cuba is implementing economic reforms but unless the embargo is lifted they cannot
achieve complete success, repealing it is key to allow the U.S help influence the
development of Cubas market economy
Katrina Vanden Heuvel on July 2, 2013, The U.S should end the Cuban Embargo. http://www.thenation.com/blog/175067/us-should-endcuban-embargo#axzz2YHSAm2Up , Editor and Publisher of The Nation. Her articles have appeared in The Washington Post, The Los Angeles
Times, The New York Times, Foreign Policy magazine and The Boston Globe.
Is there a greater example of utter folly than Americas superannuated policy toward Cuba? During more than 50 years
corrupted by covert actions, economic sabotage, travel bans and unending embargo, the United States managed to make Castro and Cuba an
international symbol of proud independence. Intent on isolating Cuba, Washington has succeeded only in isolating itself
in its own hemisphere. Intent on displacing Fidel Castro, the U.S. enmity only added to his nationalist credentials. A recent visit
reveals a Cuba that is already beginning a new, post-Castro era. That only highlights the inanity of the continuing U.S. embargo, a cruel relic
of a Cold War era that is long gone. Cuba is beginning a new experiment, driven by necessity, of trying to build its own
version of market socialism in one country. Just as populist movements in the hemisphere looked to Castro and Cuba for inspiration,
now Cuba is learning from its allies as it cautiously seeks to open up its economy. A former minister of the economy spoke of
how Cuba is committed to fostering private coops and businesses, and is beginning a push to make more state
enterprises make their own way. This month, 100 state-run produce markets and 26 other establishments are scheduled to become
private cooperatives. The government says many more establishments will follow, beginning in 2014, as an alternative to small and mediumsize state businesses in retail and food services, transportation, light manufacturing and construction, among other sectors. Despite the
embargo, Jos Mart International Airport displays the new vitality. Hundreds of Cuban Americans fly into see relatives, bringing everything
from flat-screen TVs to consumer basics. Since President Obama lifted restrictions on family visits in 2009, remittances
and material support from Cuban Americans play a growing role in the microeconomy of the island. Whereas in the
1990s, Havana was willing to permit only limited private enterprise as an emergency measure, government officials now speculate
openly about aiming toward 50 percent of Cubas GDP in private hands within five years . Of course, an expanding
small business sector wont resolve some central issues facing the island: access to large-scale credit and investment and the need to boost
exports and address anemic productivity, not to mention the demands of an aging population. In Havana, there is more talk about Brazils
investment in renovating Mariel Harbor than about Edward Snowden. Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht had to resist threats by Floridas
state government to cut off any state contracts if it invested in Cuba. This enormous deep-water port is designed to handle trade with the
United States and beyond in a post-embargo world, if the embargo is ever ended. Cubas official media remains sclerotic, though there are
spirited debates in a few online outlets. But the government appears to understand that the explosion of social media will transform
communications and politics, and however tentatively, realizes it has little choice but to change if it is to engage a younger generation. It is
long past time for the United States to end the embargo and influence Cuba, rather than threaten it. Ironically, as a
result of a new Cuban migration law lifting more than 50 years of restrictions on the ability of its citizens to travel freely abroad, taking
effect this year, Cubans are now freer to travel to the United States than Americans are to Cuba. The president cant end the travel ban
without Congressional approval, but as Peter Kornbluhexplained in a recent piece in The Nation, he can take several steps that would
transform our policy. Obama should start by removing Cuba from the State Departments list of nations that support
terrorism, terminating the economic and commercial sanctions that come with that designation . The Treasury could
stop fining international banks for doing business with Cuba, a practice that impedes the countrys slow opening to private enterprise. At the
same time, the president could expand licensing for travel to Cuba, making it easier for entrepreneurs, scientists, doctors and others to travel
and explore commercial possibilities. The Cold War Cuban Democracy and Contingency Planning Program, designed
for regime change, should be reconfigured to a people-to-people exchange program that would actually have
some influence.
The Embargo is a failed policy, Cuba is pushing for the U.S to End the Embargo
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/americas/american-embargo-oncuba-has-50th-anniversary.html?_r=0
HAVANA (AP) The world is much changed since the early days of 1962, but one thing has remained constant: The United States
economic embargo on Cuba, a near-total trade ban that turned 50 on Tuesday. Supporters say it is a justified measure against a
repressive Communist government that has never stopped being a thorn in Washingtons side. Critics call it a failed policy that has
hurt ordinary Cubans instead of the government. All acknowledge that it has not accomplished its core mission of toppling Fidel
Castro or his brother and successor, Ral. All this time has gone by, and yet we keep it in place, said Wayne Smith, who was a young
American diplomat in Havana in 1961 when relations were severed and who returned as the chief American diplomat after they were
partially re-established under President Jimmy Carter. We talk to the Russians, we talk to the Chinese, we have normal
relations even with Vietnam, Mr. Smith said. We trade with all of them. So why not with Cuba? In the White House,
the first sign of the looming total embargo came when President John F. Kennedy told his press secretary to buy him as many H. Upmann
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Cuban cigars as he could find. The aide came back with 1,200. Although trade restrictions had been imposed by his predecessor, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mr. Kennedy announced the total embargo on Feb. 3, 1962, citing the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet
Communism with which the government of Cuba is publicly aligned. It went into effect four days later at the height of the cold war, a year
removed from the failed C.I.A.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion meant to oust Communism from Cuba and eight months before the Soviet
attempts to put nuclear missiles on the island brought the two superpowers to the brink of war. Little was planned to observe Tuesdays
anniversary, but Cuban-American members of Congress issued a joint statement vowing to keep the heat on Cuba. Supporters of the
policy acknowledge that many American strategic concerns from the 1960s are now in the past, such as curbing
Soviet influence and keeping Fidel Castro from exporting revolution throughout Latin America. But they say that other justifications remain,
such as the confiscation of United States property in Cuba and the need to press for greater freedoms on the island. We have a
hemispheric commitment to freedom and democracy and respect for human rights, said Jos Crdenas, a former
National Security Council staff member on Cuba under President George W. Bush. I still think that those are worthy
aspirations. With just 90 miles of sea between Florida and Cuba, the United States would be a natural No. 1 trade
partner and source of tourism. The embargo is a constant talking point for island authorities, who blame it for
shortages of everything from medical equipment to the concrete needed for highway construction. Cuba
frequently fulminates against the blockade at the United Nations and demands the United States end its
genocidal policy. Every fall, a vast majority of nations back a resolution condemning the embargo.
For the first time in more than fifty years, Cuban citizens can travel abroad without permission from their
government. The move, part of a broader reform package being phased in by Raul Castro, underscores the irrationality of
Americas continuation of a five-decade old embargo. While the embargo has been through several legal iterations in the
intervening years, the general tenor of the U.S. position toward Cuba is a hardline not-in-my-backyard approach to communism a la the
Monroe Doctrine. The official position is outdated, hypocritical, and counterproductive. The Cuban embargo was
inaugurated by a Kennedy administration executive order in 1960 as a response to the confiscation of American property in Cuba under the
newly installed Castro regime. The current incarnation of the embargo codified primarily in the Helms-Burton Act aims at producing free
markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties. Since
Fidel Castro abdicated power to his brother Raul in 2008, the government has undertaken more than 300 economic reforms
designed to encourage enterprise, and restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal
governance, electronics access, and more. Cuba is still a place of oppression and gross human rights abuse, but recent events
would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the right direction. Despite this progress, the U.S.
spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States . At least 10 different
agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office , the
U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the
embargo each year. At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped
and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasurys Office of Foreign
Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20
other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit
drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum. At present, the U.S. is largely
alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and
allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the
United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba
despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims. Moreover, since
Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State
Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American
multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges. Yet, estimates of
the sanctions annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to
skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states
like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent. Whats worse, U.S. sanctions
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encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in
2011, the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link,
circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores. Repealing the embargo would fit into an
American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in
clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. China, a communist country and perennial human rights
abuser, is the U.S.s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a
fifty year history of genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government. Which, of course, begs the question: when will
the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo? If Cuba is trending towards democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo
to be rolled back? The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is
higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because
of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of
American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism. A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving
towards reform makes little sense, especially when Americas allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It keeps a broader discussion about
smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.
Its time to lift the Embargo, failed policy and numerous benefits
Richard Danielson April 8 2013, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/us-rep-kathy-castor-lift-cuba-embargo-travelth
could threaten Florida beaches, and an opportunity for Tampa to become a tourism gateway to the island.
The Embargo has failed to succeed, Now is the time to lift it.
SCOTT STERN, February 10, 2012, Lift the Cuba embargo, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2012/02/10/stern-lift-the-cuba-embargo/ ,
Writer for the Yale Daily News
Fifty years ago Tuesday, President John F. Kennedys Proclamation 3447 entered into full force, and all trade
between the United States and Cuba was prohibited. The measure dramatically tightened what had been a
partial economic embargo against Cuba and the harsher measure continues to this day. The embargo was
initially enacted after Fidel Castro took power and the Cuban government nationalized American holdings in
The embargo prohibits American citizens from doing business with Cuba, visiting (except under
The embargos extraterritorial
provisions also make it extremely difficult for Cuba to do business with other countries. The embargo has
stunted the Cuban economy and limited Cubans access to good food, modern technology and useful medicine. It
has also hurt the United States relationships with other countries the European Parliament actually passed a
Cuba.
law making it illegal for Europeans to comply with certain parts of the embargo. The purpose of the embargo
was undeniably to make life so difficult for Cubans that they would see the error of their ways and expel Castro
and communism. The United States government has maintained for 50 years that it will not do business
on countries like the former USSR, China and Venezuela for trade. The appalling hypocrisy of the embargo is
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that the United States nearly always maintained diplomatic and economic relationships with countries like
Russia, China and Vietnam even during the heart of the Cold War. Numerous influential people have come out
against the Cuban embargo, including Pope John Paul II, Jesse Jackson and George Schultz. They all claim that
the embargo hurts the Cuban people, not the Cuban government. Democratic politicians Gary Hart, George
McGovern and Jimmy Carter have also expressed this view. It is interesting to note, however, that Hart and
McGovern only became vocal enemies of the embargo long after their presidential runs. Politicians are scared
openly to oppose the embargo.
The U.S should end the Cuban Embargo, Laundry List of Reasons
PHYLLIS POMERANTZ, Jan. 01 2013, Nows the time to lift the U.S. embargo on Cuba,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/nows-the-time-to-lift-the-us-embargo-on-cuba/article6790494/ , Phyllis Pomerantz is a professor
of the practice of public policy at Duke Universitys Sanford School of Public Policy and a former staff member of the World Bank.
Now that the election is over, the United States has a rare opportunity to do away with one of its most pointless and
ineffective foreign policies the embargo of Cuba that is as obsolete as the cool 1950s and 1960s sedans still running
on the streets of Havana. Just a few weeks ago, U.S. President Barack Obama sat down with leaders in Myanmar, an international pariah
for many years with a military responsible for thousands of civilian deaths. The United States now trades actively with Vietnam,
which remains under the control of the same Communist Party against whom it once fought and lost a terrible war. The U.S. has a
normal, albeit complex, diplomatic and commercial relationship with China, another Communist country. Yet, Cuba
is still treated as a pariah, a bizarre relic of the Cold Wa. I just returned from a visit there and realized that lifting the embargo
would be to both countries advantage. Americans would have full access to Cubas rich culture and natural beauty, and some new trade and
investment opportunities. Cuba would have expanded economic options, which it needs to improve the material well-being of its citizens.
The U.S. has had normal diplomatic and commercial relationships with regimes and despots of all stripes from Mobutu in Zaire to
Mubarak in Egypt. The list is long. So what makes Cuba so special? Is it because it is so close to the continental United
States? No the U.S. has had a good, if testy, formal relationship with Mexico for many years, including when it was a
one-party state. Is it because Cuba poses a military threat? Maybe, once upon a time. But if Americans got over the Vietnam War,
they surely can put the Cuban (or was that Soviet?) missile crisis behind them, especially since the U.S. now has
quite a normal relationship with Russia. What about a security threat? Arguably, almost every country could be wittingly
or unwittingly harboring extremist plotters. Somehow, though, I dont think al-Qaeda operatives are drinking mojitos on
Cuban beaches. Cuba loosened its ban on organized religion some time ago, but imagining either the government or its people
sympathetic to Islamic fundamentalism is quite a stretch. Is it because Cuba lacks economic opportunities for U.S.
business? Granted, its not a potential powerhouse such as Russia, China or even Vietnam for commercial purposes. But the U.S. has
maintained good relationships (and made money) with many small, poor countries. Whats one more? Is it because
Americans are standing on principle over Cubas human-rights record or strident rhetoric? Its hard to argue this when the White House has
entertained leaders of countries with even worse records and positions. Moreover, many of those countries do not have education, health-care
or food systems that reach the poor. Cuba does, although increasingly it is a challenge. Of course, America should care about
human rights and, along with that, everyone should have access to adequate food, education and health care. But
sadly, none of these reasons explain why the U.S. keeps a strict embargo on Cuba and has no diplomatic
relationship with it. No, the real reason is because of a small vocal minority (Cuban-American exiles and their families)
who happen to be clustered in an electoral swing state (Florida) that gives them political clout. Some say the attitudes
of the younger generation are softening toward Cuba. Does Washington really need to wait another generation or
two? The U.S. stand on Cuba is incomprehensible and only serves to look hypocritical and arbitrary in the eyes
of a world that doesnt understand the intricacies of American politics. Now that the election is over, there is a window of
opportunity to open up a full commercial and diplomatic relationship. Mr. Obama should use the full extent of his executive
powers to immediately relax restrictions, and Congress should pass legislation lifting the remaining legal
obstacles. Its time to forget about old grudges and remember that the best way to convert an enemy into a
friend is to embrace him. Instead of admiring Havanas old cars, Americans should be selling them new ones.
The U.S MUST lift the Embargo, has only produced negative results laundry list
Sven Khn von Burgsdorff US Policy towards Cuba: Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama AdministrationMarch
2009, Post-Graduate Diploma in Development Studies Deutsches Institut fr Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Berlin, Germany.
06.02.1987 Ph.D. in Political Science, Albert-Ludwigs-Universitt, Freiburg, Germany. 29.06.1984 M.A. in Political Science, AlbertLudwigs-Universitt, Freiburg, Germany., http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf
Contrary to all intended purposes the US embargo and the restrictions imposed under the Bush administration
did not succeed in ousting Fidel Castro or triggering regime change in Havana. The negative externalities
observed in the majority of countries against which economic sanctions had been applied, could also be
confirmed in the Cuban case: a) Since the US took an extremely public policy stance towards Cuba, Havana had a
distinct disincentive to offer any positive behavior to Washington in the face of threats and sanctions. Moreover,
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as a matter of both national pride and cool political calculations the Cuban leadership had to signal to the US
that human rights were non-negotiable sovereignty issues. b) From the outset the US sanctions failed in
mobilizing domestic opponents because they were simply too weak to challenge the regime. With the advent of the
Bush administration the sanctions even undermined the infant political opposition movements because the regime condemned opponents
by stigmatizing them as mercenaries paid by the US to topple the Cuban government. By
regime has successfully exploited the nearly five decade old embargo in general and the Bush
restrictions of 2004 in particular, by denouncing the measures as foreign aggression and calling for a rally-round-theflag as the only remedy to counteract the US assault on national sovereignty. Indeed, the quasi-totality of the Cuban
population rejects the US embargo, but mostly because it deprives them of access to US consumer goods and fluid contacts
with the American people, including those family members having fled the island. e) Furthermore, the Cuban regime succeeded in
translating the rally-round-the-flag effect into increased cohesion between the leadership and those strata of
society believing in the legitimacy of the goals of the Revolution, namely in the field of social justice. The regime, rather
successfully, painted the Revolutions social acquis as being under constant threat by the US embargo. As a result, important segments
of the Cuban population are fearful that the US agenda is not only driven by regime change but also by taking
away Cubas social agenda. f) Havana claims that total losses caused by the US embargo during the past 47 years stand at well
above 90 bio USD. Official US sources believe this figure to be in the range of some 120 mio USD annually since 1991 (some 2 bio USD
overall), i.e. after the collapse of the Soviet Union as Cubas key political ally and economic benefactor. In either case Havana
can
plausibly argue that the US sanctions affect negatively Cubas economic and social development and cause
harm to the Cuban people. g) The humanitarian and economic costs of the economic sanctions are clearly
instrumentalised by the regime and serve as a much welcome scapegoat for first, blaming inefficiencies and
hardship on the embargo, and second, justifying stifling public policy responses such as drastic austerity measures
to contain public spending or tighter control to fight informal sector activities. h) Last but not least, it comes as no
surprise that in a tightly state-controlled economy such as in Cuba, scarce economic resources will be increasingly
controlled by the most trusted segments of the regime, which in Cubas case is the military. Today, two thirds of
Cubas foreign exchange generating economic activities are directly managed or controlled by the armed forces.
The analysis of the impact of the US embargo against Cuba clearly demonstrates that the economic sanctions
did not only fail in attaining their intended purposes but also proved to be counterproductive in all respects and
at all levels. The US policy did not achieve any of its objectives and damaged severely the reputation of the United
States, isolating de facto the US in its policy approach towards Cuba (in November 2008 185 countries supported the Cuba-introduced
resolution against the US embargo at the UN General Assembly). It alienated traditional allies and partners because of the
extraterritorial application of US law, actually strengthened the Castro regime, weakened the opposition, and hurt the
Cuban population. The embargo policy even undermines national security interests of the US by not engaging in farsighted conflict prevention measures with a view to reducing the probability of a - however unlikely - mass
exodus of Cubans (as a result of a humanitarian crisis triggered by sudden and total regime breakdown in Havana).
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Mechanics
Plan Mechanics---Executive Order
Plan does not require congressional approval
Sweig, 13 [July/August 2013, Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America
Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are
Transforming the Island, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991]
The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new
diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana. In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical
problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile
nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy steps Obama should take at this stage -removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there,
and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain
with Havana. Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping
Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba can stand to become a more open,
democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could
have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on
the island for greater economic and political liberalization.
AT: Disads
AT: Cred/Appeasement
Cred/Appeasement---Embargo Worse
Removal Embargo boosts Cred more than it would hurt- international backlash proves
Safran, 12 [8/14/12, Brian Safran has a Master of Science in Global Affairs , End the Cuban Embargo - Brian
Safran, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran]
Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the
Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban
communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective.
Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its
having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is
of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing
its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as
justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize
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AT: Politics
Plan Popular
The Plan is politically viable
Bandow, 12 [12/11/12, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to
former US president Ronald Reagan, Time to End the Cuba Embargo,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo]
The embargo survives largely because of Floridas political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win
the Sunshine States electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc. But the
political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life
in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: for the first time in years,
maybe there is some chance for a change in policy. And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans
who support a more sensible approach to Cuba. Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some
exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more
than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United
States. Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He
also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.
Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has
defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he
voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was
probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a
crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo. There is
essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to explore
improving relations with Havana. Spains Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a
positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and
Cuba. The administration should move now, before congressmen are focused on the next election. President Obama
should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the embargo. He also could use his authority to
relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses to visit the island.
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ABC News Rick Klein reports: Fresh off a trip to Cuba that included a visit with both Fidel and Raul Castro, members
of the
Congressional Black Caucus are lobbying President Obama to lift the nations longstanding Cuba embargo,
and open up lines of communication with the Castros. Rep. Laura Richardson, D-Calif., said on ABCNews.coms "Top Line" today that
she and her colleagues want a complete elimination of the embargo first instituted by the Kennedy administration .
Click here to watch our interview with Richardson. Richardson said she welcomes the Obama administrations planned
loosening of travel and financial restrictions impacting those with relatives in Cuba but said she wants the president
to go further. "The real big steps that we have to take is looking at the embargo, and the question is, has the embargo worked for 50 years?"
said Richardson, who serves on the House Homeland Security Committee. "What I can tell you is, [from] when I went there, every country is
working with Cuba except the United States. And my question to you is, what has isolation gotten us in the last 10
years when weve isolated ourselves from other countries?" Such a move would fit with the presidents efforts to
remake Americas image, she said. Richardson said her visit to Cuba only confirmed her sentiments regarding the need to fundamentally
change the relationship between Cuba and the United States. "You know President Obama just two days ago when he was in Turkey, he talked
about turning the page," Richardson said. "The key, I think, to having progress is if youre actually talking to someone. Currently over the 50
years, maybe there has been limited progress in that area, so are we just gonna continue not to talk for another 50 years?" "So, the question is, we
can continue not to talk and not to have any progress, or we can sit down and maybe through those dialogues that they will see the benefits of
what weve gained, how we operate in this country, and as weve seen successes in other countries, I believe we would see the same in Cuba."
The White House has signaled that it will make changes to Cuba policies in advance of this months Summit of the Americas, specifically to
make it easier for those with family on the island nation to travel thereand send money to relatives. Congress is also expected to
consider a measure that would allow all Americans to travel freely to and from Cuba. But the president has not
indicated a willingness to lift the US trade embargo against Cuba, a cornerstone of American foreign policy toward one of the
nations closest neighbors for 47 years. The Castro regimes fiercest critics in Congress are promising to fight any effort to ease the terms of the
embargo, until or unless the Cuban government first commits to reforms such as releasing political prisoners and scheduling democratic elections.
"The position on the embargo is principle-driven . . . We should not be providing any type of unilateral concessions to that regime," Rep. Lincoln
Diaz-Balart and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, both Florida Republicans, said in a joint statement provided to ABC News. Of their colleagues trip to
Cuba, they added: "Its truly unfortunate that they did not dedicate any portion of the trip to meeting with the victims of repressions in Cuba, or
those who are advocating for human rights and a democratic transition." Those promising to fight changes in Cuba policy include some
prominent Democrats. "Our great nation should always stand for human freedom and democracy and against underwriting regimes that oppress,
suppress and murder," Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., the son of Cuban immigrants and head of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
said last week after fellow senators introduced legislation that would end the travel ban. But members of the Congressional Black
Caucus say theyre looking to the new administration to revamp policies of isolation that they view as outdated . "We
are convinced based on the meetings which were held, that the Cubans do want dialogue, they do want talks, and
they do want normal relations with USA, and I believe that its in the US best interest to do that," said Rep. Barbara
Lee, D-Calif., the caucus chairwoman, said Tuesday, after she and her colleagues returned from their trip to Cuba.
Cuban Americans, for the last 50 years one of the most reliable constituencies for Republicans, particularly in the
perennial swing state of Florida where most of them live, voted for the Democratic candidate in unprecedented
numbers. According to exit polls conducted by both Fox News and the Pew Hispanic Center, Obama beat Romney by a 49-47 percent margin
among Cuban-American voters in what one close observer of Florida politics called a historic demographic upset. A couple of other polls,
including one conducted by the highly respected Miami-based Bendixen-Amandi International polling firm, found Romney prevailing over
Obama among Cuban Americans, but only by a mere 52-48 percent margin.I think it has made clear that the Cuban-American
community is no longer as monolithically Republican as many interested parties would like them to thin k, Fernand
Amandi, the firms managing partner, told IPS Friday. What it means is that this administration will have more room to
maneouvre on Cuba policy than they ever thought they had, said Geoffrey Thale, a Cuba specialist at the Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA). U.S. policy for decades has been determined far more by political considerations about
the vote in Florida than foreign policy considerations, particularly toward Latin America which has called consistently for an end to
the U.S. embargo, Thale told IPS. So having more room in Florida means they have more flexibility in their policy if they choose to use it.
Like others, Thale stressed that Obama was unlikely to take major new steps to warm relations, particularly so long as Alan Gross, a U.S. Agency
for International Development contractor arrested in 2009 and sentenced to a 15-year prison term for crimes against the state, remains in jail. But
a greater opening toward Havana, including broadening current bilateral discussions and further relaxing curbs on
travel to Cuba, could be in the offing. While Florida remains the one state in the country whose electoral votes have not yet been cast
due to the continuing counting of ballots there, virtually all political analysts say they believe it will end up in Obamas column. He is currently
leading the state by one percent, or about 50,000 votes. If, as expected, he prevails, it will be largely due to the higher-than-anticipated Latino
turnout which Obama won by a 60-39 percent margin, according to most exit polls. That margin was considerably less than the 71-27 percent
spread in Obamas favour for all U.S. Latino voters, who made up a record 10 percent of the nationwide electorate this year and almost twice
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much in Florida. The largest group of Latin voters in Florida are of Cuban heritage about one-third of all Latinos in the state a clear
explanation for why Obama did not score as well with Latinos there as in every other state in the country. S till, the results in Florida
stunned most observers who interpreted them as a confirmation of a generational shift in Cuban-American political
attitudes. This is a generational phenomenon, said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue (IAD), a
Washington think tank. It reflects the passing of the old generation and the acceptance of new attitudes. Young Cuban
Americans are more open about dealing with Cuba and also have other issues that are important to them that Obama was able to capitalise on, he
told IPS, adding, however, that so long as Gross remains in prison, Obama is unlikely to do much more than he has already in terms of rolling
back many of the restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba that were imposed during the George W. Bush administration. While the Pew and
Fox News polls showed Obama winning the Cuban-American vote, the Bendixen survey was more detailed and confirmed the generational
divide. Cuban-born voters, it found, favoured Romney by 55 percent to 45 percent, but Cuban-American voters born in the U.S. voted for Obama
by a 60-40 margin. The Cuban-American community is changing, said Wayne Smith, a former head of the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana who resigned to protest Ronald Reagans hard-line policies and has been working for three decades to promote educational and scientific
exchanges between the two countries. The younger the community and the newer the immigrants, the more difficult it is for
the old hard-liners to control, Smith, who is based at the Center for International Policy, told IPS. Indeed, as recently as 1988, 85 percent
of Cuban Americans in Florida voted for the Republican presidential candidate George H.W. Bush in that year. Until now, the high-water mark
for a Democrat was Bill Clinton, who won 35 percent of the Cuban-American vote in 1996 and subsequently moved to ease rules governing
travel and remittances to Cuba. He also punched a big hole in the trade embargo by permitting agricultural exports to the island for the first time.
In 2000, however, Vice President Al Gore won only 25 percent of the Cuban-American vote in Florida, compared to George W. Bushs 75
percent. Eight years later, Obama equaled Clintons performance, as the generational shift appeared to take firmer hold. But this years
Democratic tally of 48-49 percent far exceeded expectations. While anti-Castro hardliners in the House of Representatives, most prominently
Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario Diaz Balart, held their seats on Tuesday, Joe Garcia soundly defeated another hard-line incumbent,
Rep. David Rivera, to become the first Cuban-American Democrat who explicitly favours better ties with Havana in
Congress. Another hard-line incumbent whose district includes the Little Havana section of Miami also fell to a
pro-engagement Cuban-American Democrat in the state legislature.
Winners Win
Plan is a win for Obama boosts his clout
Leogrande, 13 [4/11/13, William M. LeoGrande was the Dean of the American University School of Public
Affairs and frequent publisher and expert on Latin America, The Cuba Lobby,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the_cuba_lobby_jay_z?
print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]
The irrationality of U.S. policy does not stem just from concerns about electoral politics in Florida. The CubanAmerican community has evolved to the point that a majority now favors engagement with Cuba, as both opinion polls and
Obama's electoral success in 2008 and 2012 demonstrate. Today, the larger problem is the climate of fear in the government
bureaucracy, where even honest reporting about Cuba -- let alone advocating a more sensible policy -- can
endanger one's career. Democratic presidents, who ought to know better, have tolerated this distortion of the policy process and at times
have reinforced it by allowing the Cuba lobby to extort concessions from them. But the cost is high -- the gradual and insidious erosion of the
government's ability to make sound policy based on fact rather than fantasy. Through bullying and character assassination, the
China Lobby blocked a sensible U.S. policy toward Beijing for a quarter-century, with tragic results. When
Richard Nixon finally defied the China Lobby by going to Beijing in 1972, the earth did not tremble, civilization
did not collapse, and U.S. security did not suffer. If anything, U.S. allies around the world applauded the adoption
-- finally -- of a rational policy. At home, the punditocracy was surprised to discover that Nixon's bold stroke was
politically popular. The China Lobby proved to be a paper tiger; the Red Scare fever of the 1950s had subsided, robbing
the movement of its political base. Likewise, the Cuba Lobby has blocked a sensible policy toward Cuba for half
a century, with growing damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. When a courageous U.S. president finally
decides to defy the Cuba Lobby with a stroke as bold as Nixon's trip to China, she or he will discover that so too
the Cuba Lobby no longer has the political clout it once had. The strategic importance of repairing the United
States' frayed relations with Latin America has come to outweigh the political risk of reconciliation with Havana .
Nixon went to China, and history records it as the highlight of his checkered legacy. Will Barack Obama have the
courage to go to Havana?
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AT: Counterplans
AT: Conditions
Solvency Deficit---Relations/Chinese SOI
CP doesnt solve relations- Latin American says no and allows China to gain influence in
the region
Gallagher, 6/18 [6/18/13, Kevin P. Gallagher is an associate professor of international relations at Boston
University, where he coordinates the Global Development Policy Program, Time for a U.S. Pivot to Latin
America, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?storyid=10035]
Increasingly, Latin American countries see China not as a rival but as a valuable trading partner. In fact, explains
Kevin Gallagher, China has become a better partner in many ways than the United States. China is offering attractive
deals to Latin American economies, while the United States continues to lecture and dictate. It's time for a real reset in
U.S.-Latin American trade relations. The Obama administration and U.S. media have made much ado about the U.S. "pivot" to Asia.What
has largely escaped their attention, however, is that China has been lining up economic allies in the erstwhile "backyard" of the
United States. Well, just as serious competition ought to awaken one's creative juices in business, it is time for the United States to
step up a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too late. The difference in approaches by the
United States and China in Latin America were squarely brought into focus just in recent weeks when U.S. Vice President
Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made tours of Latin America. The United States principal offer to its Latin
American neighbors is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP offers access to the U.S. market to Latin American and
Asian nations on the basis of a triple form of conditionality. First, they must deregulate their financial markets; second,
adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms; and third, allow private U.S. firms to
directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for violating any of its conditions. Talk about a heavily
conditioned offering. So what's the Chinese approach? On his visit to the region, China's President Xi Jinping offered more
than $5.3 billion in financing, with few conditions attached, to China's newfound Latin American friends. These offers
will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: $3 billion in commitments to
eight Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3 billion to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit ,
including a $900 million dollar loan from the Chinese Development Bank for upgrading a petroleum refinery and a $400 million dollar line of
credit for road infrastructure from the Chinese Ex-Im Bank; and a $1 billion credit line from the China Ex-Im bank to Mexico for
its state-owned oil company PEMEX. Making available this financing comes on top of the already $86 billion in financing provided by China to
Latin American governments since 2003. Granted, that amount large as it sounds seems just like another number in
today's world. To put it into proper perspective, consider this: Since 2003, thus over the past decade, China's policy banks have
provided more finance to Latin America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and
the U.S. Export-Import Bank. If anything ought to awaken the United States from its past slumber and taking Latin
America essentially for granted, that comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the United States and the array of largely
Western-dominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by China's financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world! But
it's not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike U.S. trade treaties or the finance from the international financial
institutions largely under U.S. control, China offers up its loans come with few strings attached. In a region that
is understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and
the World Bank, China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities. That said, the Chinese don't lack a strong
commercial focus. Often times the Chinese provide a tied offer requiring that Chinese firms will be hired to conduct a bulk of the envisioned
project work. What is more, the U.S. offer of a Trans-Pacific Partnership to all of the Latin American countries in the TPP process doesn't amount
to much in the real world. They already have trade treaties with the United States that grant them access to the U.S. market.In just a few years,
China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two trading partner (for Peru and Mexico). These aren't just
any countries. They are the most important economies in Latin America. Of course, the United States is still the most important
economic partner for the region overall. However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long, the
United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism just telling Latin America what it needs. Compare that to
China's approach: It offers Latin America what it wants (in the form of financing and trade from China). When President Obama
took office, he and his team pledged to hit the reset button with the region and rethink its trade regime with Latin America. It hasn't worked out
that way. Thus far, "reset" has essentially meant making the same old offer, but via new faces. In addition, too much of the
interaction with regional governments has been on such efforts as concentrating on drug interdiction purposes. Those countries rightfully
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don't see that as much of a growth-enhancing development approach, but rather as a foreign-based, defensive
mechanism to protect the U.S. homeland. Given all that, it is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a
true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America. Very soon, it may be too late.
Say No
QPQs dont work
Calzon, 4/14 [4/14/13, Frank Calzon is executive director of the Center for a Free Cuba in Washington, Cuban
embargo: Castro wants money, not a dialogue, http://www.cubademocraciayvida.org/web/article.asp?artID=20969]
Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez died, and Ral Castro is searching for investors in Cuba. Chvez spent billions of
Venezuelas petro-dollars shoring up Cubas economy but Venezuelas new leaders may not be as beneficent. Venezuela may
cut off its Cuban subsidy, just as new Russian leaders did after the Soviet Unions demise. American taxpayers are at the top of
Castros list, but can the Cuban communist government cash in on its years of political theater proclaiming itself the victim of American
economic aggression while running its own economy into the ground and training and financing anti-American
insurgencies around the world? Perhaps it can, given that the collective U.S. memory is rather short if not wholly forgiving. Earlier this
year, Vermont Sen. Patrick Leahy visited the Cuban dictator and returned home saying this is the time to overcome continuing
obstacles and to improve relations because that would be in the best interests of both countries. The senator
means well, but his statements cry out for a more detailed appraisal of U.S.-Cuban relations. The real questions are:
Improve relations for what purpose? And under what conditions? It might be in Americas best interests to improve relations with
North Korea, Syria and Iran too, but the obstacles standing in the way are similar to those in Cuba. There is no quid
pro quo their leaders are willing to offer. Granted that while in Cuba, Sen. Leahy managed to wrangle permission from Gen. Castro
to visit Alan Gross, a subcontractor with the U.S.Agency for International Development, who is serving a 15-year prison sentence. Gross afterthe-fact crime was giving a laptop computer and satellite telephone to a Jewish organization seeking access to the Internet. Gross is innocent
and also quite ill. Amnesty International reports hes lost more than 100 pounds in prison, and he has developed a growth that may be cancerous.
Havana wont allow an American physician chosen by his family to see him. There are others. Amnesty International says that Calixto Martinez,
a Cuban independent journalist a reporter not working for state-run media was jailed when he went to Havanas international airport to ask
about a shipment of cholera medication sent by the World Health Organization. He has not been charged nor had a trial. Havana does not want
tourists to hear about a cholera outbreak. But, back to the benefits of lifting what remains of the U.S. embargo against the
Castros dynasty: Cuba is broke and has suspended payments to many creditors. There is no ban on American companies
selling foodstuffs or medicines to Cuba, which they do on a cash-and-carry basis. But Washington wont provide credit to Cuba, i.e., absorb the
loss if the regime fails to pay its suppliers. Thus American companies selling to Cuba get paid and American taxpayers arent on the hook when
the regime fails to pay what it owes. Individually, Cubans have no purchasing power to speak of. The government is the islands only
employer and pays workers the equivalent of $20 a month. Except for cigars, Cuba now has very little to sell to anyone. For 200 years, the
engine of Cubas economy was its sugar industry. It is now in shambles due to state planning. Lastly, the United States lists Cuba as a statesponsor of international terrorism. It does so, despite the best efforts of Ana Belen Montes, a high-ranking Defense Intelligence Agency analyst,
who presented Havana as peace-loving and no threat to anyone. Montes was a spy for Cuba. She pleaded guilty and is now in a federal
penitentiary. Her reports are still used by Castros advocates. It is difficult to improve relations with dictatorships that deny
human rights, ban labor unions and abuse and jail peaceful dissidents for talking about democracy. Visiting members of
European parliaments have been arbitrarily arrested in Cuba. President Obama tried unilaterally to extend a hand of
friendship without success. Today Havana wants money, not a meaningful dialogue that might lead to a
transition. Like Sen. Leahy, I wish things could be different, but that requires a demonstrable Castro initiative to change the
nature of his rule in Cuba.
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with the United States, calling such a proposition "a nonstarter." She added, "What I see there is the same mistake
previous administrations have made" by attempting to place conditions on Cuba.
into line with our policies toward immigrants from other countries; increasing discussions with Cubas political and
military leaders on affairs of mutual interest; and looking objectively at the reforms under way today and deciding
how Washington can promote change while defusing rather than stoking domestic conflict and tensions. Whatever else we
do, we must jettison our quid pro quo approach that holds essential U.S. policy changes hostage to repeated
vetoes by both Cuban-Americans in the States and Castroites in Havana.
The United States should not precondition action on changes in Cuba and should refrain from using
keywords and catchphrases that have had political cache at home but that inhibit the ability of the United States to
engage constructively. Instead of talking about isolating the Cuban regime, U.S. leaders should discuss the desire
for reconciliation with the people of Cuba. The next president should stop talking about transition in Cuba altogether,
which allows the Cuban government to suggest that the United States wants to intervene in its domestic affairs . U.S.
politicians should also cease referring to Cuban Americans as exiles. When eighty percent would elect to stay in the United States even if Cuba
became a democracy and three-quarters favor the ownership by current residents of properties in Cuba rather than returning them to their
original owners, it is clear that the vast majority of the community is no longer living in exile.92
Conditions dont work, the past 50 years prove, only worsens economies and relations
Sam Stern, May 30, 2012, THE COST OF CRISIS IN CUBA, http://dartmouthbusinessjournal.com/2012/05/the-cost-of-crisis-in-cuba/ ,
Writer ofr the Dartmouth Business Journal
The losses from trade that the United States incurs by imposing the Cuban embargo further exposes its absurdity.
The U.S. government promises to lift the ineffective embargo on the condition that Cuba transitions to democracy,
yet communist China remains Americas second largest trading partner. After 50 years, the embargo resembles more
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an outdated manifestation of the Cold War than an effort to improve the lives of Cuban citizens.nearly impossible for
entrepreneurs to create successful businesses.
Lifting the embargo, unilaterally and without Conditions has the most benefits
Jorge A. Sanguinetty April 2013, Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted?,
http://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/08/who-benefits-and-loses-if-the-us-cuba-embargo-is-lifted-by-jorge-a-sanguinetty/ , Director, Latin
American Program in Applied Economics at American University
The answer depends on the conditions under which the embargo is lifted. I focus on the expected distribution of benefits (and costs) between the
government and the Cuban population. A unilateral move by the US Government, without any quid pro quo by the Cuban
government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown
magnitude to the population at large. I posit that the magnitude of the latter depends on the degree of internal liberalization of the Cuban
economy. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or
constraints arguably more restrictive than the US embargo. What I have called the internal embargo consisted in the Cuban
government outright prohibition for Cubans to own enterprises, freely employ workers or trade domestically and internationally. To many
Cubans, probably a majority, such constraints were the main cause of the country s secular economic crisis.
that would have surrendered as much executive authority to Congress on any issue...as President Clinton did
in signing the Helms-Burton legislation.23 The problem with Clintons 5 Point Plan was not increasing remittances, travel and aid
to Cuba. The problem is that President Clinton severely limited executive power to relax, alter or even stop the
embargo altogether when he signed the Helms-Burton Act into law. Consequently, no president alone has the
latitude to implement policies strong enough to encourage significant change in Cuba . So Obama can certainly
plan to re-institute an increase in travel and remittances to Cuba, but as Clintons policy has already proven such minor
changes are not strong enough to serve as a catalyst for a change to democracy in Cuba.
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AT: Kritiks
Neolib
Neolib K---Perm Solvency
The Embargo is a tool of Neocolonialist ideology- the plan reverses that
Safran, 12 [8/14/12, Brian Safran has a Master of Science in Global Affairs , End the Cuban Embargo - Brian
Safran, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran]
Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the
Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban
communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective.
Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its
having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is
of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing
its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as
justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that
it fosters in many of its international engagements.