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focus on stress testing the parts (e.g. individual banks, companies, governments, cities etc.) of a system are no longer enough.
The notion of systemic risk and practices of systemic risk management are being influenced by multiple traditions in scholarship
(e.g. complexity science, resilience concepts), contesting theories of risk (e.g. social, mathematical, psychological) and the
practical experiences harvested through professional bodies focused on risk management in banking and financial services,
environmental management, urban planning, insurance and reinsurance, etc. In this WP, we focus on identifying and comparing
how risk management, the search for resilience and their respective approaches to strategic foresight and anticipatory
knowledge might be better related and more effectively practiced in a range of different contexts such as at the organizational,
sectoral-, national- and international-systems levels. Our first year deliverable is the state of the art concerning risk, systemic
risk and resilience in times of globalization. The conventional risk management paradigm assumes that a loss
event is relatively limited, specific and isolated and with proper analysis can be anticipated and thus,
avoided or contained and mitigated. In the conventional risk management paradigm the default is to forecast the future - or a
probabilistic analysis i.e. the assumption that the future is knowable. Formal interest in risk and risk management originates
from the fields of engineering and epidemiology in the 20th century (Kates & Kasperson, 1983) and from interdisciplinary studies
of natural hazards (White & Haas, 1975). Since then the social sciences created significant independent contributions to risk
research (Golding, 1992). Krimsky (1992) summarized the roles theory can take in risk analysis, which are quantitative laws,
taxonomic frameworks, models, functionalist explanations, cognitive explanations, or analogical models and interpretive
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representations. Beck (1992, 1994) and Giddens (1991, 1999) pointed to the elaborate role risk plays in the macro organizational
levels of modern society. Societies are self-reflective in the sense that they seek to govern their
own behavior to avoid catastrophic consequences. As such, the concept of risk is also politically relevant
(Lupton, 1999). Providing an overview of the different perspectives on risk research, Renn (1992) distinguishes the technical
perspective on risk (expected or modeled value, probabilistic risk assessment), economic perspectives (risk-benefit analysis),
psychological perspectives (psychometric and cognitive analyses), sociological perspectives (plurality of approaches), and
cultural perspectives (grid-group analysis).
CONTINUED
Another stream of literature focuses on the perception and social construction of systemic risk. First, studies look into the
paradoxical situation of policy makers to stimulate innovation but also to regulate risks arising from accelerating innovation. This
argument is put forward to support post-normal science and decision-making as the appropriate approach to modern (systemic)
risk management situations. Then, risk perception biases for catastrophic risk have been examined
and ultimately, the classic reductionist treatment of risk management was held responsible for rising
occupation with risk in society. Public actors play a paradoxical role in the relationship
between risk and innovation, between the interests of the public and private actors (Ravetz, 2003). Ravetz sees
accelerating innovation as a necessary tool for private companies to compete in a globalizing knowledge economy and the role
of the public to ensure an environment in which speedy innovation can take place. On the other hand, public actors need
to ensure the safety of new technologies and innovation acting as an agent for their
citizens, remaining the source of public trust and safety provider for citizens. Besides this
paradoxical role, technological innovation threatens the global environmental system; so,
how much technological innovation is desirable and how much risk in it acceptable?
Ravetz argues that finding appropriate answers to this question can only be found in a
policy-making process that involves the public in dialogues about scientific findings and by
disclosing ambiguities in scientific finding, thus embracing policy principles for a postnormal world of science.
CONTINUED
An initial review of the literatures relating to resilience reveals a fragmented field. In social ecology, resilience is concerned with
the longer-term survival and functioning of ecosystems species, populations and services in a changing or fluctuating operating
environment. The social ecology approach introduced by Holling (1973) argues ecological systems are non-deterministic because
of inherent complexity. characterizes the ecosystem as complex set of elements and parts existing in dynamic interrelationship
and interdependency. The key contribution of the ecological view of resilience is to provide a focus on the systemic nature of the
problems and on the longer-term demands on policy and management. It emphasizes the need to keep options open, while
appreciating heterogeneity and keeping a broader than local view organization this is in contrast to dominant management
approaches which are concerned with compartmentalizing issues, limiting change to the margins and views of the future rooted
in attempt to preserve the present. The critical distinction is that between resilience and stability.
The stability/equilibrium paradigm approaches the future with the aim of strengthening
the status quo by making the present system resilient to change and aiming to achieve stability
and constancy. In the management literature, the focus when using the resilience concept is on the persistence and survival of
individual businesses and institutions in face of change. A bulk of the management literature on organizations focuses on the
strategies for individual businesses to be resilient to change -- on innovation, experimentation and leadership to ensure survival
and growth of a specific institution/business -- however the ecosystem perspective requires us to think about the health and of
the forest and the services its provides rather than the role of individual species! What are the sources of resilience in the system
and or an organization? The process of increasing resilience is different from optimization and
improving system performance in existing conditions what organizational characteristics build resilience. Successful adaptation
requires for individual organizations, agents and businesses to continue to full fill their own goal and function but must also
include measures of promoting adaptive capacity of the system. Despite the richness in conceptual thinking underpinning the
concept of resilience, there is limited evidence of how groups, organizations are societies are translating the notion of resilience
into practice. The constructivist tradition in social theory argues that social response is non-
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localized responses, self-reliance and self-organization; (4) buffering: the ability to absorb disturbances to a certain extent and
(5) redundancy: having multiple options routes, supply chains, etc so that if one fails, others can be used. The
resilience frame opens the opportunity to think in terms of nonlinear and nondeterministic futures and, in doing so, to displace practices in probable futures with
plausible and preferable futures. The resilience frame also invites attention to realizing transformation, rather than
future proofing of established structures, identities and values. It invites consideration of the
uncertainty as irreducible and inherent, going beyond the lack of knowledge and
encompassing ambiguity and ignorance.
Black Swans events that have major effects and are yet unpredictable
are ignored by the affirmatives. They ignore the intuition of the
unpredictable events that we experience every day and that we have
empirically observed in history.
Hansson, 5 [Sven Ove; Professor- Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology
at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden; The Epistemology of
Technological Risk Techn: Research in Philosophy and Technology, Volume 9, Winter 2005
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v9n2/hansson.html //AC]
We therefore need criteria to determine when the possibility of unknown dangers should be taken seriously and
when it can be neglected. This problem cannot be solved with probability calculus or other exact
mathematical methods. The best that we can hope for is a set of informal criteria that can be
used to support intuitive judgment. The following list of four criteria has been proposed for this purpose.
(Hansson 1996) 1. Asymmetry of uncertainty: Possibly, a decision to build a second bridge between
Sweden and Denmark will lead through some unforeseeable causal chain to a nuclear war.
Possibly, it is the other way around so that a decision not to build such a bridge will lead
to a nuclear war. We have no reason why one or the other of these two causal chains
should be more probable, or otherwise more worthy of our attention, than the other. On the other hand, the
introduction of a new species of earthworm is connected with much more uncertainty than the option not to introduce the new
species. Such asymmetry is a necessary but insufficient condition for taking the issue of unknown
dangers into serious consideration. 2. Novelty: Unknown dangers come mainly from new and untested phenomena. The
emission of a new substance into the stratosphere constitutes a qualitative novelty, whereas the construction of a new bridge
does not. An interesting example of the novelty factor can be found in particle physics. Before new and more powerful particle
accelerators have been built, physicists have sometimes feared that the new levels of energy might generate a new phase of
matter that accretes every atom of the earth. The decision to regard these and similar fears as groundless has been based on
observations showing that the earth is already under constant bombardment from outer space of particles with the same or
higher energies. (Ruthen 1993) 3. Spatial and temporal limitations: If the effects of a proposed measure are
known to be limited in space or time, then these limitations reduce the urgency of the
possible unknown effects associated with the measure. The absence of such limitations
contributes to the severity of many ecological problems, such as global emissions and the
spread of chemically stable pesticides. 4. Interference with complex systems in balance: Complex
systems such as ecosystems and the atmospheric system are known to have reached some
type of balance, which may be impossible to restore after a major disturbance. Due to
this irreversibility, uncontrolled interference with such systems is connected with a high
degree of uncertainty. (Arguably, the same can be said of uncontrolled interference with economic systems; this is an
argument for piecemeal rather than drastic economic reforms.) It might be argued that we do not know that these
systems can resist even minor perturbations. If causation is chaotic, then for all that we
know, a minor modification of the liturgy of the Church of England may trigger a major
ecological disaster in Africa. If we assume that all cause-effect relationships are chaotic,
then the very idea of planning and taking precautions seems to lose its meaning. However, such a
world-view would leave us entirely without guidance, even in situations when we
consider ourselves well-informed. Fortunately, experience does not bear out this pessimistic worldview.
Accumulated experience and theoretical reflection strongly indicate that certain types of influences
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on ecological systems can be withstood, whereas others cannot. The same applies to
technological, economic, social, and political systems, although our knowledge about their resilience
towards various disturbances has not been sufficiently systematized.
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Sub-Point B) Collapsability
been traditionally undertaken in disciplinary silos in highly specialised ways which are often in
isolation from each other. Environmental vulnerability is assessed by the climatologists, nutritional vulnerability by
the food security experts, market vulnerability by the economists, disease vector vulnerability by epidemiologists, and so on.
The precise nature of vulnerability is often also heavily debated, leading to differences
within the silos. The gap between this stove-piped understanding and multi-faceted
reality becomes heightened when one considers the number of ongoing global crises. The
financial crisis is just one of a number of global trends (that we currently know about) which are interacting and impacting
on the lives of poor and vulnerable people. To take another example, the 2010 World Disasters Report focused on
urbanisation, and found that a high proportion of this urban growth is in cities at risk from the increased frequency and
intensity of extreme weather events and storm surges that climate change is bringing or is likely to bring. Along similar
lines, the global food system is showing signs of strain once again. Work done during the last upswing in prices in 2008 suggested
that a key requirement was better monitoring and anticipation of future bubbles. Unfortunately anticipation has not led to
preventative action. All the signs are that environmental disasters - driven by climate change - and a growing speculative bubble
in commodities driven partly by changing investor patterns in the wake of the financial crisis - are pushing the world into a new
food price crisis. In the face of these trends and shocks, there is a slowly growing recognition that vulnerability itself
has become globalised. Interestingly this insight has not come from within the aid sector but from organisations such as
the World Economic Forum, whose Global Risk Report 2010 shows that like the world economy vulnerabilities are now tightly
interconnected. Global shocks and stresses have multiple, unpredictable effects and
increasingly demand but do not always trigger diverse responses at the local level. As recent research indicates,
employing language which Aid on the Edge regulars will recognise: Cause and effect in global systems is
distinctly nonlinear. Inputs and outputs may not be proportional: a cause with ever-so-slightly different parameters than
the previous instance might result in a wildly different effect. Additionally, systems and their component sub-systems
interact to produce feedback loops that can either amplify or stabilize resulting effects. Feedbacks blur the
line of what is cause and what is effect. The global system is characterised by various
sizes and degrees of complexity combined into a tangled and heaving mass of interdependent actions. Despite
these shifts in the nature of vulnerability, international aid policy and practice are still
dominated by narrow, parochial approaches. Take for example the findings of a report on chronic
vulnerability in Africa which found that much of the analysis undertaken by international agencies did not
examine root causes and tended to divide vulnerability into immediate and structural
issues. The agencies then focused their efforts on the immediate issues, allowing the structural issues to be largely ignored.
By contrast, the reality of vulnerability for most poor people was found to be complex and
nuanced vulnerability can be influenced by gender, ethnic group and generation issues, and by contemporary and historical
social processes that are often not analysed and not explained. (emphasis added) It would seem that it is only after things go
seriously wrong that the inter-relationships between the key drivers of vulnerability become of importance to international
agencies. To cite one prominent and very current example, the densely urban population in Port-Au-Prince was up until January
2010 experiencing high levels of vulnerability and multiple climactic shocks. It was only after the 12 January earthquake that aid
agencies became sensitive to this interconnected reality, by which time it was already too late for many in Haitian population. As
one satirical headline put it at the time: Massive earthquake reveals poor country called Haiti to the world.
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of centuries it was
a nation of consumers, ran significant fiscal and trade deficits, a corrupt senate taxed and looted
the people, and the imperial military was overstreched just like modern-day America. Its economic decline and
weakness was challenged by various barbarian tribes eager for a big slice of the Roman pie. The empire had to either
restructure its economy and military or face defeat. It ended defeated and destroyed.Much later, the
feudal age collapsed from its own internal contradictions, but humanity did not return to the Stone Age; instead
its collapse gave birth to a qualitatively different economic system known today as capitalism , gave
birth of modern banking in Italy, and revived science, culture, and art during the Renaissance.More recently, at the
beginning of World War II, Japan was at peace, but nevertheless prepared for war. The Japanese economy was
choking under the ever dwindling supplies of oil that were vital for the development of its military .
The critical point was reached when the Americans cur off a vital source of oil supply in 1941 . Without oil,
Japan had literally two options either suffer economically and abandon militarization or strike back and declare war.
The fateful decision was to strike Pearl Harbour and the rest is history.We can similarly view the
development of the economic and political system. As complexity rises and the current institutional and
regulatory framework cannot cope with internal disorder, the breakpoint is typically reached with
the eruption of an economic crisis; this usually leads to social chaos, revolution, social and
economic re-engineering, and qualitative jumps in development. The crisis causes either the system to
collapse or brings about progress. Crisis should bring hope, like the crisis in Zimbabwe today, but
unfortunately the reality is not that simple crises cause an uncountable suffering and death, yet
the outcome is far from clear.With rising social confusion and system entropy, the system becomes
increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. It is quite unclear which way it will swing.
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EXTENSIONS
Moderate policymaking is no longer sufficient for addressing these systemic
impacts- thats is an internal link to dedev DA.
Wilkinson, 12 [Cathy Wilkinson, urban spatial planning at Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Socialecological resilience: Insights and issues for planning theory Planning Theory May 2012 vol. 11 no. 2 148-169 //AC]
In the USA, two Long Term Ecological Research Network urban projects, in Baltimore and Phoenix, are grappling with how to
make analysable a linked social-ecological system (SES). The difficulty of establishing a strong cross-disciplinary theoretical
basis or research agenda for coupling nature and human systems is recognized by scholars involved in this project (Redman et
al., 2004) who acknowledge that standard ecological theories are insufficient to address the complexity of human culture,
behaviour, and institutions (Grimm and Redman, 2004: 13 as summarized in Evans, 2011: 228). How does this relate to the way
planning theory conceptualizes humannature relations? Issues of humannature interaction are central to the very process of
human settlement, urbanization and well-being. Ever since the establishment of the very first permanent settlements
following the shift from nomadic to agrarian-based living, ecosystem services have been
critical to the capacity of those settlements to survive and indeed thrive (Daily, 1997; Redman,
1999). Access to fresh water, reliable food and energy sources, and construction materials
has been essential. Yet archaeology reveals repeated examples of urban civilizations
exceeding the limits of accessible ecosystem services. Among the more severe human-induced
environmental impacts are those associated with ancient urban societies, whose dense populations,
rising rates of consumption, and agricultural intensification led to regional degradation so
extreme that cities were abandoned and the productive potential of entire civilizations
was undermined to the point of ruin. (Grimm et al., 2000 : 572) It is not surprising therefore that there are well-known
and established bodies of research exploring humannature relations in and of cities, from disciplines including geography,
history, archaeology and of course planning. Indeed, there is a long history of attention to humannature relations through design
and planning practice. Since the emergence of town planning as a discipline, humannature relations have been highlighted
through the Chicago School of planning, the early British town planners such as Ebenezer Howard (18501928), Patrick Geddes
(18541932) and his influence on Lewis Mumford and later on through more detailed practice-based attention of how to design
with nature (McHarg, 1969). From the 1970s, environmental planning emerged as a sub-discipline (Slocombe, 1993). More
recently this relationship is explored through the sustainability discourse (e.g. Owens and
Cowell, 2002; Rydin, 2010) and emergence of climate change. However, when attention is turned to the
planning theory literature per se, there is arguably minimal attention to the implications of ecological
considerations as a primary concern. This is not to say that these issues havent been dealt with at all, but that contributions
seem to be limited compared to the extensive focus on the trajectory of planning theories from rationalist and critical through to
collaborative and post-positivist. Areas where planning theory has specifically taken up matters of humannature relations regard
environmental ethics and political ecology. In addition, in relatively recent years increasing attention is being paid to what a
relational understanding of social-ecological processes means for planning theory (e.g. Hillier, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2010).
Environmental ethics is of import for planning theory because it critically informs the difficult choices and tradeoffs society must
make to address serious environmental problems (Beatley, 1989; Jacobs, 1995). It is not suggested that planners be the ones to
decide what the morally correct or ethical environmental decision is, but that they are certainly in a position to put forth, and
cause to be considered, key questions in arriving at an environmental ethic (Beatley, 1989: 26). Some of these issues are taken
up in brief by subsequent planning theorists. For example, Healey (1997: 164) raises the issue of moral responsibilities for those
who cannot speak for themselves, other species and future generations and Wilson and Piper (2010: 120) suggest that climate
change radically extends attention to the longer-term future at the same time as throwing into greater relief the problems of
ensuring equitable outcomes of plans and planning decisions both now and in the future . Political ecology is
relevant for planning theory because society must consider the environmental crisis as
one of ideological and political as well as ethical and moral origins (Harrill, 1999: 68). From this
perspective, it is argued that a progressive or radical form of planning is required in order to
transform the social and political structures hindering sustainability (Harrill, 1999: 72). This
transformation must occur in spite of the very present risk that as economic conditions decline so does the capacity to negotiate
sustainable development gains, including ecological outcomes (Davoudi et al., 2009; Rydin, 2010) and in face of the systematic
depoliticization of social-ecological governance (Swyngedouw, 2010). In an insightful piece in Ashgates most recent Research
Compendium to Planning Theory, Swyngedouw (2010: 31214) urges that planning intervention be seen as irredeemably violent
engagements that re-choreograph socio-natural relations and assemblages and as such must be accompanied by democractic
agonistic struggle over the content of socio-ecological life, struggles he argues are being replaced by techno-managerial
planning, expert management and administration.
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Systems sometimes enter regions of highly erratic and chaotic behavior. In such cases it
becomes impossible to predict the future behavior of the system even when based on its
entire past history. From moment to moment the system jumps violently in its behavior,
moreover, it may be infinitely sensitive to any external change of fluctuation.But is a chaotic
system totally devoid of order? A chaotic system appears totally unpredictable in its behavior,
moreover its behavior may be impervious to corrective measures. But scientists are now
finding that what is called "deterministic chaos" exhibits certain regularities. For example,
erratic swings, while entirely unpredictable, may nevertheless be confined to a particular
limited region -- called a chaotic or strange attractor. So while the moment to moment
behavior of the system is unpredictable, uncovering the geometry of the strange attractors
give information about the overall range of behavior. It is also a matter of debate as to
whether a chaotic system should be spoken of as totally devoid of any order, or as exhibiting
a highly complex and subtle order.Moreover such systems may also exhibit "intermittency",
periods of simple order which emerge again and again out of chaos. When faced with the
alternation of order and chaos one may ask: "Does this represent a break down of good
order, a failure of policy? Or is the order itself a temporary breakdown of a more general
chaos - or infinite complexity of behavior?"That there can be order within chance can be
seen in the following way: Suppose someone has tossed ten "heads" in a row. Most people
would bet that the next throw must be tails. But knowing that the system is truly random
indicates that there is a 50:50 chance that the next throw will be "heads". In this way an
experienced gambler will, on the average, win over a gullible opponent. In a similar fashion,
knowing the range of chaotic behavior enables one to hedge policy bets and come out
marginally ahead over a long period of time.
v Self similarity
Chaotic systems have much in common with fractals, indeed their strange attractors have a
fractal structure. Likewise there may be detailed fractal patterns in their dynamics that
repeat at different scales of time. Having knowledge of such patterns would make it possible
to, on the average, make better micropredictions. I.e. one computer analysis of stock
market data suggests that there are self-similar patterns at 14, 5 and 2 yr. periods and in
5 month periods and that the same patterns may be present within each day.
vi Feedforward
Where two or more products compete for a given market a process of feedforward takes
place. The effect of a tiny initial fluctuation may cause one particular product to
eventually dominate the market. An example of this is the competition between VHS and
Betamax videocassettes.
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Since the only predictable feature of these systems is their irregular and
sporadic behavior, the entirety of the affs solvency mechanism comes into
question. Ultimately, they can offer only momentary, short-term and
probably unreliable solutions to the problems they identify.
Levy 03 [Applications and Limitations of Complexity Theory in Organization Theory and
Strategy, University of Massachusetts Boston,
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/david_levy/complex00.pdf, 10/12/12//CC]
A. Long-Term Planning Is Impossible. Chaos theory has demonstrated how small
disturbances multiply over time because of nonlinear relationships and feedback effects.
As a result, such systems are extremely sensitive to initial conditions, making their future
states appear random. Networks, even when in the ordered regime, are subject to
perturbations from external influences, which sometimes cause substantial, though
unpredictable reconfigurations. Forecasting is particularly difficult in systems that never
approach a stable equilibrium state. The traditional approach to understanding the
influence of industry structure on firm behavior and competitive outcomes has been derived
from microeconomics, with its on comparative statics and equilibrium. Even the most
complex game theoretic models are only considered useful if they predict an equilibrium
outcome. By contrast, chaotic systems do not reach a stable equilibrium; indeed, they can
never pass through the same exact state more than once. Organizations wander the shifting
terrain of fitness landscapes on infinite journeys. Industries might reach some temporary,
relatively stable pattern, but this is likely to be short lived. Endogenous change, due to
corporate decisions to enter or exit the market or to develop new technologies, shifts the
fitness landscape and the attractors in a system. Industries are subsystems of larger
economic and social structures, which themselves are complex dynamic systems unfolding
in unpredictable ways. Stacey (1995) relates this coevolution to Giddens's (1984) concept of
structuration, in which the decisions and actions of agents change institutions, and these
institutions in turn constrain and condition the behavior of individual agents. Formulating a
long-term plan is clearly a key strategic task facing any organization. People involved in
planning have always known that models are simplified representations, that forecasts are
uncertain, and that uncertainty grows over time. Nevertheless, our conventional
understanding of linear models suggests that better models and a more accurate specification
of starting conditions would yield better forecasts, useful for months if not years into the
future. Complexity theory suggests otherwise; the payoff in terms of better forecasts from
building more complex and more accurate models may be small. Meteorologists can
improve their models by using more terrestial observations and dividing the atmosphere into a
great many small interacting units of analysis; despite the application of successively more
powerful computers, the accuracy of forecasts still falls off very rapidly after 3 or 4 days.
Similarly, we cannot learn much about the future by studying the past: If history is the
sum of complex and nonlinear interactions among people and nations, then history does
not repeat itself. Concerning urban planning, Cartwright (1991) has noted that we have to
acknowledge that "a complete understanding of some of the things we plan may be beyond all
possibility." Stacey (1996: 187) concluded that though short-term behavior might be
predictable, "members of an organization, no matter how intelligent and powerful, will be
unable to predict the specific long-term outcomes of their actions." How long is the long
term? Many discussions of complexity avoid this critical issue. For the weather, it is clear that
more than 5 days is long-term forecasting. For biological evolutionary systems. the time
frame might be miilions of years. For firms and industries, the relationship between
uncertainty and time is less clear; businesses have traditionally developed strategic plans for
3 or 5 years, though many companies also attempt to predict major technological trends over
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10- and 20-year horizons. B. Dramatic Change Can Occur Unexpectedly. Traditional
paradigms of economics and strategy, built upon simplified assumptions of cause and
effect, would suggest that small changes in parameters should lead to
correspondingly small changes in the equilibrium outcome. Complexity theory forces us to
reconsider this conclusion. Large fluctuations can be generated internally by
deterministic chaotic systems, and small perturbations to networks, even when in the ordered
state, can sometimes have major effects. Just as population levels of a species can crash as
a result of ecosystem dynamics, economic systems can enter depressions and stock
markets can crash even in the absence of external shocks. The size of fluctuations from
one period to the next in chaotic systems has a characteristic power law probability
distribution. Under this distribution, large fluctuations occur more frequently than under the
normal distribution, suggesting that managers might underestimate the potential for large
changes in industry conditions or competitors' behavior. Small exogenous disturbances to
complex systems can also cause unexpectedly large changes. The implication for business
strategy is that the entry of one new competitor or the development of a seemingly minor
technology can have a substantial impact on competition in an industry. The development of
transistors, for example, originally appeared to be merely an incremental improvement
over vacuum tubes. Similarly, the deal between IBM and Microsoft in 1980 to develop an
operating system for their personal computer has profoundly shaped the software and
hardware market since that time.
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distinctive value added in relating academic debates to concrete matters of policy and
practice.
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