Ontological Economy and Grand Unified Gauge Theories

Author(s): M. L. G. Redhead and J. S. Steigerwald

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 280-281
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187698 .
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DISCUSSION:
ONTOLOGICAL ECONOMY AND GRAND UNIFIED
GAUGE THEORIES*
M. L. G. REDHEAD and J. S. STEIGERWALD
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Chelsea College, University of London

In his paper, "Grand Unified Gauge Theories and the Number of Elementary Particles," Robert Weingard (1984) suggests what he calls the
Extended Redhead's Principle (ERP)1for elementary particles: "Two particles for which there are conceivable circumstances in which one can be
'rotated' or reoriented into the other are the same (species of) particles"
(p. 154). The philosophical soundness of such a principle is questionable.
In discussing the physical world, what is sought is a consistent explanation in terms of what actually occurs in this world. It is possible that
we may eventually uncover a more encompassingphysical theory in which
phenomena originally inexplicable do become explained. For example,
by moving from a two-dimensional plane to a three-dimensional physical
space, new interconnections between phenomena are found. Once the nature of this third dimension is understood, what its properties are and how
it interrelates to the already familiar two-dimensional realm, the actual
interconnection of phenomena through it can be understood and explained. Thus, as in Weingard's example, two objects in a two-dimensional world, related by a discontinuous spatial transformation(a mirror
reflection), can be made to coincide by placing their two-dimensional
planar world within a three-dimensional physical space and rotating one
object through the third dimension. This may indeed suggest that the two
objects are different versions of the same figure; not because, as Weingard suggests, there are "conceivable" circumstances in which one can
be rotated into the other, but only if those circumstances are understood
and explicated as actual physical conditions. Until the reorientation process is understood in this way, there is no reason "naturally"to regard
the two objects as different presentations of the same figure. It is only
*Received January 1985.
'Weingard develops ERP from the discussion of unification given in Redhead (1983).
See also Redhead (1984).
Philosophy of Science, 53 (1986) pp. 280-281.
Copyright ?D1986 by the Philosophy of Science Association.

280

ONTOLOGICAL ECONOMY/GRAND UNIFIED GAUGE THEORIES

281

from the three-dimensionalperspective that the relation of the two objects

becomes manifest.
Weingard argues that each gauge multiplet contains a single species of
elementary particles as there are "conceivable" circumstances in which
the particles within a multiplet could be rotated into each other-namely,
if the Kaluza-Klein theory were true and the extra compact dimensions
Bnexisted. But this argument could equally be reversed. The elementary
particles could be distinct in a Kaluza-Klein universe because there exist
possible worlds in which their reorientation into one another cannot take
place. Certainly, conceiving of circumstances in which an ontological
reduction may be achieved acts as a stimulus to elucidating those circumstances, but the ontological reduction is only effected once those circumstances are found to correspond to the actual physical world. Otherwise, many kinds of particles could "conceivably" be rotated into one
anotherin possible hypothetical circumstances. And particles found to be
of the same species in this world could be "proved"distinct because there
exist "conceivable" worlds in which they cannot be rotated into one another.
Conceivability is one thing, actual explanation is another.
REFERENCES

Redhead, M. L. G. (1983), "QuantumField Theory for Philosophers", in PSA 1982, vol.

2, P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles (eds.). East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.
. (1984), "Unification in Science", British Journal for Philosophy of Science 35:
274-79.
Weingard, R. (1984), "Grand Unified Gauge Theories and the Number of Elementary
Particles", Philosophy of Science 51: 150-55.