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The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45,[1] seeking to nullify the July 12,
2002[2] and the November 22, 2002[3] Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U7541. The decretal portion of the first assailed
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the instant
motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action.[4]
The second challenged Order denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a
first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family,
Regino went to college mainly through the
financial support of her relatives. During the
second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising
campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go
to the construction of the schools tennis and
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the
following issues for our consideration:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of
the human relation provisions of the Civil Code,
filed by a student against her former school.
Whether or not there is a need for prior
declaration of invalidity of a certain school
administrative policy by the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) before a former
student can successfully maintain an action
exclusively for damages in regular courts.
Whether or not the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for damages based
upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on
human relations filed by a student against the
school.[9]
All of the foregoing point to one issue -whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable. The
Court, however, sees a second issue which,
though not expressly raised by petitioner, was
impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the
Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to
Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the RTC. According to them, the
determination of the controversy hinge on the
validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs
academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should
have been lodged in the CHED, the
administrative body tasked under Republic Act
No. 7722 to implement the state policy to
protect, foster and promote the right of all
citizens to affordable quality education at all
levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure
that education is accessible to all.[10]
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds
no relevance to the present case since she is
praying for damages, a remedy beyond the
domain of the CHED and well within the
jurisdiction of the courts.[11]
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
bearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v.
CA,[12] the Court had occasion to elucidate on
the rationale behind this doctrine:
The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative
remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and
convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the
available administrative
remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper
11.
12.
13.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
15.
16.
17.
and
thenceforth
she
ejected plaintiff and the
other student from the
classroom;
18.
19.
20.
Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract
In Alcuaz
v.
PSBA,[23] the
Court
characterized the relationship between the
school and the student as a contract, in which
a student, once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester.[24] Two
years later, in Non v. Dames II,[25] the Court
modified the termination of contract theory
in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual
relationship between the school and the
student is not only semestral in duration,
but for the entire period the latter are
expected to complete it.[26] Except for the
variance in the period during which the
contractual relationship is considered to subsist,
both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in
characterizing the school-student relationship
as contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also
reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences
xx
xxx
1)
Q
The appellate court, and even the trial
court, observed that petitioners were remiss in
their obligation to inform respondent of the
change in the expected number of guests. The
observation is reflected in the records of the
case. Petitioners failure to discharge such
obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted
paragraph 4.5 of the parties contract provide,
respondent from liability for any damage or
inconvenience occasioned thereby.
As for petitioners claim that
respondent departed from its verbal agreement
with petitioners, the same fails, given that the
written contract which the parties entered into
the day before the event, being the law
between them.
Respecting the letter of Svensson on
which the trial court heavily relied as admission
of respondents liability but which the appellate
court brushed aside, the Court finds the
appellate courts stance in order. It is not
uncommon in the hotel industry to receive
comments, criticisms or feedback on the service
it delivers. It is also customary for hotel
management to try to smooth ruffled feathers
to preserve goodwill among its clientele.
Yes.
xxxx
Q
Yes, maam.
PNCC vs. CA
FACTS
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension
electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts
traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon.
Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby reducing
their distance from the ground to only about 810 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who
were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As
early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon
made verbal and written requests for NPC to
institute safety measures to protect trail users
from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr.
Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed the
Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional
poles, and they identified a possible rerouting
scheme to improve the distance from its
deteriorating lines to the ground.
19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a
pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket
miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They
cut 2 bamboo poles, and they carried one pole
horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble
carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead
as they passed through the trail underneath the
NPC high-tension lines on their way to their
work place. As Noble was going uphill and
turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo
pole that he was carrying touched one of the
dangling high-tension wires. Melchor narrated
that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a
second or two, then he saw Noble fall to the
ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him,
but Noble was already dead.
A post-mortem examination by the
municipal health officer determined the cause
of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to
ventricular
fibulation,
secondary
to
electrocution. There was a small burned area in
the middle right finger of Noble.
Police investigators who visited the site
confirmed that portions of the wires above the
trail hung very low. They noted that people
RATIO
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard
which he is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory negligence
when the partys act showed lack of ordinary
care and foresight that such act could cause
Damages awarded
Nobles unearned income of 720k [loss of
earning capacity formula: Net Earning
Capacity = 2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x
(gross annual income reasonable and
necessary living expenses)]
Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is
gross negligence]
Moral damages of 50k
P35,813.87 (Exh. J)
20,024.94
Josefina Enriquez
and Josefina Valeiro
d. Leonor Macaspac
2,740.00
f. Rene Tablante
20,000.00
P10,000.00 (Exh. F)
b. Julieta P. Enriquez
c. Ailyn C. Enriquez
d. Josefina R. Enriquez
e. Josefina P. Valerio
f. Nenita Salonoy
8,000.00 (Exh. Q)
h. Josephine Bernabe
2,000.00 (Exh. R)
10,000.00
j. Manilyn G. Salonoy
k. Jack Salonoy
l. Leonor C. Macaspac
m. Victor Ignacio
n. Rene Tablanta
....
Q: You said that the lights were going towards
you. Now, at what pace did these lights come
toward you?
A: Fast pace.
Charito Estolano, another passenger who was
seated in front of the Cimarron, similarly testified that
they just saw the panel truck hurtling toward them. She
said:[8]
Coming from?
ATTY. ALILING:
Can we stipulate that it is 1 foot, Your Honor.
ATTY. GONZALES:
A little more, 1 1/2 feet.
ATTY. ALILING:
1 1/4 feet.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2 feet.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
[2 (80-46)]
3
=
22.6
P124,300.00
[P11,000 - P5,500]
5,500
states:
WHEREFORE,
the
present
appeal is granted, and the trial courts
Decision dated February 7, 2003 is set
aside. Defendants-appellees
are
ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants or
their heirs the following:
a)
Actual
damages
of P136,000.00 as above computed, to
P37,200.00
Laarni
Pomasin
P37,200.00
Andrea
Pagunsan
P.
P37,200.00
Dionisio
Perol
P37,200.00
Annie
Pagunsan
Jane
P37,200.00
P.
c)
Moral
damages
of P50,000.00 to each of the victims;
and
d) Attorneys fees of 10% of the total award.[10]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution[11] dated 19 July 2006.
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact
and law which lead back to the very issue litigated by
the trial court: Who is the negligent party or the party
at fault?
[12]
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
Could you describe to the Court
what was the kind of vehicle you saw
running in zigzag direction?
A:
A Toyota-jitney loaded
passengers with top-load.
with
Q:
You said that the top[-]load of
the jeep is loaded?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
A:
None sir.
Q:
A:
Yes sir.
Q:
You said you were ascending
towards the direction of Liboro,
Camarines Sur, is that correct at the
time the incident happened?
A:
A:
The road was curving and
downward.
Q:
And the road was of course clear
from traffic, is that correct?
A:
Yes sir.
Q:
And practically, your jitney was
the only car running at that time?
A:
supplied)
Yes
sir.[22] (Emphasis
A:
We were no[t] zigzagging but because we
were going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) we
saw the on-coming vehicle going down very fast and
encroaching on our lane so our driver swerved our
vehicle to the right but still we were hit by the oncoming vehicle.[23] (Emphasis supplied).
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the
road condition was straightforward and consistent. The
recollection of Gregorio veered from curving and
downward to uphill.[24] On this point, Jabon and his
testimony is more credible.
The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road
shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial courts
conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill
which, it may be repeated, was the original testimony of
Gregorio that the road was curving and
After the collision, PO3 De Peralta assisted the ownertype jeep's driver, who fell to the ground, and helped
load him into a tricycle that would take him to the
hospital. Then he went to the driver of the passenger
jeep and asked him what happened. The driver
remarked, "Even if you do not like to meet an accident,
if that is what happened, you cannot do anything."
Thereafter, PO3 De Peralta proceeded on his way
southward. He reported the incident at the Police
Station of Candon, Ilocos Sur.15
VALENZUELA vs. CA
These two petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an
action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the
early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the
trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of
Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasidelict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident.
was not mostly dark, i.e. things can be seen (p. 16,
tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified
that after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the
trunk compartment, defendants car came approaching
very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was
zigzagging. The rear left side of plaintiffs car was
bumped by the front right portion of defendants car; as
a consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved to the right
and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
thrown to the windshield of defendants car, which was
destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that
defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could
smell it very well (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs
submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of
gross negligence and liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held
Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It
ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the
following amounts:
1.
P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her
severed left leg;
2.
The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La
Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on
June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized
profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant,
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment; and
(c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in
plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the
date of this decision;
3.
4.
5.
6.
Costs.
MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp,
frontal left; abrasions, chest wall,
anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to
5th inclusive. Third rib has a double
fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma;
Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower
lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to
probable basal fracture, skull.
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of
nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep,
frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior,
left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal
phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III
and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal;
(3) left supraorbital
EILEEN CAEDO:
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base,
5th finger, right, lateral aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle
finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3)
shin, lower 1/3.
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and
lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3)
nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third,
anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
SO ORDERED.9
Not satisfied with the RTC decision, Losin appealed to
the CA presenting the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE OVERPAYMENT MADE BY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO VITARICH
CORPORATION;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF THE THREE (3) CHECKS WITH
STOP PAYMENT ORDERS AND WITHOUT ANY
ANTECEDENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES FOR
THE TWO (2) CHECKS, NAMELY: RCBC CHECK
NO. CX 046324 AND RCBC CHECK NO. CX
046327 ; AND
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
VITARICH CORPORATION NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION OF ITS EMPLOYEES AND NEITHER
FINDING THE CORPORATION LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE.10
On November 26, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed
decision in favor of Losin. Pertinently, the said decision
reads:
It is axiomatic that we should not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in a
better position to determine questions involving
credibility having heard the witnesses and having
observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial unless there is showing that the findings
of the lower court are totally devoid of support or
glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion. This is such an instance.
By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to
render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter. Thus, the elements of
agency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the parties
to establish the relationship; (ii) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x."
xxx
xxx
payment, rather than on the creditor to prove nonpayment. The debtor has the burden of showing with
legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged
by payment.
True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court24 provides that the
burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth
of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
amount of evidence required by law. In this case,
however, the burden of proof is on Losin because she
alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin
failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court
is of the opinion that Losin failed to present a single
official receipt to prove payment.25 This is contrary to
the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written
and signed acknowledgment that money and goods
have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of
payment although not exclusive.26 All she presented
were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to
Vitarich through its agent Directo,27 a Statement of
Payments Made to Vitarich,28 and apparently copies of
the pertinent history of her checking account with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these
may only serve as documentary records of her business
dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments
made but these are not enough to prove payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or
bills of exchange or other mercantile documents
shallproduce the effect of payment only when they
have been cashed, or when through the fault of the
creditor they have been impaired. [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was
neither confirmed that the checks issued by Losin were
actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot
consider that payment, much less overpayment, made
by Losin.
Now, the Court ascertains the extent of Losins liability.
A perusal of the records shows that Vitarich included in
its list of collectibles,29 several amounts that were not
properly supported by Charge Sales Invoice, to
wit, (1)P44,987.70; (2) P3,300.00; (3) P28,855.40; (4) P9
8,166.20; (5) P73,806.00; and (6) P93,888.80.30 It bears
noting that the Charge Sales Invoices presented for the
FACTS:
On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los
Santos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos
was fetched by Wilfredos brother Armando, husband
of respondent Carmina Vda. de los Santos, from Rizal
Theater to after Teresas theater performance.
Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a
company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members
of the cast of production joined Teresa Elena in the
Galant Sigma.
Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan
Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the
shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo
S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner Filipinas
Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12
meters from the point of impact, across the White
Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp
Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into flames
and burned to death beyond recognition all four
occupants of the car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple homicide was
brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of
Mejia (shuttle driver). A consolidated civil case was filed
by the families of the deceased against Mejia. The RTC
ruled in favor of herein respondents. After the denial of
the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence this petition stating that the respondent court
erred in finding Mejia negligent, such not being
supported by evidence on record.
ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligent
HELD:
Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los
Santos made a turn along White Plains Road without
exercising the necessary care which could have
prevented the accident from happening. According to
petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the
victims should also be considered as negligence on the
part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating,