San Sebastian College Recoletos

College of Law

2011 CASE DIGESTS IN

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Submitted to: Atty. Rodolfo C. Sabio

Submitted by:
Chavez, Bonifacio
Gelvosa, Cedric
Pajente, Jigg
Rivera, Nazario Dwight
Salen, Low
Violago, Khriska Bea Claudia

ESTATE OF MARGARITA D. CABACUNGAN,

represented by LUZ LAIGO-ALI, petitioner.

G.R. No. 175073

- versus August 15, 2011

MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO ROY LAIGO,
STELLA BALAGOT and SPOUSES MARIO B.
CAMPOS AND JULIA S. CAMPOS, respondent.
FACTS:
Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land La Union.
The properties were individually covered by tax declaration all in her name. Sometime in 1968,
Margaritas son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. (Roberto), applied for a non-immigrant visa to the United
States, and to support his application, he allegedly asked Margarita to transfer the tax declarations
of the properties in his name. For said purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children,
executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property whereby the subject properties were
transferred by donation to Roberto.
In 1990, Roberto sold the part of the properties and allegedly, these sales were not known
to Margarita and her other children. It was only in 1995, at Robertos wake, that Margarita came
to know of the sales. Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted the instant complaint
for the annulment of said sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject
properties as well as for the cancellation of Ricardos tax declarations. Margarita admitted
having accommodated Robertos request for the transfer of the properties to his name, but pointed
out that the arrangement was only for the specific purpose of supporting his U.S. visa
application. She emphasized that she never intended to divest herself of ownership over the
subject lands and, hence, Roberto had no right to sell them.
The vendees advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good faith,
and had merely relied on Robertos representation that he had the right to sell the property; and
that, hence, they were not bound by whatever agreement entered by Margarita with her
son. Further, they noted that Margaritas claim was already barred by prescription and laches
owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject properties and upon the execution of the
affidavit, an implied trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed
only a period of ten (10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to
enforce an implied trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.

ISSUE and HELD:

(A.) Whether or not that the rule on innocent purchaser for value applies in this case of
sale of unregistered land; and

Fundamental is the rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer of
realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and
the purchase was made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in which case
the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser
in good faith and for value. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, respondents
purchased the same at their own peril. Their claim of having bought the properties in good
faith, i.e., without notice that there is some other person with a right to or interest therein, would
not protect them should it turn out, as it in fact did in this case, that their seller, Roberto, had no
right to sell them.

(B.) Whether or not there is an implied trust and as such, is barred by prescription.
When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created
by law in favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner
prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the title. An action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on a constructive implied trust
prescribes in 10 years likewise in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Yet not like in
the case of a resulting implied trust and an express trust, prescription supervenes in a constructive
implied trust even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. In other words, repudiation of
said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.
It is now well settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to
Art. 1144. This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers
the land.
From the foregoing, it is clear that an action for reconveyance under a constructive
implied trust in accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is
registered or the instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it
is what binds the land and operates constructive notice to the world. In the present case, however,
the lands involved are concededly unregistered lands; hence, there is no way by which Margarita,
during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto
in favor of respondents, except by actual notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is
from that date that prescription began to toll.

(C.) Whether or not the complaint is barred by laches.

Laches, being rooted in equity, is not always to be applied strictly in a way that would
obliterate an otherwise valid claim especially between blood relatives. The existence of a

confidential relationship based upon consanguinity is an important circumstance for

consideration; hence, the doctrine is not to be applied mechanically as between near
relatives. Adaza v. Court of Appeals held that the relationship between the parties therein, who
were siblings, was sufficient to explain and excuse what would otherwise have been a long delay
in enforcing the claim and the delay in such situation should not be as strictly construed as where
the parties are complete strangers vis-a-vis each other; thus, reliance by one party upon his blood
relationship with the other and the trust and confidence normally connoted in our culture by that
relationship should not be taken against him. Too, Sotto v. Teves ruled that the doctrine of laches
is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that the parties are connected by ties of
blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.
Petitioner believes that the existence of such confidential relationship precludes a finding
of unreasonable delay on Margaritas part in enforcing her claim, especially in the face of Luzs
testimony that she and Margarita had placed trust and confidence in Roberto. Petitioner also
refutes that there was a donation of the properties to Roberto when the truth is that the subject
properties were all that Margarita possessed and that she could not have failed to provide for her
other children nor for means by which to support herself. It reiterates that the transfer to Roberto
was only an accommodation so that he could submit proof to support his U.S. visa application.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,

G.R.No. 172011

- versus -

Promulgated:

TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR., Respondent.

March 7, 2011

FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC
of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for theregistration of a
parcel of land, located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of
the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer Dated December
31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he
presented, among others, Tax Declaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of
Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application. On April 20,
2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition. The MTC of Bauang, La
Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its Decision, approving respondents
application. The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the
CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has complied with all the
requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has
become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time
required by law.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second,
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The first requirement was satisfied in this
case. The certification and report dated July17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states
that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such
since January21, 1987. Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and
possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. However, the
third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession
and
occupation
of
the
subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied.
R e s p o n d e n t o n l y managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers
ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of
AbsoluteS a l e d a t e d J u l y 8 , 1 9 5 8 b e t w e e n E u f r e c i n a N a v a r r o a n d B i b i a n a P .
R i z a l v o . H e presented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro
and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in
the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof
of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning
June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier

Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is
enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or thedevelopment of the n
ational wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registrationbecause the land was certified as alien
able and disposable in 1987, while theapplication for registration was filed on December 7, 2000,
a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws
on prescription.

TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 150462

- versus
LUIS FAJARDO AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS
PIAS CITY,
Respondents.

FACTS:

June 15, 2011

VICELET LALICON and

VICELEN LALICON, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 185440

- versus NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent.

Promulgated:
July 13, 2011
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority (NHA) executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage over a Quezon
City lot in favor of the spouses Isidro and Flaviana Alfaro. The deed of sale provided, among
others, that the Alfaros could sell the land within five years from the date of its release from
mortgage without NHAs prior written consent.
About nine years later while the mortgage on the land subsisted, the Alfaros sold the same to their
son, Victor Alfaro, who had taken in a common-law wife, Cecilia, with whom he had two
daughters, petitioners Vicelet and Vicelen Lalicon.
Cecilia, who had the means, had a house built on the property and paid for the
amortizations. After full payment of the loan the NHA released the mortgage. Six days later
Victor transferred ownership of the land to his illegitimate daughters.
About four and a half years after the release of the mortgage, Victor registered the sale of the land
in his favor, resulting in the cancellation of his parents title. The register of deeds issued TCT
140646 in Victors name. Victor mortgaged the land to Marcela Lao Chua, Rosa Sy, Amparo
Ong, and Ida See. Subsequently, Victor sold the property to Chua, one of the mortgagees,
resulting in the cancellation of his TCT 140646 and the issuance of TCT N-172342 in Chuas
name.
A year later or on April 10, 1998 the NHA instituted a case for the annulment of the NHAs 1980
sale of the land to the Alfaros, the latters 1990 sale of the land to their son Victor, and the
subsequent sale of the same to Chua, made in violation of NHA rules and regulations.
ISSUES:
1.
the NHA;
2.

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Alfaros violated their contract with
Whether or not the NHAs right to rescind has prescribed; and

3.
Whether or not the subsequent buyers of the land acted in good faith and their
rights, therefore, cannot be affected by the rescission.
HELD:

1. The contract between the NHA and the Alfaros forbade the latter from selling the land
within five years from the date of the release of the mortgage in their favor. [3] But the
Alfaros sold the property to Victor even before the NHA could release the mortgage in
their favor. Clearly, the Alfaros violated the five-year restriction, thus entitling the NHA
to rescind the contract. The resale without the NHAs consent is a substantial
breach. The essence of the governments socialized housing program is to preserve the
beneficiarys ownerships for a reasonable length of time, here at least within five years
from the time he acquired it free from any encumbrance.
2. The violation comes under Article 1191 where the applicable prescriptive period is that
provided in Article 1144 which is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. The
NHAs right of action accrued on February 18, 1992 when it learned of the Alfaros
forbidden sale of the property to Victor. Since the NHA filed its action for annulment of
sale on April 10, 1998, it did so well within the 10-year prescriptive period.
3. The Lalicons and Chua were not buyers in good faith. Since the five-year prohibition
against alienation without the NHAs written consent was annotated on the propertys
title, the Lalicons very well knew that the Alfaros sale of the property to their father,
Victor, even before the release of the mortgage violated that prohibition.
As regards Chua, she and a few others with her took the property by way of mortgage
from Victor in 1995, well within the prohibited period. Chua knew, therefore, based on
the annotated restriction on the property, that Victor had no right to mortgage the
property to her group considering that the Alfaros could not yet sell the same to him
without the NHAs consent.