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HINTIKKAVS.FREGEONTHE"LOGICOF
BEING"
IgnacioAngelelli
0.INTRODUCTION*
HintikkablamesFregeandRussellforhavingestablishedinthetraditionofmodern
logicthe"dogma"oftheambiguityof"is"betweenexistence,predication,identity,and
classinclusion.TheaffirmationofthismultipleambiguityiscalledbyHintikkathe
"FregeRussellthesis".
Hintikka'scriticismoftheFregeRussellthesisis(asemphasizedbyHintikkahimselfin
SelfProfile1987a)twofold:theoretical(Englishdoesnothaveanddoesnotneedthe
distinctionofmeaningsof"is")andhistoriographical(preFregeantexts,tobeproperly
understood,donotneedtheretrospectiveprojectionofthatdistinction).
Fregeistherealculprit,ratherthanRussell.HintikkaviewshisdisputewithFregeas
pertainingto"thelogicofbeing"(aphraseapparentlycoinedbyhim;cf1979,endof
section10:"GametheoreticalsemanticsisthusmuchclosertoAristotle'sviewsonthe
logicofbeingthanisthereceivedview[Frege's]",emphasismine,butthetheoreticaland
historiographicaloppositiontoFregeconcerningthemeaningof"is",isonlyapartofa
moregeneral"revoltagainstFrege"(Hintikka1981b)undertakenbyHintikka.
TheaimofthispaperistoevaluatethesuccessofHintikka's"revolt"againstFregeinthe
particularissueoftheambiguityof"is".Insection(l)Idescribethethesisofthe
ambiguityof"is"attributedtoFregebyHintikkaandHaaparanta.In(2)Iexamine
Hintikka'sreasonsforrejectingthethesisoftheambiguityof"is".Section(3)isdevoted
toananalysisofthehistoriographicalcampaignaspresentedinthevolumeTheLogicof
Being.
FromthecriticismsIpresentineachoneofthethreesectionsitfollowsthatmyfinal,
globalevaluationisnegativeinallofthethreeaspectsunderconsideration:my
conclusionisthatHintikka's"revoltagainstFrege",intheissueofthe"logicofbeing",
hasnotsucceeded.
1.FREGEON"IS"
**AfirstdiscussionofHintikka'scriticismofFregewaspresentedin,andpublishedin
theproceedingsofthe"CongresoInternacionaldeFilosofa",Crdoba,Argentina,
September1987.Cf.myEntornoala"lgicadelser"deHintikka.

1.1.FREGEON"IS"ACCORDINGTOHINTIKKAANDHAAPARANTA
WhatHintikkaandHaaparantaclaimFregesaidabout'is'maybesummarizedas
follows:a)'is'('are',etc)hasfourmeanings:i)predication(p.81TLOB)orcopulative
meaning(p.ixofTLOB),ii)identity,iii)existence,iv)classinclusionorgeneric(p.ixof
TLOB);b)thesemeaningsare"mutuallyexclusive";c)thedistinctionisofmeanings(or
senses),notmerelyofuses(orforces)
Thereisvasttextualsupportformyformulationoftheconjuncts(a)and(c);lessfor(b).
ForHaaparanta's(a)thethreepublicationslistedinthebibliographymaybeconsulted:
1985,p.14;1986b,p.269;1986ap.157;forHaaparanta's(b):1986b,p.269:"several
altogetherdifferentmeanings";for(c)ibid.
WithregardtoHintikka's(a):hehasapparentlymovedfromaninitialhesitationbetween
athreefoldandafourfolddistinction(dependingonwhether"classinclusion"iscounted
ornotasoneFregeansenseof"is",cf.Hintikkal979,l984,whichisapaperreadin
1979)toafullendorsementof(a):Hintikka1981,l983,1986a,1986b,1987a,1987b.
ConcerningHintikka's(b)thereisadifficulty:Hintikkainhis1979,p.442,assertsthat
"theFregeanreadingsaremutuallyexclusive";therevisedreprint,however,doesnot
includethisphraseanymore.Theeditorsexplain(p.xi)thatthepaperwas"reprinted
withanumberofminorchanges".Theeliminationofthementionedassertioniscertainly
notminor.
WithregardtoHintikka's(c):cf.1979b,p.448("undeniablediscrepanciesbetween
differentuses"),1983,section3,p.207("this[theexistenceofdifferentusesof"is",
which"noonedoubts"]doesnotimplythatwearedealingwitharealambiguity");1984
p.37("Iamnotdenyingthattherearedifferentusesof"is"").Hintikkausestheterm
"force"asavariantof"use"andtheterm"sense"asavariantof"meaning";forexample,
inhisAristotlepaperinTLOB(p.82,96).
1.2FREGEON"IS"ACCORDINGTOFREGE
1.2.1SUBORDINATION
ContrarytoHintikka'sandHaaparanta'sclaims,Fregeneverdistinguishesan"is"of
subordinationasopposedtoan"is"takeninanothersense.Infact,relativetothetypeof
sentencesconsideredbyFregetherewasnoreasonwhyheshouldhavesingledouta
subordinationsenseof"is".Ibelievethatthereisinthisconnectionamisunderstanding
thatneedsacarefulclarification.
i)Theprincipalfeatureoftraditional,Aristotelian,predicationtheoryasopposedto

modern,Fregeanpredicationtheorywasthatthecomponents,marks,ofauniversal(its
notae)werepredicatednotonlyoftheindividualsfallingundertheuniversalbutalsoof
theuniversalitself;forinstance,animalwaspredicatedofman.Equivalently,the
universalwassubject(ofpredication)ofitsowncomponents(mansubjectofanimal)
ii)Forourpresentdiscussionitisimportanttoobservethatthejustmentioned
predications,inwhichauniversalissubjectofoneofitsownmarks,occurredintwo
forms:i)indefinitecategoricals(i.e.categoricalswithoutquantifiers)withthesubjectin
thesingular:"homoestanimal";quantifiedcategoricals:"omnishomoestanimal".The
formerwerequitefrequentinLatinlogics,buttendedtodisappearfromlogicswrittenin
modernEuropeanlanguages,suchasGermanorEnglish,aquantifieroradefinitearticle
beingprefixedtotheuniversalterm(arareexceptionis"man"inEnglish).
iii)Fregerejectedtheprincipalfeatureoftraditionalpredicationtheory;inhis
terminology,marksofaconceptarenotpredicatedoftheconceptsofwhichtheyare
marks(openinglinesofGRL53).Subordinationbetweentwoconceptsshouldbe
distinguishedfromthesubsumptionofanobjectunderaconcept.Thus,forexample,
accordingtoFrege,homoisnotsubject(ofanimal)andanimalisnotpredicate(ofhomo)
eitherintheindefiniteform"homoestanimal",orinthequantifiedform"omnishomo
estanimal".Homoandanimalstandinthesubordinationrelation,whereasSocrates
standstoanimal,ortohomo,inthesubsumptionrelation.
iv)HowdoesthisFregeanrevolutionaffecttheverb"est"?Here,Ibelieve,itiscrucialto
distinguishbetweentheindefiniteandthequantifiedcategoricals.Withregardtothe
latter,thereisnoreason,fromaFregeanpointofview,tosayanythingabout"est";in
"omnishomoestanimal"theword"est"expressesthesubsumptionofwhateverx
happenstobehomounderanimal.Allweneedistoaddasecond"est"ofsubsumption,
asforinstanceRauedidinthe17thcentury:"omneidquodesthomo,estanimal".
Withregardtotheindefiniteformofcategoricalsthesituationisdifferent;the"est"of
"homoestanimal"cannotbeclaimedasasubsumption"est";fromaFregeanstandpoint
oneisforcedtodistinguishthe"est"in"homoestanimal"fromthe"est"in"Socratesest
animal",andtosaythattheformermeanssubordination,thelattersubsumptionor
genuinepredication.
v)AsFregedoesnotseemtohaveconsideredindefinitecategoricalsfromthescholastic
literature,butratherthequantifiedonesinGermanwritings,hedidnothavetosingleout
asubordinationuseof"is".HadFregeconsideredindefinitecategoricalshewouldhave
probablymadethedistinctionbetweenasubordination"est"andasubsumption"est",just
asheobservedthatSchrder'ssymbolofEinordnungwasambiguousbetween
membershipofanobjectinaclassandinclusionofaclassinanotherclass(KSCHp.).
Again,hadFregereadthat,accordingtoAbelard,inthesentence"homoestanimal"
"animalpraedicatur,homoverosubicitur"("animalispredicate,manissubject",quoted
byJacobi,inHintikka'sTLOB,fn.100),hewouldhavecertainlyobjectedthat"homo"is
notsubjectofthepredicate"animal"andhewouldhaveprobablyobservedthatthe"est"

doesnotexpresspredicationbutUnterordnung,subordination.
1.2.2EXISTENCE
InonlyoneoccasionFregereferstotheexistential"is".ThishappensinhisDialogmit
Pnjer.Theissueiswhetherinthesentences"thistableexists"and"therearetables"(but
notethatGermandoesnotbringintheverb"tobe"atall,asithas"esgibt"ratherthan
"thereare")thephrases"exists"and"esgibt"haveornotthesamecontent(p.68).The
dialoguecouldhavebeencarriedoutwithoutevenmentioning"is"or"tobe",butata
certainpointFregeuses"is"[ist]insteadof"exists"[existiert];insteadofsaying"Leo
Sachseexistiert"Fregewrites"LeoSachseist".
Notonlyisthistheonlyreferencetotheexistential"is"inFrege'scorpus;thereference
is,moreover,quitenegative.Fregeregardssuchauseof"is"asuninformative,emptyand
intheenda"deification"ofthecopula(Vergtterung,wronglytranslatedinto
"apotheosis"inthePosthumousWritings,p.64).
Totalkofa"Fregethesis",asHintikkadoes,withrespecttotheexistential"is"isclearly
disproportionedbutitappearstobeevenmoresowhenonelearnsthatforcenturiesthe
existential"is"hadbeen,contrarytoFrege'sviewofit,firmlyestablishedandrespected
inthephilosophicalliterature.ThefollowingpassagefromSt.Thomasisparticularly
attractive:
"considerandumestquodhocverbumestquandoqueinenunciationepraedicatursecundumse;utcum
dicitur,Socratesest:perquodnihilaliudintendimussignificare,quamquodSocratessitinrerumnatura."
(InPerihermeneias,212).

1.2.3IDENTITY
Theonlydistinction,amongthoselistedbyHintikka,seriouslymadebyFregeisthat
betweenthe"is"ofidentityandthe"is"ofpredication.Therearemanytextsonthis
issue:1)GRL57,2)BGGE,inKSp.1689,3)lettertoLinke,inBriefwechsel,4)
KSCH,inKSp.200,5)LUM,Nachlassp2589,6)LUM,Nachlassp.2556,7)UGG,
inKSp.297,8)WIF,inKSp.280.Perhapsthemostcomprehensiveaccountisgivenby
(2):
DerBegriffwieichdasWortversteheistprdikativ[EristnmlichBedeutungeinesgrammatischen
Prdikats].EinGegenstandsnamehingegen,einEigennameistdurchausunfhig,alsgrammatisches
Prdikatgebrauchtzuwerden.[...]Kannmannichtebensogutvonetwasaussagen,esseiAlexanderder
Grosse,oderesseidieZahlVier,oderesseiderPlanetVenus,wiemanvonetwasaussagenkann,essei
grn,oderesseieinSugetier?Wennmansodenkt,unterscheidetmannichtdieGebrauchsweisendes
Wortes"ist".IndenletztenbeidenBeispielendientesalsKopula,alsblossesFormwortderAussage.Als
solcheskanneszuweilendurchdieblossePersonalendungvertretenwerden.Manvergleichez.B."dieses
Blattistgrn"und"diesesBlattgrnt".Wirsagendann,dassetwasuntereinenBegrifffalle,unddas
grammatischePrdikatbedeutetdabeidiesenBegriff.IndenerstendreiBeispielenwirddagegendas"ist"
wieinderArithmetikdasGleichheitszeichengebraucht,umeineGleichungauszusprechen.ImSatze"der
MorgensternistdieVenus"habenwirzweiEigennamen"Morgenstern"und"Venus"frdenselben

Gegenstand.IndemSatze"derMorgensternisteinPlanet"habenwireinenEigennamen:"die
Morgenstern"undeinBegriffswort:"einPlanet".Sprachlichzwaristnichtsgeschehen,alsdassdie
"Venus"ersetztistdurch"einPlanet";abersachlichistdieBeziehungeineganzanderegeworden.Eine
Gleichungistumkehrbar;dasFalleneinesGegenstandesuntereinenBegriffisteinenichtumkehrbare
Beziehung.Das"ist"imSatze"derMorgensternistdieVenus"istoffenbarnichtdieblosseKopula,
sondernauchinhaltlicheinwesentlicherTeildesPrdikats,sodassindenWorten"dieVenus"nichtdas
ganzePrdikatenthaltenist.Manknntedafrsagen:"derMorgensternistnichtsanderesalsdieVenus",
undhierhabenwir,wasvorhinindemeinfachen"ist"lag,invierWorteauseinandergelegt,undin"ist
nichtsanderesals"istnun"ist"wirklichnurnochdieKopula.Washierausgesagtwird,istalsonichtdie
VenussondernnichtsanderesalsdieVenus.

ThefollowingEnglishversionisfromTranslations:
Theconcept(asIunderstandtheword)ispredicative[fn:Itisinfactthereferenceofagrammatical
predicate].Ontheotherhand,anameofanobject,apropername,isquiteincapableofbeingusedasa
grammaticalpredicate.[...]Can'tonejustaswellassertofathingthatitisAlexandertheGreat,oristhe
numberfour,oristheplanetVenus,asthatitisgreenorisamammal?Ifanybodythinksthis,heisnot
distinguishingtheusagesoftheword"is".Inthelasttwoexamplesitservesasacopula,asamereverbal
signofpredication.(InthissensetheGermanwordistcanbereplacedbythemerepersonalsuffix:cf.dies
BlattistgrnanddiesBlattgrnt.)Wearesayingthatsomethingfallsunderaconcept,andthe
grammaticalpredicatestandsforthisconcept.Inthefirstthreeexamples,ontheotherhand,"is"isused
likethe"equals"signinarithmetic,toexpressanequation.Inthesentence"ThemorningstarisVenus"we
havetwopropernames,"morningstar"and"Venus",forthesameobject.Inthesentence"themorningstar
isaplanet"wehaveapropername,"themorningstar"andaconceptword,"planet".Sofaraslanguage
goes,nomorehashappenedthanthat"Venus"hasbeenreplacedby"aplanet";butreallytherelationhas
becomewhollydifferent.Anequationisreversible;anobject'sfallingunderaconceptisanirreversible
relation.Inthesentence"themorningstarisVenus","is"isobviouslynotthemerecopula;itscontentisan
essentialpartofthepredicate,sothattheword"Venus"doesnotconstitutethewholeofthepredicate.One
mightsayinstead:"themorningstarisnootherthanVenus";whatwaspreviouslyimplicitinthesingle
word"is"isheresetforthinfourseparatewords,andin"isnootherthan"theword"is"nowreallyisthe
merecopula.WhatispredicatedhereisthusnotVenusbutnootherthanVenus.

Fromthejustquotedtexts,inconjunctionwiththeothers,itappearsthatFregethoughtof
"is"ashaving(atleast?)twouses[Gebrauchsweisen].Inoneoftheseusestheword"is"
isamerecopula,a"mereformalwordoftheenunciation"(freelyrenderedbyGeachand
Blackas"mereverbalsignofpredication"),hasnopropermeaning(keineneigenenSinn
hat,text3),lacksanyparticularcontent(ohneirgendeinenbesonderenInhalt,text4).In
itsotheruse,theword"is"doeshaveameaning,aSinn,astext(1)says,whichisthe
meaningofthephrase"thesameas"or"identicalto".
Thisisareal(sachlich,text2,quotedabove)distinction,revealedbythefactthatinone
use(identity)"AisB"convertsinto"BisA"butnotintheotheruse(text2,quoted
above).Thedistinctionofthetwousesisconcealed(verhllt)byordinarylanguage(text
3).ThereisofcourseinFregethenormativeapproachtologicandlanguageatwork:the
mereobservationthattherearetwousesinordinaryGermanisnottheend;itisnecessary
toadjustournotation;thus,forinstance,itisanerrortoreadanidentitysentence"A=B"
as"AisB"(text8,also6).
FromFrege'stextsonemightthinkthatitiscorrecttoinferthatinthecopulause"is"

doeshaveameaningafterall,whichwouldappeartobenothinglessthatFrege's
"fundamentallogicalrelation",i.e.thefallingofanobjectunderaconcept,subsumption,
oritsconverse,predication(text7saysthattheoutputofoneuseof"is"isan
Identittssatz,theoutputoftheotheruseisaSubsumtionssatz.)However,itisobvious
thisisnotwhatFregewants.Foronething,itiswrongtothinkofSubsumtionasitwasa
thirditeminadditiontotheobjectandtheconcept(cf.berSchnflies,p.193).Atany
rate,inthecopulause"is"performstherathersyntacticalfunctionof"makingthe
predicateknown",introducingorannouncingthepredicate(text3:alsKopula[...]nur
dasPrdikatalssolcheskenntlichmacht).
Inspiteofallthedifferences,thecopula"is"isnotrelatedtotheidentity"is"inaway
thatmightbecalled"mutuallyexclusive";rather,theidentityuseincludesthecopulause,
althoughnotviceversa:in"themorningstarisnootherthanVenus",thecopula"is"is
partofthepredicate"isnootherthanVenus"(cf.endofquotedtext2).
Afterestablishingthatthe"is"ofsubsumptionandthe"is"ofidentityareseriously
distinguishedbyFrege,thequestionarisesofFrege'soriginalityinthisrespect.Strictly
speaking,theanswermustbenegative,inviewofthefactthatthesamedistinctionwas
alreadymadebyAquinas(Weidemann,inHintikka'sTLOBp.183)
1.2.4ASSERTION
Finally,thereisoneuse,orperhapsbetter"force"(Kraft)of"is"thatFregesinglesout
quitecarefullybutismissinginHintikka'slistaswellasinHaaparanta'slist(1985p.14)
althoughsheknowsquitewellofit(ibid.,ch.5,2).Thisistheassertive"is".Thetextsare
briefandmaybequotedinfull:
1)berSchnflies,p.192:DieKopula"ist"rechnenwirmitzudiesemSatzteile.Abermitihristinder
Regeletwasverbunden,vondemwirhierabsehenmssen:diebehauptendeKraft.
PosthumousWritings(p.177):Wecountthecopula"is"asbelongingtothispartofthesentence.Butthere
isusuallysomethingcombinedwithitwhichheremustbedisregarded:assertoricforce.
2)EinleitungindieLogik,p.201:MankanneinenGedankenausdrcken,ohneihnzubehaupten.Doch
fehltesindenSprachenaneinemWorteoderZeichen,dasalleindieAufgabehttezubehaupten.Sowird
esauchindenLogiken,wieesscheint,dasPrdizierenverquicktmitdemUrteilen.
PosthumousWritings(p.185):Wecanexpressathoughtwithoutassertingit.Butthereisnowordorsign
inlanguagewhosefunctionissimplytoassertsomething.Thisiswhy,apparentlyeveninlogicalworks,
predicatingisconfusedwithjudging.
3)EinleitungindieLogik,p.207:Das"ist"musshieraberimmerohnebehauptendeKraftgenommen
werden.
PosthumousWritings(p.191):Butthe"is"heremustbetakenthroughoutasbeingdevoidofassertoric
force.

4)EinleitungindieLogik,p.211:ImGrundebesagtjaauchderSatz"Esistwahr,dass2einePrimzahlist"
nichtmehralsderSatz"2isteinePrimzahl".WennwirimerstenFalleeinUrteilaussprechen,soliegtdas
nichtindemWorte"wahr"sonderninderbehauptendeKraf,diewirdemWorte"ist"beilegen.Dasknnen
wiraberebensogutimzweitenSatzetun,undderSchauspieleraufderBhnez.B.wrdedenersten
ebensogutwiedenzweitenohnebehauptendeKraftaussprechenknnen.
PosthumousWritings(p.194):Infactatbottomthesentence"itistruethat2isprime"saysnomorethan
thesentence"2isprime".Ifinthefirstcaseweexpressajudgement,thisisnotbecauseoftheword"true",
butbecauseoftheassertoricforcewegivetotheword"is".Butwecandothatequallywellinthesecond
sentence,andanactoronthestage,forexample,wouldbeabletoutterthefirstsentencewithoutassertoric
forcejsutaseasilyasthesecond.

5)KurzebersichtmeinerlogischenLehren,p.214:AblsungderbehauptendeKraftvomPrdikate.Wir
knneneinenGedankenfassen,ohneihnalswahranzuerkennen.[...]EsbestehtdasBedrfnis,einen
Gedankenauszudrcken,ohneihnalswahrhinzustellen.InderBegriffsschrifthabeicheineigenes
ZeichenmitbehauptenderKraft:denUrteilsstrich.IndenmirbekanntenSprachenfehlteinsolches
Zeichen,unddiebehauptendeKraftistmitdemIndikativindenHauptstzenfestverbunden.

PosthumousWritings(p.198):Dissociatingassertoricforcefromthepredicate.Wecangraspathought
withoutrecognizingitastrue[...]Weneedtobeabletoexcpressathoughtwithoutputtingitforwardas
true.IntheideographyIuseaspecialsigntoconveyassertoricforce:thejudgementstroke.Thelanguages
knowntomelacksuchasign,andassertoricforceiscloselyboundupwiththeindicativemoodofthe
sentencethatformsthemainclause.

1)Fregedoesnottalkofaspecialmeaningof"is"butofaspecial"force"(Kraft).
2)HeisnotsatisfiedwiththemereobservationthatinordinaryGermantherearethese
diverseforcesof"is";hewantsanotationthatreflectsthatdifference(texts2and5).The
famousverticalstrokeinhisideographyispreciselyintendedtoexpressassertion.
3)Fromahistoricalpointofview,Frege'sdistinctionbetweenassertion(Urteil,
Behauptung)andpredicationis,likeotherdistinctionsofhis(Begriff,conceptinan
objectivesensevs.conceptinasubjectivesense;conceptsoffirstandofsecondlevel,
etc.)novelonlyrelativetothesocalled"modernphilosophers"(fromDescartes
onwards),whotendedtoforgetthegoodoldscholasticteachings.Inthescholastic
traditionthedistinctionisquitevulgaris.Ithassurvivedeventhroughneoscholastics
texts(forexample,Maritain:thecopula"is"hasa"doublefunction":"merely
copulative"and"properlyjudicative").
1.3CONCLUSIONS
OurexaminationoftheFregeantextsconcerningthemeaningof"is"showsthatthe
HintikkaHaaparantareportonFrege's"is"isfarfromaccurate.
Asforpart(a),oneoftheitemsattributedtoFrege(subordination)isnotinFrege,oneof
theitemsactuallyinFrege(assertion)isnotinHintikka'sorHaaparanta'slist(butifit
wereitcouldhardlybecountedasFrege'sinvention).Itisquiteinadequatetoattributeto
Fregetheexistential"is":neitherheinventeditnorhelikedit!.Eventhedistinction

betweenidentityandpredication,soemphaticallydefendedbyFrege,cannot,strictly
speaking,bepresented,accordingtotoday'sscholarship,asacontributiononthesame
leveloforiginalitystillenjoyed,forinstance,byFrege'snewpredicationtheory.
Withregardtopart(b),Ialreadyobservedthatitisinappropriatetosaythattheidentity
"is"andthepredication"is"areforFrege"mutuallyexclusive".Tosaythattheyare
"altogetherdifferent"isacceptable,butonlybecausethephraseisvague.
Asforpart(c),HintikkaandHaaparantashouldhavediscussedFrege'sspeakingofuses
andforcesof"is"ratherthanofthemeaningsof"is",inordertodetermineifitisjustan
externalcoincidencewiththeirfavoredterminology.
2HINTIKKA'SREJECTIONOFTHETHESISONTHEAMBIGUITYOF"IS"
2.1THEPROBLEM
FromareadingoftheHintikka'spaperscitedinthebibliography,thefollowingseemsto
beanadequatedescriptionofhisapproachtothesemanticsof"tobe".
Hintikkastartsfromarecognitionofthefactthattherearewhatmightbecalled
semanticaldiscrepanciesamongtheoccurrencesof"is".Heobservesthatthe"is"of
"Jackisaboy"isclearlypredicative,whilethe"is"of"JackisJohnJr."isclearlyoneof
identity(1987a,p.36).
Thequestionisnextwhetherthesesemanticaldiscrepanciescanbeconstruedasmere
differencesofuse,asjustrepresentingdifferentuses(orforces),orhavetobeseenas
differencesinmeaning(sense).
Thecriterionfordistinguishingbetweenuseandmeaningisthefollowing:asemantic
discrepancyisjustofuseifthecontextsufficestoresolveit,sothataspecialnotation
(suchas,inthecaseof"is":,=,etc)isnotrequired.Onthecontrary,ifthecontextfails
toresolvethediscrepancy,thenaspecialnotationisrequiredandwehaveagenuine
ambiguity,oradifferenceofmeanings.
2.2HINTIKKA'STHESIS
Hintikka'sthesisisthatthevarietyofdirectionsinwhich"is"seemstoperformdoesnot
involveanambiguityofmeanings;themeaning,heclaims,isonlyone:"theallegedly
differentsensesof'is'[suchaspredicative,identity]simplycannotbedistinguishedfrom
eachother"(1987a,p.37).
Thus,forexample,Hintikkaaffirmsthatthe"is"of"Jackisaboy"andthe"is"of"Jack
isJohnJr."are"identicalinmeaning"(1979,p.440),"synonyms"(1979,p.442),
"synonymous"(1984,p.36).

Thesynonymityoruniquenessofmeaningof"is"ispresentedbyHintikkaasa
consequenceofafeatureofhisgametheoreticalsemanticsordialogues("itfollows",
1979,p.440;"therefore"ibid.,endofsection8intheoriginalversion,beginningof
section9intherevisedreprint;"invirtueof",1984,p.36;"hence",1987a,p.367).The
featureinquestionisthatinHintikka'sdialoguesalltheoccurrencesof"is"areleft
untouchedbythe(presumablytruthpreserving)ruleswhichgraduallyleadfrom
compoundstocomponents.Thus,forinstance,"JackisJohnJr."isobtainedfrom"Jackis
aboy"byasubstitutionof"JohnJr."for"aboy"thatleavesuntouchedtheword"is".
Thisisfoundi)in1979(endofsection8,beginningofsection9intherevisedreprint),
wherethe"is"of"JackisJohnJr."isviewedasa"descendant"ofthe"is"in"Jackisa
boy";ii)1987a,whereHintikkapointsoutthatthetwo"is"are"oneandthesameword,
infactpartofthe[expression]whichremainsconstant[emphasismine]inthetransition"
from"Jackisaboy"to"JackisJohnJr.".
Ofcoursethis"proof"makesthethesisoftheuniquenessofmeaningof"is"validonly
forthedialogicalgames.Infact,Hintikkaemphasizesthathisclaimson"is"arerelative
tohischosengametheoreticalsemantics:"InaFregeansemantics,"is"ismanifoldly
ambiguous;ingametheoreticalsemanticsnosuchambiguityexists"(1984,p.38).Still,
healsoentertainsthenotionthathisthesisontheuniquenessofmeaningof"is"holds
absolutelyforEnglishberhaupt:
Firstandforemost,theredoesnotseemtobeasingleEnglishsentencewhichinfacthasseveralreadings
becauseoftheallegedambiguityof"is"[...]Henceonanytheory,howevermanysensesof"is"itmay
postulate,thedifferencesbetweendifferentusesof"is"canalwaysbeexplainedbyreferencetothe
context.Afterall,itisthecontextthatalwayssuffices(ifmyclaimisright)toresolvethealleged
ambiguity.(1979,section16)

ThereisinHintikka'stheorynotonlythemeaningof"is"buteventhebasicmeaningof
"is":
EventhoughinthebasicmeaningofestiwecannottelltheallegedlydifferentFregeansensesapart,
contextualfactorsmayonoccasionhavetheeffectofalmostseparatingfromeachotherthedifferent
FregeRussellforcesandnearlyeliminatingallbutoneofthem( 1986a,endofsection3,p.98,emphasis
mine)

Similarphrasesoccurinthesamepaper:"thebasicsemanticalforceofesti"(p.86),"the
basicsemanticalmeaningofesti"(p.87).
2.3CRITICISM
a)Letusbeginwiththebasicmeaningof"is".Twointerrelatedquestionsarisehere.
First,whatisthedenotationofsuchsophisticateddescriptionsas"thebasicmeaningof
is","thebasicsemanticalforceofesti"?.ThereaderexpectsfromHintikkathelogiciana
clearaccountofthatxsuchthatxisameaningof"is",xisbasic,andxistheonlyentity
fulfillingsuchconditions.Butthereseemstobenotevenahintatananswer.Wearetold

10

that"thebasicsemanticalmeaningofestiisneutralwithrespecttothedifferentFregean
senses"(p.87),whichisamerelynegativeexplanation.
Secondly,thereisthequestionofwhatistherelationshipofthebasicmeaningtothe
varioususesorFregeansenses:isitlikefromindeterminatetodeterminate(horsetothis
orthathorse),inwhichcasewewouldnotexpectthebasicmeaningtooccurassuch
ever,oristhebasicmeaningofthesortthatthereareoccurrencesof'is'whichconveythe
basicmeaningandnothingbutthebasicmeaning?Noanswertothesequestionsisfound
inthepertinentHintikka'swritingsIhaveconsulted.
Fortheconsiderationofthesequestionsitmightberelevanttopointoutthatinthe
volumeTLOBwefindseveralphrasesthatremindusoftheoldanalogiaentis:"focal
meaning"(1986a,p.108),"analogousterm"(1986b,p.xiii),andeven"analogicalfocal
meaningtheoryof'is'"(1986b,p.xiv).ElsewhereHintikkawrites:"Aristotle
distinguishesbetweenoutrightambiguity(homonymy)ofawordanditsbeingusedin
manyways(pollakhoslegetai)"(1987b,commentsonthepaperlistedas1973b).ButIfail
toseeanyspecificwayofunderstandingHintikka'sviewson"is"intermsofthe
Aristotelianscholasticanalogyofbeing.
b)Letusremove"basic"fromthephrase"thebasicmeaningofis",andjustconsiderthe
description"themeaningofis".Whatisthatuniqueentityperformingtheroleof
denotatumofthedescription"themeaningofis"?Thisquestionremainsunresolved.Itis
notpredication,itisnotidentity,whatisthen?Hintikkadoesnotanswer.
c)Aswesaw,Hintikkabaseshisclaimthatrelativetohisdialogues"is"hasjustone
meaningonthefactthatthedialogicaldevelopmentleaves"is"untouched.Thisis
howeveronlypartofthetruth.The"is"mayremainuntouched"inside"thedialogue,but
itmustbecarefullywatchedatametadialogicallevelinordertosecurebothacorrect
constructionandtheappropriatefinaldeterminationofthetruthvalueoftheatomic
sentences.
First,oneofthedialogicalrules,called(G.an),takesfromsentencesoftheform"...is
a...",where"a"isunderstoodasanexistentialquantifier,toasetofsentencesoneof
whichisagainofthesameform"...isa...".Hintikkastopstheregressbystipulatingthat
therule(G.an)doesnotapplytosentencesoftheform"...isa..."whenthelatterexpress
predication(1977,section4;1979,section6).
Secondly,oncethedialoguesreachatomicsentencestheissueofthetruthvalueofthe
latternaturallyarises.InthisconnectionHintikkapointsoutthatanatomicsentence"bis
Y"thatexpressespredicationistobeevaluatedaccordingtowhetheritattributesornot
tobthepropertyorcomplexofpropertiesexpressedbyY(1979,section6).Presumably,
ifYwasasingularterm,theevaluationwouldhavetofollowdifferentinstructions,such
as:istheobjectdesignatedby"Y"thesameastheobjectdesignatedby"b"?

11

d)Hintikka'sanswertothejuststatedobjectionwouldprobablybethatneitherinsidethe
dialoguesnorinthemetadialogicalreflectionaspecialnotationforthevarioususesof
"is"hastobeeverintroduced:thecontextalwayswilltell.Asnotedearlier,Hintikka
thinksofthisclaimasholdingforordinarylanguagengeneral,notjustforafragmentof
it.HeretheobviousobjectionisthatsuchaclaimhasnotbeenestablishedbyHintikka.
Relativetotheordinary,unregimented,language,theclaimmayevenfailtobeproof
definite(i.e.onedoesnotevenknowwhataproofofitwouldbelike).Relativetoan
alreadyregimentedlanguagelaFrege,withsharpdelimitationofsingulartermsand
predicates,theclaimmayfarebetterbutthenanewobjectionemerges:theacceptanceof
regimentationinsomeareasandtherefusaltoclarifytheuseof"is"bymeansofaspecial
notationdonotconstituteacoherentbehavior.
2.4CONCLUSIONS.TWOAPPROACHESTOLANGUAGE
MyconclusionisthatHintikkadoesnotreallyopposetotheambiguityof"is"butonlyto
itsrecognitionthroughsomespecialnotationinwrittenororallanguage.Itisquite
irrelevantwhetherweusetheterm"ambiguity"oranyotherphrasethatHintikkamight
prefer:semanticvarieties,varietyofuses,forces,etc.Thefactisthatthereisaplurality
ofwaysofunderstanding"is"andthatthispluralityisfullyrecognizedbyHintikka
exceptwhenitcomestoexpressingitinwriting(ororally).Herehesays"no",andhe
truststhathecansay"no"byprovingeventuallythatitisnotnecessarytoreflectthe
semanticpluralityintheformofadifferentiatednotation.Frege,onthecontrary,is
alwaysanxioustoexpressrelevantsemanticaldiscrepanciesbyspecialsymbols.
ImagineHintikkaandFregereadingthefirstthesisofWittgenstein'sTractatus:"DieWelt
istalles,wasderFallist".Fregepointsoutthatthefirst"ist"isofidentity,whilethe
secondispredicative(copula,cf.hislastlettertoWittgenstein,p.26).Wemaysuppose
thatHintikkaagreeswiththisdistinction,buthewouldcertainlydisagreeatthemoment
Fregedemandedarewritingofthethesis,as"DieWelt=alles,wasderFallist"oras
"DieWeltistdasselbewiealles,wasderFallist"(thelatterformulationisbasedon
Frege'sownrecommendation).
Itiscertainlyawkward,oreveninconsistent,toacknowledgementaldifferencesbutto
prohibittheirsymbolic,writtenrepresentation.WhatcanbethereasonwhyHintikka
refusestoexpressinlanguagethedifferencesthatheacknowledgesin"is"?Icanonly
imagine,asexplanation,thatlanguageisviewedasapieceofnaturethatshouldnotbe
disturbed;Englishhas"is"anditiswrongtotamperwithit.Thislinguisticnaturalism(or
"environmentalism")isofcoursepreposterous,sincelanguageisnotapieceofnature,
butapieceofculture(thephrase"naturallanguage"isaspreposterousas,say,"natural
aircraftcarrier").Whilepiecesofnatureshouldberespected,toolsofcultureshouldbe
improved,asFregeinsistedthroughouthislifewithregardtolanguage.
Ifoneadoptsanormativeapproachtolanguage,andoneisinterestedinenhancingthe
clarityandprecisionofthelinguistictools,onewillrecommend,withFrege,theuseofa

12

specialsymbol,say"=",insteadof"is"insentencessuchas"Venusisthemorningstar"
andonewillfindthatthe"confusionofthecopulawithexistenceandwithequality"is
"grotesque"(Weyl,8).If,onthecontrary,onefollowsthetrendoflinguistic
naturalism,onewilldisapprovetheintroductionofthatspecialnotation,orofanyspecial
notationforthatmatter,withoutrealizing,however,thatthegivenordinarylanguageis
itselfaproductofmanyspecialnotations(normativelyorcarelessly)introducedinpast
centuries.

ItisinterestingtoobservethatinsuchacomprehensivevolumeasTLOBthereseemsto
bejustonesinglehintatthenormativeapproachtolanguage.ThisoccursinJacobi's
essayonAbelard.AccordingtoJacobi,Abelardpointsoutthat"thereisalwaysan
existentialimport"inesse,evenwhenitisusedasacopula,butAbelardsaysthiswith
regret:"itwouldbeidealifthecopulahadabsolutelynosemanticcontent".Herewehave
thenormativeinsight.Infact,asJacobifurtherexplains,Abelardthoughtthattheroleof
thescienceofargumentativediscoursewas"toreflectonandexplainlanguageandyet
nottoshyawayfromcorrectingitandbringingtoitagreaterprecision"(p.156).
3THEHISTORIOGRAPHICALATTACK
Thissectionisdevotedtotheanalysisofthevolume"TheLogicofBeing"(TLOB),
editedbyHintikkaandKnuuttila.(ThelistofessaysincludedinTLOBisgiveninthe
bibliography).IwillconsiderfirstthetwopaperswrittenbyHintikkahimself.Secondly,
Iwilldiscusstheotherauthors.

3.1HINTIKKA'SPLAN
Hintikka'sintentionineditingTLOBmaybedescribedasfollows.Thelackofa
distinctionofmeaningsof"is"inEnglishorinthepreFregeantraditionisnottobe
regardedasadefect(asa"logicalhowler",TLOBp.x)butasafeaturetobepraised
sinceitreflectsabettersemanticsofnaturallanguage(TLOBp.82).Scholarsinterested
inrevealingthegoodthingsofancientphilosophersshouldnolongerfeelobligatedto
showthatclassicalauthorspavedthewayforthe"FregeRussellthesis"sucha
precursorshipwouldbe,inHintikka'sjudgement,a"nonhonor"(TLOBp.257).]
3.1.1HINTIKKAONARISTOTLE
Ofcourse,byholdingtolinguisticdescriptivismonemayhavetheillusionofvindicating
fragmentsofthehistoryofphilosophythatnormativethinkerslikeFregehadledusto
viewaswrongoratanyratetoseriouslyquestion.Infact,thisactuallyhappensasaby
productofHintikka's"revoltagainstFrege".IwillgivetwoexamplesfoundinHintikka's
paperonAristotle(1986a).i)Hintikkadistinguishes,fortheinterpretationofAristotle(p.
83),a"transitive"froman"intransitivepredication",restartingthepreFregeantheoryof
predication(cf.inmyStudies,5.42,thefascinatingCajetan'sphrasepraedicaride
praedicatocontingitdupliciter,inonewaywithtransitivity,inanotherwaywithoutit).ii)

13

InMetaphysicaZ,6,Aristotleaffirmstheidentityofeachthingwithitsessence.Thisis
typicallyirritatingforanyonedemanding,laFrege,asharpdistinctionbetween
individualsanduniversals,betweensingulartermsandconceptwords.Hintikka's
attitude,onthecontrary,towardsthefamousAristotelianchapterissympathetic;afterall,
"is"canexpressabitofidentityaswellasabitofpredication;wecanread"Socratesis
man",likeanyotheressentialpredication,asbeing"inasense"anidentity(p.95).
InreadingHintikka'scommentsonAristotle's"is"adreadfulsuspicionarisesinthemind
ofaFregeanreader:perhapsthequestionofwhatisthemeaningofHintikka'sdefinite
descriptions"themeaningofis"or"thebasicmeaningofis"hasasimpleanswer:itisa
bitofeverything.Butthiswouldbeunacceptable;whileonemightacceptHintikka's
notionthateachcontextbringsoutoneuseof"is",itcannotbeaccepted,froma
minimallynormativepointofview,thateachcontextbringsoutabitofmorethanone
useof"is".]

FromHintikka'spaper1986a:ThevarietiesofbeinginAristotle,welearnthat
(unsurprisingly)"AristotledoesnotrecognizetheFregeRussellambiguityof'is'"(such
isthetitleofsection1),thathowever"thenonambiguityofestidoesnotprecludepurely
existentialuses"(titleofsection2),or"purelyidentificatory"uses(section3,last
paragraph).IhavenotseenHintikka'sreferencestoa"purelypredicativeuse",buta
predicativeuse(pureornot)iscertainlyavailableinAristotle.
Thus,wehaveinAristotlethreeofthemeaningsof"is".Thattheyareusesratherthan
meaningsmerelyindicates,inHintikka'sapproach,thatthereisnoneedofintroducing
specialnotationsforeachoneofthem.Thecontextwillalwaystell.
ThesituationishowevercomplicatedbyHintikka'sclaimthatsometimesmorethanone
use(ormeaning)isatwork:
Ingeneral,itisnotpossibletounderstandthequestionsAristotleisaskinginsuchworksasMetZ6
withoutappreciatingthesimultaneouspresenceofseveralFregemeaningsinestiinhisdiscussion(endof
section1,emphasismine).

Itisofcourseconceivabletohavesucha"simultaneouspresenceofseveralFrege
meanings"totheextentthattheyarenotinconsistent.Forinstance,Fregewouldagree
thatin"Socratesisman"the"is"mayexpresssimultaneouslysubsumptionofanobject
underaconcept(predication)andourassertion,judgementthatrecognizesthesentence
astrue.Astowhether"is"canexpresspredicationandidentityatonce,thisisalso
possible,forinstancewhenwehaveanidentity:"AustinisthecapitalofTexas":thereis
alwaysapredicationassociatedwithit.Thus,thereisanumberoflegitimatesensesfora
"simultaneouspresenceofseveralFregemeanings".Itisnotcleartome,however,that
thisappliestothesortofsimultaneouspresencerequiredtomakesenseofMetZ,6,
especiallyinHintikka'sinterpretation.

14

IbelievethatthemajorshortcominginHintikka'sstudyofAristotleinconnectionwith
"is"liesinhisoverlookingtheproblemthatisinmyviewthecentralissuewhenAristotle
andFregemustbecompared:thetheoryofpredication,intheparticularsensethat
Aristotledoesnotdistinguish,asdemandedbyFrege,subsumptionandsubordination.
Theclashbetweenthetwogiantsoccurs,forinstance,whenAnalyticaPrioraB27and
GrundlagenderArithmetik53arebroughttogether.
Hintikkadoesnotaddresstherealproblem,namelythatforAristotleamarkofaconcept
ispredicatedoftheconcept(animalofman)whereasthisisforbiddenforFrege.Hintikka
doesnothighlightthecontrastbetweenFregeandAristotleasIjustdid,butintermsof
theEnglishtranslations"Socratesisaman","amanisananimal";herethefactthat
disturbsFrege(animal,whichisamarkofman,predicatedofman)isnotshown.When
Hintikkawrites:
itisclearthatthereisnoFregeRusselltypedifferenceinmeaningforAristotlebetweenthedifferent
occurrencesofisin"Socratesisaman"and"amanisananimal"(p.84,towardsendofsection1),

Fregecouldverywelldisagree:aspointedoutabove,hemightwellsaythatthe"is"of"a
manisananimal"isapredicative"is",justlikethe"is"of"Socratesisaman"andallwe
needtoaddisasecondpredicative"is"associatedwith"man":foreveryx,ifxisman,
thenxisanimal.
OneofthefallaciesdiscussedbyAristotleinSophElis:"youknowCoriscus,Coriscusis
themanwhoisapproaching,henceyouknowthemanwhoisapproaching[whereasin
factyoudonotknowthemanwhoisapproaching]".Aristotle'sreplyis"Itdoesnot
necessarilyfollowthatallthesameattributesbelongtoallthepredicatesofathingandto
thatofwhichtheyarepredicated"(SophEl00).Forthosewhohavebeencorruptedby
Frege,theanalysisconsistsintranslatingthesecondpremissinto"Coriscus=theman
whoisapproaching"andthenreadingthejustquotedtextasarestrictiononLeibniz's
law.ButforHintikka:
drawingthepredicationvs.identitydistinctionisnotwhatAristotleisdoinghere.Whatheactuallydoesis
drawadistinctionbetweentransitiveandnontransitivepredication.(p83,section1)

andinfactHintikkaeasilyreadstheAristotelianabovequotedstatementasarestriction
onthetransitivityofpredication.Thisisanamazingexampleofrepetitionofhistory.
Cajetan:praedicaridepraedicatocontingitdupliciter(oneistransitive,theotherisnot).
3.1.2HINTIKKAONKANT
WithregardtoHintikka'sessayonKant,itisconvenienttoquoteinfullthefollowing
portionofHintikka'spaperonKant(p.2578):
Butdoesn'tKantdeserveatleastthehonorofanticipatingtheFregedistinction?Iamnotsurethatsuch

15

precursorshipnecessarilyqualifiesasanhonor.IhaveshownthattheFregeRusselldistinctionisnot
indispensable.Therearecorrectalternativewaysofdealingwiththesemanticsof"is",wayswhichmay
evenbepreferabletotheFregemethodforthepurposeofunderstandingnaturallanguageandarguments
conductedinnaturallanguage,includingtheargumentsconductedbyvirtuallyallpreFregean
philosophers.ButevenapartfromthisdevaluationofFrege,Kantdoesnotratethenonhonorofpavingthe
wayforFrege.ItisamplyevidentfromKant'sownwordsthathedoesnotthinkofourwordsforbeingas
exhibitingtheFregeRussellambiguity.Seeingthisisneverthelessmadesomewhatmoredifficultbythe
factthatKantdoesnotspeakofjustexistence(Dasein,Existenz),being(Sein),and"is"(ist),butalsoof
"position"(setzen).Whatisthis"positing",anyway?Kant'sprecriticalessayonproofsofGod'sexistence
showsunmistakablythatitismerelyanotherexpressionforbeing(Sein),andthatitisunambiguous
(einfach):
DerBegriffderpositionoderSetzungistvlligeinfachundmitdemvomSeinberhaupt
einerlei.(Academyed.,vol.2,p.73).
IntheCritiqueofPureReason(A598=B626),Kantsaysthat"'being'isobviously[sic]notareal
predicate....Itismerelythepositingofathing,orofcertaindeterminations,asexistinginthemselves".
ThereasonwhyKantintroducestheterm"setzen"isprobablyadesire[sic?]tohaveatermwhichsitsmore
happilywiththecasesinwhich"is"apparentlyhasamerelypredicativefunction."Godisomnipotent"c
accordingtoKantbetrueeveniftherewerenoGod.Itmerelyexpressesanecessaryrelationbetweenthe
subjectandthepredicate."Godisomnipotent"doesnotlogicallyimplyforKantthat"Godis",eventhough
thestepmightseemtempting.Inordertoavoidthistemptation,itseeKantuseshisterminusquasi
technicus"setzen"forpositingsomethingasbeinginanysenseofbeing.
TheexplanationKantgivesofthedifferencebetween"Godisomnipotent"and"Godis"nevertheless
showsthatwearedealingwiththesame"is"inbothcases.Inbothcases,weare"positing"something.The
onlydifferenceisthatintheformercasethepositingisrelativebutinthelattercaseabsolute.Otherwise,it
isthesameoldpositing.
[In]theproposition,'Godisomnipotent',...thesmallword'is'addsnonewpredicatebut
onlyservestopositthepredicateinitsrelation[Kant'sitalics]tothesubject.
Herepositingclearlymeanspredication.ButKantcontinues:
Ifnow,wetakethesubject(God)withallitspredicates...andsay'Godis',or'Thereisa
God',weattachnonewpredicatetotheconceptofGod,butonlypositthesubjectin
itselfwithallitspredicates...
Herepositingclearlymeanstoassumeexistence.Therelationofexistencetopredicationisthusmerely
thatofanabsolutepositingtoarelativeone.Thisobservationisconfirmedbyfurtherpassages[...]Thus
Kantclearlythinksofthe"is"ofpredication(thecopula)andthe"is"ofexistenceastwousesofthesame
notion.Occasionallyheevenseemstoconsiderthecopulative"is"[...]asavariantofthe"is"ofidentity.
Hethinksofanecessaryjudgmentlike"Godisomnipotent"asexpressingtheidentityofaGodandan
omnipotentGod."Theomnipotencecannotberejectedifwepositadeity...,forthetwoconceptsare
identical"(A595=B623).HencemeaningdifferencesbetweenthefirstthreeelementsoftheFrege
ambiguityarerejectedbyKant.
Asforthefourthallegedsenseof"is"apudFregeandRussell,Kant'sassimilationofittoothersenses
(especiallytothe"is"ofpredication)isseenfromhisfailure(orrefusal)todistinguishthesubsumptionof
oneconcepttoanotherfromtheapplicationofaconcepttoaparticular(inotherwords,thisparticular's
fallingundertheconcept).

16

Remarks.
1)Hintikka'streatmentofthe"fourthallegedsense"isquiteunnecessary;itwouldbea
greatdiscoverytofind,beforeFrege,thatanyoneclearlystatedthedistinctionbetween
subsumptionandsubordination.
2)Hintikka'streatmentoftheidentitymeaningof"is"isjusttoohastyinsofarasallthe
quotedtextmaymeanisthatthetwoconceptsareequiextensional,butalsounnecessary,
sincetheviewofaffirmativestatements(predications)beingbaseduponanunderlying
identityisacommonplaceinthephilosophicaltradition.Thelatterhoweverdoesnot
entailthatidentityandpredicationarenotdistinguished;theroleofidentityisoneof
truthmaker.
3)ThegravestobjectiontoHintikka'sanalysishastodowiththeexistencepredication
distinction.ThedistinctionofferedbyKantandacceptedbyHintikkaisbetween1)the
positingofarelationbetweenamarkofathing(Ding,Sache)andthething,and2)the
positingofthewholesetofmarks,i.e.ofthething.The"positing"commontothetwo
casesamountstoverylittle;inthefirstcaseitsimplymeansthatthereissomerelation
(normallysubordination)betweentwoconcepts;inthesecondcasethepositingmeans
nothinglessthanexistence.Anatheistmayacceptthefirstpositingbutnotthesecond.
3.2THEOTHERCONTRIBUTORSTO"THELOGICOFBEING".
InTLOBHintikkahasorganizedapowerfulteamofscholarsinordertocarryoutthis
historiographicalrevolt;asonecanreadinthecoverofthevolume,thepurposeofTLOB
istomounta"frontalattackatthehegemonyoftheFregeRussellthesisonthehistorical
level".(ThesamehistoriographicalrevisionismisexpressedinHintikka'sSelfprofile,
sectionvii.)LetusexaminehoweachofHintikka'ssoldiersactuallyperformshisduties
inthebattleforthelogicofbeinginthehistoryofphilosophy.Thepapersincludedin
TLOBwillnotbediscussedinalltheiraspects,butonlyquarelevanttotheHintikkian
enterprise(Alanen'spaperisnotrelevant,pacetheeditors'remarksintheintroduction).
OfcourseHintikka'sowntwopapersinTLOBarenotpartofthisgroup:theywere
alreadydiscussed.Haaparanta?
3.2.1KAHN
Fromthejustdefined,restrictedpointofviewIwishtomaketwomainobservations
concerningKahn'sessay,followedbysomeconcludingremarks.
1)KahndistinguishessevenwaysofunderstandingtheGreekesti:copula,veridical,
existential(ofwhichtherearethreetypes),possessive,potential(thetwolatter:esti+
dative,esti+infinitivearenotdiscussedinTLOB).Myphrase"waysofunderstanding"
isnotKahn's;Ichoseitonpurposeinordertoavoidthewords"use","sense"or
"meaning"for,asweknow,Hintikkaacceptsadistinctionofusesbutrejectsa

17

distinctionofsensesormeanings.Kahn'sviewonthismatterisrevealedbythefollowing
passagesofhispaper:
1)"Whetherthisdiversity["theunionofthepredicative,locative,existentialandveridicalfunctionsina
singleverb"]isproperlyregardedasacaseofambiguityofmeaningisaquestiononwhichIdonot
proposetotakeastand"(p.4).
2)"TherehasrecentlybeenanoticeabletrendawayfromtheMillRussellviewthat"is"hasdifferent
senses,whichtheGreekphilosophersshouldhavedistinguished.Seee.g.,BensonMates'suggestionthat
Plato'sdifferentusesof"is"canallbeunderstoodonthebasisofasingle,univocaluseofthecopula[Kahn
referstoMates'paperinTLOB].AndcompareJaakkoHintikka'spaperinthisvolume.Inmyopinion,the
questionwhether"is"hasdifferentmeaningsoronlydifferentusescannotbeansweredwithoutconfronting
certainverydeepproblemsinthetheoryofmeaning,whichisultimatelypartofthetheoryofknowledge...
epistemologyandmetaphysicsmustbecalledin..."(footnote10,appendedtotheabovequotedtext1).
3)"Despitemygeneralreluctancetodecidewhenadifferentusebecomesadifferentsense,Iaminclined
tospeakhereofaveridicalmeaningorconnotationofeinai,incaseswheretheGreekverbcannot
adequatelytranslatedbythecopulaorbyanidiomaticuseofisalone...andtherearecasesoftheveridical
connotation..."(p.9).

Whiletexts(1)and(2)areevasive,(3)isstraightforward:Kahnisinclinedtospeakofa
distinctionofmeanings,orsenses,ratherthanofmereuses.Itiscrucialtoobservethat
thisiswrittenbyKahninfullawarenessofHintikka'sterminologyandviews,asshown
byKahn'sfootnote10(ourtext(2)).Theterm"connotation"intext(3)isclearly
introducedbyKahnasanequivalentof"meaning";towardstheendof(3)thephrase
"veridicalconnotation"maybereplacedby"veridicalmeaning":using"connotation"
insteadof"meaning"mayhaveappearedtoKahnaslessantagonizingwithrespecttothe
editor'sviews.
2)Kahndistinguishestwoaspectsinthecopulafunctionof"tobe":1)amerely
syntactical,sentenceformingpurpose,2)asemanticalside,whichconsistsinthefactthat
"is"expressesanassertion.Thus,onthefaceofit,thesemanticsofKahn'scopulaisjust
assertion,hencewemustconcludethatforKahntheunassertedcopulas(averyfrequent
situation,asemphasizedbyscholasticmanualsandbyFrege)havenomeaning,theyjust
havesyntax(hereKahnjoinsthestubborntraditionaccordingtowhichthecopula'is'has
"nocontent",is"mereform",orasAbelardmisleadinglyputit:"copulattantum").The
purposeofsuchameaninglesssyntaxremainsobscure.Kahn'saccountofthecopulause
of"is"lacksasemanticsoftheunassertedsentence.Ahintatthemissingsemanticsof
thecopulaiscontainedinKahn'sreferencetothe"truthconditions"ofasentence(p.6
justbeforefn14)andespeciallyinfootnote14,whereQuine'sdescriptionofpredication
isquoted.Thecopula,orpredicative"is"expressessubsumption,thefallingofanobject
underaproperty,etc.regardlessofourassertingitornot.
Tosumup,Kahni)distinguishessevenwaysofunderstandingtheGreek"tobe",
carefullyavoidstakingastandintheissueof"uses"vs."meanings"butdefinitelyspeaks
ofthe"veridicalmeaning".ii)Curiously,Kahn'sveridicalmeaningisthesameasthe
assertivemeaningemphaticallydistinguishedbyFregebutoverlookedbyHintikkaand

18

HaaparantaintheirinventoryofFregeanmeaningsof"is".iii)Thesubsumptionmeaning
oftheesticopula,ifrecognizedbyKahn,asitshouldbe,wouldcreateanadditional,
numbereightwayofunderstanding(use?,meaning?)theancientGreekesti.
Briefly,Kahn'spaper,ifanything,helpsFrege,notHintikka'shistoriographicalprogram.
TheeditorsofTLOB,nevertheless,believejusttheopposite,asshownbytheir
astonishingclaimintheIntroduction(p.ix):"KahnhasarguedthatFregeandRussell's
thesisthatverbsforbeing,suchas'esti',aremultiplyambiguousisillsuitedforthe
purposeofappreciatingtheactualconceptualassumptionsofGreekthinkers."
3.2.2MATES
InoppositiontosomePlatoscholars,Matesassertsthatthereisno"conclusiveevidence"
(conclusionofhissection3)thatthereareanysuchsensesof"is"asidentity,predication,
paulinepredication(classinclusion),eitherinGreek(esti)orinEnglish(Matesrefers
bothtoGreekandEnglish;cf.forexamplethefirstpageorsoofhissection3).
Moreover,Matesclaimsthatitis"possibletomaintainthatPlatousestheverb"tobe"in
asinglesensethroughoutasinglesenseintermsofwhichsomeoftheothersensesthat
havebeenproposedcanbedefined."(p.42).
InMatestheory,thereisaprimitive"is"(note"primitive"fourtimes:p.36,second
paragraph,5;p.43,line5;footnote36).Indeed,thereisonlyoneprimitive"is",sothat
wemaytalkoftheprimitiveis(p.43fn36secondoccurrence).Thereseemstobejust
oneaxiomfortheprimitive"is":"AisA"istrueforallA.Thevarioussensesof"is":(1)
identity,2)classinclusion,subordination,orPaulinepredication,and3)ordinary
predication),aredefinedasfollows:A=BiffAisBandBisA;Ais(Pauline)Biff
anythingthatisAisalsoB(plusarestrictiveclausethatwemayignorehere);Ais(a)B
("ordinarypredication")iffAisBbutnotBisAandnotAis(Pauline)B(p.42).
IcannothelpseeinginMates'theoryoftheprimitive"is"onemoreexampleofthe
perverseinfluenceofthemodernmisconceptionoftheaxiomaticmethod.Thereis
nothing,semantically,toMates'primitive"is".Ifthelatterseemstohaveacontentitis
justbecauseofthefamiliarconnotationsoftheword:assoonastheprimitive"is"is
replacedbyareallyunknownsymbol,say*,therealsituationemerges,andonerealizes
thattherearenotruthconditionsatallfortheprimitive"is".HowdoesMatesknowthat,
forinstance,"Socratesisaman",withtheprimitive"is",istrue(p.43top)?Heshould
replace"is"by"*":"Socrates*man",andthentheimpossibilityofansweringthe
questionwouldbeclear.
Still,Matesmightargueasfriendsoftheaxiomaticmethodfrequentlydothatitisnot
thelogician'stasktodiscussthecontentbuttooutlineaform;itisPlatowhoshould
providethecontentfor"*".Myreplywouldbethat,onceordinarypredication,identity,
andPaulinepredicationareruledout,thereishardlyanythingleftforPlatotofillthe
emptyprimitive"*"with.

19

Matesreliesheavilyonthecontextandthebackgroundinformation;itseemstomethat
thecontextmayhelptodeterminesomepartiallygiveninformationbutifthereisnothing
atallatthebeginning,asinthecaseof"*",thecontextualhelpwillnotbeabletogetthe
procedureevenstarted,unlessthereisthetacitassumptionthat"*"mustmeanoneofa
setofpossiblethings.Infact,atacertainpointMateswrites:"IfPlato'susageismoreor
lessalongtheselines,thenwecanexpectthatforhim,whenever'AisB'[A*B]is
asserted,then'AisthesameasB'or"Ais(Pauline)B"or'Ais(a)B'couldalsobe
asserted."(p.42).Thishoweverturns"*"intoamereabbreviation,timespacesaving
procedure,asinahistoryofGreekphilosophyweusedjust"Aristpla"insteadofthetwo
singularterms"Aristotle"and"Plato",leavingtothecontextthedeterminationofwhich
ofthetwomustbefilledin.Actually,theabbreviationviewwouldamounttofully
restoringthemultiplicityofmeanings(senses,uses)of"is".
Tosumup,Mates'contribution,contrarytoKahn's,coincideswiththeintentionsofthe
editorsofTLOB,butfailstohelp.Theeditors'commentsonthesignificanceofMates'
essay(p.x)misstheissue.
3.2.3DANCY
LetusconsiderthefollowingpassagefromDancy'sessay:
Togetatthis,firstconsideranotherdistinctionthatsomehaveallegedtobepertinenttoEnglishandGreek
being:thatbetweenidentityandpredication.Thereiscertainlyadistinctionhere:itisbetweenclaimslike
(16)Dr.JekyllisMr.Hyde,
ontheonehand,andclaimslike
(17)Dr.Jekyllisschizoid
or
(18)Dr.Jekyllisanaddict
ontheother.(16)statesanidentity;(17)and(18),Ithink,donot,andIshallcharacterizebothas
predications.
Philosophersare,notoriously,myopic,andwhentheyapplytheirmagnifyingglassestosentencesthatdo
differentthings,theyusuallycanonlymanagetobringintofocusasingleword.Herethewordis'is'.They
professtospotthe'is'ofidentityin(16)andthe'is'ofpredicationin(17),andthenfalltoarguingoverthe
characterofthe'is'in(18).
Ishallcallthishabitofsupposingthateverydifferenceincharacterfromonesentencetothenextmustbe
locatableinsingleambiguouswordsthe"fallacyofthemagnifyingglass'.Wedonotneedtopulltheword
'is'outofthosesentencesandgointoAngstoverthemeaningofbeing.Thesituationiscompletely
describedthat'is'isfollowedin(16)byasingulardefinitenounphrase,in(17)byanadjective,andin(18)
byanindefinitenounphrase.Sentencesthatshowthestructureof(16)stateidentities;theothersare
predications.Butthishasnothingtodowiththeoccurrenceof'is'indifferentcolors:itiswhatcomesnext
whatcounts.
Aristotledoesnotcommitthefallacyofthemagnifyingglassinconnectionwith'einai',identityand
predication.But[...]hethinksthatthefactthat'man'and'pale'relatedifferentlytoSocratesmakesfora
different'is'in
(3)Socratesisaman

20

fromtheonein
(2)Socratesispale[theformeran'is'perse,thesecondan'is'peraccidens].(P.634).

Dancy1)rejectsthedistinctionbetweenthepredicationandidentitymeaningsof"is"in
general,2)deniesitsacceptanceonthepartofAristotle,3)regretshoweverthatAristotle
introducesthedistinctionbetweenaccidental"is"andessential"is".
Withregardtotheexistentialmeaningof"is"Dancy'sviewisthat"Sis"isjustelliptical
for"SisP"(p.59);"Sis"isnotasentencebutonlyhalfasentence,a"truncated"
predication.Itisfalsetorefertoitasan"existentialsentence",totalkofits"truth
conditions"(p.57),todescribeitasan"existentialclaim",ortoreplaceits"is"by
"exists"(p.66).Dancydiscusses,relativetoPlatoandAristotle,thetworules"SisP
Sis"and"SisnotPSisnot",andaffirmsthat,
"attheveryleast,the'is'intheantecedentmustbethesame'is'asin[the]consequent.Inparticular,there
canbenoshiftfromanallegedpredicativesenseof'is'toanallegedexistentialsenseof'is'.Since...there
arenosuchsensesof'is',thisisnotaproblem"(p.53).

IfnowweaskDancywhatisthemeaning,ifany,of"is",theanswerappearstobethe
following:
Soweareleftwith'simplesentences':subjectpredicatesentences.Thesefrequentlyemploy'is'.Butthis
wordis,afterall,quitemeaningless:itismerelyasyntacticdeviceforconnectingsubjectsandpredicates
wherethepredicatesarenotalreadyverbphrases(p.63).

AfteroutliningDancy'srelevantclaims,wehavetoevaluatenowhiscontributiontothe
historiographicalcampaign.1)ThereaderlearnsfromaGreekphilosophyscholarthat
thereisnoreasoneitherintheancientphilosophicalGreeksourcesorincurrentEnglish
tosearchforaspecialmeaningof"is"whenthelatterappearstoexpressexistence,for
thesimplereasonthatsuchcasesdonotreallyexist:"Sis"isjusta"truncated"full
sentence"SisP".Thatis,Dancytellsusthatthereisnotaspecialexistentialmeaningto
bedistinguishedfromtheothersbecausethephrase"Sis"doesnotreallyoccur.2)But
thenthereisafurther,evenmorelethalreasonthatshoulddiscouragethefriendsofthe
"FregeRussellthesis"bothfromprojectingitontheoldGreektextsandfromapplying
ittoEnglish:thelittleword"is"hasnomeaningatall.Nostrongerargumentcanbe
imaginedagainsttheclaimsthat"is"isambiguous:"is"ismeaningless.Meaningless
soundscannotbeambiguous.
Tosumup,Dancy'scontributionistoohelpfultobereallyhelpfultotheeditors'
program.
3.2.4EBBESEN,JACOBI,WEIDEMANN,KNUUTTILA
Ebbesenwrites:"Thedistinctionbetweenthepredicativeandtheexistential'is'hasmet
withgeneraldisapproval,atleastfromthetimeofRobertKilwardby(c.1240).Heflatly
denies'is'isequivocal"(p.124).Also:"Withothers,sensesof'is'andmodesofbeing

21

tendtoproliferate"(p.131);"theyclaimthat'is'isananalogicalterm"p.131.
WeconfirmfromEbbesen'spaperthatthehighlightingoftheexistentialmeaningoruse
of'is'wasnotFrege'sachievementwho,assaid,hardlyreferredtothisissueonce,and
quitenegatively;ratherithadbeenforcenturiesadisputedquestion,withpeopleinfavor
andpeopleagainst.Inotherwords,Ebbesen'sessayreallyunderminestheeditors'
programratherthanhelpingtocarryitout.
AccordingtoJacobiinAbelardandamonghiscontemporarieswefindanintense
concernwiththedistinctionbetweenthecopulativeandtheexistentialfunctionsofthe
verb'tobe'.Interestingly,JacobiobservesthatforAbelardthetwofunctionsinfactdo
notoccurpurely,buttheyshould(thismaybetheonlyhintatanormativeapproachto
logicandlanguageinthewholeTLoBvolume):
Inspeakingof'esse'Abelardpointsoutthat"thereisalwaysanexistentialimportinitslinkage"and"it
allowsustodeterminethatanotherthingexists",evenwhenitisusedasacopula.Buthesaysthiswith
regret.Itwouldbeidealifthecopulahadabsolutelynosemanticcontent.(p.156).

Weseethattheawarenessoftheexistentialfunctionof"is"isnotaFregeanmatterbuta
traditionalissue,relatedtothedesecundoadiacentepropositions.Iwrote"function"of
"is"toavoidthewordsmeaning,senseoruse.Jacobidoesnottakeastandintheissueof
meaningvs.use.Heusesmostly"use"ratherthan"meaning"butitisnotclearthathe
meansthetechnicalopposition;forexampleonp.164thatterminologybecomes
importantbecauseheisdescribingmultipleuses,equivocationetc.
Theessaysinthisbook[TLoB]investigatewhethertheword'tobe'isindeedambiguous,asisassumedin
mostmoderndiscussionsoflogic.ThefirstdiscussionsketchedfromAbelard'swritingsteachesthat
cautionisrequiredattheoutset,intheformulationofthequestionitself.Ifaskedwhethertheword'tobe'
alwaysconveysthesamethingorwhetheritconveysdifferentthingsaccordingtocontextanduse,Abelard
wouldsurelyhavebeenunabletofavoreitheralternative.Forthisformulationofthequestionassumesthat
'est'hasasignificativefunctionwhereveritisemployed,anassumptionwhichAbelarddoesnotshare"(p.
148)

Jacobiwantstobecautiousinhisjoiningthehistoriographicalcampaignoftheeditors.
Moreover,hebrilliantlyobserveswhatIbelieveappliestoDancyinsofarasthelatter
insistsonthepurely"syntactic","meaningless"natureofthecopula.
Weidemann,aftershowingmorethananyoneelsethatAquinashasalltheFregean
distinctions(exceptclassinclusion)andmore,asks:"DoesAquinas,whendistinguishing
betweendifferentusesoftheverb"be",everimplythatthisverbisgenuinely
ambiguous?"(p.186).Theanswerispredictablynegativeforanyonewhoisacquainted
withthebasicsofThomism:beingisanalogous.
Unfortunately,WeidemannbringsintoconsiderationthefamouspassagefromS.Th.I13
12(p.1878)toshowthatpredicationandidentityareassimilated.Thesecondtexthas
todowiththefoundations,thetruthmakerofapredication,whichissomethingthatFrege

22

doesnotfocuson.ThefirsttextistheFregeanone:clarityoflanguage.
Thefamousanalogyofbeing(intheThomistScotistdebate)isKnuuttila'stopic.Asfar
asIcansee,therelevanceofKnuuttila'spapertotheTLoBmainpurposeisthe
observationthatAquinasbeingisanalogous.
Itseemsthatitispartoftheprojecttobelievethattheanalogyofbeingisaweapon
againsttheFregeRussellthesis;obviouslyithastodowithpart(b)ofit.Ibelievethis
doesnotaffectintheleastFrege.
3.3GENERALEVALUATIONOFTHEHISTORIOGRAPHICALCAMPAIGN
1)ThepapersincludedinTLOB,asidefromHintikka'sandHapparanta's,donotservein
generalthepurposeoftheeditors;onthecontrary,theyratherundermineoropposeto
Hintikka'shistoriographicalprogram.
2)ThecentralcomparativeissueforanyoneattemptingtodohistoryoflogicandFregeis
thesubordinationsubsumptiondistinction.Thisdistinctionwouldhaveprobablyled
Fregetotheformulationofadistinctionbetweenasubordination"is"andasubsumption
(predication,copula)"is",hadhebeenconfrontedwithindefinitecategoricals(homoest
animal).
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24

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inThomasAquinas;SimoKnuuttila:BeingquabeinginThomasAquinasandJohnDuns
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ontologicalargument[=Hintikka1981];LeilaHaaparanta:OnFrege'sconceptofbeing
[=Haaparanta1986b].
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25

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