O n the final aim of the natural dialectic

of human reason

A669/B697

The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; rather

it is merely their misuse which brings it about that a deceptive illusion
arises out of them; for they are given as problems for us by the nature
of our reason, and this highest court of appeals for all rights and claims
ofour speculation cannot possibly contain original deceptions and semblances. Presumably, therefore, they have their good and purposive vocation in regard to the natural predisposition of our reason. But as usual
the mob of sophists makes a hue and cry over absurdities and contradictions and rails at the regime whose inmost plans they are unable to
penetrate, although they too have its benevolent influences to thank for
their preservation and even for the culture which puts diem in a position to blame and condemn.
One cannot avail oneself of a concept a priori with any security unless
one has brought about a transcendental deduction of it. The ideas of
reason, of course, do not permit any deduction of the same kind as the
categories; but if they are to have the least objective validity, even if it
isjjnly an indeterminate one, and are not to represent merely empty
thought-entities (entia rationis ratiocinantis)" then a deduction of them A670/B698
must definitely be possible, granted that it must also diverge quite far j
from the deduction one can carry out in the case of the categories. That j
de(luctianjs..the completion of the critical business of pure reason, and \
it is what we will now undertake.
~ "It makes"a big difference whether something is given to my reason as
an object absolutely or is given only as an object in the idea. In the
first case my concepts go as far as determining the object; but in the second, there is. really onlya.schema, for which no object is given, nqteyen
hypothetically, but which.serves only to represent odier objects to us, in
accordance with their systematic unity, by means of the relation to this
idea, hence to represent these objects indirectly. Thus I say the concept
of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, i.e., its objective reality is not to
consist in the fact that it relates straightway to an object (for in such a
signification we would not be able to justify its objective validity); rather,
it is only a schema, ordered in accordance widi the conditions of the
greatest unity of reason, for the concept of a thing in general, which

Gcdjnkanrwni; beings of sophistical reason

605

Doctrine of Elements. Pt. II. Div. II. Bk. II. Ch. Ill
serves only to preserve the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use
of our reason, in that one derives the object of experience, as it were,
from the imagined object of this idea as its ground or cause. Then it is
A671 / B 699 said, e.g., that the things in the world must be considered as if they had
gotten their existence from a highest intelligence. In such a way the idea
is only a heuristic and not an ostensive concept; and it shows hotTiowarT
object is constituted but how, under the guidance of that concept, we
ought to seek after the constitution and connection of objects of expedience in general. Now if one can show that although the three kinds of
transcendental ideas (psychological," cosmological and theological)
cannot be referred directly to any object corresponding to them and to
its determination, and nevertheless that all rules of the empirical use of
reason under the presupposition of such an object in the idea lead to
systematic unity, always extending the cognition of experience but never
going contrary to experience, then it is a necessary maxim of reason to
proceed in accordance with such ideas. And this is the transcendental
"deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason, not as constitutive pri_n-_
ciple? for the extension of our cognition to more objects than experience can give, but as regulative principles' for die systematic unity of
the manifold of empirical cognition in general, through which this cognition, within its proper boundaries, is cultivated and corrected ^ more
than could happen without such ideas, through the mere use of the principles of understanding.
A672/B700

I will make this clearer. Following the ideas named above as principles/ we will first (in psychology) connect all appearances, actions, and
receptivity of our mind to the guiding thread of inner experience as if
the mind were a simple substance that (at least in this life) persists in existence with personal identity, while its states - to which the states of
the body belong only as external conditions - are continuously changing. Then second (in cosmology) we have to pursue the conditions of
the inner as well as the outer appearances of nature through an investigation that will nowhere be completed, as if nature were infinite in
itself and without a first or supreme member - although, without denying, outside of all appearances, the merely intelligible primary grounds
for them, we may never bring these grounds into connection with explanations of nature, because we are not acquainted with them at all.
Finally and thirdly, (in regard to theology) we have to consider every-

" The first edition reads "the psychological

b
Prwripkv
' Prmcipim
d
bcrkhtigt; the first edition reads "berechtigt" (justified).
' Prinripicn

606

Section VII. Critique of all speculative theology

thing that might ever belong to the context of possible experience as if
this experience constituted an absolute unity, but one dependent
through and through, and always still conditioned within the world of
sense, yet at the same time as if the sum total of all appearances (the
world of sense itself) had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground
outside its range, namely an independent, original, and creative reason,
as it were, in relation to which we direct every empirical use of our rea- A673/B701
son in its greatest extension as if the objects themselves had arisen from
that original image of all reason. That means: it is not from a simple
thinking substance that we derive the inner appearances of our soul, but
from one another in accordance with the idea of a simple being; it is not
from a highest intelligence that we derive the order of die world and its
systematic unity, but rather it is from the idea of a most wise cause that
we take the rule that reason is best off using for its own satisfaction
when it connects up causes and effects in the world.
Now there is not the least thing to hinder us from assuming these
ideas_jis objective and hypostatic, except only the cosmological ones,
where reason runs up against an antinomy when it tries to bring diis
abouT(thc psychological and theological ideas contain nothing of that,
sort at all). For there is no contradiction in them, so how could anyone
dispute their objective reality, since he knows just as little about their
possibility in denying it as we do in affirming it? Nevertheless, in order
to assume something it is not enough that there is no positive hindrance
to doing so, and we cannot be allowed to introduce mere thoughtentities'1 that transcend all our concepts, though they contradict none
of them, as real and determinate objects merely on credit, just so that
speculative reason can complete its business as it likes. Thus they A674/B702
should not be assumed in themselves, but their reality should hold only
as that of a schema of the regulative principle4 for the systematic unity
of all cognitions of nature; hence they.should be grounded-only-as~analogues_ of real_things, but not as things in themselves. We remove from
the object of an idea those conditions that limit our concept of the understanding, but that also make it possible for us to be able to have a
determinate concept of any tiling. And now we are thinking of a Something about which we have no concept at all of how it is in itself, but
about which we think a relation to the sum total of appearances, which
is analogous to the relation that appearances have to one another.
If, accordingly, we assume such ideal entities, then we do not really
extend our cognition beyond the objectsr of possible experience, but

' Grdnnkcmvcsm
* Piincip
' Objecte

607

Doctrine of Elements. Pt. II. Div. II. Bk. II. Ch. Ill
only extend the empirical unity of these objects* through the systematic
unity for which the idea gives us the schema; hence the idea holds not
as a constitutive but merely as a regulative principle. * For that we posit
a thing corresponding to the idea, a Something or a real being - by this
fact it is not said that we would extend our cognition of things with
transcendental concepts; this being is grounded only in the idea and not
in itself, hence only in order to express the systematic unity which is to
A675/B703 serve us as the standard for the empirical use of reason, without settling
anything about what the ground of this unity is, or about the inner
property of such a being on which, as cause, it rests.
Thus the transcendental and single determinate concept of God that
merely speculative reason gives us is in the most precise sense deistic,
i.e., reason does not furnish us with the objective validity of such a concept, but only with the idea of something on which all empirical reality
grounds its highest and necessary unity, and which we cannot think except in accordance with the analogy of an actual substance that is the
cause of all things according to laws of reason; of course this is insofar
as we undertake to think it as a particular object at all, and do not, content with the mere idea of die regulative principle' of reason, rather
prefer to set aside the completion of all conditions of thought as too extravagant d for human understanding; but that is not consistent with the
aim of a perfect systematic unity in our cognition, to which reason at
least sets no limits.
Hence now it happens that if I assume a divine being, I do not have
the least concept either of the inner possibility of such a highest perA676/B704 I fection or of the necessity of its existence; but then I can deal satisfactorily with all other questions concerning the contingent, and reason
can obtain the most perfect satisfaction in regard to the greatest unity
J
for which it is searching in its empirical use, but not in regard to the
I presupposition itself; this proves that it is reason's speculative interest
j and not its insight which justifies it in starting from a point lying so
i far beyond its sphere in order to consider its objects in one complete
i whole.
^ Now here, regarding one and the same presupposition, a distinction
reveals itself between ways of thinking which is rather subtle but nevertheless of great importance for transcendental philosophy. I can have a
satisfactory reason for assuming something relatively (suppositio relativa)
without being warranted in assuming it absolutely (suppositio absolute).
This distinction is pertinent when we have to do merely with a regulaObjecte
Privrip
Princip
iib<mchr:cnglich

608

Section VII. Critique of all speculative theology

tive principle," which we recognize as necessary, but whose source we do

not know/ and for which we assume a supreme ground merely with the
intention of thinking the universality of the principle' all the more determinately, as, e.g., when I think as existing a being that corresponds to
a mere and indeed transcendental idea. For here I can never assume the
existence of this thing in itself, because none of the concepts through
which I can think any object determinately will attain to it, and the con- A6JJ/B 705
ditions for the objective validity of my concepts are excluded by the idea
itself. The concepts of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity
in existence have, beyond their use in making possible the empirical
cognition of an object, no significance at all which might determine any
object/ They can therefore be used for explaining the possibility of
things^jn the_world iif_sense,_ but not the possibility of a world-whole
itseifvhecause this ground of explanation would have to be outside the
world and hence it would not be an object of a possible experience. Now '
I can nevertheless assume such an incomprehensible being, the object of
a mere idea, relative, tothe world of sense, though not in itself. For if the
greatest possible empirical use of my reason is grounded on an idea (that J''""
of systematic complete unity, about which I will have more to say
presently), which in itself can never be presented adequately in experi- ,
i.w r
ence, even though it is unavoidably necessary for approximating to the "highest possible degree of empirical unity, then I am not only warranted c ; ^
but even compelled to realize this idea, i.e., to posit for it an actual object, but only as a Something in general with which I am not acquainted
at all and to which, as a ground of that systematic unity and in relation
to that, I give such properties as are analogous to the concepts of the un- A678/ B 706
derstanding in their empirical use. Thus according to the analogy of realities in the world, of substances, causality, and necessity, I will think of
a being that possesses all of these in their highest perfection, and since
this idea rests merely on my reason, I am able to think this being as selfsufficient reason, which is the cause of the world-whole through ideas
of the greatest harmony and unity; thus I leave out all conditions limiting the idea, so as - under the auspices" of such an original ground - to
make possible systematic unity of the manifold in the world-whole and,
by means of this unity, the greatest possible empirical use of reason, by
seeing all combinations as if they were ordained by a highest reason of
which our reason is only a weak copy. Then I think this highest reason
through mere concepts, which really have their application only in the

* Prinrip
* crkcwnrn
t prjncip
d

Object
' Schutze

609

Doctrine of Elements. Pt. II. Div. II. Bk. II. Ch. Ill

world of sense; but since I put that transcendental presupposition to no

other use but a relative one - namely that it should give the substratum
for the greatest possible unity of experience - I may very well thinkji^
being that I distinguish from the world through properties which be..{,.
long solely to the world of sense. For by no means do I require, nor am
'-;:.-,. 3 s, . I warranted in requiring, cognition of diis object of my.Id.ea as to whit
' ' '> \ it might be in itself; for I have no concepts for that, and even the conA679/B707 cepts of reality, substance, causality, indeed even necessity in existence,
lose all meaning* and are empty tides for concepts without any content
when with them I venture outside the field of sense. I think only the relation* which a being, in itself unknown to me,_has to the greatest systematic unity of the world-whole, and this is solely in order to makejt
into the schema of a regulative.principle' for the greatest possible empirical use of my reason.
If we now cast our glance over the transcendental object of our idea,
then we see that we cannot presuppose its actuality in accordance with
the concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc., in itself, because these
concepts have not the least application to something that is entirely different from the world of sense. Thus reason's supposition^ of a highest
being as the supreme cause is thought merely relatively, on behalf of the
systematic unity of the world of sense, and it is a mere Something in the
idea, of which we have no concept of what it is in itself. This also explains why, in relation to that which is given to the senses as existing,
we need the idea of a being which is necessary in itself, but can never
have the least concept of this being and its absolute necessity.
Now we can place the result of the entire Transcendental Dialectic
A680/B708 clearly before our eyes, and precisely determine the final aim of the
ideas of pure reason, which become dialectical only through misunderstanding and carelessness. Pure reason is in fact concerned with nothT
ing but itself, and it can have no other concern, because what is given
to it is not"objects to be unified for the concept of experience, but cognitions of understanding to be unified for the concept of reason, i.e., to
be connected in one principle/ The unity of reason is the unity of a system, and this systematic unity does not serve reason objectively as a
principle, extending it over objects, but subjectively as a maxim, in
order to extend it over all possible empirical cognition of objects.
Nevertheless, the systematic connection that reason can give to the empirical use of the understanding furthers not only its extension but also

" Bedevtimg
* Relation.
c
Princip
d
Supposition
' Princip
610

Section VII. Critique of all speculative theology

guarantees its correctness, and the principle" of such a systematic unity
is also objective but in an indeterminate way (principium vaguni):b not as
a constitutive principle^ for determining something in regard to its direct object, but rather as a merely regulative principle and maxim for
furthering and strengthening the empirical use of reason by opening up
new paths into the infinite (the undetermined) with which the understanding is not acquainted, yet without ever being the least bit contrary
to the laws of its empirical use.
Butreasoncannotthink this systematic unity in any other way than A681/B709
by giving its idea an object, which^ however, cannot be given through
any_experieiixe|_for_experience never gives an example of perfect systematic urutVyNow this being of reason {ens rationis ratiorinatae)d is, to
be sure, a merejdea, and is therefore not assumed absolutely and in itself as something actual, but is rather taken as a ground only problematically (because we cannot reach it through any concepts of the understanding), so as to regard all the connection of things in the world
of sense as if they had their ground in this being of reason; but solely
with the intention of grounding on it the systematic unity that is indis- :.
pensable to reason and conducive in every way to empirical cognition ''" <* of the understanding but can never be obstructive to it.
One mistakes the significance of this idea right away if one takes it to
be the assertion, or even only the presupposition, of an actual thing5 to -=. -'" ;> -.--<--.
which one would think of ascribing the ground for the systematic con- '--
stitution of the world; rather, one leaves it entirely open what sort of '""'
constitution in itself this ground, which eludes our concepts, might
have, and posits an idea only as a unique standpoint from which alone
one can extend the unity that is so essential to reason and so salutary to
the understanding; in a word, this transcendental thing is merely the A682/B710
schema of that regulative principle^ through which reason, as far as it
can, extends systematic unity over all experience.
~\ P
The first object of such an idea is I_myself, considered merely a s - ^ ' 'v"" - thinking nature (soul). If I want to seek out the properties with which a
thinking thing exists in itself, then I have to ask experience, and I cannot even apply any of the categories to this object except insofar as its
schema is given in sensible intuition. By this means, however, I will
never attain to a systematic unity of all the appearances of inner sense.
Thus instead of the concept of experience (of that which the soul actu" Princip
* vague principle
' Princip
J

"being of reason reasoned," i.e., an entity created by reason functioning rationally.

' Sache
f Princip
Object

611

Doctrine of Elements. Pt. EL Div. II. Bk. II. Ch. Ill

ally is), which cannot lead us very far, reason takes the concept of the
empirical unity of all thought, and, by thinking this unity.unconditionally and originally, it makes out of it/ajconcept of reasqp^(an idea) of a
simple substance, unchangeable in itself (identical in personality),
standing in community with other real things outside it - in a word, the
concept of a simple self-sufficient intelligence. With this, however, reason has nothing before its eyes except principles ' of the systematic unity
in explaining the appearances of the soul, namely by considering all determinations as in one subject, all powers, as far as possible, as derived
from one unique fundamental power, all change as belonging to the
A683 / B 711 states of one and the same persisting being, and by representing all appearances in space as entirely distinct from the actions of thinking.
That simplicity of substance, etc., ought to be only the schema for this
regulative principle/ and it is not presupposed as if it were the real
ground of properties of the soul. For these properties could rest on entirely different grounds, with which we are not acquainted at all, just as
we might not really be able to cognize the soul at all through these assumed predicates even if we let them hold of it absolutely, since they
constitute a mere idea that cannot be represented in concreto at all. Now
nothing but advantage can arise from such a psychological idea, if only
"one guards against letting it hold as something more than a mere idea,
i.e., if one lets it hold merely relative to the systematic use of reason in
respect of the appearances of our soul. For then empirical laws of corporeal appearances, which are of an entirely different species, will not
be mixed up in the explanation of what belongs merely to c inner sense;
then no windy hypotheses about the generation, destruction or palingenesis121 of souls, etc., will be admitted; a consideration of this object
of inner sense as a whole wilH therefore be instituted, and this will not
be mixed up with properties of any different kind; moreover, the investigation of reason will be directed to carrying through the grounds of
explanation in this subject as far as possible on the basis of a single prinA684/B712

ciple;e all of tbisjs best effected through such a schema just as lf.it werje.
an actual being - indeed, it can be effected only and solely in this way.
The psychological idea can also signify nothing other than the schema
of a regulative concept. For if I wanted only to ask whether the soul is
not in itself of a spiritual nature, this question would have no sense at
all. For through such a concept I would take away not merely corporeal
nature, but all nature whatever, i.e., all predicates of any possible expe-

* Piinripim
b
Princip
' fiir; the first edition reads "vor" (before).
d
wird; this word is missing in the first edition.
' Princip

612

Section V H . Critique of all speculative theology

rience, hence all conditions for thinking an object for such a concept,
which alone and solely makes it possible for one to say that it has any
sense.
4The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason is the con- >,-,
cept of the world in general. For nature is really the single given object"
in regard to which reason needs regulative principles.* This nature is
twofold: either thinking nature or corporeal nature. Yet to think of the
latter as regards its inner possibility, i.e., to determine the application of
the categories to it, we do not need any idea, i.e., any representation
transcending experience; no such representation is possible in regard to
it, because here we are guided merely by sensible intuition - not as with
the fundamental psychological concept (the I), which contains a priori
a certain form of thinking, namely its unity. Thus for pure reason there
is nothing left to us except nature in general, and the completeness of A685/B 713
conditions in it in accordance with some one principle.'' The absolute
totality ofthe series of these conditions in the derivation of their memEeriTsTan idea which of course can never come about fully in the empirical use of reason, but nevertheless serves as a rule for the way we
ought to proceed in regard to them: namely that in the explanation of
given appearances (in a regress or ascent), we ought tojproceed as if the
series were injtself_infinjte,_i.e., proceed in indejjnitum;122 but where
reason itself is considered as the determining cause (in the case of freedom), hence in the case of practical principles/ we should proceed as if";
we did not have before us an object^ of sense but one of pure understanding, where the conditions can no longer be posited in the series of
appearances, but are posited outside it, and the series of states can be
regarded as if it began absolutely (through an intelligible cause); all this
proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles/ and are far from positing, as it were constitutively, an actual totality in such series. The rest one can seek in its place in the Antinomy
of Pure Reason. I23
The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative supposition11 of a being as the sole and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, is the rational concept of God. We do not have die least
reason to assume absolutely (to suppose* in itself) the object of this
idea; for what could enable or even justify us in believing or asserting a
' Object
h
Primipien
' Princip
d
Piinripicn
' Object
* Piivripicn
* Supposition
* mpptmicren

613

i... ,;*.:
A686/B714