The Effects of The Atomic Bomb On Hiroshima, Japan (The Secret U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Report 92, Pacific Theatre, Etc... ) (1947-71) Part 1

THB UNITID STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
THE EFFECTS
OF
THE ATOMIC BoMB
ON
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
Volume I
Physical Damage Division

May 1947
G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE

1. Conclltlona Prior to Attaclc
Tlae city of Hiroshima \\as a11 excelll'nt target
for the atomic bomb (rom a fire standpoint: Tl1ero
l1ad been no rain (or t.l1roo \\ooks; tlaP cit) \\us
highJy COOtbuatibJe,' COOHitlting prin~ipoJly o( ,JUJlUhe&e domestic-type structtJres; it \\uR f'on~tn~tNI
oYer 8a' terniD; and 13 aquare miles (including
_ltreela) of the 26.6-equare-mile city was more
tbao 5 pereeat built up (i. e., covered by plan
U\111 of buildinp). ThA remainder of tla., city
compriled water areas, parka ancl areas built UJ,
below 6 pereent. Sixty-eight percent of tlao I :i~quare-mile area was 27 to 42 percent built P
and the 4-equare-mile city ~ent~r \\'RA ptartir.alarly
denae, 93.6 percent of it ~ing 27 to 42 JK'~t'llt
built up.
Fin lhparlm~nt. Public fire eqtaipment laa'l
been littltt improved in anticipation or wartimr
&rea. Private fire equipment l1a'l bet-n aatagmeoted 110mewhat but instru~tion to ltone ~~
panta in ita uee l1ad bet-n lintitecl to tr.Unin~ ir1
eoJDbating incendiary bon1bs.
13
EAST ELEVATION
NORTH ELE\1\TION
,.
1
I
..1
ILET (}
~=---=
SERVANT
ROOM
lATH
I~
--
tl
I~
'
I
I
LIVING
ROOM
GUEST
ROOM
..L..--~--
FIRST FLOOR PLAN
o'
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBWG SlJNEY

TWO-STORY
JAPANESf
RESIDENCE
FIGURE 6 -llll
o. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible

structures and materials by heat directly radiated
by the aUmi bomb and by otber ignition aourcN
developed the following: (1) The primary fire h zard waa present in eombuitibl materials aq1l irs
fire-resiativ~ buildings with unshielded wall opp,rlinp; (2) six persons who bad been in rciJlforct'Ciconcrete buildinp within 3,200 feet of air zero
stated that black cotto11 bl ck-out curtains Wf'
ignited by radiant b t; (3) a rew persons state<l
tltat tbu1 rice paper, cedarbark roofs, tlauhOO
roofs, and tops of wooden poles w re afire ianme<lia tely after the explosion; (4) dark elotl1it1g was
scorched, and, in aomc eases, reported to have
bunt into flame from Oaab heat; (5) but a larg~
proportion or over I ,000 pe-rsons QUl'Stione(l was irl
agreement that a great majority of tlac origir1ul
fires was started by debris falling on kitch,n c.~lr
coal fires, by u1dustrial procl'SS fires, or b.) t1 ctri(
short circuits.
6 ._- -. . :o .- .
. ported to hav
o
~1 wi in ten minu tea
~
..Uploaion. . 01.~ total num r or
biUdinP. m_
. .:107 ugbt &re, d, in 69
~ probable use of initial ignition or
the bUD .or .. r oon nta was establisbetl as
fo : (1 a by direct radia d h t from tb~
bOmb (primary fire), (2) 8 by condary sources
and .(3) 53 by fire spread rrom exposing huilllings.
u.
'
14
DriM~J~e In llollir~g
Sloelt. 01 tbr. 123 tnlloy

eara o,.ratftl by tl~ compaa1y, 20 JH'ft'tnt
e.
"m
damapd by fire ancl 45 JK'reent J,y blat. ()I tl.81 motor bUIJIC'8, fire clamagecl 21 prn~at a1acl
blut 26 pert'e'nt. Radiant hl'at lro111 '''" l)()ml
ignited ean and buMM witllin 1,500 lt'tt or GZ.
Total dam-e to ean rxtc-nclccl a axil ,,r
&,700 feet from GZ, lac~a,y damaar to 8,400 frtt
and alight damage to 12,500 ft'tt. DaafW'S "cn
totaUy damage-d at -1,000 lcttt atacllara,il~ clamagccl
5,600 lft!t from GZ.
d. DamGfe In OtYrla,atl Sy"''''' lllatMt attacl fire
clamag.d 11.4 milt'll ol tht ca\crlac-acl t ratasm issio11
system ineludiftiC clamagt to 500 "noel .,,,a I 00
awl polee. No clunage oc-ttarrt'd to t-otl<-ntc
polea, t.be nearPSt of whirh ""rr 6,(M)t) ft'C'l fmrn
OZ. Wood polra ""re clamagtd at a na.~imt111a
diatanl'r or 4,500 feet from GZ, ancl strrl pole-s at
3,100 fft't. Ovtrhr.ad traaasmiL~io11 cal,lc! "aM
downed by blat at 8,000 le.t.
21
3. Conditions on Momlng of Attack

a. The morning of6 August 1945 \\"as cl~nr \\ith
a small amotmt or clourls at high ultitutlc. \\"ind

\\"a& from the south \\ith a v~lo~ity or about 4 }~
miles per hour. Visibility \\as l 0 to 15 milts.
6. AJ1 air-raid "al~rt.'' \vas soundC'd throughout
Hiroshima Prefccturt- at 0709 hours. Rt~I>Orts of
the 11umbcr of p)an('s causing this altrt \\('rl' ronOicting. The govt'mor of thl' prl'rccturc~ stattcl
that four B-29& were sighk'd, \\'hil~ Lht Kurt' Na\"al
District rt.~ported three large plan<'8.

c. The aircraft apparently can1c out over
Hiroshima from the direction or Bungo Suido and
Kunisaki Pl'ninsula, circled the city, and withdrew
in the direction t;f Ha~Nada at 0726 hours.
"All-clear" wu aounded at, 0731 hours.
d. The following circumstances account in part
for the high number of casualties resulting from
the .atomio bomb:
(1) Only a few persons remained in the air-raid
shelters after the "all-clear" sounded.
(2) No "alert" was sounded to announce the
approach of the plant's involved in the atomicbomb attack.
(3) The explosion occurred during the morning
rush hours when people had just arrivf.'d at work
or Wf're hurrying to their places of busine88. This
concentrak'<l the population in the cenwr or thu
city where the principal businl'ss district "as
located.
{4) Many pl'rsons residing outsidt' tht city \\Pr~
present for reasons or busin ss, travel and pltastJr(.
(5) National volunt<-('r and school tu1its \\'t'rt
1nobiliz"d and <'ngag<'d in <'Vacua tion operations.
84
THE UNITED STATES

THE EFFECTS
OF
THE ATOMIC BOMB
ON
HIROSHIMA, }APAN
Volume II
Physical Damage Divfsion

Dates of Survey:
14 October-26 November 1945
Date of Publication
May 1947
A.
.a:'lot. iol -..liHA . ...............

~ tzi;4;::. .
~............ ,.....,..,a
IR~~s.:mmv
~-~~ -
~~Ji~Qir~
. .
'nie:;~~---~~ ..-.~.,s,. ~ to.. ~~
t.:oae:-m-.Jor':. _.. Oecurrecl in a -~~ water
-~ of~iO~~ ,~~;
uiam Wbeo:Bridp 2e which carri8d it ,.. coli..,..t by blut. This aod a larp n~bfJr of
~)~JM. ~--~
oo e. AU,...t 1M6,
and _tO.....,_.tbe-eontribUtm, tieton.
bieUa
in IIDAil. p~
above
...~ in ~~
~
.
. . . -~--------
a. su.Mt.Wtv
buDclinp redUeed water ~ in _t.he .,.tam,

but the reeerv'oir never ran dry ud .Jack of water
wu not a factor in the extent of tbe fire.
Thii 18ction pre~e.Dta a picture of fMton pertainiDI to. Ire ill }JiNihima before, durjq and after
U. atomic-bOmb at~ Part C deeenbe. 8re condi*icma prior to the it~ aDd aDIIysM the eft'ec~- pnaau~ 8re meuw:ee; Part D
rela~ the ..__., of the. Ire; Part E preaenta a
detailed ~ of flie in eeleeted fire..reeiative,
7.
The temperature resulting from the exploaion

of the atomic bomb wu of great intensity but of
extremely abort duration. At ground zero, 2,000
feet from the center of heat, tho temperature
probably exceeded 3,500 C. for a fraction of a
second. Only directly e.~ surfaces were
flash burned.
ti---
DODCOIIlbUdible, amf combuatible buildings, and

their conteiata; Part F dieeUIIell the cauac and
extent of flr8 in bridpa; and Part G present concluaiona and recommendations.
1.
8."-JCVideoce
relative to ipition of combustible

lttucturel and materials by directly radiated heat
from the atomic bomb and other ignition sources
waa obtained by intel'I'Option and visual inspection of t.be entire city. Six persona who had been
in reinforced-concrete buildings within 3,200 feet
of air zero stated that black cotton black-out
curtains were ignited by ftaab heat. A fow persons
stated that thin rice paper, cedarbark roofs,
thatched roofs, and tops of wooden poles were
afire immediately after the rxploaion. Dark
clothing was scorched and, in somo C88('s, was
reported to have burst into flamC' from flash lH'at.
A large proportion o( OVl'r 1,000 persons qurstionl'd was, however, in agn.><'m<'ltt that a gn.>at
majority of thl' original fires W<'rc startl'd by d~bris
falling on kit.chen charcoal firt>s. Otlu~r sourct>s of
secondary fire Wl're industrial-proct'S8 firts and
electric short circuits.
The city of Hiroshima, likl' other Japanese
citiee, waa poorly pftpared to combat a conflagration of larp-eca]o proportions. Private fire equipment bad been augmented and homf.' occupants
bad been given limited instructions and training in
combatting incendiary bombs. Public fire equipment had been little impro\ed to .fight wartime
tiM~.
I.
The public water syetem was fairly adequate

foJ' rmal Ire conditione, although preaaurc was
V8f'Jiow on dead-t-nd mains at the south end of the
city. No improvements had been made for wartime emergencies.
3: The Ota River and ita six branches divided the
city into nine distinct areas.
The river couJ"B('S

and ,000 feet of firebreak lanes which had been
preparpd by removing combustible buildings on
one or both aides of fairly wide str('('t.a fonnl'd an
extensive network of firebreaks.
9.
The city, consisting principally of Japanese domestic structures, was highly combustible .and
densely built up. Sixty-eight percent of the 13aquare-mile city area waa 27 t~ 42 pl'.rcent built up
and the f.equare-mile city center was particularly
denae, M percent of it being 27 to 42 perct>nt built
up. All the large industrial plants were loca t~d on
the south and southeast edges of the city.
Th~re had lxtm practically no rain in th~ city

for about 3 Wl'eks. The Vl'locity of the wind on
the morning of the atomic-bomb attack was not
more than 5 mil'8 per hour. A fire storm, including both wind and rain, hl'gan to develop soon
after the start of the initial fires. The fire wind,
which blew always toward the burning area,
reached a maximum velocity of 30 to 40 miles per
hour 2 to 3 hours af~r the explosion, and iiAcrmittently light and heavy rain f~ll over thrl north
and west portions of the city.
5. Precautionary fire measures were incfl'ective
10. H undrcds of fiJ't'8 Wl'rr rl'ported to ha vc
largely because widespread damage was caused by
started in the center of the city within 10 minutes

after the explosion.
4.
blut, the populace suffered severe casualties,

innumerable fires were started throughout the city
on both sides of natural and man-made firebreaks,
/
('
OVER ~BUILT UPNESS
IAVEIUIOE: 4t11., 1Xlf1ESTIC~)
20 4ot.
BlLTUPNESS
(AVERAGE f111.,00MUTIC . COMiiiERCIAl.) I
10-~
~
\.
~-
BULT-lAESS
I AVE!tAlE J011o, IHili.ISTRW..)
5-20~
BULT-UPNESS
( ~ IMI.,co.ERCW. !XlfiESTIC
STOfUIIE T~Wt~PCRTATION l
PERIMETER OF FIRE DAMAGE
////////h
~FIRE
BREAK
(NOT TO ICAL)
MAIN WATER PIPES

MUI FR STATION
SUB FIRE STATION
DESTROYED FR: STATION
'
US.STRATEGIC EOIB; SURVEY

' 8lA.T-lFNES5 a FIRE PROTECT10N
HIROSHIMA,JAAlN
FIGURE 1- IX
roc)ft 3,200 tee-t n~ ~ "(10;700 feet),.-adered no

&re dainap; {2) farmera work:ios in an ope field
D. THE CONFLAGRAnON
1. Stall ol Fire
a. Saurt:e oj Ef1Ulmu. Because of the practically ~tal combustion which prevailed in the
burned-over area of 4.4 square miles in the heart
of the city, moat of tha t'vidence relative to ignition by radiant heat from the bomb and secondary
aourcea of heat was necessarily obtained by interrogation which, wherever possible, was checked by
field inspection. Also, since the heaviest casualties occurred closer in, a majority of tbe persons
questioned were 3,000 feet or more from ground
zero (GZ) at the time of the explosion. ~lost
people who had been within 2,000 feet of GZ
(2,800 feet from air zero) were utterly confused as
10 .!\~:-~ ~eel iiDDitely after the
ae~
-~:.afor. ~
- time thereafter, although
,J4QA :.~
:]oea~ Who could give reasonably
. .t~ atmiei. ~use the distance of a point
ftie. ground ~air I8J'O (AZ) was important
from:. nignition atandpoilit and the distance from
GZ Wa&"impolf,ant from a fire spread standpoint,
the relationship between the two has been shown
on Figure 2.
b. Ditw:llgnititm ""IM .Atomic Bomb. {I) Six
pei'IM.JDI were iound who bad been in reinforcedconcrete: buildings within 3.2Uo feet of AZ at the
time o f the explosion and who stated that black
cotton black-out curtains were blazing a few seconds later. In two cases it was stated that thin
rice paper on desks close to open windows facing
AZ also bunt into flame immediately, although
heavier paper did not ignite. No incidt-nts were
recounted to the effect that furniture or similar
objects within buildings were ignited dirt'ctly by
radiated heat from the bomb.
(2) Straw-thatched roofs were illegal within the
city limits, but a number were erected outsidt-. A
few penona stated that they had set-n lhi-J type of
roof buni into flame directly from heat radiatflcl
by the bomb but the stories were inconsistflnt except in two instances where the persons could
point to specific building sites. Both of thflse
locations were almost due north of AZ, thr. first
approximately 12,700 ft-ct and the second approximately13,900 feet. Despite the strong eyt-witnt-ss
accounts of the persons intt'rrogatcd, tlwrc.~ is considerable doubt ill the minds of the investigators
that these buldings were ignited directly by radiated heat from the bomb. This doubt is predicated chiefly upon three considerations, nomt-ly: (1)
Buildings, including many with straw-thatched
-.._..eat :.1rer.
oil
only 800 . feet beyood (1,,700 feet) suffered no

burns of any kind ~thogp they felt a wave of
wann m puii over them almoat simultan~ualy
w.itJ.,the IOUDd of the explosion; and (3) the roofs
of:build.iDp collapaed as a reault of the blaat
and' inay have been ignited by charcoal braziers.
. ~ ;,(&)-~,OP -~ which had a cedarbark-1i.e
.'I'.':;::
' ~ -~..., \.. ~- ~
- .....- ..e--~~
"ted ._ _. tM.:i_
flUh
.....
. J":M,~ JID1 , ..ul,: , . .
Jf;f~-/~ . -~ .-~ ~~-- foUDc!:!:JP.,roDm&tely
'O~Joo:_ f~~ ~o~~ -~--~ - iJid:. qhtly ov_. 200

~-t .b.8~~ the ~-: of. ~ burnecl-over area.
ThiabOuee was of tM ~e aud stucco type comIQon to the area and wa& one of several forming a
smail group within an enclosure formed by an 8-
foot IDUODI'.f and wood wall. All houses within

the enelolure had tile-covered roofs, but one of the
group also had a small section covered with highly
inflammable cedarbark shingles which showed fire
damage, although the fir~ had been extinguished
before the entire roof was consumed (Photos 28
and 29). The owners of the property, including
a son wbo was a university graduate, insisted that
the roof covering burst into flame immt-diatt-ly
with the bomb t-xplosion. Tb('ir story could not
be shaken. - The chief of the fire. dt-partment
stated that he had heard of two or thr('( casfls
where the ct-darbark-covert'cl roofs, also not
pt-rmitted within the city limits, had b('t~n ignit('d
directly by tlw bomb, and thought tlw reports
credible. A number of buildings with unburned
cedarbark roof shingles were found at a rayon
plant approximately 11 ,000 feet southwest from
AZ.
(4) About 600 fet.t east of the dwelling des<~ribed
above and about :J65 fc.flt from the neart-st burned
building, a wood pole which had apparently c.~ar
rit-d elt-ctric wirt>s, probably 220 volts AC, was
found with 3 to 4 feet of its top bun1fld off and
rather ht'avy flash bun1s on tht side facing AZ
(Photo 30). Several r(l8idents of the arc.a stat-ed
that this pole had bt'en seen burning about 5 or 10
minutes after the bomb explosion. 1t is "ntirtly
possiblfl that ignition of this pole was caus<'d
dirt.~ctly .by heat radiation from thfl bombr)....Tiw
pole was capped with a light stet-1 plat.t- of dark
color and it may be that the steel absorbr.d sufficient heat and retained it long tnough to ignite
dry rot which probably was present under the
metal cap. An attempt to determine from utility
company records whetht-r or not the pole had b('en
bum~ previously was unsuccessful. :Many wood
21
poles within .~tt tire ~ter wel8 burned, bu~ it.
is im))Oiiiible fA> atate .With Oei1aiitty whether .:tile

source of ignition wu .direct heat fro.m the bomb
or heat Uld flyinc~ from n~by buiLUnp.
Other eviden~, however; leads ~ the conclusion

that expQ&ed wood was aeldom ignited by radiated
heat from the bomb.
(6) A .cemetery about 2,600 feet from AZ was
found ~uttered with pieces of very light wood
(excellebt kindling) which showed no evidence of
flaeh or other bums (Pho~ 31). It is believed
that this debris must have been blown by the
blast from the interior or other unexposed portions
of structures and this accounts for the lack of
ftash-bum marks. It is interesting that none of
this material was ignited by ftying embers, as it
was very close to the center of the burned-over
area of the city. Photos 32 and 33 also show
unburned combustible buildings at 3,800 and
5,000 feet from AZ.
(6) One of the graves in the cemetery was enclosed with a wood fence. The fence was compoec.ad of four comt-r poles extending about 30
inches above the ground and supporting two
horizontal pieces, about 12 inches apart. Bamboo
pickets (about
by ~.-inch) were lashed to the
fence with v~etable-fibre ropt~. Th<' rorncr
poles show<'d dt'l'P charring which later provtd to
have been done according to Japanest~ custom
when thl'y were ercctl'd. The horizontal pit'ces
appart'ntly were not charred, but when th" lashing
for the pickets was r<'mo\ed \'<'ry definite evidcme
of flash-bum showed. The bamboo pickt'tsshowcd
light flash-bum marks. Th" ropt~ lashing for
the pickets showed no evidtnc<' of having btt'n on
fire, but was sin~t'd.
(7) At the Red Cross Hospital, 5,:300 f<'t't south
from AZ, three chairs with barks and Stats upholstered with a pile fabric (appartntly mohair)
Wt're near a window whid1 was txpos('(l to AZ.
The backs of the c.mairs showed modt'ratl to dNp
singf'ing ex('ept for thf' lowtr part which hnd httn
shittlded by the roncrl'tt' wall and showNl no discoloration. Parts of the stats of tht chairs showf'd
light flash-burns where tlw sta ts had not hNn
shielded by the chair backs. No part of tlw upbolstl'ry was burnt'd through (Photo :J4). Xtxt to
the chairs was u varnished wood door whi(h Nhowed
definite cvidenct' of flash-burn t'Xctpt for a nry
smaU spot adjact'nt to th<' door knob which
shieldPd it.. Tlw door did not t~atch fire (Photo 35).
A cotton jac.k(t worn by ont' of tlw nurs<'s was
charred across one breast. 'fhc ouhr mat<'rial of
I"
24
the ..j~~t .~ burned WV.. ~ ~~ but the

-:=dclecl
eot~n n ...; ..._ ..a:.-.~ ."a..:-..a"' ' ' '1.. was not
~~~
- ~.
~ uuvu-,.3- .~~~
b~
thrOugh {Pho~ 36).~ TJle : ~~ who had
worn the jacket wu leverely iD.j.uii8cfb.J. the blast

and wu n~t .available for qUetitioning. It was
stated that her body wu not burned through the
coat. Testimony at the hospital indicated that
several coati had burned similarly, but the others
could not be produced for examination. Furthermore, nobody at the hospital was certain that
these coats luad actually burst into ftame, and, in
fact, the concensue was that they had only
smoldered. There was no other evidence of fire
in the hospital.
(8) Scores of penons throughout all sections of
the city were questioned concerning the igniti.on
of clothing by the flash {rom the bomb. Repli<'s
were consistent that white silk seldom was affected, although black, and some other color('(l
silk, charred and disintegrated. N umt'rous instances were reported in which designs in blnc.k or
other dark colors on a white silk kimono Wf'J"(~
charred s0 that they ft'll out, but thl' whitt part
was not afft'cud. Th('Se statt'mtnts wtrt ronfinntd by Unitt'd Statt's m<'dical offirtNl who haul
Jx.en ahlt to t'Xamirw a numhtr of kimonos nYailahlo in n. hospital. Tt'n school boys wtn lo('utcd
durin~r til(' study who had httm in sl'hool yurds
ahou t 6,200 ftl't east and 7,000 fttt wtst. rcsp<'ctivtly, (rom AZ. Thtst boys hod flush hurus
on til(' portions of tlwir fn<'('S whieh hod htn
dirt'Ctly txpos<'d to rnys of til<' homh. Tlw hoys'
storit's Wf'rt consishnt to tiU' tff(.'t thut t lwi
clothing, nppnrtntly of ('Olton rnntPriuls,
"smok<'d," but did not hurst into ftnnw. Photo
:16 shows a hoy's tout thnt startfd to smoltiPr from
ht'at rays at 3,800 ftct from AZ.
(9) Three nutomobilt tru<'ks, powtrtd with
int.. rnnl combustion motors m~in~ f1wl ~uruttd
hy burnin~r dtnnonl (no gusolirw or sirnilur
Yo)ntilts ustd), which wtrt pnrkfd in n <'ltnrinJ!
nhout 7,800 ftrt north from AZ Wf'fl' snirl to lun,.
bttn ignih'<l imnwdiattly nft,r tht homh f'Xplosion. Firt' dnmn~" to th<' nhidts wns totnl.
Connrstly, howtvtr, u stdun showing no firf'
dnmagt was txnmirwd whtre it haul h<'tn nhundorwd us a r<'sult of scv.tre blast dnmngt' on n wilt~
~tn~<'t nbout 5,800 fl'tt sout.lwnst from AZ.
(10) A privat(' gard<'n ro\ering an nr.-n of
slightly onr 5 a(ns and lorat<'d about 5,000 ff'f't.
nortlwast. from AZ shmnd no cvidf'n<'<' of havinJ!
b<'en on fir<', although tht're was som<' flash-burn
damage on tht edg<' of tlw artn fafin~ .AZ.
PlltYfl) 36 IX. ~hen' par1l1 hurttd evat. uf t ...~- ho

wa.a In ot~eb 1teer l tt ~ llaU \ 811liclinc . , 3..atQO ' " '
.fauin AI..
3800 feet from air zero;
3300 feet from ground zero
PROBABIUTY OF FIRE SPREAD

IN
VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF BUILT- UPNESS
I
I
40
...c
...u
35
[7
~trial
~ ldings' '---..
!()
~
~
l
I
25
20
cg.
/
y
~ Dome stic
i
15
/I'
10
./
-- --
Buildil 'QS
----
..__._
-- - -1-----
-- --- -- - - -- - - - -
--
/
-
0 ~
0
--- - - -
10
20
40
60
70
80
90
-- --
100
Probability of Fire Spread- Percent
FIRE SPREAD VS. BUtLT- UPNESS

HIROSHIMA. JAPAN
FIGURE 4 -11:
42
PROBABILITY 0 F FIRE SPREAD

ACROSS
\t\RIOUS EXPOSURE DISTANCES
150~--~--~--~~--~--~--~~--~--~--~--~
\\
IZOr---~---+--~~--~'~,--~--~---+----~--~--_,
\
\
110 t----4-------+-----1~--~~.~---+------+---+--+---~-_,
\
\
~~-~--+--~~-+-~~~-~~-+---~--~-~
t---~--+--~-+------1\+-----+---+----+----+---- -1
e eo~-4---+-~~-+--~\~~~--+---~--~--~
j ~~~~-4---+---+--~~~--~--~--~~
If
eo~-~---+-~~--+--~-~-~--+--~--~--~
50
40
1----+------+----+--+--~\
--+---+---+----1
~---+-----+---~~---+----l- --- ~--llll-..__-+---+-----+-----1

I
50~-~--+----~--~--+
,. ---~~\~--+-~--~
10~--~---+----~--~--~---- -~---+-~-~--~--~
ii
"""'--.......
10~--~---+---~-4----+----~--4----+~~~~
""'., ..
L----'----L------L--~---'-- _ __.__ _ _ _
10
20
30
40
so
eo
----- - - ---l --
ro
eo
-L----100
so
Probabiity of Fire Spread- Percent

U. S. STRATEGIC IOMIING SURVEY
ARE SPREAD VS.DPOSUR DISTANCES
HIROSHIMA. .fUM
fiGURE 5 .. .IX
TABLE
5.-Fire-rui3tt:ve building data (fire)
IU,,
Fire
shutt~
Occupancy
on wall
opeoiD!S
~ o .....
Unprotected
- ~
wall openings ,
ext>O!Ied to ' E c;g
AZ at zero
fiS :s
hour
- !..o
=..9
Areas in
thousands
square feet
Probable
cause of
initb\1
Ignition
Stories burned (after

blast dam&~e)
8i
;i=
~=
~~,Q
-----1
4H
4H
5H
58
6
7
8
~H
50
10
133
58
SH
68
5H
68
5H
68
5H
58
5H
5H
liB
&H
6H
68
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
6H
liB
51
SH
5H
5H
SH
SH
5H
5H
51
5I
51
51
61
51
11
31
3H
3H
30
10
40
60
60
40
60
60
60
71
liJ
30
60
liJ
134
JJ6
51
11
12
18
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
31
32A
32B
320
32E
32F
320
32H
33
38
39
41
43
45
47
48
49
50
51
fiG
61
62
64
65
67
74
7e
79
86
8&
i3
G6
II
100
101
1130
121
1tl
132
4J
2.100
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
! 2,100
j 2. 100
--- 1 ---------11---- 1----~- 1 ---
omee .. ... .... ...... ....
700
800
600
600
600
600
600
No... ..
Yes ... . ... . .. .
... .. do . . . . . . . .... . . . . ... No . .... Yes ... . . . ....

..... do . .. . .. . .... . . . .. YH . .... Probably no .
Bank . . . . .... .. . . . . ...... Yes . . . Yes ..... . . ...

. ... do . . . ... . ..... . . .. ... YH .. . . . Yes . ... . . .. . . .
Oftk.oe .. . .. . . . ...... Yes .... . Yes .... . .... . .
. . .. do . .. . . . .. . . .. ... . . .. Yes ... . Yes .......... .
700 ..... do.. .. . . . . . . .. . . ..... No .. . . . Yes . ......... .
700 .. . .. do . ... . ... ... .. . . .. No .. . . . . Yes .. . . . . ... .
2,3)0 1,000 Bank .. .. . . . . . . . . ... . ... Part . .. . Probsbly no . .
2,200 1,000 .. . .. do ..... . ... . ......... Yes .. .. Yes . . ....... .
2, 200 1, 000 Oftice .. . . . __. . . . . . . . .. . Part. . . . Yes .. .. . . .. .. .
2,300 1, 300 Bank .. . . . . . . .. .. ........ Yes .. ... Yes . ...... . .
2,300 l,Ioo omce ............. ...... Part . . Yes . . . . . . . . ~ .
2.300 1,200 . . .. do . .. ........ .. . . .... No . . . . Yes . . . . . .. . .
2.400 1,300 Bank . .. .... . . . ... . ...... Yes .. ... Yes . . . . . .. . .. .
2.400 1,400 Art museum ... . ....... Part ... . Yes .. .... . ...
3, 000 2, 300 Oftlce .. . .. --- -- --- - . ... Part... . Yes .. ........ .
3,100 2.400 Library . .... . ..... . . . . Part .... Yes . .... ..
3,800 , 3.300 omce . . . .. .. . . . . ... . . . . . No.... Yes ......... .l
5,300 4, 000 HospitaL ... .. . . .... No ... . . Yes ......... .
5,100 1 4, 700 Classrooms . .. . ......... No. .... . Y~ --------- - 6,200 1 4,800 Library .. . . .. . ... . .. . . Yes . . . . . No . . . ... .. .... ,
5, 000 4, 600 Cl8S81'00ms-laboratories.. No...... Yes . . . ....... _,
4, 700 4, 200 Classrooms. . .... . .... . .. No. . .. .. Yes . . .. . . . ... .
II, 000 4, 600 Laboratory. . ............ No.... . . Yes . . .. . .. . ... 1,
li,:IJO 4, 800 Kitchen . . .. .. . ...... . .. No ... . . Yes . . ... ... ..
5, 300 4, 000 Laboratory... . .... . . . ... No. . . . . . Yes . . . ....... .
s, 600 s. 300 omce. .. .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . Part. ... Yes . . . . .....
2, 000 2,100 .. ... do ... . . . . ...... . . .... No ...... Yes .. . ....... .
3, 200 2, 1100 ..... do_.. ........... _... Part . . .. Yea. .. ... .. . . .
3, 200 2.000 l>epartmentstore ... . . .. No ___ ___ Yes .. . . . ..... .
2,600 1,700 Classrooms . . . .. .. ... . ... No ..... Yes ...... .. ..
2, 800 2, 000 Telephone exchange..... Part . . . . Yes . . . . . ..... .
, 2, 700 1, 800 D epartment store.. .. . .. Yes... .. Yes .. .. . ..... .
1 2.700 1,800 Bank ..... ... .. . . . . ... . .. Yes ... . . Yes . ... . . ... . .
:l,IOO 1 2,300 Beer hall.. . . . ..... .. ... . No . . .. . . Yes ... . ......
3.300 1 2.000 1 Hospital. -- ----- - No . . .... l Yes ....... . ..
3,600 ! 3,000 1 omce .. . . .. . . ........... Part ___ __ l Yes . .... . ... . . ,}
3,000 ! 3.000 1 Newspaper plant . . ... . . No . .. . __ Yes ... . . . ... . . 1
3,700 ! 3,200 ! Bank ... .. . . . ... . . . .... . . Part ... . Yes . . .... .. ... ,'
4,1100 j' 4,100 I Otllce .. . ....... ... ... . .. 1 Part .. .. . Yes .. ...... .. .
4, 000 3, 400 Radio station . .. .. .. _. .. , No .. . _. . Yes . . . ... . ___
4,100 3,800 Reaidenee .... .. . ... ... No. . ... . Yes ... . . . . . ..
5,308 4,i00 Ba.pttal . ... .. . . . No .. . . . . Yes . ... . ....
5,300 f , - <Miee . . . .. .. . ..... No .. . . . Yes . . . . . . . ... .
5,000 4,D Munltloosstorap.... . . Yes .. .. . No . ... . ... .
. . . I,OOD Ddricallabora&clry No . ..... Yes . ... .. .. . .
6.100 Wanboule . ..... . Yes . . . . Yes .. . . .. . . .
6,100 6,800 . .. . do ... . . . . . ... . Yes . . Yes .. .... .. . .
3,1110 3,300 Telepboneescballle .. .. Yes . . . Probebly no...
J,OOO Claarooml. . .. . ... . .. No. ..... Probebly BO
a,aoo 1,1100 Wareboule .. .. ... .... . Yes No ...... .. . . . .
2,300 1,200 Cllarooma. . .... . No. . Yes . ... .. .
2,000
400 ClothiDcstore . . ..... No. .. .. . Yes .... . ....
2,100
800 Oftlce ... . .. .. . ... ...... No. . .. Yea . ___ _____ _
2,800 1, 7'00 Warehouae .. .. .. .... . .. Yes . . Probably oo .. .
7,700 7,400 Ctprettemaoufaeture . . No. ... . Yes . . . ....... .
6, 7'00 6,400 Bank . ..... . . .. . . . .. .. . Yes ... Probably DO
6,000 5,800 . . . .. do .. . . . . . . .. ..... . . No . .... . Yea ...... . .. .
5,7'00 6,400 Warehouse ... . . . ..... Yes . . . . No... . ... .
6,:110 5,UOO Mercantile .. .. . . . .. . _ No . . . Yes ____ __ ____ _
&.300 6,000 Oftlee ____ ___ ____ _______ _ Yea .... Yes ... .. . .. ..
6,800 6,1100 Bank . . . ... --- - ---- - -- - Yea . . . Yes ..
e.
a.
- - -- ----1--------1- - - - - - -
0
20
10
6
10
10
10
30
10
10
20
10
. _. . ... .. .. . _. . .
. . .. .. . .. .......
Flrespread ____
... .. do .. .. .....
.. . . . do . . __... __
.... . do ... . . .. ..
.. . . . do..... . . . .
-
. ............. .
Flrespread . .. .
Primary .... . .
..... -.-- .. - .- - -
!!
-~~i~~--- ~~~~~
10
25
10
10
25
50
75
25
II
30
30
12
0
6
90
20
10
.... . . ... .. ....

Fin> spread .. . .
- - -Primary . . ....
-- --- ----------Firespread ...
No ftre .... . .
Firespread .. . .
. _. __ do. __. _. . _.
Secondary.... .
Fire spread. .. .
. . ... do. . . ......
.. ... do.. . . ... . .
. .... do ... . . .. . .
. . ... do .. __ _.. _.
.. . .. do.. .. .....
Primary..... . .
B-2
B-3
B-3
2
3
B-3
2
3
B-3
B-5
B-4
3
B-7
B-3
2
B-6
4
B-4
.B-3
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
B-4
B-3
4
: ~~::~~~--~~:~~~~: :=!
1-2 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70%B,100%1-3. . . ....
1-2. . . ... . . . . .. ... . .. . .
1-3. __ . . . .. ... . . . .. . . . .
1-3 ........ . . ... . . . ....
1-2. ..... . ..... .... . . ..
1-3.. ... .. .. .... . ... . ..
B-3 . .... .... .. .. . ... . .
B-5 . . ... . . . . . ..... . . ..
75% 1-2,100%3-4 .... .
1-3 .. . . .. ... -.-.-.- - .-.
3. ll
16.6
5. 7
9. o
4.9
2. 5
9. 8
15.8
4G.4
29. 9
. 5
15.3
6. 7
9. 0
4. 2
2. 5
9.8
15.8
46.4
; 25. 2
4. 5
!=!~~:~~ ::~~~::~~::~~~~ ~:! I ~:!

1-7. . . .. . ... . .. . . .. . ..
II% 2, 100%3 . .. . ...
1-2 -- --- --- -- --- -
CO"/oB,100%1-5. . . ... .
1-4 . . . . ---- -------- --
80%B-1,100%2-4 . .. .
None .. ... .. . . . .... . . ..
1-2 ..... - ------- - --1-2. .. . ..... . ... . .. . .. .
1-!L . . .... ... . ......
1-3 . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . ..
1.. .. .. .. . .... . . . ..... .
None... . ...... . ..... . .

1-2 . . .. . ....... ... .. .. .
None. . . . .... .. ........
B-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
1-4 . .. . ........ . .. .. ...
43.3
32. 8
5.4
112.0
13. (
"3.4
88.6
2.8
3. 7
103.3
39. S
2.0
3.0
3.8
62.6
10. 4
32.0
39.0
5.2
5.4
46.5
13.4
84. 9
0
2. 8
3. 7
103. a
39.11
2.0
3.0
3.8
0
10. 4
! 32. 0
~-B.-100o/r:i~.a- -~.- ~:~ ~: : ~: ~ I
3ll Secondary .. .. 3 1-3.- ..... - . . . - . .... -5 ----- --- ---3 1-3... . ........ . .......
0 --------- ---- - 3 1-3 .... . . . . .. . ... ..... .
20 Fire spread.. .. B-3 1-3... . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
6 ......... . ..... .
2 1-2... . .. . . . . ........ . .
7 1-7 .. .... .. .. . ... . .. . .
{Primary _. . . . .
90
Fire spread .. . .
3 1-3 ........ . .. -
40 Primary . ... .. . B-3 15% B, 100% 1-3 . .. ...
B-3 None . . ... ... . . . .. . . . .. .
2 1-2... . . ......... . . . .. .
0
2 1-2.. - . - . - .. - - . -- . -- . - .
30 Primary- --- - . B-2 Second only . . . . . .. ...
ao Fire PI'Md---4 M% 1-3,90% 4 . .
126 No ftre ______ __
1 None... . .... .... . . ....
30 Fire spread- - - B-2 70% B-1,100% 2....
0 . ... . do......
1 1---- -------- - ----e .....do. . ... ___ _ 2 1-2--------- - -- ---- 3 26% second only ____ __ _
126 8ecoodaey .. --126 No fire . . . ..
0 Fire spreed ..
2 1-2.. . .. .. . ..... . .. ....
30
B-3 B-3.. . . . . . .. . . . . . ....
10 - ---- - -- - ---- - - B-3 1-3 . . ... . ... .. .... . .
2 t-2__ __ ___ __ __ ____ _____
0 -------- - -- - --6 Fire spread . . _
2 1-2 - - - ---- - -80 Noftre . . .. ... .
1 None .... . .. .... . .. . . ..
5 Fire spread _. . .
2 None.... . .. .... .. . .. ..
12 No ftre .. . . . . . . B-2 1 None .. . ........ . . ....
0 Fire spread . . _ B- 1 B-1... .. . .. . . . . . .. ..
8 . . . . . do .... . .. . .
4 1-4 .... - . ... . -. -.- . -- -
eo ... .. do. . ... . .
3 80% 1, 100% ~3 . .. ... .
100 No fire. ------- B-2 None . . .. . . _. . . . . .. . ..
~ - ~~~-~~~~----J
4. 2
00% B, 100% 1-3 . .. .... 27. 3 34.3
36. 1
4. 3
8.0
15. 3
2.9
14. 7
~-
26. 7
16.2
8. 3
36. 1
4.3
8.0
13. 2
2. 9
14. 7
24. 5
19.2
83
89
92
100
100
86
100
100
100
100
84
100
100
100
90
16
100
88
100
91
0
100
100
100
100
100
0
100
0
100
100
100
95
100
100
100
86
100
100
100
72
8. 3
100
2. 2
2.2
100
15.9
83.
1. 7
13. 2
16.9
14. (
1(. 2
. 5.3
10.0
33
60
0
80
3 Nooe .................. 11.5
10.6
111.9
14.
1.1
0
2.9
2.9
49. 5 49.6
12.4 9.3
3.0
3.0
4.3
4. 3
M. 6
0
11. 1 0
16.2 0
15.0 15.0
3. 0
3.0
4.8
(.5
9. o 0
100
100
8
0
100
100
75
100
100
0
0
0
100
100
94
0
SOURCE: USSBS's Secret report, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan,"
vol. 2
Only 8 of 64 non-wood buildings had thermal flash ignition evidence, 3
had blast damage induced fire, and 28 were ignited by firespread from wood homes.
(4) It was reported that. a cotton black-out

curtain at an unprotect('d window in the east stair
to\ver of Building 85 {3,800 fl'et from AZ) smoked
aod waa ecorched by radiated heat from the bomb
but it did not burst into ftamea. All windows
otliei..than .tboee in the stair tower were protected by. closed steel-roller shutters. There was
fire damage in a few telephone relay units in the
second story but this was caused by electrical
short circuits when debris from windows was
blown into the ~uipment by blast.
(5) A man who was in the third story of building
26 (3,000 feet from AZ) stated that radiatc<l heat
from tlie bomb ignited cotton black-out curtains at
unprotected windows in the \\est \vall and tllin
rice paper on dt'sks. Accordittg to his recollection, all stories were nfirr five minutes aft('r til'
attack. On the other hand, two Dlrll \vlo \Vf'r('
working in Buildir1g 28 (3,800 f"et from AZ) stalell
that there \Vas no primary fire in this building, the
windows of which Wl're not equippe(l \Vith fire
shutters. Black-out curtains at ull windo\\s \Vl'rt~
drawn back and no fires started in them. According to tbe same men, fire spread into the building
by ftying brands from tl1e soutl1 Jl('arly t\vo l1ours
after tl1e attack.
47
Fire fighting \\ith water buckets was reported inside only four buildings (24, 3:3,59, and 122)
and probably prevented extensive fire damage in
them. In Building 24, fire \\"88 started in contents
of a room at the southwest corner of the SC('oncl
story by sparks from trees on the south side about
1ahours after the attack. ~fen inside the building
Axtinguished the fire and probably preventeci
further damage in the first and second stories
(Photo 85). A little later, contents in the thircl
story were ignited by sparks from the outside and
were totally damaged. This fire wns beyond
control before it was discov<'red, but did not
spread down,,ard through open stairs. ~\t Builrling 33, sparks from the west exposure, which
burned in early evening, set fire to black-out
curtains in the west wall and to waste paper in
the fourth aUry of the northwest section of the
building. Twenty persona were on guard in the
building awaiting such an occurrence and th<'
fires were quickly extinguished wlule in th<'
incipient stage. At Building 59 sparks frorn the
south exposure ignited a few pieces of furniture in
the first and third stories and black-out curtuins
in the first story about 2 hours after thf' attu('k.
These fires were extinguishet"l by men inside nnd
negligible damage resulted. A fe\\ \\"indo\\ frnrnt's
in the east and \\est \\ails and 2 or a dtlsks in thP
first story of Building 122 \\Pre ignitt'cl b) rndin tPcl
heat and sparks fron1 tht' ,,est nnd north~nst
~xposures. Thf'se fires \\(lr(l (lXtin~uishl'd quirkl~
nnd dnrnuge \Vas negligi bl(~.
(10)
58
A. SUMMARY
bombe apiDat Occidental conatruct.ion were est.imatal to be approximately:
,.,., ....
1. The awmic bomb dewnated at Hiroshima was

an extremely effective and powerful blast weapon.
Blast effect wu essentially similar w that produced by a large charge of high explosive except
that it was on a much larger ecale; thus, damage
was cbara.cterized by disoortion or crushing of
entire buildings rather than collapse of a single
truss or rupture of a single wall.
t.
Multlltory, 1teel- and relnforced-coacrete _ 0. 06
Vf11'1 IJpt, lteel-frame one-story, low-coet

lndUit.rial and storap ____ ------------- 3. 4
Munbtory, load-bearinc, brick "aU _______ 3. 6
One-etory, load-bearins, brick wau __ . ----- 6. 0
MAE values against other types of Occidental

construction, including moderate to heavy, steelframe, indUitrial construction, could not be estimated because buildings of comparable construction were not present in Hiroshima.
Uaual blast phenomena such as shielding, re-
Section, and diffraction were observed. The

poeitive phase of the blast of the aromic bomb is
believed U> have been of comparatively longer
duration that that of high explosives.
6. Fire was the principal cause of damage to

contents. In multistory frame construction fin.
cauaed the major part of all contents' damage,
suffering only slight to moderate initial damagP
from blast and debris. Contents in light, steelframe buildings suffered moderate initial damage
from blast and, subsequently, in the burned-over
area, almost total damage by fire. Outside th~
burned-over area there was some exposure damage.
Blast and debris were the major causes of damage
to contents of bri<'k buildings, additional damag.resulting from fire and exposure. Throughout
the burned-over area practically all contents of
wood-frame buildings were destroyed by fire.
Beyond the limits of the fire there was slight to
moderate damage to tontents from blast, dehri~,
and exposure.
3. The primary cauae of damap w buildinp was

blut. In many instances the fire which swept the
central portion of the city increased disoortion of
t.he building frames, and consumed the combustible contents and interior trim and &nish of most
of the fire-resistive buildings located within the
burned-over area. Blast damage U> wood-frame
buildings extended well beyond the limits of the
burned-over area and it is probable that aU woodframe structures within the burned-over area
suffered structural damage initially by blast.
4. The mean areas of effectivene88 (MAE) of the

awmic bomb for structural damage about ground
zero (GZ) and the radii of the ~fAE's for the
several classes of buildings present werP computed
w be as follows:
MAE's
in square
mllea
Multistory, earthquake-resistant______
Multistory, steel- and reinforcedconcrete frame (including both
t>arthquake- and non-earthquakeresistant construction) ___________ _
1-story, light, steel-frame _______ ___ _ _
Multistory, load-beanng, brick-walL_
1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall _____ _
Wood-frame
industrial-commercial
(dimension-timber construction) ___ _
Wood-frame
domestic
buildings
(wood-pole construction) _________ _
Residential construction ____________ _
7. J.~x<'ept for multistory, steel- and <oru-reteframe buildings, tontents and structural damage to
buildings were g<'nerally of similar extent. at.
torresponding distances from air zero (AZ).
Radii of
MAE's
in feet
0. 03
500
. 05
3. 4
3.6
6.0
700
5,500
5, 700
7,300
8.5
8,700
9. 5
6.0
9,200
7,300
8. Had the bomb detonated at a somewhat lower

altitude, damage to multistory, steel- and reinforced-c'Oncrete framP buildings wbicb were clustered relatively nPar GZ probably would ha,p been
greater. Tbe effe<'t of such an explosion upon the
c.-:d-ent of damage to ot.hc.-r classes of buil<lings i~
uncertain, but probably would not have been great.
9. Comparison of t.he
atomic~ bomb with highexplosive weapons results, at best, in ,cry rough

approximations because of the a88umptions necessary. Based upon damage to load-bearing, brickwall structures, an equhalent bare charge of approximately 4,400 tons of TNT was estimated.
10. BecatJse of the large area through which

damage extended, particularly w load-bearing
Of the values listed abo,e, those for wood-frame

and residential construction are peculiar to Japan
and are not applicable to any other locality.
5. 1\-IAE's for similar, high, air-burst atomic
brick construction which constitutes a large proportion of the residential and older industrial sections of occident-al cities, the air-burst atomic
96
TABLE
1.-Buildif&l data, .Uel- aftd reiaforel-cMICf'de-/rtarM

(A~
ill u.o..ndl olsqaan feet]
..
1111
Ocleupaocy
J
~
=
1
2
11
18
It
21
22
21
"28
17
lU
I2A
12B
12D
12E
IS
40
43
44
47
ao
..
&1
II
15
74
.,.
II
IIU.
neB
:a0
!>.
E-o
-4B
4B
6B
611
611
611
611
Oftkle . .. . _.. -- . . . -
___ __do_-------------- -----do.---------------Bank ... ----- - --------Oftlce .. ---- - --- - . ____ __
----.do.--------------But. _______ .. __._. ___
&B .. do. - ---- ----- - -- - -

au Oftlce. . . .. . . ........ ..... ........... ....
&B Bullr. .. __ ____ __ ____ __ .
au Oftlce.... ... __ . ____ ___ .
5H - --- .do . . . - .. . . - . . --.- -&B Bank . --- - -- -- --. -----

&H omce .......... ___ _____
&H Library .... _. __ _._ . . __
m Oftlee __ __ .. ------- - --.
IU Ho.pltaL __ .. ___. . _.. .
m
IH
Ill
611
811
c~----- - - --- -Library . . . . ------ __ _._ .

c~ labon&ory . .
cJawrooms .. ____ ____ __

omce ___ ____ --- -------.
&II . .... do.- --------- ---&I _____ do ___ ____ -- ------- &B Depertment ltoft ... . --
611
5B
&II
58
51
&I
&I
&I
&I
&I
II
31
IH
ao
40
ao
c~ --- --------Telepbone ezcbaop .. .

Dei*'UDeot ~We .... -.
Beer ball. .. -- -- -- ----omce.. ____ _________ . __
Newspaper ___ _________
But ... ______ .. --- -- . .

Oflke .... ---.-- - ------ .
Radio ltatloo . ............... . . ......
Rsidence ... ___ ------.
DoepltaJ .. .. __ ----- __ .
Oflee . . . __. __.. __ _. _. __
ltleetrieallaboratJ . _.
Wuebouse .. _--------Telephone excb~ .. .
C~rns. - ----- ----
-----do.------ ---------ao Clothtntt ltore . . - - -. .

11 w.e~~oo~e.- ---------40
122
Bank __ _-- ----- --- -- ---
12
II
25
46
&H
Of&oe . ... ------ - - -- ---.

Eleetrle 10bstatlon .. ..
Art mUIMID'I . . -----Jeweb'y
Hoepl&aL . _-- __ - - ____ _
t8
100
101
121
ft1
Ul
58
&H
E1
E1
E1
ltt
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E1
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El
E1
E1
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Rallrued roand"oaN.- A2.4
A1.2
uer
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an
El
JU
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7J
7J ___ .. do ... ______ ____ __ __
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store.---------
ao 1V~~----------10 omee ________ __. ______ .

ao
w..-. __ ----------
71
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38
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dam-.e
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3
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3
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V-1
V-1
V-1
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V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
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R
R
R
R
R
R
R
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2,3)0
2,100
2,100
2,100
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2,2)0
2,300
2,300
2,300
2.400
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
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3,000
3,100
3.800
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2,800
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2
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V-1
V-1
V-1
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V-1
V-1
V-1
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V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
V-1
v-a
V-3
V-8
v-a
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R
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1/3
3
7
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2
2
2
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2
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I
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R
R
R
R
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R
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R
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83.4
12.2
14.4
14.2
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12.4
71.1
71.1
71.1
71 . 1
&.1
14.8
4.1
&.4
1.1
2.1
2.1
3.0
4.3
14.0
1. 7
16. I
8,200
&.7UO
2,100
1,100
2,400
2.800
3,300
2,MJO
2,100
2,800
N/C
ft,ftOO
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1. 7
1&. 8
&4.1
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V-4
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a
a
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11.8
1
1
1
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V-4
V-4
R
R
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t.O
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1.&
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7,800
8,100
8,000
103
--
---
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-----
toa. a
-- ----- -...... - -- . - ... --- ... . . ... -..... - .. -...... -- ... - .. . . --- .. . 4.4 ... -.... .. . . -
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32.0
78.1
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...
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. ......... . . -- .. .. ---...... . . . . . .. -.. . -......... -- .. --- ....
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4.1 ... .. ............. ..................... -. . .. ..... . . 1. 7 . ... .. -- ... - ... -...... . . .... .. ... --- ...... ...... -. . ........
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......... .
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- ...............
-----
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24.3
14.3
1.0
4.2
9.8
48.4
25. 2
4.5
7.3
20.4
0
5.2
48.&
13.4
84.8
0
2.8
3.7
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. . . - ...
--.... -- ----- .. -
1. 0 -.. ----2.1 ------ ~ ~ ~ ~~ : 1 :~~~~ :

1.9 -- ... .........
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2.1 . ....
..
4. 8
------ .. ........ . . ...........
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,.I
2,700
3,100
3,ft00
- ....
...
32.8
&2.0
13.4
tl.4
8llG
2.8
3.7
101.3 i. --- --.
I
38.6 i-----82.1 !- ..... - . . - .
2.800
s,s;oo
2
2
2
2
2
1/2
1
1
1
ta.3
...
10.4 -- ---.
32.0 ..... ..... . . . . . .
78.1
21.4 ... . . .
38.1 . . . . .. --.....
4.3
1. 7
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3t.5 .. ..
.....
.
- ...
&,000
4, 700
5,800
R
R
R
- ,-
27.3
Ull
9.0
4.9 .
1.8
4&.0
21U
4.&
7.3
20.4
a,-.
4, Dl
4.000
4,100
5.300
5,300
8,300
I, 100
3.800
2,0
2,300
2,000
8,800
lq.
---- -------- --- ---- -
Coat.eot claiDale
BuDdiDI daJD~~~~&-ftoor area
.-.
>I
-- ... - .. -- ...... -- -... -...... .. ..

- -- ... --- ---- . . ...... ..... . . ...
... ... . .. --- -------1-------
... ...
... ... ...
31.&
0
...
4.3
13.2
14.7
:14.&
11.2
0
8.3
2.2
5.3
60.0
10..
14.4
1. 1
0
48.5
1.3
0
0
0
0
0
1&.8
2.&
5.4
N
100
go
100
100
go
100
100
100
Fire.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Mised.
Fire.
go
D'l.
30
Mixed.
go
Fire.
Do.
Do .
Debris.
Fire.
Do.
Do.
Do.
100
16
26
1CIO
100
100
100
1&
100
100
100
16
100
100
II)
100
100
II)
10
100
100
40
70
II)
100
60
30
100
7&
0
0
Blut-de
bria.
I'Ire.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Do.
Blalt.
P'tn.
Do.
Mixed.
Do.
P'lre.
Do.
Mixed.
Debris.
P'ln.
Do.
0
0
0
100
ao
Mixed.
Do.
100
Pin.
Mixed.
1GO
100
100
100
100
100
10
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.1
2.1
2.1
a.o
4.a
14.U
0
14. e
Fire.
Mbed.
Fire.
Debris.
P'lre.
Bspo!UJ'e
Fire.
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE BY BLAST

TO
MULTI-STORY, STEEL- AND REINFORCED- C~CRETE- FRAME BUILDINGS
(BASED ON TOTAL FLOOR AM:Al
MAl rolf ALL STEEL-a REINf:-OONC:-FRANE BL06S 0. 03 80 Nl
MAl. ~OR !AATHOUAK!-RfSISTANT BL098 ONLY
~0 . 03 8Q Nl
\ \
\ \
\
M~-------+--~~~~------~--------~--------~--
\ \
\ \
\ \
\
40 ~-------+--------~------~--------~--------~--
f!L-a lt!INf.
ONO~fRAME
DGS.
10 ~--~---.--------~~----~--------~--------~-UAKE-RESIST NT ILDII. 0
U.S. S11'A T81 C IOMIING SURVEY

BUILDING DAMAGE
HIROIHI.A,-'APAN
FIIURE e1
0
0
1000
1000
DISTANCE
4000
FROif
~~}-FEET
~000
DAMAGE TO CONTENTS
-IN-
100
REINf. - CONC.- FRAME BLDGS.
--.--=_;:;;:.;:::;=:;;:..;;....;::;~~
80
60
40
zo
0
22 ONESTORYe LIGHT
100----.--
STEEL-FRAME SLOGS .
80
60
40
+--=-.._
20
i ~:
I
w
<!)
c
2
u..
0
...LnSTOII1 LOAD -BEARING BRICK-WALL

.....--,-.- ZO
'
-.....
80
f--
f--
60
r---.
40
f--
f--
20
0-
:::;
" ['._
60
40
20
n
%
~
,..
_J
Cl)
f--
Ll
0
...,
27 WOOD FRAME I INDUSTRIAL

( NO BURNED
- COhiMERCIAL
..
~
_ii ~
80
~~
~
zo
100
iii
r-.,
a>
28 ONE- STORY LOAD-BEARING, BR ICK-WALL SLOGS.
60
40
~~
100
eo
"~
~~
BLDGS
SLOGS
.........
SLOGS. INCLUDED)
~cri
!".
z~cs:::i
-en
...w.a.
o-g~~~8~8~8~8~8-~a-~
-
LEGEND
DISTANCE FROM GZ - FEET
U.S.STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
STRUCTURAL DANAGE BY BLAST

CONTENTS DAMAGE
(VALUE LOSS)
CONTENTS DAMAGE
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
{FIRE
BLAST 8 DEBRIS
EXPOSURE
FIGURE
] 2!
10-X
--
-----l---------l----t------t---l-----l--1-------------a
4B
I.D
100
400
&B
6B
1,000
2,000
2,
2, 400
ao
m
m
m
m
a.ooo t.mo
2,mo goo
4,eoo 4,mo
a, 100 a, aoo
8B
a, 800
37
42
63
M
56
eB
67
61
m
m
6
11
14
1&
17
aoo
m a, aoo
ac
&B
6I
51
6B
6I
41
eo
e&A
e&B
100
t. aoo
1, 400
4, goo
6, :m
eoo 4, :m
eoo 1, eoo
a, tO) 3, :m
4,
2,
3, 700
3, 700
4, 700
3, 100
3, 100
4, 300
a, eoo a. ooo
4, aoo
4, 400
4,
4, ooo
3, goo
Blee&rlo eabltat!= ----- No......

No
BOIPI&al- -- ------------- No..
otlcle . --------------- Y----Baftk ______ -------------- No. .....
Bieetrle repair. No
Odloe .. No..
8oyeauoewareboule .. No ...
Gymnutum ________ ~--- No... ...
Llbrary. ------------- Yes .
M...,...CGe ..............
m a,aoo 1.
a. aoo 2, 800
tiB
esc
4R
4H
88
70
71
72
77
3, 000
7, aoo
2H
7, 800
3G
3G
e. 700
80
aG
4G
82
83
84
In
40
&0
IH
50
10
'1
7G
98A
70
102A
4F
1028
4F
102C
4F
104 I 3G
106 I 4F
107
4F
SF
108
1)1
110
wi
6, . ,
4, 400
8,1100
2,400
2,300
e,aoo
6, 7'00
6,800
6,300
6,300
6,300
6,400
4,400
4,310
6,2)0
6,2)0
1)1
6,300
71
1120
71
6,1100
6, goo
113G
71
1:.>
4.J
1
8H
7H
6, 400
, goo
a, 100
a. ., a. aoo
111
112C
13~~
do ---------------Army lt.orel------------2, 300 ..do ___________________

1, :m Auditorium . _----------7, eoo OymDAIIium __ -------- --
aH e. aoo e. :m
7,400
6, 000
6, 000
8, 000
Aluminumfoundry ___ __
Oymnytnm _________ --- lron foundry ___________ _

Lilbt macbloe lbop ____ _
----.do . -- _------.---- -
3,300 __.do... ___ ____ ____ ..

1,300 Bank .. ----------------1,100 LJcbt manufaeturing __
8,000 Llgbt macblne sbop ____ _
6,400 Paper machinery- -- _- - &,DJ
storaae- ------- -- --
omee
Macbloe shop. _______ __-
4,1100
4,WO ___ do ____ __ --_---_._ .-.
4,000 __ ___ do. ________ _______ . _
6,000 Gymnasium . __ --------3,1100 Lllht machine shop ____ _
3, 700 Gymnasium. __ _________ _
6,000 Auditorium . ________ ____
6,000 Bank .. .. ---------------6,000
6,800
6,600
7,100
a, 7'00
6, 7'00
7, 7'00
~ ---
Y. ----
Y. ---------
Y---------
Ye1 ..
Grato wareh0WIIl8 ______ _

MiJctelleoaous storage_ . _
Probeblrao
~yao .
PlobabiJ ao..
Probab17 ,..__
Y- -- .. Probab17 Jill--
Yea. ___ _
Yes .- -- No. ___ _
No _____ _
No __ ___ _
No _____ _
No _____ _
No ..... .
No _____ _
No ______
Yes _____
No ___ ___
No ______
No __ ___ _
No _____ _
No _____ _
No _____ _
No .. __ __
No ___ ___
No ___ ___
No _____ _
No ______
Yes ._ . __
No ______
No ___ ___
No _____ _
No _____ _
BeeoDdary_____ B-1
1& --------------
I
1& ---------------1
II ---------------I
JO --- ------------0 ----------------
2
1
0 ---------------6 l'lre apr'Md -6 _____
do_________
0 ... do..... ....
0 do.........
0 8eaollclary----110 ------------
1
I
10 ------10 ----------------
1
1
6 -------
Y-----------
Y----------No ~------
Art muaeum ... Y-- No
PubUc batba. .. No...... Ye1. -------PubUo audltoriGDl. . ..... No . Ye1... ........ .
Wareboule.............. No . ~ -.
Match manulacturlnl--- No..... . Y-- -----
Electrieal ware~--- Ye1 . . . Y- ~- -----
GytDDalium .... No.. Ye1 .
Cburob .. -------------- No. _-- Y---------Armyatoree.. .. Y---- ProbMiyao
-----do------------------ Y-- --eoo 4, :m ..... do................... Ye1 ..

eec 41
41 4,100 4,400 ..... do ___________________ Y-- -liD
88A 4B &,too 2,aoo .....do................... Y .. --41
Y-----------
Y----------
Probably yes __
Probably yes. _
Yes __________ _
Yes __________ _
1'119....-4----
_____ do_________
.....do.........
1
1
....do.........
...do.........
------------------------------I
eo ----------------
1
40 - --------------1
16 Fire spread 1-Bal.
10 ___ .. do___ ______
Yes .-- ----- --Yes .. --------Yes.---------Yes __________ _
16
Secondary___ __
Fire spread .. 100 No ftre. ------0 ... do_________
YYes __---------________ _
Yes __________ _
Yes __________ _
Yes __ ________ _
0 ---------------0 ----------------
Yes.------ -- -_
Yes __________
Yes. _------ - -Yes .- -------- Yes __________ _
Yes.--- ---- --Yes .---- ----- Yes. _- -------Yes .- --------No __ _______ ___
Probablyoo ..
Yes ___ _______ _
No ___________ _
Yes ______ ____ _
Light machine sbop ____ _

Miscellaneous storage ._ .
Printinr sbop .. ____ ____ _ No ___ ___ Yes . . -- ------Gymnaatum _____ ---- ___ _ No ______ Yes . ---- -----Boller bouse------------- No .. . Yes. _-- ---- ---
1
1
2
1
1
1 ,
1
!1
1.1
...
4.0
1.4
6.8
6.t
2.4
1.1
ll.t
a.1
...
4.0
1.2
6.8
6..
2.4
1.1
U.t
a.
a. e
.t
.t
2.7
2.7
t. t
t.t
1.1
1.2
1.1
8.1
lt. 1 1t. 1
1t. 1 lt. 1
1t. 1 1t. 1
10. 1 I 1t, 1
14.4 1 14.4
14.4 14.4
14. 4
14.4
1-Bal.
6. 4
1-!
Firespread.
2
No ftre________
1
25 . . do___ _____ _
1
25 . dO-- -----
1
26 ~ -----do_________
1
35 , _____ do____ ____ _
1
15 l ____ _do___ __ ____
1
25 Fire spread....
1
~
No ftre ________ 1-Bal.
~ -~~:~----~~
2.1
1
1
llO . do __ ______ _
2.3
14.4
14. 4
6. 4
6.4
2.6
5.6
0
0
6.4
13.0
20%
5.6
None 1 6.6
None 1 9.6
40
0 Fire~~- --76 . .. do__ __ _____

Ill ! No ftre________
110 . .. do ____ _____
2 .. .. do ___ ___ ___
1.8
1
1
1
1
1
0 ---------------2
15 ------- --- ------ 1-Bal
m No ftre________
1.8
.o ao.o
1
1-a
1-2
1
1-2
1-2
1
1-3
1-2
1
1-1
1
1
1-2
1
1
1-2
1-2
1-2
1-2
1
1
1
1
2
I
2
6 . do.........
B-1
1-a
1-Bal.
None
2% 2d only
None
None
None
None
None
3.6
3.6
;:~
3.2
7.0
2.9
4.4
0
7.6
6.8
5.3
6.t
13.0
3.3
.1
0
0
0
0
0
4.4
2.
a o
4.8
None
8.4
4.8
0
2.6
1-~ I ~::
None
None
None
1
1
1
.9
.8
4. 2
4.3
6.8
5.0
1"1
4. 2 .
4.3
6.8
5.0
100
100
100
100
100
180
100
100
1GO
1GO
100
110
-100
100
1GO
lGI
teO
110
100
100
100
100
100
0
0
100
100
100
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
100
100
0
0
0
100
100
100
Xot c lightning rods

hy fire.
011
ronf
liuildinK :\o.: 2. (,oordinateH: 4H.

800, (AZ): 2.100.
w~rc
not clamagccl hy blal>t.
l)istauce frorn (C1Z):
X:\ ~II;: HiroHhima Charnl>er of ('ornnaerct.
( .' 0:\8Titt.;('TIOX A!\D Df;SJ(i:\

TyJ>t~: lteinforced-concrete frarne.
Xutnt>er of ~toricR: 3 and b~ment. J'fG cl~~: l:t.
ltoof: 5-inch reinforced-concrete slab and bearn.
l,artitiorut: Reinforced concrete, major-tile, ~ccoudary.
\\.all~: Reinforced concrete.
Floors: \\food over reinforced-concrete t>ea111 and slah.
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE Dn.. BJON
Field Team No. 1, Hi.roehlma, Japan

BUII~DING
Sa&ET
ANALYSIS
No. J
Bui4lin1 No.: lS. Coordinates: 5H.

100, (AZ): 2,000.
NAME: ShJma Surgical Hospital.
SHEET No.2
Distsnce from (GZ):
(Fire Supplement to Sht"Ct No. 1)

Building No.: 5. Fire classification: C.
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIO~

Type: Baring wall.
Number of stories: I. JTG clas8: A 2- 3.
Roof: Tile over wood on wood trUM.
Partitions: Plaater on wood lath and studs.
Walla: Brick-bearing, 18 inches.
Floon: Wood on wood bea'll8.
Framing: Wall bearing-roof only wood.
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceiling~t: Unknown.
Condition, workm.nahip and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Greater
strength than comparable United States type and
occupancy.
OCCUPANCY: Doctor's offic.e and private hospital.
CONTENTS: Office and medical equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Complete destn1ction. Entire
building including walls leveled to the top of the foundation.
Cause: Blast.
To contents: Complete d~truction .
Cause: Debris {primary). Comhur;tibll'S burned.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet ): 2,340. Structural
damage: 2,340. Superficial damage: - .
FRACTION OF DA~lACE: Building !-!tructural : 100
percent. Superficial: - . ContcntR: 100 percent.
REMARKS: Of building~ !'l tudied this iR tlw nearest to
GZ. DeRtruction was so complete a.q to preclude ol>taining detailM on roof trus.qes.
N OTE . -Building daruagc h&8ed on total floor ana. Contents damage is fraction of contents se ri ously damugP.d .
Enclosed
Fire doon
Autumatlc
EITt'Ct of hiRJit
Stairs:
Elevators:
EXPOSURE:
FlrebN'ak
Location
N
E
8
Distance C lt.l&nlnN
No
~
U'
So
~
So
30'
Ko
1-'lrr
\Ia.~
Burrwtl
('
\'~
c
c
Yt"S
Hrmarl> ~
\'(OS
Yes
PROBABLE CAl SE OF FIRE: ~ot dct.crwinc1l.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD:
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total fl oor area: 2,300 squarf'
feet. Floor area burned : 2,300 squar<! f<'et. 100 percent
(ofter blast damage).
HE~lAUKS:
1-tO
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAIUOB DIVIIION
Field Team No.1, Blroehlma, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS
SuET No.2
Sa&&T No. 1
Building No.: 6. Coordinate.: &H. Distance from (GZ):

800, (AZ): 2,100.
NAME: Chlyoda Life Insurance Co., Chugoku branch.
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforoed-eonerete frame.
Number of etorlee: Three and buement. JTG claN: El.
Roof: Relnforced-coaerete beam and slab-tile covered.
Partitions: Relnforced-eoacrete, major-metal lath and
plaater, minor.
Walla: Relnforced-coacrete panels, 10 inches. Reinfoteed-concrete panlte facing.
Floon: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Framing: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab.
Window and door frames: Steel. Ceilings: Wood lath
and plaster third floor only.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United Statett buildings: Extremely heavy construction, cspeciall~ bea,us and
columns.
OCCUPANCY: Life insurance office.
CONTENTS: Office equipment.
DAMAGF; to building: Minor crackinp; in roof slab and
beams, saHh trim y,indow~, etc., dcst roycd hy internal
fire-minor damage only.
Cause: Fire.
To contents: Completely dcst.ro~cd.
Cause: Fire.
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. 1)
Building No.: 6. Fire clasaifieation: R.

WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rollent.
Shut: Yee.
Etlect of blast: Blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Stain!:
Elevators:
Endoeecl Fire doon Automatic ~IYect of bla.~l

Nooo
Part
Blown ln.
Metal
YN
EXPOSURE:
Flreb~Mk
Location Distance Ckoarancr ClaM

N
JO'
No
C
E
J:i'
~o
C
s
20'
~0
c
W
30'
So
PHOBABLE CAVSJ<; OF
<'
Flrl'
Hurntd
lhmnrks
Ye.1
Yl'tl
YtS
Yt"s
FIHE:
Fire
~prcaul
from
exposures.
VERTICAL FIRE ~PREAD: Probably up stairs and

elevator.
EXTE:\T OF FIRE: Total flour nra: Hi.fiOO scpum
feet. Floor area burned: 15,300 tHJilnrc feet. 92 txrccnt (after blast damap;c).
HEMAHKS: Fir" iu tutirc huildinJ( f:X<'tpt nhuut 30
percent or t.lQ...;("fuent.
U. 8. STRATEGIC 'BOMBINO SURVEY

PHYSICAL DAIUO. DIVUION
Field Team No.1, Blroeblma, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS
8RKICT
No. 1
SBIIKT
No. 2
Distance from (OZ):
CIOO, (AI): 2,100.

NAME; __l,(Jppoo Life Iuuruoe Co., Blroebfma braocb.
oNSTR1JCTION AND DESIGN
BuDding No: 10. Fire cluelfleatfon: R.

WALL OPE~INOS: Shutten: Steel rollen.
Shut: Part.
Effect of blut: Blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Bu0dln1 No.: 10 Coordinates: IJB.
Type:~ ~ brick Wall.

Nuaiber of nor1ea~ See drawiq. JTG claaa: F2.
~: ~oroed-GODcrete slab 6lncb (~inob bars 6-lnoh
oo by 12lnch oo).
Panltlona: Major, 13-lnoh briok, minor, plaster and wood
.ud. . . . .
Walla: Brick 18- and 4-lnch atone trim on front.

l'loon: Concrete on earth-wood beams and flooring second
11oor.
Pramins: Reinforced concrete and wood framed second
Stain:
Elenton:
Eocloled Plre doon Automatic Eftect ol blut

Y
Metal
No
Blown ID.
EXPOSURE:
Location Dlltaoce Clearaoce CW. Burned
N
E
8oor.
Window and door frames: Wood. CeiUnp: Unknown.

CondlLlon, worlunanabJp, and mat.eriala: Fair concrete not of good quality.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Considerably stronger.
OCCUPANCY: Ufe lnsuranec company.
CONTENTS: Insurance and office equipment.
DAMAGE to building: Roof partially collapsed-remainder depressed and ruptured. Walls cracked and buckled
partially collapsed.
Cauee: Blut.
To content&: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Debris and fire (about equally).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA: (square feet): 2,500. Structural
damage: 2,500. Superficial damage:
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building structural: 100
percent. Superficial: - . Contents: 100 percent.
REMARKS: Entire building t> out or plumh and cracked
as to be in a virtual state of collapse.
10'
'IY
30'
No
No
No
YM
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Remarks
DuUdlng II (10' wall

behreoeo).
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire spread from exposure.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Pos..<~ihly.
EXTENT 01-' FIRE: Total floor area: 2,500. Squart!
feet floor area bumcd: 2,500. &Juarc feet: 100 JH'rcent (after hlast damage).
REMARKS:
N OTs.-Bui1ding damage hMCd on total floor area.
Contents damage Is fraction or content.'i ~Wriously damaged.
l()(j

PHYSICAL DAM.AOB DIVIBION
F ield Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BU1LDJNG ANALYSIS
SRBBT
No.1
Building No. : 18. Coordinates: 5H. Distance from

(OZ): 1,000, (~); 2,200.
NAME: Oeibl Bank Co. 1 Hiroshima Branch.
CON TRUCT10N AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforoed,..cono:ret.e frame.
Number of storlee: 6 and~ basement. JTO ol : El.
Roof : Roinforced~<mcre~ slab (metal pan).
Partition : Reinforced-concr te (6-lnch). Wood lath and
plaster in rear addit.ion.
\Valls: Reinforced concrete (10-inoh).
Floors: Roinforced-eoncrote labs (metal pan eonatruetion).
Framing: Relnlorced concrete, heavy haw1che .
Window and door [ra.me : Metal. Ceilings: Plaater on
concr ~.
ondltion, workmansrup, and material : Good.
Compare with usual nited tntcs building : Con iderably heavier in structural framing.
OC UPA CY: Bank and offic .
ONTE T : Bank quipment and furnishing .
DAM A E to building: Light ste 1-framcd roof over rear
addition d troyed by blast. Portion of roof of main
building depr
d, b am cracked and . palled at
haunche and center of span- teet elongated. ~~ inor
drunage throughout.
use : Bios .
To contents: Destroyed.
Cau : Fire.
fOTAL FLOOR AREA ( quar feet) : 46,400. ~~ rnctural damage: 3,200. Superficial damage:
FRA TION OF DA:\tAG F;: Building . t.ructurnl 7 J>NcPnt.
uperflcial: -.
'ontent : 100 percen t.
RE:\IARK : 1,400 quar feel of s tructural damn~<' showu
above was in inferior conHtruct ion.
SllEET
No.2
(Fire Supplement to heet No. 1)

Building No.: 18. Fire classification: R.
WALL OPEN lNG : butters: Steel rollers in w t 1scc/
Uon and in north wall only of ea.! t eo lion.
Shut: Yc.
EO'ect of bl.u t: 1\lo t blown in.
FLOOR OPENING
Encl
talrs:
P rl
Fire doors Automatic Effect or b!Mt

Non doors op n
No
lN'I rol
IMJ
Kl \'DlOrs:
Y es
Kum~uuurs
tc I rol
lers
:"'u
Flrcbreolc
Fire
Burned
upcu
EXPO URE:
Location Dlattmcc Cl uruncc Cl
~
Y es
('
y~
20'
No
:'\o
:'\o
Y et~
40'
;>;o
('
Y es
12h'
Ye
('
Ycs
10'
2h'
Heumrks
Bulh.llmt HI (I H oo t
woll betw('('n ).
14-fool concrete wu ll
hclW'I:'II.
\\'
PROBARLE CAC. E OF FIRE :

expmntrc.
Fire :'prtad fr o m
\'EH.TIC.:AL FIHE SI'H.EAD:

EXTE:\T OF FIRE: Total flou r tLr<a: 4G.600 :,;rtuan
fpet. Floor lH<'a humed: 4f>,.t00 sqntHP fel't ; I 00 pnc<'nt (after bla~ t damngl') .
R E\1 :\ H l\~ : Fir<>s in <xpO:-i llr<'S ~otl ll aft l' r l>otnl> .

buildin g well nfin nt. 1000 hom:'.
This

PHYSICAL D.UUOB DIVISION
Field-Team No. 1, Hiroehlma, Japan

BUII.DING ANAJ.YSIS
SHEET
BuUding No.: 23.
No. 1
C-oordloatee: 6H.
SHEET
NAME: Fukoku Building.

Type: Steel core reinforced-eoncrete frame.
Number of 1t.oriee: 7 and buement. JTG claM: El.
Roof: Reinforeed-ooncrete beam and slab (steel core).
Partitions: Relnforeed concrete.
Wails: Reinforced eonerete, &tone trim .
Floon: Reinforred concrete, wood finish.
Framing: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: MP.t.al. CeilinK!': :\Ictal lath
and pluter.
Condition, \\'orkmanship, and material":
Compare with usual United States buildings:
OCCUPANCY: Fint story, commercial. Ucmainder,
office spaee.
CONTENTS: Office equipment and furnit;hinf(,., l'ommunieation equipment second and third floor.
DA~IAGE to building: I..onp;-tipau tru~ t~uppurtinK roof
ruptured and roof dl'prcHt~erf. Three panehc of ftr:ot
ftoor slab dLprCKHed by blatst. :\liuor damaJ(t' frum fire~
throughout buildinK.
Cause: Blut.
To contents: :\lmoHt cornplf'tc ,Jc:otructiun f'Xetpt in hu.'l'ment.
Cau!4C: Fire (prinaary): some dc~hri~ dnmn~ott.
TOTAl. lo'I.OOit :\IlEA (llfJUBrP ftf't): l~i.300. l"trtut ural damaf(l': -'.600. SuJK'rficinl danaa~ott:
FltACTIO~ OF U:\~1.-\<iE: Buildin~~t 10tructuml: II JHrcf'nt. Huperfil'ial: - -. Cnutenf." : 90 JM'rt'l'lll.
HE~I:\RKS:
:\ OTF..- Build inK
Cottttllf~ datnUf((~
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No.
Distance from
(GZ): 1,200; (AZ); 2,300.
clnmal(f' hn.""tl ou total floor nrl'll.

is fmction of l'Oilltllf~ ~(: riou~ly dutlliU!td .
No.2
1)
Building No.: 23. Fire ciAMifteation: ~/R (unprotected

steel In roof).
W AI.L OPENIXGS: Shut.terH: Xo (wired Klat~tJ in all
windows).
Shut:
Effect. of blast: All broken.
FLOOR OPESISGS:
.\uti..
Rtalrs:
Y.k-\ators:
Eol'lol4-d
Flh' donn
matlc
:ff,cf uf hl&~t
'll'rs
MC>tal and W. 0.
Mrtaland W. 0 .
Su
So
l'arl hlun ulf.

l'art hlmn1 ntt
Yta
EXPOSt'!RE:
Flrehrl'lk Flrr
IAX'11llon lllstanre Ck-aran~ Clus Uunl

S
Y.
10'
100'
So
y,.,
IC
Y~
"Jf'
Sn
I~'
Yo~
f'
C
f'
Yt~
ltomarb
llulllllli! 1'.l.
\"e~
Yrs
PHOBAHI.E (':\t':H: OF FIHE: :\ot ltttrlllitwd .

\"EHTIC:\1. FIHE SPHE:\1>: Pruhnhly up ,.tnir~. t-lt\lltor and pipe !!haft.
EXTE:\T OF FIHE : Total flour nrtn: l:t~~oo :-:qunr
(Nt.
Fluur nrtn lltlriU'Il: :m,CHlll ,.;quun r. ,; Hll JH'fl't- 11
(afllr hl:al't clurnaa.tt') .
H J-:~1.\ H 1\~: Fir thrnu~hottt huildinL( .. ,,.,.pi iu lou,trrwr.t.
IIIIIIII
I~IIIIII
Ill Ill Ill Ill
Ill Ill Ill Ill
Ill Ill Ill Ill
'
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBt; SlJNEY
BUt..DNG 23
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
FIGURE 2 3-X A
GRID 5H
I
-
-laT.Fl..OORDAIIICE
SECTION AT A-A
ROOF DAMAGE

PHYSICAL DAMAO.E DIVlSlON
Field Team No. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUlLDINO ANALYBIS
BaeET No. 1
SHEET
Building No.: 24. CoordlnatA!s: 68. Diatance from

(GZ): 1,.300, (AZ): 2,400.
AME: Bank of Japan, Bltoehima branch.
Type: &inforced~onorete frame (steel core).
Number o! Stories: 3 and baaement. JTG class: El.
Roof: Reinfo-rced~nerete.
and slab.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete and wood lath.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch) and stone (6-inch).
Floors: Reinforced concrete.
Window t.nd door 'frames: Metal (ext~rior) wood (interior). CeiUngs: Plaster on concrete.
onditlon, workmanship, and materials: Excellent.
ompare with usual United States buildings: Much
stronger-stc l core construction.
OCCUP A CY: Bank.
CONTENTS: Bank and office equipment furnishing .
DAMAGE to building: Only minor damage-top tory
burned out, partitions, sash, trim blown out in two
lower stories.

WALL OPENING : Shutters: teel rollers.
Shut: Part.
Effect of bias : Blown in.
beam
ause: Fire.
No.2
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Enclorcd
Stairs:
Pan
El vatora:
Yea
Fire doors
Automatic
let' I r ollva
M tal and W. 0 .
Effect of biWIL
No
Noue-doors open.
No
Bent.
EXPO URE:
Firebreak Fire
Rt>mlllks
Location Dist ance Cltarnncc C lass Burnorl
!Hoot concntt wall be
?>;o
N
Y f8
u
tween.
Building 21i (I Hoot wnll
Yts
R
25'
No
E
bctW'Ct'O).
No rxpo.cnJr!.
:l'o
12J'
Yes
Yrs
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Fire prcad from expo urea.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: No.
EXTEI\T OF FIRE: Total floor ana: 32,800 square
feet. Floor area burned: 5,200. ((111\r<' f PI'; 16 perce nt
(afte r bla.sl damagf').
To Contents: De troycd in third t!tory- mod rat d bris

and blast damag in fin~t and eco nd tori , none in
basement.
au.sc: Fire and debris (about efJually).
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feel): 32, 00.
tructuml
damage:-.
uperficial damage:
FRA TION OF DA~tA .E: Building tructural: - .
up rficial: - . Cont e nt : 30 perc ut.
RE~IARK : Glass removed from skyligh t (20 by 20
feet) and light Mte 1-framc . tructure and roof covered
with 12 to 18 inches of Hand and cind r .
HE:'\IARKS : Firl' only i11 roo111 ut t;ou thwi::H corncr of
l:i'Cond . tory and in f'lllirc third ti lory. :\o fire in

building ri~ht after bomb, hut afire at 1000 h o ur~ .
Fire in room in scco11d story cxtinguishd with wu tcr
IJuckets.
N OTl'l.- Building damage based on total floor arPa.

Contents damag is fraction of cont nt.s criously damaged.
217
U. 8. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PIIYSIOAL DAMAOB D1Vl8ION
Field TeAm No. 1, Hiroehlma, Japan
BUILDING ANALY1 IS
SH"EET
No. 1
SHEET
No.2
No.: 26.
oordinate
5H. Distance from
(OZ): 2,300, (AZ): 3,000.
NAME: C bugoku Electric Co.
ONSTRU TION AND DE ION
Type: Reinforced-eoncrete frame.
Numher of tories: 5 and basement and penthouse JTG
cla88: El.
lW<>f: Reinforced-eoncretc beam and lab.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete (6-inoh).
Walls: Reinforced concrete (12-inch) .
Floons: Reinforced-concrete Jab, parquet wood s urface
3, 4, 5, and 6 floor .
Window and door frames: Metal.
ilings:
CondiLion, workman hip, and materials; Excellent.
Compare with u ual Un ite d tat es buildings : Conid rably tronger.
OC uPAN Y: Office.
'ONTENT : Office eq uipme nt and furnishin~s.
DAMAGE to buildin~: One roof s lab and girdf'r crackcrt
by blast. Minor damag throughout from blast and
fire.
C ause : lllll! t :
To contents : Severe damage, excr pt in wes t ~ec ti o n of
ba:;()meu t and a port io n of cast sec t ion of ba.."\c lllcnt.
CauBr: Fire 75 percent. Bla..'> t and drhri." 15 pc rcr nt.
TOTAL FLOOH :\H EA (square fett): .12,000. St ruct.ural damage: - . Supe rficial dalllt\JZ:C : 220.
FHA 'TlOX OF 1>:\:'\IAf:J-: : Buildin~ !< truetural:
~upcrficial: 0.2.S JHrrt'll l.
<'olltcllt ~: !10 ptrctrtl .
Bulldlng

WALL OPENINGS: Shutter : Ste I rolle r in north wall of
west section only.
Shut: Part..
Effect of blast: Most blown in.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
lAin:
Elevators:
EnciCl'K'd
No
YlOS
Flrt>
d~
Automatic
EfTrrt
or bla., t
No
E XPOSL"RE:
Fl.rebroolr Fll"t'
IM~~
nunu: d
Location Distance Cl(llll'ancc
H tuttHk!>
YNI
Yt.s
c
1'\
00'
c
YP.
Jo:
:-.=o
~
c
YtS
:-.= o
SF.
10'
::;
!)()'
Dulltllnl('17.
Y l.'l4
:-.=o
H
ltJY
Y t'll
Y e~
PROBABLE C' .-\ l'.'E OF F I HE : DirPct htat radiation

fro m bomb.
\'EHTICAL FIHE HPHE:\T> : Po:;:;ibly ttp,.;tair.- und pipe
l'ihaft .
EXTE:\T OF FI HE : Total fl oor a rca : 52,000 ~<< prnrr f<"f' t.
Floor urea hur11f'Ci: W,.SOO ::;quare fee t; 88 ptrcPIIt (aftt>r
hla..-<t dama~e) .
HE\1:\HKS: Fire througho11t IHt ildinK PXC'tpt in fiO pnce nt of ha:emc ut (no fire in bn."PIIH'IIl o f w p:;t st<t iou
and about 25 perce nt ofet\.'~ll'iPCtiun ) . \Ian who wu,.. in
third :-; lory stat ed that he :;aw cot to11 blackout curtai11,.;
in WP :-1 1 wall a!ICi thi11 paper 011 d!'sk:< catch fin fro111
fla..-.h of homh. Fire wa..'< rrportl'd t o ha,c IJee11 i11 all
i' to r ie,.: 5 mirtlll l~ a ft<'r hu1111J.
REl\tARK. :
:\ oTE . - Buildi11~ dar111l~W lla..-;NI 011 total floor ana.
Coutent s darnngP i~ frllc tioll uf cottlellt ,.; ,.;triuu:-:ly danH\gtd.
222
U.
TRATEGIC BOMBING
URVEY
l,.B Y8lCAL DAMAGE DIVJ ION
Field Team No. 1, Biro blma, J"pan

BUILDING ANALY I
oE&T
No. 1
UEET o.
Building o.: 28. Coordinates: 6H. Dl.stance from (GZ):

3,300, (AZ}: 3,800.
~ AME: HlrOfJhimt. City BaU.
CON TR CTIO AND DESIO
Type: Reinforced concrete, stucco ftniJh.
:\umber of storf : Four and b.uement. JTG class: El.
Roof: Relnforeed concrete, tile finish.
Partition : R inforced eonorete (5-inch) an tile, wood
walt1.8COAtAS in talr halll.
Walls: Reinforced concrete (10-luch).
Floor!f: Reinforced concrete, cement finish.
eilings:
Window and door fram : M tal.
ondition, workmanship, and material : Excell nt..
mpare with usual nited tates buildings : Coniderably t.rong r.
P A~ CY: Office.
0
ONT ~T : Funtishin~t and e quipme nt for office and
ci y admini t.raU n.
DA~IAGE
to building: Mluor damag only

h blown
out, trim and finish d troyed by fire. Few til partition blown out.
C'at : Fir and blast.
T o content :
verely damaged.
Cause : Fir .
T TAL FLOOR AREA ( quare feet) : 93,400 .
t ructural
damage: - .
uperficial damag :
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Building s tructural:
uperficial : - .
ontent : 75- 100 percent.
HE:\IARK :
~ OTE.- Building damage b
d on total fl oor area.
'ontr>nts damag i fract ion o f contents criously damaged .
(Fire
upplement. t.o
2
heeL
~o.
l)
Buil:iing No. 28. Fire classification: R.

WALL OPEr\ING
hutt.ers: None.
but.:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENING. :
EnciO!!t'd
lAin:
F ire d oors .o\ut orn t ic )o: fll'Ct or bbst
~0
EleYIUortl:
nE:
EXPO
Location Dl!tun
~
Ftrcbr k Fll't'
C li'UI\IOCC C lnM Ourrw<l
Rc murk s
~n
~0
..:
l'nrtlol
200'
('
Yts
SE
12.'1'
Y t~
).')()'
Yt
Yt
('
\\'
('
Yo!-
l' t pnsun- .
A II I' posun hurnl.
PROBAULE C'Al'... E OF FlHE : Fire s prl'n l from t>xJ>Odure .

\ 'E H.TIC'AL FIHE .'PHEAI> : Probahlv .
EXTEi\T OF FIHE: T otal fl oor ar.cn: 93,\00 Hqunn'
feet. Floor are a burned: 4,900 HIJUIHl' f eN ; 9 1 ))('rcent (afte r blast damage).
RE~lAHKo: Fire in entire hu ild irtK txccpt o f 20 pt nPnt.
of h llliem ent and finH :; lo ry at (ru;t c url of ea.'lt Sf'C'I io11
(lran \' rsc partition,; wrre JIOJt com b us t ihl< wi t ho ttt
openings all(! there wen' 110 o mhu~ t ihle co ns tru c t io11
materials a11d co11tcnts in the corrido rs ut tiH' 11orth
wall . Two men who w< n i11 huilcliu)o( nl timf' uf homh
tat <'d tllf\1 fire s prN\O i11 from :-<o uth cxpo:-urc hy fl~ i11p;
f' mhc rs n t 1000 h o ur~ . Fin ~ tnrtPrl fir:-<t i11 thl' thi rd
:-~to ry.
Lowf'r :<t ori<:; may htL\' 1' h l'r'll ig11i t<d lntrr
di rect I~ hy rx posun fin s.
U.S. STRA'tEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

PHYSICAL D.UUOB DM810N
Field Team No. 1, Hlroeblma, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sa~rr No. I
BuDdln1 No.: 33. Coordinates: 6H. Distance from

(OZ): 5,300, (AZ): 6,600.
NAME: Hlroehima Poetat S.vl.np Bureau.
T)'l)e: Reinforced-concrete frame.

Number of stories: 4 and buement. JTO class: E I.
Roof: Reinforced concret.e, tlle ftniah.
PartltioM: Reinforced concrete.
Walla: Reinforced concrete. tile finish.
Ftoora: Relnforeed concrete.
Framfnl: Relnforeed concrete.
Window' and door frames: Metal. wood (Interior). Ceil-
So&T No.2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet
BuUdiq No.: 33. Fire cluaiftcatlon: R.

WALL OPENINGS: Shuttert1: Steel rollcr8 in north and
cut "'alia only or northeast section.
Shut: Few only.
Effect or blast: Bent inward t!lightly.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Encloerd
So
So
E~vat0r11:
1-: IYl'<'l or bb.,t

I'art blow 11 oiY.
Blown oiY.
EXPOSURE:
ln:bn'llk
Lomtlon I Hs tanC'C f'lt"arunct>

SW
l:.tl'
Y~
Y.
1111'
Yt'~'
:-1
t!l'
Y'll
\\'
I !-.II'
\' t ~
Fin
Hnrnl'tl
Yl'll
Clast~
r
('
Yt'li
f'
Yo'l'
('
\' o~
PHOBABLE CAJ;SE OF FIHE : Fin "Jirtnd rrom ""~'

ex pmm re.
\'EHTICAL FIHE SPHEAI> : ~cme.
EXTE:'\T OF FIHE : Total floor nrcu : 1\2.1){)() square
fett. Floor Rrf'a burned : 0 "<JIIIlrt~ r('tJ; n Jll'r('l'lll
(aftN bla...;t dnmagt) .
HE~IAHKl-3: Spark" from wt,.;t txpo,..llrt! iJ(nit<l <"olton
hlnck-oat curtniu" iu we,;t wall at 2000 houN und wu... te
Jl8(Wr ill follrt h ~lor~ or nor! ltwt:-;t !<I'C't i011 Ill 2100 hour~.
Fin" Wtrt I' Xt i llf(llblud with wntcr IHI!'ktt,. h_r 20 fi ro
1(111\rcl~ whu Wl'rt' "llltinlll'<l in,.idc.
Fin dnllllll( to
Colltl'nl-< Wll" IH'I(Ii~otihlt. Pnptr rpconb ,otorcd ill wood
and ~ll'f'J rack~ ill llorl hPfL.'-1 "t'f'l ioll nr h11 i Jdi11~ Wfrt
I'XJ>O~t'd to dirccl radiatcd IH'nl rrom holllll hill did ,,.,,
<nt "h fi re.
collapsed.
Cause: RIMt.
To contents: Slight damage to rurni~hilll(~ ami ul hc'r COlitents rrom hlut and dehrit~.
Cau~: Bl~U~t and dchrh;.
TOTAL FLOOH AREA (11(JIIRrl' feet ): fi2,1100. Structural damnp;e: - . Superfic:al darna~e :
FRACTIO~ OF DA~fAGE:
Buildin~ot ~trul"luml :
Superficial: --- . Coutnt~ : l.'i perCI'IIt.
HE~tARKS:
~ OTE. -
Fire door11 :\ utomatlc
St11lrs:
ings: Plaster on \\'ood lath- top story. Plaster on concret&-others.

Condition, workmanship, and materials: Excell~nt.
Compare with usual United Statc8 buildin~t": ~tuch
stronger.
OCCUPANCY: Office.
CONTENTS: Office rurni11hinp;" and t'quirmtcnl.
OAMAGE to building: ~linor-gl~'i blown out. 140IIlc
MSh cteronned. Hung ceiling in top t~lory 75 pcrc'nt
Coutcut~
~o. 1)
Building dtuuag! hn~t~l o11 tot nl floor urcn.

clamaJot(' i~ fractiou or conttut~ -.priou,-1_,. dnuuj.tt(l.
260
U. S. STRATEGIO. BOMBING SURVEY
Sut:T No.2
(Fire ~upplemeot to Sheet No. 1)
PIIY.IICAL l).UU.OB DJVISION
Field
Team No.1, Hiroshima, Japan
Bulldin- No.: 4(}. Fi~ clu8iflcatJoo: R (north roof on

weet . . .lon).
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sbut;-
8DBT No. 1
Buil4ina . ~oL: 40.
Eeet or blut:
CoordlnateH; , 5H. Distance from
F~R
(OZ): 2,~, (~.: 8_,200;

N 4M,:!4.~~~partment Store.
CONSTRUC'riON .AND DESIGN:
.
Ty~: .Reinfotoect~nerete fraine.
.
Num~r ofstOries: 7 and basement and on~h&lf of eighth.
JTO olaal: El.
.
Roo(: Remforced-conorete beam and f'lab (st.eel ti'US8e8
OPENINGS:
Enclolc!d Fire doors Automatic
Effect or blast
Part
Melal
No
hlownln or bent.
YM
Metal
No
Blown In or lx'nt.
Stain:
EJen&on:
EXPOSURE:
Firebreak Fire
llfmBtks
Location Dbtanec Clearance Cla.u Burned
Yrs
Rulltlln11 all.
R
N
50'
No
\'(,!!
lllO'
c
E
Yell
o\er theater).
PartiUoM: Metal lath and plaster.
Walls: 8-incb reinforced concrete-large windo~s.
Floors: Wood over reinforced concrete.
Framing ~ RA:i.n forced conerete (or protected steel).
\\ indow and door framt!l8: Steel. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Good.
Compare with usual United States huilrlings: Considerably stronger than comparable United States
buildings.
OCCUPANCY: Departmentstore.
CO r\TENTS: Merchandise on display for sale.
DAMAGE to building: Minor throughout- sa.<;h hlown
out; finis h and t rim, ineluding floon~, burned out. Steel
tru88Cs supporting roof over theatre show sli~ht deformation.
Cause: Mixed.
To contents: Destroyed.
C autse: Fire.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (!'quare feet \ : 78,900. f't ruct uml
damage:-. Superficial damage :
FRACTIO~ OF DA!\IACiF:: Building :-tructural:
Su~rflcial: - .
Contcutl': 90-IOfl percent.
RE!\1 ARKS:
1110'
Yes
Yt'S
D)'
Yes
Y es
Hulldlni! 3S.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FIRE: Direct radif\ted head

from bomb.
VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Probahl\' .
EXTENT OF FIRE: Total floor are's: 78,900 "quare
feet. Floor area burned : 78,900 sq uare feet ; I 00 pe rc<'n t
(after blMt damage).
REM ARKS: Three persotlfl who were queHtionerl inclividually stated that this building WM afire immcd iatPiy
or within 20 minut es after the bomb. One man who wa.-;
in the building at the time ~"tt atcd that cotton blackout.
curtain,; in the west wall W<'rc smou ldNinK imnwdiatd~
after the bomb. The ent i rP bu ildi 11~ WIL" afire at I 000
hour:;,
BUILDING 40
HIROSHIMA , JAPAN
FIGURE
46 XA
GRID SH
IJ\VN/I\IIJ' t\VNII'
~2
~on;. -
Building dama!!e ha.'Wd o n total floo r area.

Cont euts dnmagc il'l fracti on of cont ents scrioui'ly damaged.
,..
285

PBYIIOAL DAMAOK DIVISION
Field Team
~o.
1, Hlrolblma, Japu
B ILDI !Q ANALYSIS
RfJET
0,
SsB&T No.2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet No. I)
BuUding
o. : 47. Coordina
5H. Distance from
(OZ): 2 300, (AZ): 3,100.
NAME: Hhoebim.a Kirln Beer Ball.
CO STRUCTIO T AND DE IGN
Type: Relnloreed-concret.e frame.
Number of stori : Ttu:ee and ba.sem nt. JT c
: El.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete beam and lab.
Partitions: 5-inch reinforced concrct .
W~: 8-IDoh relnforoecl concreto integral-large windo\\'s.
Floon: 6-lnch relnforoeckoncrete beam and slab.
FramlDg: Relnforoed concrete.
Window and door framee: Steel. Ceilinp: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workJIULD8bip, and materials: Good.
Compare wltb usual United States buildings. Considerably stronger than t:nited States de21ign.
OCCUPANCY: Beer ball.
CONTENTS: Bars, tablet~, etc.
DAMAGE to building: Minor----Haxh blowu out, rini!<h a11d
trim partly destroyed by fire.
Cause: Mixed.
To contents: Moderate damage from hoth hla14t (throwilll(
furnishings around) and fire.
Cause: !\fixed.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (K<I'aare feet): 15,300. ~~ rtal't urul
damage: - . Superficial dama~e:
FRACTION OF DA~IAGE: HuildinJ( !'tructuml:
Superficial - . Content11: 60-80 J><'rctJit.
RE~lAllKS: Building and cunt('llfl' colltllilled I'O ftw
combustibles that internal fil'f' wu..-. 11ot. of gnat illtensity.
Bulld1n1 No.: 47. Fire cluei&cation: R.

WALL OPENINGS: Sbutten: None.
Shut:
Effect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Stain:
Elevawn:
Eneloled
Fire doon
Part
Metal and atua
Yn
Autom~Atlc
Mdaland alass
~o
Effect or bl~t
Bcont.
No
Blown ofT.
EXPOSURE:
Fl"'brrak t'lrt'
lhm111b
Locallon J>lslance Ckwanco Class Burned
:o-;o elJIO!IUno.
YH
N
Y('l
c
~0
~
E
8
l'o C!lJIOSUrt.
Y('ll
6.\'
Ys
"1'1'5
PROBABLE C'At:SE Oio' 1-'IIU:: Fire t>1mad frum txpo14Urctt.
\"Jo;UTICAI. Jo'IRf: SPUI-:AD: l,o!CI'Iihly.

EXTE~T 01-' FIRE: Total rltH,r an~a: 15,300 squun
ft.oet. Floor a~a hurUt!d: 13,200 Btjllar! ff'tt; RU fHrctnt
(after hl&~&t dantaKe).
UE~lAHKS: ~(an who wotkt!d in huilclinK hut wu... nut
on premil4t-s at t iml' of IKnnh :o~t atNI that fin :-~prcacl
intu huildiu~ from ra.oct txpo:o~urt aiHlllt utu! lunar afttt
hmuh. 1-:ut irt huildinK had firt in it txcct)f. h&"C'JIIcnt.
C'nmhu:o~l ihilil ~ uf rnnhuts "'"'" luw ancl \'try litt It
chllllftKC' Wa." dunt t u huildinac h~ hrt,
NoTE.- Buildin~ damal(c based on totnl floor nn.u.

Contents damage iii fraction of contf'nts !'l'riou~l" damn~tl'd.
306
U. 8. STBATBOIC BOMBING SUBVBY

PBYIICAL DAIUOS DIVIIION
Field Team No. I, B....tma,Jepa
BUILDING ANALYSIS
Son No.2
8a&T No. 1
BuQdllia .No.: 4t.
Coorcli.Jaat8': II.
(OZh a,ooo, <AZ>: a.eoo.

Name: . Qbttpku N.......
BuDding No.: 41. Fire clulllcatlon: R.

\\'ALL OPENINGS: Sbutten: Steel rollen at ftnt to
third etoriee of west wall only.
Shut: Part.
Effect of blut: Blown ln.
FLOOR OPENINGS:
CONSTR.U~ON AND DESIGN

1'1Pet . Wor~te ,..._.
NQaber o~ ~tor~e~: "'aDd pentbo111e. ~TO c'-: El.

~: Reli.t~o01ete beam and 11\eb.
Paiiltiont: Retoforoed: C)Ooorete-lath ud plalter.
W.U.: 7-lnah. relnforoec:i aoncrete-larp windows.
Floon: &-Inch relnforced-eonprete beam and elab-small
pan wood overlay.
(Fins Supplement to Sheet. No. 1)
Dlltance from
Framlnc: Relnfo,ced concrete (on steel frame).

WiDdow ud door frames: Steel. Cellinp: Pluter on
aonerete.
.
CondiUon, workmaneblp, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual United States buildings: Considerably heavier than United States.
OCCUPANCY: Nenpaper office-used in conjunction
with BuQdiltl ISO.
CONTENTS: Ofllce equipment and supplies.
DAMAGE to buDding: Minor throughout; 8A8h blown
In, ftnlsb and trim deatroyed hy internal fire.
Cauae: F1re.
To contents: Complete destruction.
Cauae: Fire.
TOTAL FLOOR AREA (square feet): 14,700. Structural
damap: - . Superficial damage:
FR.~CTJON 'OF DA~IAGE: Building Htructural: - .
Superficial-. Contents: 100 percent.
.
.
REMARKS: Contents' damage b&Med upon interro~at1on
aa all debris ~as remo\ed.
NOTE.- Building damage hased on total floor area.
Contents damage is fraction of content~" ~riou'"ly damaged.
312
8t.aln:
Elen&Gn:
Fire doon
No
Metal
Eaaloled
Y
YN
Aulomalie Elfed ot blut

No
Put blown ln.
EXPOSURE:
Flrebrtoak n!
Loeatlon Dlttuee Clearance Clua Burnt'd
Rtmarkll
c
Yes
N
lao'
Eand8
'if'S Build in M (unaru
No
R
0'
v..
~ed
185'
Yf'S
Yrs
\V
go'
'it'S
YM~
oawntnp).
1M ff't!t bt-)ond Build

lnll 50.
PROBABLE CAl"SE OF FIRE: Direct radiated heat

from bomb.
VERTICAl. FlUE SJ>HEAD: Po"'4ibl~.
EXTEXT OF JqRE: Total floor area: 14.700 square
feet. Floor area burned: 14,700 square feet; 100 JX'rcent (after blast damage).
RE~IAHKH: ~lan who wa." iu huildira~ at tinw of honah
stated fire broke out in third ami fourth l"tori('s imnwdiatel\' aftf'r bomb fla."ll. ll<'ad hookkt"<'pl'r in hauk iu
Buiidiug 51 ~tated that thre wa.." fire in third ~;tory of
Ruildin~ 49, 10 minutes aftlr homh flash.

PBYIJCAL DAMAOK DIVIIION
Field Team No. t, BlrolhJma, Japan
BUILDING ANALYSIS
SauT No.1
Sun No.2
BuUdlnc No.: 52. Coordinates: 51. Dlatanee from (GZ):

2,800, {AZ}: 3,400.
NAME: Talyo Theater.
Type: IJabt steel frame.

Number of 1torlee: - . JTG elua:
Root:
Partitions:
WaDe:
Floon:
Framlnc:
Window and door frames: - . Ceilings:
Condition, workmanship, and materials:
Compare with usual United States buildings:
OCCUPANCY:
CONTENTS:
DAMAGE to huilding: Completely destroyed.
Cauae: Mixed.
To conteut.s: Completely destroyed.
Cause: Mixed.
TOTAL FI.OOR AREA (square feet): l"nknown. St ructural damage:-. Superficial damage:
FR.,CTION OF DA:\IAGE: Building 11tructural: -.
Superficial: - . Contents: - percent.
REMAUKS: :\fi~ed constn1ction. Damage too I'C\"Crc to
pernit analysis of caui!C of damage or deHign of !;tructure.
NOTE.-Building dam~e b~d on total floor area.
damage if fraction of contents seriously clamageo.
Content~
Building No.: 52. Fire oluaiftcation: C.

WALL OPENINGS: Shuttei'B: None.
Shut:
Eeet of blut:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Endoled Fire doon Automatic Elff'Ct of hlo.at
Scalrl:
BlenlOn:
EXPOSURE:
Fir!break F lr!
Location Dlataoce Clfaraoor Clasa Bumro Rl'mark!
N
0'
No
C
YH
E
110'
YPS
R
Yn
8
0'
No
C
Yt>ll DulldlnK!I 411 and
W
10'
No
C
YM
ro.
PROB.,BI.E CAUSE OF FIRE: Not oetermin'o.

EXTEST OF FlltE: Total floor aru: - 11quare feet.
Floor area burned: - squart' fct't; 100 pt>reent (aftN
blast damage).
.
HE:'\IAHKS: Thi:< huilcling wa-; cxC'IIHIP<l from hoth bla.."t
and fire ~t udie~.

PHYSICAL DAMAOE DIVISION
BUILDING ANALYSIS
REET
Building No.: 59.
No. 1
Coordinates: 51.
SaEET
Distance from (GZ):
4,100, (AZ): 4,500.

NAME: Geibl Bank Co., Biro hima Branch (In u
time of bomb a the Hi aebi PoUce tation).
CON TRUCTION AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
Numb r or storl : See ketch. JTO cia
El.
Roof: Relnforced-eoncrote beam and slab.
at
Partition : 7-ineh reinforced concrete.

Walls: 8-lnch reinforced concrete monolithic- medium
window.
Floors: Reinforced-concrete beam and slab- parquet and
tile.
Window and door franes: teel. Ceilings: beet metal on
wood framing.
Condition, workmans hip and material:i: Good .
Compare with 11 ual Un ited States building:;: Appreciably t.rong r han Uoit d tPtc. de. igu.
OCCUPANCY : Police tation (office) .
ONTENT : Office q uipm nt.
DAMAGE to building: ~lmor damage nnly- sa:1h blown
o ut and hung ceiling~; partially stripped .
Cau e: Blast.
T o content s: Slight rlamagc to con tt>nt,: fro111 hlu ~t and
rlcbri. .
Cause: Bl~ t .
TOTAL F'LOOR AHEA f,:quarf' fl'f'l 1: IG , ~OO . :-it ru ct 11m I
damage: - . Sup1!rficinl clamng1 :
FH:\CTION OF DA ~I :\CE: Building. Struct u ral :
Hup'rficinl : Content~: 10 pc rcp ut.
11E:\lARK :
:\oTE.-Building d!itllfl!_l:l' hu ,:Pd llll total floor a na.
Contents damage i" frac tion of contPnt,: ;'C r io usly dnmll~Pd .
(Fire
up~lement
No. 2
to Sheet I\o.
1)
BuildiPg No.: 59. Fire olaasificataon: R.

WALL OPENING : butters: Steel rollen; iu ca."t wall
and third tory of SQuth and we l walls (wired gla:;!< in
all windows}.
Effect or blast: Blown in at we!<l wall, hc n t at !->OUtll
wall.
FLOOR OPENING :
Auto
talrs:
Enclosro
F ltl' d oors
Yl'S
:\fttal
m t ic
:'\o
F. fTN:t ol hilL!
~tn t
s iiRhll}'.
El voton:
EXPOSURE:
Fltebtenk F lrr
Location D istance C'INimnCl' C't . Jlurnr<l
('
\' (.,
160'
Yt>s
F.
Yts
00'
Yt:>s
c
:10'
P ortIa I
c
Y ~s
A II
100'
y
\\'
\"('S
00'
c
Ht m n rl; ~
l'l po
urt lrllrlltd
PROBABLE C :\l.SE OF FIHE: F ire ~ pn u d frun1 rxpo urc. .

YEHTI CA: L FIRE SPRE:\ D : :\o.
EX TE:\T OF FIRE: T o t ul fl uo r url'a : I ti,:.!OO ~qllllrl'
fC'l' t. Floor nrPn buml'd : 0 !H JII Il n fctt; 0 )wrcr r1l (aft n
hlu."'t d !lllll.l~e ) .
HE:\1 .\HKH : .pari; ,. fro11 1 ,..o11th t ' \ ) HI~IIn ign itrd f, .,,
p iPC(,; of furnit 11 n ir1 fir~ I lll ld t l1ird ~~ 11 r it , 11 11d I'll It 0111
blacko11t curtnir 1,.; i11 fir~ t ~ t " r~ :d'""' 10:10 hour' . Fin,
w rJI t''\lingui,: lll'd with 11atn lnrrl;r t,.; hy ptoplt i11,idt.
:'\p~li~ihlt fire d nunp:t n ,llltrd . Hu111r (rf f'\)"''irq.,:
building,; hnd j 11~ t ht'l'll n niiJ\'td pr iur t" t l11 IH1 111b .

PHYSICAL DAMAOB DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hfrolhima, Japan

BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sazn No.2
BRUT No. 1
Building No.: 61. Coonllnates: st.
(OZ): 3,400, (AZ): 4,000.
NAME: Hh'Oiblma BadJo Station:
D~tance
from
CONSTRUC'l'ION AND DESIGN

Type: Relnforcad-conerete frame.
Number of etorlel: 2. JTG cl.ue: E 1.
Roof: Relnfo~uerete beam and llab.
Partitions: 4-IJJOb reinforced concrate %-9 inches 0. C.
Watls: 8-lueh rei.;doroed concrete-moderate openings.
Floora: Reinloreed. concrete.
Framb~J: Relnfoi'Cied~conerete beam and slab.
Window ~d door frames: Steel. CeUlnRtJ: Unknown.
Condition, workmanship, and materials: Poor, eoncrete poor, reinforcement exposed In many plRces,
form work poor.
Compare with usual United States buUdlngs: Somewhat heavier than United States design.
OCCUPANCY: Broadcasting studio.
CONTENTS:
DAMAGE t{) building: Small panel or fin-t Hoor depr~sed
4 to 6 inches In front of door. Two non-Joad-lX'aring
partitions blown out. ~II nor damage throughout .
Sash blown out. trim and fini!!h hurned out.
Cause: BJ&Ht.
To contents: Completely dt>stroyNI.
Cau~~e: Fire (may ha\'c b(.'CIJ !'time df'bri:-~ damal(t' ).
TOTAL FLOOH AHF.A (!!quare feet): 8,300. Structuml
damage: - . Sur>erficlal damagt-: - .
FRACTION OF DAMAGE: Buildiu~~: !<tructurul: - .
Superficial: - . Conte11t11: 100 perceut.
REMARKS: Water pipe~ in !ICcoud Hoor rupt urcd at orH'
point. General couditiou ami corr,.tructioll of huildirrg
was very poor.
1\0TE.- -Building damage O&."l'd orr total floor ann.
Contents damage is frnctiorr of coutPIIIt' !<triou!"ly cfurnn~td.
Building No.: 61. Fire clauifleation: R.

Shut:
Eft'ect of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Endoled Fino doors Automallc Elleet or blast
Stairs:
Ek!n\01'1:
~o
EXPOSURE:
Flrobrak
Jo'lrr
l..ocatlon l>bltanor CINnlnor Clull Burnt'<!

~
tlO'
Yf'l
C
Yt-s
F.
If>'
!'o
C
Yl'~
!10'
'\'~
\\'
10'
l'\o
Remarks
Yt'S
\'t'S
PROBABLE CAl'SE OF FIHE: 1\ot dctcrmirred.

VERTICAL FIRE SPREAD: Pos!!ibly.
EXTF.XT OF FJHE: Total floor area: 8.300 !<qtutre
feet. Floor area bumcd 8.300 squarl' feet; 100 percent
(after bla-;t dama~c) .
HE:\IAHKS: Some of PXpu!"ill~ huildiug,.; werl' ju,.;t being
renro\pcf nt time of bomb.

PHYSICAL DAIUOB DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hirolhima, Japao

BUILDING ANALYSIS
Sasn No. 2
(Fire Supplement to Sheet. No. 1)
SnBET No. 1
Bulldln1 No.: 86. Coordinates: 6G. Dlatancc from
CGZ): 2,000, (AZ): 2,800.
NAME: K6k6 Private Grammar School.
CONSTRUCTION AND DF.SIGN
Type: Reinloraed concrete.
Number of atorietJ: Three. JTG clue: E1.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete alab.
Partlt.ioaa: 9-lnoh bnok and 6-lnoh reinforced eoncl"t"te.
Walle: Jlelnlorced oonoretto (8-JO inchett).
Floon: Reinforced concrete, wood finish on 111ccpen~.
Framlns: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: Wood. Ceilinp: Wood lath
and pluter.
Condition, workmall8llip, and material":
Compare ith usual united State2f buildinp: Stronger
aad hea\lor.
OCCUPANCY: School.
CONTENTS: Clauroom furni14hinp, e<tuipment, and
omco furnishings.
DAMAGE to buildintc: One roof girdor t"rackcd, 9-illch
brick partition in ftl't't !'tory fractured at ceilhg. hun~
ceilin1 dl't4troyed. All sa.-.h hlu" n out, dunf"'4 and trim
clamqed. Outside toilet at. wettt end of buildiug cullapiK.od.
Cau~~e: Blut.
To contents: Furnitdaing." aurl ot lwr content~ cut h~ ftiiL"'~
and debri~ and brokt'u hy turnhliu.c around hy hla."t.
Cau~~e: Ul&~et and d<hri~t (about C'JUall~).
TOTAL ~or.ooR ARE:\ (ll<1uare fc>tt,l : 11,500. ~truct wl
dam~e: 600. Supcrficial dacnaKt:
FRACTJO:S o D:\~1:\C:I-:: Buildiug "tructurol: I pcrccnt. SutJCrficial: - . Coutt>ut:o~: 20 10 pr.-tnt.
RE~lARKS: l.tau-to tuilc~ t in which a\11 :-; tr~uturnl tlauun~ot
UCCUrrccf, Wft!'l nf WtDktr ('Unl"t rllt't it til t hull rcl"l uf
buildi11g.
X OT:.- - Builcliu.c clatnl\~f' htL"'f'tl 1111 t ut ul flour urrn.
Cunteut ~ tlatttull,e i=- frnct iu11 of cunt cut s =-riottl"ly cl:uunjlecl.
Bulldin1 No.: 86. Fire olualftoatloo: R.

WALL OPENINGS: Shutte"': None.
Shut.:
Meet. of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
Endaled FIN doon Automatle :ftm of blast
l'
No
Stain:
ElevatGn:
RXPOSURE:
Flftbrtak Fire
l.oratlnn
()L~tanf'fl
12&'
I.W
\'ea
\'I'll
l'es
l'
\'~
12.''
IW
\'t'S
\'cos
c
c
F.
g
\\'
C'IMntnno ClaM Rnrflt'fl
......,
\'('!
lll'mRrk!l
lllank wull '''"'''' nro

I'Sallll! talts.
lllant " ttll.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF JolltE: ~o lirt>.

EXTENT OJo' Jo'l RE: Total fttK)r ana: II ,50tl :o~c1ttm f~t.
Floor ana burned: 0 811111\rt ftct; 0 JMrctut f.nftc~r hlat~t
datuagt').
RE~l ARKS: Jo:xttntltd cn=-t -wc"t nxis uf huilcliu~ot wuulcl
pBs!'l approximahly thrnu~h 7.tru puiut. Etl'"' wall.
which factd 7.<'ru pniut Wll.' blank cXt't'JII fur xit nt
f'ach l"tury to fire (':-Capf. H clunr~ at fir ,.,..cnJH' \\'l'ft
tlu=-ccl ut t inw uf humh, J,ruhnhly t h iultriur of tIll'
huihliug Will' l"hiclclcrl fruna tlifl't'l mrlintrd 111':11 frn111
tIll' hum h
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING St!RVEY

PHYSICAL DAMAGE
Dl\'1810~
Field Team No. I, Hlrolblma, Japan

BUJLDI:SG ANALYSIS
SHan Xo. I
SHUT
Bulldina :So.: 87-A. Coonlbaat!t': 7F. DL1ta11cc rrom

(GZ): 8,000, (AZ): 8,200.
N A~IE: Funalrl Grammar Behool.
CON8TRI1CTION A~D DF..SIQ~
Type: Wood frame.
Xumber of atone..: Two. JTC e...: E2.
ltool: Aabeltoe eement on wood , ......., and uod eheatlah~~r.
Partltlone: Wood.
Walt.: Wood lath and pluter 1dth wood exterior.
Je1oon: Wood over wood rramin1.
Framln1: Wood.
Window and door franeet~: \Vuod. CeUilltcJ&: \\Ofxl.
('ondltloaa, orknaanebip, and 1nateriaLt: Guud, but
cte.lpa rather poor.
Compare with 111'11&1 t:nited States huildiraRM: \\'r.aker
iw&UN ol \ery .-leuder eohnune and JM)()r johatH.
OCCt.~PANCY: ClaMrooma~.
eONTENT8: Clauromn runaillhinl(and ~ltaitnnent.

DAl\IA(U: to bulldin1: :ntire buildhaR on ,.,.,.,. ur
~ollaJMe, and one \\ira(( rompletcly enllaJMd. \\'aU,.
and eohamntc ruhaR blut hucklt"(l arul huildha.c di~JJiand
aay rnma blal4t.
Cau~~e: Hwt.
To euntente: llu:o&l uf cuntnll'l wNe :o&C\erely claunatc'<l h~
dt!hi'Lt and .,,. htinR u\erturm'<l aurl hlnwu uiNmt It~
blatct.
.
Cautte: lila.-.e ami rlc!hri:o& hlhuua rocaunll~).
TOTAl. t.OOIC Alti-:A (:o&tfllltrt! ftocl): :IX.-ItMt. :O:treutural datnatcc: 3M.-IfM). ~UJMrfhinJ cJnuuuu:
JottA<'TIOX UJo UA li.-\(H-:: Hui!tlheK .. , r, ... , ur:al: HMt
JMrctllt. ~UJKrfic-iaJ:
( 'utalt!lll .. ; :;() JHrttlll.
Hl-:li,\IU\K: in w:all~ Wtrc nr rt!iufurcecl cmu-r
X OTt:.
Uuildintc damaag lm!"eoel ou t ut ul flunr :arc:a.

is rraet iuu ..r ,........... ~ ~riuu .. J~ clauu:uccl.
Cnuttnt~ diUIIIlt(t!
l2!t
Xo. I
Bulldlftl Xo.: 87-R. Coordinate.: 7F. Diltance from

(GZ): 8,000, CAZ): 8,200.
NA.IE: Funalrl Grammar Sebool.

Type: Lipt eteel frame.
Number oltoriell: One. JTG ctu..: A2 2.
Roof: .bbc,.,.tOM "hhadt!l' o\er ood-a~htoathinR and rmrliu~.
Partitiont~: Xonc.
\\'allll: Pl&~~tcr on ood lath \\ith ood ~xttarior tduoathiu1.
Jo1oonc: \\!ood o\er \\cMKI hr.am" ou nm~rote J>Oit.
Framin1: l.i11ht t&ti!C.'I-truM.-.eacl an!b.

Windn and dtMtr rrallat!IC: \\"uod. ('cilinRti: Xom.
C"ondltiou, workman..hiJ, and matc!rial"": (icMMI.
Comtro with u~&uall:nitNI State~ buildin~: ~litchtly
lidatcr d("24i1n but Rtaucrally ccmrrahlt!.
OCCt"PAX<'Y: Sc!latMJI auditorium.
COXTJo:XTS: 1.-tt!ru, btmeh..,., tahlt':o&, tt!aclahuc nil~.
UA ll AG Jo: tu huildiuK: Hnof t ru~M:o& tolitchtly dcfuru ...d
hut J,rohahly will he U!'Ctfl ita )Jiac-t. lln:o&l uf ruufiretc
tilriJJ)M'<I ur dil"JJiaaocl. \\an faacheK hlu"'l hlmna iu.
('au~: UJa,..t.
Tu c-unlellll": ~litchi dauam.c :1ml t hut Jriumril~ chw to
C!SIHtl'Un!.
( 'uu!Oc: EXJHt!OUr.
TOT:\ I. FI.OOIC :\ICE..\ !OCIIIur fccl): I.!MM). !o't rtatt urul
clanuatc:
. SuJ~trliciaal cl:wua.cc: I.!MMt.
FH:\CTIO~ OF U.\ ~I:\( i E: Builcliu.c ~ reac-t ur:al :
SuJMrficinl: lfM) JHrccul. ( ueetcUil": IU Jur~ut.
HEll:\ H1\S:
~ ......:.
h~u~
Huilclila.C clnuma:c t.:a ..cd u1a lut:al fluor arc:&. ( uucluruu,.w i!O fr:u-tiuu uf culatc'' .. ,riuu .. J~ c!:uu:u.:l.

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION
Field Team No. 1, Hir08hima, Japan

BUILDING AN ALYSJS
SatEET No. 1
SuEET :\o. 2
Building No.: 95. CoordinateH: 4G. Distance from

(GZ): 1,200, (AZ): 2,300.
NAME: Honkawa Grammar School.
CONSTRUCTIO" AND DESIGN
Type: Reinforced concrete.
Number of stories: Three and bMCment. JTG clags El.
Roor: Reinforc:ed concrete, cement ftnish.
Partitions: Reinforced concrete (7-inch).
Walls: Reinforced concrete (l~inch).
Floon: Reinforced concrete, wood ftniKh on 8lecpens.
Framin1: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door fra1n~: Metal. Ceilings: PIBl'ltcr on
eonorete.
Condition, workotanHhip, and materials: Excellent.
Compare with usual t;uitcd States buildin~: Stronger.
OCCUPANCY: School ci&M.'Irooms.
CONTENTS: School furni11hingH and (!quipmcnt.
DAMAGE to building: Panf!l wallM facing hlBl'll hucklt-d.
One roof girdt>r structurally damaRCfl and Hlah dC'pressed. About 15 (X'rcent of roof t~lahR cracked aud
bcanllf cracked with some spalliug hut utmbh~ in place.
All ftnitth, floor"!! and trim htJrnC'd out, SU.."h aud doors
blo\\n out.
Cause: Blast.
To contents:- ComJ,Ictely dC'~l royNI.
CauliC: f'ire (primary) mny ha \'C he(u :;omc
df'hri:~
dnmagt>.
TOTAl. Fl.OO H :\ R E:\ (,-quart
(ec>t ) : HUiOO. St ruct.ural dntna(lc: 500. Ruptrficial clamu~P: :i,OOU.

FUACTIOl'\ OF DA:\L\CE: Building ,-tructuntl: I Jk'rccnt. ~upcrfkinl: fi JHntul. Couttut~: 1(}0 J.Hnt: ut .
ItEMAHKS :
:\oTF.. - Duil<liu~~; rlnllllll(t' hn~d 011
tclll:i daUIU!(t'
j,-
(ru<"l in11 of
COlli I'll I"
tot nlllonr ureu. Cou,-trious (y dnllln!(t'd.
Building No.: 9!>. Fire claMificat.ion: n.

WALl, OPENINGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect. of blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
EociOIIII"<I
l'llrl
Stain:
Fire door:~
Aulonmllc Jo:lfi'CI <f hl ..~ l
EXPOSURE:
l..ocallon
Di~lttnn
Clt-arunct'
C'IIL'\.1
:s
~'J#
Yt'll
:10'
:So
l'nrtlol 1!10'
('
\\'
100'
"t'('!l
Jt. nmrl> ~
Uurnl"l
:Su '''l'" ~tJro .
YtS
.\II
t'\J>CI~ IIn ~
!Jurrul
Yr~
PHOBABLE C AUSE OF FIHE: :'\ot clelcrmirrtd.

VERTICAL FIHE SPREAD: Pruhnhly.
EXTEJ'\T OF FIHE: Total floor unu: -t9,;i(}(l ~ qtum ftl"l.
Floor Rrca hurnl'<l: 49,500 ~quare (('1'1: I 00 ptrttrrt.
(1\ftcr hla:;t dnmnl(t>) .
RE~IAHK~:

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Brii.DING AX A LYSIS
SREBT ~o.
SoEET No.2
No.: 96. Coordinates: 05.

(GZ): 400 (AZ): 2,000.
BuDding
Dilstance
(Fire Supplement to Sheet I\o. 1)
from

WALL OPENIXGS: Shutters: None.
Shut:
Effect of bla.'lt:
FLOOR OPENii\GS:
NAME: Taiaho Clothing Store.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGX
Type: Reinforced concrete.
Number of storiee: Three and basement. JTG clas."': El.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete Hlabs, cement ftni.lth.
PartitioM: Reinforced concrete and wood.
Walls: Reinforced concrete ( 10-inch), brick panels on
ft 1'8t floor.
Floors: Reinforced concrete (wood ftniHh on sleepen~,
second floor).
Window and door frames: Metal. Ceilin~s: Plaster on
concrete.
Conditions, workmarudaip, and materials: Fair.
Compare with usual United States buildiugl'l: Considerable stronger (larger structural members).
OCCUPANCY: ~lercantlle.
CONTENTS: !\lerchandise ror RAIC.
DAMAGE to building: All roor slabs dep~"t.'<i, fracturing beams and girders and stretching Hteel. Panel in
east wall buckled, girders in second ftoor rt!ar crackecl
and spalled. Ninety JM'rcent of Jl&r&J)Ct dLtnolished.
All 8814h and doors blown out. Fini~h and trim hurm!d
out. No fire in b&l'lement.
CauKC: llla~t.
To con tentH: Completely dt!st royt'fl. tx<ept in l.lll!'t!IIIPII!
Cause: Fire (primar,y cause- pruhahly so111e dchris
EncloM-d
Stain:
Eleva ton:
t'trcbnoak
HE~IAHKS :
1'\oTt:.-- Buildiul( cltamaJ(t' ha~wcl uu total tloor nna .

is f ract io11 of l'OIJilIJ I "' ::'Nioli,..J)' dllllll.l~t"d
('Oil t ('II t S dtallUll(t'
..-I
Ill'
II
"'"
'I
SECTION "A-A"
...-r
f U.S. STRATEGIC BOMI!lMl SURVEY
I.ocutiun
;:.;
Dis~nr~
t:
10'
10'
\\"
I !>II'
J,.",'
t"lre
f'lt'Urunre <llu!l'l llumt"<l

("
~
ll'o
Xo
c
Yt~
( "
y,.~
Xu
.....
y,.,.
("
Hmar 1.:'
Yc~
PHOHABI.E C'An;E OF FIHE: :'\ot detlnuinccl.

VERTICAL Fl RE SPHEAD: Pol<,..ihl_v.
EXTE~T OF FJ HE: Total ttoor nna: 12,400 Rq uure fppt.
Floor arta hunat>cl : 9.300 squun ftPt; ( ;) p-rccut (nftPr.
bln."'t da mal(I').
HE ~I A H K~ : Firt t hrottJ(hout huildilliC except in lm,..cJm'lll
dam~e).
.\utomutlc t:fftct or hlast
EXPOSt:RE:
TOTAL FLOOR AREA ("!quare fe('t): 12.400. ~tru<tuml

damage: 3,900. Su)lerficial dama~t:
FRACTIO:'\ OF DA~IAGE: Builcliull struetuml: 31 pt-rcent.. 8upt>rficial: - . l'ontf'lat s: 7;, J>f'rrclll.
t"tno door.
l"o
BUILDING 9 6
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN GRID 5H
FIGURE 100 - X A
II ill

PH\'81'-'f, IUMAOE DIVISION
Field Team Xo. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDIXG ANALYSIS
SHEET So. 1
Su&t:T No. 2
Building N8.: 100. Coordinates: 5G. Di'ltance from

(GZ): 800, (AZ): 2,100.
NAME: Nippon Simple Fire Insurance Co.
Type: Reinforced-concrete frame.
~umber of stories: 2. JTG claM: E2.
Roof: Reinforced-concrete slab and bearrus.
PartiUonc None.
Walla: Reinforced concrete, stucco finish.
Floors: Relnforoed-concrete slab, cement finish.
Framiq: Reinforced concrete.
Window and door frames: :\Ictal. Ceilings: Plaster on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and material!!: Good.
Compare with u.mal {jnited States buildinJ(s: Comparable.
OCCUPANCY: Office.
CONTENTS: Office furnishings and equipmcut.
DAMAGE to builrling: One roof girder cracked ami spallcd.
Sub anrt doors blown out or deformed. Trim and
ftnit~h damaged by fire.
Cal18e: Bla~~t.
To contcntJ: Completely dc:Jtroycd.
Cal18e: Fire (prohahly apprl'ciahlt hla-;t ami df'hri,.,
damage).
TOTAl. FLOOR :\REA (square feet): :i,OOO. :-;tru(t ural damage: - . Hurwrficial damaJ(c: 80.
FltACTION OF 0:\:\L\GE: BuiHiuJ( l'trurturul:
Superficial: 3 JlCrCl'llt. Conteut s: l 00 JM!rt'l'll t.
(Fire Supplement to Sheet !\o. I)
ltE:\IARK~:
XoTE.-UuildinJ( dam&J(f' ha.-;('(1 011 toiRI flour nnn.

Contcnb1 damagl' b fmctiou of ruute111~ :-<lriou,;ly cllwm~ cl.
Building No.: 100. Fire classlfteation:

WALL OPE~IXGS: Shutters: No.
Shut:
Effect or blast:
FLOOR OPENINGS:
F.nclottffl
Htaln:
Elc,..ton:
n.
Flrl' doon Automatic t:ITt't't ul hlll,'jt
~o
EXPOSl"RE:
Ylrl'btl'ftk
Flrr
i.O('fttlon Dbtanet> f'li'IUlUlet> l'lus Jlumt'fl

:-.;
t:
0'
1.\'
40'
:-o;o
U'
f'
~0
So
C.'
;'l;o
('
\' t'!l
Htmark~
I lour hlu"n uiT ur '"'Ill .
..-~
y,.,.
llhmk '"'!Ill.
PHOBABLE l'.\l'SE OF FIHE: :Xot cltlf~rmiul'l.

\'EHTICAL FIHE SPREAD: PU!I:o;ihl~ .
EXTE:XT OF FlHE: Total ftnor area: :J,OOO ll<pum
feet. Floor arl'a huru('(l: 3,000 ~quare fl.>ct 100 txnrt
(after hla.'!t. clamnJ(e).
RE~I:\HI\}): Ea-.t wall which factcl wro poi111 was hluuk
aucl it i:-< twlil\'l'd t ht iutt~rior oft ht huiltliu~o: wu:-< :-hif'lclf'd
from flirt~l'l m :lintf'd llf'nl fro111 1hf' ho111h.

rDY81CAL DAMAOB DIVISION
Field Team So. 1, Hiroshima, Japan

BUILDING
SHEET
No. 1
Buildin1 No.: 122. Coordinateg: 5J. D~tanee from

(OZ): 6,400, (AZ): 6,700.
NAME: Sumitomo Bank Co., Hip.Khi Mat,.urara Branch.
Type: Protected steel frame.
Number ol atorietii 2. JTO clau: El.
Roof: Reloforced-eonorete lab on steel beams.
PartitloM: Pluter on metal lath~

Walla: Brick p&nel-13-lneh.
Floon: Reinforced-concreto slab and twams.
Framin1: Steel-protected.
Window and door framca: Wood. CeiUnp: Pla,;tc!r on
concrete.
Condition, workmanship, and materiah4: Excellent.
ComJ)are with usual United ~tateK buildinR~t: Slightly
hea\ier.
OCCUPANCY: Bank with office" on l'econd floor.
CONTENTS: Office and hankintt t'(JUipment.
DAMAGE to buildin: Glatt~i blown out, ftw :ohuttl'r='
fach11 bi&Mt deformed.
Caufle: Bla~~t.
To contentJ4: None.
Caul4Cl:
TOTAl. FI.OOR AltF.A (l"(]uarr fttt): ;"i, JOn. =-'trtartural damage: - . Superficial darnal(t :
Jo'RAGTIO~
OJo, DAMAGE: lhailtlinJC ~tru<"tuml:
Superficial: - . ('ontrut s :
UF.MAHKS:
NoTt:.-8uildital(
Contcllt:i damagt
j,c
ANAI~YSIS
daana~e ha."'td em total lloor tma.

fract iun uf runttllt~ ,.:triuwly flluun~.tcl.
SHEET
No.2

Building No.: 122. Fire cla88iftcation:r lt; . . . . .
WALL OPENINGS: Shutters: Steel rolltlrs aiid hinged
shutten.
Shut:
Effect of bla~~t: Part bent in t~light ly.
FI~OOR OPENINGS:
Stain:
F.lfoulon:
Fl~ dnot"ll
EnelciiNI
Yl'l
Automullc- :fll'!l of bhlSt
!'l:n
EXP08l'RE:
,...
,... ,. ,,.......,.
........ UIIt.... ("........ ("... R.-d

lA'
So
c
s
F.
"
"'
\'f'A
So
PICOBABI : (' AIN:
Rrla:ullJ
.......
rann. t.,. c ,_
.,... "'. n ......,~
,,.,....... a,...
su ..,,....u,...
('
o uu:: ...in
"lnatl frutn
t"';-
PCJIIUnot~.
\' ..:ltTIC"AI. 1-'IIU: ~PIU:AO: ~u.

:xT:~T
Jo"lltF.: Tutal fluur ear: 5.100
I'CIIIftfl'
,...... Flour ana lmre...d: 0 "'lllan ,, ...,; n IH'rt'tllt I nfttr

bta..t dauaa,c.).
It 1-: MA It 1\~: in :oamacl iut u huilcliutc frum xpu,.ur.. u1
.,.,., allaueluurt hca!lt rure ...r. Fin!l wtr ,.,, iutcui,.Jael
It~ ,,... ,pit iu,.;iclc at HI ltftclitrihk clalllftl(t wa.. elutw.
EDGE OF
FIRE AREA
GROUND
ZERO
EDGE OF
FIRE AREA
Commercial Museum ('300 meters) before and after
THE UNITED STATES

THE EFFECTS
OF
THE ATOMIC BOMB
ON
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
Volume III
Physical Damage Division
Dates of Survey:
14 October- 26 November 1945
Date of Puhlication
May 1947
r ouvn<:.
- A U.I
I . - 1 -' -= 55 , c;::; ,
f j , /' \. ' ' -,;<C ~ " <' '"=f

I ) ,. ,'l1. ]E:.':i:._;- :1 J'r':....
,...,'o/ j I' f Iii{ j >_._'S%~. .'
')(_
.r
<.:
- ~ . (
_.=.' \,
. ,
n ' 1 -:'< . i _ ~
LEGEND
DAMAGE TO CARS
POLE TYPES
TOTALLY BURNED
I 22
HALF BURNED
SEVERE DAMAGE
8 23
a 24
MODERATE DAMAGE
SLIGHT DAMAGE
D36
NO DAMAGE
TYPE I-WOOD POLES
TYPE 2-STEEL RAIL
"
~ .
\..~
_ .)
.l_ .,
(
'
.,.
'
---+-
DAMAGE RADII
./
LIMIT OF BLAST DAMAGE TO OVERHEAD CABLES (8000')
.-:;:.- '
LIMIT Cf' FIRE DAMAGE TO TYPE I POLES (6500')
,-..,---- LIMIT OF BLAST DAMAGE TO T't'PE I POLES (4500')
r---...-- LIMIT OF BLAST DANAGE TO TYPE 2 POLES ( 3500' l
LIMI T OF BLAST DAMAGE TO TYPE 4 POLES (3000' )
TYPE 3- LATTICE STEEL
"',i
TYPE 4- BUlL TUP MEMBER

TYPE~ -CONCRETE POLES
. -, -= J.
- -- - --- :- ~ - ~.
~'" ~
\ .
I~ -(12 ON MIYAGIMA LINE)
~\
TROLLEY LINE (RAIL)

DAMAGED OVERHEAD TROLLEY LINES - - - - - - -
'j
HIROSHIMA
J"~ :~~REFECT URE, HONSHU,
~~
'
-..
HIROSHIMA
CITY ELECTRIC RAILWAY
AND BUS SYSTEM
1"
J=
,,
1
',J
t' . :
r -~
,I
.....
~=~"""'....... -
' ~"1
I
l.
C:
'I'
l'
c-
;/
-"'
,
'\
tJ}\
LLUSTRATION SHOWING THE DERAILING

OF FREIGHT TRAIN 377 BY THE ATO..C
BOMB
t
AP-IIATILT
<
141. I '
!
I
APPIOIIMATLY
.t/
IRIDGE I
Ill'
LEGEND
TUMID COIIIU:TilLY
OVER 01 LlAIIII
IIIII
eura
Df:RAILfD
9i
DERAILED AND BURNED
~ ~ )7")/~
HIROSHIMA
ELECTRICAL GENERATING
AND
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
;; ..:J~'K ffC' >~~~f.:z" 9 iV&::nx::~~A~/Kj 1 ( 7 ~--N~f
IL '1"#7if'...t 1 FNtt J - \cS_ , "
~r:: r~ ': ,rl, "i! : >_:_, ,~'J ~--,
'<t
14GH HEAD
CAP 10,000 KW.
110 KV
LEGEND
- - OVERHEAD WilES
----UNDERGROUND WIRES
I
-_f
fr
- _1' j
I (
) ! ...--- !
, ~-. .
,_ 1 1 -- :_
~> '
-,
',-t (- (_
,,r',~
: :,7~\~\-,>~
t<-_n
.'' , ~ : :,
> ' Y-'
,/
:ji~~
,:r~Ji-. o r,)l
' .; I{. ..
HIROSHIMA
HIROSHIMA PREFECTURE, HONSHU, JAPAN
~~
_'
., . ..... 7
'!'A
r....-rut
,...,.
OIMO IY tn ... 110 011 1000 ft.IID

.0--.D fiCIILJ COUC
.-o

ELEC. GEN.
OIST SYSTEM
HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
FIGURE 9- XID
I(
\.
~-
"
HIRO~~I~A
-- .
1"7.~~- 5
HIROSHIMA PREFECTURE, HONSHU, JA~N
i1
-
'V'~ -
-~
7??7........,....__
poe Wf f [tt
::---.~
~=1' ~
:. ..: \\H ill ... U :
, ,
.;.fl
~lc;.o. l(
I ~
.. , , , . ,
1': Cr O
'\ .
\ ' "" ",

..,..-, ..{
WO'~
.. , ( 44
.o1..0
~:......::I ~
-: ,- .. , . . .
u . t
..0
US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
- -::
.,
~~
-''
.__ , '
WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

HIROSHIMA, JAPAN
LEGEND
Q
POINTS AT WHICH PRESSURE TESTS
WERE TAKEN
/:
- ~~?- ' t
' I
,' J
FIGURE 16 - Xlll
,. f - -
POINTS AT WHICH BREAKS OCCURED
I'
f,
- ;
' ,.
.. ..,
,J o
I _,, ,
l.
'- '
r , .
I '
J _,
~J. ---~, --y-.

,,
\ .
\~
..
'
~;-: -
\\. I
'. j! ' /
. . i,
'
t _~ _ :.
1
'}.
.~ '"
'\
r . (4~
- f
. I
h "t
)J /
_..I
.<.
1_,_
~-'
HIROSHIMA
ADA038738
Secondary Fires
secondary fires ar~ those that result fro airblast damaae. Their
causes include overturned aas appliances. broken gas lines. and electrical short-circuits. McAuliffe and Moll (Reference 1 ) studied
secondary fires resultina froa the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and
Naaasaki and c~arod their results with data from conventional bomb
inas. explosive disasters. earthquakes. and tornadoe$. Their major conclusion was that secondary ignitions occur with an overa~l averaae frequency of 0.006 for each 1000 square feet of floor space, provided airbla.t peak overpresaure i$ at least 2 psi. The frequency of secondary
ignitions appears to be relatively insensitive to higher overpressures.
Based on surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki buildings.
FREQUENCY OF SECONDARY IGNITIONS AS A FUNCTION OF ~UILDING TYPE

Ttpt of Structure
Frequenct of Secondary Ignitions
(for eac 1Loop sgu,aJ:e fee.t, of. floor area)
0.019
Wood
0.017
Brick
0.004
Steel
Concrete
0.002
MULTlPLYlNG FACTOR FOR TYPES OF BUILDING OCCUPANCIES
Tm of OccuJ.-ncx.
Multiplying
Public
Mercantile
Residential
Manufacturing
Miscellaneous
0.4
0.5
0.5
Facto~
1.0
10.0
--
MULTIPLYIMG FACTOR FOR TIME OF DAY

!Lme of Day
Mult1pl~fng Fa!2!
Night
Day (other than
mealtimes)
Mealtimes
1
0.5
1.0
2.0
Secondar~ IJnitions in Nuclear Attack, J. McAuliffe and K. Moll,

Jtanforcf Rescsarch Institute, Menlo Park, California 94025, SRI
Project 5106 (AD 625173), July 1965.
15 min. (Enola Gay)

Hiroshima fires merging
0.12 mile from GZ,

Hiroshima
790m west of GZ, Hiroshima
Postal Savings Bureau

1 mile
City Hall 1100 meters

USSBS Building 28
USSBS Hiroshima Building 31, 1,600 m from GZ.
Red Cross Hospital
/
/
USSBS 49
Chugoku
Shim bun
3,000 ft GZ
GEIBI BANK CO. BUILDING AFTER ATTACK ON HIROSHIMA

Bank of Japan: USSBS Building 24, 1300 ft from GZ
Geibi Bank Co: USSBS Building 59, 4100 ft from GZ
(Table 5 of USSBS report 92 Hiroshima, v2.)
In both, survivors extinguished fire with water buckets.

(Ref: Panel26 of the "DCPA Attack Environment Manual", Chapter 3.)
USSBS Report 92, v21 MAE's

Hiroshima bui1dinqslm~
Multistory, earthquake-resistant _____ _
Multistory, steel- and reinforcedconcrete frame (including both
~arthquake- and non-earthquakeresistant construction) ___________ _
1-story, light, steel-frame ___________ _
Multistory, load-beanng, brick-wall __
1-story, load-bearing, brick-wall _____ _
Wood-frame
industrial-commercial
(dimension-timber construction) ___ _
Wood-frame
domestic
buildings
(wood-pole construction) _________ _
Residential construction ____________ _
Radii of
MAE's
in feet
0.03
500
. 05
700
3.4
3.6
6.0
5J500
5,700
7,300
8.5
8,700
9. 5
6.0
9,200
7,300
NP-3041
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBS
The Report of the Joint Commission for
the Investigation of the Effects of the
Atomic Bomb in Japan; Volume VI
By
Ashley W.
George V.
Averill A.
E. Cuyler
Oughterson
LeRoy
Liebow
Hammond
Henry L. Barnett
Jack D. Rosenbaum
B. Aubrey Schneider
July 6, 1951
[TIS Issuance Date]
Army Institute of Pathology
UNITED STATES ATOMIC
ENERGY
COMMISSION
T c h n i c a I I n form at i o n S r vice, 0 a k Ridge, T n n
11
Thia document containa information affectinl the national defenae of the United
Statea within the meanin&: of the Eapiona~~:e
Act, SO U. S. C. ~ l and 32, aa amended.
Ita tran~iaaion or the revelation of ita
contenta in any manner to an unauthorized
peraon ia prohibited by law .
RESTRICTED
Percent
100 r
WORK PARTIES
DISTRIBUTION
HIROSHIMA
SCHOOL CHILDREN
NP-3041
""
~
-- .. ~
--
UNSHIELDED
93.7
))
UNSHIELDED
85.3
83.7
90
80
70.
so 1
60.5
I~
1/
M"--'
I I
I /1
, ..... ..,.,
"-""1
~'
~
.I
'
,-,.._,.........-
@
I
SHIELDED
<t
~50
a:
0
~ 40
30
20 I-
19.2
101-
ol
1.0
14.2
SHIELDED
1.5
DISTANCE
14.5
SHIELDED
2.5
2.0
(Kilometers)
3.0
4.0
HIROSHIMA
&
::!
....z
lu
lt
a::
(J
liJ
Q.
~
~
Q
(J
C/)
a::
>
>
a::
,,
,d
!l~
u ...
Q)
..
CIS
BUILDING
DESIGNATION
NO. INDIVIDUALS
EXPOSED
POST OFFICE
TELEGRAPH OFFICE
TELEPHONE OFFICE
CITY HALL
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
BRANCH POST OFFICE
P. 0. SAVINGS OFFICE
1.5
1.0
RANGE, MILES FROM GROUND ZERO
~~~ R-f
2.0
~M
Q)o
:a~
Ulll.
<Z
682
346
750
2.5
1-
f- 1
,_
'!
80
..
~t
1---
1- t--~-
-- --rl
-
60
-~
-t
- 1- ->---
~~-!
1-
=t-.r_ 1-i~~
-:Cr--
...:J
~
r-
1-
> so
t-
__,_
r~
c
u
'!
..._ 70 h
...
-.:.=~ ..=~ r-
'-
:J
1- - -
...--
G(
+- ::::!~~
- - :!
::=
r-
~ - ---+-
~i-
~~
r-~~-r-+
30
r- ~
1--t---
20
h..
BLAST EFFECTS
10
'"'o
.Ca
~co
=f:- r
90
g;
~M
oz
. .B
400
301
474
216
NONSEISMIC REINFORCED-CONCRETE BUILDINGS
r+-
c-
b.O~
I
2
3
4
5
6
DC-P-1060
.. ::;.
.::J
0.5
(/)
Q)M
,0'
..
.. >
...........I
~~ .
00
Q)
~Q
DOCUMENT NP-3041 VOL lll
j;f
I
I
es..
:a<
Cii()
~
Q
~,'
08
rilo-1
/;/
(/)
:::: c
ALL EFFECTS
~~
_g
s1U
0~
<"Q
I
I
I
I
.~
'0~
o/
&!1.2
DASA 1271
-~
I()
,p
~/
::>
....:
.. m
(/).-4
.0 . ..
~
ob.O
..,..JI
-..II
!it
C/)
,,,
20
OVERPRESSURE (psi)
40
10
403 337
MEMORANDUM
RM-3079-PR
1963
DISASTER AND RECOVERY:

A HISTORICAL SURVEY
J aok Hirshleifer
PREPARED FOR:
UNITED STATES
.~IR
FORCE PROJECT RAND
SANTA MONICA CAllfOIHIA
12
As at Hamburg, people proved

tougher than structures. Almost 70 per cent of the buildings in
Hiroshima were destroyed, compared with around 30 per cent of pop
1
ulation.
The Research Department of the Hiroshima Municipal Office
is reported to have estimated the population in the city as 407,000,
in Hiroshima (Hiroshima Publishing Company, 1949).
1
These proportions are the estimates used by the U.S. Strategic

Bombing Survey report. The Hiroshima Municipal Office calculations
show an even greater disparity, reporting 22 per cent of population
killed and missing but some 89 per cent of buildings as destroyed or
needing reconstruction (Hiroshima).
13
On Auguat 7 power waa generally reatored to

aurviving areaa, and through railroad service c~ced on Auguat 8.
Telephone service started on Aupat 15. Hiroshima waa alao not a
dead city. the u.s. Strategic BoBbing Survey reported that plants
responsible for threefourtha of the city's induatrial production
could have reaumed nor.al operation within 30 daya (the newer and
larger planta in Hiroahima were on the outakirta of the city, and
both physical premiaea and peraonnel generally aurvived). 1 By
mid-1949 the population had grown to over 300,000 once more, and
70 per cent of the deatroyed buildlnga had been reconatructed. 2
1
USSBS, "'lbe lffecta of AtOilic a.ba at Hiroahima and Nagaaaki,"
P 8.
2utroth1.
AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL

STRESS
Psychological Studies
of
Bombing and Civilian Defense
Irving L. Janis
The RAND Corporation
First Edition
NEW YORK TORONTO LONDON
McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

1951
CHAPTER 2
EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THE A-BOMB
UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE POPULATION

At both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, disaster struck without warning.
Whether intended so or not, an extraordinarily high degree of surprise was achieved by both A-bomb attacks. At the two target cities,
prior to the bombing, there had been relatively little anxiety about
the threat of heavy B-29 raids. When the planes carrying the A-bomb
arrived over their targets, the population was almost completely
unprepared. At the time, not even a light air raid was expected.
People were caught at home, at work, out on the city streets, calmly
going about their usual daily affairs.
When the first A-bomb was dropped, on August 6, 1945, very
few residents of Hiroshima were inside air-raid shelters. An all-clear
signal from a previous alert had sounded less than half an hour
earlier and the normal routine of community life had resumed.
,Shortly after eight in the morning, when the explosion occurred, the
.working-class population was arriving at the factories and shops.
Many workers were still out-of-doors en route to their jobs. The
majority of school children, along with some adults from the
suburbs, were also outside, hard at work building firebreaks as a
defense against possible incendiary raids. Housewives, especially in
middle-class families, were at home, preparing breakfast. Only a few
minutes later, their flaming charcoal stoves were to create hundreds
of local fires, adding to a general conflagration of such intensity that
even if the assiduous labor of Hiroshima's school children had been
completed, the fire storm still would have been beyond control.
At Nagasaki, three days later, the populace had heard only vague
reports about the Hiroshima disaster. Here again, people were at
4
work in factories and offices, tending their homes, engaging in their

normal daily activities. A few hours earlier a raid alert had been
canceled; before the raid signal could be repeated, the bomb had
already exploded. Only 400 people out of a population of close to a
quarter of a million were inside the excellent tunnel shelters that
could have protected some 75,000 people from severe injury or death.
It is generally recognized that the element of surprise was an
important factor contributing to the unprecedented casualty rates at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of those who were exposed to lethal
gamma radiation, struck down by flying debris, or trapped in collapsed buildings would not have been killed if they had been
warned in time to flee to the outskirts of the city or if they had
been in adequate shelters. Thousands of people who were out-ofdoors or standing in front of windows would have been protected
from incapacitating flash burns if they had been under any sort
of cover. 1
Whether or not they suffered severe injury, those who survived
the explosion were also affected by the element of surprise in quite
another way. The absence of warning and the generally unprepared
state of the population undoubtedly augmented the emotional effects
of the disaster. "I was just utterly surprised and amazed and awed."
This brief remark, by a newspaper reporter who was living in Nagasaki at the time of the disaster, epitomizes the way in which
survivors described the terrifying events to which they were so
suddenly exposed.
Of great importance in the predispositional set of the population
is the fact that there was not a state of readiness to face danger or
to cope with the harsh exigencies of a major catastrophe. The stage
was well set for extreme emotional responses to dominate the action.
It is against this background of psychological unpreparedness that
the emotional impact resulting from the atomic disasters should
be viewed.
USSBS Report, The Effec/J of Atomic BomhJ on Hiroshima and NagaJaki, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1946.
1
(US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946 report "Effects of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki", page 16)
1-'
0)
PROTBCI'ION AG~INSX RADIANT BEAT. Tbls t!llliMII (IJbolopllfJh.l b, ]11/J-..s~ 2 Oaob.- 194') UJIIS llholll 61'00
I from grolltlll %.rtJ wb 1/J ,.,,,,_, bn. /rtHII lh Z./1. Hls "" WIIS
lo llf'OI< lh lo/1 of his bllll
llilul liMb b...,.
l/idftll
HIROSHIMA
(Lethal 6.7 cal/sq em, according to the 1979 US Office of Technology Assessment "Effects of Nuclear War")
Clothing protects back, 1 mile from ground zero Hiroshima. aged 1

Photo t aken October 1945. Unclothed arms burned f acing burst.
...
..
I
..
\
Fatsia japonica shadow on electric pole, Meiji Bridge
DASA 1271
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST
by
Clayton S. White, M.D.
Presented before
The Armed Forces Medical Symposium
Field Command, Defense Atomic Support
Agency, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
November zs. 1961
Technical Progress Report

on
Contract No. DA-49-146-XZ -055

This work. an aspect of investigations dealing with the Biological
Effects of Blast from Bombs, was supported by the Defense Atomic
Support Agency of the Department of Defense.
(Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any

purpose of the United States Gove-rnment.)
Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research

Albuquerque, New Mexico
December 1961
Fig. 44
t:
,,/
PERCENTAGE OF SURVIVORS
AS A FUNCTION OF RANGE
FROM GROUND ZERO (HIROSHIMA)
::!
If
~
0
,I
I
REF JOINT COMMISSION REPORT, VOL 1Zl

DOCUMENT NP-3041
"""'
~/
16
of
I
I
-a uNSHIELDED SCHOOL PERSONNEL
~0
I
.....
--./I
&
Q
it
I
I
EXPOSED INSIDE CONCRETE BUILDINGS
NO.
.:::J
2
3
4
5
,,
,,
,,
sHIELDED SCHOOL PERSONNEL
POINT
,d
o.
JOINT COMMISSION DATA FOR OVERALL

SURVIVAL
-o
6
7
, .
BUILDING
DESIGNATION
NO. INDIVIDUALS
EXPOSED
POST OFFICE
TELEGRAPH OFFICE
TELEPHONE OFFICE
CITY HALL
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
BRANCH POST OFFICE
P. 0. SAVINGS OFFICE
400
301
474
216
682
346
750
,J)'
0.5
1.0
1.5
RANGE, MILES
2.0
2.5
Oughterson, A. W., LeRoy, G. V., Liebow, A. A., Hammond,

E. C., Barnett, H. L. , Rosenbaum, J. D. and Schneider, B. A.,
"Medical Effects of Atomic Bombs- The Report of the Joint
Commission for Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb
in Japan,
11
Vol. VI, AEC Technical Information Service, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, July 6, 1951.

TABLE 5
Comparative "Free"-field Effects Parameters

at 50 Per Cent Survival Ranges for Hiroshima
Items of Interest
Gonc.rete
buildings
Range for 50fo survival - mi
Conditions of Em,oe-ul:'~
!Iis1de
xed
(average)
schools
<::iiitside
schools
0.12
0.45
0.8
1.3
37
20
7.9
3.6
780
500
2.40
170
140
58
2.4
59,000
. 5800
480
15
355
115
Estimated "free"-field effects

at range for 50fo survival
Max side-on overpressure -psi
Max wind - mph
Thermal radiation - cal/ em
Initial ionizing radiation - rems

Max displacement velocity at
10 ft of t .r avel - ft/ sec
10-gm glass fragment

for a 2.0 kt burst
Probability of penetration of glass fragments into the abdomen
Fig. 41
log v = 2.5172 -log (log m + 2 .3054) + 0.4842 P

v = impact velocity in ft /sec
po....;::--....::::o."""=='"_...;::::oo,""'-!~-...;::::oo,""c::_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ m= mass of glass fragments in gms
P = probability of penetration
=--___;:""""""~---Standard Error 0 .0745
...
......
G
~
u
0
c;
>
200~--------~~--.
a.
E
Missile moss, oms
There are a number of simple lessons portrayed by these survival

curves which actually relate human experience with a nuclear detonation.
Let us consider some of the more important.
1.
First, the 50 per cent survival ranges for the four curves
from your right to left of 1. 3, 0. 8, 0. 45 and 0. 12 miles forcefully emphasizes the importance of the conditions of exposure.
2.
The area of complete destruction at Hiroshima has been
described as covering a circle of about 1. 2-mile radius (4 square miles),

a range at which 4-5 psi existed.
survival of near 90 per cent.
At this range there was an over-all
It is apparent, therefore, that one must
not confuse the area of complete destruction of houses (a physical concept)

with "complete destruction" of people.
5 per cent over-all survival.
Even in to near 0. 2 mile, there was
By way of emphasis, let it be clear that
there was a marked difference between the ranges for physical and biological destruction at Hiroshima.
The gloomy habit of confusing the two
concepts is, I am afraid, as prevalent as it is unrealistic and, indeed,

untrue.
3.
The great good fortune of just being indoors and 'Shielded
against the most far-reaching effect, direct thermal radiation, is

illustrated by the survival range of 0. 45 mile for school personnel mos'tly
inside compared with 1. 3 miles for those mostly outside.
This proved
so even though the fact of being inside involved exposure to falling and
flying debris, greater displacement potential and higher pressure reflections.
Apparently, the latter hazards are relatively less than the
dangers from direct thermal radiation.

4.
The marked value of simply being inside concrete buildings
is illu&trated by the 50 per cent survival range of 0. 12 mile.
-33-
What the H-bomb does to people, houses, other things 35

Houses as shelters
The chances of survival of people in such relatively fragile
structures would seem to be small, but Second World War
experience shows that they are better than one thinks. The
main danger to people inside houses is collapse; but
although the weapon that demolishes a house may vary
enonnously in size and range, the weight of a house remains
the same, and in most cases the staircase is strong enough to
support the debris that will fall on it. So !People who shelter
under the stairs- idiotic as this may sound for a precaution
against nuclear weapons-will also be protected against heat
flash and flying glass and have a good chance ofsurviving the
almost complete destruction of their homes. Even at the
11 p.s.i. (08 kg/sq em) line there should be no more than
11 per cent of people actually killed. . ..
In Dusseldorf in 1943, 30 per cent of the houses were
destroyed, but only 001 per cent of people were killed or
injured.
Peter Laurie
Revised and expanded edition published by
Granada Publishing Limited
in Panther Books 1979
AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL

STRESS
Psychological Studies
of
Bombing and Civilian Defense
Irving L. Janis
The RAND Corporation

1951
13
4 sec at 1 mile:
Time from flash to blast
A substantial proportion of the respondents in Hiroshima and

Nagasaki reported having reacted immediately to the intense flash
alone, as though it were a well-known danger signal, despite the
fact that they were unaware of its significance at the time. A number of them said that they voluntarily ducked down or "hit the
ground'' as soon as the flash occurred and had already reached the
prone position before the blast swept over them.
14
REACTIONS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI
From the above discussion, it is apparent that some of the survivors immediately perceived the flash as a danger signal. It also
appears that for those who were not located near the center there
was an opportunity to take protective action that could reduce
injuries from the secondary heat wave and from flying glass, falling debris, and other blast effects. It is noteworthy that some
survivors evidently failed to make use of this opportunity, as is to
be expected when there has been no prior preparation for it.
In a later chapter on the problems of civil defense, we shall have
occasion to take account of these findings, since they suggest that
casualties in an A-bomb attack might be reduced if the population
has been well prepared in advance to react appropriately to the
flash of the explosion.
..
.....
.
India n Springe ( ,.hoee pe rman ent population i 17)

and adjacent air bue are 42 mileo from J..aa Ve j!at
YUCCA FLAT
<>
<>
,IINCH~AN'S
FLAT
All fOICE IASI
SCHOOL
The blast sites have been from 20 to 35 mle>

from the :.chool building
LAS VEGAS
EVERAL months a go. the people of the nation
learned with some interest that for the first
time combat troops were to witness an atomic
bomb test from close up. But to the youogsters at
Ind ian Sprin11' Public School. near Las Vegas. Nevada. such an experiment was old-hat. T hey already
bad seen. from less th an 25 miles away, more
atomic bomb blasiS chan anyone in the world except for the handful of nuclear scientists and technicians who set them off.
Starting last October. when the influx of atomic.
military and construction personnel brought more
than 200 families into the nrea. the Indian Springs
school hod become M unplanned experiment in the
indoctrination or young children to atomic bombs.
"The children ~t this school. by their sheer rroximity to the tests. are getting the same type o psychological indoctrination we are giving some of our
combnt troops." an Atomic Energy Commission
spokesman commented recently. " If all the llCbOOI
children in the nation could witness an A-bomb
b last. it wou ld do much to destroy th e fear and uncertnmt ~ wh rch now eJust."
Egh t -grad er 0 1clC Bower. thirteen, s:~ys he wa
once told at an aton1ic bomb drill in a southern
Californrn school thll there was a po,ib1lity the
whole earth could be blown up if ~nough such
bombs were exploded. " I was really scared when
we moved up here ... Dick says. "but I h:~v~ seen a
couple of bombs go ofT now and it's just ordrnary."
IS FOR ATOM
II~
KOB..:trr C\IIN
A doM!II time, the au:eoome nuultroom lw.s riH>to in rin" of liteM> youngller. 2 5
mile. from the Nerada tell ite. llert' tilt' llory of our nwll atom-u:iM! kidA
Comer's Weekly, June 21 , 1952, pp. 15-17
The Effects of
Nuclear Weapons
SAMUEL GLASSTONE
Editor
Revised Edition
Reprinted February 1964
Prepared by the
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Published by the
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

April 1962
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington 25, D.C. - Price $3.00 {paper bound)
Foreword
This book is a revision of ''The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared
by the Defense Atornic Support Agency of the Department
of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of
nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact
evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the
combined judgment of a number of the most competent
scientists working on the problem.
There is a need for widespread public understanding
of the best information available on the effects of nuclear
weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as
accurately as possible, within the limits of national
security, a comprehensive summary of this information.
Secretary of Defense
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
S. Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962:

Explosion yield
Height of burst
(feet)
Time after
detonation
(seconds)
20 kilotons ____ ____ _

1 megaton ____ ____ _
1, 760
6, 500
3
11
Distance from
ground zero Height of stem
(miles)
(feet)
0. 87
3. 2
185
680
20 KILOTON AIR BURST

3 SECONDS
NUCLEAR AND THERMAL RADIATION
PRIMARY BLAST WAVE FRONT
REFLECTED BLAST WAVE FRONT
6 PSI
MACH STEM
OVERPRESSURE
BLAST WIND 180 MPH
MILES O
10 SECONDS
REFLECTED BLAST-~
WAVE FRONT
NUCLEAR RADIATION
PRIMARY BLAST
WAVE FRONT
~~-:.:.-:'~~-HOT
GASEOUS
BOIIB RESIDUE
-MUSHROOM STEM
-AFTERWINDS
MILES
1 PSI
MACH STEM
----t
OVERPRESSURE
BLAST WIND 40 MPH
1.0
2 .0
2.6
At 10 seconds after a 20-kiloton explosion at an altitude of 1, 760

feet the Mach front is over 2% miles from ground zero, and 37 seconds
after a 1-megaton detonation at 6,500 feet, it is nearly 9~~ miles from
ground zero. The overpressure at the front is roughly 1 pound per
square inch, in both cases, and the wind velocity behind the front is
40 miles per hour.
BASIS FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION

In Japan, where little evasive action was taken, the survival
probability depended upon whether the individual was outdoors or
inside a building .and, in the latter case, upon the type of structure.
At distances between 0.3 and 0.4 mile (530 and 700 yards) from ground
zero in Hiroshima the average survival rate, for at least 20 days after
the nuclear explosion, was less than 20 percent. Yet in two reinforcedconcrete office buildings, at these distances, almost 90 percent of the
nearly 800 occupants survived more than 20 days, altho~gh some died
later from radiation injury.
These facts bring out clearly the greatly improved chances
of survival from a nuclear explosion that could result from the adoption
of suitable warning and protective measures.
12.11
TABLE
12.29- ARRIVAL TIME FOR PEAK OVERPRESSURE

Explosion vield
Distance
(miles)
JKT
JOKT
JOOKT
1MT
JOMT
(Time in seconds)
4. 3
3. 6
8. 1
3. 7
7. 4
2. 5
6. 5
1.5
5. 0
The major part of the thermal radiation travels in straight

lines, and so any opaque object interposed between the fireball and
the exposed skin will give some protection. This is true even if the
object is subsequently destroyed by the blast, since the main thermal
radiation pulse is over before the arrival of the blast wave.
12.36 At the first indication of a nuclear explosion, by a sudden
increase in the general illumination, a person inside a building should
immediately fall prone, as described in 12.30, and, if possible, crawl
behind or beneath a table or desk or to a planned vantage point.
12.35.
Because of its particulate nature, fallout will tend to collect on horizontal surfaces, e.g., roofs, streets, tops of vehicles, and the
ground. In the preliminary decontamination, therefore, the main effort should be directed toward cleaning such surfaces. The sin1plest
way of. achieving this is-by water washing, if an adequate supply of
water is available. The .addition of a commercial wetting agent
(detergent) will make the washing more efficient. The radioactive
material is thus tranferred to storm sewers where it is less of a hazard.
12. 72
342
THERMAL RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Nevada in 1953.
12 calories per square centimeter
ignitable
trash
before exposure to a nuclear explosion
after exposure to a nuclear explosion.
7.59 The value of fire-resistive furnishing in decreasing the number of ignition points was also demonstrated in the tests. Two
identical, sturdily constructed houses, each having a window 4 feet
by 6 feet facing the point of burst, were erected where the thermal
radiation exposure was 17 calories per square centimeter. One of
tl;le houses contained rayon drapery, cotton. rugs, and clothing, and,
as was expected, it burst into flame immediately after the explosion
and burned . completely. In the other house, the draperies were of
vinyl plastic, and rugs and clothing were made of wool. Although
much ignition occurred, the recovery party, entering an hour after
the explosion, .was able to extinguish the fires.
7.76 It should be noted that the fire storm is by no means a special
characteristic of nuclear weapons. Similar fire storms have been reported as accompanying large forest fires in the United States, and
especially after incendiary bomb attacks in both Germany and Japan
during World War II. The high winds are produced largely by the
updraft of the heated air over an extensive burning area. They are
thus the equivalent, on a very large scale, of the draft of a chimney
under which a fire is burning. Because of limited experience, the
conditions for the development of fire storms in cities are not well
known. It appears, however, that some, although not necessarily all,
of the essential requirements are the following: (1) thousands of
nearly simultaneous ignitions over an area of at least a square mile,
(2) heavy building density, e.g., more than 20 percent of the area is
covered by buildings, and (3) little or no ground wind. ,Based on
these criteria, only certain sections-usually the older and slum
areas-of a very few cities in the United States would be susce tible
to fire storm eve opment._
Weapon test report WT -775, Project 8.11 b,

ENCORE nuclear test, Nevada, 1953:
Decayed+
Decayed
White
trashed
fence
washed
No trash kindling
Trash kindling for fire
Effect of 12 calories/sq em thermal flash:
BURNED AF.te _____,_

15 MINUTES
NO
FIRE
IMMEDIATE
IGNITION
6' x 6' wood frame houses
rr.~;'=l~t:'\fT!
~ -~ .. ~
' ...__,~ -
J .; l
WT-774
I\ t
;'-\
L..
Copy No.
"'~""' A
J.CO
(_)
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE
NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS
March- June 1953
Project 8.11a
INCENDIARY EFFECTS ON BUILDING
AND INTERIOR KINDLING FUELS
(ENCORE EFFECT REPORT)

27 kt at 2,423 feet altitude, 19% humidity
(DASA-1251)
(Note: cities humidity is -s0-80%)
DATA
This de -: ""lt con~a-:r s resttlcted data a-s
define.. .::. ;jle Atom1c .C:nvgy Act o' f946.
Its Lr- . _..i[ittal or ~r.e drsclosure of its
ccr.t~:us.. in any manner to an unauthorized
ge~SOif is prohibited.
HEADQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

SANDIA BASE, ALSUQUE RQUE, NEW MEX JCO
Weapon test report WT -774, Project 8.11 a, Incendiary effects on buildings and interior kindling fuels
ENCORE test, Nevada, 1953

10' x 12' wooden houses with 4' x 6' windows
17 calories/sq. em thermal flash
Immediate room flashover during thermal pulse

("Encore effect") in inflammables-filled house
while fire-resistant fabrics in other house survived!
LEFT HOUSE: fire-resistant furnishings

(woolen rugs and clothes, vinyl plastic draperies)
RIGHT HOUSE: non-fire resistant furnishings

plus inflammable magazines and newspapers
Smouldering armchair extinguished 1 hour after detonation, when recovery party arrived at house
THERMAL RADIATION FROM
~~CLEAR
EXPLOSIONS
Harold L. Brode
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
-17We have aJ.l bad the frustrating experience of trying to light a

fire with green, moist, or wet wood.
Just as wet wood can't be easily
induced to burn, so thick combustibles are not easily ignited.

a
.2:2
Even
two-by-four burns reluctantly and stops burning when taken out
of the fire.
kindlingt
It is a different matter with a shingle or a bunch of
Density also plays a role, a heavier combustible being
harder to ignite than lighter-weight material.
Of course, the chemistry
of the material to the degree that it influences kindling temperatures

and flammability, is an important parameter.
Modern plastics tend to
smoke and boil - to ablate but not to ignite in sustained burning while paper trash burns readily.
Just as most materials are not particularly sensitive to the
sun's thermal radiation, and are not highly inflammable nor even
ignitible, the surfaces exposed to the thermal intensity of a nuclear
explosion are generally not given to sustained burning.
Very intense
beat loads may mar or melt surfaces, may char and burn surfaces while
the heat is on, but may snuff out immediately af'terward.
-18PRIMARY AND SECONDARY FIRES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Although thermal radiation would start many fires in urban and

in most suburban areas, such fires by themselves would seldom constitute a source of major destruction.
OUtside the region of exten-
sive blast damage, fires in trash piles 1 in dry palm trunks, in roof
shingles, in auto and household upholstery, drapes, or flammable
stores are normally accessible and readily controllable.
By the very
fact that these fires start from material exposed to the incident
light, they can be easily spotted and, in the absence of other distractions, can be quickly extinguished.
Where the blast effects are
severe and damage extensive, little effective fire fighting is likely.
HUMIDITY HAS LESS INFLUENCE

KINDLING IGNITION ENERGY(/;
THAN ON WOOD IGNITION~,~
//
/~ /,-
~~
-- - ,
~
.
THERMAL PULSE CANNOT
THERMAL PULSE
DRIES LEAVES/PAPER
PENETRATE 1 MM OF WOOD
....,-
_.
THERMAL PULSE IS TOO BRIEF

TO DRY OUT WOOD
EFFECTS OF 1 PSI
OVERPRESSURE ON
IGNITIONS
From : Goodale, Effects of
A ir Blast on Urban Fires
URS7009-14 Dec. 1970
(AD 723 429)
Blast winds both

cool burning
material and
upset flame
convection system.
50% of burning
curtains are
extinguished by
1 psi overpressure
100% are put out by
2.5 psi. Note that
burning LIQUIDS
in high-wall trays
are not put out by
blast waves, but this
is not relevant to
city fires.
Burning beds can
continue to smoulder
until extinguished
with water.
Operation SAILOR HAT, 0.6 kt shot CHARLIE, at Kahoolawe island, Hawaii, on 16 April1965. The displacement effects to
a standing observer at a peak overpressure of6 psi (41 kPa) were simulated by using a realistic (fully articulated) dummy.
Operation Snowball, station 1OSB, comparison of human dummy with standing goat (proxy)
peak velocity of initially standing 165 lb dummy = 33.7 ft/sec with 20 ft total displacement
(A U.K. dummy lying prone at 9 psi peak overpressure was unmoved In this test)
(a)
(b)
0 msec
78
(c) I 56
(d) 234
(e) 313
(f) 39 I
(g) 469
(h) 54 7
{ i) 62 5
{ j) 703
(k) 781
(I) 859msec
965ft range
500 tons TNT
10 psi peak overpressure,
0.23 sec duration
DASA 1859
80
70
60
..
4~
o
o
Prairie Flat, 500 tons HE

Distant Plain, 50 tons HE*
/). Snowball U.S.~ 500 tons HE

~ Snowball U.K.~
o Prisci II a, 38 kt nuclear*
*Measured displacements
adjusted to 500 tons HE.
Dummy standing
Q)
50
E
Q)
0
Curves computed with

translational model.
Acceleration Coefficient
z
a = s Cd/m ft /lb
s is area presented to the wind,
cd is drag coefficient,
and m is mass.
Q. 40
.n
-0
{:!.
30
20
El
10
e~:o.Q' 4
__.~---.-:---;---Dummy prone aligned with wind
00
15
20
Peak Overpressure, psi
25
30
35
DASA 2710
100
90
fK)
1\
70
I-
60
'
\
1\
!\
25
-~
1\\
15
~
~
0
:..:
<
r.1
Maximum toind oelocity (milu _

per hour)
1, 170
940
670
470
290
160
70
1\
\
\
g.,
1\
FREE AIR RUBS r
r-..
_I' 1\
<BASI ~ON 2W) ssu ~ ON>

3
1\\
1\1\
2.5
1\
1\ 1\
1.5
1\ 1\ \
~
\
1
0.10
1-kiloton surface burst
0.06
1\
0.06
1\
10
r\
20
Peak dynamic
Peak overprea'8UTe {peunda rer preaaure (pountla
per aquare inch)
aquare inch
80
72
40
50
16
30
20
8
\
2
10
\
0. 7
5
\
0. 1
2
30
.I
0.15
0.20
0 .25
0.3
0.4
0.5
\
\
!\
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (MILES)
Scaling. For yields other than 1 KT, the range to which a given
overpressure extends scales as the cube root of the yield
1000
'
100
REDWING SURFACE BURSTS BLAST DATA

(Source: WT1344, ADA995132; Fig. 2.53.)
V)
D..
"'-"'
Ill::
..
D..
--
V)
V)
Ill::
I""
_......._
Ill::
>
<C
w
D..
10
1 KT SURFACE
..-
\\>BURST DATA
-.
' ~\
\',
1
100
_j
1000
1 3
DISTANCE, FEET FOR 1 KT (SCALED BY YIELD / )
l__l
10,000
TEST (BOTH ON 700 FT TOWERS) 37 KT PRISCILLA
WT-1469
44 KT SMOKY
GROUND RANGE
5320 FT
Static pressure
Dynamic pressure
5.3 pal
0.7 pel
Prone dummy
Upright dummy
0
21.9 ft
Prone dummy
Upright dummy
Velocity
0
21.4 ft/sec max. at
0.45 sec
3406 FT
and
DASA-1777
AD638342
6 6
' pet
15.8 pal
PRECURSOR
Movement
~::.~ ft PRECURSOR
1651b dummy
lying prone at 5.3
psi overpressure
Prone dummy after 37 KT PRISCILLA
Upright dummy after 37 KT PRISCILLA
from Priscilla was

unmoved, but
standing dummy
was translated
13ft in air and
then rolled for 9ft.
37 KT PRISCILLA
Upright dummy
t:; -eo
0::
~
0::
2W
C(
w
~
w
~-40
.I
.2
.3
TIME,
.5
SECONDS
Upright dummy 37 KT PRISCILLA

/TIME, SECONDS
~~~~--~--~~~t-~~~~4
H indicates Head of Dummy

F indicates Feet of Dummy
WT-1454
H
SMOKY 1957 PRECURSOR

BLAST WAVEFORM
Cf)
0..
3406 FEET
txl
~
(/)
~
~
43 kt,
700ft
tower
o~------------------~~------------------------------------~---0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
100
900
TIME - MSEC
Fig. 3.109-Blast-line pressure-time; self-recording pressure gauge records.
99
98
95
Impact with concrete

11211
53 Human Free- Fall Cases
Number of cases 11
0
90
...
80
4D
60
c
CD 70
u
..
..-- 40
Q.
~50
L~
54.4 ft/sec
t: 30
0
::E
20
0
7
DNA-2738T
(AD734208)
10
20
40
70
Impact Velocity, ft/sec
100
200r
C1>
~
+-
..
'+-
l{'w)l.o~
'
Guinea Pig
Rabbit
Dog
0
\1
Goat
(All orientations of animals)

,,~
..
-C1>0
>
~\
/~/ "--2sec
40
I.
-'()/
30
/
0
+-
-c
"'0
C1>
-0
1/3]
I.
1 5
1/~
=-1.15822+1.616921og10 ~o( ~ )
5
1. sec a-5 =0.04857 a-5 (%} =11 .2
n =230 (47guinea pigs, GO rabbits, 48goats, 75 dogs)
8o
log 10 [t( ~ r }- o .73976+0.61692 log10 [zo ('~ r J

1 5
(/)
stopping times
10
Ls('!
log,o
105
e:,ef:J
ro~~ ~
.~
DASA 1859
-E
......_.....
~
15
20
30
40
50
Scaled Stopping Distance,
100
165
150
113
s(m(lb}) ,
ft
200
300
400 500
1.885
10
Cl)
IU
~
w
~
c(
:)
(J
Cl)
...
50% BREAKAGE
Source: DNA-55931
(ADA105824),
1980, Fig. 3
.,.,...
G)
--.,.,
u
~
~
0
( !)
PG
0.316
c(
w
PG
SG
c(
0 1
0
SG (Double
strength)
PG = Plate glass
SG = Sheet glass
1 PSI= 6.9 kPa
(Single
strength)
Windows are face-on to blast wave
0.1
0.3
1
10
PEAK INCIDENT OVERPRESSURE (kPa)
AECU-3350
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF BLAST FROM

BOMBS. GLASS FRAGMENTS AS PENETRATING
MISSILES AND SOME OF THE BIOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF GLASS FRAGMENTED BY
ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS
By
I. Gerald Bowen
Donald R. Richmond
Mead B. Wetherbe
Clayton S. White
Table 5. 1
Statistical Parameters and Predicted Penetration Data

for Missiles fr.om Traps at Various Ranges from Grolmd
Zero
30 kt TEAPOT-APPLE 2 nuclear test, 1955

4,700
5,500
10,500
5. 0
3. 8
1.9
Z1Z9
3ZO
37
Geometric mean missiles mass, gms
0. 133
0.580
1. Z5
Standard geometric deviation in mass
3. 01
3.47
3. 35
Geometric mean missile velocity, ft/sec
170
168
103
Standard geometric deviation in velocity
1. Z7
1. Z5
1. Z5
Distance from Ground Zero, ft

Maximum overi>ressure, psi
Number oi traps
Total number of glass missiles
Per cent of total missiles expected
3.9*
1Z.8*
0.4*
45.5
z. 1
to penetrate
Average number of missiles per sq ft
Missiles per sq ft expected to penetrate
100.9
3.9*
*Computed from individual evaluation of each missile
5. 3*
0.006*
ADAI 05824
DNA 5593T
GLASS FRAGMENT HAZARD FROM WINDOWS

BROKEN BY AIRBLAST
E. Royce Fletcher
Flying glass injured to 3.2 km in Hiroshima, 3.8 km in Nagasaki.

3.2 mm thick window glass fragments striking walls 2.1 m behind
the windows in nuclear and high explosive tests gave:
10 fragments/m2 for 6.3 kPa (0.9 psi) overpressure
100 fragments/m2 for 29 kPa (4.2 psi) overpressure
1,000 fragments/m2 for 65 kPa (9.4 psi) overpressure
Figure 10
DUCK AND COVER
----------------------------------~
Window Wall (2.1 m behind window)
h~
........
n
..
density - exp(-0.09374 adegrees )

........
0
........
..... ...
a ' ....
u
Measured distribution
ll
........
....
[S ........
....... ........
o 6.7 mm thick glass

a 0.2-0.3 mm thick glass
....
u ........
........
........ .....
tl
n
"
.... ....
..........
.... ....
.... ....
........ .....
...
......... ....
Angle below lower edge of window, degrees
...
1njurtes
F1gaara 17.
&lass-frag~~~ent
1-
10
ht
iii 4
il
1
....
Bare Subject
137 x 183-cm Window
...
side-on sheep
-1
I
2 behind a windaw
10
Clatbed SUII)1ct
137 181-cn~ Wlndaw
side-on sheep
I
2 behind a windaw
0
40
100
EFFECTIVE PEAK OVERPRESSURE ON THE WINDOW. ~PI

all-cotton tee shirt {145 gmtm2)
cotton-sateen material (285 gm/m2)
300
V(50%)
=K(A/m) + B
K
.,
.........
E...
,.......,
CLOTHING: 281.07
BARE SKIN: 124.71
FRAGMENT VELOCITY DEGRADATION

I DUE TO COMBAT CLOTHING
...
73.51
22.03
0
ll)
.........,.
>...
~
2001
100 I
.,..-
COMBAT CLOTHING
sd
....,
~
-~z
ll)
0:::
0
II..
cw
cw
w
-u~
BARE HUMAN AND GOAT SKIN
0
.....
w
>
0.2
0.4
0.6
FRAGMENT AREA PER UNIT MASS, A/m (cm2 per gram)
0.8
1
ARCSL-TR-78004
,
,
,
s::
I
I
I
0.8
s::
Bare Skin
2-layer
006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
C/)
.
....
..
I
I
4-<
I
I
>-. 0.4
....,
.....
:' 6-Iayer uniform

0
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
......
......
0
0
0..
......
b
11.)
s::
11.)
0
o'
0
0
... . .
~/_.. ... '
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
.........
..0
~
..0
0.2
....
.
I
I
0..
,,
,
,
_/
104
..
/
0
106
Kinetic Energy per Fragment Area Presented (Jm- 2 )
105
Lewis, James H., eta/, An Empirical/Mathematical Model to Estimate the Probability of

Skin Penetration by Various Projectiles, Technical Report ARCSL-TR-78004, April
1978, US Army Armament Research and Development Command
107
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1964)

GLASS PENETRATING ABDOMINAL CAVITY
Probability of penetration (ptrcent)
1
Mass of glass
fragments
(grams)
50
99
.Impact velocity (jt/sec)
0. 1
1. 0
410
245
235
140
730
430
GLASS
Peak
overpressure
(psi)
1. 9
5. 0
Median
velocity
(ft/sec)
108
170
}.fedian
mass
(grams)
Maximum
number per
sqjt
4. 3
1. 45
0. 13
388
~ 2,000 t::=~----1-----4-----+----~
ril
:::>
r:Q
1,ooo ~--.....L:~DL-~~~~l----W-
=
=
~
ril
o~--~--~-&~~~~--._--~-
1,000
2,000
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (FEET)
Peak overpressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst
E. R. Fletcher, et al., "Airblast Effects on Windows in Buildings and Automobiles on

the Eskimo II Event", in report AD775580, p. 251. Eskimo II was equivalent to 11 tons
of TNT, 22 May 1973. Data below: 1,210 ft (0.54 psi incident, 1.1 psi reflected, 0.158 sec)
Ct:r~.s indicate tiHI P'fi/Nibilily of 11 fr~~gmltfs
PMimting I em of soli linu.
Gltla F'rtlg!Nith ln~pp< "om

approxima,.ly 1/4 -inch !hick
paMs of 11 graund rar.g of
1210 ,,
--
0
Regression LifHI:
In V= 4 .464-0.244/nM
S.EE. : 0.431 In Units
N:~mber of F'ragmtJnfs: 176
Symbol Cubical
PDfHIS
8
81
PI t1nd P2
82
PI t1nd P2
0
0
B:J
PI t1nd P2
tL-~L_~~~LU~~~-L~~~U-~-L~-L~UU~~-L~~-L~UU
0.1
0.2
0.5
10
20
50
100
200
500
1000
FRAGMENT MASS. M. gm
Curv~s indicate lhe probability of a frog~nt's
penefmling I em of soft tissue
~-------=== 99~
90$
-----50"
u
4U
......
"'
Glass Fragments lropped from

approximately 1/8-inch-thick
pantls ol o ground range of
/210ft
-- --- ---
--
{M
50
1.64 gm
-o-
V50 : 69.2 It/sec

Regr~ssion
Line:
--
Symbol Cubical Pane
In V= 4.314-0.155/nM
S.. . 0.349 In Units
83
PJ
83
P4
Number of Frogmnfs: /43
IL_j_~J-j_LLLUL-~~~~~~~~~-L~~~~-L~-L~~~
0.1
0 .2
0.5
20
FRAGMENT MASS, M, gm
50
100
200
500
1000
E. R. Fletcher, et al., "Airblast Effects on Windows in Buildings and Automobiles on

the Eskimo II Event", in report AD775580, p. 251. Eskimo II was equivalent to 11 tons
of TNT, 22 May 1973. Data below: 1,700 ft (0.41 psi incident, 0.83 psi reflected, 0.180 sec)
500
Glass Fragments trapped

from appf'Oximately 1/4-inchthiclc panes at a gTound
,ang11 ol/700 ff
99
--
Symbol Cubical
0
0
8
10 ,.,
--
85
PlandP2
86
87
PI CJndP2
PI andP2
M,so: 7.47fm
--.
--.---
<>
--. --..
PantiS
--
v-'0 :38.4 ft/sec
<>--.
0
--.. --..
0----
R~rl!ssion
Line :
In V= 4 .125 -0.237/n M
S.E..: 0.579 In Units
Number of Fragments: 30
--..
--.
IOL-~----~----~~~J-LL~----~~--~----~~~~~---._~---~-~~~~~
0 .1
02
0.5
10
20
50
100
FRAGMENT MASS, M, gm
>
>200
<...>
g,oo
....,
>
......
:z
-- - -- -
--
-. -. ..Q...
I S
~Qo-o
~ .
Q--...._o ~
Q)
~o a
-.
_ oc;,o
oo-6~ -
--
~,..itln Lin':
In V 4.205-0.248 In M
SE.. : O.J91111 IIIIiI
a:
20
0_8 ...._
.
<.D
~
~ 50
cr
Numb' of FngmMfl: 72
0.5
fRAGMENT MASS, M, tm
- --. -.
WT-1468
Report to the Test Director
SECONDARY MISSILES GENERATED BY

NUCLEAR-PRODUCED BLAST WAVES
A 40-ft concrete-block wall was built 2750 ft from GZ on shot Galileo, 11 kt
..
..
'"
..
...
-.. ; ' -_ ..j
Coacrete-block wall (64 in. high, 40 ft long, and 7.5 in. thick}
Photograph illustrating the scatter of blocks from the wall
broad side of the wall was oriented toward GZ.
8.4 psi. peak overpressure
--100
1528 fragments from concrete wall

Numbers indicate fro9ments in 100tt2 Atto
ol
Galileo, 11 kt
-50
'
.s ' ~, " '
-~------------------~--~~~
=--------...::..'
_:.:':. . .:;. .'...,.._.,....., .. ' ' ' .
.z '
'
.a '
--~~-~
.....z
.. .s ' ~
;..
"D
' '
d
.3
of
ol
..'
'
I
50
.t
' ..
Mso 1.366 lbs
'
'
8.4 psi. peak overpressure

100
50
100
150
d ft
Spatial distribution of all fragments with masses over O.llb from the coacrete-block wall.
200
500r-~-r-r~--r--r-.-.-..-.-.-~--~~~----
DOWNWIND DISTRIBUTION OF THE 155 WALL FRAGMENTS

CONSISTING OF WHOLE, HALF, OR JOINED BLOCKS
Curve computed assuming a geometric

mean initial velocity of 32ft/sec and a
geometric standard deviation of 1.55
+-
..
)(
-o
a)
100
c:
0
+(/)
0
-c
c:
-~
8.4 psi peak overpressure

11 kt Galileo wall debris
velocity estimate from
observed displacements
10
DASA 1859
I
.!o.... _
Per Cent of Wall Fragments Displaced Less Than Indicated dx
Stones
Hoi low Blocks
Filled Blocks
..
..
DASA 1859
(All orientations of blocks)

concrete blocks
+(.)
-~
0
-c:
+-
stopping times
Stopping Distance, S, ft
332
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
U.S. Congress, June 1959
Average Minimal Impact Velocities From a 10 lb. Missile

Expected to Cause Skull Fracture and
Maximal Velocity Without Fracture
Impact velocities expected to
fracture the hurna.n skull*
Region of blow
ft/ sec
mph
Maximal without fracture
23.1
15.7
Minimal with fracture
14.6
9.9
*Computed from the data of Gurdjian, et al. using hurna.n material
ORNL-TM-3396
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE- FIELD ENVI RONMBNT RECOMMENDED
FOR INITIAL RADIATION SHIELDING CALCULATIONS

J. A. Auxier, Z. G. Burson,
R. L. FrenCh,
F. F. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and E. A. Straker

Table 8. PillionProduct Gemma Ray Expoaure Durin1 the Firat 60 Seconds
from a Typical TN Weapon at a I 00-M Bur1t Heipt
----............-
- .. ------------
Slant Range
Shock Arrival
(m)
(Ree)
Percent Before
Shock
Percent After
Shock
IOOKT
538
740
1030
1446
2097
0.3678
0.8187
1.822
4.055
11.02
13.8
20.4
36.2
63.1
95.7
86.2
79.6
63.8
36.9
4.3
13.7
20.5
38.6
69.8
98.8
86.3
79.5
61.4
30.2
1.2
11.1
88.9
81.7
61.8
24.7
0.2
lOOKT
771
1060
1472
2065
2995
0.5488
1.221
2.718
6.049
16.44
1 MT
1146
1576
2190
3075
4458
---
0.8187
1.822
4.055
9.024
24.53
18.3
38.2
75.3
99.8
ORNL-TM-3396
NUCLEAR
WB~S
FOR INITIAL
PRBE-PIELD BNVIRJNMBHT RB<X>ENDED

RADIATI~
J. A. Auxier,
SHIELDING CALCULATIONS
z.
G. Burson, R. L. French,
P. P. Haywood, L. G. Mooney, and B. A. Straker
0.9
0.8
SECONDARY
GAPIMA DOSE
0
2: 0.7
11.1
tH
0.6
NEUTRON
DOSE
8
~
~
0.5
~ 0.4
~
.... 0.3
lL
0.2
0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
FRACTION OF 4... SOLID ANGLE, w
Figure 9.
Angular Distribution of Neutron and Secondary Gamma

1200 m from a Thermonuclear Weapon
HIROSHIMA
John Hersey
NEw YoRKER ol31 August, 1946
I
A
NOISELESS
FI.~ASH
AT exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning,

on August 6th, 1945, Japanese time, at the moment
when the atomic bomb flashed above Hiroshima,
Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young member of the

surgical staff of the city's large, modern Red Cross
Hospital, walked along one of the hospital corridors
He was one step beyond an open window

when the light of the bomb was reflected, like a gigantic
photographic flash, in the corridor. He ducked down
on one knee and said to himself, as only a Japanese
would, "Sasaki, gambare ! Be brave!" Just then
(the building was 1,650 yards from the centre), the
blast ripped through the hospital. The glasses he was
wearing flew off his faoe ; the bottle of blood crashed
against one wall; his Japanese slippers zipped out from
under his feet-but otherwise, thanks to where be
stood, he was untouched.
Dr. Sasaki shouted the name of the chief surgeon
and rushed around to the man's office and found him
terribly cut by glass.
Starting east and west
from the actual centre, the scientists, in early September,
made new measurements, and the highest radiation
they found this thne was 3.9 times the natural "leak."
V)
u.
IJJ
UJ
c
_.J~
>E1
->
uo
u
(/)
:::)~
_j<(
~~
uu
-~
lta
a~
w~
I-1
,_li:
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t:i
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~
q
\J
Ul
ruz
aw
ow
_jlJ)
ll.oc
Xw
w>
-l--W
.w
ll[=>
lU~
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g~
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w<(
z~
<(Ill
w
ml-::x:
ttl~
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om
m:r
uUl
_q:
~it
&~
wi
F.~
-rf_
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~~
g~
~~
ua
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::ll!l
0~
':r~
1-- LL
lllUl
wl!l
mz
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Yl_JW
-I
01--
"'
t9
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l1--
wo
~w
~z
0~
lll:::l
u..m
[b~
lUQ
Y.q:
om
.wz
lllffi
~~
\IS
nu
..
z
w ~
fij::lUl
.~
Ulol.W
lliom
~UlUJ
t-::li
Oll)tz<(lll
<{
.::l
mzn
_.-z
___.
~ZO[_
n5
zDln
-'J)z
I
Wwi
rfl:~:W
y_t-m
Uzz
:J-~
o~o
Ul- 0 D
lllj~
Oou
O:r:::l
~<(a
o~
......
Q{
w
.
>
a
~LJ
t-o
Zz
~<(
~Y.
Ulu
Z::J
-D
1--
-'Y..
oo
Qg
:o
z
Olq:
WO
mz
<
lll~
<m
lli
~~--
l-Z
::)0
mD
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN,
Director~
Atomic Test
Operations~
FCDA
The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by

many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of
great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively
large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a
given point.
92
BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION

Professor of Surgery at the University of Rochester. Consultant to several Government departments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of
Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special
Weapons Project
BY DR. HERMAN ELWYN PEARSE,
After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the
National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiromima.
140
Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and we found again that
the wounds healed in the same manner. as those that we had produced in
the laboratory. There was 'SOme difference in these lesions from the ordinary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experiments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they
are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char
acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing.
142
For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get
much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers,
you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed
by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first
degree bums at 107 calories.
143
If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent

thousands and thousands of bums.
. . . For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree

bums on bare skin required 4 calories. When we put 2 layers of cloth in
contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters,
about a fifth of an inch, and it increases. the protective effect 5 times. The
energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a seconddegree bum is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you
are better off than if your wear tight clothing.
144
OSTIID: 4411414
STUDIES ON. FLASH BURNS:
THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY 2, 4 AND 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS
George Mixter, Jr o, Mo Do and Herman Eo Pearse, Mo Do

THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
ABSTRACT
Fabric interposed between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester
White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ burnso
For the 2, 4 and
6 layers of fabric studied this increase was 3o6, 38 and
over 104 cal/cm2 respectively when the inner layer of fabric was in contact
Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 mm increased
with the skino
the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 7o4 to 29 cal/cm2,

provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardationo
was not so treated, sustained flaming
~~curred
If the outer layer
which in itself added to the
thermal burn o
JNTRODUCTION
In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study
of flash burns in unshielded skino
It is well known from the atomic bombing
in Japan that this type of burn was modified by clothing
A laboratory
analysis of' the protective effect of' fabrics against flash burns was begun
(5)
by
shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com-
binationso
1.
2 Layers
ao light green oxford
2o
olive green sateen

thin cotton oxford
wool-nylon shirting
knitted cotton underwear
b.
4 Layers
light green oxford (HPM)

3o
6 Layers
olive green sateen
thin cotton oxford
mohair frieze
rayon lining
wool-nylon shirting
knitted wool underwear
5o Morton, J o II o, Kingsley, H Do , and Pear~e, H Eo , "Studies on Flaeh

o
B~ ~
The Protective Effect6 of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology
and Obstetrics ,
94, 497-501 (April 1952)o
rflf)[~JTI"'.l
WT-770
I
Copy No.
TECHtU!~I\l
G of the
Df.FF.NSE t! 1
AQEm
f\U6 !
NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS

March -June 1953
Project 8.l\
ASSEMBJ.~IES
t :u
.......
defined in ~ht: Atom--.---

Its transm1ttal
to ar. unauthorized
HEADQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND, ARMED FORCES S?ECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

SANDIA SASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
G8t4FI8Et4TIAL
WT-770
UNCl).SSIHEO
This document consists of 64 pages
No.
19 8 of 295 copies,
Series A
OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE
Project 8.5
THERMAL RADIATION PROTECTION AFFORDED

TEST ANIMALS BY FABRIC ASSEMBLIES
REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR
by
Quartermaster Research and Development Labor!ltorles

Army Medical Service Graduate School
Walter Reed Army Medical Center
University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project
CONFIBEt4TIAL.flNr.JJSS!FlfD
CHAPTER 4
DISCU$ION
4.1 AlfTICI}!ATED AND tmSERVED RESULT
4.1.1 lrotectisg UtqCied bx the Various Uni01'111 Assemblies
Pei.haps the moat outstanding result or these tests was \he
degree ot thermal protection afforded the test animals by the various
unitor.a assemblies. At the higher levels or radiant energy, where
laboratoey tests (with the carbon arc) indiqated that the animals
should have sustained at least 2+ burna, ( 7 J an unexpected degree ot
protection ns toun~ in the field. In the laborator:;, tharmsl energies
as low as 44 cal/clf!- (delivered in 2 sec.) were sufficient to produce
burna in pigs skiD under the tour layers or the Temperate ensemble.
lD the field the maximum level at which anr animals, clothed in the
Temperate unitor.u, wre recovered alive on Shots 9 and 10 waa 26.0
cal/cra2 and one at 1.8 cal/cm2 (calc.) on Shot 2. Although no animals
were recovered aliw ~t the maximum exposure level ot 75 cal/cm2, there
was a complete lack or any evidence to indicate that the animals would
have suttered burns trom the primaey effects or the thermal radiation.
Soae ot the aniD&ls wearing the Temperate unifora not treated tor tire
reeistance sustained minor skin burns, but these resulted from exothermic reactions {flame or glow) and occurred onl7 at the more distant stations. Damage to the tabrlc itself from direct thermal
radiation was also less serious than expected, being limited to the
two outer layers, whereas 1D the laboratory three or the ~era were
dawaged and the underwear layer discolored at 40 to 60 cal/cm2.
!he two-~er HI 50/50 and HWPR ;0/50 assemblies had not been
tested m the laboratoey with the carbon arc, although tests in connection with napalm studies had indicated that the wool/cotton underwear ot this combination might be, quite effect iva. The outstanding
reaults obtained 1n the field with these fabric assemblies, however,
exceeded the most optimistic anticipations. Exceptionall1 good
ther.aal protection was observed up to the closest stations from which
dAta vereobtaineda 41.0 cal/cm2 tor HW 50/50 and 33.5 cal/cm2 for
Bin 50/50.
Severe burns were sustained by the majorit7 or the pigs wearing
the two-layer HW and HWFR assemblies. However, even these thin cotton
tabrics were of considerable protective value as can be seen by' \!Omparing these results with the bare-skin exposures or the porthole
44
pigs (Section 3.4). The degree and extent or burns noted beneath
these assemblies were less than would hav~ been expected on the basis
or previous laborato~ experience, especial~ at the higher calorie
levels.
4.1.2 [!ctors Contributing to the Greator Degree of Thermal Protection
in the Field.
There are several conditions enco~tntered in the field, especially at the higher energy levels, but no~ duplicat~d iu the laboratory (at least not up to the present time) that ma7 account tor the
fact that like amounts or thermal energy did not produce comparable
results in the laboratory and in the field. First, the thermal energy
is delivered much more rapidly with the explosion of an atomic bomb
than it is 1n tho labore.tory. Second, due to smoke obscuration the
animals in the riel~ actuall1 received a smaller percentage or the
total energy delivered than they- did in the laboratoey. Third, the
blast wave rollowing the explosion tended to extinguish flames o.nd
remove char, whereas no such wave was present in the laborator,r tests.
Fourth, where the heat rea~hed the fabric layer next to the skin,
Wliform drape (or spacing) provided additional protection in the field.
(1) In comparing field with laborator.y results, consideration must be given to irradiance, which expresses the time-intensity or
the thermal pulse (cal/cm2/sec). At the highest calorie levels laborator.; irradiances were much lower than field irradiances. The reason
fol' this is that an atomic axplosion delivers a high quantity or
thermal enargy per unit area .1n a much shorter time than the same
quantity can be delivered oer a practical exposure area (1.7 em diam)
with existing laboratory equ:S.pment. For example, approximate:cy 2 sec
are required to deliver 75 cal/cm2 in the laboratory with the carbon
arc operating at peak capacity, an irradiance or 37 ,.5 cal/c-af./sec. In
the ri~ld this much energy was delivered at the forward stations in
both Shots 9 and 10 in approximately 0.5 sec, an irradiance ot 150
cal/c~/sec.
Irradiances have been varied within the limits possible in the

laboratory, and it has been found that certain levels or thermal
energy will produce)a more serious lesion if applied slowl1 than ir
applied rapidly. (18 Beneath the H\1 assemb~ spaced 5 mm from the
skin, for example, a 2+ burn was produced when a thermal energy or 17
cal/cm2 was applied in 2 sec (8.5 cal/cm2/sec) but no burn, or at the
most a mild 1 burnt resulted when the same energy was applied in 0.5
sec (34 cal/cm2/sec). With lower irradiances the fabric may be
scorched or charred but remain intact and thus act as a heat reservoir
from which heat can subsequentl1 be transmitted to the skin. With
higher irradiances, laborator.1 results indicate that all or part of
the thermal input may be di3sipated by an endothermic decomposition
at the fabric. Ln the field, e~eciall7 at the closer stations where
irradiances exceeded 35 cal/cri2/sec, conditions were favorable tor
such dissipation or energy.
(2) Motion pictures ot clothed animals, exposed to 50.0
and 33.5 cal/cm2 on Shots 9 and 10 respectively, showed heavy clouda
ot black smoke enveloping the animals within 120 ms ot the e:.q>losion.

There is reason to believe that, in view of the short time within which
most or the radiant energy from the explosion was d~l1vared 1 much or
this energy was prevented from reaching the animals by this smoke. ln
the laboratory tests, because the expoaure area was so much smaller
and the time of energy application at the high calorie levels so much
longer, smoke obscuration appears to be or little or no significance.
{3) The blast wave following the explosion, which has not
been duplicated in laborator.y applications of thermal energy, has two
possible protective effects. First, it car1 be Gxpected to extin~~ish
flames induced by the radiation in assemblies not treated tor fire
resistance, thus removing a source or high heat. Although the blast
wave mAy not actually extinguish iiha flame in all cases,* it can be
expected in general to have this effect. Second, the blast wave would
tend to remove any char which, if' allo-..ed to rerna in, would act as a
heat reservoir and increase the likelihood or a severe burn.
(4) The drape or the unitorm may have contributed to a
reduction of thermal injur,y in the field, in the case or the two-layer
Hot-Wet assemblies. Laboratory tests upon nhich estimates ot protection in the field were based consisted or the application or energy to
fabrics in tight contact with the animal's skin. Other tests on
cotton fabrics have indicated that spacing the tabric away from the
skin would increase the protection afforded. In the uniforms,
although some fabric areas were in close skin contact, many we~e
spacad awq in normal drape. This fact undoubtedly gave the .miforms
an additional protective value as compared to laborator,y tests where
fabrics were held in close akin contact.
4.2 THE ROLE OF THE FLAMEPROOFING TREATMENT

One of the major problems designated for study at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE
was to determine whether materials actually did flame under the
conditions of the test and, if so, how much protection could be
afforded by rire resistant treating the outer layer. The results of
the test show conclusively that flaming and probab~ glow did occur
in JD8l'l1' instancee. The principal value or the fire retardant used in
these tests, braminated triallyl phosphate, 1~ in its prever.tion of
these exothermic reactions. In some cases it also seemed to give
additional protection against the primary thermal effects ot the explosion, although 1n other cases the untreated fabrics gave better
protection than the treated. The peculiar pebbly, blistered, weeping
edema noted in these teats occurred only in pigs wearing the tire
resistant uni!or.ms.
*The occurrence of persistent lama t.ype burns that require longer to

produce {according to laboratory tests) than the blas~ arrival time
may indicate that the blast wave does not always extinguish the flame.
On the other hand such burns may have been induced by glow.
46
TABLE B.7 Percentaae Destruction ot
The nnal.
HW
I
HWFR
I r~/r~
......
I
-
I
T
I
TFR
Energy
rn/rn
(cal/cm2) I Outer second I ~ OUter Second 1 Outer Second I ~Outer Second 1 Outer Second I Outer Secon
Y!
75.0
Shot
so.o
u.o
1100
l1oo
33.5
100
21.5
98
98
95
12.5
I 95
98
95
20
15
95
30
10
4D
30
90
90
2
0
0
90
95
25
30
80
15
75
95
l.O
70
70
40.5
33.5
26.0
I 98
l.OO
I10098
75
60
0
0
0
0
80
98
98
95
95
75
15
5
30
95
95
98
90
98
0
1
0
0
0
25
60
100
98
30
98
15
98
95
95
98
0
0
0
25
95
98
85
95
98
I 98
98
l!
98
95
95
98
15
2
95
1100
I
so
90*
98
98
I 98
100
17.5
95
.. 29.5
16.0
98
98
98
98
Shot
90
0
98
95
0
0
fLa:?!r
I 9595
0
0
.... :
HOT- lET FIRE RESISTAIT
HOT-lET
8
'0
""
---g
0
-""
0
0
2(i
40
60
10
-
....:J
:J
--u
oo
I0
:J
--
JC
.2 40
--
100
JC
--
~HOT-lET 50/50
otPo
100
~
0
0 L ooocPo
cal. I sq. em.
lET
LflRE RESlSTAIT 50 /50
~OT-
0 100
'0
--
-,
-0
4()
L1g111d
-,""
-
coo
e OUTER LAYER
0
SECOND LAYER
.!!
....
'I
--I
eo
TEMPERATE
Jot
GOO 0
10
40
eo
ao
cal. I sq. em.
100
or
00
10
40
eo 10
cal. I sq. c:m.
100
Fig. 3.5 Destruction of Outer and Seccmd LQ-era of Pigs' Uniforme (Shots 9 &M 10)
WT-1441
This document consists ot 50 pages.
"' 7r
No: ;. Jot 185 copies. Series A
!)PERATICN
PLUMB BOB
~HADA
~~A Y-
TEST SITE
0CT08ER 19 57
'--------:..
Project 8.2
PREDICTION of THERMAL PROTECTION of
UN I FORMS, and THERMAL EFFECTS on a
STANDARD-REFERENCE MATERIAL (U)
Issuance Date: May~. 1960
HEADQUARTERS fiElD COMMAND

DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
SANDIA BASE. ALBUOUEROUE . NEW MEXICO
,.
This material c?ntalns information a.ffecting

the n~ttonal defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws
Tltlc 18, U. S. C. , Sees. 793 and 794, the
transmission or rP.velatlon of ~hlch In anv
manner lC.: ;an u:1.1 uthorl%ed persvft !.
~~
hlb1terl ily law.
~ ....
:.... ;, :.
~~ .
~~
1.2.~
Contparison of Skin-Simulant Response and Burna to Pigs. The improved NML skin
simulant, molded frQm R.llica-powder-fllled urea formaldehyde, has the thermocouple embedded
at a depth of 0.05 em In order to give burn predictions based on maximum temperature attainment.
The baste criterion ls a rise of 25 C or more for a second-degree burn to human akin or for a
2+ mUd burn to plg skin. This criterion ts baaed on the assumption of (1) the equivalence of a
minimal white burn on the rat skin (or a 2+ mUd burn ln pig skin) to a second-degree burn ln
human sktn, (2) an lnltlal skin temperature of 31 c, and (3) correspondence of the thermal properties of pig, rat, and human skin. The accuracy of such a burn prediction in terms of indtcent
radiant oxposure Is estimated to be 10 percent. A sktn-simulant temperature rlae of 20 C or
greater Ia estimated to correspond to a first-degree human burn or a 1+ moderate plg skin burn,
and a rlse of 35 C ta estimated for a third-degree human burn or a 3+ mild ptg burn. The latter
estimations, probably accurate to * 20 percent, are baaed on pig-burn data obtained at the University of Rochester (Reference 6).
12
CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 2.1
RADIANT ABSORPTANCES OF SKIN

SIMULANT AND STANDARD FABRICS
Radiant Absorptanco
Specimen
Skin slmulant, bare
o.'12
Skin slmulant, blackened
0.95
Poplin, Shade 116, 5-oz/ydl
0.63
Sateen, gray, 9-oz/yrl
0.91
15
CONFIDENTIAL
0.2 seeond tm pulse

IIOCktntd - - - - ,
Figure 3.1
Ftrure 3.2
-~
--
""~
1"""-I'..
....
...........
..........
r--...
SefiMft U Ct..tectl
-i'-....
...........
.......
, -;.;-.-.u.. c.moctl
r--
t-o .t
o.
0.1
0.0
T1""' t o Moawnulft,S.Conctt
Poplin Spaced
12
,.
Equivalent Field Radiant Exposure,col/cma
..........
10
UNSHIELDED PERSONS
DC-P-1060
10
20
THERMAL EXPOSURE
40
60
(callcm 2 )
:1
a:
"
.j
100
20
Hellbr.,n / . Hamburg
Dikewood Corporation, DC-TN-1058-1
18
80
Dresden
I
I
INTENSE
FIRESTORMS
16
14
Darmstadt
:. 12
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(HIROSHIM_!~!NAGASAKI)
--..,
Aamorl
Freiberg
',
Hiroshima
Sollngen
1 BTU (British Thermal Unit)=

energy for 1 F rise In 1 lb of water
= 252 calories
'
B.-men
Fukui
Frledrlcklhllfen
Aachen Ulm Tbyama

Nagesa!<J
'
Hamburg flrestorm area = 45% area covered

by buDdlngs containing 70 lb/sq. ft of wood
Hence 0.45 x 70 32 lb/sq. ft of wood loading
Every 1 lb of wood = 8000 BTU of energy
Over 2.9 hours: 685 million BTU/sq. mile/sec.
Severe flrestorms require

600 BTU/sq. mile/second
\
I
: Chosl
Fukuyama
FATALITIES IN WORLD WAR II FIRES
oL---~~C-------~------~------._------~------~------~------~
0
100
200
300
400
600
600
700
800
AVERAGE FIRE SEVERITY (Millions of BTU per sq. mile per second)
T. E. Lommasson and J. -~ Keller, A 11acroscopic Vie\v of Fire

Phenomenology and l\1ortality Prediction; Proceedings of the Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Program, Mass Fire Research Symposiun1 of
the Defense .~tonlic Support Agency, 1'he Dike\vood Corporation;
October, 1967.
EXPERIENCE OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE AIR RAIDS

Source: AD0642790, p. 8. Basic data:
Dirkwood DC-WP-1040-1, AD-827 029/0
City
Tokyo
Hamburg
Kassel
Darmstadt
Hiroshima
Nagasaki
Lives Lost
Percent of
Population
Buildings
Destroyed
84,000
42,000
1. 2
Z.4
300,000
300,000
8,700
8, 100
70,000*
40,000*
3. 8
7.4
28.0
17.0
33,000
ZZ,OOO
68,000
Zl,OOO
*Guest Korean workers, POWs, and military personnel excluded.
Area Burned,
sq m1
15.8 (total loss)
4. 5 (total loss)
1 Z (heavy damage)
z. 9 (total loss)
1.5
4. 4 (fire storm area)
0. 049 (fire only)
0. 864 (!ire and blast)
When water evaporates from the burned surface, cooling results and the body loses heat. The larger the burn wound, the more
water loss and the more heat or energy loss.
How Can the Fluid and Heat Losses Be Diminished?
Think Plastic Wrap as Wound Dressing for

Thermal Burns
ACEP (American College of Emergency Physicians) News
http://www .acep.org/content. aspx ?id=40462
August 2008
By Patrice Wendling
Elsevier Global Medical News
CHICAGO - Ordinary household plastic wrap makes an excellent, biologically safe wound
dressing for patients with thermal burns en route to the emergency department or burn unit.
The Burn Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, has
advocated prehospital and first-aid use of ordinary plastic wrap or cling film on bum wounds for
almost two decades with very positive results, Edwin Clopton, a paramedic and ED technician,
explained during a poster session at the annual meeting of the American Bum Association.
"Virtually every ambulance in Iowa has a roll of plastic wrap in the back," Mr. Clopton said in
an interview. "We just wanted to get the word out about the success we've had using plastic wrap
for burn wounds," he said.
Dr. G. Patrick Kealey, newly appointed ABA president and director of emergency general
surgery at the University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics, said in an interview that plastic wrap
reduces pain, wound contamination, and fluid losses. Furthermore, it's inexpensive, widely
available, nontoxic, and transparent, which allows for wound monitoring without dressing
removal.
"I can't recall a single incident of its causing trouble for the patients," Dr. Kealey said. "We
started using it as an answer to the problem of how to create a field dressing that met those
criteria. I suppose that the use of plastic wrap has spread from here out to the rest of our referral
base."
Although protocols vary between different localities, plastic wrap is typically used for partialand full-thickness thermal burns, but not superficial or chemical burns. It is applied in a single
layer directly to the wound surface without ointment or dressing under the plastic and then
secured loosely with roller gauze, as needed.
Because plastic wrap is extruded at temperatures in excess of 150 C, it is sterile as
manufactured and handled in such a way that there is minimal opportunity for contamination
before it is unrolled for use, said Mr. Clopton of the emergency care unit at Mercy Hospital,
Iowa City. However, it's best to unwind and discard the outermost layer of plastic from the roll
to expose a clean surface.
UCRL-TR-231593
LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE
NATIONAL
LABORATORY
Thermal Radiation from Nuclear

Detonations in Urban
Environments
R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock

June 7, 2007
Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within
buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded
estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be
greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].
We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a
"radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban
environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction
of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.
6. L. Davisson and M. Dombroski, private communication; "Radiological and Nuclear
Response and Recovery Workshop: Nuclear Weapon Effects in an Urban Environment
2007 ," M. Dombroski, B. Buddemeier, R. Wheeler, L. Davisson, T. Edmunds, L. Brandt,
R. Allen, L. Klennert, and K. Law, UCRL-TR-XXXX (2007), in review.
11
Addendum No. 1
lor
DNA 1240H2, Part 2
HANDBOOK OF
UNDERWATER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
21 January 1974
M. J. Dudash
DASIAC
General Electric Company-TEMPO
816 State Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93102
CHAPTER
PAGE
TITLE
VOLUME 2 - PART 2
SURFACE SHIP PERSONNEL CASUALTIES: EFFECTS OF
UNDERWATER SHOCK ON PERSONNEL
18
CHAPTER 18
19 August 1973
18.7
18-1
TRnMAL ~RD lft1CLIAR L4DIATION I'PRCTS ON StJIP~CI SHIP PDSONNIL
18.7.1 Casualty and Risk Criteria

Table 18-2
CDC NUCLEAR AND THF.RK\L RADIATION CRITERIA
N~
Thermal Radiation Criteria
Riak Criteria for Burne Under Summer Uniform to Warned, Exposed Pereonnel
2
2
2
7. Incidence Mechanism lOKT cat/em
lOOKT cal/cm
lOOOKT cal/cm
Negligible
Moderate
Emergency
2.5
5
5
1 burn
0
1 burn
0
2 burn
3.1
3.7
6.3
4.2
5.0
8.8
Casualties due to 2nd Degree Burns

2
2
Time to lneffectiveneea 1 Incidence IOKT cal/cm
lOOKT cal/cm
24. hr
50
38
53
5.8
6.8
12
2
lOOOKT cal/cm
73
Personnel Risk and CasualtY Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Effects

ACN 4260, u. S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Nuclear
Studie&, August 1971
EFFECTS OF SPECTRAL DISTRIBUTION OF RADIANT ENERGY

ON CUTANEOUS BURN PRODUCTION IN MAN AND THE RAT
Research and Development Technical Report USNRDL-TR-46

NM 006-015
Z5 April 1955
by
E. L.
C.P.
S. B.
A.K.
Alpen
Butler
Martin
Davis
U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY

San Francisco Z4, California
For human skin the reflectivities and critical energies for
production of a standard burn are the following:
filter
11
filter
11
A 11 , X
max = 0.4Z::, r
=Z4.4 + 3.5 per cent,
= 3.ZO . 0.37 cal/cm1 ;
B", A
= O.S5p., r = 40.9 3.8 per cent, Q = 3.ZS O.Z8 cal/cm1 ;
max
= 9.9 Z.l cal/cm1 ;

=53.4 + z.z per cent, Q = 14.0 1.1 cal/cm1 ;
= 17 0.60 per cent, Q =Z.50 cal/cm1 (approx.).
filter "C", A
max = 0.65J.L, r = 56.9 Z.S per cent, 0
filter "D",
filter
11
F",
"-max =0.85Jl,
"'max = 1. 7J,t,
r
r
The ranges shown are standard deviations.

The significance of the optical properties of skin has been discussed and
the property of the high transmission of skin in the region 0. 7 to 1.0 has been
presented.
SUMMARY
The Problem
How does the critical energy for the production of standard burns in
both rats and humans vary with the wavelength of radiant energy?
Findings
The critical radiant energy, corrected for spectral reflectance, required for production of standard burns in both rat and haman skin varies
as much as 4~old depending on the wavelength.
AD689495
MASS BURNS
Proceedings of a Workshop
13 - 14 March 1968
Sponsored
by
The Committee on Fire Research

Division of Engineering
National Research Council
and the
Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army
Published
by
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.
1969
Dr. Edward L. Alpen (U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory):
About this question of the spectral dependence of radiant energy, I
think Dr. Haynes may have given you the impression that white light
does the trick. There is later work which tends to refute that. The
work done at Virginia used cut-off filters. The effectiveness of all
energy above a certain wave length or below a certain wave length was
measured. At the upper end the most effective and the least effective
were mixed together and made it appear that infrared was not too good
in producing burns. When you subdivide the spectrum, the most effective
energy in producing a flash burn is the infrared above about 1.2 microns.
The importance of this, and the only reason I make an issue of
it, is that a very important source of flash burn, both in civilian
life and under wartime disaster conditions, is radiant energy burns
from flaming sources. We have done a great deal of research on this
subject for the U. s. Forest Service, because radiant energy burns are
important in forest fires.
Energy in the wave lengths of 0.6 to 0.8 micron is about oneeighth as destructive as the rest of the spectrum. But long wave
length radiation above one micron is extremely destructive, and the
most effective of all.
49
Dr. Alpen:
Anything that shields out
radiation above one micron is extremely effective in preventing burns
to the skin.
50
RESBARCH TRIANGLE INSTituTE

Durham, North Carolina
Final Report R-85-1
CRASH CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM STUDY
AD0403071
by
K. E. Willis
E. R, Brooks
r. J. vow
Apr Ll 30 , l96 3
l,rcpnrcd fC'r
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- D-2 -
FeasibilitY
In the typical household, some materials will generally be available for
covering windows against thermal radiation. Ona half roll of aluminum foil would
cove~ about 25 ft 2 and woul d provide very affective cavering for 1 to 2 windows
(thoae most likely to face the blast).
colored paint, Bon Ami, or

cover windows.
~1iting
Sufficient quantities of either light
would be available in most households to
Aluminum screens attenuate from 30 - 501 of the thermal radiation
and hence screens should be closed or installed.

nle amount of water per square foot required to dissipate 25 cal/cm2
thc~mal
radintion can quickly be calculated from the
he~t
or
of vaporization of
water (580 cal/gm).
Allowing 90l losses due to absorption or spillage, one

gallon of water is sufficient to wet 10 ft 2 of material so that it can widastand
25 cal/cm of direct thermal radiation (i.e., the radiation is normal to the

material
surf~ce
at nll points).
Since the average daily water consumption per
service (Reference 3) is about 700 gallons, it is apparent that the wetting of

interior flammables (pilod up curtains, furniture, etc.) is feasible in most
cases when used in conjunction with the other measures.
3.
Statistical 4bstracta of the United States.

Government Printins Office, 1962.
Waahlngtont
u.
S.
HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT
MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I
PAMPHLET No. 1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
LONDON
. HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1956
The probable fire situation in a British city

35 Japanese houses are constructed of wood and once they were set on
fire they continued to burn even when knocked over. In this country
only about 10 per cent. of all the material in the average house is
combustible, and under conditions of complete collapse, where air
would be almost entirely excluded, it is doubtful whether a fire could
continue on any vigorous scale.
40 It seems unlikely from the evidence available that an initial density
of fires equivalent to one in every other building would be started by a
nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that a much
smaller proportion of b~~gs than ~ would be ~XPC?Sed to thermal
radiation and even then tt ts not certain that continumg fires would
develop. Curtains may catch fire, but it does not necessarily follow that
they will set light to the room; in the !ast war i~ was. f~und that only
one incendiary bomb out of every SIX that hit buildings started a
continuing fire.
From a 10 megaton bomb, with its longer lasting thermal
radiation (see paragraph 21), it takes about 20 calories per square
centimetre to start fires because so much of the heat (spread out over
the longer emission} is wasted by conduction into the interior of the
combustible materiat and by convection and re-radiation whilst the
temperature of the surface is being raised to the ignition point. But
the distance at which 20 calories per square centimetre can be produced
is only 11 miles, so that the scaling factor for a 10 megaton airburst
bomb is therefore 11 and not 22.
43 For a ground burst bomb, however, several other factors contribute
to a further reduction in the fire range. Apart from an actual loss of
heat by absorption into the ground and from the pronounced shielding
effect of buildings, the debris from the crater tends to reduce the
.radiating temperature of the fiiebau and a greater proportion of the
energy is conscr9uent1~ radiated in the infra red region of the spectrum
..-this proportion being_more easily absorbed by the atmosphere.
ADA383988
November 1963
Second printing May 1964
Unclassified Version
SURVEY OF THE THERMAL THREAT

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Prepared for:
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
By~
Jack C. Rogers and T. Miller
SRI Project No. IMU-4021
Approved:
- -~-
~OBERT
A. HARK[;R, DIRECTOR
MANAG!:MENT SCIENCES DIVISION
OCD REVIEW NOTICE

This report represents the authors' views, which in gener~l are in h~rmony with the
technical criteria of the Office of Civil Defense. However, a preHminary evaluation
by OCD indicates the need for further evaluation of the fire threat of nude~r weapons
and formulation C\f promising research and action programs.
tz:l
Table B-VII
1:
0)
('z) z
oo
...,.
en o c. ..,.
CO~~ARISON
ID:I...,:I
:I IIIJ .....
,. :I
..., .... oq
... 0
:s ....,
:s
rn ~
c
(')
IIJ
en
~ t11
~
::s
. "'
nSD:aoq~
~ ...
~
.... "tJ
Q,
f"t
f"t
.t~
...
.....
,.
....
c:: ::r
Cotton auto seat upholstery,

green, brown, white
16
Heavy cotton draperies, dark

color
28
1.75
.....
CDO'l
Ul
CD
I'D
IIJ
........
0 IIJ
'0
....
f"t
,.
........
oq 0 CT
.... :I ....
n
.....
.........
.....
...
i'
:s
,_ (')....
Wool pile chair upholstery,

dark color
Newspaper, medium printed
Newspaper, dark areas
Q.l
Cll
rt
25
0.7
40
8.7
5.
30
Corrugated Kratt board
Kraft paper carton, flat

side exposed, used, brown
15
Deciduous leaves
12
grass
40
2.-8
Cll
Q.l
g-0.c
o.m
rt
mo
t1
rti::C
-~
Walnut leaves
Beech leaves
54
36
3.
16
Harding grass
44
2.7
18
Pine needles
50
2.7
4.5
I'D
SD .,..
Ponderosa pine needles,

brown
< t1
Q.l m
Cll
~oarse
f: ... ~
S"i' ....
~
... "'
I ._.
~
(not sustained)
f"t
"':.c
~ c
35
:s
::o:ac
{12
0)
ID ID
a. a. n
Wool pile chair upholstery,

wine
~ ~ i'
Q :; ~
~ .... ~ Newspaper, single sheet
<
_.,
c .... ....
IIIJ
...
rt
m ::s
........
... ....0 0....,.
.... 0
:I
Martin, et al. (1959)

~
Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
~ ~
Cal/clft2 tor
Ratio ot Q.l t1
Ignition
NRDL to ENW t1 ~
Material
Glasstone (1962)
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Cal/cm2 for
~~terial
Ignition
on,.::t
::r 0
....
~~
..
. .... ..ar
....
VI
0
OF ESTIMATES FOR IGNITION ENERGY REQUIREMENTS

(10 mt)
::fH
8
~ t-3
o.t<
~
~~
H)
~ H)
Q.l m
Cll
t1
01~
z m
0
~
t<
Sources:
Martin, et al. (1959) and Glasstone (1962).
t-A
\0
dP
Cll
A SURVEY OF THE WEAPONS AND HAZARDS WHICH MAY FACE

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WAR'riME
Harold L. Brode
P-3170
June 1965
-15Moat expoed
~rfaces
in the city are
non- combustible and a~ch of the rcainder la not ignitable by thermal

flash.
Although aany fires could a:IBultanaoualy start wherever build-
ing interiors are illtDDinated by the bomb thetmal energy, they are
not likely to be immediately beyond control, and will often go out
unattended as they exhaust the available fuel (as in trash barrels or
isolated wood piles or even pieces of paper on tables or floors).
Banging non- flamnable shields over
window openings and removing likely fuels from aposed positions
could also help.
RAND CORPORATION
100 r------.-...............
..,..,..~---,.......,.. REALISTIC CITY HUMIDITY
1
NI
2
~ u
-'
~ 2
:l ~ 50~ 3
~ u
4
Q. z
~ 5
)( 6
z
... 0
zc ...
0 z
C CD
-
WI~D
RL'. I I
50 1.
50 %
I
I
42%
0
:
I. WEATHERED CHEAT GRASS
~~ ~ I
-+-+--+-+-+++++---T .,..
2. CORRUyATED FIBRE
I I ,_ \
~.
13. RATOh. CHARCOAL GREY.-...
I 111111
a:
0
"-
I I I [1-:.
4. NEWSPRINT, CLASSIFIED PAGE"'
,~....,~-+--+-+~1-1
,-~'
ii ITI""'ITI::;__--+--+~~,.~~-H~. .~. . .
' , \ I 1111 1, . ;
1&1
--"1"'"'9"'t""T"'""----,,.-.,...-.or-r""T'""''.,.,
--+--+(UNLIKE NEVADA DESERT) -+-~H+-~~+--+-+-+-++1~1

M.P.H. HUM I OITY --+---+--4--+-+++++----+-+-+-Hr-+++t----t----1-t--t-M-};.'
I
50%
~ ~
I
II
80~~I
--~ ~--~ .... I I ~tt- ~
-.~::'t""coT O~
-1
,..,.,
T"7"
~~\
SATEE.N,
Bl.AC~
1111111
IO~~~l~l~ll~l~II~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S~~P~?~~D-ER_O_SA_ _PI_NE_ _NE_E_DL-ES

II<T
IOKT
IMT
IOOKT
WEAPON
IOMT
YIELD
"TECHNICAL OBJECTIVE AW-7, CRITICAL RADIANT EXPOSURES FOR PERSISTENT

tGNITION, JULY 1160, J. BRACCIAVENTI 8 F. DEBOLD
AD-249476; DASA-1194
UCRL-TR-231593
Thermal radiation
from nuclear
detonations in
Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within
buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded
estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be
greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].
We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a

LAw R E N c E urban environments "radius" for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban
LIVER M 0 R E
In many cases only a 1ew

~
. 1 sw1aces,
..~
.
envuonments.
unshadowed verttca
a sma11 fraction
~A::~~TNo:~
of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.
June 7, 2007
Thermal radiation shadowing

in modern high-rise cities
TENEMENTS, COMMERCIAL,
Ill I ~iiiiiCiia!il
1111111
1111 - I l l
Ill Ill
,....cr::::;:::;:r::::;:::;:~
The National Archives
HOME OFFICE
SCIENTIFIC ADVISER?S BRANCH
HO 2.2-S /l2.l
CD/SA 121
(Paper at Tripartite Thermal Effects Symposium, Dorking, October 1964)

IGNITION AND FIRE SPREAD IN URBAN .ARF'..AS
FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR ATTACK

G. R. Stanbury
INITIAL FIRE INCIDENCE
Thermal pulse precedes the blast wave
Assuming that buildings on opposite aides of a street which is

receirlng heat radiation from a direction perpendicular to ita length
are of the same heie.t we take the average depth ot a floor to be 10 ft.
Effect of Shielding:
Distance
from
Estimation of the number of exposed floors

'fidth of street
(units of 10 tt.)
Angle
of
explosion
arrival
miles
3
4
13i
10
.5
.5
5
5
.5
5
4
1
5
5
1
1
.5
1 5
1
1
1 5
1 5 1.5
SPREAD OF l'IRE
From last war experience or mass fire raid8 in Germany it was concluded
that the overall spread factor we5 about 2; i.e. about twice as many buildings
~ere destroyed by tire aa were actually set s.ligbt by incendiary bomba
NWiber or firea started ~er a~are mile in the
tire-atora raid on Ha.mbur , 27
28th July, 194)
102 tona H.B.
100 tirea
48 tona, 4 lb. ll&!fleaiUil
40 tona, }0 lb. gel.
27,000 bomba
8,000 on buildings
1 ,600 fires
},000 boaba
900 on buildings
800 fires
2,500 firoa in 6,000 buU~a

Howe"Yer, the i.llportant thin& to note ia that the total DIUlber ot f'irea
aterted in each a quare aile ( 2, 500) waa nearl.,y half that or the total nuaber o'f
builclin&a; in other worda, a.laost eYery other building waa aet on fire
When the f'isure or 1 in 2 tor tho Geraan fire atorq is coapa.re4 with the
fisurea tor initial tire inoiclence ot r ..J 1 in 15 to }0 obtained in the Binin&haa
and Liftrpool atudiea it can only be oonoluded that a nuclear exploaion ooul4 not
poalibly produce a :tire atona.
SECONDARY FIRES FROM BLAST DAMAGE IN LONDON

J'ire aituation t'roa 1 W tly bomba in the built-up
part ot the London Region
(Fires from 1 ton TNT V1 cruise missiles, 1944)

Nuaber
ot tly
bomba
No tire
Bomba
Caused
Small Medi\111 Serious Major

tire
fire
tire
tire
609
1,4-99
Grand Totala
n:v
75
4-
Tbt large proportion at.arted no tirea at all even in the moat hea'ri.ly built-up &rf:laa
.All these tl;r boaba tell in the 8UIIlller aontha ot 1 944. which were unu:aually
dry. In winter iJa tbia oountry in residential areaa there are man.T open tirea
which ~ pro'ficle ftnra aourcea ot ignition. The domeatio occupanoy ia a low
tire riak howeftr, and aa the proportion ot auch property in the important City
an4 We at Bnd areu ia amall tbia ahould not i ntrocluce ~ aerioua error , MoreOftr, in winter, 'the hi&h atmoapberio bumicUty and the correspondingly high
aoiature oontent ,t tiaber would tend to ret.arcl or eftn preTent the growth ot tire.
Takata, A.N., Mathematical Modeling of Fire Defenses,

IITRI, March 1970, AD 705 388.
10
No Fire fighting
I
I
I
I
I
t!)
\
\
z
z
IX:
:::::1
cc
Vl
...1
:::::1
cc
!z
1.1.1
1. 5% of population
'
',
t!)
u..
0
, L
' ...... .... _
---
respond 10 minutes
after detonation
......
''
''
'
'
\
\
IX:
1.1.1
c..
' ' ............ ___ ,---.... ,
......
__
---
7.5% of population, _ _ /
immediate response
OOL-----roL-----~~----~00-----~~----1~00----~120
MINUTES AFTER DETONATION
Folded ne\vspapt'rs may not take

fire, but loosely crumpled ones wlU.
The answer? Get rld or trash.
A W't mnp or broom will snuff
out small ftrl'A. So will a burlap
bag or a small rug soAkPd In walPr.
Buckets of water and sand are

CSSE'ntial.
Water Is an cfft'ctlve fire fight
lng agent IK'eause tt amotht'rs and
cools at the samt' time.
FIRE-BOMBS rained on London
They did
n~t
all fall on roads
'[HE LUFTWAFFE SOUGHT A KNOCK-OUT

.
unpact
fell on the docks. The great day raid of 7th Septem~r, 1940, which was continutd throughout the night and renewed on many nights after, left miln of fires blazing along either
bank of the Thames. This is St. Katherine's Dock on the night of 1 rth September.
A n1endl Refwi1U
june, 1940
Croum CopJ'f'ight Reserved
Am RAID
PRECAUTIONS
HANDBOOK No. 9
(1st edition)
INCENDIARY BOMBS
AND FIRE PRECAUTIONS
1ssued by the
Ministry of Home Security
LOX DON
PtJBLISHED BY HIS ltiAJESTY'S STATIOXERY OFFICE
FIRE CoN"tROLL~D BY \VATER
Clothing on
fir~.
Never allow a person whose c1othes are on fire to

remain standing for a moment. Fatalities nearly always
arise from shock of burning about the face and head.
If the person starts to run, trip him up at once. Roll
him on the floor or in a coat or blanket if you ha~e one
handy. If your O'\\Ttl clothes catch fire, clap your hand
over your mouth, and lie down and roll.
3
If\
'
I
I
I
I
I
I
.hi/,
sheet
'I-
1ron
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
+-
, , Plug, .
mat]ne.s1um
alloy
~BodY,
magnes1um
alloy
~
I
I
I
0)
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t-
.........
I
FIG. I-'fYPICAL
KILO MAGNESIUM
I~CBNDIARY BoMB.
..Fuse~
magnesium
alloy
FIG. 2-TYPICAL KILO

MAGNBSJUM lNCJ:NDIARY BoMB.
SECTIONAL DRA\VING.
Restricted
For Official Use
DEFENCE
TRAINING PAMPHLET NO.2
CIVIL
(3rd Edition)
OBJECTS DROPPED
FROM THE AIRluutd /;y th Ministry of Homt Stcurity
Cr()fl)n Copyright RtstTTJtti
LONDON
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1944
Price 6d. net
Copies will be sold only on written application by a Clerk to a local

authority, a Chief Constable, a principal of a public utility company, or by
County Secretaries of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, British Red Cross
Society, and St. Andrew's Ambulance Association to H.M. STATIONERY
OFFICE at any of the following addresses: York House, Kingsway, London.
W.C.2; lla Castle Street. Edinburgh; 39-41 King Street, Manchester li
I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; or 80 Chichester Street, Belfast.
TAIL
UNIT
NFLAMMAIL!
ALLOY CASE
Ml G
MAIN
WIRE~~~
~.... INCENDIA~Y
..
..... ...
.....:..
.,.._t-__..
0
~~~P (PAlMER)
R~CESS ~~~"""'
FILLED
WITH
INSULATING
1'!---t-.~ TAPE. FUZE
FILLING
WHICH FIRES
MAIN INC~NDIAJh'
FILUNG.
--
YSa...wt"-
BODY._._.........,
DETONATOR
WHICH ,IRI$
CAft TO INCCHDIAAV P'IU.ING
AND
N LCAOINO TO
:TIME FUZE;
WHICH P'IRrS
DETONATOR
WHICH IN TURN II'IRI:S
DELAYED
ACTION
EXPLOSIVE
UNIT
MAIN
EXPLOSIVE
HAROC
STEEL EXPLOSIVS
..cc~NTAINER
_FIGURE I2A.--GERMAN INCENDIARY BOMB WITH EXPLOSIVE
NOSE
To obtain some protection from the heat it is necessary to move out of the direct path of
the rays from the fireball; any kind of shade will be of some value.
A fire-storm occurred only in an area of several square miles, heavily
built up with buildings containing plenty of combustible material and where at least every
other building in the area had been set alight. It is not considered that the initial density
of fires, equivalent to one in every other building, would be caused by a nuclear explosion
over a British city. Studies have shown that due to shielding, a much smaller proportion
of buildings than this would be exposed to the heat flash. Moreover, the buildings in the
centres of most British cities are now more fire-resistant and more widely spaced than they
were 30 to 40 years ago. This low risk of fire-storms would be reduced still further by the
control of small initial and secondary fires.
P-3026
FIREBALL PHENCMENOLOGY
Harold L. Brode
The BAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
This paper was prepared for presentation at The Tripartite
Technical Cooperation Panel Meeting, Panel N3,held at the Joint Fire
Service College, Dorking, England, 5-9 October 1964. The papers are
to be published by Defense Atomic Support Agency.
.. ---
------=--
..
. ..
i- -
Fig. 20-S urface burst features influencing thermal radiation
....
Nl-.:....__-~.,...----::--:-----
-c
0
:t:
::
~
Ll)==============...::::::::=::::::=:::::::::::
....uc
.....
~
~
~
~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~-
iiliii
c
u
>.a
~
C)
c:
-ll.:::=::=::::::=::===::::::::;:
-.t:
~
--c
tn
.a
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;:::::;,....=::====~
...,
:::l
1..
...,
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0
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Ln
1'-
.....
...,
1..
tn
:::l
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C)
1..
:::l
tn
Q)
tn
cu
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tn
II)
II)
(J
:::l
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-...,>Q)
cu
-c
Q)
E
E
-c
-tn
c:
tn
c:
(J
Q)
tn
-c
~Q)
II)
I .
<C
eiNFIIENTIAl
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL

TM 23-200
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03400.18
AFL 136-1
NAVMC 1104 REV
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS
CAPABILITIES
OF
ATOMIC WEAPONS (U)
Prepared by
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY

AND THE AIR FORCE
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1957

eiNFIIENTIAl
aM FIDEl I lit
Personnel in structures. A major cause of
personnel casualties in cities is structural
collapse and damage. The number of
casualties in a given situation may be
reasonably estimated if the structural
damage is known. Table 6-1 shows
estimates of casualty production in two
types of buildings for several damage
levels. Data from Section VII may be
used to predict the ranges at which
specified structural damage occurs. Demolition of a brick house is expected to
result in approximately 25 percent mortality, Vt;th 20 percent serious injury
and 10 percent light injury. On the
order of 60 percent of the survivors must
be extricated by rescue squads. Without
rescue they may become fire or asphyxiation casualties, or in some cases be
subjected to lethal doses of residual
radiation. Reinforced concrete structures, though much more resistant to
blast forces, produce almost 100 percent
mortality on collapse. The figures of
table 6-1 for brick homes are based on
data from British World War II experience. It may be assumed that these
predictions are reasonably reliable for
those cases where the population is in a
general state of expectancy of being
subjected to bombing and that most
personnel have selected the safest places
in the buildings as a result of specific
air raid warnings. For cases of no
prewarning or preparation, the number
of casual ties is expected to be considerably
higher.
Glass breakage extends to considerably

greater ranges than almost any other
structural damage, and ma~ be expected
to produce large numbers of casualties
at ranges where personnel are relatively
safe from other effects, particularly for
an unwarned population.
Tablt 6-1 . Eatimattd Ccuualty Production in Structure1
for l'ariou& Dtgreea of Structural Damagt
Serious
Killed
Injury
ouutcht (bospi
&aliz.a
tioo)
l-2 story brick homes (high exploshe data):

PtrunJ
Severedamage _______________
25
!\1oderare damage____________
<5
Light damage ________________ ------
PtrunJ
20
10
<5
Licht
InJury
(~o bos
plt.aliza
tioo)
Ptr~nll
10
5
<s
Nolt . Tbest peraeot.ace.s do not Include tbe casualties wblch may result
from ftre.s, aspbr1iatioo, and otber causes from faJiurt to utrlcate trapped
personnel. The numbers represent tbe estimated perceot.ace of casualties
upected at tbt muimum ranee where tbe specUied structural da~ oecurs.
Personnel in a prone position

are less likely to be struck by fl);ng missiles than those who remain standing.
6-3
Table 6-f.
Critical Radiant Expoure1 for Burm Under

Clothing
2
(Ezpreed in cal/cm incident on outer urface of cloth)
- -
Clothing
Summer Uniform._. ___ ._ .

(2 layers) ________ . ___
'Winter Uniform ___________
(4 layers)_ .. _________ _
6-2
100 KT
Burn
1 KT
10
20
10
20
11
20
60
70
25
80
90
10 MT
14
35
100
120
6-4
CINf"IIEtiTI 11
2.1c (1)
--
FIGURE 2-6
~---------
GROWTH OF THE MACH STEM
''
''
''
'
Reflected
_.---<:2-R
/ /
1~
' '
Region of Mach Reflection

Region of ReQular
Reflection
FIGURE 2-7
MACH STEM HEIGHT
(I KT)
200
400
600
Horizontal Range
800
(yards)
1000
1200
CII~IIINtiAL
3.1
SECTION Ill
THERMAL RADIATION PHENOMENA
3.1
General
Q-
n2 u en cal/sq em (atr. burst).
3.16X 101
For a surface burst having the aame yield as an

air burst, the presence of the earth's surface
results in a reduced thermal radiation emission
and a cooler fireball when viewed from that surface.
This is due primarily to heat transfer to the soil
or water, the dist4rtion of the fireball by the
reflected shock wave, and the partial obscuration
of the fireball by dirt and dust (or water) thrown
up by the blast wave.
where Q=radiant exposure (cal/sq em)

'f.- atmospheric transmissi'f'i ty
H'=weapon yield (KT)
D=slant range (yds).
CINPIDEN I lit
eiNFIIENfiAL -
3-1
~leasurements
from the ground of the total

thermal energy from surface bursts, although not
as extensive as those for air bursts, indicate that
the thermal yield is a little less than half that
from equivalent air bursts. For a surface burst the
thermal yield is assumed to be one-seventh of the
total yield.
3-2
and
Q=-
[)2
u (T) cal/sq em (surface hurst).
3-3
Th(l> differences between the air burst and

surfac(l> burst cur,es are caused bv
.. the difference
in apparent radiating temperatures (\\"h(l>n viewed
from the ground) and the difference in geom(l>trical
configuration of the two t~pes o( burst..
50 mile ,;sibility and 5 gm/m3 water vapor.
10 mile ,isibility and 10 gm/m3 l\ater vapor.
81Niilllll lll
7
3.3 Radiant Exposure vs. Slant Range

Spectral. C!ha.racuriltics. At distances of
operational interest, the spectral (wa,elength}
distribution of the incident thermal radiation,
integrated with respect to time, resembles very
closely the spectral distribution of sunlight.
For each, slightly less than one-half of the radiation occurs in the visible region of the spectrum,
approximately one-half occum in the infrared
region and a very small fraction (rarely greater
than 10 percent) lies in the ultraviolet region of
the spectrum. The color temperature of the sun
and an air burst are both about 6,000 K. A
surface burst, as viewed by a ground obsener,
contains a higher proportion of infrared radiation
and a smaller proportion of visible radiation than
the air burst, with almost no radiation in the
ultraviolet region. The color temperature for a
surface burst is about 3,000 K. A surface burst
viewed from the air may exhibit a spectrum more
nearb" like an air burst.
J.35X 10'
.&ooo
4.
z,ooo
4.ooo
1,000
10,000
zo.ooo
40.000
TOpoQ
1.0
FIGURE 3-58
ATIIOII'IIERIC TRAIIIIIISSIVITY
VS. SLANT RANtEAIR AND
SIIR,ACE IURSTI
o.
0.1
D.T
O.T
...
i.. o.
o.e
!c
;,
0 .5
0.0
0 .4
0.4
-!
:
0
I
;
0 .5
""
"
\.
\.
o.z
IPOO
2,000
4,000
T.ooo 10,000
llont fllont (Yordt )
zo,ooo
40.000
0.5
o.z
To.ooo
.CIIFII!I,IIIF-
12.3
Tabu 11-!. Crilicol Radiant l!.rpoture Valuea /trr Variou Material

Critical radlallt erposu,.
Q (cal/sq c:m)
Maurlal
1 ET
100 ET j1o )fT

I
Tent material:
Can\"as, white, 12 oz/yd1, untreated.............. .. .
Canvas, OD, 12 oz/ydt, flame-proofed
Packaging materials:
Fibreboard, V2S, BT 350 psi, laminated.............
Fibreboard, VaS, BT 275 psi, laminated
Fibreboard, vac, BT 350 psi. corrugated............
Fibreboard, W5C, BT 200 psi, corrugated.
Ply,;ood, douglas fir G~ in.) .
Destroyed .
Destroyed ..
12
5
21 .
9 I'
a;
li
Flames during exposure

9
I
Flames during exposure .
6
5
9
20
Aluminum surface discolored
Airship material, aluminized, N-llaA100, 16 ozfyd2 Aluminum surface destroyed _______ _
24
{ Fabric destroyed _. _.
2i
Aluminum surface discolored _
10
1
15
Airship material, aluminized, N-llaA70, 19.4 oz/yd ------ Aluminum surface destroyed
{
20
Fabric destroyed.--_----- .
2
.
hi
t
at
al
.
.
d
,.._128A1-o
8
I
d
{Delaminates
.
Aus p ma en , ummlZe , .l'
1 ,
oz Y --- F b d t ed
5
a nc es roy ---Doped fabrics (used on some aircraft control surfaces) :
Cellulose nitrate covered with 0.00 15" thick aluminum Sporadic flaming _ _ _ _ _. _
60
foil.
Cellulose nitrate, aluminized _ _...... Persistent flaming __
5
Plastics:
;a
Laminated methyl methacrylate._ _ _ Surface melts _
USAF windov; plastic ~ in.) _ _. _.... Bubbling 240
3
) v .
h" k
{Dense smoking..
. . (
VJn)
1Jte opaque . 71 m. t 1e - -- - -- ---- --- Fl
a011ng .
20
Sand:
Coral _ _ _ _ _ _ Explosion
IS
11
Siliceous --- -- - -- ----- -- --- -- --- -- Explosion*- - - - --
10
Sandbags: Cotton canvas, dry. filled _.... . ..... Failure. _
10
Wood, white pine ---------- ----------------- 0.1 mm depth char .
White pine, given protecti\e coating_. . 0.1 mm depth char __ _ _
40
Construction materials:
8
a1 urf
{Surface melts .
R o11 roofi ng, mmer
s ace- - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - Flammg
d unng
expoeure __ _ _
22
Surface melts ____________________ _
4
R o)1 roofi ng, smooth surface- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - { Fl d
am1ng urmg exposure _ _
9
IIIFIIEHTIL\1.
I;
'
16 1
1a 1
11 1
10 '
t6 I
a i
., .
4a l
47 !
18 !
2- '
a~!
29
2a
19
18
20
61
i5
82
a1
44
61
10
17
80 I
140
10
120
4ao
2ao
750
6
25
20
27
19
18
18
4i
as
32
a2
126
il
14
40
;I
16 .
I
25
it
12
29
..
FIGURE 12-58
TEAPOT -MET 1955 ablation of spheres inside fireball

10 inch diameter spheres
REDUCTION OF SPHERE RADIUS WITH DISTANCE FROM A 23 KT BURST
FOR ALUMINUM, STEEL. CERAMIC INSERT SPHERES
. .
.
.
1.1
0
-
c:
-.;
.-..
:1
a:
-
c:
c0
'
- -- - -
...
- - - - -
- - -
Aluminum Ceramic ln.. rt Spheres
...
..
...
- -
..
- - -
_.._
0.5
- - - - -
_ _ _..... _
..
_ _
- -
- -
80
180
~
-
240
: :
..
. ..... . .. . .. . .
.. ::::. ... ... :
. .
=:::Steel
Spheres
:: :::.
.
...
.. . .. .. .
. ... ~~
. .. .... .-:_:-~:.:;::
....-..
.
.
.
.
. .
: ~ ; : : : : : :: I ...
. ::
. !
.
..... ...... . .. ,.. . .. . ..
. ..... ... . . ..
.
.
.
.
.. .
.
: :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : . :
: . I
: : : : .
. .. : :
-----:I:------.......
-
------.
.
.
..- ... . .
. ..
.
.
.~
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.. .. .
.. ..... ...
'
..
a:
... a .
... :.:.::.. : ::::: : r

. ..... .. . _. _ __ ____,...... - --- - -
..
. _....._--. -----.
------...
:
..
.. .
. . .. . .
. ....
320
Distance From Burst Point (feet)
12-10
.
. .. ..
...
.
.
..
.
. .
. -------
. . .. . .. .
- ... . .. - .. -
.........
... . .
. .. - . --------
. ...
. . . .. :.
:
. .
.
..
. ..
.
. .
.
1.0~ . . ~ - ....
~
.
~
...
~
.
.
.
.
.
.
!
.
.
. ..
.-----
.. .. . . . . .. . . .... ....
.
.
.
.
. .
. .. ..
.. . .
.........
... . . - . . .. .. -.. . -- -
.
. . -----.
. . . . ----. .. ----------
.
.
.
. .
...
. .. . .
..
. . .. . .
.
.. . .
..
. . ...
.. .
.
. . ..
.... .--. -........ .
. .. . . .. . .. .
400
480
...,
~
0
-c:
G)
:a
m
0.01
Q02
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.5
1.0
2.0
100
-u>
ct:
.....
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DOSE

'!
. . OF INITIAL GAMMA RADIATION
vs. TIME AFTER DETONATION
! .. i .:.1.. I . !
! .
.. I
'
..'
i.: .
04
i
t
.. r
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. I
..
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.-.
1.
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It
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..
.
..
I
I
t\J...
,. t "
i
I I
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.5
Timt
(seconds)
1.0
II
''
0
. . . 40
j
I
!I
'
I '
I
.. I . .
'!
.
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~. - I i
J,
i
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~
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~ o
l I
i : ..
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5.0
20
:
I;
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. .. . !
2.0
I
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:
!
0.02
'0
,.
0.01
'
I:
I
I .I .
,.
II
.,8
..
I
..I :. .
..
. I..
~ :
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. , . .I
0
60
I
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I!
80
ac
u
a
'
. .:
'
!'
! .!
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"\
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iO. +- .
'
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40
ooo
.
.I . . ...
I :
60
100
I
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. I:
....0
.i
I
20
10
801
5.0
0
20
10
...
Ul
G ')
c:
:a
1'11
Ql
1,000
Q2
0.!5
1.0
10
20
!50
11
100
200
17
500
1,000 2poo
I
5,000 10,000
I
11,000
500
200
200
100
50
50
c:
j!
'
...
.!!
~
0
-=-
"'.)'
20
>=
10
UNDERGROUND BURST
DOSE RATE CONTOUR DOWNWIND DISTANCES
FOR IS KNOT SCALING WIND
AND BURST DEPTH OF 17
f-.EET
AT A REFERENCE TIME OF ONE HOUR
AFTER BURST
wf.
J.O'
0.1
0.2
0.5
1.0
If
I I
10
20
Downwind Dlttonct
50
100
( ttotutt mlltt)
200
500
1,000 2,000
I
I 1.0
5,000 10,000
t
CIO
"'
:!!
G)
=
::a
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.1
.~
.2
10
20
50
100
200
~00
100
~0
!50
._\
0
+0
~'\
5~
-.s-
,_,
-,..
,-
--
..
aoO
10 ~
1,000
100
oo
0
,,
..
..
'
/
-....
/
/
-UO
-f~
..
'
00
.. '
~
0.5
-lo.s
LAND SURFACE BURST

DOSE RATE CONTOUR AREAS
AT A REFERENCE TIME OF
ONE HOUR AFTER BURST
Kl LOTON YIELDS
:!!
-,..
I
. 0.2
i&:
0.1
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.1
.2
.~
1.0
Area
10
2
5
(square miles )
20
50
100
200
500
'0.1
I,OCXJ
"'~
:.
DNA EM-1
PART I
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY EFFECTS MANUAL NUMBER 1
CAPABILITIES
OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1 JULY 1972
HEADQUARTERS
Defense Nuclear Agency
Washington, D.C. 20305

The Effects of The Atomic Bomb On Hiroshima, Japan (The Secret U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Report 92, Pacific Theatre, Etc... ) (1947-71) Part 1

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The Effects of The Atomic Bomb On Hiroshima, Japan (The Secret U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Report 92, Pacific Theatre, Etc... ) (1947-71) Part 1

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THB UNITID STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Physical Damage Division

G. CAUSE AND EXTENT OF FIRE

FIRST FLOOR PLAN

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBWG SlJNEY

o. Evidence relative to ignition of combustible

Sloelt. 01 tbr. 123 tnlloy

3. Conditions on Momlng of Attack

a small amotmt or clourls at high ultitutlc. \\"ind

District rt.~ported three large plan<'8.

THE UNITED STATES

THE ATOMIC BOMB

Physical Damage Divfsion

.a:'lot. iol -..liHA . ...............

'nie:;~~---~~ ..-.~.,s,. ~ to.. ~~

t.:oae:-m-.Jor':. _.. Oecurrecl in a -~~ water

buDclinp redUeed water ~ in _t.he .,.tam,

The temperature resulting from the exploaion

DODCOIIlbUdible, amf combuatible buildings, and

relative to ipition of combustible

The city of Hiroshima, likl' other Japanese

The public water syetem was fairly adequate

3: The Ota River and ita six branches divided the

city into nine distinct areas.

The river couJ"B('S

Th~re had lxtm practically no rain in th~ city

5. Precautionary fire measures were incfl'ective

10. H undrcds of fiJ't'8 Wl'rr rl'ported to ha vc

largely because widespread damage was caused by

started in the center of the city within 10 minutes

blut, the populace suffered severe casualties,

OVER ~BUILT UPNESS

IAVEIUIOE: 4t11., 1Xlf1ESTIC~)

(AVERAGE f111.,00MUTIC . COMiiiERCIAl.) I

I AVE!tAlE J011o, IHili.ISTRW..)

PERIMETER OF FIRE DAMAGE

MAIN WATER PIPES

US.STRATEGIC EOIB; SURVEY

roc)ft 3,200 tee-t n~ ~ "(10;700 feet),.-adered no

only 800 . feet beyood (1,,700 feet) suffered no

'O~Joo:_ f~~ ~o~~ -~--~ - iJid:. qhtly ov_. 200

foot IDUODI'.f and wood wall. All houses within

poles within .~tt tire ~ter wel8 burned, bu~ it.

is im))Oiiiible fA> atate .With Oei1aiitty whether .:tile

Other eviden~, however; leads ~ the conclusion

the ..j~~t .~ burned WV.. ~ ~~ but the

thrOugh {Pho~ 36).~ TJle : ~~ who had

worn the jacket wu leverely iD.j.uii8cfb.J. the blast

PlltYfl) 36 IX. ~hen' par1l1 hurttd evat. uf t ...~- ho

PROBABIUTY OF FIRE SPREAD

Probability of Fire Spread- Percent

FIRE SPREAD VS. BUtLT- UPNESS

PROBABILITY 0 F FIRE SPREAD

~---+-----+---~~---+----l- --- ~--llll-..__-+---+-----+-----1

Probabiity of Fire Spread- Percent

ARE SPREAD VS.DPOSUR DISTANCES

5.-Fire-rui3tt:ve building data (fire)

Stories burned (after

--- 1 ---------11---- 1----~- 1 ---

omee .. ... .... ...... ....

Yes ... . ... . .. .

... .. do . . . . . . . .... . . . . ... No . .... Yes ... . . . ....

'nie:;--- ..-.~.,s,. ~ to.. ~~

!=!: ::~::::~~~~ ~:! I ~:!

_ do_-------------- -----do.---------------Bank ... ----- - --------Oftlce .. ---- - --- - . __

----.do.--------------But. _____ .. ._. ___

cJawrooms .. __

ao 1V~~----------10 omee . .

~~~~ ~ ~ l ~: a.o -- - . . . .....

1. 0 -.. ----2.1 ------ ~ ~ ~ : 1 :~~ :

Oymnytnm _ --- lron foundry ___ _