263 scra 420

Publication Administrative Orders

PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for
importation from the Peoples Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed
export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing
products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the
said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the
said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications for
imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by
EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO
is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera
which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published
as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or
a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The
AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it
is punitive in character.
Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002]
(Administrative Law, quasi-legislative power, proper procedure, filing and publication)
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority to
operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15,
Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed
with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative were
deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect
in granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules
with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations
can take effect.
Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. (Extelcom) [GR 147096, 15 January 2002]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan
Telecommunications,Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to

install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer
for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January1993, the NTC issued Memorandum
Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their
respective applications before the Commission on or before 15 February 1993, and deferring the
acceptance of any application filed after said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior
to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantels original
application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May
1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was
published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing were
mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application.
But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order
dated 19 December1993 stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities
in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for
the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain pending for an
indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and
when the requisite frequency becomes available. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February
2000, the NTC granted BayanTels motion to revive the latters application and set the case for
hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application was ordered
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency shall become
available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition
(With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantels application; arguing that Bayantels
motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus, the
documentary evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all out dated and
should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the
NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service,
applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the
Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority
to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000
allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install,
operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs
of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC orders dated 1 February
and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantels Amended Application without prejudice to
the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the
other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum
Circular 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the
NTC and Bayantel filed their petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR
147210 respectively). In the present petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should
have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase on its own initiative;
accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the
Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as
the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has
been applying the 1978 Rules.
Issue:
Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of
Bayantels application.

Held:
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating
that theNTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have
not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is
nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law
Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register
is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select,
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua
non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which
implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall
squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera.
Administrative rules and regulations must bepublished if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules
should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can
take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after
their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore,
it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El
Banco
Espanol-Filipino
vs.
G.R.
No.
L-11390,
March
26,

Palanca
1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation
may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under
special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed
the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially
such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession
of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to
El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29,
1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding
but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of
Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which
is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente

Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested
the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
or
over
the
subject
of
the
action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of
the
action
*
Whether
or
not
due
process
of
law
was
observed
RULING:
On

Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular
kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which
is
the
subject
to
the
litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain
and
the
relief
it
may
grant.
How

Jurisdiction

is

Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of
the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though
at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An
illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where
the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and
held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over
the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of
land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and
to
adjudicate
the
title
in
favor
of
the
petitioner
against
all
the
world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it
partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the
property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former
an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object

the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or
other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings
is
conclusive
only
between
the
parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however,
does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem;
and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng executed a mortgage upon various parcels of real property
situated in Manila in favor of El Banco Espanol-Filipino as security for a loan. After he executed the
mortgage, Engracio returned to China and never went back to RP until he eventually died. Because
of non-payment, the bank filed a suit to foreclose the mortgage (at this point Engracio was still alive).
Since defendant was a non-resident, the bank gave notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which was in
China. However, it was not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
the CFI proceeded with the case and a judgment by default was rendered in favor of the bank.
Mortgage was foreclosed and the properties were sold in a public auction. After 7 years, Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of Engracios estate, filed a motion to set aside the judgment by
default and to vacate all subsequent proceedings on the ground that the judgment rendered was
void since the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Issue: WON the CFI
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
Held: YES. Ratio: Tanquinyeng is a non-resident and having refused to appear in court voluntarily, the
court never acquired jurisdiction over him. This is, however, not essential since the foreclosure
of mortgage is an action quasi in rem and what is essential is the courts jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the property is based on the following:
(1) That the property is located within the district;
(2) That the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by
the mortgage; and
(3) That the court at a proper stage of the proceedings take the property into custody, if necessary,
and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. And since jurisdiction is
exclusively over property, the relief granted by the court must be limited only to that which can been
forced against the property itself. Therefore, whatever may be the effect in other respects of the
failure of the Clerk of the Court to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such
irregularity could impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court.

Judicial Due Process Requisites

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted
to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his
payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and
he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to
sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish
Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute
Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the
annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the
summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are;

1.
2.
3.
4.

There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.
The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

FABELLA VS CA
FACTS:
Secretary Carino of DECS charged the teachers of Mandaluyong High School who had participated in walkouts and
strikes. DECS committee then rendered a decision declaring the teachers guilty as charged and ordered for their dismissal.
Teachers argued that the composition of the committee was illegal for failure to comply with the procedures prescribed in
R.A. 4670, otherwise known as Magna Carta for Teachers and that their dismissal was ordered without any formal
investigation therefore, they are denied of due process. The secretary defended that the said law was already repealed by
P.D. 807.
ISSUE:
Whether the teachers were denied of due process?
RULING:
Yes. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers
organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. It was also not repealed by the PD for being a special law.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by
them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The
inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard. Therefore, there is no formal investigation and they were denied of due process.
Contention: Waiver of Right of be Heard
Committee considered that the teachers waived their right to be heard because they walked out during the proceedings.
Ruling - not tenable because the walk out was staged in protest against the procedures of the committee and its refusal to
give the teachers counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal
of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against them and the opportunity to
defend themselves.
RE: Hearing presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the absence of an
independent, competent and impartial tribunal.
Re: Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones
favor, and to defend ones rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected
RE: Right to Strike
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging
strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.
Exceptions:
If not prejudicial to the public, or they did it during their break time, weekends, or holidays.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta
together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine
Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol
dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand,
welcomed and asked them to sit down.
They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees
involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the
processing of the papers.

The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary

deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.
Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit
pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000
to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman
inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted
a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was
reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos
entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the
pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala.

Ramos even heard a

woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in
Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later,
Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then
organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.
Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and
assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused
submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for
vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.
The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b)

Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal
recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not
accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated

HELD:
(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining
recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties.
In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the
Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement.
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.
The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal
recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner
promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the
lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of
such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of
the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent
of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is
evident on its face.

If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language

that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and
placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for
employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and
harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to
appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad.
Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of
individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of
speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which
cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to
give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

(2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her
defense.

She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine

Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment,
appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained
scot-free.

From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on

grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea,

and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is
not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by
officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be
present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory
purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.
In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a
clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed
their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by
mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this
presumption.

The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the

commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not,
is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal
protection of the laws.

ANG TIBAY vs. CIRFACTS:

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. avers that: (1) Toribio Teodoro, who is the manager and
proprietor of Ang Tibay, was falsely claiming that there is a shortage of leather soles for him to
temporarily lay off the Members of the National Labor Union, Inc. as it was unsupported by records;
(2) the alleged lack of materials was a scheme to discharge systematically the Members of the NLU,
Inc. from work; (3) The National Workers Brotherhood of Ang Tibay is an illegal union which is
dominated by Toribio Teodoro; and that (4) The employer, Toribio Teodoro, was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against the NLU, Inc, and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood. The case enumerated the specific powers of the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR,
as the Court observed is not constrained by technical rules of procedure in hearing the matters
before it, but it does not mean that it can ignore entirely the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
ISSUE:

What are the cardinal rights or the requisites of procedural due process which must berespected
in administrative proceedings?
HELD:
The Court provided the ff. as the requisites of procedural due process in administrativeproceedings:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submitevidence in
support thereof.
2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. Decision must have something to support it.
4.Evidence must be substantial (more than a mere scintilla, relevant evidence a reasonable mind
accepts to support a conclusion)
5.Decision must be rendered on the evident presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record or disclosed to the parties affected.
6.Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7.The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
Due Process Admin Bodies CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National
Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new
trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they
were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies
cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001

KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends
Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there
to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine,
on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about
the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for
the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter
said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and
were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of
P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment
conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters,
immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment
was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house
and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see
around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible
employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15)
minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the
arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid
was executed.
Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions
her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and
penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement
is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.
The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is
unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and
therefore should be exculpated
HELD:
1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is
void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.
In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition
of recruitment and placement.
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the
proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of
records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the
Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing
from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper
construction. It is not void for vagueness.
Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by
merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or
employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does
not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed
to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute.
2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although
the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes
Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free.
From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a
Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally
guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by
officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is
not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional
discrimination. In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional
discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption
can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any
evidence to overcome this presumption.
The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea,
the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied
appellant equal protection of the laws.