Toward Combined Arms Warfare:A Survey of 20th~Century Tactics,

Doctrine, and Organization

by Captain Jonathan M. House, U.S. Army
August 1984

U.S. Army
Command and General
Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS 660274900

Library

of Congress

Gataloging

House, Jonathan M. (Jonathan Mallory),

Toward combined arms warfare.

in

Publication

Data

l&X?-

(Research survey / Combat Studies Institute; no. 2)

August k984.
Bibliography: p.
1. Tactics--History--20th
century. 2. Armies-Organization--History--20th
century. 3. Military
art and science--History--20th century. I. Title.
II. Series: Research survey (U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College. Combat Studies Institute; no. 2)
U165.H8 1985
355.42
85-W

For sale by the Superintendent

of Documents,

U.S. Gavemaent

Printting OWce, WeshEngton, D.C. 28402

CONTENTS
iii

Contents...........................

iv

Figures............................
Maps.............................

Introduction

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to 1914 ................

..................

19

Chapter One.

Prologue

Chapter Two.

World War I.

Chapter Three.

TheInterwarPeriod..............
. .

79

. . .

105

1945 . . . . e . . . . . . .

141

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

181

Chapter Four.

World War II:

Chapter Five.

World War II:

The Complexity

Chapter Six.
Conclusion

43

The Axis Advance, 1939-1942.

Combined Arms After

of Total

War, 1942-1945.

Notes .............................

191

Bibliography

207

.........................

iii

FIGURES
1

Type French and German Divisions,

2.

Type British

3.

Trench System, World War I.

4.

Type U.S. and German Divisions,

5.

Type German Panzer Division,

6.

1914. . . . . . . . e .

10

1914. a . e . e * . =

11

and Russian Divisions,

. . . * .

. , . . a e . . .

23

1918. . . . e . . . . a .

41

1935 . . a (F . c m . . * * .

56

French Light Mechanized Division,

1934, and
Armored Division,.1940
e a s . . . . a . e e . . . = t s

62

Soviet Mechanized Carps, December 1935, and

MotorizedDivision,1939....
*..*
*.*..$..

67

8.

U.S, Triangular

74

9.

British

7.

Infantry

Division,

Armored and Infantry

June 1941. + . . . e .

Divisions,

90

. m. . = . . . . .

98

10.

Schematic of Blitzkrieg

11.

Soviet

Tank Corps5 1942, and Tank Army, 1943. * . . . . .

101

12.

Type U.S. Armored Division,

March 1942 and
September 1943. . . f . . . . c . . . . . . . e e * . .

109

13.

Soviet

V . . * . . . . . . . . .

124

14.

Type Soviet Tank Division,

1947, and
Mechanized Division,
1946/51. e . . . . . . . . . . . .

143

15.

Type U.S. Infantry

148

16.

U.S. Pentamic Infantry

. . . * e . .

156

17.

Type U.S. Armored Division,

ROAD, 1965-1983 . e m . . . .

159

18.

1st Cavalry

Assault

Encirclement.

1942. . * . . t .

Group Formation.

Division

and Armored Divisions,

Division

. e m. .

(Airmobile),

iv

1947. . . .
l

1965. . . . . . . * . e

163

MAPS
1.

Battle

2.

Second Battle

3.

The Maginot

4.

Khalkin-Gol,

5.

Sidi

Barrani,

6.

Sidi

Bou Zid - Kasserine

7.

Imphal-Kohima,

8.

Task Force Dolvin,

9.

Lam Son 719, February-March

10.

of Cambrai,

of Armageddon, 19-24 September 1918 ....

Line and the 1940 Campaign. .........
lo-31

70

December 1940 ...............

7th Armored Brigade

92

Pass, February

March-April

1943. ......

Korea,

5 February

1971. ............

at Abu Agheila,

1956. ........

120
136

1944 .............

Anyang-ni,

38
59

August 1939. .............

30

20-30 November 1917. .........

1951. ..

151
166
175

INTRODUCTION
We have gotten
into
the fashion
of talking
of
tactics,
and infantry
artillery
tactics,
cavalry
This distinction
is nothing
but a mere
tactics.
There is but one art, and that is the
abstraction.
tactics
of the combined arms. The tactics
of a body
of mounted troops
composed of the three arms is
subject
to the same established
principles
as is
that of a mixed force in which foot soldiers
bulk
largely.
The only difference
is one of mobility.
-Major

Gerald Gilbert,

British

Army, 1907l

but
The concept of llCombined Arms has existed for centuries,
the nature of the combination
and the organizational
level at
Prior to the seventeenth
which it occurred have varied greatly.
was often
no need to combine
century,
for
example I there
Each
and cavalry at the small-unit
level.
infantry,
artillery,
branch served a specific
function
on the battlefield,
and only
the senior commanders present needed to coordinate
the effects
of
In succeeding centuries,
the general trend
the different
arms.
has been to combine the arms at progressively
lower levels
of
from
gone
commanders has
The concern
of
organization.
coordinating
the separate actions
of separate arms, to gaining
to combining their
greater
cooperation
between them, and finally
actions to maximize the effect of their various properties.
At the time that Gilbert
made his plea, many officers
paid
lip service
to combined arms, but few understood
the need to
achieve such cooperation
or combination
between the branches at
century warfare and
Since then, twentieth
the small-unit
level.
have developed to the point
at
especially
mechanized warfare
which some form of combined arms is essential
for survival,
let
Yet the very complexity
of
alone victory,
on the battlefield.
this
warfare
leads
to specialization
in both
training
and
maintenance,
a specialization
that is currently
reflected
in the
formation
of companies and battalions
consisting
of one or at
A mechanized
major
weapons sys terns.
most three
different
infantry
battalion,
for example, normally
includes
direct-fire
indirect-fire
infantry
weapons, antitank
weapons, and limited
Such a
support in the form of mortars and grenade launchers.
battalion
has little
or no organic capability
in the areas of
long-range
indirect
fire,
or air
armor, air defense, engineers,
A tank or artillery
battalion
is even more specialized
support.
and restricted
in its equipment.

Although
these units are task organized
and cross attached
for
field
operations,
the demands of specialization,
unit
identity,
and maintenance
naturally
cause many soldiers
to
concentrate
on the use of one weapon or arm to defeat
the
corresponding
weapon or arm of the enemy. Such a narrow view has
frequently
characterized
professional
soldiers,
wish
who
naturally
to conserve
techniques
This
that
seem effective.
simplistic
approach
is
perhaps
less
common among senior
commanders and within
infantry
or
reconnaissance
(armored
cavalry)
units,
where the different
weapons are integrated
on a
more frequent
basis than in some other organizations.
Still,
at
least some tank crews train
primarily
to fight
enemy tanks,
tactical
fighter
units seek air superiority
over enemy fighters,
and engineers concentrate
on enhancing the mobility
of their own
forces while impeding the mobility
and eountermooility
efforts
of
enemy engineers.
All of these tasks are essential
for combat
but none by itself
will
ensure proper
interaction
success,
almost
by
between the different
arms and weapons.
Indeed,
definition
a particular
arm or weapon system has most of the same
strengths
and weaknesses of its enemy counterpart,
and thus may
not provide the best means of defeating
that enemy.
The very term "combined arms" often means different
things to
different
people, or is left undefined and vague.
As a minimum,
however, this term includes at least three related elements:
1
The combined arms concept is the basic idea that
different
arms and weapons systems must be used in concert
to
maximize the survival
and combat effectiveness
of each other.
The strengths
of one system must be used to compensate for the
weaknesses of others.
Exactly
which arms and weapons are
included in this concept varies greatly
between armies and over
time.
Today, however, the list of combined arms would include at
least the following:
infantry
(mechanized, motorized,
airborne,
air
assault,
light,
and special
or unconventional
operations
antitank
forces1,
armor,
artillery,
cavalry/reconnaissance,
forces,
air defense,
attack helicopters,
and
combat engineers,
some form of close air support.
Under certain
circumstances,
this
list
may also
include
electronic
warfare
and,
when
authorized,
nuclear and chemical fires.
Beyond this basic list,
all the combat support and serviee support elements are equally
important if the force is to fight
in a coordinated
and sustained
manner.
In the interests
of brevity,
however, logistical
aspects
of combined arms will be discussed only briefly
in this study.
2.
(company,

Combined
battalion,

arms organization,
brigade/regiment,

at
etc.),

whatever
brings

level
these

differe:lt
arms and weapons systems together for combat.
This may
peacetime tables of organization
and ad hoc
include both fixed,
or task-organized
combinations of elements in wartime.
Combined arms tactics
and operations
are the actual
3.
roles performed and techniques
applied
by these different
arms
and weapons in supporting
each other
once they have been
organized
into integrated
teams.
This is the area that is of
yet it is precisely
this
most concern to professional
soldiers,
area where historical
records and tactical
manuals often neglect
combined
arms
tat tics
and
important
details.
Moreover,
techniques
at the level
of battalion
or below are the most
difficult
aspects about which to generalize
historically,
because
they are most subject to frequent changes in technology.
A short study such as this cannot possibly
consider all the
complexities
that these three elements bring to recent military
Hhat it can do is trace
some recurring
themes or
history.
problems in the recent conduct of combined arms warfare
in the
British,
French, German, Soviet,
and United States armies.
At
various
times,
each of these armies has led the world in the
development of tactics
and doctrine.
For the period since 1948,
the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) must be added to this
list,
because the Israeli
experience
has had a major influence
on
In particular,
this paper will
weapons and doctrine
elsewhere.
trends
in the development
of tactical
and
identify
general
organizational
concepts for integrating
the different
arms and
This does not mean
weapons systems at division
level and below.
describing
the thousands of minute changes that have occurred in
divisional
structure
in these armies since the division
became a
the trends
in terms of
fixed
table
of organization.
Yet,
proportions
of different
arms and levels at which those arms were
integrated
can be illustrated
with a limited
number of line and
Such trends should provide an historical
framework
block charts.
and background for readers who are developing
their
own more
detailed
concepts of how to organize and employ the combined arms
today.
This study is a tentative
overview rather than an exhaustive
My hope is that it will
prompt others to develop or
analysis.
thereby
the trends
described
in these pages,
even contest
advancing the study of a central issue in land combat.
Before proceeding
to specific
historical
developments,
some
Most
basic comments on the combined arms concept are in order.
but they may assist
readers
of these comments are self-evident,
in placing the following
chapters into context.
In the
combination

abstract,
tactical
warfare
may be considered
protection,
elements :
mobility,
three
of

as a
and

offensive
power.2
Mobility
means not only
the ability
to
maneuver and concentrate
forces
over terrain,
but also
the
ability
to move men and units when exposed to the fire
of the
enemy.
Mobility
is not an absolute,
but must be measured
relative
to the difficulty
of the terrain
and to the mobility
of
other friendly
or enemy forces.
For a combined arms team, the
least mobile element may determine
the mobility
of the entire
force.
Without mobility,
the principles
of mass, maneuver, and
offensive
cannot
be applied,
and
surprise
becomes very
difficult.
Protection
means both security
against enemy surprise
attack and protection
to allow offensive
maneuver or defense on
the battlefield.
This battlefield
protection
may be accomplished
by using terrain
defilade
and defensive
fortifications,
or by
employing artificial
means such as armor.
Qffensive
or fire
power is necessary in order to impose onefs will on the enemy, to
overcome his protection.
These three elements have interacted
continuously
throughout
military
history.
In particular,
the past century
has been
characterized
by a vast increase
in weapons power, an increase
that can be overcome only with great difficulty
by a carefully
designed combination
of protected
mobility
and other firepower.
The most obvious example of this is the defensive system of World
War I.
That combination
of firepower
and protection
had to be
countered
by close coordination
of infantry
fire
(mobility),
support
(offensive
power),
and armor
(which
theoretically
combined all three elements).
Even this explanation
of World War
I is simplistic,
but the three
bask
elements
of mobility,
protection,
and offensive
power are present
in most tactical
equations.
At a more practical
level,
these three elements are combined
technically
in the design and employment of individual
weapons
and tactically
in the eombination of different
weapons and arms.
The 1982 edition
of Field Manual 100-5, Operations,
divides
the
concept
and practice
of combined arms into
two procedures:
supplementary
or reinforcing
combined arms, and complementary
combined arms.
As the name implies,
supplementary
combined arms
means increasing
the effect of one weapons system or arm with the
similar
effects
af other weapons and arms.
For example, the
effects
of mortars and artillery
may reinforce
or supplement each
other in an integrated
fire
plan,
Engineers may enhance the
protection
of armored vehicles by digging in those vehicles
with
engineer
equipment.
Complementary combined arms, by contrast,
have different
effects
or characteristics,
so that together
they
pose a more complicated
threat,
a dilemma for the enemy. The
defender may place a minefield
so that it halts an enemy force at
a point where observed artillery
or antitank
fires
can attack
that enemy as he clears
the minefield.
The defender has thus
integrated
the different
weapons to provide a much greater effect

than any one by itself

could achieve.
The resulting
dilemma
forces the enemy to accept casualties
while clearing
the mines,
or to seek a passage elsewhere.
It is not sufficient,
however, to develop a doctrine
for
In order to practice,
combining the different
arms and services.
refine,
and employ this doctrine,
at least five other elements
are necessary.
First,
an army must design and procure weapons
with the characteristics
required
by the doctrine
and must stay
abreast of technical
changes that may invalidate
or modify those
weapons and doctrine.
Second,
the doctrine
must be effectively
explained
and
disseminated
to the commanders who are expected
to use it.
Third,
the commanders must believe
that
the doctrine
can be
effective
with the organizations,
weapons, and troops available.
Dissemination
and acceptance
are hampered by the fact
that
soldiers
naturally
rely on past experience,
so that a colonel may
unconsciously
expect platoons to function
as they did when he was
a lieutenant,
years or even decades before,
Experience
is a
priceless
asset to any army, but it naturally
retards or distorts
the application
of changes in technology
and doctrine
that may
render parts of that experience obsolete.
Fourth, in the eyes of the commander, his unit must have the
A recurring
theme
training
and morale to implement the doctrine.
tend to
soldiers
professional
of this
study
will
be that
overestimate
the amount and quality
of training
necessary for the
There is no
effectively
in war.
rank and file
to perform
substitute
for good training,
but historically
leaders with high
standards have rejected
or modified
doctrine
that their
troops
seemed incapable
of executing.
On the other hand, training
may
dot trine
or
genuinely
be an obstacle
to
a particular
organization.
If company commanders are, on the average, capable
of coordinating
only eighty men and two types of weapons systems,
it
would be useless
ten
to design
170-man companies with
Training
officers
to handle these
different
weapons systems.
may be prohibitively
expensive
in
larger,
more complex units
peacetime.
Finally,
a combined arms system cannot work without effective
Indeed,
command and control to integrate
and direct
that system.
speed of decision
making,
factors
that improve span of control,
and leadership
ability
can be as important
as the weapons
themselves.
Successful
commanders throughout
history
have instinctively
One could argue that
neither
understood
these requirements.
the Great of Prussia,
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, nor Frederick
nor Napoleon I of France actually
developed major new doctrines

and weapons for the combined arms.

What they did well was to
procure weapons, understand and disseminate
doctrine,
train
their
troops, and apply the results
in battle,
With the larger armies
and technical
complexity
of weapons in this century,
it may be
beyond the capability
of a single
leader to fulfill
all
these
requirements.
This possibility
further
complicates
a military
reality
in which, since 1914, the combination
of different
arms
has become essential
for
survival
rather
than optional
for
improved
combat
power.
The
process
of
developing
and
institutionalizing
the combined arms concept,
organization,
and
tactics
in this century is the focus of this study.

Jonathan M. House
Captain, Military
Intelligence
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command & General
Staff College

CHAPTERONE
PROLOGUE TO 1914
In the 169Os, European armies developed
and fielded
the
socket bayonet , a long spike-shaped
blade that could be fixed on
the end of a musket without
obstructing
the bore of the weapon
during
loading
and firing.1
This
simple
device
allowed
well-disciplined
infantry
to withstand
norse cavalry
charges
without the aid of specialized
weapons such as the pike.
For the
next 150 years,
infantry
units
armed solely
with
smoothbore
firearms
and bayonets were the backbone of all Western armies.
Skilled
senior
commanders understood
how to coordinate
this
infantry
with cavalry and with direct-fire
smoothbore artillery,
important
at the level
of
but such coordination
was rarely
regiment or below, because these units were basically
armed with
a single type of weapon.
The need to maximize the firepower
of
inaccurate
smoothbore weapons led to extremely linear deployments
on the battlefield.
The infantry
maneuvered into long formations
of two or three ranks, with the artillery
located
between or
slightly
behind the infantry
battalions.
The limited
effect
of
even such carefully
arrayed
firepower
made it
possible,
if
dangerous, for dense masses of cavalry and Infantry
to attack at
a specific
point
and break the thin
lines
of the defender.
Fire-support
coordination
was simple,
because the infantry
and
artillery
unit commanders had face-to-face
contact or used hand
signals to designate targets.
The fundamentals
of weaponry,
technology,
and small-unit
tactics
were refined
but remained basically
unchanged until
the
mid-1800s.
Stability
made professional
soldiers
skeptical
of
innovations
even when they came from serious students of tactics.
Technology

and Manpower

During
the period
1827-1870,
the first
of two waves of
technological
change In the nineteenth
century revolutionized
the
battlefield.
The most important
innovation
of this first
wave
The
was the development
of rifled,
breech-loading
firearms.
muzzle-loading
rifle
with a bullet-shaped
proJectile
initially
Rifling
and an improved seal
replaced
the smoothbore musket.
between bullet
and bore increased
the velocity
and accuracy of
range
of nearly
500
out
to
an
effective
small
arms fire
meters .2
During
the American Civil
War of 1861-1865,
dense
infantry
formations
in daylight
provided
lucrative
targets
for
Both sides learned to spread out
defenders
armed with rifles.
for their
part,
Defenders,
into skirmish
lines when attacking.
had to dig in to reduce their own vulnerability
to the attackers
rifle
fire.

The muzzle-loading
rifles
used by most soldiers
during the
Civil
War were already obsolescent,
the result
of the Prussian
Army ' s development
of
breeeh-loading
rifle. 3
the
Unlike
breedh:loaders
could be reloaded
in a prone
muzzle-loaders,
position,
allowing
infantry
to remain under cover while firing
metallic-eased
ammunition made loading
Soon fixed,
repeatedly,
the Franco-Prussian
War in
even faster.
By the time of
had adopted breech-loading
artillery
as
1870- 187 1, most armies
well as rifles.
The first
wave of technological
change also included
the
These inventions
introduction
of the railroad
and the telegraph.
greatly
increased
the speed of communication,
mobilization,
and
At the
troop movement at the strategic
and operational
levels.
maneuvered on foot or on
tactical
level,
though,
troops still
horseback.
The second wave of technological
change came in the 1880s and
rifles,
repeating
magazine-fed
Smokeless
gunpowder,
improved artillery
fuzes,
artillery,
recoiling
and quick-firing
combustion engines appeared in rapid
machine guns, and internal
srmecession e With the exception of the engine, these developments
all increased
the volume, range, and accuracy of fire,
placing
the soldier
in the open at a tremendous disadvantage
compared to
General staffs
were created
the soldier
in prepared positions.
to mobilize
and deploy enormous armies using these new weapons.
Although radiotelegraphs
existed in the armies of 1974, the radio
had not yet improved to the point where staffs
could follow and
direct events on the battlefield.
1890s.

The cumulative
effect
of these
two waves was to make
cooperation
and coordination
between different
units
and arms
absolutely
essential.
Anything less than total
coordinatkon
in
the attack might well result
in defeat by defensive
firepower.
Canverse ly , an uncoordinated
defense invited
disaster.
The American Civil
War and the Wars of German Unification
61864-1871)
gave professional
soldiers
many opportunities
to
That
change,
technological
first
wave of
the
evaluate
in combination
with an effective
reserve component
teehnology,
system, provided the tools of victory
in Prussias
struggles
to
When World War I began, however, professional
unite
Germany.
soldiers
had not yet digested and agreed upon the effects
of the
As will
be seen below, most tactical
second wave of change.
daetrines
in 7914 showed a healthy
respect
for the effects
of
but such doctrines
had not
solved
the resulting
firepower,
problems on the battlefield,

Quite apart from changes in weaponry, the Prussian example of

large cadre and reservist
forces overwhelming professional
armies
convinced other European governments that they must develop mass
European general staffs
therefore
produced
armies of reservists.
elaborate
plans to mobilize
and deploy such reserves by railroad
As a result
of these efforts,
by 1900,
at the outbreak of war.
Germany had only 545,000 men on active duty but a total wartime
strength
of 3,013,OOO; France had 544,450 men in peacetime and
4,660,OOO in war; and Russia could mobilize over 4,000,OOO from a
peacetime strength
of 896,OOO.Q In contrast , the British
Army
Expeditionary
Force of 1914 consisted essentially
of regulars
and
contained
only
a limited
percentage
of reservists
who had
previously
served on active duty.
The Prussian reserve and militia
(Landwehr) formations
of the
1860s were successful
partly
because they were filled
with the
veterans
of previous
Prussian wars.
By 1914, however, a long
period of peace had deprived
most armies of such experienced
reservists.
Every continental
army had to develop its own system
of reserve
training
and organization,
and every army had to
decide what percentage
of reservists
could be absorbed into an
Many officers
distrusted
the
active duty unit on mobilization.
competence of their
citizen-soldiers.
The absence of reservists
from regular
army formations
during most of the year meant that
units
were well below authorized
wartime strength
and were in
thus making realistic
training
for
effect
skeleton
formations,
both officers
and conscripts
difficult.
Organization

and Doctrine

Pre- 19 14 armies organized

the different
combat arms into
divisions
and corps that bore a superficial
resemblance to those
of today.
The most obvious difference
was the absence of the
By the
vehicles
and electronics
associated
with modern combat.
end of the Napoleonic
Wars, European armies had accepted the
infantry
and
combining
unit
for
division
as the war time
artillery,
although
most cavalry was concentrated
into separate
divisions,
or even corps.5
brigades,
As in so many other
agreement
areas, the Prussian example had produced considerable
Most
by 1914 on the basic organization
of an infantry
division.
divisions
contained twelve battalions
of infantry,
each with two
machine guns either
assigned or in direct
support (see Figures 1
and 21.6
Battalions
were usually
grouped into four regiments
although the British
regimental
headquarters
no
and two brigades,
longer had a tactical
command function
and therefore
remained in
Divisional
cavalry was universally
very small, because
garrison.
most functions
of screening
and reconnaissance
were assigned to
These large cavalry
the separate cavalry brigades or divisions.

TYPE FRENCH

DIVISION,

1914

15,000

men. 36 guns,

24 machine

guns

xx
HQ

2 x machine

TYPE GERMAN

DIVISION,

17,600

1914

gun

men, 72 guns, 24 machine

El

un

18 x 77mm

18 x 77mm

Figure 1. Type French and German Divisions,

84-3330

-lO-

1914

guns

cl

18 x 106mm

TYPE BRITISH

r
a

DIVISION,

1914

18,000

men, 76 gunr,

24 mechine

1
xx
O

FiE!l

2 x mschine

18 x 83.8mm

cl 0

gun

18 x 4.6;
4 x 127mm

TYPE RUSSIAN

DIVISION,

21,000

1914

Figure 2. Type British

84-3330

gun6

men, 48 guns, 32 mschine

and Russian Divisions,

-11-

1914.

E
gun6

formations
were almost pure cavalry,
with a few horse artillery
1923-14)
for example, did the
batteries
attached.
Not until
Germans add company-sized
elements
of mounted engineers
and
bicycle-equipped
infantry
to their cavalry divisions.7
Where the armies differed
most markedly was in the proportion
and
calibers
of artillery
divisions.
included
in
the infan try
Ciivisfonal
artillery
varied from as few as thirty-l&x
light
guns
of 75-m
in the French dkvision
to as manyas
seventy-six
(114.5~Id
artillery
eighteen
4.5-inch
pkeces,
including
howitzers
and four 127~mm guns, in the British
division.
These
confusion
variations
in
structure
and
ref leeted
profound
disagreement
over the role of artillery
and the importance
of
combined arms.
In order to understand
the doctrinal
interrelationships
of
the different
arms before World War I, some conskderation
of each
arm is in order.
Cavalry and engineers may be discussed briefly;
deserve a more detailed
explanation.
infantry
and artillery
Because the U.S. dfviskon
was only just developing
during the
it is omitted from this discussion.
period 1911-17,
mobility
in the days before
Cavalry
had the greatest
automobiles
and was therefore
closely
assoeiated
with functions
requiring
such mobility.
Traditionally,
cavalry
had three
shock
missions : reconnaissance
and security
before the battle,
action
on the battlefield,
and pursuit
after
the battle.
The
increases in firepower
during the later
1800s led many tacticians
to suggest that shock action was no longer a feasible
role except
because
the charge
They argued that,
under rare circumstances.
seemed almost obsolete ) cavalry should be reequipped as dragoons
This would enable the mounted arm to
or mounted infantry.
continue
its
reconnaissance
or security
also
mission I while
functioning
as highly
mobile infantry
that dismounted to fight
after
making contact with the enemy. Cavalry actually
operated
in this
manner during
the American Civil
War, the Boer War
(1899-1902))
and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
By 1974, the
British
and German armies had equipped their cavalry with machine
guns and trained them to fight dfsmounted when necessary.
Yet the desire
to retain
cavalry*s
operational
mobi.lity
in
reconnaissance,
security,
and pursuit
eaused many cavalrymen to
prefer
mounted fighting
whenever possible,
despite
the large
target a horse and rider presented to the enemy. Another factor,
also helped preserve the traditional
Cavalry
social conservatism,
of lances and sabers in most armies.
In additisn,
defenders of
cavalry shock action justified
their views by citing
one cavalry
known
charge of the Franco-Prussian
Mar, an action appropriately
battle
of
ride.
At
the
Bredow s
death
VOE?
;Tonville-Mars-la-Tour
on 76 August 1870, NaJ* Gen. von Bredow

12

led his Prussian cavalry

brigade down a depression
to within
a
few hundred meters of the left flank of the French VI Corps.
The
French had already
suffered
from artillery
fire
and were not
entrenched when von Bredow charged out of the smoke. The charge
achieved its objective.
Yet during an attack that took less than
five minutes and produced only a momentary tactical
advantage,
380 out of 800 German cavalrymen were killed
or wounded.8
Of the four combat arms, engineers were the most neglected in
doctrine.
They generally
operated
in
small
units,
very
performing
technical
tasks and maintaining
weapons or equipment
in addition
to their
mobility
and countermobility
missions.
Because of these missions,
engineers were often the only troops
trained
in the detailed
construction
and destruction
of obstacles
and field fortifications.9
With respect to infantry,
a rifle
battalion
before 1914 was
just that--four
companies of rifle-armed
infantry
plus, in most
cases,
two heavy machine guns.
Such battalions
lacked
the
variety
of
grenades,
mortars,
and
similar
short-range,
indirect-fire
weapons that we today associate
with infantry.
To some extent,
armies neglected
these weapons because of the
specialized
training
they required,
or because, in the case of
the pieces were too heavy to
the heavy machine gun and mortar,
keep pace with advancing infantry.
Machine guns were usually
cast in an economy-of-force
role,
such as protecting
an open
flank.
Moreover,
once an infantry
battalion
detrained
and
was neither
more mobile
nor more
advanced to contact , it
protected
than infantry
in the eighteenth
or nineteenth
century.
magazine-fed
rifles
and machine
The firepower
of breech-loading,
guns had greatly
outstripped
the mobility
and survivability
of
As everyone discovered
in the fall
of
foot-mobile
infantry.
the
only
immediate
remedy was to
1914,
entrench.
All
professional
soldiers
were aware of this problem before the war,
but they regarded defensive
firepower
as a costly obstacle
that
had to be overcome by a highly
motivated
attacker.
At tacking
infantry
was expected to forego protection
in order to maximize
its own firepower
and mobility.
In order to understand this belief,
we must consider the war
The Wars
that professional
soldiers
expected to fight
in 7914.
of German Unification
had provided models of short wars won by
Over and over during the summer of
decisive
offensive
action.
and better-armed
French infantry
had
1870, the better-trained
only to be
selected
defensive
positions,
taken up carefully
outflanked
and driven
back by determined
and costly
German
attacks . JO Thus, many soldiers
concluded that standing
on the
In any event,
no one
defensive
was a sure road to defeat.
believed
that a war that mobilized
the entire
manpower of a

nation could go
that an entire
rough t . Under
collapse if the

War in ?914 meant

on for mare than a few months.
economy halted while the reserves mobilized
and
such circumstaneesS
societies
and economies would
war dragged on.

Tfiis belief
in a short war determined many of the tactical
With few excegtfons,
they did
expectations
of European soldiers.
not anticipate
assaulting
prepared
fortifications
across open
envisaged a series
of meeting
Instead I most soldiers
ground.
engagements or encounter
battles.lf
Each commander hoped that
his cavalry
screen or his infantry
advance guard would find a
weak point
whioh he would attack
immediately
to develop the
the defensive.
The
situation,
and force
that
enemy onto
attaokers
artillery
would then act ta pin down and isolate
the
enemy defender, preventing
rei~~Qrceme~t or serious entrenchment.
Meanwhf.le , the attacking
infantry
would approach the hastily
by ~a~~u~~ri~
to an open flank.
entrenched
enemy I preferably
The gaal was to infiltrate
to within
400-800 meters of the
During
all
available
cmver- and concealment,
defender by using
the Balkan Mars of 1972-13, Serbian and Bulgarian
infantry
had
infiltrated
to within
200 meters of the enemy before
opening
fire.
Most soldiers
considered
this
to be an exceptionally
successful
movement.72
Once the defender engaged the advancing
infantry,
the attaeker
would deploy into a series
of skirmish
lines W The desired
density
of these skirmish
lines
varied
between armies and over time, but soldiers
generally
moved one to
three meters apart,
Because of the reco nized strength
of the
defenders
firepower,
skirmishers
would advance by fire
and
movement, one group providing
covering
fire
~hlle another group
rushed forward for a short distance L The skze of each group and
the distance cavered at one rush would both beeome sm
Enemy fire
would intensify
attacker
closed with his opponent.
Casualties
were
while
the attacker
found cover more sparse.
expected,
but supporting
troaps would replenish
the attacking
skirmish
line,
The defender would be outnumbered and isolated.
Prewar machine guns were too heavy to accompany the advancing
skirmishers,
so these guns were usually deployed to provide fire
Eventually,
the attacker
expected to get
support from the rear.
establish
fire
within
a
distance
of
the defender,
short
and assault with the bayonet.
superiority
with infantry
rifles,
With certain
variations
I most armies shared this
doctrine
before 19 14. It had a number of problems that are obvious in
retrospect,
First,
the
but were not so evident
at the time.
attacker
assumed that he would have local numerical
superiority
whereas the numbers of troops fielded
in 1914
over the defender,
even at specific
that numerical
superiority,
were so similar
Second, this scenario assumed,
to achieve.
points ( was difficult

14

perhaps unconsciously,
that the enemy and friendly
forces were
operating
in a vacuum, moving to contact against each other with
their
flanks
open for envelopment.
In practice,
however, the
density of forces along the French, German, and Belgian frontiers
in 1914 was so great that anyone seeking to maneuver to the flank
either
friendly
or enemy.
was likely
to encounter another unit,
Open flanks did occur, notably
in the battles
of the Marne and
Tannenberg at the end of August, but these were exceptions
caused
by faulty
command decisions
on a battlefield
that was still
fluid.13
The most significant
problem with prewar doctrine
was that
subordinates
considered
their
many professional
soldiers
incapable
of executing
the tactics
required.
The kind of battle
high morale and firm
envisioned
seemed to depend on two things:
control.
Officers,
especially
in the French,
Austrian,
and
Russian
armies,
psychological
continually
emphasized
the
advantage of the attacker.
Yet most professionals
recognized
difficult
to
that discipline
and control
would be extremely
maintain
under intense direct
fire.
The problem was compounded
by the fact that, with the partial
exceptions
of the British
and
German armies,
most European units
had a large
number of
reservists
and untrained
draftees.
A French first-line
infantry
company, for example, had a wartime authorized
strength
of 225
or
were reservists
enlisted
personnel,
of which 65 percent
first-year
conscripts.
14
observers
of
According
to
many
these
reservists
and
conscripts
demonstrated
peacetime maneuvers,
that they lacked the training
and discipline
necessary to conduct
dispersed
fire-and-movement
tactics
under heavy enemy fire.
Professional
soldiers
argued that these troops would never stand
This belief,
up and advance if they were allowed to take cover.
correct
or not, led French, Russian, Austrian,
and other officers
These
to attack
standing
up in relatively
dense formations.
officers
recognized
the risk
they were taking,
but felt
that
there was no other way to achieve the necessary rapid victory
with undertrained
personnel.15
1924
was a
Expeditionary
Force of
Because the British
phenomenally well trained
body of regulars
and some reservists,
the British
did not face this training
problem at the outbreak of
by a
the
same problem
war.
The German Army minimized
three-tiered
system of units,
consisting
of twenty regular
army
corps with a relatively
low proportion
of well-trained
recent
reservists,
fourteen
reserve corps composed of regular cadres and
and numerous smaller
Landwehr or
large numbers of reservists,
militia
formations.
By carefully
focusing on training
before the
war, the German Army not only reduced the problem in first-line
units,
but became the only European army to produce fairly
Indeed,
one of the great
effective
reserve
component units.
surprises
for France in 1914 was the German willingness
to use

15

these cadred
formations
in the line
of battle
immediately.
Prewar French estimates
of enemy strength
had ignored
these
reserve units.16
Both the British
and German armies, however)
They had to
suffered
heavy casualties
in the initial
campaigns.
form new divisions
from half-trained,
patriotic
volunteers
during
the fall
of 1914, and these volunteers
were then used in rigid
tactics
of
French
the
suicidal
that
repeated
attacks
August&September.
Given the emphasis in all armies on the meeting engagement
the
prewar
training
of ten neglected
attack,
and the hasty
defense.
The Germans constructed
field
fortifications
for their
annual maneuvers, but their defensive doctrine
focused on rigidly
French defensive
holding
a single,
densely
occupied
trench.
doctrine 9 as reflected
in prewar engineer manuals t planned for a
to delay the enemy, a
defense-in-depth
, with an advanced position
to limit
a
main line
of resistance f and a second position
successful
17
doctrines
enemy penetration.
Ironically
1 these
defending
had been reversed by 19 15, with the French and British
well
forward
in a rigid
structure,
while
the Germ
beginning to develop a defense-in-depth.
If infantry
had difficulty
adJusting
to the requirements
of
The
the new .firepower,
artillery
was even slower to react.
traditional
tactic
for artillery,
as perfected
by Napoleon, was
to concentrate
the guns in a direct-fire
role,
placing
them
between or a few hundred meters behind the infantry
units they
This tradition
of direct-fire
support
meant
were supporting .
that by 1914 all
armies had standardized
on relatively
light,
highly maneuVerable
field guns with flat trajectories,
even after
advances in technology had made accurate indirect
fire possible.
The French 75-m,
the German 77-m,
the American and Russian
18~pounder (83.8~mm)
were all
X-inch CT6.2-mm), and the British
Larger weapans were too heavy for a
designed for this role.
These guns
standard team of six horses to move across country.
were
too small to have much effect
against
even hasty field
and they lacked the high traJectory
necessary for
fortifications,
This was perfectly
satisfactory
indirect
fire in rough terrain.,
In preparation
for an infantry
attack,
French
to the French.
commanders relied
upon an extremely rapid rate of direct
fire to
a defending
to destroy,
rather
than
temporarily)
;:P,&-yl
The volume of such fire
was intended
to force
the
aimed
enemy to remain under cover, unable to provide effective
The
fire,
even if he were not wounded by the French shells.
encour
century
had
colonial
wars of the nineteenth
That same
British
to believe
in a similar
suppressive
function.
experience
had also led the British
Army to maintain
a much
higher proportion
of artillery
than in French divisions,
because
fire
such
value
of
the
had discovered
infan try
British

16

support. 19
but rarely
unnecessary.

indirect-fire
techniques
Artillerymen
knew about
practiced
them because they seemed complicated
and

The Boer War, and even more the Russo-Japanese War, provided
a glimpse into the future,
with trench systems and the skillful
use, particularly
by the Japanese, of indirect-fire
artillery.
Many professional
soldiers
dismissed
these conflicts
as minor
wars fought at the end of long supply lines and having no useful
lessons
for a future
war in Europe.
Yet observers
of the
Russo-Japanese War, especially
those from the German Army and
British
Royal Artillery,
were impressed with the necessity
for
indirect
fire,
if only to protect
the gun crews from enemy
counterbattery
fire.
The rest of the British
Army, however,
insisted
upon having
close
direct-fire
support
and believed
was accomplished
only by
simplistically
that massed firepower
massing guns well forward on the ground.
Thus, the British
in
they possessed an assortment
of
1914 fell
between two chairs:
weapons but no clear doctrine.20
The German Army, by contrast,
conducted
a serious
study
of indirect-f
ire
techniques
and
equipment.
Beginning
in
their
1909, the Germans increased
indirect-fire
capability
by converting
one battalion
in each
division
to 1054111 howitzers
and by adding a battalion
of 150~mm
howitzers
to each corps
These weapons had an
artillery.
effective
range of 7.5 kilometers,
as opposed to the French 75-mm
with
a four kilometer
range ,21
BY
1914, Germany had 3,500
many howitzers and large siege
medium and heavy pieces, including
mortars,
while
France had only 300 modern guns larger
than
i5-mm.22
A few of the German heavy weapons had been developed
but they were still
available
for
to reduce Belgian fortresses,
field use.
The small caliber
and limited
number of guns involved in most
of the lesser wars at the end of the 1800s meant that no one was
prepared
for the devastating
effects
of massed, large&caliber
matters
To complicate
artillery
fire
on the battlefield.
further , in the nine years between the Russo-Japanese War and the
technological
change occurred in
start
of World War I, a final
the explosive
contained
rounds.
The
charges
in artillery
experiments
of Alfred
Nobel and others
gave all
armies high
explosive
rounds
that
were much more destructive
than the
artillery
shells of the nineteenth
century.23
Thus, at the outbreak of World War I, cavalry and artillery
in most armies had not fully
adjusted
to the new technology,
ability
to execute the
while infantry
commanders doubted their
relatively
sophisticated
fire-and-movement
tactics
of the day.
Perhaps most significantly
, none of the combat arms had trained
for really
close cooperation
with the others,
an oversight
that

proved disastrous
in 19 14 s The most obvious axamp& of this
mind-set
was the standard methad of describing
the siae of an
army in the field.
Instead of counting combined arms divisions,
the average praEessionaL
officer
or even single
am regiments,
described
any force in terms of the numbers of rifles,
sabers,
and guns--the
separate weapons af the three principal
arms.

18

CHAPTERTWO
WORLDWAR I
The defensive
power of indirect
artillery
and machine guns
19 14.
From the very
first
dominated
the battlefields
of
contacts,
commanders had to restrain
the llimpetuosity
of their
in the
upon careful
engineer
preparation
troops
and insist
defense and artillery
preparation
in the offense.1
The French
and British
were shocked by the vulnerability
of their
exposed
troops
and guns to carefully
sited
German machine guns and
artillery.
The Germans, in turn, were surprised
by the accuracy
and rapidity
of British
and French guns.
By the end of 1914,
this firepower
had resulted
in the creation
of a continuous
line
of foxholes
and hasty trenches
from Switzerland
to the North
Sea. Thereafter,
every attack was of necessity
a frontal
attack
on these trenches.
The stereotype
of trench warfare did not appear overnight.
of
fronts,
the battles
both
the Eastern
and Western
August-September
1914
were characterized
by a great
deal of
fluidity
and maneuver.
Prewar infantry
tactics
appeared to work
under the right
circumstances.
At 0430 on 8 September,
for
example t the infantry
of the Prussian
Guard Corps infiltrated
forward and, in a surprise
attack without artillery
preparation,
overran the positions
of the French XI Corps .2 On the Eastern
the German Eighth Army surrounded and destroyed an entire
Front,
Russian army by a double envelopment.
In fact, the Eastern Front
was never as immobile as the Western, because of the greater
frontages
involved.
Yet,
this
fluidity
produced
indecisive
results
until
first
the Russians and then the Austro-Hungarians
became exhausted and demoralized by attrition.
On

Given these examples of maneuver, many commanders regarded

and temporary
the thin line of 1914 entrenchments as an unnatural
British
and French commanders spent most of
pause in the war.
the war seeking the means of penetrating
and disrupting
the enemy
Because the
defenses in order to restore
the war of maneuver.
Germans concentrated
most of their
efforts
on the Eastern Front
during 1914-19 16, they conducted an economy-of-force
defense with
relatively
few attacks
in the West.
In order to understand the
nature of World War I tactics,
therefore,
we need to examine the
problems of Allied
attacks and, then, the development of German
The solutions
to both problems
involved
defensive
doctrine.
cooperation
than had previously
been established
on
greater
of
either
side; in some cases they also involved the combination
the different
arms.

19

Artillery

and Coordination

Once the infantry

attacks
failed
and trench warfare because
a
the reality
of combat, the most obvious means of creating
penetration
was massed artillery
fire.
Indeed) the British
and
French rapidly
gave up any idea of combining artillery
fire with
infantry
maneuver
concentrated
and
instead
on achieving
overwhelming
destruction
in the preparatory
fires.
Although
higher-level
planners
still
saw a role
for
infantry,
many
tactical
commanders interpreted
the new techniques
as *the
artillery
conquers, the infantry
occupies.3
Artillery
conquest was not easy.
Everyone had expectted a
short
war, and thus few armies had sufficient
supplies
of
massive
the
artillery
to
ConduCt
ammunition
and
heavy
preparations
necessary
to
demalish
even
temporary
field
In both Britain
and Russia, scandals arase over
fortifications.
the long delays necessary to produce more ammunition and guns.
Even when France began ta produce more guns, the first
madels of
medium and heavy artillery
had extremely
slow rates of fire,
while the more rapid TS-mm gun had such a short range that it had
to move well forward and displace frequently
behind the advancing
troops in order to destroy any defenses-in-depth.4
Adding to the problem was the fact that most gunners had
little
experience
in precision
indirect
fire.
b&my of the
today were
procedures
that
are commonplace to artillerymen
establishing
developed painfully
during
the period
19 14-1911:
measuring and compensating
for the
forward observer techniques,
and using ammunition from
effects
of weather and worn barrels,
the same production
lot to ensure that sueeessive volleys
fell in
The first
French regulation
describing
the same general area.
The
until
November 1W5.
such procedures
was not published
British
Royal Artillery
needed new maps of the entire
area of
Northeastern
France before it could establish
a grid system for
surveying
battery
locations
and ad$.zsting
indirect
fire.
The
fledgling
air
services
of the belligerents
had to provide
aircraft
for photographio
mapping and both aircraft
and balloons
Finally,
improved radiotelegraphs
for adJusting
indirect
fire.
artillery
fire
allowed
aerial
observers
to
talk
to
the
controllers.5
Such developments took most of the war to reach
perfection.
Quite apart
from the technical
problems of indirect
fire,
there was the even greater
problem of coordinating
the infantry
and artillery
in an attack.
The first
deliberate
attacks
conducted by the British
and French during late 1974 and early
because both
difficult
to control,
1915
were particularly
artillerymen
and oommanders lacked experience
in indirect
fire.
The easiest procedure seemed to be the establishment
of a series

20

of phase lines,
with artillery
firing
on the far siae of a phase
line while all infantry
remained on the friendly
side.
Once the
commander directed
artillery
fires
to shift
forward past a new
safety.
phase line, the troops could advance in relative
Such phase lines encouraged commanders to ignore the terrain
contours to their
front and the possibilities
for maneuver, and
to favor instead simple advances by all units on line.
This in
turn discouraged
massing of artillery
or infantry
at critical
points.
More importantly,
there were no effective
communications
procedures that would allow the leading infantry
units to talk to
their
supporting
artillery.
During the Champagne campaign of
on
1915, the French went to the extreme of sewing white cloths
the backs of their
soldiers
to help observers
determine
the
forward progress
of troops,
but casualties
from friendly
fire
still
occurred.
The Germans experimented with colored flares and
signal
lamps to communicate between infantry
and artillery,
but
su eh signals
were often
difficult
to recognize
amidst
the
destruction
of battle.6
Beginning
with
the battle
of the Somme in July
19 16,
artillery
was able to provide a rolling
barrage of shrapnel that
could advance at a steady rate of speed.
The use of shrapnel
instead
of high explosive
made it safer for the infantry
to
advance close behind the artillery
barrage labout 100 meters),
because the explosive
effect
of shrapnel
was focused forward
along the line
of flight.
Shrapnel,
however, had almost no
effect
against well-prepared
positions--the
best It could do was
force the defender to stay under cover during the assault.
In
addition,
there was still
no way for the infantry
to adjust the
rate at which the rolling
barrage
moved forward.
The rigid
forward movement of artillery
-fire often outran the heavily
laden
infantryman
struggling
across
the
shell-pocked
battlefield,
allowing
the defender time to leave his shelter
and engage the
attacker after the barrage had passed over a trench.
This problem of infantry-artillery
coordination
was only one
aspect
of
problems
of
command, control,
and
the greater
The huge
communications
that plagued a World War I commander.
scope of offensives
and the scarcity
of trained staff officers
at
junior
headquarters
meant that most operations
were planned at
the level of field
army or higher.
Given the crude nature of
artillery
procedures
in the early
stage of the war, artillery
planning and control were also centralized
at a high level.
This
meant that each time the advancing infantry
reached an objective
or phase line they had to stop and request permission
to continue
A messenger had to hand-carry
the advance or to commit reserves.
the request under fire back to the lowest headquarters
(usually
telephone
where the field
or division)
brigade , regiment,
circuits
had survived
enemy counterfire.
These circuits
then

21

relayed the request through the different

levels of headquarters
in order to obtain a decision from the senior commander in charge
of operatfons.
Once a staff
estimate
had been made and the
process had
cammanders decision
announced, this communications
For
to operate
in reverse
before
the troops
could advance.
example, at the battle
of Neuve GhapelPe on 10 March 1915, one of
War
artillery
preparations
of
the
the
first
concentrated
The forward
destroyed
most of the shallow
German defenses.
British
troops,
however, had to wait at a phase line for seven
corps
authorization
from
their
received
hours
before
they
During
this
delay,
the
commanders to continue
the advance.
Germans were able to move in reserves and reestablish
a defense
in the very path of the British
advance.7
Once the momentum of
it was very diffLcult
to organize a renewed
an attack was lost,
advance.
To some extent,
these communications problems were a product
A senior
commander could not
of the technology
of the Ume.
He was tied to
command chose to the front even if he wished to,
the field
telephone system that brought all information
to him
Although radios
did exist,
and conducted all orders forward.
and generally
suspect because of the
they were bulky, unreliable,
These limitations,
possibility
of enemy signals
intelligence,
*plus the difficulty
of direct
communication between infantry
and
artillery,
made subordinate
inftiative
and rapid
exploitation
The attacking
troops might well
fall
potentially
disastrous.
prey to their
own artillery
support if they did not coordinate
with higher headquarters.
techniques
and
artillery
improvements
in
1918,
BY
The
communications
made such initiative
muoh more practical.
Australian
general
Sir John Monash, for example, developed an
system to determine
the forward
progress
of his
elaborate
Advancing troops carried specially
oolored flares,
while
forces.
a detachment of aircraft
did nothing but spot the location
of
these flares F write
out reports
based on the locations,
and
This gave a corps
airdrop
the results
to Monashs headquarters,
commander the forward trace of his forces with a delay of twenty
or fewer minutes + provided he had local air superiority.8
The Problem of Penetration
The problems of indirect
artillery
fire
and of command and
control
were only two aspects of the basic tactical
question of
how to achieve and exploit
a penetration
more rapIdly
than the
defender could redeploy to prevent or seal off a penetration.
Consider the accompanying abstract
diagram (Figure
3) of a
fully developed trench system.
In order to advance, one side had
the defensive
fire
of the enemy ts
to begin by neutralizing

22

NO MANS

v
n

V
n

V
n

V
n

artillery

LAND

V
n

V
n

V
n

positions

Figure 3. Trench System, World War I.

s-3330

-23-

V
n

barbed
wire

trenches
and artillery
batteries.
As early
a3 the battle
of
Neuve Chapelle
in
had demonstrated
the
19 15, the British
possibility
of achieving
sueh a penetration
by concentrated
or
fire.
Eliminating
prolonged
artillery
the barbed wire
and
similar
obstacles
in front
of the enemy trenches was somewhat
Shrapnel had very little
effect
against wire;
more difficult,
nor would prewar fuzzes For high explosive
rounds detonate against
the very slight
resistance
they encountered when passin& through
barbed wire.
By 1917 the British
had developed the Instantaneous
model 106 fuze that would detonate high explosive
rapidly
enough
to destroy
wire .9
Indeed,
even the German3 conceded that
artillery
and infantry
together
could always capture
the first
and even the second trench lines,
especially
if a short artfllery
bombardment and good operational
security
maintained surprise.
The problem came when the attacker
tried to displace
forward
to develop and exploit
the resulting
partial
penetration.
The
infantry
that had made the initial
assault would be exhausted and
in many cases decimated,
while the artillery
would need to move
forward in order to continue
its fire3
on the enemy third
line
Even after
a senior commander learned
and artillery
posItions.
of succe3s,
decided to exploit,
and communicated his decision
forward, all of his troops9 guns I and supplies had to move acros3
the intervening
No Man3 Land and captured enemy trenches 9 an
In most
area that usually
was a sea of mud and shellholes.
cases t by the time the attacker
had completed this displacement,
the defender had been able to bring up reserves and establish
new
trench line3 in front of the attacker.
The defender*s
role was
much easier I because his reserve3
could move by railroad
and
motor truck while the attacker3
forces toiled
forward over the
broken ground.
Moreover) the defender could easily counterattack
and pinch off any penetration
that did not occur on a broad
because the newly captured
area would be exposed to
frontage,
concentrated
defensive artillery
fire,
Even if the attacker
Tmoved faster
than the defender
and
actually
penetrated
through existing
trenches and gun positions,
the second echelon infantry
would aga~in be tired,
out of the
range of artfllery
support and communications,
and essentially
restricted
to Foot mobility,
Thus ) another
passage of lines
would be required.
In theory,
thLs was the stage when horse
cavalry
could use its greater
mobility
to exploit,
although
in
practice
a feu machine guns could
delay
such exploitation
significantly.
Thus ( the timing of the decision
to exploit
and the problems
of mobility
across No Man?3 Land ,remained major obstacles for any
attacker .
Various
solutions
were
tried.
Some artillery
the battle
and
moved forward
prior
to
batteries
secretly
themselves
just
behind
the friendly
first-line
eamouf laged

24

trenches,
allowing
sustained
artillery
support
to a slightly
deeper range.
Attacking
brigades or regiments developed a system
of leapfrogging,
with second-echelon
battalions
passing through
the attacking
battalions
to
sustain
the advance.
Ultimately,
however,
the point
would be reached
where the attackers
advantages of artillery
preparation
and, if possible,
surprise
were cance 1 led out by the defenders
advantages
of depth,
terrain,
and operational
mobility.
Of course, these problems could be minimized if the attacker
did not try to achieve a complete penetration
in any one attack,
but
settled
for
capturing
a limited
objective.
Meticulous
planning and preparation
would allow such a surprise
attack
to
succeed within
the limits
of artillery
range and command and
would be
after
which a new defense
capabilities,
control
organized
to
halt
the
inevitable
counterattack.
French
commanders such as Philippe
Pktain were particularly
noted for
using thrs technique during 1917-18, after the French morale had
been shattered
by too many blind
frontal
attacks.
Such a
set-piece
battle
certainly
improved morale and could achieve a
limited
victory
at low cost;
it could not, however, break the
stalemate
and win
the war.
Ultimately,
a combination
of
attrition,
new weapons, and new infantry
tactics
were required
to
achieve the elusive victory.
Flexible

Defense

While the British,

French, and later
the Americans sought to
the Germans gradually
of the penetration,
solve the mystery
perfected
their
defenses
against
such a penetration.
This
evolution
of German defensive
doctrine
was by no means rapid or
easy, but the result
was a system of flexible
defense-in-depth
that not only hindered attack but developed the capabilities
of
the German infantry.
At the beginning of the war, senior commanders on both sides
As the cost of
emphasized a rigid
defense of forward trenches.
taking
ground
increased,
it
seemed treasonous
to surrender
voluntarily
even one foot of precious
soil to an enemy attack.
Moreover,
commanders
believed
that
creating
m=u
defenses-in-depth
and allowing
units to withdraw under pressure
would encourage cowardice,
as troops expecting
a retreat
would
Only gradually
defend their
positions
only half-heartedly
. I0
did German leaders
realize
that massing their
forces
in the
forward trenches was suicidal;
the artillery
bombardment before a
French or British
attack
eliminated
many of the defenders
in
those trenches,
increasing
the possibility
of enemy penetration.
This was most obvious at the battle
of Neuve Chapelle,
when the
single line of German trenches disappeared under the weight of a
nothing
but a string
of concrete
British
bombardment, leaving
pillboxes
behind the lines
to block the British
advance until
reinforcements
arrived.

25

Beginning with the shock of Neuve Ch&pelle, Germany gradually

evolved a system that by 1917 included
up to five successive
defensive
lines,
one behind the other,
in critical
sectors.
The
first
two or three lines were sited on reverse slopes wherever
the terrain
permitted.
This not only complicated
the task of
adjusting
enemy fire
on those trenches,
but meant that
the
attacking
British
and French infantry
were out of sight
and
therefore
out of communication with their
own forces when they
reached the German defenses.
At the same time,
if a German
trench
on a reverse
slope were captured,
it would be fully
exposed
to
fire
and counterattack
from
the
German rear
The rearward trenches were beyond the range of enemy
positions.
light and medium artillery,
making them more difficult
to reduce,
Quite apart from the choice of terrain,
the German defensive
system emphasized three principles
: flexibility
, decentralized
In terms of flexibility,
the forward
control,
and counterattack.
German trenches most exposed to bombardment contained few troops,
with perhaps one battalion
out of every four in the first
two
trenches.
By contrast,
the French put two-thirds
of every
lines,
with orders
to hold at all
regiment
in these forward
costs.
and had
BY 1916, the Germans had gone even further
decided that trench lines were useful shelters
only during quiet
periods.
Once a bombardment began, the rearward German troops
moved into deep bunkers, while the forward outposts moved out of
the trenches,
taking cover in nearby shellholes.
The British
and
French artillery
bombarded the deserted
trenches
until
their
barrage passed and their
infantry
began
to advance.
At that
point the Germans would come out of the shelters
and open fire
from the shellholes
or from the remains of the trenches.
The second aspect of the German system was decentralized
control,
Squad and platoon leaders had considerable
independence
and might defend or delay anywhere forward of the third,
or main,
defense
line.
The forward
or
Front
Battalion
Commander
frequently
directed
the entire
defense of a regimental
Sector.
In the mature system of 19 17-18, this battalion
commander ,had the
authority
to commit the remaining two or three battalions
of his
regiment
in a counterattack
at the moment he judged most
This only exaggerated
the difference
in decision
appropriate,
cycles:
while
the British
and French attackers
had to seek
orders and reinforcements
from their
corps or army commander
the defending
German battalion
located
miles
to the rear,
commander could direct a regimental
counterattack
on the spot.11
This, in fact,
pertains
to the third
element of the German
defensive
tactics :
counterattacks
at every echelon to retake
In those
lost ground before
the attacker
could consolidate.
areas that seemed most vulnerable
to attaok,
a second-echelon
division
was located behind every one or two front
divisions,

26

ready to counterattack
if needed.
Whenever a major offensive
began, the German defenders sought to contain the flanks of the
penetration
by blocking
positions;
counterattacks
would then
eliminate
the resulting
salient.
Such tactics
did
not
evolve
overnight.
Many German
commanders bitterly
opposed the flexibility
and decentralized
control
of the elastic
defense.
For example, at Passchendaele in
July-August
1917, the local
commander ordered all
outposts
to
hold in place while awaiting
the counterattack.
The result
was
disaster,
with
many outposts
being cut off.
There is some
evidence that the British
incorrectly
decided that this costly
experiment
was the real key to German defenses,
leading to the
rigid forward British
defense that collapsed in March 1918.12
The combination
of flexibility,
decentralized
control,
and
counterattack
at every echelon made the German defensive
system
almost invincible
until
attrition
and demoralization
gave the
Allies an overwhelming numerical superiority.
The Allies,
by contrast,
received
fewer ,attacks. from the
Germans and therefore
took
longer
to arrive
at the same
A French directive
of 8 July
1915 did require
conclusions.
commanders to hold the majority
of their
troops in the rear for
counterattack,
but this order was frequently
ignored.
Not until
the five German offensives
of 1918 did French field
commanders
learn to array their
forces in depth and accept the loss of
lightly
defended forward positions.13
Technologica_l

Change

Like all major wars, World War 1 accelerated

the development
In addition
to changes in artillery
and
of new technology.
communications,
a number of new weapons appeared as the result of
None of these efforts
efforts
to solve the penetration
problem.
was entirely
successful,
but they all
represented
additional
weapons or tools to be combined with the traditional
arms.
Gas warfare
was the first
attempt
to break the trench
defense.
Although
the French had experimented
with
various
noxious gases on a small scale at the end of 1914, it was the
Germans who first
conducted major gas attacks.
The first
German
test of gas took place in January 1915, at Lodk on the Russian
Much of the chemical, however, failed
to vaporize because
front.
of low temperatures.
The first
use on the Western Front was on
22 April
1915 at the Ypres salient.
There a surprise
attack
routed
French colonial
troops
on a five-mile
front,
but the
They had no
Germans were not prepared to exploit
their success.
significant
reserves
available
to advance before
the French
each side found that primitive
Thereafter,
sealed
the breach.

27

gas masks and uneertain

weather conditions
made the existing
nonpersistent
and early perslstent
agents difficult
to employ
successfully . When the British
first
used gas at Loos on 25
September 1915, the wind eondltions
were extremely calm, so that
the gas moved too slowly or in the wrong direction
along most of
tne front.
The British
troops
advanced Into
their
own gas,
suffering
more casualties
than their opponents.
The Germans, for
their
part,
had problems with chemical warfare
on the Western
Front because the prevailing
winds came from the west, often
Gas warfare became only an
blowing gases back in their
faces.
adjunct,
useful to degrade enemy effectiveness
but not to achieve
By 1917-78,
the most common use of gas
a penetration
,by itself.
was to mix chemical and high explosive artillery
shells during a
preparatory
fire,
in hopes of forcing
the enemy out of - his
deep
shelters where the gas settled.14
World War I was also the first
oonflict
to have significant
air action.
Hllitary
aviation
aeveloped at a tremendous rate
dur%ng the war, but was still
in its infancy in 1918.
All of the
pubXicity
went to fighter
pilots,
whose primary mission was to
achieve
local
air
superiority.
This
eondition
allowed
the
primitive
aircraft
of the time to conduct
their
more basic
functions
of reconnaissance
and artillery
fire
adjustment.
Not
191'7 did the BrLtlsh
and Germans officially
recognize
the
until
posslbklity
of ground attack by fighters
in the forward area, and
both sides considered
the main effect
of such an attack
to be
demoralization
rather
than destruction.15
the first
By 1918,
bombers with significant
payloads appeared,
but
in
moat
cases
reconnaissance
and not bombardment was the critical.
contribution
of air power.
The military
motor
vehicle
also
developed
from a few
prlmltive
cars in 1914 to thousands of large trucks
by l916*
Although
not a tactical
weapon, the truck
allowed
the rapid
movement of troops ,and supplies
between widely separated points.
As such, it increased
operational
mobility
as significantly
as
had the raflroad
in previous generatlons.
This made It possible
to mass suddenly and conduct a surprise
attack at an unexpected
Trucks were
or to move reserves to blunt a penetration.
point,
also essential
for stockpiling
the ammunition and materiel
needed
for major offensives.
The tank was originally
designed as a special weapon to solve
an unusual tactical
situation,
the stalemate
of the trenches.
Basically,
the tank was intended
to bring
the firepower
of
artillery
and machine guns across the morass of No Mans Land
while providing
more protection
than a purely infantry
unit could
weapon was to assist
the
The sole purpose of this
carry.
infantry
in creating
a penetration
so that the eavalry,~ which had
been waiting
for the opportunity
since 1914, could exploit
into
the German rear.

28

This purpose must be remembered in order to understand

the
shortcomings of early tanks.
British
and especially
French heavy
tanks had slow speeds, poor mechanical
reliability,
and great
vulnerability
to direct-fire
artillery
once the initial
surprise
wore off.
After all,
these new weapons had to advance only a few
Moreover,
miles and then turn the battle
over to the cavalry.
the great secrecy surrounding
tank development,
coupled with the
skeptioism
of infantry
commanders, often meant that infantry
had
little
training
to cooperate
with
tanks.
As a result,
the
infantry
would become separated
from the tanks,
allowing
the
German infantry
to defeat
the two arms separately.
Generally
speaking,
infantry
that had the opportunity
to train
with tanks
and to work with tanks in battle
swore by them,
before battle
while infantry
that was thrown into battle
without
prior
tank
training
swore at them.
Small, local attacks,
beginning at Flers on the Somme on 15
September 1916, dissipated
the initial
surprise
of the tank.
Not
until
20 November 1917, at Cambral, did the British
Tank Corps
get the condfktions
it needed for success.
Using new survey
techniques,
the British
guns moved into position
without
firing
ranging shots prior
to the attack.
The tanks then began to move
forward at the start of a very short artillery
bombardment, with
The elimination
the Infantry
following
in the lee of the tanks.
of a long artillery
preparation
not only achieved surprise,
but
also left the ground more traffieable.
Four hundred seventy-four
healy tanks In three brigades had practiced
extensively
with five
of the six infantry
divisions
they accompanied.
Tanks operated
in sections
of three:
one tank used machine gun fire
and its
treads to suppress the defending
infantry,
while the other two
tanks,
accompanied by British
infantry,
crossed the trenches.
These tactics
worked well except at Fl&qui&res
.Ridge, in the
center of the Cambral sector.
Here the commander of the 51st
Highland Division,
believing
that German r'lre would be focused on
the armor, had forbidden
his infantry
to come within
100 yards of
the Royal Flying
Corps erroneously
their
tanks.
Furthermore,
reported that it had driven off the German artillery
in the area,
whereas one enemy battery had moved onto the reverse slope of the
ridge.
As a result,
the British
tanks were unsupported when they
Direct-fire
German artillery
knocked
slowly topped the ridge.
out sixteen
unmaneuverable
tanks
In a few minutes.16
This
Incident
convinced many people that .armor could not survive when
separated from infantry,
an attitude
that persisted
after
1918,
In any event,
even when tank speed and maneuverabllity
improved.
the available
tanks were distributed
evenly across the Cambrai
to exploit
the greatest
success.
leaving
no reserve
front,
because of the attrition
battles
of 1916-17,
the
Moreover,
Brltlsh
had few infantry
reserves to commit at Cambrai--they
had
regarded it as a raid rather
than another attempt to penetrate.

29

GERMAN

COUNTER-ATTACKS,

30 NOV

CAMBRAI
BR ADVANCE

\+BR

ADVANCE

21 NOV

.
COUNTER-ATTACKS

NOV

ENBURG MAlN LINE

avrincourt

Woods

5KM

0
SCALE

Map 1. Battle of Cambrai,

84-3330

20-30

November 1917.

The usual problems of Allied

generals commanding from the rear
meant that the Germans rebuilt
their defenses before the Brltlsh
cavalry
moved forward
to exploit.
Ten days after
the British
offensive
at Gambrai, the Germans counterattacked
and restored
the original
front.
In Its own way, this
counterattack
also
surprise,
colored
reflected
the latest
developments of the war:
flares
to shift
artillery
at phase lines,
and multiple
attacking
waves to clear out Brltlsh
strongpoints
bypassed by the first
wave.
Even before Cambral, the Germans had begun to develop an
Ln marked contrast
to the beliefs
of British
antitank
doctrine.
armor commanders, the German commanders were more concerned by
the psychological
effect
of tank attacks
than by the LImited
firepower
and armor of the tanks themselves.
Psychological
effect
rather than infantry
support was the point emphasized
by
postwar
German theorists.
In 1917-18,
however,
the Germans
Instead,
lacked the resources
to compete in tank production.
they relied
upon obstacle
plans combined with existing
light
artillery
pieces (the 77-m guns) and some armor-piercing
rounds
for Infantry
weapons.
These rounds were effective
against early
British
tanks, and by 1918 the Germans had developed oversized
antitank
rifles
against
later
British
models.
To combat the
terror
of tanks, German troops received training
on how to defeat
German infantry
would wait until
the
them.
Where possible,
British
engage the accompanying
attacking
tank had passed,
infantry,
and throw bundles
of grenades
to disable
a tank
tread.17
vulnerable
unless accompanied
By 1918, tanks were extremely
by infantry
and ground-attack
aircraft,
both of which worked to
locate and suppress antitank
defenses.
During the first
three
days of the battle
of Bapaume in August 1918, German antitank
defenses or mechanical
failures
immobilized
81 percent
of the
attacking
tanks.18
Any tank that broke down on the battlefield
was almost certain
to be knocked out by antitank
fire
In a few
shaped perceptions
of tank
minutes.
Again,
such experiences
technological
change had
and roles
long aster
capabilities
restored the tank's Initial
advantage.
and (with French equipment)
Americans
The French, British,
The British
Whippet"
tank
organized
light
tank units in 1918.
was faster
(7.5 miles per hour versus four miles per hour) than
most heavy tanks,
but was still
hardly
a vehicle
for rapid
Light tanks were much easier to redeploy in secret
exploitation.
from one sector to another,
because they could be loaded onto
trucks instead of moved by rail.
Although
the Royal Tank Corps
armored vehicles
in which to transport

experimented
with
special
radios,
supplies,
and even

machine guns, all tank units in World War I were just that--pure
tank formations
of up to brigade size, intended for attachment to
infantry
un3.ts rather
than
for
combined
independent
arms
mechanized operations
of their own.
Gas warfare,
aviation,
motor transport,
and tanks had two
otner than those derived from their
individual
tactical
effects,
eharacteristkcs,
on the positional
battlefield
of World War I.
On the one hand, their development made the problem of combining
different
weapons for attack
or defense much more complicated.
This
reinforced
the
tendency
for
detailed
planning
and
centralized
control
at a time when infantry-artillery
cooperation
was still
being developed.
On the other hand, the army that
succeeded in this
orchestration
had a much better
chance of
eventually
defeating
its
opponent
by attrition,
even
if
penetration
was never achieved.
The Resusence

of lnfantry

Host of the developments in artillery,

gas warfare,
aircraft,
and armor were based on the supposed inabrlfty
of 1914 infantry
to advance under fire.
During
the course of World War I,
gradually
evolved to a point where it had
however, the infantry
recovered some of its original
ability
to take and hold terrain
on Its own,
In the process,
modern infantry
organlzatfon
was
developed.
The 1914 Infantry
battalion
was almost exclusively
armed with
rifles,
plus a few heavy and almost immobile machine guns.
As
soon as the
effects
of firepower
became evident
on the
battlefield,
however, the infantry
of various
armies sought to
increase
their
own firepower
in return.
The first
such effort
Nortars had existed
as a form of heavy
was the trench mortar.
artillery
for centuries,
but in 1914 the German Army introduced
a
llmlted
number of small, eheap, portable
minenwerfers,
which were
breech-loading,
low-trajectory
mortars.
Other armies quiokly
copied the minenwerfer,
and in March 1915, the English engineer
Wilfred
Stokes developed the grandfather
of all current
infantry
mortars,
the
3-inch
muzzle-loading
Stokes
mortar.l9
This
weapon was much simpler
to manufacture
than artillery
and
therefore
was employed extensively
in all armies during the war.
However, larger caliber
mortars were often classified
as weapons
for artillerymen
or, in the German Army, for engineers,
and thus
placed in batteries
<and battalions
separated from the infantry.
As early as 1915 the French began to issue other new weapons
notably the light
automatic rifle
and the rifle
to the infantry,
grenade launcher.
These, plus ordinary
hand grenades, gave the

32

French infantry
more mobile automatic
firepower
and short-range
\;II, to 150 meters)
indirect-fire
capability.
On 27 September
France reorganized
the Infantry
company to consist
of a
which included
communications
and pioneer
(combat
headiuarters,
engineer)
personnel,
plus four platoons
of two sections
each.
rifle
sections,
hand
grenadiers,
Within
these
twelve&men
grenadiers,
and riflemen
were organized
around the automatic
rifleman
as the base of fire.
Three of these infantry
companies,
Plus a company of eight heavy machine guns and a 37-m gun in the
modern
bat tallon
that
headquarters,
made up an infantry
infantrymen
can recognize as such.
Other armies adopted similar
although
the Germans delayed until
armament and organizations,
The German preoccupation
with accuracy of fire
by heavy
1917.
to accept
the relatively
machine guns made them reluctant
inaccurate
light
machine guns and automatic
rifles,
until
in
desperation
the frontline
German Infantry
began to use captured
French automatic rifles.20
The resulting
changes in infantry
tactics
were slow to take
root.
In May 1915, an obscure French captain
named Andre/
Laffargue
privately
published a pamphlet that suggested a variety
of innovations,
including
not only trench mortars but so-called
skirmisher
or sharpshooter
groups.
These groups,
armed with
light
machine guns, rifle
grenades,
and hand grenades,
would
precede the main assault wave by fifty
meters.
Their mission was
to provide covering fire for the ma-in attack and, if possible,
to
infiltrate
through the forward German positions
to suppress and
The French
government
outflank
German machine gun posts.
distributed
but did not endorse this
pamphlet;
the British
largely
ignored it and were among the last to give up the linear
Not until
1916 did the French officially
reduce the
advance.
density of their skirmish
lines to one man every two, and later
every five,
paces, as opposed to every pace, and Integrate
the
Meanwhile,
the
new weapons fully
into
infantry
organization.
Germans captured a copy of Laffargues
pamphlet during the summer
of 1916 and may have adapted parts of It to their
own tactical
doctrine.21
The evolution
of German offensive
tactics
during World War 1
Although
the
than that
of the elastic
defense.
was slower
Germans as early as Verdun In 1916 used small groups of riflemen,
and engineers
to inflltrate
past the French
machine gunners,
their
new infiltration
outposts
at the start
of an attack,
in 1977 on the Russian and Italian
tactics
actually
evolved
These tactics
are
fronts,
in the battles
of Riga and Caporetto.
Gen.
probably
erroneously,
Wutier
tactics
.'I
sometimes called,
Oskar von Hutier
commanded such attacks
on the Russian and
Italian
fronts
during
1917 before
directing
one of the field

33

armies in the German spring offensive

of 1918, but he did not
invent the COnCepts. Some German officers
nave since denied the
very existence
of the Hinfiltrationlf
or "soft-spot"
tactics,
and
in fact the victories
of 1918 were probably
the result
of the
intelligent
application
of lessons learned against
the Russians
rather
than any sudden Innovation
In tactics.
It
and Italians,
Erich von
is clear,
however, that the German Chief of Staff,
Ludendorff,
issued
a set of offensfve
instructions
dated 8
February 1918, which directed
infantry
to attack on Its own using
machine guns, rifles,
grenades, light .mortars,
and accompanying
direct-fire
artillery
pieces.
During
early
1918 as many as
seventy divisions
rotated
tnrough a special
training
course in
the new offensive
tactics.22
The result
was the astonishing
April
1918. The taetios
involved
German developments
in combined
spirit
behind
tactics,
these
equipment, had much to do with the
The Return Of Mobility,

German success of March and

represented
the culmination
of
arms during World War 1.
The
armored
when combined
wrth
later German blitzkrieg.

1918

The German infiltration

tactics
of 1918 can be summarized
BruckmGller
artillery
preparation;
the
under four
headings:
combined arms assault or storm battalion;
rejection
of the linear
advance in favor of bypassing enemy centers of resistance;and
attacks to disorganize
the enemy rear area.
Cal.
Bruckmliller,
an obscure
officer
retired
for
Georg
nervous problems in 1913 but recalled
to duty for the war,
developed German artillery
techniques to a fine art.
The essence
of
the
Bruckm6ller
artillery
preparation
was a carefully
snort but intense bombardment designed to isolate,
orchestrated,
demoralize,
and disorganize
enemy defenders.
Before each of the
great offensives,
Bruckmuller
and hrs assistants
held classes for
junkor leaders of both artillery
and infantry,
explaining
what
The
result
was
not
only
unprecedented
would take place.
understandLng
and cooperation,
but a much greater
confidence
on
Next,
BruckmiEller
allocated
.different
the part of the infantry.
For example, each
weapons against
different
specific
targets.
to thirty
meters of
trench mortar was given only twenty-five
battery was assigned
enemy front
to engage, while each artillery
to suppress a speclfie
enemy battery
or to attack
100 to 150
meters of enemy positions. 23 BruckmGller
avoided area targets,
concentrating
on such key points as artillery
observation
posts,
command posts,
radio
and telephone
centers,
rearward
troop
Be carefully
and major approach routes.
concentrations,
bridges,
Pinpointed
all. these targets
on aerial
photographs.
The result
was to cut enemy communications and isolate
forward units.
The
Using the survey techniques
effect
was increased
by surprise.

34

developed in aI.1 armies during 1916-17,

Bruckmiiller
his
batteries
in
secret
position
and range
immediately behind the forward infantry
trenches.

was able to
from
point3

At the start
of the German orfensive
on 21 March 1918,
Bruckmiiller
began his bombardment with ten minutes of gas shells
to force
the British
to mask, followed
by four
how-3 and
twenty-five
minute3 of mixed gas and high explo3ives.24
The
preparatory
I-ire3 shifted
back and forth,
30 that the BrltLsh did
not know when the artillery
was actually
lifting
for the Infantry
advance.
Meanwhile,
automatic
rifle
team3 moved as close as
possible
to the British
positions
during
the bombardment.*5
When the Germans did advance,
they moved behind a rolling
barrage,
further
enhanced by intense
fog.
The combination
of
and carefully
selected
target3 was
surprise,
brevity,
intensity,
unique.
The combined arms assault or storm battalion
was a union of
all the weapons available
after years of trench warfare,
weapons
which could be focused by a battalion
commander.
A typical
assault battalion
task. force consisted of:
3-4

infantry
companies
trench mortar company
1 accompanying artillery

77-m

battery

or

half-battery

of

guns
1 flamethrower
section
signal detachment
1 pioneer (combat engineer)

section

additional
machine gun
The regimental
commander might attach
units and bicyclists.
The accompanying artillery
pieces did not
participate
in the artillery
preparation,
but waited behind the
infantry,
ready to move immediately.
One of the principal
tasks
of the pioneer3 was to assist in the movement of the guns across
obstacles
Upon encountering
and shellholes.
a center
of
the infantry
provided
suppressive
fire,
while
the
resistance,
and flamethrower3
attempted
to eliminate
that
guns, mortars,
Despite a specially
constructed
low carriage
on some
resistance.
was a very high casualty
rate among the
77-m guns, the result
al though
of
British
exposed crews,
the disorganized
state
defenses made such situations
relatively
rare.26
The essence of the German tactic3
was for the sirst
echelon
of assault
unit3
to bypass centers
of resistance,
seeking to
penetrate
into the enemy positions
In columns or squad groups,
Some skirmishers
had to
down defiles
or between outposts.
precede these dispersed
columns, but skirmish
lines and linear
The local
commander had authority
to
tactics
were avoided.
continue the advance through gaps in the enemy defense3 without

35

regard
for
events
on his flanks,
A second echelon,
again
equipped with light
artillery
and pioneers,
was responsible
for
eliminating
bypassed
enemy
positions.
This
system
of
decentralized
tfsoft-spottf
advances was second nature
to the
Germans because of their
fIexible
defensive
experience.
At the
battle
of Caporetto
in 1917, the young Erwin Rommel used such
tactics
to bypass forward
defenses
and capture
an Ltalian
infantry
regiment with only a few German companies.27
The final
aspect of the German infiltration
tactics
was the
effort
to disorganize
the enemy rear.
The artillery
preparation
the
began by destroying
communications
and command centers;
infiltrating
infantry
also attacked
such centers,
as well as
artillery
positions.
The BrLtish defenders who opposed the rzrst
German offensive
of 1918 lost
all
organization
and retreated
thirty-eight
kilometers
in four days.
Col. 3.F.C. Fuller,
one of
the foremost British
tank tacticians,
observed that the British
Major
seemed to collapse
and retreat
from the rear forward.
British
headquarters
learned
of multiple
German attacks
on
forward
units
just
before
PosMg contact
with some of those
units.
The higher British
commanders then ordered their remaining
successfully
defendkng their
bypassed
forces I which were often
positions,
to withdraw in order to restore a conventional
linear
front ,z8
The German spring offensives
ultimately
faILed for a variety
including
lack
of mobUity
to exploit
initial
of reasons,
As a result,
successes and lack of clear strategic
objectives.
Ludendorff
dissipated
his forces
in a series
of attacks
that
achieved
tactical
success
but no operational
or strategic
decision.
fn other words, the German offensive
of 1928 used tactics
and
organization
that could be described
as a bfitzkrie
wlthout
tanks, disorganizing
and demoralizing
rather than systematically
destroying
the defender.
This was especially
easy to do against
a World War 1 army, where the static
nature of deployments and
telephone communlcatlons had combined with the elaborate
planning
nec!essary for a set-piece
battle
to produce a defender who had
Both sides found
great difficulty
reacting
to sudden changes.
that their soldiers
no longer knew how to fight
in open terrain,
the enemy
but dug in immediately
whenever they broke through
defensive system.
The German spring offensives
of 1918 were the most obvious
example of mobility
returriirig
to the battlefield,
but Ln fact all
armies in 1918 were better
able to attack than they had been in
Beginning
on 15 July
1918, the
the preceding
three
years.
and Americans launched a sustained
series
of
British,
French,
a.ttacks that combined all the Allied
innovations
made during the
war.
Infantry
units
used renewed mobility
and firepower,
plus

tanks to precede them and suppress enemy strongpoints.

Airpower
provided
llmited
ground-attack
capability
plus reoonnaissance
both before
and during
the battle.
This air
reconnaissance
focused on antitank
threats
to the advancing forces.
Artillery
had become much more sophisticated
and effective
than in 1914.
Most important
of all,
the different
weapons and arms had learned
to cooperate
closely,
at least
in
carefully
planned set-piece
operations.
Commanders could no longer rely on one or even two
arms, but had to coordinate
every available
means to overcome the
stalemate of the trenches.
Despite
all
this,
the 1918 offensives
in France never
achieved a decisive
result
on the battlefield,
and the Germans
were defeated more by sustained attrition
and demoralization
than
by any decisive
penetration
and exploitationW29
One of the few
cases In which a 1918 army penetrated
a prepared defense and then
exploited
with conclusive
results
occurred
in Palestine
rather
than France, where the British
defeated Germanys ally,
Turkey.
This victory
is known as the second battle
of Armageddon or
Megiddo (Map 21, because it was fought in the same area as the
original
battle of 1479 B.C.30
Edmund Allenby,
had steadily
The British
commander, Sir
advanced from Egypt tnrough Palestine
against a Turkish army with
a German commander, Liman von Sanders, and a few German units.
The Turkish government had diverted
its resources
elsewhere,
so
that
in 1918 the British
outnumbered the Turks two to one.
Allenby further
increased
his advantage by a detailed
deception
plan that convinced the Turks that the British
would attack at
the eastern end of the front,
in the Jordan Valley.
The actual
attack was then conducted in the west, near the seacoast.
The
fact that the British
possessed a tremendous numerical
advantage
does not detract
from the significance
of the second battle
of
Armageddon in terms of its
tactical
methods and strategic
objectives.
Allenby used all available
elements, beginning with irregular
troops in the enemy rear areas.
On 17 September 1918, two days
before
the planned offensive,
the famous T. E. Lawrence and
Prince Feisal of Arabia conducted a wave of attacks
on Turkish
rail
lines
to divert
In order
attention
and isolate
the
battlefront.
The Royal Air Force also harassed Turkish lines of
communlcations
for days.
At 0430 on 19 September, the British
infantry
began to move forward behind a fifteen-minute
artillery
barrage.
This short preparation
achieved surprise
and avoided
tearing
up the ground.
Moreover, the long delays in assembling
troops
and supplies
prior
to the offensive
had enabled the
British
and Commonwealth infantry
to train
to high standards Of
flexibility.
Unlike the campaigns in France, exploitation
forces

37

fib

NAZARETH

\ \\

CARMEL

MEDlTERRAffEAN

\.

FRONT,
18 SEP 1918

SCA.LE

Contour

lntervsl

150 meters

Map 2. Second Battle of Armageddon,

84-3330

-38-

19-24

September 1918

did not have to wait for authority

to engage.
Instead,
one
Australian
and two British
cavalry
divisions
began the battle
closed
up tightly
behind
the
assaulting
infantry,
with
already
designated.
Because of this
exploitation
objectives
decentralized
control,
the 4th Cavalry Division
had completed Its
passage of lines and had begun the exploitation
within four nours
of the initial
assault.
The primary
objectives
of the campaign were the railroad
junctions
at El AfuYe and Beisan, forty miles behind the front;
a
secondary
objective
was
Nazareth,
the
German-Turkish
headquarters.
Seizure of these points would cut off the forward
Turkish
units
from their
supplies.,
commanders, and route
of
retreat.
The key was to move cavalry through the passes of the
Mount Carmel heights so rapidly
that the Turks could not react to
block the passes.
This was accomplished
on the evening of the
first
day.
The next morning,
a brigade
of the 4th Cavalry
Division
encountered
a reinforced
Turkish
infantry
battalion
marching
forward
in a belated
effort
to block the pass at
of armored car machine gun fire and horse
Musmus. A combination
cavalry
lances captured this battalion
before it ever deployed.
Twenty-five
nours after
the offensive
began, another
British
cavalry brigade surrounded Nazareth, which had been Isolated
and
Although the German commander escaped
harassed by alr attacks.
in the confusion,
the British
captured all the documents in the
enemy headquarters.
The Turkish
Seventh and Eighth
Armies,
except for a few hundred stragglers,
surrendered
In mass, and
only the November armistice
ended the British
pursuit.
The significance
of Second Armageddon was threefold.
First,
it
represented
a rare
ability
from
to make a transltion
penetration
to exploitation
and pursuit
before the defender could
numerical
react.
this
from
The key
to
success,
apart
superiority,
was the fact that the exploitation
force did not
wait for permission
from higher headquarters,
but was committed
on the decision
of division
commanders and in execution
of a
Second, Allenby used all his weapons
previously
arranged plan.
and units in a flexible
and integrated
manner that was matched in
Second Armageddon
Finally,
World War I only by the Germans.
influenced
an entire
generation
of British
cavalry officers,
who
After
the
considered
it the model of a mobile,
deep battle.
frustrations
of trench stalemate
in France, the exploitation
in
When these cavalry officer3
Palestine
seemed a dream come true.
became armor commanders, they stressed
the need for mobile,
one-half
of the British
lightly
armored vehicles.
As a result,
armored force in 1939 wasp equipped with inadequate guns and armor
and was not prepared to cooperate with the other combat arms.

39

Organizational

Results

In addition
to the changes in infantry
battalion
structure,
the rapid development of weapons and tactics
during World War I
significantly
changed tactical
organizations.
The number of
automatic
weapons in an infantry
division
rose from a norm of
twenty-four
heavy machine guns in 19l4 to the following
totals
in
1918:
Germany : 144 automatic rifles
and 54-108 machine guns
France:
216 automatic rifles
and 72-108 machine guns
Britain:
192 automatic rifles
and 64 machine guns
288 automatic rifles
and 72 machine guns
Italy:
United States:
768 automatic rifles
and 260 machine
guns31
Artillery
developed almost as dramatiealfy,
although most of
in nondivisional
units
the additional
guns were concentrated
whose numbers varied
depending on the mission of the division
As Gen. Wilhelm von Balck,
a major German
being supported.
tactician
both before and after the war, remarked:
The question as to the proportion
of the artillery
is no
longer:
'How many guns for each thousand men should be
'HOW much infantry
will
be
provlaed?,'
but far rather:
required
to utilize
the success of the fire
of the
artillery??
a . .there
are no longer
principal
arms.
Each arms has its use, all are necessary.32
More complex problems drove other
organizational
cnanges.
For example, both the French and the Germans found that the
with
two brigades
each of
two
structure,
square
division
regfments;
was unsuited
to positional
warfare,
Given the broad
frontages
involved
in this type of war, no European power had
enough manpower and units to deploy divisions
with two regiments
If, on the other hand, tnree
in first
line and two in second.
regiments were in the first
lfne and the fourth
regiment served
one of the twa infantry
brigade commanders
as a general reserve,
was superfluous.
So the Germans left
one brigade commander in
control
of all infantry,
and by 1916 both the French and the
Germans had reduced the number of infantry
regiments
in a
The British
had entered
division
from four to three (Figure 4).
the war with a three-brigade
structure,
which they retained,
but
they eventually
followed
suit by reducing the brigade from four
infantry
battalions
to three
when manpower shortages
became
This
had
the
added
advantage
of
increasing
the
proportion
acute.
of artillery
and other branches to infantry,
although the Germans
Thus, a
moved part of their artillery
into nondivisional
units.

40

--.

TYPE

28,106
men, 77 guns,
2_60 machine guns

U.S. DIVISION,
1918

HO

3 or 76mm

TYPE

11,643
64-108

GERMAN DIVISION,
1918

men, 36 guns,
machine guns

HQ
&I

MRD

cl@

1.

0
I 0
-I *
106mm

how

Bearers

ffl

@
tzo
77mm

Figure 4. Type U.S. and German Divisions,

84-3330

-41-

1918

gun

1914 French Infantry

division
consisted
of 87 percent infantry,
and 3 percent support elements, while the
IO percent artillery,
1918 version had a proportion
of 65 percent infantry,
23 percent
artillery,
and 8 percent support.33
The one exception
to this trend was the United States Army,
which not only insisted
upon a four-regiment
structure,
but
actually
increased the size of rifle
companies during
1911 (see
figure
4).
The result
was a division
that varied in size from
2Y,OOO to over 28,000 aen, a giant
considerFng
the average
strength
of a European division
was down to 8,000 men or fewer,
In fact,
the French and British
commanders who oontrolled
American divisions
refused to use them according to their design
and, instead,
pushed them into line with .three regrments forward
and the fourth either
in second echelon or in corps reserve.
In
the 42d U.S. Infantry
Division
assumed the defense
one instance,
of a sector
previously
occupied by an entfre
French corps of
three divisions.34
In principle,
however, the American design
was intended
to provide
for sustaIned
offensive
and defensive
operations
despite
the high casualties
of trench warfare.
The
apparent intent was that an American brigade commander, wkth one
regiment in contact and the second behind it, could leapfrog
his
reglxnents to sustain
an offensive
almost indefinktely,
thereby
cuttkng
the decision
cycle time necessary to relieve
exhausted
Unlike
all
higher
commanders
on
the
Allied
side,
assault
troops.
this colonel
or brigadier
general had only a few aides and was
reserve
The only
free
to command from forward
locations.
available
to the dlvision
commander was the two-battalion
combat
which was frequently
pressed into service as
engineer regiment,
infantry.
Even though the Americans differed
with their
allies
about
all
participants
came
away
from
World
War
I
with
many details,
the
tremendous
problems
of
impressions
In
common:
certain
for detailed
planning
and
logistics
and manpower; the necessity
coordination;
and the difficulty
of advancing even when all arms
Under carefully
planned and controlled
worked closely
together.
circumstances,
the Allies
had been able to combine all weapons
Of all the belligerent
systems to maximize the effects
of each.
systems for achieving
this combination,
the German proved to be
most adaptable to new weapons and tactics.

42

CHAPTERTHREE
THE INTERWARPERIOD
The conventional
image of military
affairs
and doctrine
between the two world
wars depicts
most armies as rigidly
committed to a repetition
of the positional
warfare of 1914-18.
According to this view, only Hitler's
Germany listened
to the
advocates of mechanized warfare,
with the result
that between
1939 and 1947 the German blitzkrieg
achieved almost bloodless
victories
over the outdated Polish, French, and British
armies.
No major army
The reality
was much more varied and complex.
and weapons that it
entered World War 11 with the same doctrine
During the interwar
period,
the
had used twenty years before.
majority
of professional
soldiers
recognized that some change was
the battlefield
better
necessary
if
they were to perform
that had proven so
functions
of penetration
and exploitation
Yet armies differed
markedly in
difficult
during World War 1.
their
solutions
to these problems.
lnstead of a simple choice
between trench warfare and blitzkrieg,
each army was faced with a
variety
of possible changes, a series of degrees of modernization
the choice
was
between the two extremes.
In many cases,
determined by social,
economic' and political
factors
more than
Even in Germany,
by the tactical
concepts of senior officers.
the advocates of mechanized warfare did not have a free hand. In
of 1939 were not so
a real sense, the German forces and doctrine
much the perfect
solution
as they were simply a solution
that was
closer to the problems of the moment than were the organizations
and doctrine
of Germany's early opponents.

Because of this tactical

variety
between the world wars, the
doctrine
and organization
of each of the major powers must be
considered up to the point at which that nation entered World War
11.
Before reviewing
these armies, however, it is necessary to
examine some common factors
that hampered military
Change in mOSt
nations.
The first
of these factors
was a general revulsion
against
warfare
and all
things
military.
After
decades of peacetime
preparation
and years of incredible
bloodshed,
few people in
Europe
or
America
interested
in
further
military
were
expenditures
or experiments
with
new weapons and tactics.
firepower
seemed so great
that
few
Particularly
in France,
soldiers
foresaw any type of offensive
success against prepared
enemy positions
without
the combination
of a mass army with
and attrition
tactics,
the means that
had
tanks,
artillery,
succeeded in 1918. Even after most armies concluded that trench
warfare was a special kind of combat that would not necessarily
leadership
were unwilling
recur, the general public and political

43

the
to risk
another
war,
In 1928, fifteen
nations
signed
Kellogg-Briand
Pact, renouncing the use of war except in national
self-defense.
During the 1920s and early
19309, a series
of
international
conferences
attempted to limit
military
and naval
armaments,
Although these conferences
ultimately
failed,
it was
difficult
for professional
soldiers
to justify
the purchase of
new weapons such as tanks and aircraft
in a social and political
environment that might outlaw such weapons at any time.
During the first
fifteen
years of peaoe, extremely
tight
defense budgets reflected
the public distaste
for warfare.
The
victorious
armies were saddled with nuge stockpiles
of 1918-model
equipment and ammunition and had to use up these stockpiles
at
peacetime
rates
before
major
new expenditures
could
be
justified.
Thus, during the early 1930s the U.S. Army spent more
money researching
means to preserve ammunition than to develop
new weapons,?
Just
as the stockpiles
were consumed or worn
out, the Great Depression caused even tighter
defense budgets,
which hampered development and procurement
of tanks, aircraft,
and other
new weapons.
The Germans, by contrast,
had been
deprived of their weapons by the Versailles
Peace Treaty of 1919
and could therefore
start
fresh.
To some extent,
the German
tactical
successes
of 1939-42 were due not to any superiority
in
equipment quality
or quantity,
but rather
to the fact that the
German tanks and other vehicles
were produced early enough to
allow extensive
experimentation
and training
before the war.
In
contrast,
the British
and Freneh had few modern weapons with
which to train
until
the very eve of World War 11, when they
mass-produced
them on a crash basis.
Nations with a smaller
industrial
base, such as Japan and Italy,
could not fully
Compete
in the arms race.
The Japanese selectively
built
a few types of
warships and aircraft
of high quality.
In land warfare,
they
relied
upon training
and morale to make up for weapons that they
not afford
could
to mass-produce.
ltaly
lacked
not
only
production
facilities,
but equipment design eapability
and even
public
understanding
of automobiles
and other machinery.
As a
result,
the Ltalians
failed
to produce any modern, well-designed
weapons.2
A third
factor was teohnology,
which affected
military
change
in two ways. On the one hand, rapid changes in technology made
governments
even more reluctant
to invest
in existing
designs
for
example,
that
would soon be outmoded.
Pn 1938,
the
Inspector-General
of the French Air Force had to advise the
French and British
governments
to avoid a showdown at Munich
beoause he believed
that the majority
of French combat aircraft
new developments such as flush-riveted
were suddenly obsolescent;
metal construction
gave the German Luftwaffe
the appearance of
technical
superiority.3
On the other
hand,
it
was often
difficult
to aetermine exactly
now this new technology
affected

44

these tactics
the tactics
of 1918. Equipment designed to fulfill
might be unsuitable
for different
functions
and concepts,
while
new designs appeared witnout
appropriate
tactical
concepts
to
accompany them.
There was also considerable
confusion
in terminology.
Both
advocates and opponents of mecnanizacion
often
used the term
?.ank" loosely
to mean not only an armored, tracked,
turreted,
gun-carrying
fighting
vehicle,
but also any form of armored
vehicle
or mechanized unit.
Such usage made it difficult
for
contemporaries
or historians
to determine
whether a particular
speaker was discussing
pure tank forces, mechanized combined arms
Similar
aonfusion
forces,
or mechanization
of infantry
forces.
existed
about the term "mechanization."
Strictly
speaking,
any
for
warfare
could
be termed
the gasoiine
engine
use of
this
term
is
usually
employed to
mechanization.
However,
combat vehicles.
By
tracked
describe
tne use of armored
contrast,
"motorizatibnf'
describes the use of motor vehicles
that
are not intended
to go into
combat, but which may improve
logistics
and mobility
off the battlefield.
No nation
in the
world could afford
to mechanize fully
in this
sense, but all
in the direction
of motorization.
armies made some motions
Prior to
Indeed, there was almost no choice about the matter.
on a pool of civilian
horses as
World War I, all nations relied
With the rise of motor vehicles
transportation
in case of war.
during the 19209, this supply of civilian
animals declined to the
point where armies had to base their
transportation
planning
on
motor
vehicles.4
seen as an
Thus, motorization
was often
change than mechanization.
easier, cheaper, less revolutionary
Fifth,
advocates of change did not always speak persuasively
Even
with one voice even when their
terms were understood.
those reformers
with a clear vision of mechanized, combined arms
war were often so extreme in their statements that they alienated
the commanders and politicians
the men they needed to convert,
In the French and Soviet
cases,
who set military
policy.
of new mechanized
retarded
the development
political
issues
formations.
Moreover, proponents of strategic
airpower
such as
William Mitchell
and Emil10 Douhet made exaggerated claims that
retarded
the development
of the tactical
combined arms team.
Intent
on achieving
independence from army control,
the airpower
adVOCateS
vigorously
opposed tactical
air support and air-ground
cooperation;
they considered the targets
involved to be too minor
These air enthusiasts
nad a limited
to justify
risking
aircraft.
success as publicists,
influencing
politicians
with an apparently
As a result,
funds
solution
to defenSe
needs.
cheap, efficient
ground
weapons
valuable
training
or
diverted
from
were
development to build air forces that were not in proportion
to
This leads to the sixth
and final
their
respective
armies.
the opposition
of the more traditional
combat
common factor,
or

45

for
arms.
nave blamed such opposition
Many commentators
thwarting
or retarding
the development
of mechanized warfare.
There is some truth to this accusation,
as will
be seen below.
Yet the tank and the alrcraft
were not the only weapons systems
that developed between the world wars.
The older branches had
genuine needs that competed with new weapons for funding and for
roles in the combined arms team.
The infantry
nad legitrmate
requirements
for increased
organio
firepower,
for antitank
and
as well
as for
some form of armored
antiaircraft
defenses,
support
to assist
it in the deliberate
attack.
The artillery
needed the same moblllty
as the armored forces
in arder to
support those forces in the breakthrough.
Fast moving mechanized
communications
formations
required
more flexible
and sire
support.
Combat engineers,
whfch had become preoccupied
with
makntaining
lines of communication during the posktional
warfare
of 1914-18, were more important
than ever when mechanized units
increased
the problems of mobility
and countermobflity
on the
battlefield.
AS a result,
although
much of this chapter will
focus on the development of mechanized formations
and tactics,
such development must be viewed within
the context
of a more
Any nation
that created
a mechanized
traditional
mass army.
elite
ran the risk
of dividing
its
army, with catastrophic
problems of coordination
and morale.
Great Britain:

'"Hasten Slowlyf~5

In
1918, Great Britain
led the world
in both armored
At a time when most soldiers
equipment and armored doctrine.
regarded the tank as a specialized
infantry-support
weapon for
a significant
number of officers'
in the Royal
crossing trenches,
Tank Corps had gone on to envision
much broader
roles
for
In May 1918, Col. J,F.C.
Fuller
had
mechanized organizations.
used the example of German infiltration
tactics
to refine what he
This was an elaborate
concept
for
a
called
"'Plan
1919.tr
large-scale
armored offensive
in 1919, an offensive
that would
not only produce multiple
penetrations
of the German forward
defenses,
but also totally
disrupt
the German command structure
Fuller's
expressed goal was to defeat the
and rear organization.
enemy by a "pistol
shot to the brain" of enemy headquarters
and
instead
of by destroying
the combat elements
communications,
German
attrition.
In
order
to attack
through
systematic
headquarters
before they could displace,
Fuller
reLied upon the
the Medium D could drive at twenty
Medlum D tank.
Potentially,
it
to exploit
the
miles per nour, a speed that would allow
In fact,
the
rupture
of trenehes caused by slower heavy tanks.
developmental
problems
of any
Medium D suffered
the usual
of equipment
and might
not have been
radically
new piece
Moreover,
available
even if the war had continued
into
1919.
then as later,
Fuller
was noteworthy
for his neglect of infantry
He could and did conceive of trucked
in the mechanized team.

46

infantry
advancing after
the tanks under certain
ClrCUmStanCeS,
but not fighting
in close coordination
with armor except at the
point of rupture in a deliberate
attack.6
Despite the efforts
of numerous innovators
like Fuller,
the
British
Army gradually
lost its lead not only in armor but in
most areas of tactical
progress.
In addltlon
to the six common
special
factors
previously
discussed,
there
were
several
obstacles to continued BrLtlsh innovation.
The most commonly cited
obstacle
was traditionalism
within
This institutional
resistance
has often been
the Brltlsh
Army.
exaggerated,
but certainly
the strong
unit
identity
of the
Brltlsh
regimental
system discouraged
radical
changes wlthin
the
traditIona
arms and services.
A related
problem was that Great
Britain
was the first
nation to create an independent air force.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) was intent
upon developing
its own
close
service
identlty
as a separate
and resls ted
any
relationship
with the army.
Like most other air services,
the
in interdiction
and strategic
RAF was increasingly
interested
In 1922, for example, the army
bombing, but not ground support.
Squadrons be permanently
requested
that eight Army Co-Operation
duties
with
ground
assigned
for
liaison
and reconnaissance
During
The RAF would only provide
three squadrons.
troops.
practiced
meehanlzed exercises
in 1926, a number of RAF pilots
but after
this display
the
close air support for armored units,
Air Ministry
formally
requested
that
the army refrain
from
encouraging
pilots
to violate
RAF doctrine.7
This limitation
was clearly
reflected
in Brltlsh
Army regulations
from 1924
onward, where the RAF was described as providing
only liaison
and
reconnaissance
in the immediate
proximity
of ground units.
Fighter
aircraft
could conduct strafing
and other ground attacks
in exceptional
circumstances, II but only at the expense of their
air superiority
mission.
DespSte the efforts
of many British
close
air
support
doctrine
was not really
armored theorists,
developed
In Britain
untI.1 1942.8
The problem of imperial
defense also limited
change.
Sine e
1868, most British
troop units stationed
at home exchanged places
with units overseas on a regular
basis.
In particular,
a large
portion
of the British
Army was always stationed
In the Middle
East and India.
These overseas garrisons
required
large numbers
of infantrymen
to control
civil
dlsorders
and made loglstical
support
of
elaborate
equipment
and
weapons
difficult.
isles could not be motorized
Consequently , a unit in tne British
or Qechanized without
considering
the effect
of this
change on
imperial
police
that
units
performance
In low intensity,
operations.
It also
This did more than delay
mechanization.
meant that In designing
armored fighting
vehicles
the British

47

were often
thinking
about the requirements
of warfare
against
relatively
unsophLsticated
opponents, and not against well-armed
European forces. 9
Despite these limitations
on innovation,
British
doctrine
did
not stand still
during the 1920s.
A repetition
of World War I
seemed unthinkable,
so positional
warfare
rapidly
declined
in
British
aoocrine to the status of a special ease.
Instead,
the
British
returned
to the concepts of open, maneuver warfare that
had been common before
1914, updating
those ooncepts only to
allow for the effects
of firepower
and motor vehicles.
The 1924
Field Serv&ce Regulations
considered
infantry
support to be the
chief mkssion of tanks, but also recognized
the possibility
of
tanks attacking
the enemy flanks
and rear to disorganize
the
opponent,
as envisioned
by Fuller.
These regulations
showed a
serious and practical
concern wrth the problems of antitank
and
antiaircraft
defense of all arms, although
actual
weapons for
these problems were slow to appear.
By 1929, British
regulatfons
had abandoned the old belief
in the primacy of infantry,
which
instead became "the arm which aonrirms the victory
and holds the
ground won" by a close cooperation
of all. arms.
Stikl,
this
cooperation
was apparently
to be achieved by detailed,
meticulous
planning of the 19 18 variety.
Coordination
in encounter battles
was much more difficult.lQ
At the same time the British,
despite significant
budgetary
restrictions,
were able to motorize parts of their artillery
and
supply units and to oontinue development of the small Royal Tank
GOlTp3 6
In 1927-28, an Experimental
Mechanized Force conducted
brigade-level
exercises
in Britain.
This force included a light
a medium tank battalion
for
tank battalion
for reoonnaissanoe,
assault,
a machine gun battalion
for
security
and limited
mechanized
artillery
infantry
operations,
five
motorized
or
batteries,
and a motorized engineer company. Unfortunately,
the
equipment used varied greatly
in its cross-country
mobhlity
and
reliability.
The vehicles were a mixture of tracked and wheeled,
experimental
and well-developed
equipment
that could not move
together except at very slow speeds.
As a result,
some officers
of the Royal Tank Corps decided
that
the other
arms were
incompatible
with armored operations
and focused their attention
on aunost pure tank formations.
The British
War Office dissolved
the Experimental
Mechanized
Force in 1928 for a variety
of factors,
including
buagetary
restrictions
and the opposition
of some- military
eonservatives.
This force dfd, however, provide the basis for Col. Charles Broad
to produce a new regulation,
Mechanized and Armoured Formations,
was a great advance in deseriblng
the
In 1929. This regulation
rakes and missions
of separate armored formations,
but it also

reflected
the pure-tank
attitude
that was becoming common in the
Even wnen Broad proposed a Royal Armoured
Royal Tank Corps.
Corps that included
tanks,
mechanized cavalry,
and mechanized
infantry,
he explicitly
excluded
artillery
and englneers.ll
StlLl,
Broad recognized
different
models of armored vehicle
and
different
roles for them.
In particular,
the standard
mixedtt
tank battalion
of an inaependent
tank brigade was a combination
of three different
types of vehicle.
Within each company; seven
the enemy posltions
and then
light
tanks would reconnoiter
provide
fire
support
for
five
medium tanks
that
actually
%lose
support
conducted
assault.
In
addlt ion,
two
the
tanks --really
self-propelled
howitzers
or mortars--would
provlde
smoke and suppressive
for
assault. l2
fire
the
Since
in
practice
the light
tanks were often small armored personnel
carriers,
the parallel
with more recent American armored cavalry
snould be obvious.
British
armored
theorists
did not always agree with each
other.
Basil Liddell
Hart, a noted publieist
of armor, wanted a
true
combined arms force
with
a major role
for
mechanized
Fuller,
Broad,
and
other
officers
were
more
interested
infantry.
in a pure-tank
role,
in part because they experienced
difficulty
one of the most
G. L. Martel,
cooperating
with the other arms.
innovative
was
theorists
and tank designers
of the period,
fascinated
with
the idea of using
extremely
small
armored
personnel carriers,
capable of transporting
one to three men and
attacks.
its
infantry
in
assist
the
a machine
gun,
to
carriers
designed
at
Martels
Unfortunately,
the machine gun
instigation
participated
in experiments
both as reconnaissance
vehicles
and infantry
carriers,
and proved inadequate for either
function. I3 Not until
the eve of World War II did the British
develop a reliable
machine gun carrier,
and even then it was
dispersed
in small
numbers within
infantry
battalions
that
attacked on foot.
the next step in
Despite
these differences
of opinion,
was
to
form
an independent
role
of
armor
developing
the
mechanized force of division
size.
This was undertaken
as an
1st Tank Brigade,
a
experiment in 1934, using Col. Percy Hobarts
newly formed unit of the type envisaged by Broad, and Maj. Gen.
George Lindsay t s partially
mechanized
7th Infantry
Brigade.
Unfortunately
for the British,
personality
differences,
lack of
training,
and artificial
restrictions
from the umpires turned the
General Lindsay,
one of the
resulting
exercise
into a disaster.
the
commltCed
to
officers
who was genuinely
few senior
development
of a combined arms mechanized division,
was so
dlscredited
by the fiasco
that he ceased to have any influence
over policy. 14

49

the conservative
Chief
of the Imperial
General
Instead,
Staff,
Gen. Sir Archibald Montgomery-Masskngberd,
chose to create
by mechanizing
large portions
of
a permanent "Mobile Division"
the British
cavalry.
The Mobile Division
authorized
in Deoember
1937 consisted
of two armored cavalry
brigades,
each almost
entirely
mounted in light
tanks and armored cars, plus one tank
brigade,
two mechanized infantry
battailons,
and limited
amounts
of artillery,
engineers,
and support units.
Such a formation was
quite appropriate
for performing
the funcrlons
of reconnaissance
and security,
whether in the empire ar on the continent.
It dfd
not, however, integrate
the different
arms at a sufficiently
low
level. to fight
in fluid
operations
as an armored formation
against
a sophistioated
enemy.
In most cases, reconnaissance,
medium armor,
infantry,
and artillery
were under
separate
brigade-level
commands. with various minor changes, this mobile
division
became the 1st Armoured Division,
whleh sacrificed
itself
piecemeal in France in 1940.15
A second mobile division
formed In Egypt, providing
the basis for later Brftlsh
operations
there.
There were also problems with equipment.
The Royal Tank
Corps had to make do with Wle same basic tanks from 1922 until
1938, despite frequent
changes in design and technology.
Almost
the only improvement came in the period
'1930-32, when radio
communioations
changed markedly.
Until
this time, each vehicle
crew had to tune Its radio by nand to a common frequeney,
and the
motion of a moving tank could easily
throw the radio off that
Colonel Broad instigated
a series
of developments
frequency.
that eventually
provided crystal-controlled,
preset frequencies.
The complexity
and expense of such equipment,
however,
made
distribution
of radios
down to individual
tanks very 810~~1~
Only such radios could allow a eommander to control
his rapidly
moving units while observing and leading from the front.
about tank roles
combined
During the 193Gs, the confusion
with frequent
changes in the defense bureaucratic
structure
to
vehicle
design,'7
thwart
good armored
Generally
spe*iws II
BritUh
armored vehicles
tended to maximize either
mobility
Or
protection.
Both the cavalry
and the Royal Tank Corps wanted
for reconnaissance
and
lightly
armored, mobile vehicles
fast,
raiding--the
light
and medium (or **cruiserf~) tanks.
On the other
performing
the traditional
hand, the "army tank battalions"
infantry-support
role required
extremely heavy armored protectron
in order to advance successfully
against prepared enemy defenses
that included antitank
guns.
.As a consequence of these two doctrinal
roles,
firepower
was
As late as 1937, the very thin.armor
neglected in t&k design.
on most tanks of the world made armor-piercing
maehine guns, or
adequate for antitank
at most a 20-mm cannon, seem entrrely

50

In fact, many soldiers

believed
that the tank was more
defense.
vulnerable
than ever because infantry
had acquired some antitank
training
and equipment.
Anticipating
improvements in tank armor,
the British
standardized
on a two-pounder
(40+&m) antitank
gun.
This was also the standard weapon mounted in most British
tanks
well Into World War II.
Yet such a weapon could only penetrate
German armor of 1939-42 design at 500 or fewer meters and was not
designed to fire
high explosive
ammunition to suppress enemy
Infantry
and towed antitank
gun rire.
Although Hobart called for
a six-pounder
(57-1~) tank gun in 1938, this was not stated
as a
formal requirement
for tank design until after the fall of France
in
'1940.18
designed
for
the
Even
most
turrets
then,
two-pounder were too small to be upgunned.
While
Britain
drifted
in
area
of
mechanization,
the
developments
In the more tradltional
arms were equally
mixed.
into
Cavalry,
as already
noted,
in
essence
merged
the
the
al though too late
to learn
all
mechanization
process,
mechanical
and tactical
differences
between horses and light
armor.
Infantry
was
saddled
inappropriate
weapons
with
throughout
the 1920s. It had no useful antitank
capability,
and
the Lewis machine gun was really
too heavy to maneuver as a squad
weapon.
Between 1936 and 1939, new equipment and organization
finally
restored
the firepower
and mobility
of British
infantry,
but at a price.
The excellent
Bren light
machine gun, with its
accompanying small armored carrier,
was a significant
advance.
Each squad in a rifle
platoon had a dismounted Bren gun, and the
platoon
had a two-inch
smoke mortar and a caliber
.55 Boyes
The battalion
consisted of four rifle
companies,
antitank
rifle.
wlth
platoons
of
Bren gun carriers,
plus
a headquarters
two-pounder
antitank
guns, three-inch
mortars,
and antiaircraft
machine guns.
Heavy machine guns and 4.1-inch
mortars
were
centralized
into
separate
support
battalions.
The result
was
tnat the infantry
battalion
was much lighter
and more mobile than
it had been, but it had a somewhat reduced firepower
and only
limited
antitank
capabllity.
On the eve of World War 11, the
inadequacies
of the Boyes rifle
rapidly
forced the artillery
to
assume primary
responsibility
defense. 19
for
antitank
The
that
had an
artillery
had indeed developed excellent
pieces
additional
antitank
capacity.
In the process,
however,
the
British
had largely
neglected
the scientific
proceaures
of
indirect
fire
developed during World War 1. Only the School of
Artillery
continued
to teach these techniques,
so that a few
of many
officers
were familiar
with them. In 1939, the prejudice
to a
techniques
led
against
survey
artillerymen
artillery
that
artillery
reorganizationheadquarters.giefly
eliminated
survey
parties
from

51

Thus,
by 1939 the British
Army had lost
much of its
Outside
pioneering
advantage in both equipment and technology.
of the infantry
battalion,
cooperation
between different
weapons
systems and arms was little
better than it had been in 1914.
Germany:

"'Strike

Concentrated,

Not Disper~ed"~~

and the United States,

the victors
of 1918,
France, Britain,
had a natural
tendency to employ at least some of the materiel
A
and doctrine
of 1918 during
the immediate postwar years.
had every reason to embraee new
defeated Germany, by contrast,
tactics
and weapons.
Even if it wished to, Germany could not reproduce the mass
The Treaty of Versailles
armies and static
defenses of 1914-18.
100,000
long-tour
professional
the German Army to
limited
for
the
paramilitary
police
wlthout
reserves
except
soldiers,
forces.
The same treaty
forbade Germany to possess tanks, poison
Paradoxically,
for
gas, combat aircraft,
and heavy artillery.
in
may have been a blessing
the Germans thks prohibition
The German defense budget and tactical
thought were
disguise.
less restricted
to, or dependent on, the technology of 1918 than
planners
could study
Instead,
were other
budgets and armies.
concepts and then develop the equipment to make those concepts
Doctrine
led
technologfcal
development,
in contrast
to
reality.
ln those instances
where field
the situation
in other armies.
the Germans used mack-ups, or tested
trials
had to be conducted,
This
equipment and concepts in secret within
the Soviet Union."
No
army
is nat to say that German planners started from scratch.
but Germany certainly
had an
can completely
escape its past,
advantage over the victorious
Allies.
Since
1860s,
the German tradition
of tactfes
and
the
operations
had favored outflanking
and encircling
the enemy or,
breaking
through to disrupt
his organization.
if that failed,
This was in contrast
to the frontal
battles
of attrition
that
most of Germany's enemies had fought in World War 1. This German
the French and
unlike
First,
tradition
meant two things.
British,
who had learned to attack on a broad front in order to
the Germans believed
in concentrating
all
protect
their
flanks,
for
narrow
front
relatively
resources
their
a
breakthrough.22
Seooyd
this
concentration
of forces
required
the careful
integration'
of all
weapons and arms at battalion
*As
the two outcast
natfons
of Europe during
the 19209,
Germany and the Soviet Union had much in common. Their secret
exchange of military
knowledge continued
until
Hitler
came to
power.

52

The
defenses .
enemys
or
below
to
overcome
the
infiltration
tactics
of 1917-18 reflected
this viewpoint
and were
Despite the restrictions
of the
retained
after
the armistice.
the 1921 German Regulation
on Command and
Versailles
Treaty,
Combat of the Combined Arms included
not only the Infantry
assault
battalion
and the
carefully
planned
artillery
and
preparations
of 1918, but also close air support,
gas warfare,
and tanks in an infantry-support
role.23
Again,
the Germans
were free to develop doctrine
on the basis of their experience
but without
being restricted
to specific
technology.
Despite
later
manuals, this sophisticated
regulation
remained the basis
of German doctrine
between the wars.
level

was
German mllltary
tradition
Another
part
of
the
decentralized
execution.
German commanders moved forward
to
observe and make tactical
decisions
for themselves.
This enabled
them to communicate their
decisions
to subordinates
much more
This
rapidly
than was possible
from a command post in the rear.
decentralization
was facilitated
by a mutual understanding
among
German leaders,
an understanding
based on common doctrine
such as
the Command and Combat of the Combined Arms. Aware of both a
commander s intention
and the common doctrine,
subordinate
leaders
could execute that
intention
in accordance with that
doctrine
and, thereby,
reduce the need for detailed
instructions
from higher
echelons.
This decentralization
and rapidity
of
decision making were ideally
suited to any form of fluid
combat,
including
mechanized operations.
it might seem inevitable
that,
once combined
In retrospect,
with the German experience
of the psychological
effects
of tanks
during World War 1, the German infiltration
tactics,
the belief
and decentralized
execution
would
in massing on a narrow front,
lead to blitzkrieg.
In fact,
however, the German Army did not
wholeheartedly
accept the concept of mechanized blitzkrieg
until
the defeat of France in 1940. Prior to that time, the majority
of senior German commander3 apparently
regarded mechanization
as
a userul
but very specialized
tool
that
would not replace
In thinking
this,
they shared much
ordinary
infantry
divisions.
the
traditional
of
viewpoint
that
characterized
their
counterpart3
in Britain,
France, and elsewhere.
Among the German proponents
of mechanization,
Gen. Heinz
Guderian was probably the most influential.
Like Percy HObaFt in
Great Britain,
Guderian
had considerable
experience
with the
This had two effects
early mlkltary
use of radio communications.
1914
service
with
Guderians
First,
upon his later
career.
radiotelegraphs
in support of cavalry units led him to insist
on
a major advantage in command
a radio in every armored vehicle,
the French and others often had radios
By contrast,
and control.
only for the command tanks and depended on hand signals or flags
Guderians
early
More generally,
units.
to maneuver small

53

service taught him the diffioulties

of integrating
new doctrine
and equipment and then overcoming institutional
resistance
to
that dot trine
and equfpment .24
As a staff
officer
concerned
with motorized transportatfon,
Guderian gained further
experience
from his first
studles of mobi-le warfare.
The small size of the
German Army in the 1920s foroed it to Increase its mobility
Ln
order to shift
limlted
forces rapidly.
Guderian was one of a
group of officers
who studied
tne use of motor vehicles
to
achieve this mobility.
To a certain
extent,
the German theorists
had to rely on BrLtish experience and regulatbons
to learn about
equipment that Germany did not possess in large numbers.
Yet I
almost
the German concept
war fare
developed
of meohanized
Independently
of such trends
in Britain.
By 1929, @hen many
British
students
of armor were tending
towards a pure armor
formation,
Guderian had become convinced that it was useless to
develop just tanks, or even to mechanize parts of the tradrtkonal
arms.
What was needed was an entirely
new mechanized formation
Only
of all arms that would maxlmlze t&e effects
of the tank.
such a formatfon
co&d sustain mobile warfare,
whether offensive
or defensive .25
The general belief
among military
theoreticians
that antitank
Unlike
defenses were becoming stronger
did not deter Guderian.
most advocates of armor, he considered antitank
weapons to be an
essential
part of the mechanized combined arms team, rather
than
the defender
of the traditional
arms agadnst the new weapons.
Most early tanks were t00 small and unstable to carry accurate,
hrgh-velocity
antitank
guns.
By contrast,
the towed antitank
gun
was specially
designed far maximum effectiveness
against
armor,
and Its small silhouette
made it difficult
to detect and engage.
The German armored units trained to avoid fighting
other tanks or
antltank
guns, and instead to exploit
in areas of little
or no
resistance.
In the event of tank-versus-tank
earnbat, the German
tanks might withdraw temporarily t luring
the enemy into a hidden
screen of antitank
weapons that had deployed behind the German
spearhead.
To do. this,
tanks needed reconnaissance
units to lead
with
combat
the way and screen the flanks
of the advance,
engineers
to sustain
the mobility
of the mechanized
force,
Motorized or mechanized infantry
and artillery
were necessary %o
reduce bypassed centers of resistance,
to support tanks in the
The entire
and to hold areas seized by such attacks.
attack,
that could keep up with a rapid
force required
support
units
advance.
In 1931, Guderian became commander of the 3rd Motor Transport
Battalion.
Using dummy equipment because of the almltaclons
of
an
battalion
was ae tually
this
the
Versailles
Treaty,
??&?chanized force consisting
of one company each Of
experimental
A similar
motorcycles,
armored cars,
tanks, and antitank
guns.
small-scale
demonstration,
using some of the first
light
tanks

54

produced in Germany, impressed Hitler

In 1934.26
That same
took
year, experlmental
maneuvers for a full
panzer division
place, and In 1935 Hitler
formed the first
three such divisions
on a permanent basis (see Figure 5 1. As in the other armies,
Germany t s first
effort
at armored
organization
included
a
tremendous number of tanks
(561 per division).27
Otherwise,
balance
in numbers and
this
organization
showed considerable
types
of
weapons.
Moreover t
regard less
of
the
pawwere
headquarters
organization t the brigade
and regimental
trained
to control
cross-attached
units
and weapons systems.
Such a system required considerable
training
and put great stress
on the maintenance and logistical
support of the cross-attached
to combine different
elements, but it enabled the panzer division
weapons systems as needed.
Guderian
did not, however, succeed without
opposition
and
The other branches of the German Army resisted
the
difficulties.
creation
of this new arm and demanded a share of mechanization
During the later
19309, the
and motorization
for tnemselves.
Chief of the German General Staff
directed
the motorization
of
infantry
all
antitank
units
and one engineer
company in all
plus complete motorization
of four selected
infantry
divisions,
divisions t at a time when the panzer divisions
were still
short
In 1937-38 t two separate tank brigades were
of transportation.
Isolated
from the other arms.
At
formed for infantry
support,
the same time, four Light Divisions, It based on cavalry units in
most cases t absorbed more motorized
and mechanized equipment.
The actual composition
of these units varied,
but the most common
pattern
was an armored reconnaissance
regiment,
two motorized
infantry
regiments,
one light
tank battalion,
and two towed
A frustrated
Guderlan found himself shunted
howitzer battalions.
aside as Chief of Mobile Troops,t with little
or no control over
the motorized infantry
and light divisions.
Nor were the German tanks up to the standards of Guderlans
Despite Hitlers
support for panzer units,
those units
concept.
had to compete for production
capacity and new weapons not only
with the rest of the expanding German Army, but also with the
German Air Force.
Hitler
placed first
priority
on the Luftwaffe
because of the Lntimidation
value that air power gave him when
dealing
with
the rest
of Europe.
Under the circumstances,
were not completely
Guderian
had to settle
for
tanks that
The Mark I was really
battleworthy.
a machine gun-armed
from
British
personnel
derived
the
Garden-Loyd
tankette,
carrier.
The Mark II did have a 20-mm cannon, but little
armor
These two vehicles
made up the bulk of panzer unlts
protection.
until
1940.29
Their value lay not so much in their
armor and
early,
In
armament, out In the fact that tney were available
This
communications.
radio
numbers , and with
considerable

55

. .I

_.

- _. ,.

TOWED,

.-

LT

-.

AR CARS

MTCL

(HVY WPNS)

_-.

LT

Q
0

MIXED

MT2

LT

MTCL

HMG

e
MIXED

Figure 5. Type German Panzer Division,

f?!ziib

1935.

allowed
the new panzer force
to conduct extensive
training,
establish
battle
procedures,
identify
and solve problems,
and
develop changes in organization
and equipment.
BY 1939,
the
panzer divisions
were not completely
ready, but they had gone
through their
first,
most necessary stages of organization
and
tralnlng . Such an advantage was aenied to most of Germanys
opponents.
Another German advantage was in the field
of close air
support of ground operations.
When the Luftwaffe
was establlshed
in 1933, most of the higher commanders were World War I aviators
and others who had served in the ranks of the 100,000~man army
imposed by the Versailles
Treaty.
Initially,
the Luftwaffe,
like
other air services,
favored mlsalons such as strategic
bombing
and air superiority
to the neglect of supporting
ground forces.
of the Spanish Civil
War (1936-39)
The experience
changed
priorities
to some extent.
The German force sent to aid Franc0
used a llmlted
number of obsolete
flghters
in a ground-attack
with considerable
effect.
role,
These experiences
provided
the
impetus for Germany to create five ground-attack
aviation
groups
in the fall
of 1936.
Ernst Udet, the chief of the Luftwaffes
development branch after
1936, persuaded his superiors
to produce
a limited
number of close support
dive-bombers
patterned
after
Helldiver.
The resulting
JU-87 Stuka
the U.S. Navy s Curtlss
dive-bombers
equipped
four
of the five
ground-attack
groups
and
extremely
accurate
Dive-bombers
were
during
1939.
demoralized
ground defenders rapidly.
In addition,
in both Spain
and Poland a very small number of air liaison
detachments were
attached to the Infantry
corps and armored division
headquarters
making the main attack.
These detachments could pass air-support
requests
directly
to the Luftwaffe
and could monitor
In-flight
reconnaissance
reports.
They could not, however, actually
guide
aircraft
the
onto
targets
without
departing
the
ground
headquarters
to which they were attached,
nor did they have
the handful
of
training
for
such a role.
In any event,
dive-bomber groups and air liaison
detachments was available
only
to the army units at the point of main effort;
all other army
headquarters
had to submit preplanned
requests
that might or
might not be honored.
on-call
air
support
against
In 1939,
targets
of opportunity
was well in the future
for most of the
German Army. 30
Thus the tradition
of combined arms integration
and updated in the German Army between the world
was tactically
incorrect
when he denied the need
and motorized equipment for the other elements
remained essentially
foot-mobile
and horse-drawn.
opposlt ion, however, did enable Germany to keep
its mechanized assets concentrated
in combined

57

was continued
wars.
Guderian
to provide armor
of an army that
His determined
the majority
of
arms mechanized

despite
the equipment
given
to other
branches.
In
out of thirty-three
tank battalions
September 1939, twenty-four
and 1,944 out of 3*195 tanks were concentrated
in the six panzer
divisions.31
The contrast
with
other countries,
where large
numbers of tanks were dedicated
to infantry
support and cavalry
roles, ls striking.

units,

France
The existence
of a lOO,OOO-man professional
German Army
forced the French to develop plans to counter a sudden invasion
by that army. The postwar French Army was huge, but ill prepared
Pt was
to stop a surprise
attack by even the small German force.
basically
a cadre for reservists,
who required
weeks or even
After 19 I&, French war weariness eliminated
months to mobilize.
the highly
developed mobilization
system of 1914 and, in 1928,
reduced.conscripted
service to a bare twelve months of training.
To protect
itself
from a sudden attack by the small German
France
chose
to
construct
a sophisticated
version
of the
Arm
defenses
that
had apparently
worked so well at Berdun.
The
Maginot Line (Map 3) was a string
of self-contained
concrete
forts
with gun turrets.
It was built
between 1930 and 1936 in
the Land
Northeastern
France;
its
function
was to protect
regained in 1918 and to force any German invasion to pass through
Belgian territory
before reaching
France.
This extra distance
would give France time to mobilize.
The Maginot Line has frequently
been criticized
because, in
retrospect,
it appeared child's
play for the Germans to outflank
quite
apart
from the political
Yet,
tnese- fortifications.
reality
that France could not abandon BeIgLum by bullding
a major
wall between the two countries,
the Maginot tine concept was much
In addition
to
less defensive
than popular
wisdom suggests,
provldIng
security
during mobilization
and protecting
critical
areas near the French frontier,
the Maginot Line was a secure
anchor, a base around which the mobile rield farces of the French
Army would maneuver.32
More specifically,
in the later
1930s
both France and Britain
expected that any future war with Germany
would be a repetition
of 1914, with Germany advancing thraugh all
Because Belgium
of Belgium and possibly
the Netherlands as well.
was neutral,
France and Britain
could not enter that country to
Thus, the
help defend it until
the Germans had already invaded.
majority
of French and British
mobile forces planned to make a
The surprise
to the Allies
in 1940
headlong rush into Belgium.
was the German penetration
through Luxembourg towards Sedan, a
penetration
that eut the hknge between the mobile forces and the
Maginot Line.

58

,,,

NETHERLANDS
EXPECYED GERMAN AXIS OF ADVANCE,

ACTUAL GERMAN AXIS OF ADVANCE,

PARIS

25 KM

Map 3. The Magi &not Line and the 1940 Campaign.

1940

194 Lo

Moreover)
its
despite
the intent
of the Maginot
Line,
practical
effects
were mueh less positive
for French defense.
The tremendous expense of fortress
construction
restricted
the
depth of the fortifications
and even the size of armament Of
included
the lavishly
those
forts.
Only a few positions
In case of
constructed
works shown in contemporary photographs.
war the line had to be supplemented by field
fortifications
and
More Importantly,
troops deployed between the fixed positions.
once built
the Maginot Line had a negative psychological
effect
The apparently
if not on the commanders.
on the politician8,
invincible
defensive
strength
of the Maginot Line reinforced
the
general left-wing
political
belief
that France should avoid any
aggressive actions and be content to defend its frontiers.

This defensive
orientation
influenced
not only
national
at least immediately
after
budgets but French military
doctrine,
1978.
More than any other participant
in the First
World War,
France retafned
the positional
warfare
concept in its postwar
Under the influence
of Marshal Phslippe Pe/tain, the
regulations.
for
the
Instructions
the Provisional
French
Army produced
was
Tactical
Employment of Larger Units C19211. This regulation
but to minimize casualties
It- dfd
not entirely
defense-oriented,
methodical
preparations
before
attacking.
insist
on careful,
Within
the carefully
coordinated
circumstances
of a set-piece
offensive,
battle wauld involve all arms to assist the infantry:
The infantry
is charged with the principal
mission in
accompanied
by
and
protected,
Preceded,
combat.
aided
where possible
by tanks
and
artillery
fire,
it conquers,
oecupiest
organizes,
and holds
aviation,
the terrain.33
First,
such a meticulously
This conception
had two flaws.
planned, centrally
controlled
operation
was unable to react to
The German offensives
of 1918 had already
sudden changes.
aemonstrated that any enemy actkon that disrupted
the defender"s
linear
deployments and lockstep
planning would catch the French
a defense against a
headquarters
off guard, unable to reorganize
highly mobile attacker.
the French doctrine
viewed combined arms as a
More generally,
process by which all other weapons systems assisted
the infantry
Tanks were considered to be fsa sort of
in its forward progress,
This
subordinated
to the infantry
branch.34
armored infantry,,t1
at least had the advantage that armor was not restricted
purely
The French cavalry experimented extensively
during the
to tanks*
These
l92Gs with
armored cars
and ultimately
half-tracks*
half-tracks
sometimes formed combat teams with armored cars,
and light
tanks carried
on trucks
towed artillery,
motorcycles,
the French half-tracks
may
until
contact was made.35
In fact,

well have been the models for later German and American infantry
carriers.
Still,
the subordination
of tanks to infantry
impeded
the development
of roles
for armor other than close infantry
support.
Moreover, while half-tracks
might be useful in oolonial
wars or for reconnaissance
tasks,
infantry
still
walked in the
deliberate
assault.
Armor was tied to the rate of advance of
foot-mobile
infantry.
The alternative
of
finding
ways to
increase the moblllty
and protection
of the infantry
in order to
keep pace with the tanks was rarely
considered.
The slow speed
of the World War I vintage FT tank, which equipped most French
armor units throughout the 19209, reinforced
this attitude.
Not all
Frenchmen held
this
view.
Gen. Jean-Baptiste
Estienne,
commander of the World War I French tank corps before
it
was disbanded,
was quite
farsighted
in his
concept
of
mechanized warfare.
In 1919, Estienne submitted a Study of the
MissIons of Tanks in the Field
to Petains
headquarters.
This
remarkable
document explained
the need to provlde
armored,
tracked vehleles not only for tanks, but also for reeonnalssance,
infantry,
artillery,
and even battlefield
recovery
teams.
Estiennes
vision
of
this
massed force , supported
by air
bombardment and attacking
in-depth
against a narrow enemy front,
closely
resembled the best mechanized ideal of World War II.
In
Estienne
proposed a fOO,OOO-man armored army with 4,000
1920,
tanks and 8,000 other vehicles.
Instead of rejecting
the use of
infantry,
he argued that armored infantry
would again be able to
attack using its organic weapons.37
Estiennes
concept was not
only radical
mllltarily,
but also seemed too offensively
minded,
too
aggressive
to
be acceptable
to
French
politicians.
remained Inspector
of Tanks until
his
Nevertheless , Estienne
retirement
in 1927.
Despite the restrictions
imposed by the Great Depression and
by the enormous cost of the Maginot Line, Chief of Staff Maxime
Weygand took
significant
steps
towards
motorization
and
mechanization
during the early 1930s.
Five and ultimately
seven
infantry
divisions
became motorized,
and one brigade in each of
four light
cavalry
divisions
was equipped with half-tracks
and
armored cars.
In 1934, Weygand continued
the trend towards
armored cavalry by forming the first
light
mechanized division
(Division
L&&re
Mecanique, or DLM, shown in Figure 6).
This
division,
with its combination
of reconnaissance,
light
tanks,
trucked lnrantry , and towed artillery,
was remarkably similar
to
the German panzer division
being developed at the same time.
Because Weygand was a cavalryman,
and beoause it was politically
easier to justify
a defensive covering force than an lloffensivel
armored unit,
the four DLMs ultimately
formed by France all
ret eived
standard
cavalry
missions
of
and
re connalssance
security,
rather than mechanized main battle tasks. s8

61

FRENCH

LIGHT MECHANIZED
DIVISION,
1934

220

LT/MDM

TANKS

crl
0

FRENCH

ARMORED

DIVISION,

1940

168 WXWHW T/WCS

12x75

mm

Figure 6. French Light Mechanized Division,

843330

--a-

1934, and Armored Division,

1940.

Just
as the French Army was cautiously
moving forward in the
Its development was almost aborted by the
area of mechanization,
writings
of Charles de Gaulle.
In 1934, Lieutenant
Colonel de
Gaulle published Towards the Professional
Army. This call for a
100,000~man armored army was based heavily
on Estienne's
work.
De Gaulle's
book was hardly innovative
in terms of doctrine
and
organization
in that it envisioned a pure armor brlgade operating
followed by a motorized
infantry
force for
in linear
formation,
mopping-up operations.
The real problem was political.
In a
and dedicated
to the
nation
that
was extremely
pacifistic
doctrine
of the citizen
soldier,
de Gaulle was -advocating
an
HIS
professional
standing
army of technicians.
aggressive,
"instrument
of repressive
and preventive
maneuver"39 might well
be used to start an offensive
war with Germany or to support a
military
coup d'etat
in republican
France.

De Gaulle's
sensational
book not only jeopardized
the more
gradual efforts
of Weygand, but also set extremely high standards
In 1936, France
for
what constituted
an armored division.
belatedly
decided to produce armor and other equipment in larger
The B-l his, developed
including
385 B-l his tanks.
quantities,
by Estienne
in the early 19209, was still
one of the best tank
designs
in the world
fifteen
years
later.
It
had sixty
millimeters
of frontal
armor in a carefully
cast hull,
hydromatie
by the
It was limited
transmission,
and other advanced features.
small size of Its turret,
where one man had to be both tank
commander and gunner for a 47-mm gun, but a lower-velocity
75-mm
gun was mounted in the hull.
The B-l bis was an excellent
weapon
that caused the Germans much difficulty
in 1940. Yet, given the
fine
craftsmanship
involved
in B-l
bis production
and the
it
took
years
to
produce
weakened state of France's
industry,
sufficient
tanks to organize an armored division
on the pattern
Even after
the war started,
desired by Estienne and de Gaulle.
France could never produce more than fifty
of these tanks per
to 1939 was much lower.40
month, and the rate prior
As a
France did not form its
fjirst
two armored divisions
result,
(Division
Cuirasske,
or DCR, as shown in Figure 6) until
after
had to greatly
reduce
the
the war began and, even then,
authorized
number of heavy tanks in each division.
The resulting
was primarily
a collection
of tanks
for
an armored
unit
breakthrough;
it
lacked
sufficient
reconnaissance,
antitank,
Similar
problems
and engineer
support.
infantry,
artillery,
plagued the production
of other tanks and military
equipment, so
that French troops rarely had the tlLme for realistic
training
and
experimentation
that the Germans had achieved before 1939. The
French regulation
for large armored unit tactics
was not Issued
the German invasion
of
until
March 1940, a few weeks before
France.41

63

Despite such limitations,

France slowly modernized during' the
The 1921 Provisional
lnstruetions
gave way to a much more
regulation
in
sophisticated
The
new Instructions
1936.
recognized
the major changes In warfare,
including
fortified
fronts such as the Maginot Line, motorized and mechanized units,
antitank
weapons, increased
air and antiaircraft
involvement
in
The regulatkon
no longer
combat* and improved communications.
but rather
designated
the particular
classified
tanks by size,
Tanks could either
mission they would perform at any given time.
precede infantry
by bounds to the next
accompany infantry,
or operate independently,
especially
after
the
terrain
feature,
enemy t 9 defenses
had already
been disorganI.zed.
The 1936
insisted
on the primacy of infantry,
regulatkon,
however, still
the careful
organization
of artillery,
and the methodical advance
As in
of al1 elements in accordance with an elaborate
planBritain,
French air support to ground forces consisted
primarily
of recannakssanee in the battle
area8 with bombing only outside
the range of artillery.
The regulation
repeatedly
emphasized the
need for "defense without
thought of retreat,"'
which tended to
mean rigid
orientation
toward the terrain
and the enemy to one*s
rather
than toward maneuvering to deal with a threat
to
front,
the flank or rear.
References to antitank
defense-in-depth
also
appeared frequently
in this regulation,
but France lacked the
because of
troops to establish
such a defense in 1940. Finally,
the possibility
of enemy signals
kntelligence,
radios were only
to be used when no other means of communication were avaklable.
In any event, at least some French tank radios were meant only
communications
with
dismounted
infantry
in a
for
short-range
in mobi'le
useless
attack
deliberate
and were consequently
operations.
Thus, most of the French command and control
still
moved at the pace of communications in World War IL,42
1930s.

France entered World War II wfth a militia

army that would
require
months to organize
and train,
and with new mechanized
formations
and modern equipment that had been fielded
too late
Like those of the
for proper testing,
evaluation,
and trakning.
Brftlsh,
French armored units were specialized
either
for cavalry
they were not
breakthrough
attacks;
missions
or deliberate
Given these
balanced
for
all
types
of mobile
operations.
the French doctrine
of slow, methodical. offensive
limitations,
action
appeared as the only course that would allow them to
Unfortunately,
the Germans did not wait for the
attack at all.
French to plan and execute such attacks.
The Soviet

Union:

Weep

Battle"43

The Soviet Union*s military

development after
World War 1
differed
from that of the rest of Europe for two reasons*
First,
the Red Army was created in 1918 after
the Eolshevik
revolution

64

and lacked the traditions

and training
of other major armies.
Many of the new Red commanders had been noncommissioned
or
commissioned junior
officers
during World War 1, but few trained
senior
officers
of the Tsarist
Army remalned with
the new
regime.
Even those who did remain were, with some exceptions,
suspected
of anti-Bolshevik
sympathies.
As a result,
the Red
Army was open to change, unhampered by excessive
traditions
or
past habits.
It was also subject to the blunders of ignorance.
War of 1918-21 was markedly different
Second, the Russian Civil
from most of' the European campaigns of World War 1. Because of
the vast distances and understrength
armies involved In the Civil
War, penetration
and encirclement
were no longer difficult,
and
fluid
maneuver was the rule.
The elite
of the Red Army by the
end of the Civil War was Marshal S.M. Budenny's 1st Cavalry Army,
which had patterned
its encirclements
and pursuits
after the best
Tsarist
cavalrymen.
The veterans
of this
army received
the
who had been the commissar of the
patronage of Joseph Stalin,
next higher headquarters.
As a result,
many officers
from this
World War 11.44
army rose to senior positions
before and during
France and Britain,
the
Like Hitler's
Germany, but unlike
Soviet
Union was openly interested
in offensive
warfare
as a
As a practical
means of spreading
its
political
doctrines.
matter,
Stalin
chose to concentrate
on developing
the Soviet
Union before expanding into Europe.
Still,
the Red Army could
expect that any future war would be offensive,
using weapons that
This offensive
democratic societies
abhorred as too aggressive.
orientation
was reinforced
by the close relationship
that existed
between the Red Army and the German Army from 1923 to 1932.
Soviet officers
studied
in Germany, while the Germans secretly
tanks,
aircraft,
and poison
gas in
manufactured
and tested
European Russia.
Soviet
doctrine,
however,
appeared
to be
largely
independent
of similar
developments
in Germany; Soviet
concepts were official
policy
long before Guderian gained even
partial
approval from his government.
During the course of the 1920s and early 19309, a group of
Soviet officers
led by Marshal Mikhail
Tukhachevsky developed a
concept of "Deep Battle"
to employ conventional
infantry
and
formations,
and aviation
in
cavalry
divisions,
mechanized
concert.
These efforts
culminated
in the Field Regulations
of
instead of regarding
the infantry
as the premier combat
1936.
arm, Tukhaehevsky
envisioned
all
available
arms and weapons
systems working together
In a two-part
battle.
First,
a massed,
echeloned attack on a narrow front would rupture
the defender's
The attacker's
conventional
infantry-artillery-antitank
defense.
would suppress defending
artillery
and
artillery
and mortars
Moving behind the artillery
especially
defending antitank
guns.
barrage and a Few meters In front
of the infantry,
the tanks
overrun machine gun postsI and reduce
could safely crush wire,

65

other centers
of enemy resistance.
Onee the enemyIs forward
defenses were disrupted,
ac!companying tanks would not be tied
strictly
to the infantry
rate
of advance,
but could
take
advantage of local opportunities
to penetrate
and attack
enemy
reserves,
artillery,
headquarters,
and supply dumps. This action
would duplicate
on a smaller scale the second part of the battle,
and destroy
which was to disrupt
the enemy by deep attacks.
"Mobile Groups,ft composed of cavalry,
mechanized formations,
or
both, would exploit
their
mobility
advantage to outflank
the
enemy or develop a penetration
in order to reach the enemy rear
areas.
The obJect was to attack
the entire
depth of the enemy
defenses simultaneously,
with conventional
frontal
attacks,
long
range artkllery
fires,
deep penetrations
by mobile forces,
and
bombing and parachute attacks of key points,
Smoke and deception
operations
would distract
the enemy from the attacker's
real
intentions.45
This remarkably
sophistioated
doctrine
was backed up by a
force
structure
that,
by 1937, was well
on its
way to
implementing
Tukhachevsky's
concepts.
&iing
the
expanded
production
facilities
of the Soviet government's
first
Five Year
Plan with
design
features
taken in part
from the American
inventor
Walter ChrIstie,'
the Soviets
produced 5,000 armored
vehicles
by 1934.46
This wealth of equipment enabled the Red
Army to create tank organizations
for both 4;nfantry support and
combined
arms mechanized
operations.
Virtually
rifle
all
divisions
had a tank eompany or battalion
attached to them, with
an entire
regiment of 190 or more tanks for each of the horse
cavalry divisions.
Beginning in 1930, the Red Army experimented
with integrating
all arms into mechanized functional
groups at
battalion,
brigade,
and higher
levels.
Although
organizations
changed frequently
as equipment and tactical
techniques
evolved,
the 1935 mechanized $*corps" was typical
of these developments
UQgure ?I.
The four corps organized
under this concept were
really
small armored divisions
(the Soviets frequently
used the
terms Qorps'" and "brigadel"
of
to designate
experimental
units
division
and regimental
size,
respectively).
These mechanized
corps were extremely armor-heavy,
but nevertheless
integrated
the
essential
eombat arms at a relatively
low level.
The trend
during the later
1930s was for these corps, redesignated
tank
corpstt in 1938, to become increasingly
large and armor-heavy.
This Soviet force structure
had Its prablems, of course.
To
begin with, desplte the massive industrfal
support of the Soviet
Unfon, the armored force Was so ambitious
that not all units
Soviet historians
have criticized
the
could be fully
equipped.
separation
equipment
into
infantry-support
and
of available
independent
circumstanoes.47
formations
under
these
More

66

SOVIET

CORPS
MECHANIZED
DECEMBER
1936

8,966 men; 348 tanks;

63 tankettea;
62 flamethrower
tanks; 20 guns

TANKElTE
t

61

RIFLE/MO
I

REFLE/MG

SOVIET

MOTORIZED
DECEMBER

DIVISION
1939

BT :
MO:

11.6SCI men; 276 tanks:

17 tankettes;
98 guns/mortars

BT model light tank;

Machine gun.

MTZ: Motorized:

Figure 7. Soviet Mechanized Corps, December 1935, and Motorized Division,

84-3330

-67-

December 1939

specifically,
the average Soviet
citizen
had little
experience
with motor vehicles,
so that maintenance was often a problem,
particularly
as the vehicles
wore out.
Soviet
radios
were
notoriously
unreliable,
making command and control
of this mass
of moving vehicles
difficult.
Despite frequent
major exercises
during the mid-193Gs,
the Soviet armored force needed several
more years of experimentation
and training
before
It
could
realize
its full potential.
It
never got that
time.
On 12 June 1937, cthe
Soviet
government executed Tukhachevsky and eight of his high-ranking
assistants,
as Stalin shifted
his purge of Soviet society against
the last power group that had the potential
to threaten him, the
Red Rrmy.
In the ensuing four years,
the Soviet
government
imprisoned or executed at least 20 percent of the officer
corps,
including
a majority
of all
commanders of units of regimental
size or larger.
Thus, at the same time the Red Army was
expanding because
of the threat
from Nazi Germany and Imperial
its most experienced
planners and leaders,
Japan, it was losing
The politically
reliable
survivors
were promoted into positions
far above their previous training
and experienee,
with disastrous
effects on unit development and tactics.48
At the same time that
T*Whachevsky$s thought
was under
suspicion,
the Soviet experience in the Spanish Civlil War oaused
the Red army to reassess mechanization.
Dimitri
Pavlov, chief of
tank troops and one of the senior Soviet commanders to serve in
The
Spain, came bac?k wrth an extremely
pessimistic
attitude.
Soviet tanks were too lightly
armored, their Russian crews could
not communicate with the Span&h troops,
and in combat the tanks
tended to run away from the supporting
infantry
and artillery.
formations
were too
Pavlov argued
that
the new mechanized
unwieldy to control,
too vulnerable
to antitank
fire,
and would
have great difficulty
penetrating
enemy defenses in order to
conduct a deep battle.
The fact that Pavlov had been able to use
e>nly f&fty tanks wlthout any chance of surprise
at the battle
of
Esquivas 629 October 19361 apparently
did not dissuade him from
generalizing.49
In any event, many observers from ather armies
reached the same conclusions
based on the limited
.experienee
in
Spain,
In July 1939, Gen. G.I. Kulik chaired a commission to review
With
most o.f
organization.
,df tank
force
question
the
there
were few
Tukhachevsky's
followers
dead or imprisoned,
formatlons,
The eomml.ssion
large
mechanized
aavocates
for
such units,
the partial
dismantling
of
therefore
directed
The
commission
also
emphasizing
the infantry-support
role.
the motorized division
created a new, more balanced organization,
of December 1939 (Figure 71. This continued support for the 1936
doctrine
and force structure
may have been in response to the

68

German armored success in Poland in September 1939, and the

Soviet success that year against Japan (see below).
Four of a
planned fifteen
motorized
divisions
were formed in early
1940,
representing
a better all-around
organization
than the tank corps
they replaced e50
In spite of this reorganization,
the Red Army was a shambles,
unable to occupy Poland effectively
in 1939 or to defeat Finland
rapidly
in 1939-40.
These battlefield
failures
prompted a series
of reforms in organization,
leadership,
and tactics
that slowly
began to improve Soviet military
ability.
The only successful
Soviet campaign of this period was in the undeclared war against
Japan.
Stalin
so concerned
was apparently
about
Japanese
expansion in northeast
Asia that he gave one of Tukhachevskys
most able students,
Gen. Georgi Zhukov, a free hand in commanding
the Soviet forces there.
The Red Army in Siberia
was among the
last
to be affected
by Stalins
purges,
and so, with
the
exception
of some reserve
component units,
the training
and
command structure
of
these
forces
were still
in tat t when
hostilities
with the Japanese Army erupted in the summer of 1939
on the Khalkin-Go1
River of Manchuria
(Map 4).
The Japanese
decided to fight
the Soviets in this remote area on the border
between Japanese-occupied
Manchuria
and Soviet-dominated
Outer
that
would
be unable
Mongolia,
believing
the
Soviets
to
concentrate
and supply a major force there.
To the surprise
of
the Japanese,
the Soviets
massed 469 light
tanks,
426 other
armored vehicles,
679 guns and mortars,
and over 500 aircraft,
all supplied by thousands of trucks.
Zhukov organized a classic
double envelopment
between 20 and 31 August 1939.
First,
a
series of Soviet probing attacks in the center fixed the Japanese
defenders, and Soviet artillery
concentrated
against strongpoints
found by these probes.
Then the two Soviet
flanks
pressed
forward,
encircling
the Japanese 23rd Infantry
Division
and part
of the 7th lnfantry
Division.
The Soviet attacks used tank and
machine gun direct
fire,
as well as coordinated
artillery
fire,
In some cases, the infantry
to protect
their advancing infantry.
rode on the outside of armored cars, reducing the time needed to
and riders
to
close with the enemy, but exposing both vehicles
concentrated
enemy fire.
On the other
hand,
some Soviet
commanders were unimaginative
in executing
Zhukovs plan, making
Japanese
repeated
frontal
attacks
instead
of
bypassing
resistance.51
Still)
Khalkin-Go1
provided
an excellent
trial
of Soviet doctrine
on the very eve of World War II.
Zhukov and
his subordinates
naturally
rose to prominence during that war.
PlnLted States
The U.S. Army, despite
its unique division
structure,
was
heavily under the influence
of French tactical
and staff
doctrine
in 1918.
American officers
had learned
to do
Of necessity,
business in a manner compatible with the French units they dealt

69

I \(

Map 4. Khalkin-Gol,

20-31 August 1939.

with daily.
To some extent,
therefore,
the immediate postwar
doctrine of the U.S. Army paralleled
that of the French Army. As
in France, the United States subordinated
tanks to the infantry
branch.
Initial
postwar regulations
reflected
the French view of
combined arms so faithfully
that
in 1923 the War Department
drafted a Provisional
Manual of Tactics for Large Units that did
not even mention the fact that it was a direct
translation
of the
1921 French Provisional
Instructions.52
The same year,
the
revised
version
of the U.S. Field Service Regulations
inslsted
that "No one arm wins battles.
The combined employment of all
arms 1s essential
to success."
In the next paragraph,
however,
it stated that the mission of the entire
force "is that of the
infantry."53
Still,
this rigid
view of combined arms did not affect
all
American soldiers,
nor did it last for a long period of time.
As
early as 1920, staff
officers
such as Brig. Gen. Fox Conner had
decided
that
trench
warfare
the
requirements
of
were
inappropriate
for
operations
on the American continent,
the
expected arena of future American wars.
Conner asked Gen. John
J. Pershing,
the U.S. wartime commander in France, to discard the
square division
structure
because it
was too immobile
and
unwieldy
for such operations.
Pershing
recommended that
the
infantry
division
be reorganized
along the lines
of European
triangular
divlslons
and that units needed only for specialized
operations
be pooled at the level of corps and field
army.54
These principles
eventually
produced a comprehensive
review of
the fundamental
relationships
between the different
arms and
services.
Despite a number of boards reviewing
the American experience
in World War 1, the square divislonts
organization
changed only
American
officer
education
slightly
during the 1920s.
By 1925,
was focused on mobile warfare,
with trench warfare relegated
to
status
of
a special
However,
financial
the
operation.
restrictions
and the general peacetime neglect of the U.S. Army
prevented major changes In equipment and organization
until
the
Then the army was able to use public
works funds
mid-1930s.
allocated
to restart
the depression
economy as a means of
achieving
llmlted
improvements
In equipment.
These included
partial
motorization
of active
and National
Guard divisions
and
with
pneumatic
tires
for
carriages
production
of different
existing
artillery
pieces.
Such carriages
allowed the artillery
to be towed by motor
vehicles
and,
in the case of the
French-designed
754111 gun, to be used in a limited
antiaircraft
role.
In 1935, Gen. Malin Craig became Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army. Cralg had apparently
been influenced
by Fox Conner and the
other reformers of 1920, and he instigated
a review of all combat

71

organization
and
tactics.55
Craig
specifically
suggested
development of a smaller,
more mobile division
using mechanical
power to replace human power wherever possible.
A General Staff
board drew up a proposed division
structure
that totalled
only
13,552 men and closely
paralleled
European divisions
of the same
From 1936 through 1939, the 2d U.S. Infantry
Division
period.
conducted extensive
tests of this concept, reviewing
such mattsers
as the amount of firepower
and frontage
that should be allocated
per
man and per
unit,
the
proportion
of artillery
and
transportation
that should support the infantry,
and the echelon
(platoon,
company, battalion,
or regiment)
at which different
infantry
weapons should be pooled.
One of the driving
forces
behind these tests was Brig.
Gen. Lesley J. NcNair, who later
designed and trained the Army Ground Forces of World War 11.
The resulting
organization
of infantry
was remarkably
close
to the Persh,lng-Conner
ideas of 1920.
In essence, the machine
gun and other specialized
heavy weapons were integrated
into the
knfantry
rifle
organization
at every
To avoid
an
level.
excessrve span of control,
each commander had a headquarters,
three subordinate
rifle
units,
plus a weapons ,unit--three
rifle
platoons and a heavy weapon platoon in each company, with three
such companies plus a heavy weapons company fn each battalion.
In practice,
commanders might shift
companies from one battalion
to another,
or even move entIre battalions
between regiments,
but
doctrinally
all units
operated with three subordinate
maneuver
unkts.
Each echelon also had a combination
of flat-trajectory
and
the infantry
received
greater
hkgh-angle
weapons e Although
firepower
in
terms of automatic
weapons and mortars I this
firepower was echeloned so that it did not impede the mobilkty of
the parent
infantry
unit,
Thus, for
example,
the infantry
platoon
had nothing
heavier
than the Browning Automatic
Rifle
the company had nothing
heavier
than the 6~hmn
(BAR), while
mortar .56 It should be noted that thls dedication
to mobility,
when combined with a continued faith
in the individual
Pif'ieman,
meant that an American army platoon had less firepower
than its
European counterparts--the
BAR had a much lower rate of fire than
This
European
squads.
most light
machine
guns found
in
deficiency
was only partially
corrected
by the rapid-ffre
ability
of the Ml rifle.
Since American tactics
were based on the
premise of establishing
a base of fire
and then maneuvering a
light
force in conjunction
with that base, this organization
left
U.S. infantry
at a disadvantage.
The same principle
of
was contknued
weapons pooling
L-light antitank
guns, heavy
throughout
the triangular
division.
mortars,
and machine guns were relegated
to the heavy weapons

72

Specialized
arms such as tanks,
company of each battalion.
and most antitank
weapons were not authorized
antiaircraft,
within
the division,
because McNair believed
that such weapons
anould be held in a central
mass and used only against a mafor
Similarly,
division
received
only
enemy force.
the
one
being
troop,
with
long-range
re eonnaissance
reconnaissance
assigned
to higher
headquarters.
The general
result
was an
infantry
force that was at once more mobile and more heavily
armed than its predecessors,
yet deficient
compared to foreign
Its
principal
drawback,
in addition
to automatic
armies.
weapons, was its limited
capacity
for antiaircraft
and antitank
As remarked before,
during
the later
1930s heavy
defense .
machine guns still
seemed effective
against alrcraft
and armored
37411 antitank
guns,
so that
these weapons, plus
vehicles,
appeared adequate for the triangular
division.
Once the German
blitzkrieg
demonstrated
its psychological
and physical
effect
on
infantry,
the U.S. Army realized
that it had to add more antitank
defenses.
triangular
division
The controversies
about
the
tests
included
the proportions
of engineers
and artillery
for
the
component.
The army was conditioned
to regard
the
infantry
engineers only in their World War I role of road construction
and
At one point,
General
Craig
limited
fortification
support.
suggested eliminating
all engineers from the division
structure.
In 1938, General McNair recommended an engineer company of 175
because he believed
that
men, or 1.7 percent of the division,
only hasty road repalr
and limited
roadblock construction
would
The engineers had to campaign vigorously
occur in the next war.
for
their
very
existence
In the division,
arguing
that
an
increasingly
motorized and mechanized army had greater
need for
engineers
to construct
and reduce antitank
defenses and other
Only the German use of combat engineers
for such
obstacles.
tasks in 1939-40 finally
convinced the U.S. to retain an engineer
battalion
in each division.57
Even this was a mixed blessing
because they were frequently
used as the
for the engineers,
divisions
infantry
reserve force.
had envisioned
a division
The 1935 division
proposal
artillery
consisting
of three combined 75-mm gun/81-mm mortar
with a 10%mm howitzer
battalion
battalions
for direct
support,
support.
All
other
was
to
be
for
general
artillery
attached
as necessary.
In actual
testing,
the
nondivisional,
artillery
found that the 81-mm mortar was essentially
an infantry
McNair objected
to this
emphasis on
In any event,
weapon.
dedicated
support
to the infantry,
arguing
that
longer-range
centralized
control
would lead to more
weapons with greater
No unit,
he said, needed weapons whose
flexible
massed fires.

73

.-

_ _,

U.S, TRIANGULAR

INFANTRY
June 1941

..-..

IS,245

DIVISION,

men. 48 howitzers.

68 antitank

guns

I
HHB

1 -

How

Figure 8,. U. S, Triangular

Infantry

Division,

June 1941.

8 x 76mm

range exceeded the parent units

area of operations.
Ultimately,
the decision was made to have three battalions
of 75-1~1 guns, to
be replaced
by 105~mm howitzers
when they were produced,
plus
The June 1941 organization
155-mm general
support artillery.
(Figure
8) represented
the final
step prior
to American entry
into the war.
over artillery
in the division
organization
The debate
occurred at the same time that the U.S. Army Field Artillery
School was developing
the next major step in infantry-artillery
the ablllty
to mass fires
on targets
of
rire
coordinat ioh,
During World War L , massed fires were normally the
opportunity.
in which
result
of carefully
planned artillery
concentrations,
known targets
were predesignated
on maps or overlays.
If the
tire
on an unexpected
target
of
infantry
needed artillery
opportunity,
however, it was difficult
to bring more than one
To begin with,
a battery
battery
to bear on such a target.
forward observer had both to see the target
and to communicate
which meant in practical
terms that he had to
with his battery,
keep in field
telephone contact with the battery.
This reliance
restricted
his ability
to
on landline
communications
greatly
accompany the infantry
in the advance, although
some forward
Even if the forward observer could
observers managed this feat.
he had no accurate way of
adjust his own battery
onto a target,
unless the target 3 map location
was
guiding
other batteries,
known precisely.
Between 1929 and 194T, a series of instructors
at the Field
Artillery
School gradually
developed a means of concentrating
any
target
of
amount
of
available
artillery
fire
on
a
opportunity.58
One obvious step in this
process was to have
field
instead
of
radios
observers
use
new, more reliable
gunnery
the
More importantly,
telephones
to
communicate.
instructors
developed forward observer
procedures
and a firing
chart
that
together
would allow
a battalion
headquarters
to
record adjustments
In the impact of artillery
shells
as viewed
Instead of the battery
location.
from the observers
location,
the
firing
tables
compensated
for
differences
in
Graphic
locations
of different
batteries,
and one artillery
piece in each
in relation
to a common
battalion
was ultimately
surveyed
reference
point
for all artillery
in that division
area.
The
resulting
fire
direction
centers
(FDCS) could provide
infantry
units with an entire
battalion,
or even multiple
battalions,
of
field
artillery
firing
on a target
that only one observer could
throughout
World War II German artillerymen
By contrast,
see.
had to use well-known
terrain
features
to adjust on a target of
Fire
massed
fires
remained
extremely
difficult.
opportunity;
Army
a
new
and
unprecedented
direction
centers
gave the U.S.
Lt also encouraged the
degree of infantry-artillery
integration.

75

to
reinforce

U.S.

maintain
divisions

large
amount3
as needed.

of

nondivisional

artillery

to

The United
States
was not nearly
so advanced in the
development of armored and mechanized forces.59
As in France,
the supply of slow
World War I tanks
and the subordination
of
tanks to the infantry
branch impeded the development of any role
other than direct
infantry
support.
Yet the British
experiments
of the later
19209, plus the persistent
efforts
of a cavalry
officer
named Adna Chaffee Jr.,
led to a series of limited
steps
in mechanization.
In 1928 and again
in 1929,
an ad hoc
Experimental
Armored Force (EAF) was organized at the Tank School
In Fort Meade, Maryland.
Two battalions
of obsolescent
tanks, a
battalion
of infantry
in trucks,
an armored ear troop,
a field
artillery
battalion,
plus small elements of engineers,
signals,
and maintenance,
formed
medical,
ammunition,
chemical warfare,
the EAF. Despite frequent mechanical breakdowns, the experiments
aroused sufficient
interest
for a more permanent force to be
established
at Fort Eustis
in 1930.
The continuing
economic
depression,
however, caused the Army to disband this unit a year
later
for lack of funds.
The Xnfantry
School at Fort Benning
absorbed the Tank School and remaining infantry
tank units.
As Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935, Douglas MacArthur wanted
to advanee motorization
and mechanization
throughout
the army,
rather
than confining
them to one branch.
Restricted
army
but Chaffee did persuade MacArthur
buagets made thfs impossible,
to conduct limited
mechanized experiments
with cavalry
units,
apparent
because cavalry's
existence
was
threatened
by Its
obsolescence.
By law, %anks" belonged to the infantry
branch,
30 the cavalry gradually
bought a group of "'combat cars,"
lightly
armored and armed tanks that were often indistinguishabLe
from
the newer infantry
fttanks.u
In 1932 a one-squadron
mechanized
cavalry regiment moved to Camp Knox, Kentucky, to be followed
by
another regzment in late 1936. These units were the nucleus of
the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized).
A series of early armor
including
Adna Chaffee himself
advocates commanded this brigade,
in
7938-40.
However,
this
force
was plagued
by the same
It was too lightly
difficulties
as mechanized cavalry in Europe.
armed and armored and was viewed generally
as a raiding
or
pursuit
force in the cavalry tradition.
Despite all of Chaffee's
efforts,
the other arms
only eooperated
with the brigade
on
Not until
January 1940, for example, was a
periodic
exercises.
mechanized engineer troop authorized
for the 7th Brigade.60
At
Regiment joined
the 7th
about the same time, the 6th Infantry
Tank Brigade grew out of the infantry
Brigade, and a Provisional
tank units at Fort Benning.

76

The German armored attack on France in May 1940 gave further

impetus to mechanized experiments
already conducted in U.S. Army
To avoid branch prejudices,
Chaffee convinced the War
maneuvers.
outside
of
Department
to
create
an "Armored
ForceV
the
tradltional
arms.
In consequence, in July 1940 the 7th Cavalry
Brigade and the Provisional
Tank Brigade became the nuclei
For
the first
two armored divisions.
These .divFsions,
like the First
organizations
of the European powers,
were excessively
tank
Bach was authorized
six battalions
of light
tanks and two
heavy.
battalions
of medium tanks (approximately
400 tanks total),
but
only two battalions
of armored infantry
and three battalions
of
artillery,
The majority
of light
tanks reflected
the cavalry
heritage
of this
division.
Such a structure
left
inadequate
infantry
to support
the tanks and too many lightly
armored
vehicles
to fight
the heavier
German tanks.
Considerably
more
production
and development
was needed before
the lopsided
American armored units became a cohesive mechanized force.
Finally;
close air support was also lacking in the American
of a Few aviators
such as Frank
combat team. Despite the efforts
the U.S. Army Air Corps was preoccupied with strategic
Lackland,
bombing to the neglect
of close air support.61
As in France
American aviators
argued that air power was best
and Britain,
used in areas beyond the range of ground artillery.
This
apparently
logical
division
of labor overlooked
three aspects of
the psychological
impact of close air attack,
the
ground combat:
necessity
of massing all combat power to overcome the inherent
advantages of the defender,
and the need to achieve this mass
rapidly
in order
to sustain
mobile
operations
and deny the
defender time to organize.
Like Guderian,
Chaffee hoped to use
such techniques
to avoid
the delays
and logistical
buildup
All
three
necessary
for
a deliberate,
breakthrough
attack.
aspects argued in favor of close air support at the critical
but in 1939-40 only the German Luftwaffe
had made even
point,
limited
preparations
to provide such support.
The preceding discussion
of Five different
armies appears to
and yet certain
common threads
go in Five different
directions,
First,
anti-war
sentiment,
limited
defense budgets,
are evident.
and similar
restrictions
hampered the development of new weapons
and doctrine
in every army except the pre-7937 Red Army. As a
consequence, no nation was Fully equipped with modern weapons
when It entered World War II, although the Germans were several
had more
years. ahead of
their
and,
therefore,
opponents
experience and trarning
with such weapons.
the World War 1
Second, even within
the peacetime armies,
traditions
of
dominance
delayed
Infantry-artillery
new
developments designed to broaden the nature of the combined arms,

77

altnough the Red Army was again an exception

until
1937.
In the
British,
French, and American armies, mechanization
developed in
two divergent
directions.
formations
Heavy, alnsost armor-pure
supported conventional
inPantry
attacks,
while highly mobile but
poorly
armed and protected
light
forces
performed
cavalry
functions.
For the British,
the demands of imperial
policing
further
restricted
development
of
large
any move towards
mechanized units.
Still,
even the Germans and Soviets diverted
some armor to specialized
oavalry
and infantry-support
roles.
During the 193Os, professional
soldiers
gradually
broke Free of
tradLciona1,
1918 views about the role of various
arms.
The
Germans had the advantage in these new developments,
certainly
aFter the purges had shattered
the Red high command. Thanks to
GuderLan and Hitler,
the Germans Funneled more of their
assets
into fewer Panzer unllts than did their
opponents, who tended to
modernize slightly
a muoh larger
part of their
armies, and who
therefore
had no Force trained and equ%pped for mechanized combat
in 7939-41.
Finally,
the air power advocates of all natkons retarded
the
Even the
development of close air support for ground operatkons.
Germans had only the embryo of an air-ground
eommand and control
system when the war began.
Had World War If
come in 1936 or 1937, Tukhachevsky's
developments
in the Red Army probably
would have triumphed
despite problems with materiel
and training.
Had the war begun
in 1942 or later,
the British,
French, and Americans would all
have had time to experiment
with and adjust
their
mechanized
auwess
in
organizations
Germany t s military
and doctrine.
1939-41
was therefore
the produot of a very transitory
set of
advantages.
The Germans had produced equipment
and fielded
mechanized units
in the mid-1930s,
so that this equipment was
still
usable and the units were well organized and trained
when
war began in 1939. In addition,
Germany had two advantages that
a primLtive
but developing
close
the other
powers lacked:
air-support
and a command and oontrol
network
that
system,
allowed for much more rapid maneuver than any opponent could
achieve.

78

WORLDWARII:

CBAPTERFOUR
THE AXIS ADVANCE, 1939-1942

World War II did more than force armies to integrate

all the
available
arms at every level into a mobile, flexible
team.
It
also forced those armies to adjust to a variety
of threats
and
Despite the vast scope of the struggle,
some major
terrain.
trends are evident.
First,
the mechanized combined arms force
thought of
In 1939, most armies still
cane of age in this war.
an armored division
as a mass of tanks with relatively
limited
By 1943, the same armies had
support
frcm the other
arms.
evolved armored divisions
that were a balance of different
arms
each of which had to be as mobile and almost as
and services,
protected
as the tanks they accompanied.
The Soviet, German, and
American armies cannibalized
infantry-support
tank units to form
Second, this concentration
of mechanized
more armored divisions.
forces in a small number of mobile divisions
left
the ordinary
infantry
unit deficient
in both antitank
weapons for the defense
The German,
and armor to accanpany the deliberate
attack.
Soviet,
and American armies therefore
developed a number of tank
surrogates
such as tank destroyers
and assault
guns to perform
these functions
in cooperation
with the infantry.
Third, one of
the driving
forces in both of the previous trends was the gradual
development of the means to counter and control
the blitzbieg.
infantry
units were
During the period 1939 to 194 1, conventional
unprepared
psychologically
and technologically
to defeat
a
rapidly
moving armored foe who broke into their
rear areas to
disrupt
communications
and organization.
By 1943, those same
their
paralyzing
fear
of armored
infantry
units
had lost
penetration
and had acquired a much greater antitank
capability.
Successful
armored penetrations
were still
possible,
as the
Soviets
demonstrated,
but they
were increasingly
difficult.
Finally,
World War II
represented
the end of pure ground
operations.
Mechanized attack required air superiority
and close
coordination
required
close
airborne
landings
air
support,
between air transport
and ground forces,
and amphibious landings
developed
as the most sophisticated
and complicated
form of
combined
operations.
Such joint
service
arms and joint
without
operational
errors
and
interaction
was not achieved
doctrinal
arguments, but by the end of the war ground commanders
had reached a temporary
working
compromise with
the other
services on most questions.
The best way to examine these developments is to consider the
actions and reactions
of the opposing armies during the course of
the war.
This chapter will begin with the reasons for the German
by British
reactions
and
success of 1939 and 1940, followed
adjustments
to that
success.
Turning
to the next cycle of
the German victories
in Russia during 1941-42 must
developments,
be compared with
Soviet
efforts
to adjust
organization
and
After
tactics
both before
and after
the German invasion.
reviewing
American developments in organization,
the next chapter

79

will
consider
the many technological
advances of the war, then
the
development
of
Allied
antitank,
mechankzed, and dose
swvey
air
support
operations
in
the
of
second half
the
war.
and
Specialized
airborne,
amphibious,
cases
such
as
unconventional
operations
are discussed separately
at the end of
Chapter Five.
Poland,

1939

During the first

seventeen days of September 1939, Germany
overwhelmed Poland and occupied more than half of its territory.
The western Allies,
who were still
mobilizing
and training
their
reserve
ccmponents, were unable to make more than a symbolic
attack
along the French-German border duri.ng this period,
Yet
the speed of the German conquest obscured a number of problems
that the Germans encountered,
problems that they attempted
to
As a result,
the Germans
solve during the winter
of 1939-40,
widened the gap of experience and experimentation
that separated
them from their future opponents, Great Britain
and France.1
To begin with, the German higher commanders had not accepted
Guderian's
theories
and did not employ their
mobJ.le divisions
in
The panzer and light
divisions
were
mass for deep exploitation.
parceled out among the various armies.
The only exception was
the German Tenth Army, which had two panzer, two motorized,
and
three
light
divisions
in addition
to its
six
conventional
In general,
the mechanized and motorized
Mfantry
divisions.
forces were employed as the cutting
edges of a more conventional
with relatively
shallow penetrations
of
advance on a broad front,
the Polish defenses.
Not until
after organized Polish resistance
into
the rear for
any
collapsed
did armored forces
exploit
distanoe.2
Although German tanks and motorized
infantry
had developed
techniques
for close interaction,
the same was not true between
these elements and their fire support.
Within hours of the first
General Guderian was bracketed
by his own artillery,
attack,
which violated
orders by firing
blindly
into the morning fog.,
The Luftwaffe
eoneentrated
on achieving
air
superiority
and
titerdieting
Polish
lines
of communication,
rather
than on
The csnphexity
of close
supporting
the ground troops directly.
air
the
and
support
operations,
problems
of eoordinatkng
eommunieating
between air and ground units,
and the lack of
training
in such methods made it very difficult
for the Luftwaffe
and army to work together.
Nany German tactical
commanders were too cautious,
allowing
This
themselves to be halted by even minor Polish resistan%?.
was a natural
response for an army that had not seen combat for
The Poles
years, but it was not appropriate
to the situation.
because they had dispersed
were probably
doomed at the outset,

80

their
forces along the entire
Polish-German border in an effort
Under the
to prevent any limited
German grab for territory.
circumstances,
German forces needed to punch through the thin
Polish frontier
defenses rapidly,
rather than stopping to deploy
whenever they made contact with Polish troops.
The German system of division
and higher
level
commanders
going forward to make on -the-spot
decisions
greatly
increased the
of operations.
However, the same system had several
t=PQ
drawbacks that were evident
even in this first
campaign.
The
presence of a higher commander on the scene tended to Snhibit the
initiative
of the battalion
or regimental
commander.
This
inhibition
may have been partially
responsible
for the caution
displayed
by German units
in Poland.
Moreover,
the senior
commanders were extremely vulnerable
to enemy attack while moving
about
in a fluid
battle.
For example,
Guderian,
a corps
commander, was pinned down for hours by a few bypassed Polish
troops.
This was a recurring
problem for leaders in many armies
during
World War II,
especially
for
the more daring
German
commanders in North
Africa.
Ultimately
some, like
Rcmnmel,
organized
ad hoc security
task forces to travel
with them.
Yet
such a security
force reduced the combat power of subordinate
units and at the same time increased the tendency for a senior
commander to become involved personally
in the small unit actions
If he lost radio contact with
he saw when he visited
the front.
his headquarters,
the senior commander became isolated
and even
less effective.
Although no German unit advanced more than 250 kilometers
into
Poland,
significant
problems
of supply
and maintenance
developed.
All
major
tank
repairs
required
evacuation
to
Germany, and forward maintenance units were unprepared for the
new demands of active
campaiming.
By the end of the Polish
campai.~, the German mechanized force was almost immobilized
for
maintenance reasons.
A related
problem was the unsuitability
of German equipment.
As noted in the previous chapter,
the Germans had intended the
Mark I tank for training
rather than combat, and the Mark II was
scarcely
better.
The use of such vehicles
in Poland reflected
two problems:
Germany had begun the war before her mechanized
forces had developed canpletely,
and those forces still
did not
have priority
for industrial
production.
During the month of
September 1939, for
example,
the Germans lost
218 tanks in
battle ? approxtiately
10 percent
of their
entire
force,
while
manufacturing
only fifty-seven
new ones. Even at the time of the
invasion of France eight months later,
the second generation
Mark
of
less than one-fourth
III
and IV medium tanks constituted
German tanks
in
did
field
units.3
The Polish
c=paiED
their
of Mark Is
by revealing
the
retirement
accelerate
deficiencies
and may have hastened the movement of Mark 11s into

81

reconnaissance,
engineer,
and command units.
As a result,
the
relatively
few Mark III and IV tanks bore the brunt of the effort
in 1940,
By contrast,
other German equipment had unexpected uses* The
half-tracks
originally
intended
as prime movers for artillery
proved to be so mobile that infantry
units in panzer divisions
sought to acquire them as armored personnel carriers.
The vast
majority
of panzer grenadiers,
however, continued
to travel
in
trucks
and motorcycles
throughout
the war; there
were never
enough half-tracks
available:
The 88-m antiaircraft
gun proved
to be extremely
useful
in a ground-support
role,
foreshadoting
its later use as the premier antitank
weapon of the German Army.
A basle result
of the German invasion of Poland was to begin
the sloti
evolution
of the German panzer division
structure
At the time of the
towards greater
balance among the arms.
Polish campaign, the six panzer divisions
averaged between 276
and 302 tanks each, organized
into a panzer brigade
of four
battalions.
Those same divisions
had only three battalions
of
infantry
and two of artillery.
This tank-heavy force proved too
untieldy
for
some commanders, and in any event Hitler
was
interested
in creating
more panzer divisions.
At the same time,
the German "'light
divisions,'"
built around two motorized infantry
pr%Ved to be too light
for
regiments
and one tank battalion,
sustafned operations,
lacking the combat power of either a panzer
Given the limited
division
or a conventional
infantry
division.
number of tanks
in the German inventory,
the s01uti0n
was
obvious--tanks
moved frmn the existing
panzer divisions
to the
light
divisions,
three of whkch beeante panzer divisions
during
the winter of 1939-40.
In addition,
during the Polish campaign
ad hoc panzer
division
had formed around one of the
zantry-support
tank brigades
created in 1938; this formation
became the 10th Panzer Division.
Thus, by the time of the Freneh
were
available
German tanks
even more of
the
c=P~En,
concentrated
into panzer divisions,
some of which were reduced
from a four-battalion
tank brigade
to a three-battalion
tank
regiment,
with a total
of 16%20Q tanks.
This put the tank
element in balance with the rest of the divisfon,
which normally
consfsted
of three
infantry
battalions
and two or three towed
battalion,
artillery
battalions,
an armored
reconnaissance
engineer
battalion,
and signals.4
This trend towards a more
balanced division
would continue throughout the war.
'Regardless
of exact organization,
all
the panzer divisions
The brigade,
of task organizing
for eanbat.
were in the habit
regimental,
and battalion
headquarters
all
practiced
attaching
and detaching
elements
of other
arms in order
to have a
combination
of tanks,
infantry,
artillery,
engineers,
and, on
The balance between these arms varied
air defense.
occasion,
with the mission, terrain,
and enemy forces involved.

82

Beyond these organizational

changes, German tactical
concepts
and structures
seemed essentially
sound. With the exception of.a
few technical
problems with a particular
machine gun design, the
infantry
divisions
functioned
well.
The only other lesson of the
Polish campaign was the predictable
discovery that armored forces
were
at
a
disadvantage
fighting
on
urban
when
terrain--fifty-seven
tanks were lost in one day while attempting
to seize Warsaw.5
This experience
only reinforced
the need for
a higher proportion
of infantry
to tanks, in order to provide
close-in
security
for the tanks on urban terrain,
where the tanks
to short-range
antitank
attacks
from nearby
were vulnerable
buildings.
The German Advance,

1940

Between the fall

of Poland in 1939 and the beginning of the
Belgian-French
camp&@. in May 1940, another German operation
unsettled
Allied morale and foreshadowed the future complexity
of
German force
joint
operations.
On 9 April
1940, an improvised
used motor movements, small-scale
airborne
drops, and seaborne
Only one of
landing3 to occupy Denmark and Norway by surprise.
the six German divisions
sent to Norway was a fully
trained,
established
organization,
yet all
units
performed
remarkably
well.
Despite
the shoestring
nature of the German operation,
this "warfare
in three dimensions"
(land, air, and sea) caused a
shift
of Allied resources and planning away from the battlefields
of France.6
This shift
meant further
confusion
and delays in
the process of mobilizing
and training
the British
and French
troops.
The stunning
operations
in Denmark and Norway preceded
another surprise
when the main battle
in France and Belgium was
joined.
On 10 May 1940, a small party of German glider
troops
landed on top of the elaborate
concrete fortress
of Eben Emael,
Using shaped-charge
the key to the Belgian defensive
system.
explosives*
and the element of surprise,
these Germans blinded
and neutralized
the huge fortress
until
ground troops arrived,
thereby
eliminating
one of Belgium's
main defenses.7
This
surprise,
coming on the heels of the Norwegian invasion,
caused
many Allied milktary
and civilian
leaders to become excessively
*The "shaped charge"
was a concept fully
developed
only
during the 1930s.
It allowed the user to focus the blast of a
particular
amount of explosive
in order to achieve a much greater
effect
than the same explosive
would produce
if
detonated
normally,
The essence of this shaping was to mold the explosive
with a cone-shaped hollow on one end, so that the blast effect
that centered within
that hollow would produce a shock wave in
one direction,
towards the wide end of the cone.

a3

concerned
about the rear
area threat
posed by airborne
unconventtonal
warfare forces.
Such eoneern was the first
in creating
the psychological
uncertainty
that was so critical
the success of the blitzkrieg.

and
step
to

Gcmquering Belgium and France required

more than propaganda
and a few paratroopers
to
create
psycholo@cal
paralysis.
Ccmtrary
to frequent
stereotypes,
the western
armies
were
remarkably
well armed by 1940, having greatly
increased
their
production
during
the later
1930s.
One calculation
indicates
that Britain
and France had a ccmbined total
of 4,340 tanks on
the continent
during the 1940 campaign, as compared to only 3,863
for
Germany.
Despite
weaknesses
such
as lack
of
radio
communications and crowded turrets,
most of the Allied
tanks were
actually
better
and
armed
armored
than
German
their
counterparts.
Only the light
British
cruiser
tanks were more
vulnerable.
For instance,
one obsolete
French FCM tank took
forty-+%)
hits
from German 37-m antitank
guns without
being
knocked out of action.
The Germans had to bring
up 88-mm
antiaircraft
guns or medium artrllery
to deal with the more
heavily
armored French B-l
his and British
infantry
support
tanks.
Indeed,
the Germans were d4sturbed
by the general
ineffectiveness
of their
the
antitank
weapons.
By contrast,
outnumbered French 25-mm and 47-man antitank
guns had much higher
muzzle
velocities
penetration
and therefore
armor
greatger
capacity than the German and British
guns.
Pet the Germans defeated
the Allies
so rapidly
that
they
seemed to validate
the concept of blitzkrieg
in
Germany and
abroad,
even when the details
of this
concept were not well
understood.
The true
r=SOIlS
for this
success have already
appeared in this study.
First,
in contrast
to their
own performance in Poland and to
the French dispositions
in 1940, the Germans concentrated
thekr
available
mechanized forces into a few large masses at critical
Seven out of ten panzer divisions,
with five motorized
points.
divisions
following
close behind them to mop up and protect
the
flanks,
Ardennes
advanced
through
the
forest
on
a
seventy-kilometer
front.
By contrast,
the Freneh Army dispersed
thirty-six
tank battalions
evenly along its borders in support of
infantry
armies, even in the Maginot Line area.
In most cases
with
the
infantry
and
these
battalions
had never
trained
artillery
to conduct a deliberate
attack or counterattack.
Much
of the remaining
French and British
armor was in the extreme
north,
moving into Belgium in a direction
away from the mafn
Four French armored divisions
were
German advance on Sedan.
still
forming,
but these were scattered
at wide distances
behind
and were broken up in some cases when committed to
the front
battle. 9

84

In additicm,
the western Allies
had organized themselves for
a linear
defense,
spreading
their
forces thinly
across a wide
front.
The French command structure
in particular
was geared to
methodical,
set-piece
battles,
but lacked the forces to create a
By rushing
true defense-in-depth
on the World War I model.
through
the Ardennes forest,
the main German attack
shattered
By the fifth
this linear
defense at one of its weakest points.
day of the campaign (14 May 19401, the German mobile forces were
envisioned
by many
conducting
the type of deep exploitation
theorists
1930s.
Such
penetrations
were
during
the
psychologically
unnerving
to the defenders,
who were suddenly
faced by major enemy forces
in the rear,
but who lacked a
procedure to redeploy
units
rapidly
to meet and contain
that
threat.
The rapid German advance disorganized
French command and
control and prevented any resc&ration
of a cohesive defense.
Because there was so little
resistance,
the German commanders
armored
tanks.
Instead,
the
did
not
always
lead
with
reconnaissance
battalions,
plus in some cases engineers to clear
led the advance by up to a day's march, with the
obstacles,
slower elements strung
out in column behind.
Ganmanders used
or light
aircraft
for
control
during
the
armored vehicles
pursuit.
Of course,
this
advance in column made the Germans
vulnerable
if
the defenders
were able
to mount a
rather
counterattack,
as Erwin Ranrnel discovered when the British
struck
the flank of his panzer division
at Arras on 21 May. Only the
improvised use of 88-m antiaircraf
t guns and 105-m howitzers in
an antitank
role halted the heavy infantry-support
tanks of the
British
1st Army Tank Brigade.
The British
did not realize
that
the 88-m gun was responsible
for their defeat until they met the
weapon again in North Africa.
Even thPs unsuccessful
British
counterattack
at Arras put sczne of the fear of tanks into the
German higher commanders, causing German armor leaders to seek
larger
antitank
weapons and higher
velocity
tank guns after
Arras.10
At the tactical
level,
both the British
and the French were
in force
structure
and practice.
at a distinct
disadvantage
German armored divisions
were clearly
bett,er organized than those
The French Division
Cuirassee was too tank-heavy,
of France.
tith
four
and two artillery
tank
and only
one infantry
When ordinary
infantry
or artillery
units
were
battalions.
attached
to this division
to correct
the problem, the attached
French logistical
units had not trained to cooperate with tanks.
support
was too dependent on roads and rails
to follow
the
Finally,
the
all-terrain
maneuver elements of these divisions.
inexperienced
French commander of an armored division
had to
the
units
direetly;
his
subordinate
control
most
of
that controlled
his tank battalions
"demi-brigade"
headquarters
were not trained
or intended to integrate
the other armSI
BY

85

contrast,
the German commanders had a number of subordinate
head quarters,
each of which had practiced
the control
of a
ccmbination of' the various arms.
German training
in combined arms was especially
evident
during the penetration
of the Ardennes.
The rapid German advance
over a poor road network was made possible
only by road repairs
conducted by ecmbat engineers.
Anti-aircraft
guns in the German
oolumns decimated Allied
air attacks.
At the eritieal
crossing
of the Meuse River on 13 May, the German infantry
and some
engineers
crossed the river
under the covering
fire
of tanks,
artillery
, and tactical
aircraft.
Indeed, the Germans had relied
on air
support
to limit
the need for artillery
units
and
Because
ammunition resupply while moving through the Ardennes.
close air support was still
developing,
however, the success at
the Meuse River was a combination
of good training
and luck.
In
exercises
before the campaign, Guderian had arranged for aecurdte
air support fran German dive-banbers,
without which it wauld have
been difficult
to suppress the French defenses on the far side of
the river.
The day before
the
attaok,
the
panzer
group
commander, General Ewald von Kleist,
attempted
to arrange high
altitude
saturation
attac&
by the less aoourate medium bcolbers.
This would have made crossing
the Meuse during bombing attacks
extremely dangerous for the Germans.
Fortunately
for them, the
Luftwaffe
did not honor von Kleists
air support request in time,
while Guderian's
prearranged dive-bombers did arrive.ll
The fall
of France demonstrated not only the importance
of
combined arms mechanized formations
and blitzkrieg
penetrations,
but also the German advantage over the British
and French in
combined arms training
and procedures*
Yet the images of
and screaming Stukas tended to obscure the
paratroops,
tanks,
combined arms nature
of
blitzkrieg
from many contemporary
observers.
The British

Response, 7940-42

The s'udden collapse

of France in 1940 caused professional
soldiers
in many armies to reassess their
organizations
as well
as their
offensive
and defensive
doctrine.
As the only major
belligerent
still
at war with Hitler,
Great Britain
had the most
urgent need to reorganize
its forces and reassess its doctrine
in
Unfortunately
for the British,
the
the months after
Dunkirk.
period
1940-42 seems in
retrospect
to have witnessed
the
which
development
of two British
armies--the
at
home,
=v
gradually
rebuilt
and developed new doctrine
and organization,
army in the Middle East, which after
initial
and the field
success against
Italy
found itself
repeatedly
outmaneuvered by
The British
troops
the small forces of the German Afrika Korps.
in North Africa were never able to reorganize
and retrain
as did

86

the army at home.

Yet these two armies were connected
in
doctrine
if not in practice,
and the British
vic+&ries
of 1942-45
owed a great deal to the quiet process of rebuilding
forces at
home.
Faced with the possibility
of German invasicn
after
France
surrendered,
the British
felt
that there was no time for major
changes in organization,
doctrine,
or equipent.
In a desperate
British
effort
to rearm the troops
evacuated
from Dunkirk,
industry
continued
to produce weapons whose designs were clearly
obsolete.
Cruiser
tanks,
armored cars, and two-pound antitank
guns appeared by the hundred because there
was no time to
redesign
and build
better
weapons.12
Same British
commanders
became preoccupied
with the material
difficulties
of obtaining
trucks
to motorize
infantry
elements within
the newly formed
armored divisions,
thereby
obscuring
the more fundamental
need
for doctrine
and techniques
of infantry-armor
cooperation.
The
British
did develop some new weapons during this
period,
most
notably
a six-pound
(5'7~nnn) gun for use both as an antitank
weapon and as the main gun on new tanks.
Yet this gun did not
appear in the field until
194.2, and even then was too large to be
mounted in the turrets
of older model tanks.13
As the threat
of invasion
lessened,
the British
Army could
emphasize training
and reconsider
its prewar doctrine
in light of
the experiences
of 1940.'4
The General
Staff
published
a
identifying
such points as
series of notes frcm various theaters,
the need for combined arms organization
below division
level and
the German use of antitank
weapons rather
than tanks to defeat
enemy tanks.
Under the
direction
of
Gen.
Brooke,
Alan
Commander-in-Chief
Home Forces and later
Chief of the Imperial
General Staff,
the units
of the expanded active
and reserve
(Territorial
Army) forces conducted training
at all levels.
Some
of this training
was simply an improvement on prewar principles,
battle
drills
for
such as the development of fire-and-movement
small infantry
units.
Col. H. J. Parham experimented
with a
single radio net to mass artillery
on the basis of an estimated
map reference;
the results
were rather
inaccurate,
but in the
Parham's ideas
absence of the American fire
direction
center,
allowed the Royal Artillery
to provide at least scme response to
targets
of opportunity.
The most unusual
1940-42 was the
feature
of the period
command post exercises and field
maneuvers,
conduct of large-unit
with detailed
study before and critiques
after
each step.
Lt.
such exercises
as a
Gen, Bernard L. Montgomery had pioneered
division
commander in
enabling
his
France
during
1939-40,
and flexibly
than most other
division
to move more rapidly
British
units.
After
Dunkirk,
Montgomery applied
the same
training
techniques
as commander of two different
corps and
finally
of an army-level
force.
He also acted as chief umpire

87

for exercises
1nvoLving other unkts in Britain.
Similar
if less
elaborate
training
took place
in the newly formed
armored
divisions
under Lt, Gen. Giffard
Martel,
the Commander of the
Royal Armoured Corps after December 1940.
McnQomery contended that few British
officers
had experience
maneuvering any unit larger
than a brigade,
and certainly
his
exercises
helped to produce commanders, staffs,
and units
that
were capable of much more rapid changes in deployment and mission
than those of World War I.
More importantly,
Montgomery and
others
developed
a common conception
of the interaction
of
different
arms and of how to commit divisions
and larger units to
battle.
For example, Montgomery argued that the decentralized
nature of German mechanized pursuit
and exploitation
had caused
many British
commander3 to lose sight
of the neeessity
for
centralized
control
in the
deliberate
attack
and defense.
Reconnaissance,
artillery,
tanks,
infantry,
engineers,
and air
power had to be stage-managed"
at the highest levels in order to
concentrate
combat power at any point where the enemy presented
an organized defense or attack,
Only in a fluid
situation
could
commmders decentralize
these arms and push them forward,
so that
subordinate
leaders
would have the different
weapons readily
available.
Defense meant not a series
of fixed
lines
on the
terrain,
but rather
blocking
positions
in depth plus massive
counterattack3
of the kind Germany had used so well in World War
I.
All arms needed to employ night attacks to reduce the lethal
effects
of aimed enemy fire.
Finally,
Montgomery opposed the
traditional
British
concept that tank units should maneuver like
cavalry.
Instead,
he saw the armored division
as a combined arms
force that would seize key terrain
in order to use the advantages
of tactical
defense
when the enemy armor
counterattacked.
Infantry
and antitank
forces
would foilow
the initial
armored
assault to mop up and hold terrain,
releasing
the amr
to refit
or attack again.15
In the Royal Armoured Corps, Martel
developed these same
concepts in a series of exercises,
until
in June I%2 the senior
armor commander3 in Britain
agreed to an "RAC creed."
This
creed--a
product
of exercises
and of a critical
analysis
of
events
in North
Africa--began,
'lan armoured division
is a
formation
of all arms.
Each am or branch of the service is a
member of the team, and has its vital
part to play.+'
Like the
Germans before them, British
armor commanders concluded
that
antitank
guns were the best means to defeat enemy tanks, although
tank-tank
combat might
still
OCXYR+. Motorized
infantry
and
antitank
weapons together
would hold key terrain,
around which
the armored forces maneuvered.l6

88

Changes in organization
accompanied changes in doctrine.
Imediately
after
DunkIrk,
the pure tank brigades
of the early
armored divisions
had given way to brimdes
composed of one
motorized
infantry
and three tank battalions.*
A 1940 British
armored
division
therefore
consisted
of
an armored
car
reconnaissance
battalion,
two armred
brigades,
and a support
battalions
of field,
antitank,
and light
group, which included
antiaircraft
artillery,
an additional
infantry
battalion,
two
engineer
companies,
and trains.
Martel
and his subordinates
deliberately
retained
this
orenization
until
1942 to avoid
constant changes that would disrupt training.
too
however,
this
structure
was obviously
BY 1942,
tank-heavy,
and so the War Office removed one of the two armored
The separate brigades
brigades from the division
(see Figure 9).
that resulted
from this removal could reinforce
any division
as
needed for a particular
mission.
Moreover,
the term "support
group"
had apparently
caused the nonarmored elements of the
division
to be regarded
as an afterthought
to the tanks.
A
motorized
infantry
brigade
plus a division
artillery
element
therefore
replaced
the support
group, with the intention
that
artillery,
antitank,
antiaircraft,
engineer,
and support elements
would be centralized
or attached
to the armored or infantry
brigade as needed.
At the same time, the British
created two
different
types of infantry
division.
The "division"
per =,
intended
for
apparently
Asian
retained
operations,
the
traditional
configuration
of three infantry
brigades
of three
battalions
each.
Conversely,
the "infantry
division"
lost one
brigade in favor of an infantry-support
tank brigade.
Martel and
the new Commander-in-Chief
Home Forces, Bernard Paget, strongly
advocated this latter
change in order to improve training
and
cooperation
between
infantry
and
supporting
tanks.!?
Unfortunately,
the British
returned
to a division
of three
infantry
brigades
by 1944.
As a result,
the quality
of
tank-infantry
widely
cooperation
in
1944-45 varied
between
different
divisions.
War in the Desert,

1940-42

The battles
of North Africa did not always reflect
the state
of the British
Army at home. In late 1940, the small force in
the Middle East was the only British
field army still
trained to

*The British
frequently
used the term "regiment"
to desisate
an armored force equivalent
to an American battalion.
American
terminology
and symbology are used here for simplicity.

89

BRITISH
ARMORED
DIVISIQN,
1942

16,OOQ men, 246 medEum tanks.

44 light tanks, 361 armored carriers,
46 field guns. 78 antitank guns

e 0
26-lber

57- or 7%mm

PARK

BRITISH
INFANTRY
DIVISIBN,
1842

19.000 mem. 190 medium tanks,

33 light tanks, 32 field guns,
110 antitank guns

0
i

25-Ibar

57- or 7%mm

9PT /HVY WPNS): Heavy Weapons or

Support company, including mortars
and antitank guns.

Figure 9. British

84-3330

Armored and Infantry

Divisions,

-9o-

_. .-~------

-____

1942.

hi&
prewar standards,
although
its equipment was little
better
joined the war on Germany's
than that found at home. Once Italy
side
in mid-1940,
Prime Minister
Winston
Churchill
took a
calculated
risk and sent a portion
of his scarce resources
to
defend Egypt against the threat from Libya, which was an Italian
colony at the time.
The shipment included
a single
battalion
(7th Royal Tank Regiment) of heavily
armored Mark II infantry
support
tanks.
This battalion,
Fn combination
with the two
understrength
but well-trained
divisions
already
in Egypt, was
the basis for a classic demonstration
of prewar British
tactical
doctrine
(see Map 5).
In SeptEYnber 1940, Marshal Rudolf0 Graziani's
Italian
army of
ten divisions
had advanced eastward from Italian
Libya into
British
Egypt.
Graziani was cautious,
however, and in any event
support.
his force was largely
foot mobile with poor logistical
He therefore
halted and established
a series of widely scattered
camps in the
general
area of SIdf
Barr&i,
eighty
about
kilometers
east
of the Libyan
frontier.
Lt.
Gen. Richard
O'Connor, commander of the British
Western Desert Force, used the
infantry
support
tanks
in conjunction
with
the 4th Indian
Infantry
Division
to reduce these camps in a surprise
advance on
8-10 December 1940.
The tactics
involved exemplified
the best of
interwar
British
practice.18
Because the Italian
camps were
protected by minefields
and obstacles,
the British
passed between
these camps and attacked them from the far (western) side, aiming
at the unmined entrance road to each camp. Artillery
and mortar
fire pinned the defenders down and distracted
attenticm
from the
unexpected assault.
Then two canpanies
of the slow infantry
tanks moved forward, with platoons of Bren gun carriers
following
behind and to the outside flanks,
providing
flank
security
and
macNne gun fire
for the tanks.
As soon as the British
C,anks
broke into
the enemy positions
and came to close quarters,
infantry
moved up as closely
as possible
in trucks,
dismounted,
and accaupanied the tanks in mopping-up operations.
After the tank-artillery-infantry
team had reduced the enemy
Armoured Division
used its
defensive
system, the 7th British
light!,
mobile armored vehicles
to conduct a high-speed
pursuit.
The retreating
Italians
lacked
effective
tanks
or antitank
weapons and were tied to the single
road that paralleled
the
Mediterranean
Sea.
The 7th Armoured Division
therefore
made a
series of wide flanking
movements south of the road, repeatedly
turning
north to the coast in order to intercept
the Italian
retreat.
This Italian
disaster
led to the introduction
of German
forces in North Africa.

91

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

\ 62r=>a
crl
1

LIBYAN
m
J----J
9 DEC
1940

SCALE
)o=

Fortified

Mian

Map 5, Sidi Barrani,

Positions

December 1940,

The roots
of the British
victory
lay in advantages
of
German intervention
superior
training,
mobility,
and equipment.
negated these assets.
In early 1941 and again a year later,
the
reduced
their
forces
in Egypt in favor
of needs
British
elsewhere--first
in Greece and, then, after
Japan entered the
when the German Afrika
As a result,
W=-, in Southeast Asia.
Korps attacked in March 1941, it met only partly
trained
British
equipment.
and
inferior
troops
with
worn
out
e q@ped
Thereafter,
German victories
and Landon's repeated demands for
desert forces
British
counteroffensives
meant that the British
had little
time to analyze their mistakes and to train to correct
them. With few exceptions,
the senior British
commanders did not
stay in office
long enough to learn and apply the lessas
of the
desert war.
The Germans had arrived
in Africa
with a system of
combined arms battlegroups,
flexible
commanders, and variable
tactics
to mass canbat power on the basis of battle
drills.
By
contrast,
the British
units
had rarely
studied
combined arms
units
from Britain
might
be better
tactics.
Newly arrived
trained,
but were often
squandered piecemeal
before they had
beccme acclimated to the desert.
The Germans also had a considerable
technological
advantage
in equipment.19
After
their
shocking
encounter
with British
infantry-support
tanks in France, the Germans had experimented
with the 88-m antiaircraft
gun to test its effectiveness
as an
The German
captured British
equipment.
antitank
weapm against
divisions
sent
to
Africa
had a number of
organizational
such as less field
but more antitank
artillery,
modifications,
including
a small number of 88-xn guns.
In addition,
the German
tanks in Africa were largely
Mark III and IV medium tanks, with
Mark II
tanks in reconnaissance
and command elements.
These
medium tanks were considerably
better armed and armored than the
British
cruiser and light tanks.
During the course of 1941, a 504un medium-velocity
main gun
Then in mid-1942,
the
replaced
the 37-mm on most Mark IIIs.
Germans installed
an even higher velocity
50-mrrm on scme Mark
IIIs,
giving them the same penetration
power as the 50-mm towed
antitank
gun that had already
replaced
the ineffective
German
and fired
37-mm. This new 50-mm tank gun had improved sights
special
"arrowhead"
ammunition (an early form of Armor Piercing
Discarding
Sabot) capable of penetrating
even thickly
armored
infantry
support tanks at short ranges.
By contrast,
the Germans
had designed the Mark IV to provide area fire
support for other
tanks,
suppressing
enemy antitank
defenses while the Mark IIIs
armament
closed in the attack.
As such, the Mark IV's original
was a 75-m low-velocity
gun capable of damaging British
tracks
but not of penetrating
thick
and roadwheels
at 1000 meters,
armor.
Again during
1942,
the continuing
German quest for

93

gunpower caused some Mark IVs to receive a higher velocity

75mm
the British
two-pound tank
b3~. All of these weapons outclassed
and antitank
gun,
As late as May 1942, the British
forces had
only 100 six-pound antitank
guns and were just receiving
their
first
American Grant tanks with 15-mm guns. Cconsidering that the
frontal
armor on German tanks was Pas@-hardened, while that on
British
tanks was not,
the British
had to close to almost
sticidal
ranges of 500 or fewer meters in order to penetrate
the
German vehicles.
In many cases, the British
had to hit a German
tank ttice--once
to shatter
the face hardening and a second Sfme
to penetrate the armor.
These equipment
problems
obscured the more basic British
failure
to coordinate
and combine different
weapons systems.
Despite Martel's
efforts,
British
tank battalions
in Britain
and
North Africa found it difficult
to resist
the temptatfon
to close
with the enemy, even when they had not located
the enemy's
antitank
guns.
Because the basic German tactic
for dealing with
enemy armor was still
the antftank
gun line,
this
British
tendency was disastrous.
On 15 June 19411 for example, a few
German tanks decoyed the 16th Royal Tank Regiment into a screen
of Y&mm antitank
guns; the British
lost 17 tanks in a matter of
minutes.20
Such bitter
lessons rapidly
convinced
the Brftish
4.
UO value
gun power above all
other
elements and to regard
infantry
as a liability
in the desert.
The armor's tendency to
maneuver on its own often left
the infantry
exposed, and the
resulting
mistrust
made any attempt aC, cooperation
between these
arms extremely
difficult.
In those cases where the British
and
CcoPnonwealth infantry
was able to entrench
effectively,
the
commanders chose positions
that were not mutually
support;lng,
so
that
the Germans could
concentrate
all
available
firepower
against one British
unit at a time.
Early
in the
desert
war,
British
commanders apparently
grasped the German concept of combined arms task organization
at
the small-unit
level,
but did not always develop the tactics
to
ccmplement that organizatfc62.
As Plontgomery was preaehfng
in
Great Britain,
the tendency
to form combined arms units
of
battalion
and brigade
size
was not
always
appropriate
or
sufficient,
and caused the divisions
to fight
as uncoordinated
and dispersed
eolleetlons
of small
units.
The concentrated
efforts
of the German Afrika
Korps often defeated these British
task forces in detail.
The British
tried
to reverse this process.
General Martel
vi&ted
North
Africa
in early
1942, and the
loeal
armor
commanders agreed to the newer concepts
of a combined arms
armored divisica?.
The local
units,
however, did not implement
these changes in organization
and taotics
before the next German
offensive,
so the British
again lost
armored "brigade
groups"

94

to employ divisions
as unified
piecemeal despite their intentions
forces.
After losing most of their
tanks, the British
resorted
to small
motorized
columns built
around the few remaining
effective
field
and antitank
artillery
units,
with just enough
security
for those units.
motorized
infantry
to provide local
"Excess" infantry
went to the rear.21
This was the situation
when Montgomery took command of Eighth
British
Army in August 1942.
Lt. Gen. Brian Horroaks,
who had
training
exercises
as an armored
participated
in Martel's
division
commander, arrived
soon thereafter
to command one of the
the Eighth Army from
corps.
In effect,
Montgomery had to retrain
scratch,
focusing
upon the problems of centralized
command and
control for set-piece
battles.
The British
gained tFme by halting
the Germans at Alam Halfa
(31 August-5 September 1942).
Having predicted
the key terrain
that the Germans would have to seize,
British
and Ccunmonwealth
The Royal Air
defenders dug in to deny the enemy that terrain.
Force attacked German armor while it was immobilized
in British
The
main
British
defenses
included
Grant
tank fire
minefields.
at long range, towed antitank
guns at closer range, and finally
These
range.
protective
fires
at
short
massed artillery
successive defenses exhausted the German attacks.22
After Alam Halfa, Montgomery used an abbreviated
form of his
training
program from Britain
to prepare the Eighth Army for the
of Alamein
second battle
deliberate
attack
known as the
(October-November
1942).
To ensure that the entire army attacked
kn a coordinated
manner, Montgomery resorted
to the elaborate
planning
and centralized
direction
characteristic
of British
Each corps directed
its artillery,
for
attacks in World War I.
example.
Such procedures
were more familiar
to British
staff
than the fluid,
improvisational
tactics
that they had
officers
attempted
to copy from the Germans.
Engineers,
infantry,
and
penetration
of the German-Italian
artillery
conducted a night
seizing
high ground on which to establish
defensive
positions,
infantry-antitank
defenses.
Next, Montgomery planned to move
armor forward under the protection
of these antitank
defenses,
In actual practice,
the
tempting the Germans to counterattack.
second battle
of Alamein was an attrition
contest
in which
because the
largely
changed frequently,
Montgomery's
plans
armored units still
had difficulty
cooperating
with the artillery
The ultimate
British
success clearly
owed as much
and infantry.
to Montgomery's methods of forcing
combined arms cooperation
upon
material
superiority
at the
his subordinates
as to the British
time.
Historians
have frequently
criticized
Montgomery for the
cautious manner in which he conducted both deliberate
attacks and
more fluid
exploitation
and pursuits.
Yet this caution enabled

95

him to minimize
caused in large
arms.23

or avoid the errors

part by an inability

The German Advance In Russia,

of his predecessors,
errors
to coordinate
the different

1941

While Germany went from vietory

to victory
in the period
1939-41, the Soviet Army stood nearly impotent, *thanks in part to
Stalin's
of its
officer
corps.
The adminfstrative
PW@
occupation of eastern Poland in the fall
of 1939 strained
Soviet
logistios
to the breaking poincU, and the disastrous
Russo-Finnish
War of 1939-40 demonstrated Soviet inability
to coordinate
units
for
a deliberate
attack.24
It
is
true
that
the Soviets
eventually
learned from their
mistakes,
redoubled their
efforts,
and forced the Finns to negotiate
an armistice
in March 1940.
Nevertheless,
the Red Army was a shambles.
In light
of these experiences,
during the period 1940-41 the
Soviet
government
undertook
reforms
in
military
massive
organization,
equipment,
command structure,
and deployment.
The
Sov5.ets mismanaged most of these changes, and none was complete
by the time Germany attacked
In June 1941.
The Germans caught
the Red Army in transition
and rkpped it apart.25
For our purposes the most noteworthy Soviet change before the
German invasion
was the reintroduction
of large combined arms
mechanized formations.
In reaction
to the German victories
of
of mechanized
1940, the Soviet government ordered the creation
rffle
corps,
each consisting
of two tank and one motorized
division,
for use as C,he exploitation
forces in each field
army.
of these
By January 1941, the Red Army had on paper twenty-nine
huge corps,
authorized
1,031 tanks each.
Unfortunately,
the
Soviets had neither
the men nor the eq&.pment to implement their
ambitious
plan.
By removing all tanks from infantry
and cavalry
the Soviets collected
approximately
17,000 tanks,
support .units,
but the new organizations
called for a total
of 29,899.
Worse
the lightly
armed and
still,
these tanks were almost entirely
armored variety
produeed
in the mid-1930s.
By 1941, such
equipment was tactically
obsolete and mechanically
worn out.
In
late 1939, the Red Army had tentatively
approved designs for newt
including
the T-34 medium and m-1
second generation
equipment,
heavy tanks.
Yet incompetent management prevented production
of
more than 1,475' of these outstanding
,new weapons before the
German attack.26
Similar
managerial
and bureaucratic
problems
depfived the Soviets of trucks to move infantry
and artillery,
of
. mines to stop'tanks,
and of modern fighters
to contest German air
superiority.
In contrast
to Soviet disarray,
the German Army that invaded
Hitler "s continuing
on 22 June 1941 was at the top of its form,

96

desire for more panzer divisions

had unintentionally
improved the
balance of arms within those divisions.
In order to assemble the
tanks necessary for the additional
divisions,
the Germans had
reduced all panzer divisions
to an establishment
of only two or
three
canpanies
each,
for
a total
of
of
three tank battalions
150-202 tanks per division.
This action,
plus an increase
in
of four trucked and one motorcycle
battalion,
infantry
to a total
meant that e&h division
had six to nine tank companies, but
fifteen
motorized
infantry
canpanies;
the other arms remained
unchanged.
Considering
the high casualties
and many demands for
this ratio
was probably the most effective
motorized
infantry,
for all forms of mechanized combat.
Armored enthusiasts
have frequently
criticized
Hitler
for
this
reduction
in tank strength,
arguing
that the resulting
panzer division
lacked the combat power for sustained advances of
the type necessary in Russia. 27 It would be more accurate
to
argue that German planners
geared the entire
German Army for
relatfvely
limited
distances
and tied
it
to railroads
and
The problems in the German maintenance
horsedrawn logistics.
system, for example, had been evident even in the short Polish
The Russian campaign involved
much greater
campaign of 1939.
distances
and longer operations.
Under these circumstances,
the
German system of centralizing
spare parts and evacuating
most
major repairs
back to the factory
was completely
inadequate.
In
commanders in Russia had to mount a major
August 1941, the field
argument to convince
Hitler
to release
300 tank engines to
Every vehicle
replace those already worn out in the campaign.
covered hundreds of miles over uneven and dusty roads, causing
If each panzer division
had retained
another
many breakdowns.
tank battalion,
those additional
tanks would have worn out at the
same rate as the rest of the division,
leaving only a handful of
additional
vehicles
still
in the field
by the time the division
reached the gates of Moscow in December 1941. What the Germans
needed was not so much more tanks as more trucks for resupply and
existing
better
field
maintenance
system
to
repair
a
equipment.28
immediately
These problems,
however,
were not
evident.
1941 campaign was the heyday of German
Operationally,
the
The Sovie:
blitzkrieg
and especially
of the encirclement
battle.
analysis
and description
of these encirclements
offers
the best
summary (see Figure 101.29
First,
C,he attacker
had to penetrate
or outflank
the enemy's
This was relatively
easy in 1941, when the Germans
defenses.
caught the Soviets in their peacetime garrisons,
unorganized for
the attacker
Under these circumstances,
any coherent defense.

97

ENCIRCLEMENT

lNlTfAL
EN.EMY
DEFENSES

II

Sl IRRnl

/
PHASE

PHASE

INrIFT)

111:1\

CONIINUED
\
EXPLOITATION

Ii:

>

INTERDICTION

m<
CLOSE

2
2

AIRSUPPORT
e-h\

v(I

INFANTRY OR
MOTORIZED INFANTRY

.
PHASE

I:

DEFENDERS EFFORTS
TQ BREAK ENCIRCLEMENT

Figure 10. Schematic of Blitzkrieg

54-3330

-98--

Encirclement.

could exploit
Mediately
with armored units.
If a deliberate
the Germans preferred
to
attack
proved unavoidable,
however,
conduct
the penetration
with
a conventional
infantry
force,
supported by engineers
to clear obstacles,
with artillery
and
preplanned air strikes
to suppress enemy defensive fires.
As the
war lengthened,
such penetrations
became increasingly
difficult
for all armies.
Next, once penetrations
or flanking
maneuvers had succeeded,
the German armored forces
sought to encircle
the enemy in
pincers.
A combined arms battlegroup
of battalion
or regimental
size usually
led each pincer.
After
the jaws of the pincers
closed, the attacker
had to create two encirclements--one
facing
inward, to hold the surrounded force and gradually
reduce it, and
another facing outward, to ward off any efforts
to relieve
the
In order to establish
these encirclements,
the
encircled
units.
Germans tried
to give each panzer corps one or more motorized
infantry
divisions
c4 follow
and support
the
two panzer
divisions.
In practice,
the Germans never had enough force in a
so the process of
panzer corps to seal off the encirclements,
holding
and reducing
encirclements
had to wait upon the arrival
of the foot-mobile
infantry
divisions.
the interim,
During
surrounded Soviet soldiers
and even entire
Red Army units were
able
to infiltrate
or break
out of the
cordoned
loosely
encirclement,
escaping to join local partisans
or to return
to
This lag time also immobilized
their
own lines and fight again.
the panzer units,
prevented further
exploitation,
and gave the
defender time to reorganize
his forces farther
to the rear,
Only
when the infantry
and logistics
had caught up with the panzer
units could the latter
resume the exploitation
and pursuit.
The Soviet

Response,

1941-42

As the Germans advanced into European Russia, encircling

me
took
Soviet
field
army after
another,
the Soviet
military
desperate
measures to overcome their
weaknesses.
Two basic
problems were immediately apparent.
On the one hand, the average
Soviet commander or staff officer
lacked the skills
necessary to
orchestrate
the different
arms and weapons for
an effective
defense or counterattack.
The general
staff
finally
had to
reprimand these commanders for continually
deploying
their forces
evenly across the ground as if on a textbook
exercise,
wkthout
regard for the terrain
or the high-speed avenues of approach that
required
antitank
defenses-in-depth.
On the other hand, the Red
units and weapons
Army was seriously
short of the specialized
that
its
comanders
found so difficult
to employ--engineers,
tanks, antitank
guns, and artillery.

99

stavka
The solution
to both questions
seemed obvious.
(Supreme Headquarters)
Circular
1, dated 15 July 1941, ordered
the simplification
of the
commander's
span of control
by
centralizing
specialized
units in pools at higher levels.
Th-fs
allowed more experienced
commanders to mass them at the critical
points.
Specifically,
the circular
disestablSshed
the rifle
corps as a level of command. For the next two years, a Soviet
field
army consisted
of only four to six divisions
or separate
brigades,
plus specialized
units such as artillery,
tanks, and
antitank
weapons.
Similarly,
by the removal of tank and antitank
and by a major reduction
in artillery,
the circular
units,
reduced the infantry
division,
which until
that time closely
resembled divisions
in other European armies, frun 14,483 men to
only 10,859.30
Much of this equipant
only existed on paper in
any case, and what was actually
available
was centralized
at the
level of field
army or higher.
The same order disestablished
the
huge mechanized corps of 1940-41.
Some of the tank divisions
within
those eorps were retained
as separate formations,
but in
general
the first
German onslaught
had already
shattered
the
mechanized corps.
The remainder of 1941 was a
in which its
Army, a struggle
battle
and large mechanized units
the German advantage in equipment
coming off Soviet assembly lines
used solely for infantry
support.

desperate struggle
for the Red
traditional
doctr-lnes
of deep
were inappropriate
because of
The few tanks
and initiative,
were formed into small brigades

Once the Red Army halted and threw the invaders

back from
Noscow in December 1941, the Soviet commanders began to revive
their
organization
and doctrine.31
Soviet
factories
made a
phenomenal production
effort
in the spring
of 1942, enabling
COIL.-Gen.
Yakov
Fedorenko,
chief
of
the
Armored
Forces
Adminkstration,
to begin construction
of new tank ozrps in
April.
on an organization
of
'Efy J&Y, these corps had settled
one rifle
and three tank brigades,
plus supporting
arms--a fairly
tank-heavy
force that the Sovkets intended to use as the mobile
In the fall
of
exploitation
unit for a field
army (Figure 311.
1942,
Fedorenko
added mechanized
corps,
whieh
were more
infantry-heavy
and therefore
more expensive
in manpower and
trucks.
Truck production
was in fact a major problem throughout
World War II,
and the Soviets
depended upon jlmported Ameriean
wheeled vehicles to move and support their mobile formations.
Unlfke those of 1940, these 1942 Soviet tccorps" were actually
of division
size or smaller.
To conduct the deep exploitations
of 150 kilometers
or more envisaged in the 192Os, the Red Army
needed a larger
formation,
on the order of a German panzer corps
of Defense took
In May 1942, the Commissariat
or panzer army.
the existing
tank corps into tank
the next logical
step, uniting
were merely improvised
armies.
The 1942 tank armies, however,

100

1942 SOVIET
TANK CORPS

1943 SOVIET
TANK ARMY

48.000

Men, 460-560

Tanks

&j
MTCL

OBSVN

Figure Il.

84-3330

:a;

1942 Soviet Tank Corps and 1943 Soviet Tank Army.

-lOl-

combinations
of
armored,
cavalry,
and infantry
divisions,
ecmbinations
that lacked a common rate of mobility
and doctrine
of employment.
Moreover, these armies rushed into battle
against
the Germans during the summer of 1942 and wore largely
destroyed
before they had even trained together.
Not until
January 1943 did the Soviets
finally
produce a
coherent tank army (Figure
11); the sfx tank armies formed in
1943 were the spearheads
of all
Soviet
offensives
for
the
remarnder of World War II.
Each of these new tank armies was
actually
a corps-sized
formation
in western termfnology
and, like
the tank Vt~orp~,)F was extremely tank-heavy.
This was probably an
appropriate
organizatica?,
both because of the open tank oountry
of European Russia, and because of the high Soviet tank losses
against the Germans.
Given the inexperience
of most tar& crews
and junior
leaders in the Red Army of 1941-43, it was inevitable
trained
German antitank
and armor formations
that the better
would inflict
such disproportionate
losses on the Reds.
Thus,
the Soviet Union's armored forces remained much more tank-heavy
than those of other armies.
Yet throughout
the war, the Soviets
also maintained
corps-sized
formation
of horse cava3.ryt
with
limited
tank and artillery
support,
for use in swamps, mountains,
and other terrain
that did not favor heavily mechanized forces,
The new mechanized formations
must be understood
in the
eontext of their accompanying doctrine.
During 1942, the Soviets
digested the lessas
of the first
year of war and fssued a series
of orders
c& correct
their
greatly
errors.
These orders
increased
the effectiveness
of the Soviet counteroffensive
that
encircled
Stalingrad
in November 1942.
Senior Red commanders
held
conferences
before
Stalingrad
to
ensure
their
that
subordinates
understood the hew doctrine.
The first
problem was to penetrate
the German defenses in
Soviet
order
to
The initial
conduct
a counteroffensive.
counterattacks
of December 1941-January
7942 had suffered
from
such dispersion
that the German defenders often outnumbered their
Soviet attackers.
On 10 January 1942, Stavka Circular
3 directed
the formation
af "shock groupsPfV concentrating
combat power on a
narrow frontage
in order to break into
the enemy defenses.
Divisfon
and larger
units
were instructed
to mass on narrow
frontages
in this manner.
Stalin's
Order 306, dated 8 October
1942$ supplemented this
directive
by explicitly
forbidding
the
echelonment
of infantry
forces
in the
attack.
Given the
continuing
the Soviets
shortages
of equipment and firepower,
decided to maximize their
available
force by putting
almost all
in a typical
rifle
the infantry
into
one echelcaz.
Thus,
division,
as many as nineteen of the twenty-seven
rifle
companies
would
be on line
for
a deliberate
attack.32
The German
defenses in 1942 were stretched
so thin that this forward Soviet

massing of infantry
was more important
than echelonment
to
sustain the attack.
Later in the war, when both sides defended
tended to echelon their
attack
in greater
depth, the Soviets
accordingly.
Even in 1945, however, shallow
German defenses
Other orders
in October
prompted one-echelon
Soviet
attacks.
1942 governed the correct
use of those tanks still
assigned to
Because infantry
commanders were
the infantry
assault.
assist
still
inexperienced,
all such tank units were to be employed in
mass under their own commanders.
Once the Soviets
completed
a penetration,
their
"mobile
groups" would pass through
for
exploitation
and encirclement
operations,
as described above.
In effect,
one such encirclement
other,
smaller
encirclements
within
its pincers.
might include
Each field
army attempted to use its own mobile group, composed
or mechanized corps, to exploit
penetrations
of a tank, cavalry,
cWo a relatively
shallow depth of fifty
or fewer
kilometers,
defeating
the enemy reserves or linking
up with a similar
group
from a neighboring
army.
as
Meanwhile, the tank armies acting
mobile
groups for
larger
elements,
such as a "Front"
(amy
group), penetrated even deeper into the German rear areas.
This,
of
these
theory.
The first
at
least,
was the
large p
operational-level
Soviet encirclements
was in November 1942, when
In fact, the
the German Sixth Army was surrounded at Stalingrad.
Soviet use of separate tank and mechanized corps in this battle
adopted two
may have been a test for the new tank army structure
months later.
Thus, by late
1942, the German techniques
for mechanized
warfare had reached their
peak, but were no longer meeting with
the success of 1939-47.
On the contrary,
Great Britain
and the
Soviet Union had reorganized
and retrained
their
own armies and
were beginning
to
their
own successful
mechanized
conduct
Both German and British
armored formations
had
offensives.
become balanced structures
where tanks no longer outnumbered the
the need
other arms. Moreover, all three armies were discovering
support
to make the
for
effective
and mobile
logistical
The stage was set for a conflict
mechanized offensives
possible.
in which
would
logistics,
technology,
and defense-in-depth
had decided in
determine as many battles
as the armored division
1939-41.

103

CHAPTERFIVE
THE COMPLEXITYOF TOTAL WAR, 1942-1945
By deferring
any consideration
of the war in the Pacific,
the
previous chapter has reviewed the evolution
of ccmbined arms in
World War II from the simple perspective
of German advance and
of the United States and the
Allied
response.
The participation
Soviet Union, however, made the war a much more complex affair,
a
war of productian
and technology
as much as of battlefield
maneuver.
This chapter will identify
those aspects of technology
and tactics
that affected
the development of caubined arms forces
and doctrine
during the second half of World War XI.
It will
and
begin
with
the evolution
of American
force
structure
doctrine,
and then consider the changes in weapons design that
made the latter
half
of the war so different
frcm the first
half.
It will
next survey the general trends
in operational
practice
frcm 1943 to 1945 and conclude by examining the more
complex and specialized
questions
of air-ground
cooperation,
and special
warfare
airborne
operations,
amphibious landings,
Units.

The American Response,

1941-44

Prior
to the Japanese attack
an Pearl Harbor in December
observer of World War
1941, the United States was an interested
II.
Most of the U.S. Army did not become involved
in major
the end of 1942 or even later.
During
ground operations
until
the period
1941-42, however, the U.S. drew certain
conclusions
and
about the nature
of weapons, organization,
and tactics,
implemented those conclusions
by continuing
its evolution
of the
triangular
infantry
division
and the 1940 armored division.
Then, on the basis of maneuvers held in the U.S. and of initial
ccmbat experiences overseas, certain changes in American doctrine
and organization
occurred
in the middle
of the war.
The
resulting
tactical
system dominated American military
thought
into the 1950s.
In March 1942, Lt. Gen. Lesley MeNair, one of the designers
of the triangular
division
in the late 19309, became head of Army
Ground Forces, in charge of all unit training
and organization.
McNair continued
to follow
the concepts that had guided him in
the 19309, and thus the basic organization
of the triangular
division
did not change significantly
until
after the war.1
First,
McNair wanted each unit
to have only the minimum
essential
forces that it needed to conduct offensive
operations
limited
in
fluid,
maneuver
warfare
against
relatively
resistance.
In the case of the triangular
infantry
divisicn,

105

this meant that the standard base of the division

remained the
battalions,
artillery
four
regiments,
infantry
three
reconnaissance
troop, and engineer battalion
developed in 1937-41.
did not need specialized
units
On the other hand, a division
that
were required
only for specific
situations
or missions.
This applied particularly
to arms with an essentially
defensive
missicm ) such as antitank
and antiaircraft
artillery.
These
division
units
that McNair "streamlined"
out of the infantry
became a "pool"
of specialized
nondivisional
compaties
and
battalions,
units
that higher headquarters
could attach
to a
division
for a particular
mission or else employ in mass at
Thus the actual canbat power
critioal
points on the battlefield.
of a division
ml
from day to day, depending upon
In Deceraber 1942, McNair extended
requirements
and missions.
units by
this trend to form ad hoe task forces to nondivisional
persuading
the War Department
to abolish
all
nondivisional
regiments
in favor
of flexible
groups.
Nondivisional
armor,
mechanized cavalry,
and canbat
field
artillery,
antiaircraft,
en@;lneer battalions
all reported
to group headquarters
when not
Some group headquarters,
notably those of
attached to divisions.
control
mechanfsed
acted
as
tactical.
cavalry,
also
headquarters.2
companies
number
of
battalions
or
The
the
depended
on
headquarters
subordinate
to
any
.wow
circumstances.
Another of McNair's
principles
was that staff
and support
order
to
maxinize
the
in
elements must be as small as possible,
proportion
of forces actually
available
for comb& and %o reduce
papermrk
and other organizational
obstacles
to rapid decision
Logisticians
should bypass divisional
making and communication.
and corps headquarters
on routine supply matters in order to keep
those headquarters
small, mobile,
and oriented
on the tactical.
a specialist
unit or person should
Wherever possible,
situaticen.
have weapons to perform a secondary role as infantry
or rear area
security
forces.
Finally,
MoNair sought to restrict
as much as possible
the
amount of motor transportation
in a unit in order to facilitate
The fewer vehicles
that were organic to a
strategic
deployment.
the Less shipping space that division
would need when
division,
For example, MeNair sought to
sent to Europe or the Pacific.
authorize
only the number of trucks needed to shuttle
necessary
during
a
ammunition
to
the
regiments
supplies
and
than
the
number
that
could
rather
twenty-four-hour
period,
Rifle units were
transport
all necessary materials
in one lift.
by the attaohment
but could become so temporarily
not motorized,
Alternatively,
if the
of six truck companies to the division.
division
had attached
elements such as a tank battalion,
the

106

infantry
could mount the tanks and the organic
trucks
borrowed
from the artillery,
allowing
short-range
mo+&r movements with
some loss in logistical
support.
When the U.S. Army finally
employed these concepts overseas,
they proved only partially
successful.
Regardless of the terrain
or enemy involved,
most divisions
in Europe and many in the
Pacific
believed
that
they needed tank,
antiaircraft,
**tank
destroyer"
(antitank),
and nondivisional
engineer
support
in
virtually
all circumstances.
Corps and field
army commanders who
followed
doctrine
by shifting
these nondivisional
units
from
division
to division
according to the situation
found that they
could maximize the use of such elements only at the cost of much
confusion and inefficiency.
division
Attachmen&CI +*o a different
meant
dealing
with
a different
set
of
procedures
and
personalities
before the attached units could mesh smoothly with
that division.
Once such a smooth relationship
waz established,
the
division
was reluctant
to release
attachments
as
its
ordered.
In many instances,
tactical
commanders found
it
elements attached to
expedient
to leave the same nondivisional
the sane divisions
on an habitual
basis that might last for
A typical
U.S. infatitry
division
in France during 1944
months.
normally
had attached
battalions
of tanks,
tank destroyers,
antiaircraft
automatic
weapons, and corps engineers.
In some
cases
the
division
also
had attached
4,2-inch
mortars,
transportation,
and logistical
support fran the pools at corps
and field
army level.
Thus, the triangular
division
in combat
was much larger,
more rigid,
and more motorized than McNair had
envisioned.
An augmented infantry
division
of this
kind might
well have the mobility
and firepower
of a motorized
division
or
even an understrength
armored division,
which goes far to explain
the superior
mobility
of American infantry
units when ccmpared
with standard German infantry
forces.
forces
were subdivided
and further
Many of these attached
attached
to infantry
regiments,
as were the division's
organic
Minor changes in
assets such as engineers and medical support.
the regiment's
organization
in 1942 and 1943 had added six 105-m
howitzers,
so that
the regiment
had its
own artillery
even
without
the
direct-support
field
artillery
battalion.
In
practice,
a majority
of infantry
regiments normally
operated as
"regimental
combat teams!' (RCT).
As a minimum, this meant that
they had their
share of the division's
medical,
engineer,
and
field
artillery
attached or in direct
support.
In addition,
as
noted above, many RCTs also had canpanies of tank destroyers,
tanks, and self-propelled
antiaircraft
guns. Thus, the RCT was a
combined arms force, a small division
in itself.3

107

During the same period,

the armored division
underwent many
more changes than the infantry
division.4
Of the six different
changes in armored organization
during the war, two were most
significant.
As described
earlier,
the 1940 American armored
division
was composed largely
of light
tanks
that
greatly
outnumbered
the medican tanks,
infantry,
and artillery;
this
division
also had several fixed headquarters
designed to control
only cne type of unit, including
the headquarters
for armored and
infantry
regiments.
When Maj. Gen. (later
General) Jacob Devers
became chief of the Armored Force in August 1941, he sought to
establish
a more flexible,
functional
organization.
His efforts
culminated
in the reorganization
of I March 1942 (Figure
12).
This reorganization
eliminated
the armored brigade headquarters
and established
two "Canbat Commands," A and B, as headquarters
that tight
control
any mixture
of subordinate
battalions
given
them for
a particular
mission.
This was an American way to
institutionalize
the battle
group concept that the German panzer
forces
achieved by improvisation.
The 1942 organization
also
reversed the ratio of medium and light tanks, leaving the armored
division
with
two armored regiments,
each consisting
of two
medium and one light tank battalion.
The new structure
still
had
six tank battalions,
but only three armored infantry
and three
This imbalance existed
in
armored field
artillery
battalions.
part because the Armored Force planned to create a large number
of armored corps which, like the German panzer corps, would have
two armored and one mo4&rized infantry
division
each.
By early
1943, intelligence
studies
of the more balanced
German and British
armored. divisions
had reinforced
General
The
MeNair's desires for a less curnbersome division
structure.
me U.S. armored division
used in the North African
campaign
but its
dispersal
into
never operated as a coherent
division,
three
or
four
different
the
subgroups
illustrated
QnlY
At the same
difficulties
of controlling
such a large formation.
time, the U.S. Army had dropped the concepts of an armored corps
and motorized
infantry
division,
making the imbaJ-ante of arms
within
structure
the
1942
armored
division
even
more
the U.S. light
tanks had been no match
significant.
Technically,
for the increasingly
well-armed and armored German vehicles,
and
therefore
the U.S., like Britain
before ft., lost enthusiasm for
the coneepLv of deep raids by lightly
armored vehicles.
As a result,
in September 1943, the War Department announced
a new, smaller
armored division
structure.
This structure
eliminated
the regimental
headquarters
that
had theoretically
controlled
only one type of battalion
and reduced the tank
ccmponent to only three tank battalions
of four companies each.
Thus, the 1943 structure
had three battalions
each of tanks,
although
in
armored infantry,
and armored field
artillery,

108

DIVISION,

TYPE U.S. ARMORER

14,620 men, 232 medium

54 self-propelled
howitzers

MAR 1942

tanks,

158 light tanks.

I
I
, g

TYPE U.S. ARMORED

DIVISION,

SEP 1943

PI

10,937 men, 186 medium

54 self-propelled
howitzers

Typical
(ttachr;;ts

tanks, 77 light tanks,

Typical
Attachments
same as
above, less
the infantry regiment.

Figure 12. Type U.S. Armored Division,

March 1942 and September 1943.

practice
there were twelve tank companies to only nine infantry.
A third,
smaller canbat oczmnand headquarters,
designated
reserve
or R, was added to control
units not subordinated
to the other
coaMlanders used this VCR" as
two ccnnbat commands. Some division
a tactical
control element like CCA and CCR.
Two U,S. armored divisions,
the 2d and 33, oontinued
under
the heavier 1942 table of organization
throughout the war.
Corps
these
reinforced
each of
frequently
01 army headquarters
borrowed from an infantry
ditisions
with an infantry
regiment
the balance of tanks and infantry
in
division * As a result,
American
divisions,
as in
the German and BrZtish
armored
Both types of U.S.
came to be approximately
equal.
divisions,
armored dfvision
received attachments
similar
to those given to
every
American
virtually
In
addition,
divisions.
infantry
armored division
habitually
controlled
two quartermaster
truck
canpanies capable of handling
the great logistical
requirements
of a mobile division.5
The actual task organization
within
each of these divisions
but a typical
ocmbat ccmmand within
a 793
varied
greatly,
(light)
armored division
usually had two task forces.
The combat
command headquarters
created
these by trading
a mediurn tank
company from a tank battalion
for an armored infantry
company
from an infantry
battalion,
producing
one task force
of three
tank companies and one armored infantry
company, and one task
caupanies and one tank company.
force of two armored infantry
These battalion
task forces also had attached
platoons
of tank
and in some cases self-propelled
destroyers,
armored engineers,
antiaircraft
guns.
An armored artillery
battalion
could be
either
%n direct
support of the ccmbat command, or attached to
that command if the division
were widely dispersed.
Antitank

Technology

Effective
force structure
and tactics
are intimately
related
any study of combined
to effective
weapons design, and therefore
must consider
the major effects
of technology.
arms warfare
one obvious
influence
of technology
on
During World War II,
tactics
was related
to the entire
question of tank and antitank
their
overcome
managed to
defenders
warfare.
Even
if
psychological
fear of deep mechanized penetration,
the blitzkrieg
effective
defense
acquired
the
unless
succeed
would still
antitank weapons and doctrine.
Antitank
ditches and similar
obstacles may slow the movement
of armored units or channelize
those units fnto anti-armor
kill
zones ) but ultimately
there are only two ways to defeat armored
vehicles.6
Kinetic
energy weapons penetrate
armor plate
by

110

sheer momentum, as if they were "pur~hing~~ through the metal,

while chemical energy weapons use explosive
blasts to destroy the
armor.
Until the middle years of World War II, chemical energy
weapons were usually
ineffective
against armor.
Antitank
design
therefore
concentrated
on
kinetic
the
energy
weapon.
Mathematically,
the energy of an object is equal to one-half
the
product of the object's
mass times the square of its velocity
(l/2
Mvq;
therefore
improving
the armor penetration
of a
kinetic
enere
weapon required
increasing
either its mass or its
velocity,
or both,
Greater mass meant larger caliber
weapons or
heavier,
denser material
in the projectile.
Thus, basic physics
explains the general trend towards larger caliber
weapons during
World War II, although an increase in caliber
alone would reduce
the projectile's
velocity
unless the designer
also took other
steps.
Velocity,
in turn,
would be Pnereased through changes
such as longer gun barrels,
more effective
propellants,
and a
better seal within the breech so that all the propellant
effect
went to drive the projectile
out of the gun tube.
In practical
terms, World War II improvements
in antitank
guns had three consequences:
first,
the size and weight of those
increased,
gun tubes
guns increased
steadily
as calibers
lengthened,
and stronger
carriages
were added to absorb the
recoil
of high-velocity
weapons; second, tanks needed increased
armor to protect
themselves
from improved
antitank
weapons;
third,
these antitank
weapons were much more effective
than those
of the previous
decade, but they were also more expensive and
specialized.
Such weapons formed the backbone of any antitank
defense,
yet no army could afford
to have antitank
weapons
The kinetic
organic
to every small unit that might need them.
energy antitank
gun simply
did not fulfill
the battlefield
requirement
that every unit must have some protection
when it
suddenly encountered enemy armor.
The alternative
means of defeating
armor was the chemical
energy weapon. The detonation
of an explosive charge usually had
little
effect
against
armor,
because unless it were focused
against
the armor plate
it had to destroy,
the blast
effect
dissipated
in
all
directions
equally.
Ordinary
explosive
artillery
rounds had to be quite large before they could do more
than damage the tracks
and roadwheels
of a tank,
and medium
artillery,
like antitank
guns, was too large and specialized
to
be of general
use.
Moreover,
using field
artillery
in an
antitank
role diverted
it from its primary function
of indirect
fire.
The solution
was to concentrate
the effects
of a
relatively
small amount of explosive
on one particular
point of
the enemy's
armor--the
shaped-charge
principle
described
in
Because the blast and not the momentum of the
Chapter Four.
shell caused the destruction,
the high velocity
and elaborate
gun
for
a
of a kinetic
energy weapon were unnecessary
carriage
chemical energy weapon.

By April
1942, the U.S. Ordnance Department had developed the
2,3&inch
"bazooka,"
which fired
a shaped-charge
warhead with a
rocket
motor.
Later that
same year,
the Germans captured
an
and from it developed the
American bazooka fran the Soviets,
larger
and more effective
Panzershrek antitank
rocket launcher.
The British
PIAT (Projector,
Infantry,
Antitank)
and the German
used the
shaped charge
Panzerfaust
propelled
by a small
The
conventional
charge, similar
to that of a grenade launcher.
same type of warhead enabled the Germans and Americans to develop
low-velocity
recoilless
rifles,
which were light
experimental
artillery
pieces
that
eliminated
the recoil
by a controlled
release of propellant
blast behind the gun. Although recoilless
rifles
and rocket launchers lacked the long range and accuracy of
they gave the infantry,
and indeed any
conventfonal
artillery,
unit,
a much greater
firepower
and capability
for
organic
short-range
antitank
defense.7
Tank Surrogates
Short-range
antitank
weapons were incapable
of stopping
a
Such weapons were most
massed armor attack
by themselves.
effective
against the thinly
armored flanks and rear of a tank
Towed antitank
guns
had already
passed the defender.
that
presented a small target
for the enemy to detect and engage and
could be maneuvered onto steep hills
or
river
crossing
sites
where a self-propelled
weapon could not go.
The towed weapons,
to score
however, had very little
armor; even if the enemy failed
a direct
hit on such an antitank
weapon, a near-miss might cause
Many
gunner's
aim.
disturb
the
casualties
or
at
least
professional
soldiers
realized
early
in the war that the most
integration
of
antitank
defense
was a careful
effective
obstacles,
antitank
mines,
artillery,
short-range
antitank
weaponsL4 and some type of large caliber,
longer-range
antitank
for mobile, large-caliber
antitank
guns in
t3m* This requirement
the defense matched the continuing
need for armor to support the
Even if the nature of the
infantry
in the deliberate
attack.
enemy defenses did not always require
tanks,
the presence of
tanks exerted a great psychological
effect
on both attacker
and
defender.
Armor experts
in most armies,
however, were determined
to
and in any event a tank was an
avoid being tied to the infantry,
scarce weapon.
extremely
complicated,
expensive,
and therefore
The British
persisted
for much of the war on a dual track of
retaining
heavy tanks to support the infantry
and
development,
lighter,
more mobile tanks for independent
armored formations.
The Soviets
similarly
produced
an entire
series
of heavy
the widespread
demand for
Nevertheless,
breakthrough
tanks.
tanks or tank-like
vehicles
outside of mechanized formations
led

112

cuo

a number of tank surrogates,

weapons designed to provide
armored antitank
defense,
close support of the infantry
attack,
or both.
In the latter
case, the surrogate needed considerable
and antipersonnel)
frontal
armor and a dual purpose (antitank
main gun.
The most original
of these tank surrogates
was the American
One particular
source of controversy
about
"tank destroyer.++
General McNair+s force
structuring
system was the question
of
antitank
defense.
McNair did not accept the extreme view, common
in 1940-41, that the armored division
had rendered the infantry
division
almost obsolete.
Instead, McNair agreed with the German
was an
concept that the best means to halt the armored division
McNair
and
Cal.
antitank
defense integrated
with infantry
units.
Andrew D. Bruce of the War Department sCvaff sought hi&ly
mobile
threat
of
antitank
guns that
psychological
would end the
blitzkrieg
by aggressive
action
against
the attacking
armored
the
1941
After
the
successful
experiments
during
forces.
Bruce became head of a Tank Destro er Center that
maneuvers,
developed
its
own doctrine
for these weapons. B While McNair
guns on the conventional
European
had supported towed antitank
model, Bruce wanted a high-velocity
gun mounted on a mobile
platform,
sacrificing
armor protection
for speed and gunpower.
The 1942 tank destroyer
battalions
were combined arms forces
although they did not include
a balance of
in their
own right,
all arms:
each platoon had four self-propelled
guns, an armored
section;
in
for
security,
and an antiaircraft
car section
addition
to three companies of such guns, the bat%alion included
platoons plus a
a reconnaissance
canpany of three reconnaissance
pioneer platoon.
Ideally,
when an armored penetration
occurred,
the tank destroyer
battalions
would mass to ambush the en-y
tanks in the depth of the American defense.
Within each tank
the
reconnaissance
canpany
selected
likely
destroyer
battalion,
anti-armor
kill
zones and emplaced mlnefields
to impede the enemy
The gun canpanies would move to
advance through these areas.
hull-down
positions
to reduce their vulnerability
and then engage
the enemy armor.
encountered the Germans in Tunisia
When the U.S. Army first
the
tank
destroyers
proved a dismal failure.
during
1942-4 3,
Both tank destroyer doctrine
and German armor design had outpaced
so that 1942
the actual development of American tank destroyers,
than
improvised
guns
mounted on
tank destroyers
were little
more
The
early
tank
destroyers
lacked
mobility
and
half-tracks.
effective
pex-&ration
power, the very characteristics
that they
in
Moreover,
most American units
were supposed to maximize.
North
Africa
were widely
scattered,
making it
difficult
to
the tank destroyer
forces
accx>rdlng to doctrine.
concentrate
Finally,
much of the North African terrain
was too open for tank

113

destroyer
vehicles
to find effective
hull-down
positions.
As a
consequence, American commanders in Africa
tended to favor the
British
system of towed antitank
weapons and specifically
asked
that one-half
of all tank destroyer
battalions
slated for the
1944 invasion
of France use towed rather
than self-propelled
weapons.
Once in Normandy, however, the Americans discovered
that the towed antitank
gun was almost useless
in the more
restricted
terrain
of Western Europe.
Towed guns were not only
slow to move, but too close to the ground to shoot over hedgerows
and other obstacles.
Furthermore,
between Africa
and Normandy,
the Tank Destroyer
Center had procured
much more effective,
properly
designed self-propelled
guns.
The Ml8 model tith
a
76-m gun and especially
the M36 with a 90-mm gun were excellent
weapons, although even the go-mm had less penetration
capability
than the German 88-xm.
Also by 1944, improvements in German
armor had rendered
the standard
57-m antitank
gun of the
American infantry
regiment largely ineffective.
The original
tank destroyer
battalions
had developed
frcm
divisional
antitank
battalions,
which the 1944 divisions
lacked.
Tank destroyer
units consequently
became even more important
for
antitank
defense.
As a result,
in July 1944 the U.S, Army began
to reconvert
all
tank destroyer
battalions
to self-propelled
weapons,
These newly converted
battalions
did not mass in
accordance with Bruce's
doctrine.
The limited
nature
of the
German armor
threat
in
the
west
prior
to
the
Ardennes
counteroffensive
of December 1944 made massed antitank
defense
seem unimportant.
Instead,
commanders wanted a few effective
antitank
weapons distributed
to every unit,
where they could
defeat the small German armored counterattacks
that were common
corps
and
army comanders
at the time.
In most cases, therefore,
habftually
attached a tank destroyer
battalion
to each infantry
division,
and in turn division
commanders attached tank destroyer
companies to infantry
regiments.
The regiments
used the tank
destroyers
not only as antitank
weapons, but also as acecmpanying
artillery
and as substitutes
for tanks to support their
infantry
attacks.9
Thus, the American tank destroyer
units
beeame a
classic
case of an arm that rarely
functioned
according
to its
doctrine,
because that doctrine
was never articulated
clearly
to
field commanders.
In keeping
with
their
doctrine
of maneuver,
U.S. tank
destroyers
usually
had their
guns mounted in turrets
and, in
fact,
resembled tanks so much that they were often mistaken for
tank
however,
relatively
few
such.
In
European
armies,
surrogates
had turrets,
because a turretless
vehicle
was much
The absence of a turret
gave
stipler
and cheaper to produce.
German and Soviet tank surrogates
a low profile
that made them
open battkef ields
of Eastern
smaller
targets
on the flatter,
Europe.
This apparent advantage meant that the entire
vehicle

114

had to turn
in order to traverse
the gun more than a few
Thus tank surrogates
were
at a disadvantage
if they
degrees.
engaged tanks or infantry
from anything except an ambush position.
tank
series
of
developed
two
The Germans
actually
surrogates--assault
guns to support the infantry
in situations
where tanks were not available,
and "tank hunters"
(Panzerjaeger)
for
antitank
role.
the
Both
were
distinguished
from
self-propelled
indirect-fire
artillery
by considerably
thicker
armor protection
and by a flat traJectory
gun intended for direct
criticized
the expenditure
of
fire.
Although
armor purists
resources
to produce these hybrids instead of true tanks, such
particularly
as the German
weapon3 performed a necessary role,
towed antitank
guns became progressively
less effective
against
Soviet armor.
The armored self-propelled
tank hunter was much
more survivable
and mobile than its towed predecessor.
The one
drawback of all such weapons was that,
unlike the towed antitank
they
had difficulty
accompanying
the
infantry
into
guns,
inaccessible
areas such as steep hills
or bridgeheads
across
rivers.
The Soviet Union also produced outstanding,
heavily
armored
assault guns during the second half of the war, but tended to use
those guns as one component of a three-way team in the deliberate
MediLrm tanks led the assault,
using their
mobility
attack.
wherever
possible
to
turn
the f la-r&s of German defensive
Heavy tanks,
operating
in pairs,
advanced slightly
positions.
behind the medium tanks,
supporting
the Soviet
infantry
and
of a German
In the event
eliminating
German strongpoints.
armored counterattack,
the heavy tanks would move forward
to
engage the German tanks head on, while the less protected medium
the assault
guns
tanks maneuvered c& the German flanks.
Finally,
provided
accanpanying
artillery
support
for both infantry
and
tanks.
To accomplish
this direct-fire
role,
the assault
guns
began the battle
in camouflaged positions
from which they could
overwatch
the advancing tanks and infantry.
The assault
guns
of
resistance
that
had
survived
the
Soviet
centers
engage
the assaulting
forces
to
artillery
preparation.
This freed
enemy
unless
a
halting
to
the
advance
without
engage
At intervals,
the assault
guns bounded
counterattack
appeared.
always keeping within 500 meters of the
forward to new positions,
heavy tanks and infantry. '0
By staying behind in this manner,
at
assault guns avoided meeting enemy armor in a maneuver battle
close range.
In such a battle,
tank turrets
could traverse
and
fire
much faster
than the turretless
assault
guns could turn
On many occasions,
of
their
entire
vehicles
to aim their
guns.
the attacking
Soviet
unit
did not have all
three
course,
guns preferred
to
different
types of armor,
but the assault
operate from an overwatch position
in any case.

115

Tank Design and Production

These teohnological
trends
in antitank
weapons and tank
surrogates
form a necessary background to the actual design and
production
of tanks during World War II.
In general,
both the
armor and armament of tanks
increased
along
tith
antitank
t ethnology , but different
nations followed
different
design and
productkon
strategies.
These factors
considerable
exerted
influence
on the battlefield.
During the war, German tank desfgn went through at least
three generaticm-3,
plus constant
minor variations.11
The first
eneration,
as already
mentioned,
kneluded such unbattleworthy
Prewar vehicles as the Mark (or Panzerkampfwagen) I and II, which
were similar
to the Russian T-26 and BT series and to the 8ritQh
crufser
tanks.
The Germans converted their tank battalions
to a
majority
of Mark III and IV medium tanks after
the 194Cl French
campaign, thereby
stealing
a march on the Soviets and BrStish,
who still
possessed the obsolete
equipment described
earlier.
However, the appearance of a few of the new generation
T-34 and
KV-1 tanks in Russia durFng 1941 ccmpelled the Germans to begin a
race for superior
armor and gunpower.
Stiultaneously,
their
successes of 1939-41 encoura"ged them to rely
increasingly
on
armor, rather than infantry,
when conducting
a rapkd breakthrough
attack.
The German solutfon
was to design third
generation
tanks
that
combined
greater
armor
protection
WiCYh the
88-InIn
antiaircraft
gun that had proved so successful
in the antitank
role.
The third generation
included many different
variants,
but
the most important
designs were the Mark V (Panther) and Mark VI
(Tiger)
tanks.
Unfortunately
for the Germans, their
emphasis on
protection
and gunpower canpromised the mobility
and relfabflity
of their tanks.
The automotive design of Mark V and VI tanks was
notoriously
underpowered and unreliable.
Ivloreover,
Hitler
and his assistants
were fascinated
with
technological
improvements and frequently
stopped production
to
apply the latest
desi.@;n changes to the existing
tanks.
The
fighting
characteristics
of Genncsn tanks remarned current
at the
cost of interference
with mass production.
This interference,
plus shortages
of raw materials,
meant that Germany could not
compete in sheer numbers of tanks produced.
In 1943, for
example, Germany manufactured
only 5,966 tanks,
as ccmpared to
29,497 for the U.S., 7,476 for Britain,
and an estLmated 20,000
for
the
Soviet
Union.l2
A disparfty
in numbers of this
magnitude
would eventually
overcoxe
the highest
quality
in
inditidual
tank design.
Similarly,
the presence of so many
different
versions
often
within
the same
of the same tank,
company or battalion,
made it extremely difficult
for the Germans
to obtain spare parts and repair damaged equipment.

116

The alternative
to constant changes in tank design was to
standardize
a few basic designs and mass produce them even though
This was the
technology
had advanced to new improvements.
solution
of Germany's principal
opponents,
The Soviet T-34, for
example, was an excellent
basic design that survived the war with
only cme major change in armament (?6.2-mm to 85-mm main gun) and
When the Soviets did introduce
new
various minor modifications.
designs,
such as, the heavier
tanks and self-propelled
guns of
production
of the older types.
1944, they did so without halting
The United States had even more reason to standardize
and
By concentrating
on
mass produce than did the Soviet Union.
mechanical
reliability,
the U.S. was able to produce vehicles
This helped
operated
longer
with fewer repair
parts.
that
alleviate
the chronic
shortage of shipping
space when the army
To further
ease the shipping
moved to Europe and the Pacific.
problems and to ensure that American tanks were compatible with
American bridging
equipment,
the War Department restricted
tank
The army
width +to 103 inches and maximum weight to thirty
tons.
relaxed these requirements
only in late 1944.l3
There was also a tactical
reascm for these restrictions.
General McNair wanted to ensure that American tanks were designed
in accordance
with
the U.S. doctrine
for
employing
armored
this
doctrine
foresaw tank
divisions.
As already
indicated,
Chance encounter8
destroyers,
not tanks, defeating
enemy armor.
role of the armored
between tanks might occur, but the primary
division
was to exploit
and pursue, not fight enemy armor.
For all these reasons, the U.S. Army standardized
on the M4
canpromise between reliability,
Sherman medium tank, an excellent
When the British
first
mobility,
armor protection,
and gunpower.
employed the Sherman in North Africa during late 1942, it proved
4.
vo be at
the
1Ei3t
equal,
if
not
superior,
to
German
Once the Tiger tank
second-generation
tanks, Mark III
and IV.
appeared in Tunisia in early 1943, however, the Sherman tank and
most of the U.S. antitank
force seemed inadequate.
The width limitation
further
hampered the Sherman by forcing
These tracks had much
designers to gLve the tank narrow tracks.
less mobility
in muddy terrain
than the wider tracks used by the
German
Soviets and Germans. The M4's only advantages over later
turret.
tanks
reliability
and a power-driven
were superior
During meeting engagements at close ranges this latter
feature
allowed the Sherman's crew to traverse
their
gun and engage the
enemy more rapidly
than could German crews using hand-cranked
turrets.
Sherman tank crews often carried
a white phosphorus
round in their guns to blind enemy tanks during such maneuvers,

117

Despite its drawbacks, the Sherman remained the main battle

tank of the U.S. Army. In early 1945, apparently
as a result of
the large-scale
"German armored attacks during the Battle
of the
Bulge, the U,S, Army finally
allowed a few heavy tanks of the T20
series
to I23 sent to Europe for canbat testing.
The arrays
Qrdnance bpartment
had developed the T2Q series
in 1943, but
considerations
of doctrine,
shipping,
and mass production
had
prevented its use in battle until
the closing days of the war.l4
Great Britain
also used the Sherman during the latter
half of
World War II,
but was concerned by the limited
penetrating
power
of the M4's ?5-mm, medium-velccity
main gun,
After considerable
discussions
with the Americans, the British
finally
modified
saee
of the Shermans they reodved,
The British
version
of the
Sherman, called
the V+F%refly,l" included
the third-generation
British
antitank
gun, the seventeen pounder (77-rnmZ1
This gunvs
lcxlg bore. and higher velocity
gave it much greater
capability
against German armor.qs
Skgnala Intelligence

and Ccmmunioations

In additfon
to the tank and aircraft,
another
piece of
technology
came of
age during
World
War II.
Signals
intelligence,
or SIGINT, was yet one more instrument
or arm that
the commander had to integrate
and caordinate
with
others.
Recent
histories
of the war probably
havs overstated
the
strategic
imprtanee
of SIGINT, while they have understated
its
tactical
role.
An army's ability
to plan for future operations
location
and concentrate
the different
arms at the deoisive
depended in part on such intelPigence.q6
Ultra,
the
British
codeword for
intelligence
based on
decoding
highly
classified
German radio
messages,
gave the
western Allies
only limited
access to German military
intentions
and capabilities.
The German Army normally used secure landline
communications
for
high-level
except
when fluid
messages,
operations
forced them to make radio transmissions.
Even then
let alone decode in a
the Allies
did not necessarily
intercept,
timely manner, every German message.
The Germans changed their
code every twenty-four
hours and periodically
made major shifts
in codes or equipment.
The Allies
might go for days QP even
months without
being able to decode transmissions
on specific
radio networks.
On 1 May 1940, for example, Germany changed
virtually
all its codes, blinding
the Allies"
SIGINT effort
until
22 May, by which time the German offensive
through the Ardennes
had succeeded.l?
Similar
problems recurred
during most of the
War.

118

Nor were the deciphered messages of Ultra always illuminating

for the tactical
and operational
situation.
Only rarely did the
specific
plans,
most senior German commanders communicate their
except where Hitler
was personally
interfering
in operations
and
Intelligence
analysts
pieced together
required detailed
reports.
much of the most valuable Ultra information
over long periods,
or
inferred
capabilities
on the basis
of logistical
messages.
Moreover, few Allied commanders below field army level had access
to this information.
The worst
drawback
of Ultra-level
SIGINT was that
it
collection
discouraged the use of other sources of intelligence
that might confirm or deny Ultra
information
and blinded Allied
commanders to threats
that were not discussed
in German radio
traffic.
In early
1943, for
example, the Allied
forces
in
intelligence
Tunisia
relied
heavily
on Ultra;
their
other
collection
means were improvised
and largely
ineffective.
The
German offensive
of Sidi-bou-Zid-Kasserine
Pass in February 1943
(Map 6) surprised
the Allies
because available
SIGINT indicated
that higher German headquarters
had disapproved such an operation
in favor of an attack
elsewhere.
Of course,
SIGINT could not
know that Rommel and other German commanders had met face-to-face
on 9 February and had developed a plan that led to the attack on
armored
Sidi-bou-Zid.
This
attack
mauled a dispersed
U.S.
division.18
Lack of SIGINT and misinterpretation
of available
intercepts
also had a considerable
effect
on Allied
failure
to
predict
the scale and intensity
of the German counteroffensive
in
the Ardennes in December 1944.
Although the western Allies
held a priceless
asset in the
strategic
intelligence
they received from Ultra,
for much of the
From
war German SIGINT was more effective
at the tactical
level.
(listening
or
example,
a single
Horch
1940 to 1942, for
intercept)
company in North Africa
skillfully
interpreted
the
unencrypted
tactical
communications
of British
units,
giving
Rcrnmel a complete picture
of enemy dispositions
ati
intentions
When the British
finally
became aware of this
during battle.
unit's
activities
in July 1942, an Australian
battalion
raided
could not replace
and captured the company. German replacements
the expertise
of the analysts
lost in that company and thus had
more difficulty
detecting
later British
deception operations.'9
relatively
little
information
is available
By contrast,
concerning
Allied
tactical
SIGINT, including
the British
"Ytr
German tactical
Service
and American
"Radio
Intelligence."
or used easily deciphered
communications were often unencrypted,
From a miniscule
prewar basis, the Allies
had to
code systems.
develop their
knowledge of German tactical
radio networks and

TUNISIA

CONTOUR lNTERVAL 500 METERS

Map 6. SIDI BOU ZID-KASSERINE

_-.-...-__

PASS, February

1943.

procedures.
In terms of offensive
electronic
warfare,
the Allies
of
During the evacuation
had a nrnnber of notable
successes.
Dunkirk
in 1940, the British
effectively
jammed German bomber
hampering Luftwaffe
attacks
on the retreating
communications,
British
forces.
Two years later,
when Montgomery launched the
airborne
jammers disrupted
German
second Battle
of Alamein,
tactical
radio communications for hours.20
The development
of effective
tactical
radio
canmunications
was the basis for controlling
fluid,
mechanized operations
as
The demand for
well as the raw material
for tactical
SIGINT.
such communications
greatly
accelerated
research and development
the U.S. Army pioneered the use of
in this area.
In particular,
frequency
modulation
(FM) radios
for
short-range
tactical
communications,
and both very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high
frequency
(UHF) radios
for
longer
range
communications.21
Unlike the European armies, the U.S. Army used FM extensively,
because it provided
static-free
signals
over a wide variety
of
channels without using a separate crystal for each frequency.
The combination
of
reliable
radio
communications
with
efficient
tactical
signals intercept
services also provided a new
opportunity
for senior commanders to follow the course of battle
without
delays in the communications
system.
Both the British
and American armies developed means for senior headquarters
to
receive
battle
reports
by radio without waiting for the messages
to be processed through intermediate
layers of command. That is,
monitor
tactical
unit
radio
the senior
headquarters
could
networks
directly,
or else assign
a radio-equipped
liaison
the situation
to the
detachment to each forward unit to report
senior headquarters.
The British
GHQ Liaison
(Phantom) units and
the American Signal Information
and Monitoring
(SIAM) ccmpanies
performed
this
service
admirably
during
194445,
and in the
British
case as early as 1942. The danger with such a monitoring
system, as Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower noted after
the war, was
the senior
commander might
be tempted
to bypass the
that
intermediate
headquarters
and interfere
directly
in the battle,
than as a source of timely
using the system for command rather
operational
and intelligence
information.22
In the latter
role
much
effective
enabled
more
these
monitoring
services
coordination
of the battle,
allowing
the commander to react
through
subordinate
commanders to
situations
as they
his
developed.
Soviet

Concepts and Practice,

1943-45

Many of the foregoing

technological
considerations
became
evident on the Eastern Front,
beginning with the Battle of Kursk
in the east ran
in July 1943. The last great German offensive
directly
into an elaborately
prepared Soviet defense organized

around antitank
strongpofnts
established
by all units of company
size or larger.
The German blitzkrieg
stalled
because it was
unable
to
achieve
the
initial
penetration
of the enemyts
defenses--Soviet
antitank
defenses were simply +too strong and,
above all,
too
deep for
the
Germans to
breech
wfthout
catastrophic
losses.
If anything,
the Germans played into Soviet
hands by leading
their
attack in some areas with massed armor,
instead
of a more conventional
infantry-artillery-engineer-tank
attack
to create the breech.
The Germans apparently
led with
massed tanks
in an effort
to Increase
the tempo of the
penetration,
but without
decisive
numerical
superiority
the
result was a disaster,
After Kursk, the Soviet Union held the initiative,
although
it was not always attacking
the Germans and their
Axis allies
on
all fronts.
Generally
speaking,
the Soviets exerted tremendous
efforts
to penetrate
the deep German defenses.
In the ensuing
exploitation,
caused
the Soviet
logistical
restrictions
usually
offensive
to grind to a halt even where there was little
German
resistance.
In the course of the war, improvements in Soviet
logistics
led to steady increases
in the depth of exploitation.
Once the Germans gained a respite
to reorganize
their
defenses,
the cycle repeated itself.
Aocordingly,
the Red Army developed a
variety
of techniques
for
both penetration
and exploitation
against the German defenders.
One significant
development during
1944 was the change in
Soviet
reconnaissance
techniques
before
a deliberate
attack.
Prior
to that
year,
the Red Army had been very effective
in
conducting
small,
time-consuming
long-range
reconnaissance
patrols.
To shorten
the time required
to prepare
for a new
offensive,
1944 sent out experimental
the Soviets
in early
company- and battalion-sized
units to engage the German outposts
or reconnoiter
by fire,
thereby
identifying
the main German
defensive
organization
much more rapfdly.
In the process,
the
Red Army received
an unexpected bonus.
Soviet
reconnaissance
units
were often
able to sefze control
of outposts
that the
Germans were defending only lightly,
as part of the long-standing
German doctrine
of defense-in-depth.
By late 1944, the Soviets
had transformed
thefr reconnaissance
units into the first
wave of
the
deliberate
attack.
and
larger
units
on
Cwm-w
reconnaissance
missions attacked within
a few hours of the main
offensive,
seizing
the German outposts and thereby unmasMng the
Then the main attack
focused on those
main German defenses.
principal
defenses.23
Although Soviet commanders massed their
forces on relatively
narrow breakthrough
fronts,
their successes were due to more than
just
numerical
superiority.
Whether
in the
reconnaissance
the Soviets
used a variety
of
echelon or the main attack,

122

procedures to overcome German defenses.

artillery
units
First,
fired
their
preparations
under centralized
control
and according
+*o elaborate
plans.
The Soviets
used a variety
of deception
measures, such as sending the assault
infantry
forward during a
lull
in the firing
in order to lure the Germans out of their
bunkers so that
renewed Soviet
artillery
fire
could destroy
them.
Heavy tanks
to support
the
infantry
and eliminate
strongpoints,
medium tanks to penetrate
rapidly
and suppress
enemy infantry
fires,
and assault
guns for direct-fire
support
against
antitank
guns and strongpoints
cooperated as described
infantrymen
earlier.
trained
Canbat engineers
or specially
frequently
rode on each tank.
Their mission was to eliminate
obstacles
and provide
close-in
protecti2y
for
the tank from
German
short-range
antitank
weapons.
tank
The
might
temporarily
assume a hull-down position
and provide covering fire
while engineers cleared minefields
and infantry
eliminated
enemy
short-range
antitank
weapons.
The Soviets reluctantly
accepted the high casualties
produced
by this
technique
Fn an effort
to accelerate
their
rate
of
penetration.
Given the meticulous
German defensive
preparations
and the lack of Soviet armored personnel
carriers,
the Soviets
had to combine engineers,
infantry,
and tanks in this manner,
regardless
of losses.
Soviet commanders may have used battalions
of "expendable"
criminals
for these tasks.
In general,
however,
by 1944 casualties
were a subject
of great
concern for the
Soviets.
The best means to reduce casualties
were concentration,
and careful
task organization
of the
speed of penetration,
attacking
forces.
Instead of advancing on-line
and in mass, the
operated in tailored
assault
groups of platoon
Soviet attackers
to battalion
size (Figure 13).
Where time allowed, each assault
a specific
German strongpoint,
thereby
group trained to eliminate
dislocating
the German defensive
organization.
Assault groups
a reconnaissance
subgroup to
normally
included
four subgroups:
clear an approach route to the objective,
a blocking
subgroup to
engage and pin down the defenders,
a fire subgroup to isolate
the
strongpoint
from reinforcement,
and an attack subgroup, including
engineers
and heavy tanks or assault
guns, to eliminate
the
objective
from the flanks or rear.25
their
Once the
Sovie%s
their
penetration,
ccmpleted
commanders sought to sustain
the momentum, moving rapidly
from
to renewed exploitation
and pursuit
so that
the
encirclement
defenders had no opportunity
to reorganize
a coherent defense.
German exploitations
of 1939-42 had normally
been centrally
to ensure that all elements moved in the same general
controlled,
directjlon
and were available
to support each other in the event
Soviet exploitation,
of counterattack.
particularly
after
the
tended
to
be more
encirclement
was canpleted,
initial
and diffuse.
decentralized
Notoriously
poor
radio
Soviet

123

E
ii0

FORTIFIED
POINT

RECDNNAISSANCE
SUBGROUP

I
Li

ATTACK
SUBGROUP

---a-

BLOCKING
j/ 6 d[
SUBGROUP
\ff,,-.-----w-0
IFLESQUADS,
PLATOONS
:
IRIFLESQUJ~DS,PLTSI

If

aaa

',I
FIRE
SUBGROUP

: N-------.-152MMSP GUNS,' N--,-,,--,J

1 ANTITANK
4
RIF&
IJiI
ANTITANK
GUNw MORTAR 6

HEAVYMACHINE
GUN
LIGHTMACHINE
GUN

Figure 13. Soviet Assault Group Formation,

1944-45.

communications
may have been partially
responsible
for
this
decentralization,
but more to the point
the Soviets
retained
their
belief
in the interwar
theory that rapidly
moving forces
the defender.
could fan out and confuse as well as disorganize
Decentralization
and small-unit
initiative
allowed leading Soviet
such as bridges and river
of opportunity,
units to seize targets
crossings,
were not immediately
obvious
to the senior
that
more
planners.
The same decentralization
made the Soviets
vulnerable
to defeat in detail
by massed German counterattacks.
Beginning in 1943, a ccmbination
of factors,
including
declining
German combat effectiveness,
growing Soviet tactical
experience,,
forces allowed
and better
close air support of the exploitation
the Soviets
to defeat most German counterattacks
and continue
their mission.
The most common formation
for Soviet exploitation
was the
"forward
detachment,"
a caubined
arms organization
of great
mobility
and firepower
that was sent ahead of the main unit to
seize key objectives
and disrupt
enemy efforts
to reorganize
the
defense.26
During
the war,
both the size
of the typical
forward detachment and the distance it operated ahead of the main
body increased
steadily.
In the last two years of the war, a
forward
detachment normally
was a tank brigade
reinforced
by
batteries
or battalions
of field
and antiaircraft
artillery,
When available,
an air
heavy tanks, assault guns, and engineers.
controller
accompanied
the
detachment
to
direct
close
air
support,
and air
units
were dedicated
to support
specific
detachments.
This reinforced
brigade operated as much as ninety
kilometers
ahead of the rest of its parent tank corps, which, in
turn, might be acting as a forward detachment for a tank army. A
follow the same routes as
forward detachment did not necessarily
the main body of troops and was not responsible
for advance guard
an efficient
forward
Frequently,
security
of that main body.
detachment commander could brush through hasty German defenses
along the way, allowing
the following
troops to continue their
exploitation
and pursuit
without
deploying
to
attack
the
and lack
of ccmbat power
scattered
Germans.
When logistics
finally
halted
a forward
detachment,
the detachment eommarder
attempted to seize a bridgehead over the next river obstacle as a
starting
point
for a renewed offensive
at a later
date.
In
the forward detachment led the mobile group envisaged in
short,
prewar
Soviet
doctrine
and greatly
increased
the tempo of
exploitaticm
and pursuit.
The German Decline,

1943-45

While the Red Army grew in both equipent

and tactical
the German Army declined not only in numbers but in
proficiency,
overall
training
and tactical
ability.
When faced with local
Soviet superiority
achieved by massing on a narrow breakthrough

125

all
soviet
ascribed
naturally
German defenders
In reality,
the
successes to overwhelming
numerical
advantage.
as a result
of their
quality
of the German armed forces declined
deelining
quantity.
As early as the summer of 1942, the German
dtvlsions
that were, not involved
in the second German offer&W
in the east were deliberately
filled
to only 55 percent
of
Even spearhead units
received
only 85
authorized
personnel.
peroent of authorized
equi ent.27
In order to maintain
their
n leaders pro ressively
armies In the field,
the Ge
reduced the
l3XE0Ullt
of training
given to replacements and used training
units
This became ,a vicious
in combat during Soviet
breakthroughs.
cycle, in which poorly trained
German soldiers
survived for only
short periods
at the front
and had to be replaced
even more
rapidly
than
before.28
quality
in
infantry
This
decline
amounts of
prcoapted German eommanders to seek ever-increasing
form
of assault
guns,
antitank
rockets,
firepower
in the
automatic weapons, and artillery.
many German infantry
divisions
Given shortages of personnel,
operated with only six instead of nine infantry
battalions
from
1942 onwards.
In 1944, the German General Staff formally
changed
According to the
the division
structure
to reflect
this reality.
1944 reorganization,
an infantry
division
consisted
of three
This configuration
infantry
regiments
of two battalions
each.
allowed each battalion
to have a greater
share of the weakened
companies than
had been
artillery
regimental
and antitank
possible
with a three-battalion
regiment.
On the other hand,
such a structure
retained
the large overhead af three regimental
staffs
and support elements, yet denied the regimental
commander
In practice
a third
battalion
to act as a local reserve force.
some ditisions
organized themselves into two regiments of three
In either
case, the 1944 German infantry
battalions
each.
division
retained
all four artillery
battalions
of the previous
structure,
so that,
at least on paper, the declining
ability
of
by a larger
proportion
of fire
support.
the infantry
was offset
divisional
the
superiority,
1944
enemy
air
Recognizing
self-propelled
battery
of
organization
also
included
a
antiaircraft
guns.29
Despite
such improved
fire
support,
after
1943 the German
defenders found themselves increasingly
hard pressed to contain,
The basis for the German
let
alone halt,
Soviet offensives.
doctrine
of defense-in-depth
was to absorb enemy attacks
and
separate armor from its supporting
infantry,
in order to defeat
By 1944, tiproved
Soviet cooperation
each element independently.
to Isolate
those fighting
among the arms nullified
German efforts
Many German commanders experimented
components from one another.
with the idea of a preemptive
withdrawal,
pulling
back their
troops just before a Soviet deliberate
attack in order to save
lives and to force the Soviets to reorganize
for another attack a

126

Yet such a withdrawal

under
few kilometers
farther
west.
pressure required
high morale and well-trained
troops,
the very
commodities
that
were declining
most rapidly
in the German
Army.30
While the infantry
divisions
gradually
wore down, the Germans
Heinz
made a belated
effort
to rebuild
their
panzer forces.
Guderian dedicated
himself
to this task as Inspeetor-General
of
Panzer Troops (1943-44) and then as Chief of the General Staff
(1944-45).
However, his continued
insistence
on the panzer arm
as a force
separate fran the rest of the German Army was no
longer appropriate.
It was true that panzer divisions
were the
e nemy
counterattacking
for
German
instrument
principal
penetrations
and encirclements.
Yet these divisions
were so few
on the Russian front
in numbers canpared to the great distances
that
singly
or in pairs,
wearing
they often
counterattacked
as Guderian
could rebuild
them.
By
themselves
down as fast
removing
armor training
and doctrine
from
the appropriate
Staff,
Guderian
only increased
the
branches
of the General
estrangement
between the panzer and infantry
forces
and made
training
between the arms more difficult.37
remained
Despite these problems, the balanced panzer division
Only
minor
an extremely
effective
force at the tactical
level.
1941.
after
tactics
occurred
and
in
organization
changes
Production
requirements
for
tanks,
assault
guns,
and other
tracked
vehicles
meant that
the
panzer
grenadiers
remained
largely
motorized,
rather
than mechanized, throughout
the war.
Even at its peak in the fall
of 193, the German panzer force had
only 26 of 226 panzer grenadier
battalions,
or 71 percent,
in certain
Thus,
mounted in armored half-tracks.32
except
elite
units,
no more than one of the four
to five
infantry
mechanized.
battalions
in
a panzer
division
was actually
one or two ccmpanies of such a mechanized
Generally
speaking,
battalion
accompanied each panzer battalion
in advance, with the
mo+&rized infantry
following
later to consolidate
and defend the
Artillery
forward observers
areas seized by the first
attacks.
in tanks or half-tracks
aecaupanied the first
wave. Where only
motorized
infantry
was available,
these troops went into battle
they were
following
in the lee of the tanks until
dismounted,
needed to clear obstacles
or defend against enemy infantry.
To
avoid being tied to this dismounted infantry
when the attackers
met with effective
fire,
the German tanks sometimes bounded
that minimized the target
assumed hull-down
positions
forward,
suppressive
fires
to
they presented to the enemy, and provided
To protect
hurrying
to rejoin
the tanks.
cover the infantrymen
the attacking
panzer force
from enemy armored counterattack,
antitank
guns leapfrogged
into a series of overwatching
posi%iOnS
Assault guns remained with the
0I-i the flanks of the advance*
motorized infantry
reserves to consolidate
gains or to engage an

enemy counterattack
that
penetrated
into
the division
mass.
Because of Allied
air superfority
on all fronts,
German armored
forces needed much greater air defense protection
in 1944-45 than
in 1940
Truck-mounted
panzer grenadier
battalions
therefore
included the Z&mm antiaircraft
guns that had proven so effective
earlier
in the war, while tank and half-track
mounted infantry
received self-propelled
antiaircraft
guns, in some cases as low
as company level.33
Such, at least,
was the theory of panzer
organization
and tactics;
in practice,
of courses the declining
strength
of such units produced a variety
of improvised
battle
groups.
American Concepts and Practice,

1943-45

The initial.
contact of American forces with Axis troops did
not fulfill
the promise of previous U.S. developments in doctrine
During the 19&!-43
invasion
of North Africa
a
and organizatioP1.
American
variety
of
factors,
including
inexperience,
led
commanders to scatter
their
forces
in regimental
or smaller
units,
thereby depriving
them of the advantages of the American
The U.S. armored divisions
had
centralized
fire
control
system.
stressed decentralized,
mobile combat by direct
fire so often in
that
their
self-propelled
artillery
battalions
had
training
Inadequate
neglected
the study of indirect-fire
techniques.
logistics
forced the Americans to leave their corps artillery
far
behind the front
in Tunisia,
further
reducing
available
fire
1943.
In
in February
support when the Germans counterattacked
the crisis
of Kasserine Pass, however, the artillery
of the 1st
and 9th Infantry
Divisions
was finally
able to operate on an
organized basis, with devastating
effect
on the Germans (Nap 6,
above).34
Similar
problems arose in the Southwest Pacific,
where in
committed
the
3 2d Infantry
1942 General
Douglas
MacArthur
Division
to battle
in Papua with no artillery
and only a few
Despite the protests
of the 326 Division
commander,
mortars.
MacArthur's
staff
mistakenly
thought
that
artillery
would be
the local
air commander,
Moreover,
ineffective
in the jungles.
Gen. George C. Kenney, assured
the division
that "the artillery
and then failed
to provide effe&uive
air
in this theater flies,"
Weather and terrain
support
throughout
a long campaign.35
prevented such air support on many occasions,
and there was so
little
communication between air and ground that Kenney's pilots
Based on the
attacked Americans by mistake on a weekly basis.
bitter
experfence of assaulting
Japanese bunker complexes without
the 32d Division
learned af great cost
appropriate
fire support,
support
with
the
the need to coordinate
artillery
and air
infantry.

128

To some extent the U.S. troops who invaded Normandy in 1944

had to relearn
this lessen.
Many of the U.S. infantry
divisions
used in the invasion had not been in eanbat before and had not
had the opportunity
for extensive tank-infantry
training
with the
separate tank battalions
that supported them.
Furthermore,
the
radios issued to infantry,
tank, and fighter
aircraft
units had
incompatible
frequencies,
making communication
among the arms
impossible.
Even when the infantry
commander was riding
cn the
outside of a tank or standing next to it, the noise of the tank
engine made it difficult
for the infantry
and tank commanders to
communicate face-ca-faee
.36
The U.S.
Army gradually
corrected
these
problems
and
developed more effective
canbined arms teams during the breakout
from Normandy.
The need for close tank-infantry
cooperation
reinforced
the habitual
association
of the same tank battalion
and infantry
division.
Signalmen installed
improvised
external
telephones
on tanks,
so that
the accanpanying
infantry
could
enter the tank intercommunications
network.
In July 1944, the
commander of IX Tactical
Air Command, Gen. Elwood A. Quesada,
provided
VHF aircraft
radios
for installation
in the leading
tanks of each armored task force.
When the U.S. broke out of
Normandy beachhead, these tanks could communicate with fighter
bombers.
The IX Tactical
Air
Command flew
"armored
column
cover,"
providing
on-call
fighter-bombers
for close air support.
It is true that this tactic
was very wasteful
of air resources,
but the high tempo of exploitation
that these tank-aircraft
teams
could maintain justified
the expenditures.
Advancing
on parallel
routes
also
facilitated
American
Where the road netmrk
exploitation
and pursuit
across France.
allowed,
U.S. armored divisions
and combat commands advanced with
+VW0 Or
routes.
more task
forces
along
parallel
moving
a German strongpoint
would halt one column, only to
Frequently,
column a few
find
itself
outflanked
by another
American
kilometers
away.
These tactics
and massive air
superiority
The Allied
forces
usually
found
propelled
the Allied
advance.
their progress hindered as much by logistical
factors
as by enemy
Allies
logistics
hampered
the
defenses.
Strategically,
throughout
1944-45.
Tactically,
scme armored units found it more
with their
canbat trains
in the midst of the
secure to travel
column, rather
than following
behind where they might encounter
Of course,
such a tactic
was only
bypassed enemy resistance.
appropriate
when exploiting
against limited
enemy defenses.
When
logistics
elements moved on their own, they often required
small
escorts
for
local
antiaircraft,
tank destroyer,
and infantry
security.37

129

This dispersion
of anU.aircraft
units
in small detachments
exemplified
the fate of specialized
American forces when their
Although
U.S.
demand.
in
fun&ion
was not
particular
antiaircraft
units conducted a number of air defense operations,
most .notably the proteotion
of the bridge at Remagen during the
made an
conquest of Germany, overwhelming Allied air superiority
system
increasingly
unimportant
during
integrated
air
defense
1944-45.
Instead,
senior commanders used antiaircraft
weapons in
role
and deaotivated
some antiaircraft
a
ground fire-support
units
to provide
much needed infantry
replacements
during
the
ecmpanies
chemical
smoke generator
fall
of 1944.
Similarly,
repaired
roads when line units did not need smoke support.
This
misuse developed a set of false
attitudes
and priorities
among
comtat commanders,
but the shortage of manpower was so severe
The excellent
performance of sueh
that no uni,t could stand idle.
specialized
units in an infantry
role during the Rattle of the
Bulge justified
the American policy that support troops should be
trained
and equipped
to
defend themselves
and fight
when
Even if, for example, the engineers had been employed
necessary.
to construct
barriers
in front of the German advance, there were
no other forces
available
to provide
firepower
in conjunction
the situation
was so
with
those obstacles*
At that
point,
desperate that local commanders were fully
justified
in using all
available
forces as infantry.
Air-Ground

(Non)Cooperation

and especially
elose air
Air support of ground operations,
of intense
controversy
between ground
support,
was the subject
and air
services
during
World War II,
No one disputed
the
but ground attack priorities
were
importance of air superiority,
another matter . That controversy
was perhaps most acute in the
but the questions involved
found echoes in other
United States,
nations as well,
Throughout the war, the U,S. Army Air Forces (AAF) operated
Soon
almost independently
from the other elements of the Army.
after Pearl Harbor President Franklin
D. Roosevelt gave the AAF a
tremendous mission--precision
strategic
bombing of Germany and
eventually
Japan--that
strained
the limited
air resources of the
AAF
leaders
believed
strongly
in the
U.S. for mast of the war.
This belief
only inereased
their
value
of strategic
bombing.
tendency to distance themselves from the ground arms. The result
was near disaster
on the battlefield,
retrieved
only by the
common sense of tactical
commanders on the spot.
AXTL~Air Force doctrine
defined three priorities
for tactical
of the
second, fFisolation
air superiority;
aviation:
first,
battlefield,"
which in effect
meant air interdiction;
and third,
attacks
on ground targets
"in the zone of contact'"
between

130

opposing
armies.38
Throughout
the war,
the AAF phrase for
close air support was "third
phase"' or "priority
three" missions,
reflecting
a basic belief
that such targets were an uneeoncmical,
and unimportant
use for
air power, and rightfully
inefficient,
belonged to the field
artillery.
Some basis for this
belief
extremely careful
existed,
of eourse-- close air support required
training
and coordination
and suffered
from the difficulty
of
differentiating
friend
from foe while
flying
at hi&
speed=
Moreover, the air leaders were probably correct
in their
belief
that the air weapons of World War II had only limited
destructive
effect
against
small,
point targets
of the type found near the
Centrally
directed
interdiction
of the enemy by
line of contact.
tactical
air assets, the ARE argued, was the most efficient
use
the
Yet
commanders valued
of
the
ground
this
weapopl.
psychological
effects
of close air support on both friend
ard.
foe, while the unseen interdiction
attacks had no such effects.
In addition,
close air support was an excellent
means of rapidly
The more that air
massing eanbat power at. the decisive
point.
leaders opposed the decentralized
use of their
aircraft
for close
the more ground commanders felt
the need to control
air support,
scme air assets to ensure their availability
when needed.
As commander of the Army Ground Forces, General MeNair led a
He argued that,
vain effort
to change Army Air Force priorities.
even if close air support missions were the exception rather than
the rule,
that exception
should be stressed in training
because
it was the most difficult
form of ground attack mission.
Yet the
aircraft
even for major ground
AAF was unwilling
to provide
Six months before the
training.
maneuvers, let alone small-unit
in England had
Normandy invasion,
thirty-three
U.S. divisions
experienced no joint
air-ground
training,
and tmnty-one
had not
aircraft
for
purposes
of
even seen displays
of friendly
1943
the
AAF
As noted
above,
in
in
battle.
recognition
arbitrarily
changed the radios in fighter-bombers
to a type that
Air and ground units had
was incanpatible
with ground radios.
little
understanding
of the tactics
and capabilities
of their
counterparts.39
During the North African
The results
were predictably
poor.
ground forces received
little
air support,
and ground
invasion,
commanders with no experience
in the employment of tactical
air
that
was available.
U.S. gmund
support
misused the little
that they fired
on anything
troops saw so few friendly
aircraft
One American observation
squadron lost ten aircraft
that flew.
in North Africa--two
to enemy air attack,
three to enemy ground
both sides
Gradually,
fire,
and five to American ground fire.
learned
to recognize
and cooperate
with each other,
but the
process was painful.4U

131

The United States

did not develop a formal
doctrine
and
training
procedure for air-ground
cooperation
until
late in the
war.
In the interti,
effective
air
support
depended upon
The XII Air Support
personalities
and initiative
in the field,
Ccnmnand collocated
its headquarters
with the fifth
U.S. Army in
Italy,
meeting each evening to plan strikes
for the next day and
improvising
a eomon network
of liaison
officers
and radios.
Within the air resources
allocated
by higher headquarters,
the
ground operations
offleer
establFshed
priorZties
that the air
operations
officer
rejected
,only when the proposed use was a
technical
impossibility.
A stiilar
relationship
gradually
developed between the 9th U.S. Tactical
Air Force and some of the
U.S. field armies in France and Germany. Yet, even in ?946, AAF
officers
assfgned to study the lessons learned from tactical
air
operations
in Europe continued to describe close air support as a
ftpriority
three"* mission and recommended the continued use of RAF
doetrine on this subject.
MeanwhEle, in the absence of effective
aerial
observation
support, the ground forces had developed their
OWn aviation,
using light
aircraft
for artillery
adjustment,
command and control,
and movement of critical
supplies.41
Not even the German armed forces were immune to this type of
interservice
misunderstanding
and rivalry.
As late as November
1941,
for example, the Luftwaffe
refused Erwin Rommel's request
for a single air liaison
officer
to arrange on-call
aircraft
for
the Afrika
Corps, because such an arrangement would be against
the best use of the air foroe as a whole."
With such attitudes,
it is not surprising
that German Stukas dive-bambed their
own
armored divisions
on at least
one occasion.42
On the Eastern
Front, of course, German air-ground
cooperation
reached its peak
during the period
1941-43.
Thereafter,
the growing strength
of
the Red Air Force and the demands of ati defense for Germany
against
American and British
strategic
bombardment caused a
in the number and qualkty
of German tactical
steady decline
aircraft.
In addition,
from 1942 onward the improved quality
of
to experiment
with
better
Soviet
tanks caused the Luftwaffe
air-ground
antitank
weapons, including
304111 automatic cannon and
shaped-charge
armor-piercing
bombs.43
Thus,
although
the
air-ground
for
procedures
Luftwaffe
developed
adequate
cooperation
in most respects,
the lack of sufficient
aircraft
to
conduct
such support
and the technolog5cal
decline
of the
Luftwaffe
fsl eomparisan to its opponents made this support rare
after 7943.
The Royal Air Force continued its policy of independence from
As in the U.S., RAE
the Britksh
Army well fnto World War II.
leaders
oonsidered
strategic
bombing and air superiority
much
From 1%2 onward,
than air-ground
cooperation.
more important
a working
compromise
developed
in three
different
however,

132

theaters
almost simultaneously.
First,
the battles
of North
Africa
demonstrated
the importance
of air-ground
cooperation
there.
Bernard Montgomery developed an entire network of liaison
officers
and collocated
ground and air headquarters
to provide
such support while still
leaving much independence to the RAF.
and Commonwealth forces
that
reconquered
Second, the British
Burma eventually
developed an even closer relationship
with their
airmen, a relationship
based on their mutual sense of having to
depend on themselves
because of poor support
from Britain.
RAF Fighter
Command sought a more
Meanwhile,
in Great Britain,
active
mission once it had won the Battle
of Britain,
This
institutional
need for a new mission coincided
with the rise in
Fighter
Command of one of the few British
fliers
with extensive
experience
in close air supporC$-Air
Vice-Marshal
Sir Trafford
Leigh-Mallory.
The irritating
but effective
Leigh-Mallory
built
the British
2d Tactical
Air Force as an instrument
to support the
Normandy invasion;
he then directed
both this
force
and the
American 9th Air Force during the 1944 eampaig.
Even then, the
proportiotl
of ground-attack
sorties
expended on close air support
cn interdiction
missions
that
was often much lower than that
searched for targets almost at random.Q4
unofficial
most
had developed
armed forces
BY 1945,
techniques
for effective
air-ground
cooperation
in the field.
differences
Such techniques
did not resolve the basic doctrinal
between air and ground components.
These disputes
persisted
in
peacetime long after the procedures for close air support were
forgotten.
Air Transportation

and Air-Landing

Forces

One of the neglected aspects of air-ground

operations
during
World War II was the use of air transportation
to move supplies
and even nonparachute
troops
within
a theater
of operations.
Just as railroads
and trucks
had changed the logistical
and
operational
mobility
of earlier
armies,
so air transportation
promised to eliminate
the historical
vulnerability
of all ground
Leaving aside
forces--their
land-based
lines
of communication.
for the moment the use of true airborne troops, the techniques of
air transportation
and supply bear closer examination.
The most significant
use of these techniques
was in Asia,
where vast distances,
poor road netmrks,
and few railroads
made
aerial
supply almost a necessity.
In order to understand
the
British
use of air transport
in Burma, however, we must digress
of Britain's
opponent, Japan.
briefly
to consider the tactics
As previously
noted,
Japanese industry
could not hope to
Much
corn&e with the mass production
of weapons by its enemies.
as the Japanese Army would have liked to have had such weapons,

133

it often had to rely on uurorthodox taetics

to make up for Pack of
equiment
and firepower.
In particular,
surprise
attacks
by
night or frun unexpected directions
seemed to allow the Japanese
to close rapidly
with the enemy.
In hand-to-hand
fighting,
Japanese leaders believed that their superior morale and training
would compensate for shortages of equipment and manpower.45
During the conquest of Malaya and Burma in 1942, the Japanese
tactic%
made a virtue
out of the lack
of heavy weapons,
Generally
speaking, British
and Commonwealth defenders were tied
to the few available
roads for supply purposes and considered the
surrounding
hills
and jungles almost impassible.
Upon cantacting
the enemy, the Japanese therefore
used a small demonstration
attack along the road to fix the attention
of the enemy and sent
a lightly
armed infantry
force
in a lang flank
march through
difficult
terrain
into the enemy rear.
Once in position,
the
outflanking
Japanese
force
would
attack
British
logistical
installations
and set up roadblocks
behind the bypassed British
defenders,
The British
response was predictable--they
turned
their,canbat
forces around to fight through the roadblocks
behind
them and rejoin
their
logistioal
support,
allowing
the Japanese
&to defeat them in detail.
*As the war continued
and Japanese
supplies
became even thinner,
many Japanese commanders acquired a
habit
of planning
to live off captured enemy supplies,
Having
achieved
their
objectives,
the Japanese would then establish
elaborate
bunker defenses that wsre difficult
to identify,
let
alone destroy, when the British
counterattacked.
Some of the British
responses to these tactics
were simple
and effective.
Divisions
reduced their
establishment
of wheeled
vehicles
and trained
to secure their
flank
and move through
"impassable"
terrain.
To destroy Japanese bunkers, the British
14th Army developed two tactics,
which incidentally
represented
partial
solutions
to the continuing
problems of how to keep the
defender pinned down by fire while the attacker
covered the final
few meters in the assault.
First,
British
tanks accompanying the
the
ammunition
at
attack
fired
a careful
sequence
of
bunkers --simple
explosive
the
jungle,
then
high
to
clear
explosive
with delayed action fuzes to break into the bunkers,
and finally
solid armor-piercing
shot as the infantry
made the
final
assault.
So long as the infantrymen
stayed out of the
tank's
direct
line-of-fire,
they could safely
close with the
Later
Japanese because this solid shot had no explosive
effect.
in the war, the extremely high degree of cooperation
and mutual
confidenoe
between air and ground elements in Burma allowed the
British
close air
support
aircraft
to fly
a final,
FtdummyE"
bombing pass against
the enemy, causing the Japanese to stay
under cover until
the Allied
infantry
and tanks were on top of
them.46

134

The key to defeating

Japanese infiltration
tactics
was air
transportation.
In March 1944, Gen. William Slim, the 14th Army
commander, correctly
predicted
a major Japanese offensive
against
his logistical
base area around the town of Imphal (see Map 7).
Using large numbers of RALFand U.S. transport
aircraft,
Slim was
able to parachute
or air-land
supplies
to all
his bypassed
elements, thus allowing
them to fight without being tied to their
threatened
lines of communkcation.
Furthermore,
Slim air-landed
most of the 5th Indian Division
on the airfields
around Imphal,
and these fresh
troops went straight
into battle
against
the
infiltrating
Japanese.
By 1945, the victorious
advance of the 14th Army in the more
open country
of central
Burma was made possible
only by a
combination
of air and surface
transportation.
Two of Slim's
divisions
reorganized
into
an unusual
configuration
for
this
advance.
Two out of three infantry
brigades
in each division
reequipped with their wheeled transportation,
so that they could
accompany attached
army tank brigades
in a mechanized advance
down major arteries.
As each objective
fell,
one of these two
brigades
paused long enough to construct
an air
strip
for
The third
brigade
in each division
was specially
resupply.
with
very
light
trucks
and narrow
artillery
gun
equipped
carriages
that would fit
onto transport
airplanes.
Thus the
entire
brigade
could be air-landed
onto airstrips
or captured
airfields
to reinforce
the ground elements when they encountered
sfgnificant
resistance.
Until
that
time,
the brigade
was in
essence a divisional
reserve that did not burden the logistical
system in the combat zone.
This combination
of armor, wheeled
infantry,
and air-landed
infantry
established
a tempo of advance
that the poorly equipped and foot-mobile
Japanese could not hope
to match.
The only drawback to this form of aerial
resupply and
redeployment
was the need for air superiority
or at least air
parity
to allow hundreds of transport
flights
into forward areas
each day.47
Other nations
also used air
transport
for
resupply
and
limited
movement of
the
German case,
air
troops.
In
transport--like
close air support--was
a promising
concept that
the Luftwaffe
was too weak to sustain in many cases.
Thus, the
surrounded German forces in encirclements
like Stalingrad
rarely
received adequate air resupply.
Airborne

Operations

All the considerations

and difficulties
of close air support
and of air transportation
loomed even larger
when ground troops
used parachutes and gliders
to land behind enemy lines.
In fact,
the Americans and British
finally
decided that the only solution

161

IV

49

14

INDIA

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23

.
254

IV
INDIAN

i
:
r

(idQ

SCALE

Map 7. IMPHAL-KOHIMA,

84-3330

MARCH

1944

-136-

KM

to such coordination
problems was to establish
a joint
and
which
1st
Allied
Airborne
Army,
combined organization--the
controlled
both the troops and the troop carrier
aircraft.
Even
with close integration
of air and ground assets,
the potential
for error in planning and executing airborne operations
was great.
airborne
operations
appeared as an answer to the
In theory,
difficulties
of
penetrating
prepared
defenses--the
attacker
simply flew over those defenses and assaulted
the enemy rear
areas.
Sudden assault
from above had the same psychological
and
penetrations,
confusing
effects
as
early
armored
disorganizing
the structure
of the defending army.
In practice,
of course , planning and communications between the air and ground
were complicated
in the extreme.
elements of such an operation
The effects
of German air
defense,
the inaccura&es
of air
navigation,
and the difficulty
of controlling
early parachutes
and gliders
during landings meant that most airborne
drops were
widely scattered.
Paratroops
had to land prepared to fight
as
individuals
or in ad hoc small groups and without the advantages
of organization
that
make any military
unit
so much more
effective
than the sum of its individual
members.
In a few operations,
such as the German capture of the island
of Crete in 1941, airborne
troops took and held an objective
aLmost unsupported,
but only at great cost in men and equipment.
Generally,
airborne operations
were best conducted in conjunction
with a conventional
ground offensive,
so that the paratroops
could link up with the attacking
ground forces within a few hours
or days of the initial
airdrop.
Finding such an ideal situation
Commanders had to abort many planned airborne
was difficult.
operations
because,
by the time the decision
was made and
the
advancing
ground
troops
had
overrun the
planning completed,
proposed drop zones.
Because of the difficulties
of transporting
heavy weapons and
airborne
units could not be equipped
vehicles
even in gliders,
Furthermore,
the parachuting
like conventional
infantry
forces.
personnel often found themselves separated from the gliders
and
cargo parachutes carrying
their heavy weapons. Thus, an airborne
and ground
protection,
unit
lacked
much of the firepower,
mobility
of ordinary
infantry
divisions.
Once on the ground, an
airborne
division
was extremely
vulnerable
to enemy mechanized
attack and had to seize and hold its objectives
before the enemy
Gen. James Gavin and other U.S. airborne
commanders
could react.
concluded
that
it was better
to accept heavy casualties
and
parachute injuries
by landing on or close to the objective
than
to descend on a safer drop zone that was several miles from the
objective.48

The poor firepower

and mobility
of an airborne
division
was
especially
significant
for the British
and Americans, because the
shortage
of combat troops
of all
kinds meant that
airborne
divisions
frequently
remained
in
alongside
ground
combat
conventional
divisions
even after
the two forces had linked up.
Ultimately,
U.S. airborne
commanders urged that their
divisions
be organized and equipped like conventional
infantry
divisions,
with
the heavy weapons and vehicles
rejoining
the airborne
division
overland after the drop zone had been secured.49
Many of the same problems plagued the Soviet
efforts
in
airborne
warfare.
Despite an initial
lead in airborne
concepts
and training
during
the 193Os, by 1941 the Red Army's higher
level
paratroop
commanders suffered
from the same problems of
their
more conventional
peers--poor
leadership
and staffwork,
inadequate
intelligence,
and lack of key equipment,
including
Of the two division-sized
Soviet airborne
transport
aircraft.
operations
of World War II, the Vyazma landing in early 1942 was
because attacking
ground elements
at best a partial
success,
never established
firm contact between the airborne
pockets and
The Dnepr landing of September 1943, on
the main Soviet lines.
the other hand, was a disaster
because the troops landed on an
As a result
of these
unsuspected concentration
of German troops.
experiences,
Joseph Stalin
virtually
ignored airborne
tactics
and
development after the war.50
Amphibious

Operations

If airborne
operations
required
meticulous
cooperation
and
air and ground,
amphibious
eoardination
between two services,
amphibious
operations
were far
more complex.
The ClppXS?d
landings of World War II foreshadowed the nature of future wars,
and land forces would have to be integrated
and
when sea, air,
coordinated
with each other and often with the forces of ather
nations.
Tactically,
the U.S. Marine Corps had developed the doctrine
of amphibious landing during the interwar
period,
at a tim@ when
most armies considered
such operations
impossible.
When war
the marines were still
struggling
to resolve
the
broke out,
problems of fire support.
An amphibious assault against prepared
enemy defenses has all the problems of a deliberate
attack,
plus
the inability
of the attacker
to bring his own artillery
onto the
beach immediately
and the difficulties
of wind and tide as the
attacker
comes ashore.
The solution
to these problems, besides
careful
organization
and command and control,
was fire
support
from naval and air units.
Yet as late as 1940, the USMC's own
aviators
followed
the familiar
argument that air strikes
should
Even
be used only when conventional
artillery
was unavailable.

138

during the invasion

of Saipan in June 1944, there was only one
frequency
available
for forty-one
air liaison
teams to control
marine close air
causing
considerable
delays in air
suppart y
strikes.
Still,
by the end of the war the USMC had extremely
effective
and responsive air support,
and even naval gunfire
was
so refined
that it could provide a rolling
barrage kn front
of
the marine attackers
on the beach.
Only the flat
trajectory
of
to provide
fire
support
naval
uns limited
their
ability
inland. f?1
In addition
to coordinating
the elements of fire
support,
there was the question of moving the assault infantry
and support
forces across the beaches and through enemy shoreline
defenses.
The amphibious tractor
gave the attacker
that ability
even where
the water was too shallow
for
ordinary
landing
craft.
The
British
Army developed an entire
armored division,
the 79th,
which was equipped with specialized
weapons such as amphibious
This equipment
Sherman tanks and mine-roller
or flail
tanks.
not only during the invasion
of Normandy in
proved invaluable,
June 1944, but also in the assault river crossing of the Rhine in
with the combination
of ground,
1945. Both of these operations,
and parachute forces of several
nations,
were
air,
amphibious,
models of the steps required
to combine many different
weapons
and units into an effective
whole.
Unconventional

Warfare

One final
specialized
weapon was prominent
in World War
Dozens of German
II--unconventional
warfare or guerrilla
forces.
divisions
were involved
in rear-area
protection
against partisan
In France and again
forces in the Soviet Union and the Balkans.
in the American reconquest
of the Philippines,
these guerrilla
were much more than an additional
irritant
to the
armies
occupying
army.
On a number of occasions,
U.S. and British
forces used the guerrillas
as an economy-of-force
tool, bypassing
enemy positions
and leaving
the guerrillas
to protect
friendly
This, plus the great intelligence
and sabotage
flanks and rear.
potential
of guerrillas,
made them a significant
weapon.
The principal
drawback to the Allied
use of guerrillas
was
largely
one of perception.
Because most military
planners
regarded the guerrillas
as an auxiliary
force, dependent upon the
they tended to
conventional
armies for weapons and training,
independent
for
of
guerrillas
the
capability
underestImate
actions of the type that dominated the 1950s and 1960s.
the experience
of the German Army reflects
To some extent,
the experience of all armies in World War II.
Initially,
Germany
that
advantages
had advantages
in training
and experience,

139

allowed its soldiers

to integrate
the different
weapons on the
battlefield
and to move so rapidly
that their
opponents became
As the war
disoriented
and incapable
of rapid
response.
lengthened,
the Germans tended to rely increasingly
on their air
support and high-quality
armored formations
to perform missions
that were inappropriate
for such formations,
such as penetration
of a prepared
defense.
Heavy tanks
took
precedence
over
half-tracks
for
the accompanying
infantry,
and thus German
production
was never able to support a fully
mechanized force.
Simultaneously,
Germany's opponents were learning
how better
to
integrate
their forces at a tactical
level and how to organize an
effective
antitank
defense-in-depth.
Moreover, from 1943 onward
inprovements
in both the quantity
and quality
of Allied
air and
ground forces dissipated
the early German advantages of training
The twin issues of quality
and quantity
became
and weaponry.
even more acute for the Japanese, who were never able to compete
in manpower and production
with their enemies, especially
because
hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops were tied down in China.
Sheer mass was not sufficient
to defeat the Axis forces on
the battlefield,
however.
The Soviet,
British,
and American
armed forces
also gained greater
skill
in combined arms and
adjusted
their
organizations
to improve this
combination.
By
1945, these armies had developed true combat effectiveness
at the
small unit level,
even though that effectiveness
was sometimes a
field
than
of
careful
product
of
improvisation
rather
institutional
development.
At that
point,
the
problem
of
combined arms integration
shifted,
at least
temporarily,
to a
higher
level
of
organization.
The lingering
problems
of
combining the arms in 1945 were not so much at battalion
or
division
levels
as they were between the army and the other
Air support in particular
was a critical
link in the
services.
success of most offensives
in World War II, yet the U.S. Army had
only achieved a temporary truce on this issue with the Army Air
Forees.
Once the war was over, the practical
lessons of small
unft integration
and of air-ground
cooperation
were frequently
forgotten.

CHAPTERSIX
COMBINEDARMS AFTER 1945
armies of the United Nations had
By 1945, the victorkous
equipment-intensive
form of
developed
a very
sophisticated,
combined arms mechanized war.
Even in the Pacific
theater,
the
Americans
and British
used generous
amounts of air
power,
specialized
landing craft,
and armored vehicles
to support their
infantry
operations.
Yet during the immediate postwar years, the
same armies faced two trends that argued against the mechanized,
armored solution
to the problems of combined arms combat.
First,
the
destructive
power of
the
atomic
bomb convinced
m=v
strategists
that traditional
land combat was obsolete and caused
others
to expect
radical
modifications
to any future
land
combat.
The atomic weapon made dense concentrations
of ground
forces on narrow frontages
extremely dangerous and caused the air
power advocates of the world to regard air-ground
cooperation
as
even less important
than they had previously
viewed it, because
the super weapon seemingly made close air support unnecessary.
Especially
during the late 194Os, when the United States had a
role of armies appeared to be to
nuclear monopoly, the future
secure the bases for strategic
bombers before a war and to mop up
Until
the
and occupy enemy territory
after
a nuclear
bombing.
early 195Os, technological
limitations
restricted
the design and
tactical
nuclear weapons. Thus
production
of truely small-yield,
by definition
nuclear warfare meant using large-scale,
strategic
ground combat fell into neglect.
nuclear weapons; consequently,
The second, and opposing, challenge to the mechanized armies
"war of national
liberation
that
of 1945 was the so-called
employed unconventional
warfare tactics.
During the later
194Os,
and Malaya made
insurgencies
in China,
Indo-China,
Greece,
conventional
armies appear too expensive and too musclebound to
compete efficiently
against
the politicized
peasant outfitted
with a rifle
and a bag of rice.
To meet this challenge,
western
armies had to neglect
the development
of new generations
of
expensive
of renewed interest
in
armored weapons in favor
The French in
increased
mobility
for light
infantry
forces.
Indo-China
and Algeria,
and the British
in Malaya, Kenya, and
distracted
from the mechanized trends
of
Aden, were clearly
the
Europeans
were
again
able
to
focus
on
In
the
196Os,
1945.
mechanized
but almost
home defense
in an intensive,
war,
Not until
simultaneously
the U.S. became involved
in Vietnam.
the mid-1970s were all
the NATO Allies
actively
studying
and
developing
doctrine
for their
own defense in Europe.
In the
interim
the Soviet Union had gone far to make up its previous
technical
disadvantages
in conventional
combat.
Of course, some
developments in counterinsurgency
wars may have application
in a
For example, despite
the
more intense,
mechanized environment.

141

potentially
forces,

trends

high air
defense threat
posed
airmobility
is clearly
one of the
of the later 20th century.

by Soviet-equipped
major
new tactical

Most
jar armies, including
that of the Soviet Union, have
been forced
to adjust
to the challenge
of nuclear
warfare
or
guerrilla
insurgency,
or both,
The only major exception has been
Israel,
and even there persistent
terrorism
has posed a difficult
problem for the mechanized Israeli
forces.
Thus, major themes in
combined arms since World War II are difficult
to identify.
Different
armies have faced the same problems, but rarely at the
This chapter will
examine the postwar period from
same time.
three different
perspectives:
the development of organization
and doctrine
in the Soviet Army, the experience
of the United
States and to a lesser extent its European allies,
and finally
the rapid
development
of the Israeli
Defense
Forces
from
guerrillas
to armor-heavy conventional
soldiers.

The Soviet

Army, 1945-66:

The Deoline

of Conventional

Forces

The Soviet Army, as it was renamed after World War II, has
three
distinct
periods
of doctrZne
and
experienced
at least
organization
since 1945. First,
from the end of the war to the
death of Stalin
fn 1953, the Soviets demobilized
a portion
of
their forces but continued with the same tactical
and operational
Seoond,
doctrines
and organizations
developed during
the war.
from 1953 to approximately
1967, the ground forces took a back
seat to the nuclear-equipped
arms of the Soviet state.
During
this period,
the Soviet Army shrank in size and neglected
Its
historical
experience in combined arms in favor of an armor-heavy
force designed to survive and exploit
nuclear strikes.
Finally,
since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has reversed this decline
of land forces,
restudied
the experience of the '"Great Fatriotic
and
prepared
for
the
possibility
of an extensive,
combined
War,"
arms mechanized oonflict
with or without
the use of nuolear
weapons.1
Immediately
after
World War II,
the Soviet
Union had no
nuclear
weapons and therefore
sought to refine
its increasingly
mechanized conventional
forces
for any European eventuality.
At
the time, this was the only possible Soviet counterweight
to the
U.S. nuclear
monopoly.
Although
the Soviet Union demobilized
from a total
of over 500 division-sized
units
to approximately
175 divisions
during the period 1945-48, the number of armored
and mechanized units
actually
increased
from thirty-nine
to
sixty-five.
In the process, '"tank corps" became tank divisions,
(see Figure
and "mechanized corps" became mechanized divisions
141.2
Each of these divisions
reflected
the experience
of
self-propelled
World War II,
including
integration
of tanks,
artillery,
and air defense at regimental
level.
guns f infantry,

142

11,541 men (wartime):

208 medium and
guns;
44 heavy tanks; 84 self-propelled
24 artillery pieces

TYPE SOVIET TANK

DIVISION,
1947
I

I I I*

0
5

HO
&TEL

Medium
c

120mm
Mortar

0
f

84-3330

II I

/
I

Gil lsh

KEY: MTCL: Motorcycle;

Mtz: Motorized;
SP: Self-propelled
gun; MO: machine gun;
SMG: Sub-machine
gun; MRL: Multipb
rocket

klX
launcher.

1947, and Mechanized Division,

--143-

122mm
Q Howitzer

12,600-14,244
men (wartime);
178
medium and 2t heavy tenks; 63 relfpropelled guns: 64 artillery pieces

cl

Figure 14. Type Soviet Tank Division,

/Hvy0 tk/SP

TYPE SOVIET MECHANIZED

DIVISION,
1946/61

cl

1946151.

Indeed, the addition

of a heavy tank/self-propelled
gun regiment
to the mechanized division
in 1951 made this division
almost too
unwieldy for a small Soviet staff to control.
Simultaneously,
the Soviets motorized
their
rifle
divisions.
The demobilization
of 1945-48 allowed them to equip the remaining
divisions
completely with motor transportation,
as evidenced by a
three-fold
increase
in the number of trucks in a rifle
division
The first
Sovfet
armored personnel
between 1944 and 1946.
carriers,
the BTR-152 series,
came into production
in late 1945,
but even the motorized
rifle
regiment
of a tank division
was
At that point,
the
truck-mounted
until
well into
the 1950s.
tracked BTR-50 series
came into production
for the mechanized
units,
and apparently
other motorized
rifle
units inherited
the
BTR-152.3
Soviet
doctrine
remained essentially
unchanged until
7953.
During
this
period
the Soviets
produced their
first
nuclear
conventional
ground forces
became less
weapons, so that their
Then Stalin's
death in 1953 allowed
vital
to natkonal strategy.
Marsh&l Georgi
Zhukov to return
to power wfthin
the armed
By 1955, Zhukov had-won government approval for a major
forces.*
His primary goal was to
reorganization
of the ground forces.
adjust
the ground forces
to the realities
of nuclear
warfare.
All units had to became smaller for better
command and control,
and better armored for protection
against the effects
of nuclear
weapons. The tubed artillery
preparations
of the Great Patriotic
War declined
in significance,
giving
way to a doctrrne
that
viewed mechanized, armor-heavy forces as the exploitation
element
after nuclear strikes had shattered
the enemy defenses.
In the realm of organization,
Zhukov abolished
the rifle
corps, the unwieldy mechanized division,
the rifle
division,
and
The motorized
rifle
the remaining
horse cavalry
divisions.
division
replaced both the mechanized and the rifle
division.
BY
tank, motorized
1958, only three types of division
remained:
Armies consisted
only of three to
and airborne
rifle.
rifle,
four tank divisions
in a tank army, or two to three motorized
rifle
divisions
and one tank division
in a combined arms army.
Missile-equipped
artillery
and air defense replaced much of the
conventional
artillery
of the Soviet Army.4

Zhukov posed a potential

*Because of his great
prestige,
As
a
result,
Stalin
banished Zhukov
political
threat
to Stalin.
to minor posts for a number of years after World War II.

144

At the same time,

the influx
of new equipment and the
reduction
in the overall
size of the army meant that all units,
with the exception of airborne
divisions,
were at least motorized
The term "mobile group," which for
and in many cases mechanized.
three decades had designated
cavalry and mechanized forces that
were more mobile than conventional
infantry,
lost its meaning and
fell
out of use.
The function
of exploiting
penetrations
remained, however, becoming a role for the tank and motorized
rifle
divisions.
Perhaps most significantly,
the entire
concept of combined
arms seemed less important
once the Soviet Army decided that any
future
war would be a nuclear war.
In particular,
infantry
as
within
existing
well
as
shrank
conventional
artillery
organizations.
In 1947, for example, a typical
"mechanized army"
Because all
consisted
of two tank and two mechanized divisions.
the maneuver regiments in these divisions
had integrated
infantry
there was a total
of thirty-four
motorized
or mechanized
units,
infantry
battalions
in this mechanized army.
By contrast,
the
and these
1958 "tank army" consisted of only four tank divisions,
four divisions
had lost the motorized rifle
battalions
from their
the tank army had only twelve
tank regiments.
Consequently,
infantry
battalions,
all of them mounted in armored personnel
carriers
in part to shield
them from the blast
and radiation
effects
of nuclear weapons.5
Beginning
in 1960, Nikita
Khrushchev further
slighted
the
Rocket
conventional
ground forces
in favor
of the "Strategic
Forces."
Individual
army organizations,
as well as the total
declined
to
a
postwar
low of 740 small
strength
of the army,
divisions.
The Soviet Union appeared totally
committed to the
the expectation
that any major
concept of the "single
option,"
war must be a nuclear war.
Rebirth

of Soviet

Combined Arms After

1967

Following
Khrushchev's
ouster in 1964, a debate began within
the Soviet
military
about the general
direction
of military
affairs.
The exact
causes of this
debate
remain unclear,
although
to some extent
it may have been a response to the
American doctrine
of flexible
response.
This U.S. doctrine,
forces
that
which will
be discussed below, called for military
would be capable of fighting
along the entire
range of possible
from terrorism
and guerrilla
warfare
up to full
conflicts,
Regardless of the causes of
conventional
and even nuclear war.
by 1966-67 the Kremlin
had apparently
the Soviet
reappraisal,
determined
that
the "single
option"
was too simplistic.
In
S.
Shtrik
publicly
announced
January 1968, for example, Maj. Gen.
that:

145

a situation
may arise in which combat operations
begin
and are carried
out for some time (most probably for a
relatively
short duration)
without
the use of nuclear
weapons,
and only
subsequently
will
a shift
to
operations
with these weapons take place.6
the Soviet military
renewed its
To meet this possibility,
study of conventional
combined arms warfare.
The government
allowed many senior commanders of World War II to publish
their
memoirs, openly identifying
the operational
and tactical
errors
More
that the Soviets
had made while
fighting
the Germans.
importantly,
these memoirs focused on the continuing
relevance of
In particular,
certain
techniques
of the Great Patriotic
War.
Soviet military
scholars
paid attention
to the concepts of the
mobile group and the forward detachment,
both of which were key
to Soviet
methods of mechanized
exploitation
and pursuit.
Although the term "mobile group" no longer applied
in a fully
mechatized Soviet Army, the functions
involved
remained relevant
to conventional
Soviet tactics.7
Soviet organization
reflected
these doctrinal
and historical
tank regiments
gradually
concerns.
During the 197Os, Soviet
regained
the mechanized
infantry
and conventional
artillery
Perhaps
battalions
that they had lost under Zhukov"s regime.
most important,
some Soviet divisions
received a r*new"' formation,
Viewed as a pure tank unit,
thFs
the separate tank battalion.
battalion
tight
seem to be an additional
reserve for the division
in the
commander. Within the context of renewed Soviet interest
Great Patriotic
War, however, the separate tank battalion
might
well be the nucleus
for a forward
detachment in any future
exploitation
and pursuit.
circle
Thus, by the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had come full
in the doctrine
and organization
of combined arms combat.
While
the United States lost a decade of mechanized development because
of its involvement
in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had developed new
generations
of armored fighting
vehicles
to implement fully
its
long-standing
doctrine
of deep battle
and mechanized combined
arms.
The U.S. Army:

Demobilization

to Korea

In eontrast
to Soviet
commanders in 1945, American field
commanders were only partially
satisfied
with their organization
the General
Board of the U.S.
In 1945-46,
and equipment,
European Theater of Operations
conducted an exhaustive
review of
This review recognized
the actual
past and future organization.
practices
of the army in 1944-45, thereby departing
from MeNair's
concepts to a considerable
extent.

146

the performance of the triangular

For example, in reviewing
infantry
division,
both the General Board and the War Department
concluded that armor should be organic to that division
in order
to provide support for infantry
attacks and to act as the primary
The infantry's
57-mm antitank
gun
antitank
weapon of the army.
seemed ineffective,
and the tank destroyer was too specialized
to
In a reversal
of
structure.
justify
in a peacetime
force
previous doctrine,
the U.S. Army concluded that "the medium tank
is the best antitank
weapon."8
Although such a statement may
of designing
a tank
have been true, it ignored the difficulties
that could outshoot and defeat all other tanks.
Moreover, even
if the tank was the best antitank
weapon, using it to defeat
enemy armor might not be the best employment of available
tanks,
which found themselves
tied
to their
own infantry
instead
of
attacking
and exploiting
enemy vulnerabilities.
In any event,
postwar
U.S.
Army received
each infantry
regiment
in the
authorization
for an organic tank company, with the division
as a
whole acquiring
an additional
tank battalion.
By the time the War Department
finally
approved a new
infantry
division
structure
in November 1946, a variety
of
changes had occurred
based on wartime experience
(Figure
15).
The self-propelled
antiaircraft
machine guns and 4.2-inch
mortars
that had frequently
provided
fire
support to the World War II
Regimental
cannon
division
became organic
to that
divisfon.
companies and antitank
companies disappeared,
but each infantry
Even the infantry
squad
battalion
received
recoilless
rifles.
at Fort
Benning,
and platoon
After
a conference
changed.
Georgia, in 1946, the army reduced the rifle
squad from twelve to
the squad leader's
nine men. This change not only facilitated
control
of his squad, but also released personnel to man a light
machine gun and an antitank
rocket launcher in the weapons squad
These new platoons
had a greater
of each reorganized
platoon.
capacity
for independent
fire
and maneuver than their
wartime
On the other hand, the nine-man squad had little
predecessors.
staying power once it suffered casualties.9
The
similar
modifications
occurred.
In the armored division,
limiting
factor
in most armored operations
during 1944-45 was the
smaller
the
even in
1943
armored
infantry,
shortage
of
divisions.
At the end of the war,
Gen. George S. Patton
estimated
that the armored infantry
suffered
65 percent of all
casualties
in these divisions
while inflicting
only 29 percent of
the German casualties.fo
Conventional
infantry
and armored
engineers
found themselves pressed into service
to perform the
infantry's
close security
and urban combat functions
for armored
In 1946, the War Department therefore
increased the
task forces.
armored infantry
in each armored division
from three battalions
of three companies each to four battalions
of four companies each.

147

TYPE U.S. INFANTRY

DLWSIO-N, l&i7

17,700 men [wartimej;

72 howitzers

141 tanks;

$1 [-y] $-Ai/l
LIizxklm
Al

20-mm

TYPE U.S. ARMORED

DIVISION,
1947

14,976 men (wartime):

361 tanks;
72 self-propelled
howitzera

REPL Figure 15. Type U.S. Infantry

84-3330

and Armored Divisions,

-148-

1947.

division,
the postwar
armored
Just
as in the infantry
that had previously
been
division
acquired
a number of units
attached to it.
A "heavy" tank battalion,
actually
equipped with
90-mm high-velocity
guns,
M26 medium tanks because of their
replaced the departed tank destroyers
as the antitank
element of
self-propelled
division.
Battalions
of
an armored
155-m
artillery
antiaircraft
machine guns alSO
and self-propelled
The three armored engineer
companies of the
became organic.
World
War II
division
had proved
inadequate
for
mobility
missions,
let alone for doubling as armored infantry,
and so the
postwar engineer battalion
received a fourth
line company and a
bridge company. The two truck companies normally attached to any
armored division
were not added as separate
units,
but the
divksion's
available
wheeled transportation
certainly
grew during
the postwar reorganization.
To cite but one example, the number
of two and one-half
ton cargo trucks kncreased from 422 in 1943
to 804 in 1947.11
Most of these notable improvements in the combination of arms
The U.S. Army
were stillborn
because of postwar demobilization.
shrank to a garrison
force occupying Germany and Japan, with only
nuclear monopoly, few
skeleton
units at home. Given America's
people outside
the army saw any requirement
for combat ready
Except for one divksion in Germany, the U.S. Army had no
forces.
formations
that even approched the 1946-47 tables of organization
All four divisions
occupying Japan in 1950 had
and equipment.
only
two-thirds
of their
wartime
authorization
in men and
Each of these divisions
had only one tank company and
equipment.
one antiaircraft
battery
and was missing one out of every three
infantry
battalions
and artillery
batteries.12
The Korean Conflict
When the Soviet-equipped
North Korean People's Army invaded
South Korea in June 1950, the understrength
American divisions
in
Japan entered combat in a matter of days.
This sudden commitment
to battle
revealed more than a simple lack of combat power; it
also demonstrated that the U.S. Army had a force structure
that
Regimental commanders were deprived of
did not fit its doctrine.
their
primary
antitank
weapon, the tank,
and had only the
launcher
for
short-range
antitank
obsolete
2.36-inch
rocket
defense.
With only two infantry
battalions
instead of three, a
if
it
tried
to defend on a normal
regiment
had no reserve
frontage
of two battalions.
The shortage of manpower and the
hilly
terrain
of the Korean peninsula
increased
the dispersion
and isolation
of defending
units.
Such dispersion
allowed the
tactics
that were a combination
of
North Koreans to practice
Japanese offensive
operations
in 1942 and the Soviet forward
A small unit of Soviet-supplied
T-34 medium tanks
detachment.
If this tank
led each column as the North Koreans moved south.

149

force encountered a strongpoint

that it could not overrunf
light
infantry
forces bypassed that strongpoint
through the surrounding
hills,
out the defender's
line of communications behind him, and
foroed the defender to withdraw or be cut off.13
Later in the war, the Americans,
like the British
a decade
before them, learned to accept being cut off and under attack
from flank
and rear.
Throughout
the war, the most eomm5n
Amsrioan
defensive
positian
was a cw=w
entrenched
for
all-round
defense of a ridge or hilltop,
separated by hundmds or
even thousands of meters from the units to its flanks.
This type
of dispersed,
strongpoint
deployment
has become increasingly
common in most armies since 1945, but it requires
excellent
fire
active
patrolling
ta provide
an
possible,
support
and, if
effective
In
the
case of
infantry
defense.
Korea,
U.S.
patrols
and outposts,
relying
on
frequently
had to forego
superior
firepower
to defeat sudden enemy attaoks
delivered
at
When such attacks
occurred,
a combination
of
close
range.
artillery,
heavy infantry
weapons, and the opganie weapons of the
infantry
proved effective
in halting
them.14
The initeal
contacts with the Chinese Communist Force CCCF)
in October and November 1950 were not deliberate
attacks
or
but rather a series of meeting engagements
small-unit
defenses,
in which both sides were trying
to use the same roads and
By late
1950, the U.S.
streambeds as avenues of movement.
divisions
had built
up to their
full
tables of organization
and
were oriented on the few roads in an effort
to occ,upy North Korea
rapidly.
Although much more lightly
equippd,
the CCF also used
the low ground, moving southward in solid columns with security
screens
out and hiding
in woods or villages
when aerial
Once
the
initial
surprise
reconnaissance
searched the area.
encounter was over, the CCF, many of whom were veterans of the
guerrilla
wars of China in the 194Os, shifted
their attention
to
the high ground, moving around the U.S. and allied
forces tied to
American firepower
soon made any daytime movement
the roads.
of company
dangerous for the oommunists, and the establishment
and battalion
perimeter
defenses on high ground further
hampered
the later
years of the Korea
the CCF movements,
Thus, during
CCF maneuver once again
became the
eanfliot , the preferred
advance along the low ground at night,
seeking to bypass enemy
strongpoints
in order to attack from unexpected directions.15
When the front
began to stabilize
in 1952, the Korean War
became a war of attrition,
with each side launching
ltiited
The U.S. used Pts World War
attacks to destroy enemy personnel.
II doctrine
for combining the different
arms in such attacks,
modifying
that
doctrine
slightly
to maximize
the available
firepower
and to minimize casualties.
One small example of this
operational
technique was the second phase of Operation
Punch, a

150

178

ANYANGNI

L.

Map 8. Task Force Dolvin, Anyang-ni,

843330

-lcIl-

MYQNGHAKTONG

Korea, 5 February

1951.

multi-battalion
limited
attack
conducted
by the
25th U.S.
Infantry
Division
during early
1951 (Map 8).
Two task forces
advaneed along parallel
roads to reduce CCF resistance,
withdrew
at night
to avoid infiltrations,
and then returned
to inflict
additional
casualties
after
the
enemy had reoccupied
his
One of these two U.S elements was Task Force Dolvin,
defenses.
which consisted
of a battalion
headquarters
and two companies of
a 4.2-inch
mortar platoon
medium tanks, a battalion
of infantry,
from a regimental
mortar company, a self-propelled
antiaircraft
maehine gun platoon,
a combat engineer platoon,
and elements for
communications,
medical aid, and tactical
air control.
Because
the intent
was to clear enemy bunkers in the area of Hill
300,
the
infantry
commander
controlled
the
entire
force.
Coaxnunication between tank crews and the infantry
riding on those
tanks was difficult,
because the newer M46 tanks,
like the M4
tanks of 1944, had no external
telephones mounted on them.
On 5 February
1951, the entire
task force
moved up the
The
around
the .base of Hill
300.
highway
and deployed
self-propelled
antiaircraft
guns, with the enormous firepower
of
multiple
heavy machine guns, deployed behind the tanks, with the
two lines of vehicles
staggered so that all could aim at the hill
For thirty
minutes,
the 4.2-inch
to engage the enemy defenses,
and
81-mm mortars,
infantry
the
recoilless
rifles,
the
antiaircraft
machine guns, and the tank weapons methodically
blasted
Hill
3001 trying
to suppress and if possible
destroy
which was sheltered
behind
enemy resistance.
Then the infantry,
the tanks during
this preparatory
fire,
advanced up the hill.
One man in each platoon deliberately
exposed himself by wrapping
a colored
panel,
originally
intended
for signalling
aircraft,
Whenever these leading men took cover beeause
around his body.
of enemy fire,
all
supporting
weapons knew exactly
where the
friendly
troops were, together with the approximate area of enemy
resistance.16
In November 1951, the U&ted
Nations
and its
Communist
line
for
the
opponents
tentatively
agreed to a demarcation
armistice
they were negotiating.
the United States
Thereafter,
and its U.N. allies
had 'little
opportunity
for maneuver attacks
even as small as that of Operation
Punch, because there was no
object in clearing
ground that would be lost at the armistice.
Except for
patrols,
raids,
and counterattacks
in response to
the
war became largely
a matter of holding
communist advances,
defensive
positions,l7
Many observers
compared this
phase of
the Korean War to the artillery
and trench struggles
of World War
Instead
of a
differences.
I, but in fact there were notable
defense-in-depth
along relatively
narrow unit
frontages,
U,N.
units in Korea formed a very thin line of strongpoints
on high
Centralized
fire
control
and artillery
proximity
fuzes
ground.

152

firepower
in the defense,
gave the U.N. defenders unprecedented
while
the attacking
communists often
had only limited
fire
In 1951, the U.S. Army further
improved its
fire
support.
direction
capability
by introducing
rotating
plotting
boards,
allowing an F.D.C. to adjust fire on a target without knowing the
observer's
location.
Upon report
of a communist attack,
a
concentration
of artillery
and mortar
fire,
horseshoe-shaped
called a "flash fire,"
would descend around a U.N. outpost.
This
firepower
isolated
the area from further
enemy reinforcement
for
hours and provided illumination
to assist the defenders.
Within
the defending infantry
had to
the horseshoe of artillery
shells,
deal with the attackers
who had closed on the strongpoint.
A
defending infantry
canpany often had up to a dozen machine guns
above its normal authorization
and, in some cases, could call on
fire
for
ground
self-propelled
antiaircraft
machine
guns
support.
On occasion,
the artillery
of an entire
corps would
fire in support of one such outpost.
During a 24-hour period in
battalions
fired
a total
of 39,694
April
1953, nine artillery
rounds to protect one infantry
eompany.JS
Artillery
fire,
even on such a lavish
scale,
could stop a
determined enemy only while the shells were actually
falling.
By
air support had a tremendous psychological
effect
on
contrast,
both sides in a ground action.
Recognizing this,
the U.S. Marine
Corps in the Korean War maintained
the tradition
of intimate
air-ground
cooperation.
This was especially
important
for the
who had less nondivisional
artillery
and other
fire
Marines,
support
than
the army.
Air
Force
preferred
to
The U.S.
concentrate
on interdiction
missions and established
a cumbersome
procedure for requesting
close air support.
In December 1951,
the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet,
expressed the dissatisfaction
of his subordinate
commanders on
In a formal proposal
to the U.N. commander, Gen.
this issue.
Mark Clark, Van Fleet requested that each of his four army corps
receive
an air
force
fighter-bomber
squadron as a permanent
attachment.
This would ensure that the pilots
were familiar
with
the units
and terrain
in a particular
area and would respond
rapidly
when needed.
General
Clark
studied
the matter
and
finally
rejected
the proposal
because it would divert
scarce
aircraft
from other
missions
such as interdiction.
He did,
however, get both the Navy and Air Force to provide a much larger
proportion
of
aircraft
available
for
close
air
support9
culminating
in 4,500 sorties
in October 1952. Gradually,
the air
and ground
leaders
became more familiar
with
each other's
operations
and capabilities.
For example, the army learned that
firing
high explosive
rounds with proximity
fuzes just before an
air strike
would help protect
the aircraft
by suppressing
enemy
antiaircraft
fire in the target area.19
One new area of air-ground
operations
in Korea was the use of
helicopters.
At the end of World War II,
both the U.S. Marine
Corps and the U.S. Army had purchased a few primitive
helicopters

153

and
studied
their
C3llp10pf2nt.
The Marines
organized
an
experimental
helicopter
squadron
in
1947
and used those
helicopters
in
small
assault
landings
during
amphibious
exereises,
Intersemice
agreements meant that the U.S. Air Force
controlled
design and procurement of helicopters
for
the army,
significantly
impeding development of this capability.
Moreover,
the U,S. Army stressed
parachute
and glider
mobility
at
the
expense of newer concepts.
Still,
by 1953 both the army and the
marines had used helicopters
not only for medical 'evacuation
and
liaison
but also for limited movement of troops and supplies.20
In Search of a Mission:
ROAD

U.S.

Army Organization

From Triangle

to

The genuine success of the U.S. Army in the Korean War caused
a temporary
Increase
in its
size and budget.
Armored forces
especially
profited
from the example of North Korean tanks in
1950, and the army increased its armored strength from one combat
command to four armored divisions
between 1948 and 1956.21
At the same time, the Eisenhower admknistration
chose to base
its
national
strategy
on %assfve
retaliation"
with
nuclear
its existence and mission, the U.S.
weapons. In order to Justify
Army had to develop a doctrine
and organization
that would allow
ground forces to function
effectively
on a nuclear battlefield.
Concentrated,
fixed defenses of the type used in both world wars
appeared to be vulnerable
to nuclear attack,
and so the army had
to find a means of greater dispersion
and flexibility,
yet still
Unlike
the Soviet Army,
retain
efficient
command and control.
which
had to
fight
only
in
the
terrain
of
Europe and
Asia--terrain
favorable
to mechanization--the
U.S. Army had to
remain relatively
light
in equipment,
so that it would deploy
rapidly
to any trouble spot in the world.
These
strategic
considerations
greatly
influenced
the
Taotieal
units had
tactical
structure
and concepts of the army.
to be sufficiently
small so that
they would not present
a
sufficiently
balanced between the arms
lucrative
nuclear target,
so that
they
could
defend
themselves
when isolated,
and
without
fight
that
they
could
sufficiently
self-supporting
vulnerable
logistical
tails.
Army commanders also wanted to
streamline
the command structure
in order to speed the passage of
information
and decisions.
The need for dispersion
and for fewer
command echelons prompted some theorists
to consider
increasing
the span of control
from three subordinate
units to five.
Five
to one higher
Spread
over a greater
area, could report
units,
headquarters,
thereby reducing
the number of such headquarters
needed at any level.

154

The result
of all these concerns was the "Pentomic? Division,"
a public relations
term designed to combine the concept of five
subordinate
units
("penta")
with the idea of a division
that
Five
could function
on an atomic or nonatomic
battlefield.
"battle
groups"
were at the core of the pentomic
infantry
division
Each battle
group was an infantry
(Figure
16).
formation
that was smaller than a regiment but larger
than the
The authors
of this
design
established
triangular
battalion.
believed
that they were eliminating
the battalion
level
of the
retaining
the reconnaissance,
chain
of command while
h=w
weapons, and command and control
elements
of the triangular
infantry
regiment.
In retrospect,
however,
a battle
group
consisting
of
a
battalion,
appeared
to
be an oversized
headquarters
and service company, four infantry
companies of four
rifle
platoons and a heavy weapons platoon each, as well as a
4.2-inch
mortar battery.
Within
the headquarters
and service
The
company, a variety
of specialized
units
were available.
reconnaissance
platoon,
for example, integrated
light
tanks, an
The assault
gun
and an armored infantry
squad.
81-m mortar,
platoon,
equipped with the unarmored,
self-propelled
M56 gun,
provided both antitank
and limited
offensive
gun support for the
infantry,
which included
the 81-mm
The infantry
companies,
rifles
previously
located
at
mortars
and 'tO6-mm recoilless
battalion
level,
proved to be too large for effective
control.
In 1959 the battle
group therefore
acquired
a fifth
rifle
company, but each company was reduced to only three rifle
and one
Even the squad changed, increasing
from nine to
weapons platoon.
eleven men and officially
acquiring
a second automatic rifle.
As
the pentomic infantry
squad was able to practice
the
a result,
fireteam,
fire and movement tactics
used by all Marine Corps and
some army squads during and after World War II.22
division
allowed
the
division
structure
The pentomic
commander to attach to each battle
group, if necessary,
one tank
battery.
company, one engineer company, and one 105~mm howitzer
and in 1959, the division's
This fire
support proved inadequate,
composite
five
batteries
gave way to
direct-support
five
each consisting
of a 105~mm battery
direct-support
battalions,
Such a composite battalion
posed notable
and a 155-m battery.
problems in training,
ammunition supply,
maintenance,
and fire
Because mortars
had again
control
of two dissimilar
weapons.
proved unsuitable
as an artillery
weapon, the 1959 modifications
also reduced the number of 4.2-inch mortars in a battle group and
returned control of those mortars to the infantry.
this
with
difficulty
the
only
Fire
support
was not
organization.
The division
commander had only one brigade
commanded by the assistant
division
commander, to
headquarters,
help control
the five battle
groups, the tank battalion,
and the
Even with
a new division
trains
squadron.
armored cavalry

155

U.S. PENTOMIC INFANTRY

DIVISION

14,000 mml

r--J
XX

J
L?

John
Rocket

(deleted

1959)

I
(The S-battery 105mm
wm replaced
by 5 composite
battalions in
1 s5sj

batt.

l!i

105mm

ts

1 S5mm

Figure 16. U.S. Pentomie Infantry

84-3330

-Ed%-

Division.

headquarters
to
division
control
logistical
support p the
commander and headquarters
risked being overwhelmed by the number
of subordinate
units involved.
The growth of the signals element
division
from
a company to a battalion
of the infantry
illustrated
these command and control
difficulties.
Similar
problems existed at the battle
group level,
where a colonel and
his small staff
had to control
four or five rifle
companies, a
reconnaissance
and assault gun platoons,
a tank
mortar battery,
company, and direct-support
artillery.
By eliminating
one level
the pentomic infantry
structure
left
all other
of headquarters,
headquarters
with an excessive span of control.
The loss of any
one of those headquarters
could be disastrous
in battle.
Mobility
was another
problem,
The pentomic
structure
included
both a helicopter
company and, for the first
time, a
large
number of armored personnel
carriers.
These carriers,
grouped in a transportation
battalion,
were able to move one
battle
group at a time.
Because the carrier
drivers
belonged to
close cooperation
between
one unit and the infantry
to another,
the two was difficult.
Any battle
group without
these armored
In addition,
carriers
had only limited
protection
and mobility.
many senior commanders anticipated
that their divisions
would be
deployed for nonatomic struggles
in various areas of the world.
Such a deployment could well mean leaving the tank battalion
and
other heavy equipment behind.
The effects
of the Pentomic concept on the rest of the U.S.
The armored division
retained
its
Army were much less drastic.
three combat commands, four tank battalions,
and four armored
company to
infantry
battalions.
It
acquired
an aviation
centralize
existing
aviation
assets and received the same general
support artillery
battalion
(155-mm/8-inch/Honest
John rocket)
as
the infantry
division,
instead of the previous
'155-1~~ battalion.
the armored signal company grew to a
As in the infantry
division,
battalion.
The pentomic changes also brought the nondivisional
armored
the descendent
of the World War II cavalry
cavalry
regiment,
reconnaissance
group,
to the structure
it
retained
into
the
Each of three reconnaissance
squadrons in this regiment
1970s.
received
enough logistical
support
elements
to enable it
to
Such a squadron
consisted
of a
operate
semi-independently,
headquarters
and headquarters
troop, three armored reconnaissance
troops, a tank company, and a self-propelled
howitzer battery.
A
reconnaissance
of combined arms
troop
represented
an ideal
integrated
three
platoons
because each of its
organization,
tanks, infantry,
scouts, and a mortar.23

157

This arganizatian
of cavalry
recsnnaissance
organizatians
Fkst,
the variety
of main battle
vehfeles
served two purposes.
in such units
made it
diffkcult
for
an opposing
force
to
dkstingufsh
between U.S. cavalry and other combined arms forces
therefore,
to determine whether the U-S, force in question
ati,
Second, this
was simply a cavalry
screen or a major force.
combination
of weapons and vehkcles allowed U.S. reconnaissance
to develop intelli$ence
about the
forces to fight;,
if necessary,
in 194U, a reconnaissance
enemy As the Soviets had discovered
force that is not able to fight
in this way will
be much less
effective
even in its primary role of intelligence
collection
and
sweening.
By 1959, the U.S. Army
operational
concept to meet
warfare.
This structure
and
armor-heavy
solution
of the
American commanders were no
their Soviet counterparts.

had a radically
new structure
and
the changing demands of nuclear
concept differed
markedly from the
post-Stalin
Soviet
Army, but the
happier with the results
than were

During the same time period,

the possibilEty
of nonnuclear
The Kennedy administration
came into office
conflict
Increased.
Despite
in 1961 committed to the concept of flexible
response.
the
pentotic
division
was
heavily
the army's original
purpose,
the army needed new
Thus,
oriented
for
nuclear
warfare.
structures
to fight
across
the entire
spectrum
of possible
conflicts
from '"low intensity"
terrorism
and guerrilla
wars up to
The
new
warfare.
nuclear
mechanized
even
and
fully
administration
quickly
approved
ongoing army studies
for
a
the Reorganization
Objectives
different
division
organization,
Army Division
(ROAD) (Figure
17).
The different
types of ROAD
division
shared a eornmon division
base, including
a cavalry
reconnaissance
squadron of some type, three brigade headquarters,
division
artillery,
division
support command, engineer battalion,
and
eventually
an
battalion.
The
brigade
defense
air
like
the oombat commands of the World War IT
headquarters,
could control
a varying number of combat aMi
armored division,
The combat arms battalion
replaced the
combat support elements.
battle
group as the largest
fixed-maneuver
organizatkon,
but
including
elements,
the
battle
group's
retained
many of
reconnaissance,
mortar, and service support units.
The unique aspect of the ROAD division
was the ability
to
"'task
level,
organizeFt
and
taflor
structures
at
any
Strategically,
the army could choose to form and deploy armored,
mechanized, conventional
infantry,
airborne,
and later
airmobile
Although
there
dependkng upon the expected threat.
diviskonss,
were recommended eonfigurat~ons
of each division
type,
in
practice
planners could further
tailor
these different
division
types
by assigning
various
numbers and mixes of armored,

158

TYPE

U.S. ARMORED

DIVISION,

18.000-20.000
men. 66-70
guns/howitzers.
27-36
light tanks, 300+ medium tanks

ROAD

I-J-I,
II

IV&

1KKmm

later
CD

El
r
I I

Oh
.I

Assigned
Maneuver
Sns

ki-l
I

Police

(Actual numbers and types of assigned

battalions varied; type infantry division
(mechanized) had 6 tank and 6 mechanized

bns)

II * II

Tgt Acquisition

SPT
?--I

xx

1
Personnel
Service

166/203mm.
later 203mm

I*p

Rocket

Military

Military
Intelligence

-I-

Notes:

Div
Materiel
Mgt Ctr

1. unit added after

initial ROAD structure was approved.
2. unit later deleted from structure.

Figure 17. Type U.S. Armored Division,

ROAD, X265-1983.

SUPPlY
81 Trans

mechanized infantry,
infantry,
airborne
infantry,
and airmobile
infantry
battalions,
for a total
of anywhere from seven to
fifteen
maneuver battalions.
The division
commander and staff
had considerable
flexibility
in 'attaching
these battalions
to the
three
brigade
headquarters.
Finally,
within
the brigades
and
battalions,
commanders could task organize
combined arms fosces
by temporarily
cross-attaching
infantry,
mechanized, and armored
air
companies and platoons,
as well
as attaching
engineers,
defense artillery,
and other elements.
Thus a battalion
task
force or company team might receive
a variety
of subordinate
units of different
arms, allowing
integration
of the arms as the
mission required.
In practice,
of course,
such tailoring
and
task organizing
were prey to the same problems that the World War
Constantly
II system of pooling
and attachment
had suffered.
shifting
units
resulted
in inefficiency
and poor coordknation
between subordinate
elements
that
were unfamiliar
with
each
other.
As a result,
battalion
and brigade commanders tried
to
keep the same elements "habitually
associated"
with each other
unless
a radical
change of mission
or terrain
occurred.
Nevertheless,
the ROAD structure
gave the U.S. Army the span of
control
and flexibility
of organization
it had lacked under the
pentomic structure.24
Air

Assault

The Kennedy administration's

dedication
to flexkble
response
also brought the long-standing
question of helicopter
mobility
to
resolution.
The result
was a noteworthy
new capability
in
air-ground
interaction
and in tactical
operations
in general.
During the later
195Os, the USMC continued to lead the other
services
in the application
of helicopters
for
battalion
and
larger unit assaults,
While the army struggled
with the pentomic
their divisions
and regiments
structure ) the marines reconfigured
to eliminate
much heavy equipment,
relying
on mortars,
naval
gunfire,
and aircraft
rather than on howitzers for direct-support
artillery.
The assault
elements of a marine division
became
eampletely
air
transportable
as a result.25
The more limited
army experiments
focused on helicopters
in a cavalry
role,
with
small aviation
units
for screening,
raids,
and reconnaissance.
comandant of the U.S. Amy Aviation
Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton,
School during the period 1954-57, conducted extensive experiments
to improvise gun and rocket armament for helicopters
and then to
use armed helicopters
tactically.
The U.S. Army Infantry
School
and the Director
of Amy Aviation,
Ma3.
made similar
efforts,
to popularize
the concept of
Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, attempted
The U.S. Air Force adamantly opposed
completely hellborne
units.
any expanded role for army aviation
as a challenge to air foree
progress was possible
during the
missions, and thus only limited

1950s. 26

160

------

..--_--__------~-.

Then in 1962, following

the suggestions
of several
army
aviation
advocates,
Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara asked
to improve
the U,S. Army to study the bold use of aviation
tactical
mobility
for ground forces.
The result
was the Howze
conducted tests on
Board of 1962. General Howze and his staff
everything
from dispersed
fuel
stockpiles
for helicopters
to
Howze
close air support bombing by army fixed-wing
aircraft.
recommended the formation
of a number of air assault
divisions
depending almost entirely
on army aircraft,
as well as separate
air
cavalry
brigades
for
screening
and delay roles
and air
to improve
the mobility
of conventional
transport
brigades
divisions.
He noted that an air assault division
could maneuver
freely
to attack a conventional
foe from multiple
directions
and
could use both artificial
and natural
obstacles
to delay or
immobilize an enemy while itself
remaining free to fly over those
obstacles. 27
After
a
considerable
internal
struggle,
the
Defense
'the creation
of a division
for further
Department authorized
testing.
From 1963 to 1965, the 11th Air Assault Division
(Test)
for
extensive
tactical
at Fort Bennkng acted as the vehicle
training
and experimentation.
The 11th itself
was so small that
it often had to borrow elements of another division
to conduct
exercises.
When the division
first
formed,
army regulations
still
forbade army aircraft
to fly in formation,
and thus many
techniques
had to be developed with
little
or no background
In order to make the division's
supply system as
experience.
the division
commarder, Maj.
mobile as its maneuver elements,
developed
refueling
and rearming
points
Gen. Harry Kinnard,
camouflaged
Artillery,
and dispersed
near the battle
area.
aviation,
and infantry
had to cooperate closely to suppress enemy
Artillery
and available
resistance
during an assault
landing.
air force aircraft
fired on the proposed Landing zone (LZ) until
assault
aircraft
began their
final
approach, one or two minutes
The last
artillery
rounds were smoke, to
prior
to landing.
signal
helicopter
gunships to take up direct-fire
suppression
around the LZ while troop helicopters
landed and discharged their
infantry.
Early helicopter
weapons were rather
inaccurate,
but
their fire had a considerable
psychological
effect on both friend
and foe.
Artillery
and infantry
changed location
frequently
by
helicopter
and often
conducted
false,
temporary
landings
in
multiple
locations
to confuse the enemy as to their
actual
dispositions
and intentions.
The division's
air
cavalry
squadron combined elements for
ground
recovery
of
and
insertion
observation,
aerial
reconnaissance
teams, and armed helicopter
'"gunships" within each
The air cavalry
conducted the traditional
akr cavalry
troop.
cavalry
missions
of reconnaissance,
screening,
and raids almost
After
a
number
of
tests,
the air assault
entirely
from the air.

The two most

division
had clearly
demonstrated
its potential.
obvious vulnerabilities
of such a unit were the loss of mobzLlity
and resupply
capability
in darkness or extremely
poor weather,
and the debatable
effects
of enemy air defense on helicopter
tactics 28
During
the same period,
U.S. Army helicopter
units,
both
armed and unarmed, supported the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN). This provided a combat test for the concepts developed
and personnel
and ideas passed
by Howze, Kinnard,
and others,
frequently
between Vietnam and the 11th Air Assault Division
at
American helicopters
in Vietnam did
Fort Benning.
Initially,
little
more than transport
troops from one place to another.
By
1964 American helicopter
gunships and transports
formed small air
assault
units
with
Vietnamese
infantry
on a semi-permanent
basis.29
Inevitably,
the U.S. Air Force protested
the U.S. Army's use
of armed helicopters
and even armed fixed-wing
aircraft
fn a
close air
support
role
in Vietnam.
The government of South
disloyalty
in its own
Vietnam was so concerned about possible
forces that it further
complicated
the already cumbersome process
of requesting
air support from Vietnamese Air Force elements.
Despite USAF protests,
American and Vietnamese ground commanders
to use any air
support
that
was available,
felt
compelled
including
aviation
when air
force
channels
proved
amy
had reversed
the
unresponsive.
By 1967, the U.S. involvement
situation , providing
large amounts of air force close support for
Because there was no enemy
ground forces in most circumstances.
air
threat
over South Vietnam,
the USAF supported
the ground
forces to such an extent that Congress held hearings about the
neglect of the air superiority
mission.
This artificially
high
level
of air-ground
cooperation
temporarily
buried much of the
rivalry
between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Foree.3U
However,
no air force
would have been able to provide
s,uch sustained
support to ground forces while stiultaneously
struggling
for air
superiority
against a comparably equipped enemy air force.
In the interim,
the U.S. Army fully
integrated
the helicopter
In the summer of 1965, the 11th Air Assault
and its tactics.
Division
became the Ist Cavalry Division
(Airmobile)
and deployed
General
Howze's plan to use'
to Vietnam
(see Figure
171.
fixed-wing
army aircraft
in a ground-attack
role had failed,
but
many of his other
recommendations
were reflected
in the new
An aerial
artillery
battalion
armed with
airmobile
division.
rocket-firing
helicopters
replaced the general support artillery
A division
battalion
found in other ROAD division
structures.
two light
and three medium helicopter
aviatZon group, including
battalions
and a general support aviation
company, could redeploy
several infantry
battalions
simultaneously.

162

15,787 men, 434 aircraft, 64

howitzers,
1800 vehicles

Ea!l
V

HO
i/i

1 (1 Bde also airborne)

EHHT E?l
I

Air Cav
Troops

Grounc I
Cav

r ---

II I
,

XT

Light

Figure 18. 1st Cavalry

64-3330

I I

Division

-163-

General

Support

(Airmobile),

1965.

Medium

COMMAND

Entering
combat in the fall
of 1965, the 1st Cavalry
much
more often found itself
fighting
North Vietnamese conventional
light
infantry
regiments
than smdl
guerrilla
bands.
On 14
landed by helicopter
in
November 1965, for example, a battalion
the base camp of the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment, forcing
the
Superior mobility
enemy to turn and fight
in his own rear area.
and firepower
of this type temporarily
halted a North Vietnamese
invasion of the south.31
One key to the airmobile
or afr assault
concept was the close
of helicopter
and ground
within
the same unit,
integration,
forces.
By eo*trast,
using helicopter
gunships and transports
from one major unit to airlift
infantry
or artillery
elements of
another unit was much less efficient,
requiring
more time and
effort
to ensure coordination
and mutual understanding
between
Army lacked
In practice,
the U.S.
the
parties
involved.
sufficient
helicopter
assets to make all the American, Korean,
and Vietnamese
units
fully
airmobile
with
their
own organic
the 1st Aviation
Brigade controlled
up to 100
Instead,
aviation.
Battalions
from
company-sized aviation
units of various types.
different
with
associated
were
habitually
this
brigade
divisions.
Even the two airmobile
divisions,
the 1st Cavalry and
frequently
had to lend their
assets to support
10lst Airborne,
neighboring
units.32
Airntobility
did more than put the enemy off balance and
It also forced the U.S. Army
neutralize
conventional
obstacles.
to change many procedures to accomodate operations
over a large
For
example,
both
territory
without
a defined
'"front
line."
their
units
ordinarily
oriented
field
artillery
and signal
support towards a particular
front
line or axis of advance.
By
contrast,
in Vietnam these branches had to operate on an area
concept, providing
fires and communications in any direction
from
Even this system did not always give
a pattern
of small bases.
sufficient
artillery
support for a large-area
operation,
and thus
the
1st Cavalry
Division
controlled
a nondivfsional
155-m
that
could be lifted
by heavy transport
artillery
battalion
helicopters.33
Lam Son 7lg
When the 1st Cavalry Division
deployed to Viet Nam in 1965,
It used the tactic
of terrain
flying--hugging
the ground with
air
a fleeting
target
for
ground
helicopters--to
present
This
procedure
worked
well
in
jungle
and
rough
terrain,
defense.
but in more open areas the enemy on the ground had more time to
principal
Because the
and to fire
on helicopters.
react
air-defense
threat
was small arms and automatic weapons fire
at

t64

at least some aviation

units began to fly above
low altitudes,
the effective
range of such weapons. Many observers argued that
such high altitude,
level
flight
would be suicidal
against
an
enemy with larger
and more sophisticated
air defense weapons.
One battle
in 1971, known as Lam Son 719, became the center of
the debate on the vulnerability
of helicopters
in combat.34
The purpose of Lam Son 719 (Map 9) was to destroy the North
Vietnamese base area in Laos, specifically
the large logistical
installations
around Tchepone.
This would forestall
a major
North
Vietnamese
offensive
to take control
of the northern
provinces
of the Republic of Vietnam.
I ARVN Corps planned to
make the main effort
with
the
1st ARVN Airborne
Division
conducting airmobile
operations
north of the Ye Pon River, while
the 1st Armored Brigade,
which was attached
to the airborne
The 1st
division,
advanced westward along Route 9 into Laos.
ARVN Infantry
Division
would conduct a secondary attack south of
the Ye Pon River, providing
fire support and flank protection
for
the main attack.
Finally,
a three-battalion
force of Vietnamese
rangers was responsible
for the northern
(right)
flank of the 1st
Airborne Division.
This plan had problems even before
the offensive
began.
First,
U.S. forces
to
the U.S. government would not permit
operate on the ground inside Laos, and thus the ARVN units had to
fight
for
the first
time without
their
American
advisors.
Although
most ARVN units were capable of such operations,
the
and
support
of air
absence of advksors
made eoordinatkon
airmobile
transport
much more difficult.
On the other hand, the
ARVN units depended upon American helicopters
and air support for
their mobility
and firepower.
U.S. Army aviation
and ARVN ground
which
as equals,
unit
commanders had to plan each operation
inevitably
slowed down the planning
process
even though both
sides tried to cooperate.
Terrain was another major handicap.
The Ye Pon River valley,
including
Route 9 that
paralleled
the river,
was the natural
avenue of approach between Viet Nam and Tchepone.
This valley
was so narrow that the 1st ARVN Armored Brigade lacked maneuver
space for its three armored cavalry
squadrons.
The valley
was
reduced
also a natural
air
corridor,
especially
when clouds
visibility
over the high ground on either
side of the valley.
The Ye Pon River was the most prominent
terrain
feature
for
helicopter
navigation.
As a result,
much air
traffic
was
and once the ARVN forces began their
channeled down the valley,
future
axis of attack was immediately
obvious to
advance, their
Huge ARVN convoys near the
the defending
North Vietnamese.
border gave the North Vietnamese ample warning of the projected
attack.

165

LAOS

x x
Is.
A

10 KM
SCALE

Map 9, Lam Son 719, February-March

i S. VET

1971.

NAM

For several
years prior
to Lam Son 719, the communists had
established
an integrated
air defense oriented
on the valley and
on the few natural
helicopter
LZs.
Nineteen
antiaircraft
artillery
battalions
were in the area, including
23-m,
37-m,
57-m,
and 100-m antiaircraft
guns, and 12.7-m
machine guns,
The antiaircraft
coverage was thickest
around the Tchepone supply
dumps.
In
addition,
the North
Vietnamese
had preplanned
artillery
fires
on all
likely
LZs.
The North
Vietnamese
reinforced
their
defenses during the battle,
reaching a total
of
twelve infantry
regiments,
two tank battalions,
and considerable
artillery
support.35
The result
was a "mid-intensity
war"
rather
than
a
counterinsurgency
operation.
attack
on 8
The ARVN began its
February 1971, but had to delay operations
the next day because
of poor weather.
Throughout the offensive,
air force air support
was often unavailable
because of low cloud cover.
Even single
helicopters
on medical evacuation or supply flights
needed armed
helicopter
support to suppress enemy air defense.
This in turn
strained
the available
resources of AH-l attack helicopters
and
forced the U.S. Army to use the slower,
more vulnerable,
and
generally
obsolete UH-16 gunships.
The helicopters
engaged North
Vietnamese
light
tanks,
destroying
six and immobilizing
eight.
At the same time, T-34
medium tanks overran the ARVN firebase
at LZ 31 after
repeated
attacks.
Because the U.S. and ARVN forces
had rarely
needed
large-caliber
antitank
weapons before this battle,
they had few
effective
defenses available.
The W.S. Army aviation
commander
for Lam Son 719 urged the army to renew its study of antitank
helicopters.36
After
several weeks of limited
success, the ARVN commander
Instead,
abandoned plans for a ground advance west of Aloui.
during
the first
week of March 1971, the 1st ARVN Infantry
of temporary
firebases
on the
Division
established
a series
escarpment along the southern side of the river.
On 6 March, two
battalions
of the 1st ARVN Airborne Division
air assaulted
into
LZ Rope,
This LZ was in the center of the enemy air defense
umbrella,
but the two battalions
lost only one helicopter
out of
120 in the attack.
These later
air
assaults
were carefully
planned and supported operations.
Strategic
and tactical
bombers
suppressed local enemy defenses and often created clearings
to be
Gunships and air-delivered
smoke
used as new, unexpected LZs.
screens protected the infantry
during their landings.
The ARVN accomplished
its mission,
destroying
the support
facilities
around Tchepone before withdrawing
with considerable
North
Vietnamese
losses.
This
delayed
a major
operation
offensive
for a year, but the cost seemed excessive.
In addition

to several infantry
battalions
virtually
destroyed,
the U.S.-ARVN
attackers
lost
a total
of 107 helicopters
shot down in six
weeks. Many observers cited Lam Son 719 as proof that akrmobile
operations
were too vulnerable
to enemy air defense and could not
be conducted in complex, mechanized wars.
Yet, these helicopter
losses must be evaluated
carefully.
one hundred and seven helicopters
represented
perhaps ten percent
of the number of U.S. Army aircraft
involved at any one time, but
only a small loss in an offensive
during which the U.S. Army flew
more than 100,000 sorties.
This was true even though many of
these sorties
were only short ?hop~.~~ The terrain
neutralized
most of the advantages of an air assault
force,
allowing
the
defender to focus his attention
on a few critical,
areas through
which the advance and withdrawal
had to pass.
This concentration
of antiaircraft
fires,
in combination
with poor weather,
forced
the helicopters
to avoid
terrain
flying
by increasing
their
altitude
to about 4,000 feet above ground level.
Finally,
since
have acquired
improved navigation
devices and
1971, helicopters
more survivable
mechanical
designs.
Similar
circumstances
of
weather and terrain
might still
hamper air assault
operations,
but Lam Son 719 by itself
did not definitely
prove such
operations
to be impossible.37
Certainly
the other NATO powers
and the Soviet Union used the airmobile
experience of Vietnam to
help in the development of their own army aviation
doctrine.
The Nato Powers
For fifteen
years after
1945, the military
policies
and
posture
of Western European powers resembled those during
the
same period after
1918. The war had exhausted the Europeans, who
were reluctant
to finance major new weapons systems for their
armed forces.
The Allies
allowed West Germany to rearm only
after a decade of occupation,
and even then only because of the
conflict
between East and West.
The new Bundeswehr could not
afford
to mechanize all its formations
in accordance with the
experience
of World War II,
and so the first-line
units
had
different
equipment and tactics
fran
the other German ground
forces.
France and Britain
had even greater problems, developing
a fully
mechanized force
three elements within
their
armies:
committed to defense of central Europe, a less-equipped
conscript
and reserve
home, and a lightly
but
force
at
equipped
well- brained
and strategically
mobile
element for
conflicts
outside of Europe.
Such conflicts
and the demands of strategic
mobility
encouraged British
and French interest
in light
tanks
and armored cars that might be used both at home and abroad.
In the 196Os, the end of conscription
in Britain
and the
gradual termination
of counterinsurgency
wars abroad caused both
the British
anal French armies to reorient
on defense in Europe.

168

Even then, democracies were naturally

suspicious
of "'offensive"
weapons such as tanks, preferring
to develop Mdefensive"
weapons
such as the antitank
guided missile
(ATGH). The Freneh SS-11 was
the first
effective
ATGM in NATO, and many nations including
the
United States adopted it during the early 1960s.
Britain,
France, and West Germany all accepted the concept of
combined arms or "all-arms
cooperation"
as a principle
of
tactics.
This similarity
of concept was reflected
by some
SFmilarity
in
All
large-unit
organization.
three
armies
converged on fixed combined arms forces that in U.S. terms are of
brigade
rather
than divisional
size.
By contrast,
within
the
U.S. ROAD division,
brigades might change their
configuration
to
adjust
to different
situations
and missions.
The evolution
of
the fixed European brigade may be a result
of orientation
on the
single mission of mechanized operations
in Europe.
In any event,
this evolution
deserves a brief review.
At the end of World War II,
the British
Army retained
its
two-brigade
armored division
and three-brigade
infantry
division
with only minor changes.
The mixture of three tank and one motor
battalion
in an armored brigade, and three infantry
and one tank
battalion
in an infantry
brigade, allowed for cross-attachment
at
battalion
and company level.
The resulting
combinations
would be
in the proportion
of three companies or platoons of one arm with
one of another.
During the 195Os, the British
Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) developed
a '"square brigade"
structure
that
was more
Each brigade then
suitable
for a variety
of tactical
situations.
eonsisted
of two tank and two mechanized infantry
battalions.
These brigades came to have a fixed organization
of other arms,.
generally
including
a 10%mm artillery
battalion,
two engineer
companies, and more service support than any other NATO brigade.
Although these units might nominally
belong to the division
as a
Thus,
whole, they were habitually
assigned to specific
brigades.
the
two levels
of
command, division
and brigade,
became
disappeared
or became
redundant.
Many brigade
headquarters
"field
forces"
in 1977-78.
This,
plus the needs of economy,
prompted the BAOR to reduce the division
to only six maneuver
battalions--three
tank and three mechanized infantry--in
1982.
Pairs of tank and mechanized infantry
battalions
still
carried
the designation
of "brigade,"
and might control
a sem2-permanent
This
arms.
combination
of artillery,
engineers,
and other
structure
bore a considerable
resemblance
to the 1943 U.S.
level
of
armored division.
Outside of the BAOR, the brigade
COlTlIMnd was more important.
Although
designated
divisions
existed
in the United Kingdom, the deployable
unit was usually
the infantry
brigade,
consisting
of approximately
five infantry
battalions
plus other arms.38

169

As late as 1954, the French Army, whose Free French divisions

had been equipped by the U.S. during World War II,
retaFned the
equipment and organization
of the U-S. armored division.
After
the Algerian War ended in 2961, the French Army renewed its study
of mechanized operations
and organizations,
eulminatjng
in the
Type-67 (1967) mechanized division
consisting
of three mechanized
brigades . Each of these brigades,
like their German and British
counterparts,
had a permanent structure.
The brigade
included
one main battle
tank battalion,
two mixed mechanized battalions,
a self-propelled
artillery
battalion,
and an engineer
company.
As in the case of Britain,
this structure
for European operations
was so fixed that the brigade and division
levels of command were
somewhat redundant.
As a result,
in the mid-1970s,
the French
Army began to convert
all
of its units
to a new structure,
labeled a division,
that was in fact an oversized
brigade.
The
armored division,
for
example,
consisted
of only 8,200 nen,
organized
into
two tank,
two mechanized,
one artillery,
one
and one headquarters
and service
battalion.
engineer,
The
infantry
division
within
France became even smaller,
totaling
6,500 men in three
motorized
infantry
and one armored car
battalion,
plus other
arms as in the armored division.
The
French hoped that this smaller division
structure
would be more
responsive
and fast-moving
on the nuclear battlefield.
For the
French Army, the function
of armored divisions
in such a battle
was to cause the enemy forces to mass and present a vulnerable
target for French tactical
nuclear weapons.39
One of the unique aspects of French Army structure
during the
1960s and 1970s was the organic
combination
of different
arms
withfn one battalion.
The French began experiments with combined
arms battalions
in the early 19609, culminating
in the mixed or
"tank-infantry"
Within
this
battalion,
two
battalion
of 1967.
light
tank companies each consisted of four tank platoons plus an
while two meehanzzed infantry
antitank
guided missile
platoon,
compani.es had three mechanized platoons each.
The two types of
companfes cross-attached
platoons
for tactical
operations.
The
battalion
headquarters
controlled
arms,
including
other
Use of the
communications,
reconnaissance,
and mortar platoons.
same basic vehicle chassis simplified
the maintenance problems of
that
all
elements
had uniform
each battalion
and ensured
mobility,
First
the AMX-13 and later
the AMX-10 family
of
armored vehioles
included
compatible
vehicles
for light
armor,
ATGH launchers,
and infantry.
The French had to extend greatly
the amount of training
given to junior
leaders to enable them to
control
three types of platoons.
This problem helped force the
French Army to reduce the size of both tank and mechanized
infantry
platoons
to three
vehicles
each, a unit
easier
to
because these tank-infantry
supervise
and control.
Finally,
battalions
could no longer provide infantry
support for pure tank
the medium or main battle
tank
battalion
in each
units,

170

acquired
an organic
brigade
mechanized
this tank battalion
company.
In practice,
the tank-infantry
battalions
because of
protection
against massed enemy attack.40

infantry
mechanized
often had to support
their
limited
armor

While France led the western powers in the integration

of
different
arms within the infantry
battalion,
West Germany led in
Based
the development of mounted infantry
integrated
with armor.
on the experience of World War II panzer-grenadiers,
the postwar
German commanders were determined
to provide
effective
armored
fighting
vehicles
for their
infantry.
The resulting
Marder was
the first
mechanized infantry
combat vehicle
(MICV) in NATO. The
Marder had a turret-mounted
automatic
cannon, NBC protective
German commanders
system, and gunports
for infantry
weapons.
intended
the mechanized infantry
to fight
from their
MICVs,
dismounting
only when necessary for special
operations
such as
patrols
or urban combat.
The German panzer-grenadiers
had the
smallest
dismounted squad size-- seven men--of any western army.
The Marder itself
became the base of fire
around which the
dismounted squad maneuvered as the assault team.
The German concept and design for a MICV drew considerable
attention
and imitation
both in the Soviet Union and in the other
members of NATO, Yet, if tanks and mounted infantry
operated as
the MICV required
the same
a team under all
circumstances,
mobility
and protection
as a tank, becoming in essence another
tank.
The British
Army had recognized this at the end of World
War II, when it had used a limited
number of Sherman tank chassis
The
heavy personnel
carriers.
without
turrets
as "Kangaroo"
Marder itself
went a long way in the same direction,
but its
weight of 27.5 tons made crossing
obstacles
difficult,
and its
production
cost prevented
the Bundeswehr from equipping
all
German infantry
with this vehicle.7
The Germans were also the only power to field
new armored
tank destroyers
during
the 19609, although
a decade later
the
The
those
tank destroyers
with
tanks.
Bundeswehr replaced
Jagdpanzer was organic to German brigades and sometimes carried
A gun-equipped
ATGMs as well as a 90-mm high-velocity
gun.
antitank
vehicle
of this type seemed too specialized
to maintain
especially
when ATGMs were so much more effective
in peacetime,
and flexible.
In the later
197Os, however, new forms of ceramic
armor protection
greatly
reduced
the
specialized
and other
effectiveness
of the shaped-eharge chemical energy warheads used
on most ATGMs and low-velocity
guns. The shaped-charge round was
not totally
useless,
because no nation
could afford
to use
ceramic armor on all its combat vehicles,
or even on all surfaces
of main battle
tanks.
Still,
the tank or a high-velocity
gun on
weapon against
a tank surrogate
was again the most effective
enemy tanks, and infantry
units were potentially
more vulnerable

171

to armored attack than they had been since 1943. Both high-and
low-velocity
antitank
weapons can neutralize
the armor
of
existing
MICVs, but nothing
the mechanized infantryman
has can
effectively
neutralize
ceramic-armored
tanks.
Further
weapons
development
must occur before
the low-velocity,
man-portable
antitank
weapons that were so popular
in the 1970s can again
compete
on an equal
basis
with
tank
or
tank
destroyer
high-velocity
guns.
From Home Defense to Blitzkrieg:

The Israeli

Army to 1967

In four wars and numerous undeclared

conflicts
sinee 1948,
Israel
has become famous as an expert practitioner
of highly
mechanized
to understand
the
combined arms warfare.
Yet
strengths
and weaknesses of the Israeli
Defense Forces
we must
remember the origins
of those forces.
In
the
Israeli
portions
of
Palestine
1948,
d eelared
independence from Great Britain
while under attack by their Arab
neighbors.
At the time, the Israeli
armed forces were a loose
eonfederation
of self-defense
tilitia,
anti-British
terrorists,
and recent
immigrants.
A number of Israelis
had training
as
small-unit
leaders,
both in the local defense forces and in the
British
Army of World War II.
What Israel
lacked were commanders
with
experience
or formal
training
in
and staff
affieers
battalion
or larger
unit operations.
Even after
independence,
Great Britain
would allow only a few Israelis
to attend British
military
schools.
Moreover,
until
the 1960s Israel
could find
neither
the funds nor the foreign
suppliers
to purchase large
quantities
of modern weapons.
As a result,
the Israeli
Army of 1948-56 was an amateur army,
poorly
trained
and equipped.
It
relied
on its
strengths
Ln
small-unit
leadership
and individual
initiative,
strengths
that
were sufficient
for self-defense
until
the Soviet Union began to
supply Egypt with large quantities
of modern heavy weapons. The
honored elite
of this light
infantry
army ware the paratroopers
of 202d &rigade,
who conducted
raids
into
Arab territory.
throughout
its history
Israel
has always assigned the
Indeed,
cream of its army recruits
to the airborne brigades.
Noshe Dayan became Chief of Staff
of this unusual army in
1953.
In 1939, Dayan had been one of a number of Jewish
small-unit
self-defense
soldiers
unauthorized
who received
training
from Capt. Orde Wingate, the erratic
British
genius who
British
attacks
in the jungles
of
later
founded
long-range
Burma e During the 1948 War of Independence,
Dayan eommanded the
89th Mechanized
Commando Battalion,
a ragged
collection
of
half-tracks
and light
vehicles
that conducted daring raids into
While visiting
the United States,
Dayan by
Arab rear areas,

172

chance met Abraham Baum, the famous World War II tank company
commander who had led a small raiding
party behind German lines
to release
American prisoners
of war at Hammelburg, Germany.
Baum's account
of American armored tactics
in World War II
reinforced
Dayan in his belief
in speed, mobility,
and commanders
going forward
to make decisions
on the spot.
Thus, Dayan
discovered
that his own ideas were in part a reinvention
of the
principles
used by both Americans ard Germans in World War II.42
Dayan's
vulnerability

genius in the 1956 war lay

to rapid attacks:

in his

recognition

of Arab

The Egyptians are what I would call schematic in their

and their headquarters
are in the rear, far
operations,
from the front.
Any change Fn the disposition
of their
switching
units,
such as forming a new defense line,
targets
of attack,
moving forces not in accordance with
the original
plan, takes them time--time
to think,
time
to receive reports
through all the channels of command,
time to secure a decision
after
due consideration
from
supreme headquarters,
time for the orders then to filter
down from the rear to the fighting
fronts.
We on the
flexibility

other hand are used to acting with

and less military
routine
e . .43

greater

The Egyptian defenders of the Sinai desert in 1956 occupied a

string
of positions
at key terrain
points lacking both depth and
flank
security.
These defenses were vulnerable
to outflanking
Israeli
movements and lacked a large
counterattack
force
to
Dayan planned
to disorganize
and ultimately
support
them.
collapse
the defense by rapid
thrusts
at Egyptian
lines
of
communication.
Still,
the instrument
that Dayan planned to use for the 1956
On the contrary,
he
campaign was not a mechanized force.
depended on the Israeli
strengths
in small-unit
leadership
and
An airborne
drop at the critical
light
infantry
operations.
Mitla Pass would assist the ground infantry
columns, which moved
across the desert in commandeered commercial vehicles,
plus a few
light
tanks and artillery
Israel's
only
pieces.
Initially,
armored brigade,
the 7th, remained in reserve,
with no mission
except to use its tank guns as additional
indirect-fire
weapons.
The 7th was a fairly
ty ical armored brigade of the immediate
post-World
War II
period. f 4 It
consisted
of a battalion
of
of AMX-13 light
tanks,
a
Sherman medium tanks,
a battalion
battalion
of
half-track
mounted infantry,
a reconnaissance
commander,
The brigade
battery.
c-paw 9 and an artillery
Col. Uri Ben-Ari,
was dissatisfied
with his symbolic role,
and

173

almost derailed
the entire
Israeli
plan by erossing
the border
too early.
His reconnaissance
company penetrated
the poorly
guarded Dyka Pass on the southern
flank
of the key Egyptian
position
of
Abu Aghe ila -Urn Katef
(Map 10).
Al though
this
reconnaissance
indicated
that the road thraugh the pass would
support only a few vehicles,
Ben-Ari took a calculated
risk and
committed his three cross-attached
task forces on three different
axes to fracture
the Egyptian defense.
Task Force A attacked in
vain against
the sauthern side of the Urn Katef, defenses ) where
two other Israeli
brigades were already making expensive frontal
to the southwest,
towards the
assaults e Task Force C exploited
Suez Canal.
Ben Ari sent Task Force B, consisting
of one company
of Sherman tanks and one company of mechanized infantry,
through
the Dyka Pass and into the middle of the Egyptian position.
The
task force commander I Lt. Col. Avraham Adan, held this pssition
against limited
Egyptian attacks from two directions
and strafing
by his own aircraft.
Only the 7th Brigades
artillery
battery
gave Adan effective
support.
This small task force
greatly
discouraged
and confused the Egyptian defenders in the area, who
felt that their line of communications had been cut.
The frontal
infantry
attacks were therefore
able to overrun the Egyptians.
The 7th Armored Brigade did not win the 1956 war by itself 8
yet its actions at Abu Agheila and elsewhere convinced Dayan that
armored forces were a superior
instrument
for future
wars of
maneuver e During the decade after
1956, the Israeli
Defense
Forces gave the armored corps almost as high a priority
for men
and material
as the air
force and paratroopers
received,
As
deput.y commander of the Armor Corps from 1956 to 1961, and
commander after
1964, Israel
Tal shaped Israeli
armor into an
effective
force.
Tal soon discovered
that complicated
armored
tactics
and equipment required the same discipline
and methodical
maintenance that had long been common in western armies,
but
which were rare in Israeli
forces,
The main problem was that Israel
lacked the resources
to
maintain
a superior
air force and elite
paratroop
element while
still
developing
a balanced
mechanized
army.
Tal got
the
government to purchase modern American and British
tanks and to
improve the older Shermanst but the rest of the armored force
suffered.
Most of the Israeli
infantry
still
rode in the
?94T-vintage
H3 American half-track,
a vehicle
with no overhead
protection,
limited
side armor, and increasing
maintenance and
mobility
problems
as
it
aged.
Tal
insisted
that
the
tank-mechanized
infantry
team was a European tactic
that was less
important
in the Middle East.
In the open spaces of Sinai,
Israeli
tanks needed less infantry
security
against
short-range
enemy antitank
weapons. To Tal, infantry
was useful for reducing
bypassed centers of resistance
and mopping up after
the battle,
Otherwise ) he agreed with the British
in North Africa
who had
considered ordinary infantry
more a burden than a help. 45

174

TO SUEZ CANAL

iI
10

SCALE

Map 10. 7th Armored Brigade at ABU AGHEILA,

84-3330

-175-

1956.

20 KM

The Six Day War of 1967 seemed to confirm these arguments.

The set-piece
attacks
conducted by teams of Israeli
infantry,
paratroops,
artillery,
and tanks to break open the Egyptian
border defenses were forgotten
in the euphoria of another armored
exploitation
to
The technology
of
the
Suez Canal.
1941
half-tracks
could not keep pace with the technology
of 1961
tanks, either
under fire or across difficult
terrain.
The close
and constant assistance
of the Israeli
Air Force made army air
defense and field artillery
seem unimportant,
especially
in fluid
operations
when the Air Force could arrive more quickly than the
artillery
could deploy.
Consciously or otherwise,
Israel came to
rely largely on the tank-fighter-bomber
team for its victories.
Israel:

The Failure

of Combined Arms, 1967 to 1973

Many of these trends continued and intensified

after the 1967
The Israeli
armored force grew from nine armored and
success.
two mechanized brigades in 1967 to an estimated
sixteen armored
The
rest of the
and four to eight mechanized brigades by 1973.
relatively
size
e
remained
stable
in
Because
Israeli
army
doctrine
regarded the tank as the best means of defeating
other
tanks, the Israeli
Defense Forces refused an American offer
to
supply new TOWATGMs.~~
in
the Israeli
Armor became the main avenue for promotion
Aside from the small number of paratroop
units,
no
mechanized infantry
officer
could expect to command above company
Israel
level
without
first
qualifying
as an armor officer,
distinguished
between paratroop,
conventional,
and mechanized
infantry,
with the latter
being part of armor branch, but having
Most conventional
and
the lowest priority
for quality
recruits.
where they
were in
the reserve,
infantry
units
mechanized
For example, the
received less training
and priority
than tanks.
three armored brigades
located
in the Sinai when the 1973 war
began had all
their
tanks and crews at a high
level
of
availability,
but their mechanized infantry
components were still
These brigades went into battle
as
in the unmobilized
reserve.
almost pure tank forces.lf7
Army.

As commander of the armor corps from 7969 to 1973, Maj. Gen.

"Bren" Adan, the task force commander at Abu Agheila in 1956,
He assigned higher quality
tried
to reverse these developments.
recruits
to the mechanized infantry
forces of the Israeli
Army,
only to have those recruits
seek reassignment
away from such an
Adan also tried to obtain large numbers of
unprestigious
branch.
Ml13 armored personnel
carriers
to replace the dilapidated
M3s.
Upon becoming chief of staff
in 1972, Gen. Israel
Tal opposed
Tal argued that
the true role of mechanized
this
purchase.
if it had a role, was to fight mounted, as in the West
infantry,
the
Ml 13 was a considerable
Although
German doctrine.

176

improvement
over the M3, neither
vehicle
had enough armor
protection
and firepower
to act as the MICV Tal sought.
The
Chief of Staff therefore
opposed spending scarce funds on a good
but not perfect
vehicle.l18
Israel
continued
to emphasize the
tank and the fighter-bomber
to the neglect of other arms.
This neglect
was also apparent in Israeli
unit structures.
Despite the great increase
in the Israeli
Army, all
echelons
above brigade remained ad hoc task forces , rather than deliberate
designs to integrate
an appropriate
balance of arms.
contrast,
the Egyptian
Army carefully
analyzed
its
By
weaknesses and strengths
between 1967 and 1973.
Indeed,
one
reason for its initial
success in the 1973 war was that for the
first
time the Arabs initiated
a war with Israel
according
to a
detailed
plan,
rather
than having Israel
conduct a preemptive
Anwar Sadat recognized
that a holy
attack.
Moreover, President
war to destroy
Israel
completely
was impossible.
In 1972 he
appointed a new staff and commanders to plan a rational,
limited
war .49
This staff
recognized
the same problems
that
Dayan had
exploited
since 1948. Egyptian leadership
and control
procedures
could not react quickly
to sudden changes in mission,
and the
Egyptian troops became demoralized
rapidly
in a maneuver battle
where Israeli
troops could bypass them and attack from unexpected
directions.
The classic World War II solution
to this problem would be to
prepare the troops psychologically
to continue
fighting
when cut
off and surrounded,
and then develop a defense-in-depth
to absorb
Israeli
armored attacks
before they could penetrate.
Yet
the
Egyptians
recognized
the lack of cohesion and mutual trust
in
their
units and, therefore,
sought a different
answer to their
problem.
They planned to force the Israelis
to attack Egyptian
positions
at a time and place of the Egyptians
choosing.
This
would allow the Egyptian soldier
to fight at his best, stubbornly
defending his own position
from frontal
attack without
worrying
about his flanks
or his
fellow
soldiers.
To do this,
the
Egyptians planned a surprise
attack across the Suez Canal, the
line of contact
between Egypt and Israel
since the 1967 war.
This attack would isolate
the small Israeli
outposts known as the
Bar Lev Line along the eastern bank of the canal.
Egyptian
units that were not involved
in this attack
surrendered
their
ATGMs and surface-to-air
(SAM) missiles
to the assault echelons,
who therefore
had three
times the normal complement of such
The first
waves of these well-armed troops rushed about
weapons.
four kilometers
east of the canal and then set up defensive
positions.
When
local
Israeli
reserves
the
armored

177

counterattacked
to
relieve
the
Bar
Lev
outposts,
missile-armed
Egyptian
infantry
faced perfect
targets
of
tank units without infantry
or fire support.

the
pure

The decision
to defend only a few kilometers
east of the
canal also enabled the Egyptians
to seek shelter
under the
integrated
air defense system that
they had constructed
with
Soviet materials
on the western bank.
Israeli
aircraft
suffered
heavily when they tried
to support their
armor inside the range
of the Egyptian SAMs.
The Egyptians also profited
from the famous Israeli
method of
command, which depended on leaders
operating
well forward
and
communicating with each other in a mixture of slang and codewords
on the radio.
The Egyptian
Army jammed many of the Israeli
command nets
and captured
codebooks
that
enabled
them .to
interpret
messages they
could
jam.
Moreover,
not
Israeli
commanders committed the classic
mistake of becoming personally
involved in local battles
instead of directing
their
troops.
On
the night of 8 October 1973, the third day of the war, an Israeli
brigade commander, battalion
commander, and artillery
commander
all risked themselves to rescue personally
the garrison
of one of
the outposts
that had escaped to the east.
Their involvement
showed an admirable concern for the safety of their
troops,
but
left them unable to coordinate
and control
the battle.50
The Arab armies also made mistakes in 1973. In contrast
to
the carefully
prepared Egyptian plan, Syria attacked on the Golan
Heights in a rigid carricature
of Soviet doctrine,
with all units
moving on a fixed schedule and no one assigned to mop up bypassed
centers
of resistance.
Soviet advisors
may have taught
these
tactics
because
Arabs
incapable
of
they
considered
more
sophisticated
operations.
Israeli
armor fought
these dense
that minimized
the target
masses from prepared tank positions
presented
to
the
Syrians.
The defenders
moved between
engagements,
rather
than leaving
their
positions
to maneuver
during a battle.
Although hard pressed, the Israelis
were able
to halt
and counterattack
the Syrians,
despite
the tremendous
initial
advantage the Syrians had in numbers and surprise.
Syria
then appealed to Sadat for help, and thus on 14 October 1973 the
Egyptians gave up most of their advantages by attacking
eastward
away from their
prepared infantry
positions
and air
into Sinai,
defense umbrella.
By this
time, nine days into the war, all
and the Israeli
forces in Sinai were fully
surprise
was lost,
mobilized and ready to fight.5'
'In the ensuing days, the Israelis
arrived
at
improvised
Airborne units functioned
solutions
to their immediate problems.
as
conventional
and even armored infantry,
because of the low
regard armored commanders had for their
own mechanized infantry.

178

After
counterattacking
and crossing
to the west side of the
canal,
the Israeli
forces concentrated
on eliminating
Egyptian
SAM sites,
destroying
the integrated
air
defense system, and
thereby allowing the Israeli
Air Force to provide more support.
Still,
the 1973 war completed the cycle in which the Israeli
Defense Forces almost exactly
repeated
the experience
of the
German Wehrmacht in the use and misuse of mechanized forces.
Like the Germans in World War I, the Israelis
before 1956 had
regarded tanks as specialized
weapons that they could not afford
to maintain.
In 1956 a few armored experts like Col. Ben Ari
showed the Israeli
commanders the value of mechanized units for
penetrating
and disorganizing
thin
enemy defenses,
just
as
Nineteen sixty-seven
Guderian had taught his seniors in 1939-40.
was the heyday of the Israeli
blitzkrieg,
but then, like
the
Germans before them, they came to rely on the main battle
tank
Once
and the fighter-bomber
to the neglect of the other arms.
their
Arab opponents developed more effective
means of antitank
and antiaircraft
defense and adjusted their defensive systems to
the threat
of armor penetration,
the Israeli
commanders found
mechanized operations
almost as difficult
as the Germans had
Blitzkrieg
was still
possible,
but it
found them in 1942-45.
required
much greater
combat power and much less reliance
on
confusion
than had been the case in earlier
psychological
eampaigns .
The Aftermath

of 1973

As the most significant

mechanized war since 1945, the 4th
Arab-Israeli
War of 1973 attracted
immense concern and study by
professional
soldiers.
The Israelis
all
themselves
were
understandably
reluctant
to talk about the detailed
problems they
had encountered.
The renewed Israeli
interest
in organic mortars
for maneuver battalions
and increased
procurement
of armored
personnel
carriers
certainly
indicated
that they placed greater
stress on the need for fire
support and mechanized infantry
to
support their armor.
the U. S Army was just
At the time of the
1973 war,
reorienting
its doctrine
and force structure
to deal with the
It was therefore
natural
that the U.S.
Soviet threat in Europe.
would seize upon the Israeli
example as an indicator
of future
For much of the 1970s) the influence
of
tactical
problems.
Israeli
experiences
on the U.S. was evident in such areas as the
great emphasis placed on ATGMs and on fighting
from hull-down
positions
to wear down a numerically
superior mechanized opponent.
Yet the lessons of 1973 and indeed of the entire
Israeli
First,
the Israeli
Army is
experience
are sometimes obscure.
organized
and trained
to fight
only one type of war in a

relatively
narrow variety
of terrain;
conclusions
about the way
that the Israeli
Army fights
may not apply to some of the many
possible
situations
for
which the U.S. Army must prepare.
Second, as noted above, the Egyptian defensive
system along the
Suez Canal in 1973 was an artificial
one, carefully
crafted
to
use concentrations
of antitank
and air defense weapons that were
far above what any army in the world issues to its field
units.
Moreover, since 1973 the development of ceramic armor has made
the shaped-charge
warhead ATGM significantly
less
effective.
Third,
the Israelis
played into
Egyptian
hands by neglecting
combined arms organization
and practice,
producing
artificially
high tank losses that gave a mistaken impression about the future
role of armor.
What is clear from the 1973 war is that all weapons and arms,
and especially
high performance aircraft,
are quite vulnerable
on
modern battlefields.
This realization
simply reinforces
the need
for mutual support by different
weapons to negate the threats
posed to other arms.
To cite one obvious example, since 1973
of enemy air
defense has become a much higher
suppression
priority
for ground units if they wish to have friendly
rotary
and fixed-wing
aircraft
support the ground battle.
Thus in some ways, the experience
of the Israeli
wars
revalidates
the
experience
of
World
War II.
Successful
operations
in mechanized warfare require
not only combined arms
organization,
but also compatible equipment, so that all arms and
services
can move over the same terrain
with the same degree of
that
must ensure
the
protection.
Combined arms training
different
arms and the aviation
assets can actually
cooperate
ATGMs and air
with each other on a complicated
battlefield.
assault
or army aviation
units must be integrated
into existing
organizations
and practices,
instead of treated as special cases.

180

CONCLWSION
Summary
Prior
to World War I,
the various
combat arms existed
independently
of each other,
with
very little
doctrine
or
training
in
cooperation.
Thoughtful
professional
soldiers
frequently
discussed the concept of combining the different
arms
for mutual support,
but in practice
such combination
was the
exception
rather
than the rule,
at least
below the level
of a
division
or
corps.
In
there
particular,
was profound
disagreement over the organization
and role of field artillery
on
the battlefield
and the degree of cooperation
needed between
artillery
and maneuver forces.
notably
those of
Some armies,
Germany and Japan, became aware of the importance
of indirect
fire
to aid the infantry
while protecting
their
own artillery
from enemy fire.
Other armies, especially
the French, maintained
the tradition
of massed artillery
in a direct-fire
role
to
suppress enemy defenses at close range.
More generally,
professional
soldiers
were acutely
conscious
Of the effects
of the new firepower
developed during the previous
century.
doctrine
allowed
for
However, even where official
dispersion
and maneuver to minimize the attacker's
exposure to
firepower,
professionals
felt
compelled to accept the risks of a
relatively
dense attack.
They believed that the need for a quick
victory
and the inadequate
training
of their
conscript
and
reservist
troops left few alternatives
to such attacks.
After an initial
period of maneuver warfare in which prewar
doctrine
seemed to justify
itself
at
least
inpart,
European
nations
gradually
developed
the elaborate
trench
systems of
1915-18.
Restoring mobility
on the battlefield
required a number
of developments.
First,
all
armies had to apply and refine
procedures for indirect-fire
support.
Between 1915 and 1917, the
British,
French, and German field
artillery
learned how to place
massed fire
on any preplanned
target,
although
targets
of
opportunity
remained difficult
to engage.
Mapping and survey
techniques,
aerial
and ground forward
observer procedures,
and
concern for such variables
as weather,
ammunition
production
quality,
and the wear of the gun tubes all
became common.
However, this
preplanned
fire
was possible
only because of a
series of rigid
phase lines and schedules of targets,
with no
means to change the firing
once it began and little
opportunity
for the infantry
to communicate with its supporting
artillery.
infantry
regained
some of its
During
the same period,
firepower
and mobility
by developing the weapons and organization
Led by the French,
which have dominated that braneh ever since.
European armies produced and issued mortars and rifle
grenade

181

launchers
for indirect
fire,
automatic
rifles
and light
machine
and small caliber
accompanyd.ng guns
guns for mobile direct
fire,
to reduce enemy strongpoints.
With these weapons came the
familiar
infantry
structures
of today:
a section
or squad
integrating
rifles,
grenade launchers,
and an automatic
weapon,
and companies and battalions
combining such maneuver elements
with heavier
support
weapons.
The German Army then mastered
giving
infantry
the tactios
these new weapons and organization,
to advance or defend in a decentralized,
flexible
manner.
The
linear
deployment of infantry
that had been used to maximize
firepower
for three centuries
was no longer necessary; the target
that infantry
presented to enemy fire was thus reduced.
Developments
In Allied
artillery
and infantry
could not
and
changes
in
command, control,
accomplish
much without
communications.
Even if the artillery
succeeded in suppressing
the infantry
had to struggle
the power of enemy defensive ,fires,
forward
across No Man's Land with no means of communicating
either
with the guns or with higher headquarters.
Long delays
ensued while the advancing infantry
sent runners and telephone
messages up the chain of command and waited for decisions
to come
beck down that same chain.
General officers
had to command from
telephone
nature
of
inflexible
the
because
the
rear,
communications and the poor visibility
inside
the trenches made
Even when the
control
from the front
almost
impossible.
commander was able to receive
information
and communicate in a
artillery,
and reinforcements
all had to
timely manner, supplies,
cross
zones of destruction
produced
by the attacker"s
own
the
German
defenders
artillery
preparations.
By contrast,
accepted the risk of allowing
junior
commanders on the spot to
make independent
decisions
and even to commit the reserves
of
the
difference
in
their
increasing
parent
units,
thereby
decksion-cycle
times between French and British
attackers
and
immobilized
largely
Hence the
trenches
German defenders.
even when German infiltration
tactics
or the
opposfng armies,
Allied
artillery-infantry-tank-aircraft
team achieved
tactical
successes.
By 1918 most armies had come to imitate
the German doctrine
leaving
only lightly
held outposts
in the
of defense-in-depth,
forward area and thereby absorbing
enemy artillery
preparations
of
attacks
forward
of the intended
main line
and infantry
resistance.
Nevertheless,
present in 1918.
British
cavalry
forerunners
for
countries.

the seeds of future combined arms attacks were

German infiltration
tactics
in the west and the
acted
as
Palestine
both
exploitation
in
the mechanized doctrine
of thefr
respective

Between the world wars a number of factors

common to all
nations
hampered the development of such doctrine
and practice.
huge
and the
Anti-war
sentiment,
tight
defense
budgets,
stockpiles
of
1918
equipment
all
discouraged
innovation.
the extreme and contradictory
claims of
Confusing terminology,
various abrasive but visionary
theorists,
and constant changes in
technology
also made it difficult
for professional
soldiers
to
develop a rational
basis for changes in equipment, organization,
few armies stood still,
and doctrine.
Despite
such problems,
although they varied in the exact compromise they reached along
between military
conservatism
and total
the long continuum
mechanization.
Great Britain
could not afford
to become so mechanized that
its
battalions
were unable to function
in the low intensity
operations
required
to police the British
Empire.
This need for
one army to fight
in various types of war foreshadowed the even
greater
problems of the U.S. Army since
1945.
For Britain
plus the problems described
between the wars, this restriction,
above and a number of unfortunate
experiments with mechanization,
caused the nation that developed the tank to lose its lead In
armored
warfare
during
the
1930s.
Instead,
British
armor
a pattern repeated to some
developed in two divergen$ directions,
extent
in the French and American armies of the same period.
British
armor and cavalry officers
sought tanks that were lightly
armed and armored, providing
the mobility
to function
as armored
On the other hand, slow,
cavalry both in Europe and the empire.
heavily
armored
tanks were still
necessary
to support
the
no British
deliberate
infantry
attack.
As a consequence,
vehicles
or armored organizations
emphasized firepower.
Even the
somewhat by
its
mobility
British
infantry,
which
improved
developing
lighter
and more effective
weapons, lacked effective
Only the Royal Artillery
had such a
antitank
capability
in 1939.
capability,
and it had neglected the indirect-fire
experience of
World War I.
In Germany, the determination
of Heinz Guderian and other
plus the limited
support of Adolf Hitler,
produced
visionaries,
the panzer division.
Guderian built
a fully
mechanized force in
and
although
service
which all
arms were integrated,
the
maintenance
elements were never as mobile as the units
they
the traditional
combat arms
supported.
As in other
armies,
controlled
some of Germany's mechanized equipment, but two-thirds
of the available
armored vehicles
remained concentrated
in the
panzer divisions
by 1939.
Germany's first
tanks were in some
ways inferior
to those of France and Britain,
but the Germans
produced such equipment several years before the hasty rearmament
Thus, the panzer units had enough equipment
of their opponents.
in their hands before the war to train and experiment extensively.

Prior to 1937, the lead in mechanized warfare belonged to the

Red Army. From the Russian Civil War of 1918-21 to the present,
the Soviets have been remarkably
consistent
in their
doctrine.
This doctrine
envisioned
a "deep battle"
fought by combined arms
mechanized
formations
that
could
rupture
conventional
enemy
defenses and then simultaneously
attack
all
echelons
of that
defense with artillery,
paratroops,
air strikes,
and the maneuver
of mechanized "mobile groups."
However, the Red Army purge of
1937-41 was a maJor factor
which caused the Soviets
to fall
behind Germany, producing
the ineredible
unpreparedness
that
contributed
to the initial
German victories
of 194142.
If
the Soviet
Union was the most advanced in nilitary
doctrine
France
most
between
the
world
wars,
was the
conservative.
The French reserve system was inferior
in quantity
and quality
to that of 1914, reinforcing
French commanders in
their
belief
that only methodical,
set-piece
operations
of the
World War I variety
were possible.
The same reserve
system
prompted the French government to construct
the Maginot Line.
The purpose
of
this
line
the
Germans
was not
to hold
indefinitely,
but to act as a shield for French mobilization
and
as an anchor for French maneuvers in the low countries.
The cost
of French industry,
and the
of the Maginot Line, the limitations
French
distrust
of elite
armies
standing
all
delayed
the
formation
of armored divisions
until
the war began, denying
French soldiers
the experienee
and training
that their
German
counterparts
had gained in the last years of peace. When Germany
invaded France in 1940, French armor was largely
dispersed in an
or functioning
as mechanized cavalry
in
infantry
support role,
Belgium, too far from the main German thrust
to redeploy under
the rigid Freneh command structure.
In any event, France lacked
sufficient
troops to establish
an effective
defense-in-depth
and
maintain counterattack
forees to repel German penetrations.
The United States was heavily
under French influence
during
the 192Os, but did develop new structures
and doctrine
in the
following
decade.
The triangular
infantry
division
gave the
United States Army, at least on paper, a more mobile, responsive,
and strategically
deployable
force than it had had in World War
I.
Unfortunately,
the organizational
concepts of that division
Also
required
significant
modification
under the test of combat.
School far
during the interwar
years, the U.S. Field Artillery
outstripped
its
European
competitors
by inventing
the fire
that
allowed
massed artillery
to
direction
center
procedures
concentrate
rapidly
on targets
of opportunity.
Such centralized
and flexible
fire
direction
has been a major advantage of all
subsequent American field units.
the

Germany's initial
victories
in 1939-41 defined blitzkrieg
as
Although all armies
standard for mechanized combined arms.

184

eventually
developed the psychological
and technical
capability
to
react
to
the
blitzla?ieg,
the
principles
involved
had
The German panzer division
was a combined
considerable
merit.
arms mechanized formation
in which the balance between the arms
improved as the war progressed,
and in which all elements had
trained
to regroup and reorganize
to meet different
conditions.
The principal
role of this force was exploitation,
encirclement,
and pursuit
after a more conventional
attack penetrated
the enemy
This exploitation
defenses on a narrow, concentrated
frontage.
was not a random scattering
of forces;
German commanders strove
to focus
the actions
of their
subordinate
mechanized units
throughout
the battle,
seeking to disorganize
and encircle
the
enemy forces.
After
the success of 1940, the limited
German
capability
for close air support expanded to assist
the ground
units in such operations.
In German hands, these tactics
produced difficulties
that
In their
heyday,
were not Immediately
apparent
to observers.
German tankers
concentrated
on exploitation,
leaving
antitank
to defeat enemy armor.
From 1942 onward, by
gum 9 not tanks,
contrast,
the
Germans redesigned
thekr
equipment
to
Put
team for
both
increasing
responsibility
on the tank-aircraft
penetration
and antitank
defense.
When Germany's
opponents
developed effective
antitank
defenses and challenged
German air
superiority,
this
fell
apart.
system
Germany denied
the
infantry,
artillery,
and other elements of the panzer force the
production
priorities
that they needed to remain equal partners
with
the increasingly
sophisticated
German tanks.
Moreover,
limited
transportation
and maintenance assets had restricted
the
making sustained operations
such as
German force from the start,
those in the Soviet Union a tremendous strain.
Poor deployments,
training,
and command and control
were
largely
responsible
for the British
and French defeat in 1940.
both organization
and
The British
response was to readjust
training.
Gradually
infantry,
armor, artillery,
and antitank
forces became equal partners
in the British
armored division
at
home, although
the forces in North Africa
were too pressed by
At the same time, Gen. Bernard
combat to adjust
until
1942.
Montgomery led a group of officers
who used large-scale
exercises
to develop a common set of concepts and procedures for mobile
warfare.
Realizing
that the British
Army still
had slow command
Montgomery
considerable
branch
prejudices,
procedures
and
"stage-managed"
large unit operations
to ensure integration
of
The result,
while much
all elements of the combined arms teams.
less responsive
and fluid
than the German battlegroups,
at least
enabled the British
to use their forces to best advantage.
The Soviet Union also had to change its organization
and
training
in response to the German menace. German accounts of

185

the war in the east usually describe the Red Army during 1941-42,
the period
when Soviet
leadership
and staff
procedures
were
poorest,
and when the necessities
of the moment forced
the
Soviets
to abandon temporarily
their
prewar organization
and
Beginning in 1942, however, the Red Army rebuilt
its
doctrine.
tank and mechanized forces and retrained
its leaders to solve the
problems of penetration
and exploitation
against
the Germans.
Popular German accounts rarely
speak of these techniques,
which
the
became standard
by 1944-45.
In the deliberate
attack,
Soviets used deception operations
and selective
massing on narrow
frcrntages to achieve an overwhelming superiority
at a few points
even when they could not claim such superiority
across the entire
front.
A wave of task-organized
company- and battalionsized
units
then initiated
the offensive
by fighting
to develop
information
about the enemy and to occupy German outposts.
Combined arms assault groups reduced specific
strongpoints,
while
and
infantry,
heavy tanks, medium tanks, assault guns, engineers,
artillery
cooperated
to push rapidly
through the main German
Once this penetration
developed,
combined arms forward
defenses.
detachments
led
the
in rapid
larger
mechanized
formations
seeking to preempt German efforts
to organize a new
exploitation,
defensive line.
As remarked before,
the U.S. Army entered the war with a
triangular
infantry
division
that was designed
to adJust its
combat power by frequent attachment and detachment of specialized
the
that
commanders concluded
Unfortunately,
most
units.
infantry
division
was inc?apable of sustained
attack
or defense
Moreover,
without
such attachments
under all
oiroumstanees,
frequent
changes in these attachments
caused much inefficiency
and misunderstanding
between those attachments
and the gainPng
divisions.
Thus,
infantry
and armored divisions,
the U.S.
actually
mobile,
although
nominally
small
and strategically
fought as larger
formations
because of the habitual
attachment
and as'sociation
of nondivisional
armor, antitank,
antiaircraft,
field
artillery,
and transportation
assets,
At least
some of
these attachments
became organic to the division
strudtures
when
the U,S. Army recognized
the reality
of its practice
after
the
war.
The other
developments
of World War II were obvious
to
The shaped-charge antitank
warhead allowed all arms to
everyone.
acquire limited
capacity to kill
tanks with low-velocity
guns and
The demands of infantry
units for long-range
antitank
rockets.
defense and for armor support in the attack produced a number of
Most nations,
primarily
armored assault guns.
tank surrogates,
including
Germany, had considerable
,difficulties
in aehieving
because air commanders saw only
effective
air-ground
cooperation,
the inefficiency
and 1Fmited destructive
capacity
of close air
support,
while ground commanders appreciated
the rapid response

186

and psychological
effect
of such support.
Although this issue
did not prevent
temporary
cooperation
between air and ground
forces on the battlefield,
air-ground
problems were symptomatic
of the larger
difficulties
of coordination
and combination when
all operations
became joint
service,
and most combined the forces
of more than one nation.
Since 1945, the atomic bomb has called
into question
the
entire role of land combat and has certainly
made massing on the
World War II model quite dangerous.
In the 1950s and 196Os, the
Soviet response to this new development was to organize and equip
their
ground
forces
for
an armor-heavy
exploitation,
with
penetration
left
to nuclear
fires.
Since the late
I 960s)
however, the Soviets have recognized
the possibility
of renewed
conventional
warfare and have restudied
the lessons of World War
II while restoring
the balance of arms within their divisions
and
regiments.
The U.S. Army, by contrast,
faced challenges
not only from
nuclear
warfare,
but also from insurgencies
and a variety
of
other conflicts
around the world.
The necessity
to fight any war
any place at any time with only a handful of divisions
places a
tremendous burden on American doctrine
and organization,
a burden
rarely
understood
by America's
allies
or even the general
The skeleton
configuration
'of garrison
forces
in the
public.
later
1940s was inadequate
to fight
a limited
conventional
war,
while the pentomic division
structure
of the 1950s lacked the
in
flexibility
of
command and control
required
to fight
nonnuclear
environments.
The requirements
of flexible
response
to a variety
of possible
threats
go far to explain not only the
ROAD structure,
with its variety
of strategic
and tactical
task
but also the American emphasis on firepower
to
organizations,
make up for
inadequate
forces
and mobility
kn different
Airmobility
is another major new development that
environments.
promises to give the U.S. Army both firepower
and mobility
on the
but
only
if
the
strategic
battlefield,
the
U.S.
has
transportation
assets to move bulky helicopters
and large amounts
of supplies to an overseas battlefield.
Today Israel
and many of America's
NATO Allies
are not
confronted
with the prospect of conducting
extended contingency
operations
outside of their
own regions;
they need only limited
French, and
forces for such contingencies.
Thus, the British,
German armies have tended to standardize
on integration
of
fixed
levels,
producing
mechanized
assets
at smaller
unit
organizations
equivalent
in size to an American brigade
or
Israel
was also able to focus on a
armored cavalry
regiment.
limited
number of possible
conflicts.
The tremendous armored
successes of 1967 and the lack of resources in a small nation led
the Israelis
to repeat the error
of Germany in World War II,

187

-.

--

relying
on the tank and fighter-bomber
to the neglect
of the
other combined arms.
This error,
plus the limited
variety
of
terrain
and threat
that Israel
faces, make generalizing
lessons
fram the Arab-Israeli
wars to other
future
conflicts
rather
hazardous.
Trends and. Principles
Certain
trends
or
principles
recur
in
all
these
developments.
Some of these trends are so self-evident
that the
military
rarely
discusses
them, yet because they have survived
the test
of different
technologies
and armies over different
periods,
they merit some attention.
major armies have tended to integrate
more and more
First,
arms and services at progressively
lower levels of organization,
mobility,
capabilities
of
in
order
to
combine
different
protection,
and firepower
while posing more complicated
threats
Integration
does not necessarily
mean combining
to enemy units.
individual
weapons or even companies of different
arms together
in a permanent organization
in garrison;
indeed,
suoh a fixed
structure
would be almost as dangerous tactically
as the current
because battalions
and companies could not adjust
organization,
the balance of weapons in response to varying terrain,
enemy, or
To be effective
the different
arms and services
must
mission.
train
task
organization
together
at
changing
all
times,
frequently.
When making such changes in task organization,
however, it is more effective
to begin with a large combined-arms
unit, such as a division
or fixed brigade, and select elements of
that unit to form a speeifie
task force,
rather
than to start
and attach
nondivisional
with a smaller
brigade
or division
elements to that formation.
In the former case, all elements af
the resulting
task force are accustomed to working together
and
have a sense
of
identity
that
can overcome maw
unit
misunderstandings.
In the latter
ease, confusion and delay may
oeeur until
the nondivisional
attachments
adjust
to their
new
command relationships
and the gaining
headquarters
learns
the
capabilities
Frequent
and limitations
of these attachments.
especially
changes that are
changes in the partnership
of units,
not
practiced
in
inefficiency,
till
produce
peacetime,
kly
the need to adjust
the
misunderstanding,
and confusion.
proportion
of arms to different
tactical
situations
limits
the
degree to which those arms can be grouped together permanently.
One corollary
is that all arms and services
need the same
mobility
and almost the same degree of armor protection
as the
engineers,
field
units
support.
infantry,
they
Not only
and
air
defense,
but
also
logistics
units
need
to
be
artillery,
able to go where the tank units go in order to conduct sustained
operations.

188

Another corollary
is that the arms must be balanced within an
together
to
perform
according
to
a
organization,
grouped
Units above battalion
level
in which one
particular
doctrine.
arm dominates the others numerically
may be useful
in certain
specialized
arms
Similarly,
circumstances,
but lack flexibility.
and elites
of all kinds,
like the tanks and tank destroyers
of
have special
capabilities
that must be balanced
World War II,
against their vulnerability
when not supported by other arms.
A fourth
trend
is the continuing
problem of air-ground
cooperation,
Artillery
and infantry
learned to function
together
in World War I, and with much difficulty
tanks, antitank
weapons,
and antiaircraft
artillery
joined that team during an3
engineers,
the aircraft
is still
not integrated
Yet
after
World War II.
into the combined arms team. In three wars since 1941, the U.S.
Army and U.S. Air Force have had to develop ad hoc compromises
and procedures for air-ground
cooperation
because their peacetime
To some extent,
training
and doctrine
were always inadequate.
the development of the helicopter
has been an army effort
to
receives
low priority
in the air
acquire
a capability
that
force.
As General Howze argued at the time that the air assault
team developed,
We drew a parallel
to the indirect
fire
support
That
available
to the infantry
company commander.
gentleman
on battalion
4.2-inch
mortars,
had call
division
155~mm and eight-inch
brigade 105mm howitzers,
Even so, he would not
howitzers,
and 240~mm howitzers.
crummy little
platoon
of three
81-mm
give up that
mortars that was part of his own company. For he had to
ask no one's permission
to use them--they
were totally
responsive,
always available,
a precious
asset
even
though a small part of the total
firepower
backing up
the infantry
company.1
The United States is not unique in suffering
this problem; even
the German Luftwaffe
and army had similar
disagreements
during
World War II.
Until the legitimate
concerns of both services are
adjusted,
air support of ground forces will remain a broken reed
at the start of each new conflict.
A final
problem of combining the different
arms and services
The
is the difficulty
of defense against
enemy penetration.
in 1939-42, and the Egyptians in
Germans in 1915-17, the Allies
Few armies have
1956 and 1967 have all suffered
in this regard.
the time and troops in peacetime to train in the establishment
Of
to prepare their
troops psychologically
a true defense-in-depth,
as well as technically
to continue to fight
when penetrated
and
bypassed by enemy forces.
In the mid-1970s,
the U.S. Army

189

conducted
such preparation
as part
of the ""Active
Defense'$
who considered
doctrine
in Europe, only ta be maligned by critics
that
doctrine
too oriented
on defense and on firepower.
If
in combined
anything,
however, the true test of an army's skill
arms is its ability
to reorient
and orchestrate
the different
arms under the pressure of a fast-moving
enemy attack.

Abbreviation
used in the notes:
Combined
CARL-U.S. Command and General
Staff
College
Research Library,
followed by the document call number.

Arms

INTRODUCTIONENDNOTES
1.
2.
3.

Gerald Gilbert,
The Evolution
of Tactics
(London,
1907),
183-84.
John F. C, Fuller,
The Foundations
of the 'Science of War
(London, 19251, 148.
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations
(Washington,
1982), 7-4.
CHAPTERONE ENDNOTES

Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb,

rev. and enl. ed. (Bloomington,
IN, 1973), 82.
132.
2. Ibid..
E, Showalter,
Railroads
and Rifles:
Soldiers,
3. Dennis
Technology
and the Unification
of Germany (Hamden, CT,
19761, 75-139.
4. David- Woodward, Armies' of the World, 1845-1914 (New York,
1978)) 30, 46, 74. Actual
forces
in maneuver units were
about half the size of these totals.
5. David G. Chandler,
The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York,
19661, 351-63.
structures
are
derived
6. The division
discussed
here
primarily
from James E. Edmonds and Archibald
F. Becke,
Operations
France and
History
of the Great War: Military
Belgium, 1914, vol. I, 3d ed. (London, 1933), 6-7, 490-97.
division
organization,
see A.A.
Strokov,
For Russian
Vooruzhennye Sily
i Voennoe Iskusstvo
v Pervoi
Mirovoi
Voine [The Armed Forces and Military
Art in the First World
On machine gun
War] (Moscow, n.d.1,
142, 144-47, 588-89.
organization,
see Wilhelm
von Balck,
Development
of
Tactics-World
War, trans. Harry Bell (Fort Leavenworth, KS,
19221, 176.
7. Pascal Lucas, L'Evolution
des Idees Tactiques en France et
en Allemagne Pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918, 3d ed. rev.
(Paris,
19321, 29.
Howard,
War:
The German
8. Michael
The France-Prussian
Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York, 19691, 156-57.
6; H. Burgess, Duties of Engineer
9. Lucas, Id&es Tactiques,
Troops in a General Engagement of a Mixed Force, Occasional
Papers No. 32, U.S. Army Engineer School (Washington,
DC,
1908), 20, 28-32.
War, 85-117.
LO. Howard, France-Prussian
Attack:
A New Look at
11. Jonathan M. House, "The Decisive
French Infantry
Tactics
on the Eve of World War I,"
Military
Affairs
40 (December 1976): 164-65.
31.
12. Balck, Tactics,
World War I (New York,
13. See, for example, S.L.A. Marshall,
19751, 76-88, 100-5.
1.

191

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

Henri Bonnal, La premiere bataille;

le service de deux ans;
Du carac&re
chez les chefs;
Discipline-Arm&e
nationale;
(Paris,
19081, 59-60.
Cavalerie.
165-67.
House. "Decisive Attack,ff
Woodward, Armies, 30-33; Lucas, Idles Tactiques,
31-34.
Wilhelm von Leeb, Defense,
trans.
Stefan T. Possony and
62;
Lucas,
Id&es
Daniel Vilfroy
(Harrisburg,
PA, 1943),
Tactiques,
6.
Shelford
Bidwell
and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power:
British
Arnvy Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945
(Boston, 1982),
14.

19.

20.
21,
22.
23.

'"Artillery
in Small Wars: The
Robert
H. Scales,
Jr.,
Evolution
of British
Artillery
Doctrine,
1960-1914"' (Ph.D.
dissertation,
Duke University
1976), 308-17.
Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power,
10-11.
37.
Ibid.,
17; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques,
Marshall,
World War I, 44.
Brodie and Brodie, Crossbow, 126,
CRAPTERTWQENDNQTES

1.

2,
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

Ferdinand
Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans.
T.
Bentley Mott (London, 19311, 16-17,
80, 83.
Ibid.,
115.
Lucas, Id&es Tactiques,
Ibid,,
55-58,
Ibid.;
57-58, 103n; Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power,
101-7.
Balck, Tactics,
244,
Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks:
The Battle in Depth in
the West (London, 19401, 26, 30.
Victories
in France in 1918
John Mona&, The Australian
(New York, n.d.1,
124-25, 171-72.
The Guns in Action (New York, 19701,
Ian V. Hogg, Barrage:
28.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

15.

Wynne, If Germany Attacks,

19; Lucas, aIde/es Tactiques,
75.
The best account of this German defensive
system remains
Germany Attacks,
202-12.
See also
Wynne, If
126-29,
Wynne's hThe Development of the German Defensive Battle
in
on British
Defence Tactics,'"
The
1917, and its Influence
Army Quarterly
24 (1937):
15-32, 248-66; Balck,
Tacti=
151-68.
Battle,"
Wynne, '"The Development of the German Defensive
22-27.
Memoirs
Lucas, Idges Tactiques,
7.5-76; George C. Marshall,
of My Services in the World War (Boston, 19761, 61-63.
The Donkeys (New York, 1962), 77-82, 84-85,
Alan Clark,
145-49.
"Evolution
of a Close Ground-Support
Brereton
Greenhous,
Role for Aircraft
in World War I,"' Military
Affairs
39
(February 1975):
22-28.

192

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Bryan Cooper, The Battle

of Cambrai (New York,
19681,
107-20; Greenhous, "Evolution,"
25.
Activities
of the
George H. Raney, "Tank and Anti-Tank
German Army," Infantry
Journal 31 (1927):
151-58.
John Wheldon, Machine Age Armies (London,
19681, 24-26.
See also Samuel D. Rockenbach, "Tanks" (Fort
Meade, MD,
1922), 17; Balck, Tactics,
130-31.
Ian V. Hogg, The Guns, 1914-1918 (New York, 1971), 72-76.
Balck, Tactics,
39-40, 181.
Wynne, If Germany Attacks,
53-58; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques,
109.

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

John A. English,
A Perspective
on Infantry
(New York,
See also
230-31.
19811, 24-26;
Lucas, Id&es Tactiques,
Lazlo M. Alfoldi,
"The Hutier Legend," Parameters 5 (1976):
69-74.
Georg

Bruckmiiller,
The
German
Artillery
in
the
Break-Through
Battles
of the World War, 2d ed. trans.
by
J.H. Wallace and H.D. Kehm (n.d.),
41, 44-46.
Ibid.,
World War I,
49-50, 65-70, 73; S. L. -A. Marshall,
346-47.
Balck, Tactics,
186.
General Staff,
Historical
Branch War
U.S. War Department,
of
German Tactics,
1918
Division,
A Survey
Plans
(Washington,
DC, 19181, 12.
See also BruckmG'ller,
54,
73-74; Robert R. McCormick, The Army of 1918 (New York,
19201, 171.
by G.E. Kidde
Attacks,
trans.
Erwin
Rommel, Infantry
(Washington, DC, 19441, 177-204.
Soldier
Memoirs of an Unconventional
John F.C. Fuller,
(London, 19361, 253.
John Terraine,
To Win A War - 1918, The Year of Victory
(Garden City, NY, 19811, 45, 55-57.
This account of second Armageddon is based primarily
on
Cyril
Falls,
Armageddon, 1918 (Philadelphia,
1964) and on
W. Wavell,
Archibald
2d ed.
The Palestine
Campaigns,
(London, 1929).
Balck, Tactics,
188.
Ibid.,
259.
299-300; Rene/ Altmayer,
Ibid.,
37; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques,
Etudes de Tactique G&&rale,
2d ed. (Paris,
19371, 20.
U.S. War Department,
General Staff,
War College Division,
Order of Battle
of the United States Land Forces in the
War:
Expeditionary
Forces,
Divisions
World
American
George C. Marshall,
(Washington,
DC, 1931),
446-47;
Memoirs, 25, 61-63; John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the
World War, Vol. I (New York, 19311, 1Oln.

193

CHAPTERTHREE ENDNOTES
1.
2,

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

Constance M, Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter 6. Roots,

Planning Munitions
for War, The
The Ordnance Department:
United States Army in World War II (Washington,
1955), 205.
Tactical
iombat,
Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet
1939, Leavenworth Paper No, 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19811,
The Mechanization
of
17-20; John J. T. Sweet, Iron Arm:
Mussolini's
Army, 1920-1940 (Westport,
CT, 19801, 49, 73,
184.
Rapport Fait Au Nom de la Commission Charge/e
C* Serrg,
d'Enqu@ter sur les Ev&ements survenus en France de 1933 a
1945, Vol. 2, (Paris,
1947-51), 298-99, 313.
Harold Winton,
"General
Sir John
Sweet, Iron Arm, 17;
Military
Reform
1927-1938"
and British
Burnett-Stuart
(Ph.D. Dissertation,
Stanford University,
19771, 2-3,
Comment by General Sir George Milne, Chief of the Imperial
for
mechanized
I.926 FroFOSal
Staff,
on a
General
Quoted in Kenneth Gacksey, The Tank Pioneers
formations.
(London, 19811, 69.
318-41.
Fuller,.Memoi &,
95, 198.
Winton, ""Burnett-Stuart,"
War Office,
Field
Service
Regulations,
Britain,
Great
Operations
Cl9241 (London,
19241, 25; Great
Volume II:
War Office
Graham, Fire-Power,
261-74.
In the Wake of the Tank (London,
Giffard
LeQ. Cartel,
Winton, Burnett-Stuart,
4.
19351, 243, 251-55;
Regulations
Volume
II:
Field
Service
Office,
War
Operations
(19.24), 122-23; Great Britain,
War Office,
Field
Service Regulations,
Volume II:
Operations (P9291, 117.
'"Burnett-Stuart,"
Winton,
Harte1,
Ln 'the
Wake, 147-48;
198; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 81,
Cartel,
In the Wake, 227-28,
120-22;
Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 99,
Ibid.,
"Burnett-Stuart,'"
Winton,
132-4;
Macksey, Tank Pioneers,
341-64.
139,
Macksey, Tank Pioneers,
Winton,
509 and passim;
180-81.
of Tanks,
1933 to 1945
G. MacLeod Ross, The Business
(Infracombe,
UK, 1976), 81-137.
Helmut Kkotz,
Les Le9ons Militaires
de la Guerre Civile
en
Ross,
2d ed.
(Paris,
19371,
61-62,
85-93;
Espagne,
142,
Business of Tanks, 13C?-39; Nacksey, Tank Pioneers,
160-62.
and
Graham,
Bidwell
74-78;
English,
Perspective,
Fire-Power,
194-95.
Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power,
164-65, 198,

194

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Heinz Guderian,
1940, quoted in Guderian,
Panzer Leader
(NY, 19521, 105.
Germany, Ministry
of National
Defense, Command and Combat
Translated
by U.S. Army
of the Combined Arms, (1921-231.
General Service Schools (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19251, 107.
Ibid.,
23-24, 91, 116, 118.
Kenneth Macksey, Guderian:
Creator of the Blitzkrieg
(NY,
1975), 6-10.
Guderian, Panzer Leader, 24.
Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg
Story (NY, 19761, 77-79.
Macksey, Guderian, 65.
Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland (19391,
DC, 19561,
Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 20-255 (Washington,
Panzer:
The
Matthew Cooper and James Lucas,
28-30;
Armoured Force of the Third Reich (NY, 19761, 22-23.
Kennedy, Poland, 28.
in Support of
Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations
the Army, U.S.A.F.
Historical
Studies No. 13 (Maxwell Air
Force Base, AL, 19621, 33-36, 131-33.
Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 23.
Instruction
Sur 1'Emploi
de la Guerre,
France, Minis&e
Tactique des Grandes Unite/s (Paris,
19361, 16.
France, Ministere
de la Guerre, Instruction
Provisoire
sur
1'Emploi Tactique des Grandes Unitds (Paris,
1922), 23.
Ibid.,
24.
"Military
Clarke,
Technology
in Republican
Jeffrey
J.
Armored Force,
The Evolution
of
the French
France:
19691,
1917-1940"
(Ph.D.
Dissertation,
Duke University,
94-97.
Jean Baptiste
Estienne,
"Etude sur les missions des Chars
blind&
en Campagne," 25 May 1919, quoted in Georges Ferre',
Le De/faut de 1'Armure (Paris,
19481, 34-47.
Confe'rence Faite le 15 F&rier
1920 sur les Chars
Estienne,
d'hssaut (Paris,
19201, 37-38, 42.
Robert A. Doughty, "The
Messenger, Blitzkrieg
Story,
89;
Enigma of French Armored Doctrine,
1940," Armor 83 (Sep-Ott
1974):
41.
Charles de Gaulle,
Vers l'Arme/e de Metier
(Paris,
[1934]
1963), 97.
Clarke,
"Military
377;
Vol.
2,
Rapport,
Serrk,
Technology,"
152; Robert Jacomet, L'Armement de la France,
l-936-1939 (Paris,
19451, 123-26.
Ferre',
D&faut, 74-75.
Ministgre
de la Guerre, Instructions
(1936),
16, 18, 21,
82.
23, 44, 46, 111, 154; Clarke, "Mili .tary Technology,"
The Soviet concept of "Deep Battle"
is summarized in David
"Soviet
Operational
Formation
for Battle:
A
M. Glantz,
Perspective,"
Military
Review 63 (February 1983):
4.
as Military
Commander (NY, 19761,
Albert
Seaton, Stalin
62-63.

195

45.
46,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

56.
57.

58.

USSR, Commissariat of Defense, General Staff,

Field Service
Regulation,
1936 (Tentative)
translated
by U.S, Army War
College (typescript
19371, 4-6, 83-84.
A. Ryazanskiy,
"The Creation
and Development of Tank Troop
1966, no.
Tactics in the Pre-War Period,"
Voyennyy vestnik,
11: 25, 32.
A. Yekimovskiy and N. Makarov, "The Tactics of the Red Army
1967, no. 3:
in the 1920's and 1930's,"' Voyennyy vestnik,
Il.
Stalin's
War With
The Road to Stalingrad:
John Erickson,
Germany, Volume I (New York, 19751, 6, 19-20.
Messenger, Blitzkrieg
Store, 100.
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
18, 32.
This accaunt of Khalkin-Go1
is based primarily
on Drea,
Nomonhan, 23-86.
Staff,
War College,
General
U.S.
War Department,
Provisional
Manual of Tactics
for Large Units (Washington,
1922-23).
Service
Staff,
Field
General
U.S.
War Department,
Regulations,
U.S. Army, 1923 (Washington, 1923), 11.
John J. Pershing,
Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of
Superior
Board on Organization
and Tactics)
to
A.E.F.
ArEeF.,
16 June
Secretary
of War, General Headquarters,
to Major Malin Craig (concerning
1920; Fox Conner, letter
division
organization),
24 April
1920, copy in U.S. Army
Military
History Institute.
The primary sources for this discussion
of the triangular
division
development
are Kent R. Greenfield,
Robert R,
The
Palmer, and Bell I, Wiley, The Army Ground Forces:
United States Amy
Organization
of Ground Combat Forces.
in World War II
(Washington,
19471, 271-78;
Harry C.
46 (19391:
"The New Division,'
Infan try Journal
Ingles,
--Army Lineage
521-29; Janice E. MeKenney, -~
Field Ari~-:illery
Series (Washington,
1980), 255-61; U.S. Army, Headquarters
2d Division,
"Special Report Based on Field Service Test of
conducted by the 2d Division,
the Provisional2d Division,
U.S. Army, 1939," National Archives File 52-83.
and
Ernest F. Fisher,
Jr., Weapons and Equipment Evolution
its Influence
Upon Organization
and Tactics in the American
Army From 1775-1963 (Washington, 1963), 61-67, 77.
Blanche D. Gall,
Jean E. Keith,
and Herbert H. Rosenthal,
Troops
The Corps of Engineers:
The Technical
Services:
Army
in
World
War
II
United
States
and Equipment.
in
(Washington,
19581, 10-20; Paul W. Thompson, Engineers
Battle (Harrisburg,
PA, 1942).
On the development of fire direction
centers,
see McKenney,
Field
Artillery,
266-73; Riley
Sunderland,
"Massed Fires
56-59.
and the F.D.C.,"
Army 8 (19581:

196

59.

60.
61.

The primary
sources
for
this
discussion
of U.S. armor
between the wars are Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development
University
of
of American Armor, 1917-1940" (M.A. Thesis,
Wisconsin,
19681, 55-188; James M. Snyder (ed.),
History of
the Armored Force, Command, and Center,
Army Ground Forces
Study No. 27 (Washington,
19461, l-17; Mildred H. Gillie,
Forging the Thunderbolt:
A History
of the Development of
the Armored Force (Harrisburg,
PA, 19471, 37-178.
Co11 et al., Engineers,
17.
Frank D. Lackland,
"Attack Aviation,"
student paper written
at the Command and General Staff School (Ft. Leavenworth,
General Staff,
FM 100-5:
KS, 1931); U.S. War Department,
Tentative
Field Service Regulations-Operations
(Washington,
19391, 22.
See also Brereton Greenhous, "Aircraft
Versus
Cambrai
to
Yom
Kippur,"
Armor:
in Timothy Travers
and
Christon
Archer (eds.)
Men at War:
Politics,
Technology
and Innovation
in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 19821, 96.
CHAPTERFOUR ENDNOTES

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

15.

This critique
of the Polish campaign is based on Guderian,
Panzer Leader, 65-82; Kennedy, Poland, 130-35; and Cooper
and Lucas, Panzer, 25-28.
Kennedy, Poland, 61-62.
Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 24, 27, 29.
Kennedy, Poland, 28-30 and 133; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 89.
Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 27.
A Study of Warfare in Warfare
in Three
J. L. Moulton,
The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (Athens,
OH,
Dimensions:
19671, especially
61-63.
James E. Mrazek, The Fall of Eben Emael (Washington,
DC,
1971).
R. H. S. Stolfi,
"Equipment for Victory
in France in 1940,"
The Journal
of the Historical
Association,
55
History:
(February 1970):
l-20.
Ibid.;
Ferre, Le Defaut, 185-95.
Macksey, Tank Pioneers,
160-62.
Guderian, Panzer&Leader, 98, 101-2.
I. S. 0. Playfair,
F. C. Flynn, C. J. C. Molony, and S. E.
Vol. II:
The
The
Mediterranean
and Middle East:
Toomer,
Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941).
Historyof
the Second World War (London, 1956), 175.
Ibid.
; Ross, The Business of Tan&, 151.
of British
developments
after
Dunkirk
is
This discussion
sources:
Nigel
following
deriv ed largely
from
the
1887-1942 (New
The Making of a General,
Hamil ton, Monty:
Our Armoured Forces (London,
York, 19811, 394-545; Martel,
155-63, 199-201; and
Perspective,
19451 75-181; English,
am,
Fire-power,
230-34.
*;illery,
Bidwell
and
Grah
on ar
Ham11ton, Monty, 459-60, 533-55..

197

16.
17.
18.
19,

20.
21.

22.
23,
24.

25.

26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

Martel, Our Armoured Forces, 159-61.

Ibid.,
379-80.
The detailed
organization
is included
in
Great Britain,
War Office
letter
number 2O/GENj6059 (S.D.
11, dated 1 October 1942, CARL N-6136.
Playfair
et al.,
The Mediterranean
and Middle East, Vol..
I:
The Early
Successes Against
Italy
(to
May 1941)
(London, 19541, 261-68.
On equipment in North Africa,
see Playfair
et al.,
The
Mediterranean
and Middle East, Qol, II,
13-14, 173, lr
341-45;
Vol.
III,
27-28;
U.S. War Department,
General
Military
Intelligence
Service,
Artillery
in the
Staff,
Special
Series No. 6 (25 November 1942), 2-30;
Desert,
Macksey, Afrika Korps (New York, 1968>, 36, 39-41; Je A. I.
Agar Hamilton and L. C. F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles,
1941 (Cape Town, S.A.,
19571, 33-55.
General Staff,
Military
Intelligence
w,s, War Department,
Special
Bulletin
No. 36:
The Battle
of Salurn,
Service,
June 15-17, 1941 (Washington, DC, 19411, 26.
Great Britain,
Middle East Command, "Notes on Main Lessons
of Recent Operations
in the Western Desert,""
dated 10
August
1942.
Typescript
copy by U.S, War Department,
General
Staff,
Military
Intelligence
Service,
in CARL,
and Middle East,
N-3915; Playfair
et al., The Mediterranean
Vol. III,
213-14, 223-24, 254, 287.
Hamilton, Monty, 653-54, 680-81.
Ibid.,
732-844.
12-22;
fMoscow, nld.)l
A. Eremenko, The Arduous Beginning
U.S. War Department,
General Staff,
Military
Intelligence
Division,
Special
Bulletin
No. 2:
"Soviet-Finnish
War:
Qperatians
From November 30, 1939, to January 7, 1940"@
dated 10 January 1940, 62 document 2657-D-1054.
Road to
see Erickson,
On Soviet
reforms
in 1940-41,
"'Tactics
of the Soviet
Stalingrad,
13-49; A, Yekimovskiy,
Army During the Great Patriotic
War,'" Voyennyy vestnik,
1967, no. 4: 12.
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
32-34..
Guderian,
Panzer Leader,
138; Coaper and Lucas, Panzer,
40-42.
Martin
Van Greveld,
Supplying
War:
Logistics
from
Waklenstein
TV Patton (New York, 19771, 160-80; Daniel R.
"Polities
and Policy:
The War Department
Beaver,
for -Wheeled
and
Standardization
Program
Motorization
Vehicles,
Transport
1920-1940, It Military
Affairs
47
(October 1983): POP; Guderian, PanzerLeader,
The Soviet theory is summarized in N. Kobrin,
'"Encirclement
Soviet Military
Review, 1981, no. 8: 36-39.
Operations,"
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
173; V,D. Sokolovskiy
ted.),
translated
by Harriet
Soviet Military
Strategy
3d ed.,
Fast Scott (New York, 19?;), 163.

198

31.
32.

33.

Erickson,
341, 358; A. Ryazanskiy,
"Tactics
of Tank Forces
During the Great Patriotic
War,'" Voyennyy vestnik,
1967,
no. 5: 13-20; Sokolovskiy,
Soviet Military
Strategy,
165.
1942, captured
and
Stalin's
Order No. 306, 8 October
translated
by the German- Army, retranslate4
byU.S.
Army.
Copy in CARL N-16582.256.
E. Bolton, "Talks on the Soviet
Art of War: 2, Strategic
to Capture
Defence, The Struggle
the Initiative,"
Soviet Military
Review, 1967, no. 6: 45<.
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
442.
CHAPTERFIVE ENDNOTES

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7,
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

This
discussion
of
concepts
is
McNair's
based
on
Organization
of Ground
Greenfield,
Palmer,
and
Wiley,
Combat Forces, 271, 273, 185.
Ibid.,
356-59.
Ibid.,
307.
Ibid.,
322-35; Snyder, History of the Armored Force, 29-43,
U.S. Army, European Theater of Operations,
General Board,
"Organization,
Equipment,
and Tactical
Employment of the
Armored Division,"
Study No. 48 (Washington,
DC, n.d.),.
Appendix 1.
For an excellent
nontechnical
explanation
of antitank
design factors,
see John Weeks, Men Against
Tanks:
A
History of Anti-Tank Warfare (New York, 19751, 12-16.
Ibid.,
100-2, 67-69; Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning
Munitions,
355-61.
Green, Thomson, and Roots,
Planning
Munitions,
388-90,
402-4; Baily, Faint Praise, 12-38.
U.S. Amy, European Theater of Operations,
General Board,
"Organization,
Equipment,
and Tactical
Employment of Tank
(Washington,
DC, n.d.1,
Destroyer
Units,"
Study No. 60.
l-2, 10.
"Cooperation
of Self-Propelled
Artillery
Pave1 Rotmistrov,
Zhurnal
brontetankovykh
i
With
Tanks and Infantry,"
8-13, translated
by
mekhanizirovamykh
voisk,
1945, no. 7:
of the Army, G2, n.d.;
K. Novitskiy,
U.S. Department
"Coordination
Between Medium and Heavy Tanks in Offensive
by U.S.
40-43, translated
1947, no. 9:
Combat," Tankist
both
Copies
of
the
Army,
G2, n.d.
Department
of
translations
in Military
History Institute.
246-56,
Planning
Munitions,
Green, Thomson, and Roots,
283-86; Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 54 ff.
Richard M. Ogorkiewicz,
Design and Development of Fighting
Vehicles (Garden City, NY, 19681, 36.
Army Regulation
850-15, cited in Green, Thomson, and Roots,
Planning Munitions,
278.
On the M4 Sherman, see ibid.,
282-87 and 302-4; Baily,
Faint Praise, iii,
7, 41-48.
Ross, Business of Tanks, 213, 263-300.

199

16.

On Ultra and its limitations,

see Ralph Bennett, Ultra
in
the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944-45 (New York, 19791,
The
13-20;
Patrick
Beeslg,
Very Special
Intelligence:
Story of the Admiralty's
Operational
Intelligence
Centre,
1939-1945 (London, 19771, 63-65, 110-11.
17. F.H. Hinsley,
E.E. Thomas, C.F.G, Ransom, and R.C. Knight,
War:
Its
British
Intelligence
In
the
Second World
I (London,
Vol.
Influence
on Strategy
and Operations,
19791, 144,
18. Ibid.;
Vol. II (London, 19811, 582-87, 739-46; 757-63.
1975),
19. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York,
102-4.
Intelligence,
148 ;
British
VCFI. I,
et
al.,
20. Hinsley
Hamilton,
Monty, Vol I, 777; see also Aikeen Clayton,
E
1980);
H.W. Everett,
"The
Enemy Is Listening
(London,
British
Army Review 60 (December
Secret War In the Desert,"
197%): 66-68.
Corps:
The Emergency (To
The Signal
21. Dulany Terrett,
December 1941),
United
States
Army in World War II
(Washington, DC, 1956), 118-20, 141-47, 178-85.
to the General Board, 4 October
1945,
22. Eisenhower letter
reproduced
in U.S, Army, European Theater of Operations,
'"Army
Board,
General
The
Tactical
Information
Service,"
Study No. 18 (Washington,
DC, n.d.),
appendix.
translated
by Ruth
1. Chuikov, The Fall of Berlin,
23. Vasili
Risch (New York, 1968), 30-33.
Experience:
"Wartime
Alferov,
S.
f Ol? example,
24. See,
Corps )"
by a Rifle
Enemy Defenses
Breakthrough
of
",o,Y,;~;~s;l~i;seskiy
zhurnal,
1983, No. 3: 53-56.
Paper No. 7
Autumn Storm, Leavenworth
25.
(Ft. Leavenworth:KS,
1984).
see ibid.,
and
26, On the development of forward detachments,
N. Kireyev
and N. Dovbenko, "From the Experience
of the
of Tank (Mechanized)
Employment of Forward Detachments
zhurnal 1982, no. 9: 20-27.
co;ps;" Voyenno-istoricheskiy
The German Defeat in
to Berlin:
27. Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad
the East (Washington, DC, 1968), 17,
German Defensive Doctrine
28. Timothy A. Wray, Standing Fast:
on the Russian Front During the Second World War (Ml%8
Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1983), 162, 221-35.
Technical
Manual E
227, 273; U.S. War Department,
29. Ibid-,
15 Mar 1945
Forces,
30-451, Handbook On German Military
(Washing&on, DC, 19451, II-$,
II-14.
301. Wray, Standing Fast, 275, 298-30 13.
Guderian, Panzer Leader, 290-91; 249-51,
31. Ibid.;
(Oxford,
UK, 19801,
32. Richard E. Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry
22.
IV-9 to IV-13.
33. TM E 30-451, II-46 to X-51,

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

David M. Hazen, Role of the Field Artillery

in the Battle
of Kasserine Pass (MHAS thesis,
Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19731,
38-42,
77-79,
147, 174-75,
187; Snyder, History
of the
Armored Force, 17.
Samuel Milner,
Victory
in Papua, United States Army in
World War I1 (Washington, DC, 19571, 92-95,
135, 375-76.
This account of combined arms problems in Normandy is based
United States
on Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,
Army in World War II (Washington, DC, 1961), 41-43, 208.
"Armor
in the Exploitation,"
U.S. Army Armor School,
Student Project (unpublished,
1949), 60-61; CARL N-2146.74.
Kent R. Greenfield,
Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground
Battle
Team, Including
Organic Light Aviation,
AGF Study
No. 35 (Washington, DC, 19481, 47. Much of this discussion
of U.S. close air support is derived from this brilliant
analysis.
Ibid.,
30, 43, 74.
Ibid.,
49, 53.
Ibid.,
58-67, 178-83, 87-92; U.S. Army, European Theater of
Air Force in the
Operations,
General Board, "The Tactical
European Theater of Operations,"
Study No. 54 (Washington,
C. Bergerson, The Army Gets an
DC, 19461, 10, 15; Frederic
Air Force (Baltimore,
MD, 1980), 29-37.
The Mediterranean
and Middle East, Vol.
Playfair
et al.,
III,
71, 241.
Deichmann, German Air Force, 37-48.
On British
air-ground
cooperation,
see Bidwell and Graham,
Fire-Power,
185-87, 260-75; W.A. Jacobs, "Air Support for
the British
Army, 1939-1943," Military
Affairs
46 (December
1982):
174-82; William Slim, Defeat Into Victory
(New York,
1961), 260, 337-38, 346.
Headquarters,
U.S. Army Forces, Far East, Japanese Research
Division,
Japanese Night Combat (Tokyo, 1955), Vol. I, 8-15.
Slim, Defeat Into Victory,
199, 337-38.
Ibid.,
249, 260-2,
321, 376, 409.
James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare (Washington, DC, 19471, 81.
General Board,
U.S. Army, European Theater of Operations,
and Tactical
Employment of the
"Organization,
Equipment,
Airborne
Division,"
Study
No. 16 (Washington,
DC, 19461,
20,

50.

51.

29-30.

"Soviet
Airborne
Forces in Perspective"
David M. Glantz,
(unpublished,
19831, Chapter 2.
A. Growl, The U.S. Marines and
Jeter A. Isely and Philip
and Its
Practice
in the
Its
Theory,
Amphibious
War:
Pacific
(Princton,
NJ, 19511, 3-4, 36-39, 59, 233, 334.

20k

CHAPTERSIX ENDNOTES
1.

2.
3.

A. Ryazanskiy,
Tactics
in the
"Land Forces Podrazdeleniye
Postwar Period,'
Voyenny vestnik,
1967 No. 8: 15.
John Erickson,
"The Ground Forces
in Soviet
Military
Policy,"
Strategic
Review 4 (April
1976): 65.
Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry
31; M.V. Zakharov (tad.)
50
Let Vooruzhennykh sil SSSR (50 Years of the Soviet Airnx
Forces]

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.
11.

G-2

12,
13.

(Moscow,

19681,

483.

Erickson,
'"The Ground Forces," 66; David M, Glantz,
"'Soviet
Offensive
Military
Doctrine
Since 1945," Air University
Review 34 (March-April
1983):
27.
U.S.) Department of the Army, Assistant
Chief of Staff for
Intelligence,
Intelligence
Research Project
No. A-1729,
"'Soviet Tank and Motorized Rifle Division"
(Washington, DC,
19581,
"The Encirclement
and Destruction
of the Enemy
S. Shtrik,
During Combat Operations
Not Involving
the Use of Nuclear
Weapons," Voyennaya mysl', 1968, No. 1: 279.
"Soviet
Offensive
Military
Doctrine,"
29; Kireyev
Glantz,
Dovbenko,
and
"Forward
Detachments,"
20-27;
R.Y.
Malinovskiy
and 0. Losik, 'Wartime Operations:
Maneuver of
&sd Mechanized
Armored
Troops,"
-Voyenno
istoricheskiy
zhurnal,
1980, no. 9: 18-25.
Quoted in Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution
of U.S. Army
Tactical
Doctrine,
1946-76, Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Fort
Leavenworth,
KS, 1979), 4; see also U.S. Army, European
Theater
of
Operations,
General
Board,
"Organization,
and Tactical
Equipment,
Employment
of Tank Destroyer
Units,"
Study No. 60 (Washington,
DC, n.d.1,
27-29; "Types
of Divisions-Postwar
Army," Study No. 17 (Washington,
DC,
n.d.l,
8.
and A/B Divisions,"
"The New Infantry,
Armored,
typed
explanation
and tables
issued by Headquarters,
U.S. Army
Ground Forces, 24 January 1947, copy in CARL.
George S. Patton, 1945, quoted in Ney, Evolution,
114.
Comparison between Staff
Officers
Field
Manual 101-10
(Tentative),
U.S. Army Command and General Staff
School,
with changes to 1943; "Armored Division"
table in '"The New
Infantry,
Armored and A/B Divisions;"
and Greenfield
et
al., Organization,
320-21; see also U.S., Department of the
Organizational
Amy, The Armored School, "Armored Division
and Manning Charts,
TO&E 17N," Instructional
Pamphlet No.
(Fort

Knox,

KY,

19491,

l-2.

The First
Year,
James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction:
United States Army in the Korean War (Washington,
DC,
19721, 54.
A Study in
T.R. Fehrenbach,
This Kind of War: Korea:
Unpreparedness (New York, 19641, 126-51.

202

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

S.L.A.
Marshall,
Commentary on Infantry
Operations
and
Weapons Usage in Korea,
Winter
of 1950-51,
Operations
Research Office Study ORO-R-13 (Chevy Chase, MD, 19511, 6-7.
Ibid.,
128-31; Marshall,
CCF In the Attack
(Part
II)"
Operations
Research Office
Study ORO-S-34 (EUSAK) (Tokyo,
19511, 7-18.
S.L.A. Marshall,
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Punch and the Capture of Hill
440, Suwon, Korea,
February
1951, Technical
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ORO-T-190 (Baltimore,
MD, 19521, 9-10, 43-44, 69.
Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent -and Fighting
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United
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DC, 19661,
119-21.
S.L.A. Marshall,
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Man
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Hermes, Truce Tent, 370-72.
Bergerson,
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Tent, 325-28.
Johll R. Galvin, Air Assault:
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Doughty, Evolution,
23.
This discussion
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is derived
from
Theodore C. Mataxis
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Nuclear
Tactics;
Weapons, and Firepower
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Battle Group, and Company (Harrisburg,
PA; 19581, 103-112;
Division
in Combat,"
John H. Cushman, "Pentomic Infantry
Military
Review 37 (January
1958):
19-30;
Letter,
U.S.
Continental
Army Command, 8 January 1959, Subject:
Changes
in ROCID TOE (U), with supporting
CGSC documentation;
CARL,
N-17935.62-U.
Army Command, 13 January 1959,
Letter,
U.S. Continental
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U.S. Army Command and General Staff
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DA approved Divisional
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14 January 1959, Subject:
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Doughty, Evolution,
19-25; Ney, Evolution,
75.
Mataxis
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122; Galvin,
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264.
Bergerson,
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Army Part I (February
19741,
Howze, "The Howze Board,"
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Howze, "The Howze Board," Part 11 (March 19741, 18-24, and
Part III
(April
19741, 18-24; Howze, "Tactical
Employment
of the Air Assault Division,"
Army (September 19631, 44-45,
rn
ZJ)L.
Air
Assault,
John J.
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Galvin,
280-87,
293;
Airmobility,
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Tolson, Airmobility,
25-28.
Ibid.,
32, 43-44; Bergerson,
The Army Gets an Air Force,
119.

203

31.

32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

40.
41.

42.
43.
44,

45.
46.

Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet:

U.S.-Vietnam
in
Perspective
(San Rafael,
CA, 19781, 98-102; Galvin,
Air
Assault,
294-95.
Tolson, Airmobility,
88, 102-4, 195, 201-2.
Ibid.,
120.
This account
of Lam Son 719 is based on U.S. Army,
Headquarters,
1Olst Airborne
Division
(Airmobile),
"Final
Report-Airmobile
Operations
in Support of Operations
Lam
Son 719" (24 April
19711, Vol.
I;
CARL N-18430.56-A;
Tolson, Air Assault,
236-52; Palmer, Summons, 238-43.
1Olst Airborne Division,
I-12, I-15,
Ibid.,
I-52.
Ibid.,
I-42 to I-43; Tolson, Airmobility,
251-52.
Simpkin,
Mechanized
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25; Jean Marzloff,
"The
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International
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1973):
178; Terry
of the Modern British
Army, 2d ed.
Gander, Encyclopedia
(Cambridge, UK, 19821, 17-23, 89.
France, Ministeke
de la Guerre, Ecole Superieure de Guerre,
Etudes Op&ations
ler Cycle, 1953-1954 (Paris
19531, Book
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3;
Marzloff,
"French
Mechanized
Brigade,"
176-8;
I,
International
Institute
of Strategic
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"The Military
Balance 1977-78,"
Air Force Magazine 60 (December 1977):
"The Combined Arms Battalion
80-81; Philippe
C. Peress,
Concept in the French Army," unpublished
student
study
project,
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
1977,
l-41,
CARL N-13423.472;
Ecole
Superieure
de Guerre,
"Memorandum on Nuclear Weapons," undated, 1976 translation
No. K-6556 by U.S. Department of the Army, Assistant
Chief
of Staff for Intelligence,
17-8.
Peress, "Combined Arms Battalion,"
1-41.
"French Mechanized Brigade,"
177-78; Edgar D.
Marzloff,
of Contemporary Non-U.S. Army
Arendt, "Comparative Analysis
Small Infantry
Unit Organizations'"
(Washington,
DC, 19671,
17-22.
Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan:
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Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York, 19661,
34-5.
This account of Abu Agheila in 1956 is derived from S.L.A.
Sinai
Victory
(New York,
19671, 94-140;
and
Marshall,
Edward Luttwak
and Dan Horowitz,
The Israeli
Army (New
York, 19751, 148-49, 151.
Avr aham Ad&,
On the Banks of the Suez (San Rafael,
CA,
19801, 207-13.
Trevor N, Dupuy, Elusive Victory:
The Arab-Israeli
Wars,
1947-1974 (New York, 19781, 231, 612-13; Edgard O'Ballance,
No Vanquished:
the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael,
No Victor,
CA, 19781, 55.

204

47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

"Armor and
Adan, Banks of the Suez, 57; Jac Weller,
Infantry
in Israel,"
Military
Review 57 (April,
1977): 3-11.
Adan, Banks of the Suez, 491-92.
Mohamed Heikal,
The Road to Ramadan (New York,
19751,
14-43, 208, 240-41; Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff
Solution,"
Military
Review, 55 (March 1975): 3-11; Chaim
October 1973 (Boston, 19751,
Herzog, The War of Atonement:
273; O'Ballance,
No Victor,
115.
Adan, Banks of the Suez, 141; Herzog, War of Atonement, 1%.
Herzog, War of Atonement, 84-113; 205.
CONCLUSIONENDNOTES

1.

Howze, "The Howze Board,"

Part

205

II,

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Q U.S. QOVERNMENT PRINTINQ OFFICE: 1@93755401162083

231

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR
:,

Captain lonathan M. House earned a bachelors

degree at Hamilton Collegeand a masters and doctorate in Europeanand Military History at the University of Michigan. He has since completed courses at
the U.S.Army Armor School,the U.S.Army ln8telEigence
Center and School, and the I1.S. Army Command
and General Staff College.

*
,)

..

*.-

Captain House has taught at the University of

Michigan, the Armor School, the Intelligence Center
and School, and the Command and General Staff
College.He has also served as a tactical intelligence
officer in both the United States and the Republic
of Korea. He wrote this survey while serving as a
research fellow in the Combat Studies Institute of
the Commandand GeneralStaff College.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Mission

The Combat Studies Institute was establishedon 18 June 1979 as a separate,department-level

activity within the U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,for
the purpose of accomplishingthe folEowingmissions:
1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the Army
and publish and distribute the results of such research in a variety of formats to the Active
Army and Reservecomponents.
2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at CGSCand assist other CGSCdepartments
in integrating applicable military history materialsinto their resident and nonresidentinstruction.
3. Serves as the TRADOCexecutive agent for the development and coordination of an integrated,
progressiveprogram of military history instruction in the TRADOCservice school system.
4. Direct the CACHistorical Program.
5. Supervisethe Fort LeavenworthMuseum.