Page 1 of 116

136 G.R. Nos. L-21477-81

April 29, 1966

FRANCISCA VILUAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PATRICIO HUFANA and GREGORIO
HUFANA, respondents.
Doctrine:
In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the
driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages.
Facts:
It appears that, as the bus owned by petitioner Viluan and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino neared the gate of
the Gabaldon school building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by Patricio Hufana
and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of
his bus and raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post,
crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.
The heirs of those who perished sued petitioner Viluan and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for
damages for breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the
driver for damages.
In their answer, petitioner Viluan and her driver Aquino blamed respondent Gregorio Hufana for the accident.
With leave of court, they filed third party complaints against Gregorio Hufana and the latter's employer, Patricio
Hufana.
After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two
buses and held both, together with their respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages.
Both petitioner Viluan and her driver Aquino and the respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals.
While affirming the finding that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of both the
Viluan and the Hufana buses, the Court of Appeals differed with the trial court in the assessment of liabilities of
the parties. In its view only petitioner Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of contract of carriage.
The driver, Aquino, cannot be made jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's
employee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage.
Issue: Should Petitioner Viluanoperator of the bus that caught firebe held to be the only one liable for the
death and injuries suffered by passengers of his bus? Answer: No.
Held: As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177 that in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some
members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.
Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that petitioner as
well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana are jointly and severally liable for the damages
awarded by the trial court. The disallowance of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 is correct and
should be affirmed. No costs.

Page 2 of 116

[136] DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND
ORLANDO MADDELA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
TOPIC
Violation of Civil and Political Rights
DOCTRINE
a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
from the public officer or employee responsible therefor
To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
FACTS
On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch
named M/L "SAN RAFAEL".
On April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery the Force and Intimidation upon Persons
against Jikil Taha.
Fiscal Ponce de Leon upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the
Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound
and take custody of the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
Upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of
Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded
it.
Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.
Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of
a criminal offense.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint for damages against
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that:
on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then
and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent;
that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was
not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property;
that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00,
P2,000.00 of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment;
that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize;
and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and
because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.

Page 3 of 116
For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs-appellants prayed that defendants-appellees be
ordered to pay jointly and severally each of them the sum of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Ponce De Leon and Maddela denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses
alleged that:
the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961
was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil
Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing
of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha;
that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando
Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the
robbery;
and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch.
TC: upheld the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that "the authority to impound
evidences or exhibits or corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who
controls the prosecution and who introduces those exhibits in the court
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the taking of the motor launch on July 6, 1962 by
Orlando Maddela upon the order of Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures since it was done without a warrant.
ISSUE/HELD
Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus
delicti of the crime and therefore liable for damages? YES.
RATIO
The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
A cursory reading of the above provision easily brings into focus the unreasonableness of the seizure of the
aforementioned motor launch. Thus in a long line of decisions, this Court has declared invalid search warrants
which were issued in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction.
Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded
the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in
the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the proper search
warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of
search and seizure. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a
warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and
seizure.
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on
Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx

Page 4 of 116
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired
is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that "he was in
good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil
Taha" when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good
faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with
malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission, gave the following reasons during
the public hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the part of the public officer
or employee is immaterial. Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO: The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past
have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their
duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In
the United States this remedy is in he nature of a tort.
Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to
implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made the
article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in
good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who
openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on
a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this
article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is
to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of
officials abusing individual rights.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor
launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing
unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered
declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in
addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees. With costs against defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.

Page 5 of 116

Aberca vs. Ver

G.R. No. L-69866 | April 15, 1988
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his
duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
Facts:
The intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT). The
plaintiffs complained that in the execution of such order, the TFM raided several places using defectively
issued judicial warrants and arrested the plaintiffs without warrant, confiscated personal property, interrogated
plaintiffs without council and employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence.
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages, which was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that (1) the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, (2) the defendants were performing their official duties
and (3)the complaint states no cause of action.
Issue:
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, and if so, who should be made liable
Held: The contention that respondents are covered by state immunity for acts done in the performance of their
official duties was not accepted by the court because plaintiffs may have been ordered to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against the communist terrorists but this did not amount to a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint. In carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards should still have been observed by respondents.
The plaintiffs cause of action were not barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
which was explicitly recognized in PD No. 1755:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out
of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising
from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought
within one (1) year.
Even if the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended petitioners' right of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention, it did not extend to suspend their right to demand damages for injuries
suffered through the confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to

Page 6 of 116
counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other
cruel and inhuman treatment.
As to who should be made liable for damages, the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, the person directly causing damage and the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Article 32 of
the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for its violation.

Page 7 of 116

138 MHP Garments v. CA

Facts:
1) MHP Garments Inc. had the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts Uniforms and
insignias.
2) MHP then received information that Agnes Cruz et al. were selling Boy Scout items and paraphernalia
without any authority to do so.
3) They then undertook the necessary surveillance and made a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
4) An MHP employee together with PC went to the stores of Agnes Cruz et al. at the Marikina Public
Market and seized the items without a warrant. The seizure caused a commotion to the embarrassment
of Cruz et al. One of the customers even shouted ay nakaw pala.
5) MHP instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendors. However the provincial
fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items of the vendors.
6) The vendors, Cruz et al., then filed an action for sum of money against MHP.
7) MHP contend that they should not be made liable for damages since they did not commit the act of the
seizure.
8) The trial court ruled in favor of the vendors. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence the case of
petition for certiorari.
Issue: (focusing on torts)
1) Won MHP is liable for damages in the unwarranted search even if it did not effect the seizure of the
subject merchandise.
Held:
Yes the SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. MHP is liable. While undoubtedly, the members of
the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents'
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.

Ratio:
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages
to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As
correctly observed by respondent court:

Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents')
merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for
the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair
to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers
conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court's query

Page 8 of 116
posed in its decision now under consideration as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the
seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he
was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even
received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused
to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Notes:
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for
violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is
entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is
the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put
an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
(emphasis supplied)

Page 9 of 116

In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly
responsible,viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of
the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for its violations. (emphasis supplied)

Page 10 of 116

139 MARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

120 SCRA 193
FACTS:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus owned and operated by
private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felarde Paje, collided
with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latters death and in physical injuries to herein
petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, information for homicide and serious physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felarde Paje.
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents, alleging that
the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.
While the civil case for damages was in progress, the criminal action proceeded. The accused Felarde Paje
was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted and the
conclusion is that CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even
GUILTY of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT.
As a consequence, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the civil case for damages against them
invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal case (Corpus vs. Paje). The trial court dismissed
the civil case for damages. On appeal the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court dismissing the civil
case was affirmed.
Petitioners averred that the civil action they filed was one of the nature of an Independent Civil Actions
provided under Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, such action should proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
ISSUE:
Is there a valid independent civil action for damages based on physical injuries in this case?
RULING:
NO. Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of independent civil action without waiting for the filing
or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper. However,
acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an
independent civil action if it is based on the crime.
As held in the prior criminal case (Corpus vs. Paje), reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of
the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were
alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil
action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felarde Paje was not for homicide or physical injuries but for reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide (death of Clemente Maricia) and physical injuries suffered by petitioners. They are not one of the
three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code; therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution.

Page 11 of 116

140 Madeja v. Caro

DOCTRINE:
-

In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 of the Civil Code is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime
of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

FACTS:
-

In a criminal case filed before the CFI of Samar, Dr. Eva A. Japzon (Dr. Japzon) is accused of homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining
witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended
party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for damages in a civil case of the
same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of said physician.
Defendant Dr. Japzon filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking Sec. 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
which the respondent Judge granted. According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3
(a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action."
Madeja now comes to court seeking to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendants motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: W/N a civil action for damages in a case of physical injury may be instituted separately during the
pendency of the criminal case? YES
RULING:
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable
provision. The two enactments are quoted herein below:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of
Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto/quasi-delict. This is manifest from
the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is
supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his
rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not

Page 12 of 116
conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to
depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in
many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but
it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the
injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly.
He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him.
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.
Therefore, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal
action against her.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is
hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.

Page 13 of 116

141 Arafiles vs Phil Journalists

G.R. No. 150256 March 25, 2004
DOCTRINE
There is no malicious sensationalization of facts in a published article when the sources come from an official
public document, such as police blotter, and from the interview made with the victim.
FACTS
Petitioner Catalino Arafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which dismissed his complaint for damages
against respondents publisher Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr, editor Max Buan Jr and reporter
Romy Morales.
Respondent Morales wrote a report that appeared on Peoples Journal Tonight, which related how Emelita
Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-ASA, lodged a
complaint against petitioner, a NAIS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with
attempted rape and the supposed details of the rape.
About a year after the report was published, Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages, alleging that on
account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item, his reputation as a
director of NAIS was injured, that he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as
a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist and that the news deferred his promotion.
In their Answer, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, they alleging that the news item,
having been sourced from the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a personal
interview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional provision of freedom of
the press . . . . , and by way of Compulsory Counterclaim, they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages plus attorneys fees.
The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but was later on reversed by CA, claiming that the petitioner
was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that (herein respondents) were motivated by a sinister
intent to cause harm and injury to (herein petitioner).
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to
thus free respondents of liability for damages
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

No. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be considered,
each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication x x x The headlines of a newspaper
must also be read in connection with the language which follows.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal.

Page 14 of 116

Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and
first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually
committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and
complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that
the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of
the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for
honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

Page 15 of 116

142.Amonoy vs Gutierrez
Topic: Intentional tort;abuse of right
Facts
"This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six(6) parcels of land situated in Tanay Rizal.
Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formida. On 12 January 1965, the Project of Partition submitted was approved and xxx two (2) of the said lots
were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney's fees charged by Amonoy was
P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida executed a deed of real estate
mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his
attorney's fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the
properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated.

"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away on 2 July 1969. Among
the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.

"Because his Attorney's fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for
their foreclosure in Civil Code4 No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of
Alfonso Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed,
contending that the attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the attorney's fees charged [were]
unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the
mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's fees. Failing in
that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.

"They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale
was held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially
confirmed. A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the
highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50.

"Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.

"More than a year after the Decision in Civil Code No. 12726 was rendered, the said decedent's heirs filed on
19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rixal[,] Civil case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al vs.
Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment thereof. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November
1977, and
this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.

Page 16 of 116

"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to
which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25
April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of
the Gutierrez spouses.

"On 27 September 1985 a temporary restraining order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of
the petitioners' houses.
petitioner appealed to SC
"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:
"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July
1985, granting
a Writ of Possession, as well as its Orderd, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May
1986, directing and
authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish the houses of petitioners
Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are
hereby ordered returned to petitioners unless some of
them have been conveyed to innocent third
persons."5
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the abovementioned Decision, respondents' house had
already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents
against petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower
court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals was correct was correct in deciding that the petition [was] liable to the respondents
for damages."
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents house.
He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only
an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this
Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents; house.

Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a
right.14 Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle

Page 17 of 116
accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much
less abated.

Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims to exercise a right but does so in an
abusive manner violative of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must

Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.True, petitioner commenced the demolition of
respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the
records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents house, was
issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the
Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.

Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the
demolition of respondents house well until the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been
legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse
of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the
demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his
acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when
he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the
demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the
modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of
justice x x x; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible
In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law

Page 18 of 116

143 ALMARIO T. SALTA vs PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

FACTS:
Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos branch. As such, his duty was,
among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of
the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care and prudence,
and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.
In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner indiscriminately
granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in manner characterized by negligence, fraud
and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. This is how the
respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed
a civil action in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case No. 79583, Branch XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil
Case No. 88343, Branch VII) on September 23, 1972, to recover losses the bank suffered. At the same time
the bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case with the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth
Judicial District at San Fernando, Pampanga, Criminal Case No. CCC-V-668, for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt
Practices
Act.
In the criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the prosecution has rested,
granted the motion providing as follows: accused ALMARIO T. SALTA ACQUITTED of the offense charged in
the Information the prosecution having to prove the essential ingredience and/or elements of the crime
charged, with costs de oficio."
With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based
on
Section
3(c),
Rule
III
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court
which
provides:
"(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
ISSUE: Whether or not a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed
on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case, which is for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
HELD: NO.
In the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether
acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the law
when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33,
34 and 2177). Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d) does not apply."
It is significant to note that under Article 31 11 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action
permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil
actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case,
may
proceed
similarly
regardless
of
the
result
of
the
criminal
case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed

Page 19 of 116
independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the courts
disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because
the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be
made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause
or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an offense committed by
means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal case,
regardless of the result of the latter.

Page 20 of 116

144 Physical Injuries

G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965
VICTORIA
G.
CAPUNO
and
JOSEPHINE
G.
CAPUNO,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JON ELORDI, defendants-appellees.
Nature: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing appellant's complaint for
recovery of damages for the death of Cipriano Capuno.
Facts:
The case arose from a vehicular collision in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery
truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as
well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of
the three victims.
While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a
civil action, also for damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity
allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan the former being appellants
herein were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y.
Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan.
In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of
these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno
heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had
already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of
the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court.
Parties entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its
claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to
the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act."
The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered wherein the accused Elordi was
acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for
damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action
which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court, from which order the present appeal has
been taken.
The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be
"well taken" were;
(1) that the action had already prescribed; and
(2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the
latter for settlement in their compromise.
Issue: WON the action has already prescribed
Held: Yes.

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death.
In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately
upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, , and the same would not have been stayed by the
filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed
after the lapse of more than five years.

Page 21 of 116

In the case of Diocosa Paulan, vs. Zacarias Sarabia, this Court held that an action based on a quasidelict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of
four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the
day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription
in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had
neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately.
Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file as in fact they did
a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case and consequently, as held in
Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."

Dispositive:
Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute of limitations, we do not consider it
necessary to pass upon the other issues raised in their brief.
The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Page 22 of 116

145 Corpus vs Paje

Facts
23 December 1976- a passenger bus of the Victory Liner driven by Felardo Paje collided within Lubao,
Pampanga, with a jeep drive. By Clemente Marcia. This resulted to Marcia's death and physical injuries to 2
other persons
-An information for homicide and double physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against
Felardo Paje in CFI-Pampanga
-Heirs of Marcia reserved right to institute a separate civil action for damages
-7 November 1960- Felardo Paje was found guilty
- 21 November 1961- Laura Corpus and minor children (heirs of Marcia) instituted in CFI-Rizal a separate civil
action for damages based on reckless imprudence against Paje and Victory Liner
-9 November 1962- CA reversed CFI-Pampanga decision and acquitted Paje on reckless imprudence and
stated that collision was pure accident.
-29 December 1962- Paje et. al. filed in civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that action was barred by
the acquittal by Ca. Motion was denied; thus this appeal.
Issue/Held:
W/on acquittal of Paje by CA in criminal action on ground of reckless imprudence or criminal negligence was a
bar to civil action for damages?
Yes. Rule 111 Sec 3- the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the
criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based
upon the same act.

Page 23 of 116

146 MADEJA v. CARO

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
Doctrine: The term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is
accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The
complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The
offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141
of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.
The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant
civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."

Issue: whether or not the term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense and not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: Yes
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.'
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised
Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in
their generic sense.
With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been
used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the
Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical
sense.
In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code

Page 24 of 116
Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and
battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it
approved the article intact as recommended.
If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the
civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the
offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death,"
(Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took
part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on
article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These
alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86
Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent
civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included
in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices.
Four Justices concurred in the result.

Page 25 of 116

147 Dulay vs CA Torts with Independent Civil Action; Physical Injuries

Parties:
Petitioners: MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION
Ponente: BIDIN, J. [G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995]
FACTS:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which TORZUELA, the security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed DULAY. Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased, in her own behalf and
in behalf of her minor children, filed an ACTION FOR DAMAGES against Torzuela and herein private
respondents SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint
contended that the incident resulting in the death of DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while
the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an Information charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. In dismissing the charge, respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence
of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law. Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on
crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising
from, quasi-delict. CA affirmed.
PETITIONERS:

Insisted that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional
and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC, thus, Torzuela's act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
That under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their
negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the
employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed
independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or
SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
That Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
o Art. 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

Page 26 of 116
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the
civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:

Since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles
2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code.
The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate
intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done with
deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard.
And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's
assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.

ISSUE: WoN a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

HELD: YES. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the
merits. This decision is immediately executory.
Ratio:
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a
delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is
the nature of the petitioner's cause of action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages
allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines,

Page 27 of 116
121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case
(supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result
of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they
are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been
established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee
(Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to
make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.

Page 28 of 116

CASE NO. 148

G.R. No. L-7817

October 31, 1956

ALFREDO M. VELAYO, in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR LINES, INC. (CALI),
plaintiff-appellant, vs SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD., defendant-appellee, YEK HUA
TRADING CORPORATION, PAUL SYCIP and MABASA & CO., intervenors.
TOPIC: Intentional Torts: Abuse of Rights
FACTS:
Commercial Airlines Inc. (CALI) is a domestic corporation engaged in air transportation businesses. Since the
start of CALIs operation, its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company, herein defendant.
Prior to 1948, CALI owed P170k (about $79k) to Shell Company. Shell had reasons to believe that the
financial conditions of CALI was far from being satisfactory. In fact, CALI offered its C-54 plane as payment to
Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient
money to pay its debt.
In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that
meeting, CALIs secretary informed the creditors that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop
operations.
The creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of
preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did
reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.
Shell Company was represented by Mr. Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working
committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors.
But while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell
Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if
not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54
plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a
writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to
Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948,
the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell.
This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI then
filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayos
appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding.
In order for Velayo to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell
Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the
alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane.
The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is
nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

Page 29 of 116
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 19, 21, and 23 of the Civil Code which
states:
Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 23. Even if an act or event causing damage to anothers property was not due to the fault
or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event
he was benefited.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by
damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages
arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. But in Article 21, the act is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The
answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles
which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premises is admitted, then the proposed
rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which
cause damages. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the
conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one can not but feel that it is safe and salutary
to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring
quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.
Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with
impunity cause damage to his fellow-men so long as he does not break any law of the State, though he may be
defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the
government to afford him protection or relief.
In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code, We hold defendant Shell Company liable to pay
to the Velayo, for the benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory damages a sum
equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and another equal sum as exemplary
damages.

Page 30 of 116

[149] SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998
TOPIC
Abuse of Rights
DOCTRINE
An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of
contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim)
and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing...
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
FACTS
Plaintiff Morada worked as a Flight Attendant for defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) which is
based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
April 27, 1990 - While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow
crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of
Thamer. When they were in the room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi,
the latter as an accomplice.
January 14, 1992 - Just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her
superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take
a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain
Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As
it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then
returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see
Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no
danger to her.
June 27, 1993 - In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court. Nothing
happened then but on the following day, June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,
however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden
her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further
orders.
July 3, 1993 - A SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her
astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five

Page 31 of 116

months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and
allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the
service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi
("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
Petitioner SAUDIAs contention: That before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It
maintains that private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
Private Respondent Moradas contention: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.

ISSUE/HELD
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City can validly take cognizance and decide on the
case >> YES
RATIO
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we
agree with private respondents assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with
judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. Based on the allegations in the Amended
Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and
hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691.
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately
control Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of
qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.

An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of
contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract
claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration,
the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.

After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint
deemed submitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable
basis for private respondents assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner
brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges
she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in
Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

Page 32 of 116

There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or turning over of the
person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as
employer. Petitioners purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional
humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the
arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioners authority as
employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly
found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was
wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for
which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done,
once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point
of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the
tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines
where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According
to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good
faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury
allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the
place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
[T]o determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here, although it should be
stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent
as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and the place
having the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on
tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising
out of this case

Page 33 of 116

150 GLOBE MACKAY vs. CA

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBET HENDRY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO TOBIAS
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
DOCTRINES:
Article 19 of the Civil Code contains the principle of abuse of rights which sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones right but also in the performance of ones duties.
While Art. 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, the remedies for its violations may be found in Arts. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing and administrative assistant
to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to Tobias, it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November
10 to his immediate superior Ferraren and to Hendry who was then the EVP and GM of Globe Mackay. The
following day, Hendry confronted Tobias and told him that he was the primary suspect and ordered him to take
a 1 week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open and to leave the
office keys.
When he returned to work, Hendry called him a crook and swindler. Tobias was ordered to take a lie
detector test and submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for examination by police
investigators.
On December 6, 1972, the police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report and cleared Tobias
of participation in the anomalies. Unsatisfied with the results, Hendry hired retired Col. Fernandez, a private
investigator, who found Tobias guilty. This report stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to filing of criminal charges against him. Lt. Tagle reiterating the results of the first report made a
second laboratory crime report.
Notwithstanding the reports, Globe Mackay and Hendry filed a complaint for estafa through falsification
of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Petitioners also filed five more complaints of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents and a complaint for Art. 290 of the RPC (discovering secrets
through seizure of correspondence). All of these complaints were dismissed by the fiscals office. The appeal to
the Secretary of Justice resulted in the same result as that of the fiscals office complaints dismissed.
In the meantime, Tobias received a notice that his employment has been terminated effective
December 13, 1972. Tobias filed a compliant for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
but the NLRC reversed the decision of the former. However, the Labor Secretary, upon petitioners appeal,
reinstated the LAs decision. While Tobias appealed the case to the Office of the President, Tobias and Globe
Mackay entered into a compromise agreement in settlement of the illegal dismissal case.
When Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO), Hendry, without
being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due
to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for damages based on allegd unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners.
RTC petitioners liable; pay 80k actual; 200k moral; 20k exemplary damages; 30k attorneys fees.
CA affirmed RTC decision in toto.

Page 34 of 116

ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for damages to Tobias.

HELD: YES.
RATIO:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" should "vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes"
An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking
the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness
and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages
under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from
work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against
Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short
Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked
petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about

Page 35 of 116
Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations
of 'Tobias' personal dignity.
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October
1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter,
Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a
longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for
damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. To constitute
malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate
a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution.
The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for
malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith. In
the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias.

Page 36 of 116
[151] ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Topic: Intentional Tort: Abuse of Rights
Doctrine: Elements of Abuse of Right: there is a legal right or duty; exercised in bad faith; for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another
FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check
was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason
Account Closed. Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one
Eugenio Baltao.
Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the
signature was his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have
transacted business with Albenson.
Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent
had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the
father to inform Albenson of such information. Instead, the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson
because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced
in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00 with the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of Baltao, in its decision the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the
account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed
Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is that it
was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao
Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with. It granted 133,350 pesos
of actual damages, 1 million pesos for moral damages, 200,000 for exemplary damages and 100,000
attorneys fees.
CA reduced the moral damages to 500,000 and 50,000 attorneys fees
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case
of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves
them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his
complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code. (Abuse of rights)
ISSUE:
Whether there is abuse of rights on the side of Albenson
RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause damage to the respondent
or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of
Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.
Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao (EB)
Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

Page 37 of 116
1.
2.
3.

there is a legal right or duty

exercised in bad faith
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1.
there is an act which is legal
2.
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3.
it is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay
him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the
adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.

Page 38 of 116

152 SERGIO AMONOY vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA
[G.R. No. 140420. February 15 , 2001] | PANGANIBAN, J. | TOPIC: Intentional Tort - Abuse of Rights

DOCTRINE: Under the principle of Damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a persons rights, even
if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a
remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a persons right, or
when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment
of ones rights, one must act with justice, give others their due, and observe honesty and good faith.
FACTS: AMONOY was the counsel of Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion PASAMBA and Alfonso
FORMILDA in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of the CFI of Pasig, involving the settlement of the estate of Julio
Cantolos, involving 6 parcels of land in Tanay Rizal. After the Project of Partition was approved, 2 of the lots
were adjudicated to PASAMBA and FORMILDA, but they in turn mortgaged these two lots to AMAONOY to
secure payment of attorneys fees he was charging them, which was in th amount of P27.6k
PASAMBA died in Feb 1969 and FORNILDA followed suit in July 1969. Herein respondent ANGELA, wife of
Jose Gutierrez, was among the heirs of Alfonso FORNILDA.
In January 1970, AMONOY filed at the CFI of Pasig, to foreclose on the two lots because he was not paid his
attorneys fees. The heirs opposed, contending that the fees that AMONOY charged were unconscionable, as
the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. The CFI however rendered judgment in favor of AMONOY in Sept.
1972, requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27.6k, secured by the mortgage, P11,880 as value of the
harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorneys fees. The heirs failed to pay, so the two lots were
foreclosed and sold at a public auction, wherein AMONOY was the highest bidder, at P23,760.00. AMONOY
claimed for deficiency, and to satisfy it, another execution sale was conducted, with him again being the
highest bidder at P12,137.50. Included in the lots sold was the lot where the house of GUTIERREZ SPOUSES
(Angela and Jose) had their house.
A year after the decision was rendered, GUTIERREZ spouses filed before the CFI for the annulment thereof,
but it was dismissed. Such dismissal was affirmed by the CA. The CFI then issued a Writ of Possession, and
pursuant to which, a notice to vacate was made. On motion by AMONOY, a demolition order was issued on the
structures in the sold lots, including the houses of the GUTIERREZ SPOUSES.
Petition was filed at the SC, and a TRO was granted, enjoining the demolition in June 86. In October 88, TRO
was made permanent. However, by the time the SC decision was promulgated, the house had already been
destroyed in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. And so, SPOUSES GUTIERREZ
filed a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house filed at the RTC in Dec89. RTC
dismissed the suit. On appeal at the CA, RTCs decision was set aside, and AMONOY was ordered to pay
SPOUSES GUTIERREZ P250k as actua damages. AMONOY filed MR, but was denied. Hence, this recourse
to the SC.
AMONOY CONTENDS: He is not liable for the demolition, because he was merely acting in accordance with
the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in deciding that AMONOY was liable to SPOUSES GUTIERREZ for
damages.

Page 39 of 116
HELD: YES, because there was abuse of right on the part of AMONOY, when he wittingly caused the
demolition of the GUTIERREZ SPOUSES house, despite his receipt of the TRO.
RATIO:
1. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. Well-settled is the maxim that damage
resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a loss without injury -- damnum absque
injuria -- for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises ones rights
does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
2. True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents house, was issued by the
Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the
Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4,
1986.
3. Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully
pursued the demolition of respondents house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from
Respondent Angela Gutierrezs testimony. The appellate court quoted the following pertinent portion
thereof:
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after
the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were
tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an
abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO
from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
4.

The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it
life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a
right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific precepts of
positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates them violates the law. For this
reason,
it
is
not
permissible
to
abuse
our
rights
to
prejudice
others.

5.

Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,[13] the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible x x x.

6. Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not
only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly
violated this Courts Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents house.
7. Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid
exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that
the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot

Page 40 of 116
be

obscured,

much

less

abated.

8. In the ultimate analysis, petitioners liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently
and whether or not punishable by law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Page 41 of 116

153 UE v. Jader February 17, 2000

Doctrine:
ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR A SUCCESSFUL
PROSECUTION BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN A SUIT FOR ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19.
FACTS:
Jader was a law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the regular exam for Practice Court I so
he was given an incomplete grade. He took the removals but he was given a grade of five. Jader attended the
graduation and prepared for the bar. He later learned of his deficiency. Jader sued UE for damages. UEs
defense was that Jader should have verified grade!
ISSUE: WON UE was liable for damages.
HELD: YES
UE had the contractual obligation to inform its students as to whether or not all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree have been met. It also showed bad faith in belatedly informing Jader of the result of his
removals, particularly when he was already preparing for the bar.
ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR A SUCCESSFUL
PROSECUTION BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN A SUIT FOR ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the
forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious.
On Art. 19:-intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
-the ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society -A person
should be protected only when he acts with providence and in GF, but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse

Page 42 of 116

154 ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992
Topic: Intentional Torts; Abuse of Rights
Doctrine: Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful
or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

FACTS: Petitioner Esteria Garciano was hired to teach in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of
Camotes. In 1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her
daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. The application approved by the
President of the school's Board of Directors.
A letter was sent to petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of
the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the PTA and the school
faculty, to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written
contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of
getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract.
Upon her return from Austria she made inquiries from the school about the matter. Then the members of the
Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was
reinstated.
The president, vice president, secretary, and 3 members of the Board of Directors, resigned their positions
from the Board for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the
reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty
of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. The RTC ruled in favor of Garciano but on
appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision. The CA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the defendants
were absolved from liability.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in absolving the private respondents from liability by faulting the petitioner
for her failure to report back to her work
HELD: No. Respondents are NOT liable for damages. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with
the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did
not make them liable to her for damages.
RATIO: The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses the authority to
hire and fire teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to
report for work. While the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through her husband, they
admittedly had no authority to do so. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have been held liable to plaintiffappellee for damages. Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter was
aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her through her husband by defendants-appellants had

Page 43 of 116
no legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from reporting for work. What is more, it was
subsequently repudiated by the Board of Directors which directed her to report for work. There was, therefore,
no reason why she did not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had been presented to show
that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work. The fact that defendants-appellants had
"acidly" received the action of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate plaintiff-appellee is
not proof that defendants-appellants had effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from resuming
her post. It was nothing more than a reaction to what defendants-appellants perceived as an affront to their
collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job
in the school and has no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants.
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or
negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21.Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice.
While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent
her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr.
Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en
masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of
free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good
customs or public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed.
She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order. Consequently,
whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on
equity, and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be
construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault. Moral
damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114
SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioners is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence
and failed to report back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself
alone, she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order
for her to report for duty on July 5, 1982.
The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she is not entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages. (Art. 2234, Civil Code).

Page 44 of 116

155 Barons Marketing vs. CA

Doctrine: Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful,
are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the
guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause
damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and
just. Hence, every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will
give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all
the facts and circumstances when the exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right
Facts:
-

August 31, 1973. Plaintiff Philippine Dodge appointed Defendant (petitioner) Barons as one of its
dealers of electrical wires and cables effective September 1, 1973
Barons was given a 60 day credit for its purchase of plaintiffs electrical products.
During the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, Barons purchased, on credit, from
plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.30
These wires and cables were in turn sold, pursuant to previous arrangements, by defendant to
MERALCO, the former being the accredited supplier of the electrical requirements of the latter
September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 out of its total purchases as
above-stated
On several occasions, plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment of its outstanding obligations due
plaintiff
Barons wrote plaintiff on October 5, 1987 requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding account in
monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until
full payment. Plaintiff, however, rejected Barons offer and accordingly reiterated its demand for the full
payment of Barons account.
Plaintiff filed a complaint before the RTC Pasig for the recovery of 3.8m peses plus attorneys fees of
25% from damage and exemplary damage to at least 100k
RTC ruled in favor of Plaintiff
CA modified in view of typographical errors in damages (3.1 million was awarded by RTC)

Issue: WON Plaitiff is guilty of Creditors abuse?

Held: No.
Ration:
-

Petitioner does not deny private respondents rights to institute an action for collection and to claim full
payment. Indeed, petitioners right to file an action for collection is beyond cavil.[5] Likewise, private
respondents right to reject petitioners offer to pay in installments is guaranteed by Article 1248 of the
Civil Code which states:
ART. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled
partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required
to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the
debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.

Page 45 of 116
-

Under this provision, the prestation , i.e., the object of the obligation, must be performed in one act, not
in parts.
Partial Prestations. Since the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance, unless
otherwise stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial prestations does not incur in delay or
mora accipiendi, except when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires acceptance.[6]

Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code, prescribes a primordial limitation on all
rights by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof .[7] Thus:

ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 the defendant must act with bad
faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. They cite the following comments of Tolentino as their authority:

Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are
anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be
concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility
or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity
which considers law as rational and just. Hence, every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its
socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be no intention to injure another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound
exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the exercise of
a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.[11]

The question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it
rejected petitioners offer and filed the action for collection.

We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that
the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same.[12] In the case at bar, petitioner
has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioners allegation that private
respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private
respondent itself may deal directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most,
such supposition is merely speculative.

Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting
petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private
respondent, the corporation had its own cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own
obligations. This is not such a lame and poor rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if
private respondent were to be required to accept petitioners offer, there would be no reason for the
latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any
enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that what we have
here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem
private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to
violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

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156 Bpi vs ca
Facts:

Atty marasigan was a bpi credit card holder

He had a credit limit of 3k then it was increased to 5k
Atty marasigan was of the habbit of paying his bills in post dated checks, and according to him, the
bank did not complain.
Their contractual relations went on smoothly until his statement of account for October, 1989 amounting
to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time
On November 28, 1989, defendant served plaintiff a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the
temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in
their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any
inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant
within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled
He then issued a post dated check like he would normally do
Confident that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check, plaintiff invited
some guests on December 8, 1989 and entertained them at Caf Adriatico.
Upon payment of the bill, the card was dishonored, one of his guests had to pay the bill.
He then wrote a letter to bpi, requesting the return of the check, and that they give a proper accounting
of his indebtedness so that he may fully settle it.
No settlement was reached between the parties
Hence atty marasigan filed a complaint for damages against the bank.
After trial, the trial court ruled for private respondent, finding that herein petitioner abused its right in
contravention of Article 19 of the Civil Code
The trial court said: , upon failure of the cardholder to pay his outstanding obligation for more than thirty
(30) days, the defendant can automatically suspend or cancel the credit card, that reserved right should
not have been abused, as it was in fact abused, in plaintiff's case.
After the communication of atty marasigan to a certain miss Lorenzo, there was no indication that the
card would already be cancelled.
The ca merely affirmed the rtc decision

Sc ruling:

Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by the private respondent, any card with
outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall automatically be
suspended.
It is clear that atty marasigan did not pay for the 2 billings before his card was finally cancelled.
By his own admission, private respondent made no payment within thirty days for his original
billing/statement dated 27 September 1989.
Neither did he make payment for his original
billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently, as early as 28 October 1989, thirty days from
the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989, petitioner corporation could automatically
suspend his credit card.

Topic:

Finally, we find no legal and factual basis for private respondent's assertion that in canceling the credit
card of the private respondent, petitioner abused its right under the terms and conditions of the
contract.

Page 47 of 116

To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19 the following elements must be present:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
As early as 28 October 1989, petitioner could have suspended private respondent's card outright.
Instead, petitioner allowed private respondent to use his card for several weeks. Petitioner had even
notified private respondent of the impending suspension of his credit card and made special
accommodations for him for settling his outstanding account. As such, petitioner cannot be said to have
capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the private respondent's credit card.
The sc ruled that atty marasigan indeed suffered some damage.
May pagkakaiba ang damages sa injury
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; i and the breach of such duty should be the proximate
cause of the injury.
In this case it was the own doing of atty marasigan which caused his embarrassment. The agreement
was that he settle his passed due indebtedness, instead of paying, he paid using a post dated check.
Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such
an instrument does not, by itself operate as payment.ii This is especially true in the case of a postdated
check.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees, is SET ASIDE. Private respondent is DIRECTED to pay his outstanding obligation with
the petitioner in the amount of P14,439.41.

Page 48 of 116

157 Ruiz vs Secretary

AUTHOR: twinkle

TOPIC: Acts Contra Bonus Mores: Elements

NOTES: VERY SHORT CASE

G.R. No. L-15526

December 28, 1963

PONENTE: Paredes, J.
FACTS:
1. The Republic of the Philippines entered into a contract with Allied Technologists, Inc. (corporation,
for short), for the construction of the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were
stockholders and officers of the corporation. The construction of the hospital was terminated in 1955.
2. Two civil cases were filed by Ruiz and Herrera against the Secretary of National Defense, Col.
Nicolas Jimenez (Engineer), the Finance Officer, and the Auditor of the Dept. of National Defense,
Pablo D. Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc.
3. First Civil Case: dismissed by the CFI; SC affirmed dismissal.
4. Second Civil Case: dismissed by CFI. CA reversed the dismissal, under the impression that the real
controversy was confined merely between defendant Panlilio and plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera over the
15% of the contract price, which was retained by the Department of National Defense. The retention
of the 15% of the contract price in the sum of P34,740.00 was made to answer for any claim or lien
that might arise, in the course of the construction. CA remanded CFI for further proceedings.
5. Panlilio and the corporation filed their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by the
Department of National Defense was already paid to defendant corporation, as sought for by the
plaintiffs in their complaint. In view of this development, the trial court invited the parties to a
conference, in which the plaintiffs indicated their conformity, to the dismissal of the complaint with
respect to the retention of the 15% of the contract price; but insisted upon the hearing of the second
question, which sought the declaration and recognition of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the
three architects of the hospital. The trial court, nevertheless, dismissed the complaint, for being
already academic and moot. Hence, this appeal by plaintiffs-appellants, who alleged in their lone
assignment of error that "the lower court grievously erred in ordering the dismissal of the case, with
costs against the plaintiffs".
ISSUE(S): whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
1) The appeal has no merit. The order appealed from, states
Considering the manifestation of counsel for plaintiffs that the latter would insist on the hearing of the
above-entitled case for the purpose of establishing their right to be recognized as the architects of the
Veterans Hospital together with defendant Pablo D. Panlilio, and it appearing that plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint with Injunction prays, among others, "That this Honorable Court order defendants Secretary
of National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez, and the Finance Officer and Auditor of the Department of
National Defense to pay the Allied Technologists, Inc., the balance unpaid by virtue of the contract
executed on September 11, 1950 (Annex "C" hereof) for services rendered under Title I and to be
rendered under Title II of said contract; that paragraph 4 of defendant Pablo Panlilio's Amended Answer
to said complaint alleges "That whatever amounts were retained by the Dept. of National Defense on the
contract price, which retention was authorized by the contract, was paid by the Dept. of National
Defense to the Allied Technologists Inc. as sought by the plaintiffs; that paragraph (e) of the ANSWER
TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT of defendant Allied Technologists, Inc., also alleges "That whatever
amounts were retained by the Department of National Defense, per the stipulations contained in the
contract, have already been paid by the Allied Technologists, Inc. and, therefore, the present action
seeking to compel the aforementioned Department of National Defense to pay to defendant Allied

Page 49 of 116
Technologists, Inc. the amounts retained by the Department of National Defense is academic,
groundless, unfounded and malicious"; that the said allegations of the separate answers of defendants
Pablo Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc., are not and can not be denied by plaintiffs, and that it is this
Court's understanding that defendant has no objection to the dismissal of this case it is ordered that
this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against plaintiffs.
2) A cursory reading of pars. 18 and 19 of the amended complaint with injunction and prayers (1) and (2)
thereof, reveals that appellants' first cause of action is composed of two parts, as follows:
(a) A judicial declaration or recognition that appellants Ruiz and Herrera, together with appellee Panlilio,
were the architects of the Veterans Hospital; and
(b) An injunction restraining the appellee government officials paying their co-appellee Panlilio the sum
retained by the former, as per stipulation contained in the contract for the construction of the hospital
because "they will not only be deprived of the monetary value of the services legally due them, but that
their professional prestige and standing will be seriously impaired".
3) As appellants admitted, they no longer consider the Secretary and other officials of the Department of
National Defense, as parties-defendants in the case, said officials can no longer be compelled to
recognize the appellants, Ruiz and Herrera, as co-architects with appellee Panlilio of the Veterans
Hospital. And, as the amount retained by the Department on the contract price, which retention was
authorized by the contract, was, as sought by the appellants, already paid to the Allied Technologists,
Inc., there is nothing more for the trial court to decide, even without first ruling on the special defenses of
appellees Panlilio and the corporation.
4) Moreover, by discarding the Secretary and other officials of the Department of National Defense,
as parties-defendants, appellants could not expect the trial court to order them to recognize and
declare appellants as co-architects in the construction of the hospital. And this must be so,
because the construction agreement expressly provides that the architect being contracted by
the Government was appellee Pablo Panlilio. The said agreement states that the same was entered
into by the government, party of the first part and "Allied Technologists, Inc. . . . and Mr. Pablo D.
Panlilio, architect, hereinafter called the party of the second part" and "The Allied Technologists, Inc. for
rendering engineering services and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio, architect, for rendering architectural services".
And the contract was signed for the Government by "Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary of National Defense
(party of the first part," and "Allied Technologists, Inc., by Enrique J. L. Ruiz, President, Contractor,
Pablo D. Panlilio, Architect".
5) But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate right or
property, but also to honor or credit (I Tolentino Civil Code, p. 67). It may be added, however, that this
article also envisions a situation where a person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material
or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that
damages were ever asked or alleged, in connection with this case, predicated upon the article
aforecited. And under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, one cannot plausibly
sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

Page 50 of 116

158 Wassmer v. Velez

Please Note: (Not included in the case) Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the following
elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public
policy; and (3) is done with intent to injure. The common element under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act
complained of must be intentional, and attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which
can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of
whether or not this principle has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21, or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. Mata v. Agravante G.R. No. 147597
August 6, 2008
***This is a short case
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Facts:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning
and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer decided to get married and set September 4, 1954
On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create
a scandal.
Paquing

September 3, he sent her another telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING

Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Beatriz sued by for damages.

Issue: WON Wessmer is liable for breach of promise to marry.

Held: Yes. The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were

Page 51 of 116
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes
it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from
again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised
as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral
and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.

Page 52 of 116

159
Title: APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-18630
December 17, 1966
Topic: Breach of Promise to Marry, Seduction
and Sexual Assault

Quick Notes/Doctrine: The essential feature is seduction,

that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence
on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded

Facts: From December, 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that
"Apolonio expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Araceli who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of Apolonios promise of marriage Araceli consented
and acceded to Apolonio's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage, Apolonio succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli, as a
result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation,Araceli had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving
P230.00 a month; that thereby Araceli became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to Apolonio's
refusal to marry Araceli, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the Apolonio to
recognize the unborn child that Araceli was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support
and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon Apolonio's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action.
Araceli Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with
the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its
support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin
to proceed with the case.
Apolonio, in turn, appealed to the Suprem Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are
not permissible in this jurisdiction

Issues: WON Araceli has a cause of action

Held: No, over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, Araceli, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of Apolonio, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all
sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was

Page 53 of 116
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the
child of the Araceli against Apolonio, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.

Ratio :
Dispositive Portion: FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs
Relation/Pertinent Law :

Page 54 of 116

160 G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B.
CIRILO, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
An action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,not actionableapart from
the right to recover money or property advanced or incurred by the plaintiff.

Under Article 21, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages.

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.

FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, Petitioner Bunag, Jr. brought respondent Cirilo to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, Bunag Jr brought respondent Cirilo to the house of his
grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and
wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973.
On September 10, 1973, Bunag, Jr. and respondent Cirilo filed their respective applications for a marriage
license. On October 1, 1973, after leaving respondent Cirilo, Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license.
Respondent Cirilo claimed that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973 Bunag, Jr. actually abducted her,
brought her to a motel or hotel, and raped and took her virginity.
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed before the RTC by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr.
On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent,
the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was
absolved from any and all liability.
Upon appeal, Bunag Jr asserted that since the action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages. But on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Was the awarding of damages (moral, exemplary, temperate) proper? Answer: Yes.
HELD: An action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil lawnot actionableapart from
the right to recover money or property advanced or incurred by the plaintiff.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. And under Article 21, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for moral damages.

Page 55 of 116
Here, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her
against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. This justifies the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
OTHER CONTENTION:
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a
finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed
by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the
fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein
private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
PROVISIONS:
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Page 56 of 116

[161] AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the
former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
TOPIC
Breach of promise to marry, seduction and sexual assault
DOCTRINE
Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire
FACTS
Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan
Mendez.
In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges that:
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta.
Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress;
that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he
was billeted;
that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think
about Ivan's proposal;
that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter
agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and
through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter;
that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man;
that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever
Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant;
that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other
man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint;
that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a
prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000.
As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit
relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.
TC: rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino
CA: set aside the decision of TC
ISSUE/HELD
Whether or not there was a breach of promise to marry and therefore, Amelita can claim for damages? NO.
RATIO
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that
through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of
Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if
sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to
Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after
their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the
months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that
passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.

Page 57 of 116
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
Quimiguing vs. Icao
G.R. No. 26795 (1970)
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao. The parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and
had close and confidential relations. Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result, she became
pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao, forcing her had to stop studying. Hence, she now claims
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Icao, on the other hand, moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. After hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Quimiguing moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining Icao's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Hence the appeal directly to this Court.
Issue: Was the trial court correct in sustaining Icaos motion?
Held:
The high Court ruled in the negative. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, an unborn child has a right to receive support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere."
Further, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint
in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the
damage caused, as mandated by Article 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2219 (3,10).
Hence, Quimiguing herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of her complaint, and the
dismissal of the same constitutes an error on the part of the lower court.

Page 58 of 116

163 Cecilio Pe, et al. v. Alfonso Pe

Doctrine:
Facts:
1) The case originates from the parents, brothers, and sisters of Lolita Pe, who had gone missing since
April 14, 1957, and at that time was single, 24 years old. It was alleged that Alfonso Pe frequented their
house on the prefect that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary because he is a China
Man. However, it was never told by Alfonso that he was married, the family only finding out eventually.
2) The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in her home
town but also the town where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. Eventually the parents of Lolita
found out and forbade Alfonso from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita.
3) The affair continued just the same and on April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house
where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador
which stated that the couple will have a date.
4) The present action was instituted in the CFI-Manila under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The petitioner
family prayed for recovery of moral, compensatory, exemplary, and corrective damages in the amount
of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation because of the humiliation that
happened to them when their daughter had an affair with a married man.
5) Alfonso Pe contended that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of
action
6) The lower court finding that Alfonso had carried on a love affair with Lolita, being a married man
himself, declared that Alfonso cannot be held liable for moral damages, it appearing that Lolita relatives
failed to prove that he deliberately and in bad faith tried to win her affection. Hence, dismissed the case.
Hence the case.
Issue:
Won the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Held:
Yes he committed an injury to her family. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas
affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn
from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused
her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed and injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Ratio:
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Notes:
Yes, this is literally what the SC held and yes not much doctrine.

Page 59 of 116

164 ANDRES LAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al

Gr 47013 FEB 17, 2000 PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
1. The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (Corporation for brevity) entered into a "Contract of
Sales Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and
shipped by the Corporation to his business address in Tacloban City. Lao would in turn remit the
sales proceeds to the Corporation. For his services, Lao would receive commission depending on
the kind of cigarettes sold, fixed monthly salary, and operational allowance. As a guarantee to Lao's
compliance with his contractual obligations, his brother Jose and his father Tomas executed a deed of
mortgage in favor of the Corporation in the amount of P200,000.00.
2. Lao regularly remitted the proceeds of his sales to the Corporation, generating, in the process, a great deal
of business. Thus, the Corporation awarded him trophies and plaques in recognition of his outstanding
performance from 1966 to 1968.
3. However, in February 1968 and until about seven (7) months later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly
sales report. In a conference in Cebu, Ching Kiat Kam, the President of the Corporation, reminded Lao of
his enormous accounts and the difficulty of obtaining a tally thereon despite Lao's avowal of regular
remittances of his collections.
4. Esteban Co, the vice-president and general manager of the Corporation, summoned Lao to Pasay City for
an accounting. It was then and there established that Lao's liability amounted to P525,053.47. And so, Lao
and his brother Lao Y Ka, enlisted the services of the Sycip Gorres and Velayo Accounting Firm (SGV) to
check and reconcile the accounts.
5. The Corporation discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction business so much so that it
suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales to finance his business.
6. It was discovered that, contrary to Lao's allegation that he still had huge collectibles from his
customers, nothing was due the Corporation from Lao's clients. From then on, Lao no longer received
shipments from the Corporation which transferred its vehicles to another compound controlled by Ngo
Kheng. Shipments of cigarettes and the corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo
Kheng.
7. Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for accounting and damages with writ of preliminary
injunction against the Corporation. March 26, 1975: CFI RULED IN THEIR FAVOR.
8. Feb 28, 1977: However, Based on the findings by the Committee of Audit, the trial court promulgated a
supplemental decision wherein it dismissed Lao's claim that he had made an overpayment of
P556,444.20.
9. The Corporation appealed the decision, dated March 26, 1975, just as Lao appealed the supplemental
decision, dated February 28, 1977, to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed, and as for the supplemental
decision, it was reversed and set aside. MR also denied.
10. Corporation filed a case of estafa against Lao.
11. Lao sought a reinvestigation of the case, contending that he was never served a subpoena or
notice of preliminary investigation that was considered mandatory in cases cognizable by Court of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court. Apparently, the preliminary investigation proceeded exparte because Esteban Co made it appear that Lao could not be located.
12. Lao lodged a complaint for malicious prosecution against the Corporation and Esteban Co, praying
for an award of damages for violation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. (NOTWITHSTANDING
the termination of the criminal case)
13. CFI ruled in the malicious prosecution case in favor of LAO. CA AFFIRMED.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner Corporation contends that the complaint for malicious prosecution brought by Lao during the
pendency of subject criminal case for estafa, states no cause of action as it was prematurely filed when the
criminal case that resulted in the acquittal of Lao was not yet terminated.

Page 60 of 116
On the other hand, respondent Lao countered that the elements supportive of an action for malicious
prosecution are evidentiary in nature and their existence or non-existence cannot be the subject of evaluation
and conclusion upon the filing of the complaint. For Lao, those elements must be determined at the time the
plaintiff has offered all his evidence and rested his case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CORPORATION is liable for malicious prosecution.
HELD:
NO. Case is premature. The case maliciously commenced should be terminated before a claim for
damages arising from the filing of such case should be presented.
The contention of Lao that the elements of an action for malicious prosecution are evidentiary in
nature and should be determined at the time the plaintiff offers evidence and rests his case, is
untenable. To rule otherwise would, in effect, sanction the filing of actions without a cause of action.
The existence of a cause of action is determined solely by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Neither does the Court find merit in respondent Lao's submission that the complaint for malicious prosecution
is viable inasmuch as it is also anchored on Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. This may appear to be a
persuasive argument since there is no hard and fast rule which can be applied in the determination of whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under the said articles of the Civil
Code on Human Relations. Indeed, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later
on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights or on malicious
prosecution.However, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights or malicious prosecution, a reading of
the complaint here reveals that it is founded on the mere filing of the estafa charge against respondent
Lao. As such, it was prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of action. Should the action for
malicious prosecution be entertained and the estafa charge would result in respondent Lao's
conviction during the pendency of the damage suit, even if it is based on Articles 20 and 21, such suit
would nonetheless become groundless and unfounded. To repeat; that the estafa case, in fact, resulted in
respondent Lao's acquittal would not infuse a cause of action on the malicious prosecution case already
commenced and pending resolution.
DOCTRINES:
Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. As thus
defined, the fact of termination of the criminal prosecution, civil suit or legal proceeding maliciously
filed and without probable cause, should precede the complaint for malicious prosecution. Such a
complaint states a cause of action if it alleges: (a) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least
instigated the prosecution; (b) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (c) that in
bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (d) that the prosecutor was actuated by
malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.
DISPOSITIVE: In G.R. Nos. 60958-59, the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 61925-R is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE; the respondent corporation is adjudged not liable for malicious prosecution due to the
prematurity of the action

Page 61 of 116

165 Que v. IAC and Nicolas

DOCTRINE:
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
FACTS:
-

In July and August of 1975, Antonio Nicolas ordered from Magtanggol Que certain amounts of canvass
strollers which were delivered to and accepted by Nicolas, who issued five (5) checks therefore to Que.
The total face value of the cheeks was P7,600. However, payment thereof was subsequently stopped
by Nicolas and Que was unable to encash them. Nicolas explained later that he had ordered the "stop
payment" because of defects in the articles sold which despite his requests Que had not corrected.
Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas in the office of the city fiscal of Caloocan City for
issuance of several checks which were subsequently dishonored when presented for encashment. The
charge was dismissed for lack of merit, the investigating fiscal holding that the controversy was
an accounting matter that did not necessarily involve deceit on the part of Nicolas.
Subsequently, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que, this time in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, for what he claimed was his MALICIOUS PROSECUTION by the
latter.
Que claimed that Nicolas act of filing a complaint in Bulacan was the latters way of harassing him. In
his counterclaim, he averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the complaint in Bulacan although he
was a resident of Caloocan City; that the private respondent was really indebted to him in any case;
and that it was he who had suffered damages as a result of the unwarranted suit.
Judge Puno held in favor Nicolas, and awarded him the total amount of P80,500 in moral,
exemplary, and nominal damages plus a P4,000 attorney's fee and the costs of the suit. He
found that Que had acted MALICIOUSLY in filing the estafa charge and in alleging that the
plaintiff had issued the dishonored checks with deceit aforethought.
Que filed a motion for reconsideration, which was DENIED by Judge Fernandez who had succeeded
Judge Puno. Que filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond, followed two days later by his record on
appeal, which was opposed by Nicolas. Nicolas filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
Que filed a motion to stay the running of the period for appeal and leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration within a period of thirty days. The trial court granted an extension. The second motion
for reconsideration was filed on that date and on the basis thereof the TRIAL COURT rendered
its amended decision which REVERSED the original decision penned by Judge Puno. It also
awarded P10,000 moral damages to Que on his counterclaim. Thus it was that Nicolas, the
would-be-appellee, became himself the appellant in the respondent court.
In his appeal, Nicolas contended that (1) the amended decision rendered by Judge Fernandez was null
and void bec. the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when the petitioner filed his notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal. (2) Assuming the appeal had not yet been perfected, the trial judge
nevertheless could not have acted on the second motion for reconsideration because it did not contain
any notice of hearing and was also filed beyond the 30-day extension prayed for by the petitioner
himself. (3) There was the further contention that the second motion for reconsideration was pro
forma and as "a mere scrap of paper" did not suspend the running of the reglementary period for
appeal.
Respondent court denied the first and second grounds of Nicolas appeal. However, it sustained the
third ground and held that the second motion for reconsideration should have been denied for
being pro forma as it was a mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and already decided by the
trial court. Accordingly, it ANULLED the amended decision based on the second motion for
reconsideration and REINSTATED the original decision of Judge Puno. Thus, Nicolas WON, Que
.

Page 62 of 116

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Que is guilty of Malicious Prosecution? NO

(focused only on the issue related to the outline/topic)
RULING:
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
In Buchanan v. Esteban, the Supreme Court had already stressed that "one cannot be held liable in damages
for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause." As Justice Moreland explained in
that case: Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief,
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which be was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that one
cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with
probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
without probable cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued
at law when their indictments miscarried.
Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights granted by law. Otherwise, there would
always be a civil action for damages after the prosecution's failure to prove its cause. The adverse
result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so
precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
In the case at bar, considering that the checks could not be encashed and the supposedly defective goods had
not been returned, Que had reason to believe that Nicolas intended to deceive him. Que was not motivated by
ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his rights. Even if the fiscal found that no deceit was involved and
that Ques claim was unfounded, the mistaken charge was not malicious.
The mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a cause of action. What was
inquired into was whether or not there was a prima facie showing of estafa. Nowhere in the fiscal's
investigation report is there any statement imputing malice to Que.
There is in fact a stronger suggestion of malice in the circumstance that the Nicolas filed his complaint for
damages in Valenzuela, Bulacan, as his alleged residence, notwithstanding that his place of business, in which
he had dealings with the petitioner, was Caloocan City. The Court finds the petitioner's claim of harassment
more plausible. However, inasmuch as good faith is presumed, and applying this presumption both to Que and
Nicolas, absent sufficient rebuttable evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice in their mutual relations.
SC denied both parties their respective claims for damages and holds that each of them must bear the
financial consequences of his own acts, including the litigation expenses.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated March 12, 1984, is SET ASIDE and
the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21, 1979, is REINSTATED as above modified. This
decision is immediately executory.

Page 63 of 116

166 Drilon vs. CA

G.R. No. 107019 March 20, 1997
DOCTRINE
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in Articles 19, 20, 21, 26,
29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8). In order for such suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal, (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and
(3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
FACTS
General de Villa was then the Chief of Staff of the AFP. He wrote a letter to Sec of Justice Drilon requesting
an investigation of several people for their participation in the failed Dec 1989 coup d'etat.
The letter was based on the affidavit of some AFP officials (Brig. Gen. Galido, Capt. Mapalo, Col. Mamorno,
Col. Figueroa, and Maj. Sebastian).
Gen. de Villa's letter was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors
created pursuant to DOJ Order No. 5.
Petitioner, Asst. Chief Prosecutor Trampe, the Team Leader, found sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. He
issued a subpoena to the people named in the letter and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a
panel of investigators composed of the other petitioners (Prosecs Arizala, Abesamis, and Solis).
This resolution was the basis for the filing of an Information charged against private respondent Adaza with
rebellion with murder and frustrated.
Feeling aggrieved, Adaza files a complaint for damages saying that the prosecutors engaged in a deliberate,
willful and malicious experimentation by filing those charges against him. Adaza claims that those prosecutors
knew that such crime did not exist in the statute books.
The prosecutors filed a Motion to Dismiss Adazas complaint saying that the complaint states no actionable
wrong constituting a valid cause of action.
CA dismissed.
Petitioner prosecutors filed in the SC for a review of the case. SC denied.
After more than a year, SC reinstated the petition and granted a TRO ordering the RTC Judge from
proceeding with the case against the prosecutors.
ISSUES
Did Adazas complaint against the prosecutors state a cause of action? Should it have been dismissed from
the start?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Re: Adazas claim that his claim was not a suit for malicious prosecution

Page 64 of 116

Adaza says that his claim in the RTC was a suit for damages based on tort because of the prosecutors
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in office and some violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. It was not a suit for malicious prosecution.
SC does not agree. The complaint was for malicious prosecution against the petitioner prosecutors for
their filing of the charge of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder.
This latest argument as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on
appeal. Nowhere in his complaint in the RTC did Adaza say that his action is one based on tort or The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A change of theory cannot be allowed.
When a party adopts a certain theory in the LC, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
because to permit him would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Re: Discussion on Malicious Prosecution

Malicious prosecution has been defined in many ways.

In American jurisdiction: Malicious prosecution is one begun in malice without probable cause to believe
the charges can be sustained.
Malicious prosecution is when a case is instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without
probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted.
In Philippine jurisdiction: An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution,
civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.
The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation
or injury.
The statutory basis for a civil action for malicious prosecution: found in NCC on Human Relations and
on damages: Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8).
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution.
For malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove 3 elements:
1) For malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove 3 elements:
2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
3) hat the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
All requisites must concur.
Judging from the complaint of Adaza, none of the requisites were alleged, and so, complaint is
dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.

Re: First element: Claim that criminal case has already been terminated

Nothing in the records shows, and the complaint does not allege, that that the criminal case filed, has
been finally terminated and the accused Adaza was acquitted.
What only appears is that Adaza has been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail.
This is not considered the termination of the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant
the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the information
against him.

Re: Second element: Prosecutor acted without probable cause

Page 65 of 116

The complaint does not make any allegation that the prosecution acted without probable cause in filing
the criminal information.
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
A suit for malicious prosecution will lie only when a legal prosecution has been carried on without
probable cause.
The reason for this rule is because:
It would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable
ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.
The decision to prosecution was fully justified in an 18-page Resolution.
Although the prosecutors were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence in People v. Hernandez,
which proscribes the complexing of murder and other common crimes with rebellion, they were of the
honest conviction that the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case. They argued:
In the Hernandez case, the common crimes were found have been committed as a necessary
means to commit rebellion, or in furtherance.
And so, the fiscal in Hernandez filed an information for rebellion alleging those common crimes
as a necessary means of committing the offense charged under the second part of RPC 48.
However, in this case, we do not apply the Hernandez ruling because the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder were unnecessary to commit rebellion.
Hence, the applicable provision is the first part of RPC 48.
While in Enrile v. Salazar, the issue of whether or not the Hernandez doctrine is still good law arose, in
a 10-3 vote, three justices felt the need to re-study the Hernandez ruling in light of present-day
developments.
Chief Justice Fernan wrote a dissenting opinion saying:
The Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule
that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed.

The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was applied by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks

The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez
doctrine that needs clarification.

See, not even the SC was all in agreement in debuking the theory of the prosecutors in this case.
A doubtful question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always
accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
duties.
Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive.
Here, since the prosecutors were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause and since
Adaza himself, did not allege in his complaint lack of probable cause, SC finds that the prosecutors
cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution.

Re: Third requirement: Prosecution was impelled by legal malice

The presence of probable cause signifies the absence of malice.

It is evident that the prosecutors were not motivated by malicious.

Page 66 of 116
In Conclusion:

The complaint filed by Adaza against the prosecutors does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action for malicious prosecution.
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss must appear on the face of the complaint
itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other.
The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge's
attention.
Paragraph 14 of the complaint stating: The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a
non-existent crime had severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's name is a conclusion of law and is
not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts.

Petition is granted.

Page 67 of 116

167 Rafael Patricio V. Hon. Oscar Leviste, Et Al.

G.R. No. L-51832 April 26, 1989
Topic: Public humiliation (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: ART. 2219,Art. 21, Art. 23

FACTS:
May 16, 1976 10 pm: During a benefit dance in celebration of the town fiesta Rafael Patricio, an ordained
Catholic priest together with 2 policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the
assigned watchers of the gate.
Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan who was in the state of drunkenness was also at the same gate struck a bottle of beer on
the table which injured and caused his own hand to bleed.
Bacalocos then approached Patricio and asked him if he has seen his wounded hand and before Patricio could
respond he hit Patricio's face with his bloodied hand.
Bacalocos was brought to the Police Station
Patricio filed a criminal case charging Bacalocos for Slander by Deed but it was dismissed so he filed for
damages in the court a quo.
Court a quo: liable for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, moral shock and social humiliation
Motion for reconsideration: Court reconsidered moral and exemplary damages, in order to merit, the plaintiff
ought to have proven actual or compensatory damages
Patricio: Being slapped in public causing him physical suffering and social humiliation, entitles him to moral
damages; Actual and compensatory damages need not be proven
ISSUE: W/N Patricio should be entitled to moral damages
HELD:YES. petition is GRANTED. CA REVERSED and court a quo REINSTATED
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts.
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Page 68 of 116
The hitting on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and causing mental anguish, moral shock,
wounded feelings and social humiliation
drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability
Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and
that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was
an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent
slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons.
Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is to compensate the injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person
ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Exemplary or corrective damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender
a. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff
is entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be
b. such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right
In cases where exemplary damages are awarded to the injured party, attorney's fees are also recoverable

Page 69 of 116

168 ENERVIDA vs DE LA TORRE

ROQUE ENERVIDA vs.LAURO DE LA TORRE and ROSA DE LA TORRE
G.R. No. L-38037 January 28, 1974
FACTS:

Roque Enervida filed a complaint against spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la Torre praying that
the deed of sale executed by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a
Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of
five years, in violation of the provision, of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Law. He further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being
the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father.
Defendants filed their answer stating, among other things, that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against them as his father was still alive and it was not true that he was the only son of Ciriaco Enervida
and that the sale did not take place within the prohibited period.
RTC: dismissed the complaint against spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la Torre.
Considering the fact that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants and has no legal
capacity to sue, and considering further that he is prompted with malice and bad faith in taking this
action to Court by alleging false statements in his complaint, this Court hereby orders the dismissal of
the case and also order the plaintiff to pay unto the defendants the sum of TWO THOUSAND
(P2,000.00) PESOS in concept of actual moral and exemplary damages and also for payment of
attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la Torre are entitled moral and exemplary
damages.
HELD: NO.
with respect to moral damages, we are inclined to agree with petitioner that these damages are not
recoverable herein, notwithstanding the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that his complaint
against respondents were clearly unfounded or unreasonable.
It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases
as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which
moral damages, may be recovered (Art. 2219).
A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But
the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208
(par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect
to moral damages.
It is true that Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to those
enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended" a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings" to be one
of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it
in Art. 2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in Art. 2219.

Page 70 of 116
Besides, Art. 2219 Specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries", as an instance when moral
damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are
excluded, excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309, par. 9, Art. 2219 and in Arts. 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the
claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its causal relation
to defendant's acts.
This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondent
were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no
definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist of.
Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation
for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or
exemplary damages.
DOCTRINE: Unfounded suit is not a basis of Moral Damages for it is not part of Art. 2219.

Page 71 of 116

169- Unjust Dismissal

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner, vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Presiding Judge of Branch XVIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
CARLOS E. CRUZ and B. E. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Nature: Petitioner company has elevated to the SC for review of two Orders of respondent Judge dismissing
petitioner's complaint for damages and denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
Private respondent Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by petitioner as Engineer Officer with the
opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course," which he.
An express stipulation in the letter-offer read:
3. BONDING. As you will be provided with conversion training you are required to enter into a
bond with Singapore Airlines for a period of 5 years
Cruz entered into an "Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore
Airlines Limited" wherein it was stipulated among others:
4. The Engineer Officer shall agree to remain in the service of the Company for a period of five
years from the date of commencement of such aforesaid conversion training if so required by
the Company.
5. In the event of the Engineer Officer:
1. Leaving the service of the company during the period of five years referred to in
Clause 4 above, or
2. Being dismissed or having his services terminated by the company for misconduct,
the Engineer Officer and the Sureties hereby bind themselves jointly and severally to
pay to the Company as liquidated damages such sums of money as are set out (tiered
depends on when it happens)
6. The provisions of Clause 5 above shall not apply in a case where an Engineer Officer has his
training terminated by the Company for reasons other than misconduct or where, subsequent to
the completion of training, he 1. loses his license to operate as a Flight Engineer due to medical reasons which can in
no way be attributable to any act or omission on his part;
2. is unable to continue in employment with the Company because his employment pass
or work permit, as the case may be, has been withdrawn or has not been renewed due
to no act or omission on his part;
3. has his services terminated by the Company as a result of being replaced by a
national Flight Engineer;
4. has to leave the service of the Company on valid compassionate grounds stated to
and accepted by the Company in writing.
Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval of the
application during the second year of the Period of five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against
Cruz for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid Agreement.
In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time had he been required by
petitioner to agree to a straight service of five years under Clause 4 of the Agreement (supra) and that
he left the service on "valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company so that no
damages may be awarded against him. And because of petitioner-plaintiff's alleged ungrounded causes
of action.
Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his
job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but on the manner and
consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner
had to suffer.

Page 72 of 116
Issue: WON Cruz violated the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
Held: Did not rule on this issue remanded to the RTC Discussion on unjust dismissal below

Squarely in point is the ruling enunciated in the case of Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer &
Plywood, Inc.4 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Although the acts complied of seemingly appear to constitute "matter involving employee employer"
relations as Quisaba's dismiss was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relations, his
complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or
backwages, but on the manner of his dismiss and the consequent effects of such
Civil law consists of that 'mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between
members of a society for the protection of private interest.
The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the
right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
If the dismiss was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents
violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor
against the other, and article 21, which makers a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for
which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, No. 10.
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the labor
Code.
The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation.
The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of
in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay.
The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a
civil dispute.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. The records are hereby
ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to which this case belongs,
for further proceedings. No costs.
Extra: Discussion on Jurisdiction Civil
The issue of jurisdiction having been raised at the pre-trial conference, the parties were directed to
submit their respective memoranda on that question, which they complied with in due time. On October
28, 1977, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint, counterclaim and
cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction stating.
The present case therefore involves a money claim arising from an employer-employee relation or at
the very least a case arising from employer-employee relations, which under Art. 216 of the Labor Code
is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to
the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee
relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg.
130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor
Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal"
without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon
him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay.
This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and
conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the
present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.

Page 73 of 116

170 Medina vs Castro-Bartolome

G.R. No. L-59825 September 11, 1982
Lessons Applicable: Unjust dismissal (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
Cosme de Aboitiz, acting in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., went to the Pepsi-Cola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and without
any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong:
GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU
ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(referring to Jose Ong ) for having allegedly
delayed the use of promotional crowns
effected on the very day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to the Company, 5 days before Christmas
and on the day when the employees' Christmas party was held so that when Medina and Ong went home that
day and found their wives and children already dressed up for the party, they didn't know what to do and so
they cried unashamedly
A joint criminal complaint for oral defamation against Aboitiz
Provincial Fiscal: dismissed the complaint since uttered not to slander but to express anger and displeasure
Petition for Review with the office of the Secretary of Justice (now Ministry of Justice): reversed
Aboitiz filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was dismissed since the complaint
for civil damages is clearly not based on an employer-employee relationship but on the manner of plaintiffs'
dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom
This case was filed on May 10, 1979. The amendatory decree, P.D. 1367, which took effect on May 1, 1978
and which provides that Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for
moral or other forms of damages, now expressly confers jurisdiction on the courts in these cases, specifically
under the plaintiff's causes of action
alreadly settled by jurisprudence that mere asking for reinstatement does not remove from the CFI jurisdiction
over the damages
The case must involve unfair labor practices to bring it within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC)
A second motion to dismiss was filed because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines and Batasan Pambansa Bldg. 70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending
Art. 248 of the Labor Code.
jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims of workers have been removed from the Courts of
First Instance

Page 74 of 116
ISSUE: W/N the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought
HELD: NO. petition is granted
simple action for damages for tortuous acts is governed by the Civil Code and not the Labor Code
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.,dissenting:
I dissent with due deference to the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Abad Santos
The two signed on January 5, 1978 letters of resignation and quitclaims and were paid P93,063 and P84,386
as separation pay, respectively
More than a month after their dismissal, or on January 27, 1978, Medina and Ong filed with the Ministry of
Labor, a complaint for illegal dismissal - dismissed that complaint because of their resignation and quitclaim.
17 days after that order of dismissal, or on May 10, 1979, filed for damages
In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct because the claims of Medina and Ong
were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, as originally provided in article 217 of
the Labor Code and as reaffirmed in Presidential Decree No. 1691. Medina and Ong could not split their cause
of action against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola.

Page 75 of 116

171 AMARO v. SUMANGUIT

G.R. No. L-14986

July 31, 1962

MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appellants filed suit for damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the chief of police
of the City of Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in
their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code, which provide:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
The pertinent allegations in the complaint are that on October 5, 1958 appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted
and shot at near the city government building of Silay;
that the following day he, together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his witnesses, "went to the
office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and
terrorized;"
that in view thereof they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime
. . . .;"
that upon advice of the City Mayor given to appellee an investigation (of said crime) was conducted and
as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal
discharge of firearm against the assailant; and
that "having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief of police is now
harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he
is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared
affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the
crime."
The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the ground that it does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
ISSUE: whether or not the above stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
HELD: YES, We are of the opinion that the facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part
in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion
of law and hence improperly pleaded.
Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's
refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the
aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation. The

Page 76 of 116
statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged
that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the
policemen.
The complaint is, without doubt, imperfectly drafted. It suffers from vagueness and generalization. But all that
the Rules require is that there be a showing by a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff his a right and
that such right has been violated by the defendant. An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity,
indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but rather for a
bill of particulars according to Rule 16. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. I, p. 111. In two
cases decided by this Court, it was observed:
Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague,
ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more
particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods
of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said "The real
test of good pleading under the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to
plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it
gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular
matter that is stated too generally (Vol. XIII, Cincinnati Law Review, January 1939.) Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75
Phil. 672.
The fact, cited by the court below in the order subject to review, that appellants have another recourse (in
connection with the crime of illegal discharge of firearm supposedly committed against one of them) as by filing
their complaint directly with the city attorney of Silay or by lodging an administrative charge against appellee
herein, does not preclude this action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code and hence does not justify
its dismissal.

Page 77 of 116

172 St. Louis Realty Corporation vs CA Other Torts; Violation of Human Dignity and Privacy
Parties:
Petitioner: ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL
Ponente: AQUINO, J. [G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984]
FACTS:
This case is about the RECOVERY OF DAMAGES for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times
where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil
belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.

St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without
permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement
with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of
Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family
have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped
neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a
more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape when
they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream
house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE
HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for wholesome family living.

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital,
noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty a letter of protest purporting that the
unauthorized use of his house is not only transgression to his private property but also damaging to his
prestige in the medical profession, which resulted in no little mental anguish on his part.

Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000.
In its answer, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired,
rectification would be published in the Manila Times. It published in the issue of the Manila Times a new
advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor
Aramil and an explanation of the error.

Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times the
following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:
This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Times
issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues
rectification of the same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of
the house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used as a
background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family. The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the
Arcadio family with their real house in the background, as was intended all along.

Trial Court: Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published
a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter

Page 78 of 116
lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about
P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil
Code). The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and
P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

CA: Affirmed that judgment, reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict
under Articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a
beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by
that contretemps.

ISSUE: WoN the case is covered by Article 26.

HELD: YES. "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
Ratio:
St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in
conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that
"every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article
2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice
Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that
he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life
was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

Page 79 of 116

CASE NO. 173

G.R. No. 120706

January 31, 2000

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS, respondents.

TOPIC: Other Torts: Violation of Human Dignity and Privacy

FACTS:
1. Nestor Nicholas was engaged in a business of supplying government agencies and private entities with
office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis.
2. Florence Bing Concepcion, was the owner of the apartment which Nestor was leasing. Florence also
resided in the same compound where the apartment was located.
3. Florence joined the venture of Nestor by contributing capital for a 50% share in the profit of the venture.
4. Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of
Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter's apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous
relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! . . . Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing
Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli
para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."
5. Rodrigo dared Nestor to see some relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the
relationship. But all the relatives denied knowledge of the affair.
6. Not contented, Rodrigo confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied. Thereafter,
Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should
something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence.
7. As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he
could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they
could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers.
8. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas (wife) started to doubt Nestor's fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings
and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband.
9. Consequently, Nestor demanded Rodrigo public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo ignored.
Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
10. Rodrigo argues that there is no legal basis for the courts to award damages to Nestor and his spouse. His
alleged act does not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or
any other form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of another's residence or meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another.
ISSUE: Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to the Nicolas spouses.
HELD: There is.

Page 80 of 116

We reject Rodrigo's posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of neither
falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident
charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind
Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from
being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective.
Thus, under Art. 26, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a
person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
The violations mentioned in the codal provisions (Arts 2219 and 26) are not exclusive but are merely examples
and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a
person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.

There is no question that Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings
and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's abusive, scandalous and insulting language. Rodrigo
admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about the issue, with the latter
vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the
denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter's humiliation.
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of Rodrigo to know the truth about the rumor and why he was not
satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face,
invade the latter's privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and children, neighbors
and friends, accusing him a married man of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This
definitely caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in
his neighborhood without feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family
where before there was none.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to
the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for F50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Page 81 of 116

[174] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 120921. January 29, 1998
TOPIC
DAMAGES Definition and Concept
DOCTRINE
Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained,
or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore
shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
FACTS
May 28, 1991 - Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his
brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia
owned by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall
at Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not tarry for long at the dance because they sensed
some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. In order to
avoid trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the
perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.
The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon
from the rear. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, an Information was filed against Ballesteros,
Galo and Bulusan wherein they were charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery. The RTC
Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified
by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and applying Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay jointly
and solidarily
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and
actual damages in the amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS
(P35,755.00), with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), and actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS (P61,785.00), with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND
FORTY CENTAVOS (P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00), with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest.
5. The costs.
The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they had
undergone preventive imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same

Page 82 of 116
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, they shall be credited in the service
thereof with only four-fifths of the time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment.
ISSUE/HELD
Whether or not the RTC erred in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims >> NO
RATIO
[The trial court was] correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages may be defined as
the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed,
the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission. In granting actual or compensatory damages, the
party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like,
as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages
to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this
Court, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity,
and not as compensatory damages. As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage
and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its
discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.

Page 83 of 116

175 CUSTODIO vs. CA

SPOUSES CRISTINO & BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO & MARIA SANTOS vs
COURT OF APPEALS, Heirs of PACIFICO MABASA & RTC OF PASIG
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
DOCTRINES:
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded, it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely
because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm, which results from the Injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
FACTS:
Pacifico Mabasa is the owner of a parcel of land with a two-door apartment which is located behind the
properties of Sps. Custodio and Sps. Santos. In order for Mabasa to access P. Burgos St, there are two
pasageways where Mabasa may pass. The first path is through the properties of Custodio and Santos while
the second passageway is narrower and Mabasa has to pass through a septic tank slightly obstructing the
passageway.
When said property was purchased by Pacifico, there were tenants occupying the premises but when
the tenants left, he went to see the premises and discovered that an adobe fence had been built in the first
passageway making it narrower in width. The adobe fence was extended in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. Pacifico filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way against Sps
Custodio and Sps. Santos before the RTC of Pasig.
RTC ordered Custodios and Santoses to give Pacifico permanent access to the public street and ordering
Pacifico to pay the petitioners as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
CA [heirs of Pacifico appealed raising the issue of not awarding damages in their favor] affirmed the RTC
decision and awarded the ff: 65k actual, 30k moral and 10k exemplary.
ISSUE: WON the awarding of damages was proper.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: A reading of the decision of the CA shows that the award for damages was based solely on the fact
that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealied rentals when the tenants
vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. The mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant recovery of damages, there must
be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or

Page 84 of 116
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering)
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act
or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the
principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the
following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing
and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said
right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all
the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of
action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been
injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.

Page 85 of 116

176 HEIRS OF BORLADO V CA ( VDA DE BULAN)

Topic: Damages
Doctrine: Only legal tender currency in the Philippines may be awarded as a form of damages
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The
original owner of the lot in question Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.

On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00). After the
death of Francsico on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as
legal guardian of her minor children, sold it to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954.
Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of the lot was with the
vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December
1947. Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan
declared the lot in her name in 1900 for taxation purposes. Salvacion and her co-defendantsappelleespossession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until
November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.
On 23 November 1972, respondents filed complaint for ejectment against petitioners. The ejectment case
was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and
members of their families were ordered to vacate and deliver possession to the respondents together with
all improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay
annually from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100)
cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five Thousand Pesos as reimbursement for the amount
respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit.

ISSUE:
W/N the court erred in their decision ordering the payment of damages in palay
HELD: Yes, but the petition is still denied for being a question of fact
Petition was denied because Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the
Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.
Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable
to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the
premises of the land in question.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. Palay is not legal tender
currency in the Philippines.

Page 86 of 116

177 FRANCISCO L. LAZATIN v. ANGEL C. TWAO and GREGORIO T. CASTRO || PONENTE: PAREDES,
J. G.R. No. L-12736 ; July 31, 1961 || TOPIC: Damages Definition and Concept
FACTS: TWAO and CASTRO, filed against LAZATIN et al. for the recovery of P35k plus interest, in relation
to the purchase by them for the from the US Govt. and the subsequent sale of some 225 auto-trucks.
Complaint was dismissed by the CFI. At the CA, the CFI order was reversed, declaring that plaintiffs TWAO
and CASTRO with defendants LAZATIN et al. were co-owners in the business of buy and sell of surplus autotrucks, and ordered defendants (one of them LAZATIN) to pay TWAO and CASTRO P10k, with legal interest
from filing of complaint. Decision became final, and it was executed with the levy on the properties of LAZATIN,
and their subsequent sale at public auction, wherein TWAO and CASTRO were the purchasers. LAZATIN,
however, was able to deposit the redemption price with the Sheriff of Pampanga, before the expiration of the
redemption period on Aug. 252. LAZATIN filed the present action on Aug. 952 to recover from TWAO and
CASTRO the sum of P19,676.09, supposedly a balance of the proceeds of auto-trucks, sold directly to
purchasers herein respondents.
On the same date,LAZATIN alleged that "there is no security whatsoever for the payment of the amount
claimed in the complaint and that TWAO and CASTROs are removing or are about to remove or dispose of
their property with intent to defraud their creditors, particularly the plaintiff," secured a writ of attachment on the
amount he deposited, and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff of Pampanga refused to deliver the sum of P13,849.88,
which should have been paid to the herein defendants TWAO and CASTRO.
On August 12, 1952, TWAO and CASTRO filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment on the ground that: (1) LAZATIN has no cause of action because if there be any, it has prescribed,
and that it has been barred by prior judgement; (2) allegations in the petition for the issuance of the writ and in
the affidavit in support thereof are false.
On September 10, 1952, the lower court, after due hearing, dissolved the writ. TWAO and CASTRO filed their
answer and after customary admissions and denials. On May 9, 1953, plaintiff Lazatin died and on March 10,
1954, Gil Gotiangco was appointed and qualified as administrator of plaintiff's estate. On date of hearing,
TWAO and CASTRO were granted a preliminary hearing on their special defenses).
Lower cour dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was barred by a prior judgment and by the statute of
limitations. At the same time, the Court set the case for hearing on defendants' counterclaim, and then
rendered judgment, ordering the estate of Lazatin to pay TWAO and CASTRO, 3k in Attorneys fees, P500
for moral damages to each defendant, and 6% interest on the amount of P13,849.88, plus costs. Appeal was
certified by the CA to SC, as, as the issues involved therein are purely legal in character.
ISSUE: Whether LAZATIN is liable for damages.
HELD: YES, however, decision is modified with the elimination of moral damages. The rest of the
decision is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against estate of LAZATIN.
RATIO:
1. The law on damages is found on Title XVII of the Civil Code (Arts. 2195 to 2235). The rules governing
damages laid down in other laws, and the principles of the general law on damages are adopted in so
far as they are not in consistent with the Code (Arts. 2196 and 2198).
2. Article 2197 mentions the kind of damages recoverable, among which are (1) actual or
compensatory and (2) moral Article 2219 provides that moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases . . . (3) malicious prosecution. There is an abundance of case
holding that the action to recover damages from the attachment plaintiff, for the wrongful issuance and
levy of an attachment (malicious attachment) is identical or is analogous to the ordinary action
for malicious prosecution ).

3. It may logically be inferred, therefore, that in order that moral damages may be recovered in
connection with he writ of attachment under consideration, malice is an essential ingredient thereof.
In Songco v. Sellner, 37 Phil. 154, where the evidence showed that defendant offered damages to his
credit, as a result of writ of attachment wrongfully issued, the Court declared that such damages were
remote and speculative and that there was no 'ending that the attachment was maliciously sued out.

Page 87 of 116
4. In Aboitiz v. Da Silva, 45 Phil. 883, the Court refused to grant damages for loss of reputation by
reason of an improper attachment, on the ground that there was no evidence from which malice on
the part of the plaintiff or loss of credit to the defendant, may be inferred or presumed.

5. "The authorities are quite uniform in holding that, in the absence of malice, injuries to credit,
reputation and business are too remote and speculative to be recovered" (Union Nat. Bank v.
Cross, 100 Wis. 174, 75 NW 992). There is no issue of malice, damages must
be compensatory merely, and confined to the actual loss from deprivation of the property
attached or injury to it, or in case of closing business, to the probable profits of the business, during
the time of its stoppage (Holiday Bros. Cohen 34 Ark. 707). All of which go to show that the attachment
defendant is not entitled to moral damages, unless it is alleged and established that the writ was
maliciously sued out.

6. It should be observed that Sec. 4 of Rule 59, does not prescribe the remedies available to the
attachment defendant in case of a wrongful attachment, but merely provides an action for
recovery upon the bond, based on the undertaking therein made and not upon the ability arising
from a tortious act, like the malicious suing of an attachment.
Under the first, where malice is not essential, the attachment defendant, is entitled to recover only the
actual damages sustained by him by reason of the attachment. Under the second, where the
attachment is maliciously sued out, the damages recoverable may include a compensation for every
injury to his credit, business or feelings.
7.

A cursory perusal of the decision would show that the trial court did not make any express ruling that
the writ of attachment was maliciously sued out by the plaintiff or any finding of facts or circumstances
from which it may be necessarily inferred that the attachment was thus obtained. The decision does
not make any finding that the defendants-appellees did in fact suffer mental anguish or injury to
their credit or reputation. The decision simply states: "Coming now to the moral damages which
defendants have suffered consisting of mental anguish, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation, it is
believed that sing businessmen of good commercial standing and reputation, each of them should be
awarded at least P2,500.00." Moreover the dissolution of the writ was due to a technicality No
moral damages can be inferred from the mere act that the redemption price to which defendants
were entitled, had been retained by the provincial sheriff for a period of 38 days. The trial court held
that the present action was already investigated and adjudged in CA-G.R. To 4533-R and the right of
action was barred by the state of limitations, and that since the writ of attachment was only a
remedy adjunct to the main suit, plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to the writ. While the lower
court declared that the defendants-appellees had an outstanding balance of P171,947.80, in the bank
and that they were not disposing their property in fraud of creditors or of the plaintiff, as alleged in the
petition for the issuance of the writ still the said court did not make any finding that the said petition was
maliciously sued out. We are, therefore, the opinion that the defendants-appellants are not entitled to
moral damages.

8. . In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be covered, except:
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation should be recovered." (Art. 2208, Civil Code).
Withal, and considering the fact that TWAO and CASTRO were drawn into this litigation by LAZATIN and
were compelled to hire an attorney to protect and defend them, and taking into account the work done by said

Page 88 of 116
attorney, as reflected in the record, throughout the proceedings, we deem it just and equitable to award at
attorney's fees for defendants-appellees. The sum of P3,000.00 adjudicated by the trial court, is reasonable
under the circumstances (par. 11 Art. 2208, Civil Code).

178 Board of Liquidators vs Heirs of Kalaw

Docrine:
Facts:
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was chartered as a non-profitgovernmental
organization avowedly for the protection, preservation and developmentof the coconut industry in the
Philippines. General manager and board chairman wasMaximo M. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and
Casimiro Garcia were members of theBoard; defendant Leonor Moll became director only on December 22,
1947. An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling some contractsentered. Nature
supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines: the firstin October, the second and third in
November, and the fourth in December, 1947.Coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive
damage. Copra productiondecreased. Prices spiralled. Warehouses were destroyed. Cash requirements
doubled.Deprivation of export facilities increased the time necessary to accumulate shiploads of copra. Quick
turnovers became impossible, financing a problem.The buyers threatened damage suits. All the settlements
sum up to P1,343,274.52.NACOCO, represented by the Board of Liquidators, seeks to recover the above sum
of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, anddirectors Juan Bocar,
Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw withnegligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 2176, new Civil Code);and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or
breach of trust for having approved the contracts without prior approval of the Board.The lower court came out
with a judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence, plaintiff appealed direct to this Court. Plaintiff levelled a
major attack on the lower court's holdingthat Kalaw justifiedly entered into the controverted contracts without
the prior approvalof the corporation's directorate. Plaintiff leans heavily on NACOCO's corporate bylaws. Article IV (b), Chapter III thereof, recites, as amongst the duties of the general manager,the obligation:
"(b) To perform or execute on behalf of the Corporation upon prior approval of the Board, all contracts
necessary and essential to the proper accomplishment for which the Corporation was organized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent as General Manager without prior approval of the Board are
valid corporate acts.
Held:
Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general
practice, custom, and policy, the general manager may bind the company without formal authorization of the
board of directors. 26 In varying language, existence of such authority is established, by proof of the course of
business, the usage and practices of the company and by the knowledge which the board of directors has, or
must be presumed to have, of acts and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs of the
corporation. 27So also,
x x x authority to act for and bind a corporation may be presumed from acts of recognition in other instances
where the power was in fact exercised. 28

Page 89 of 116
x x x Thus, when, in the usual course of business of a corporation, an officer has been allowed in his official
capacity to manage its affairs, his authority to represent the corporation may be implied from the manner in
which he has been permitted by the directors to manage its business.29
In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has been to allow its general manager to negotiate and
execute contracts in its copra trading activities for and in NACOCO's behalf without prior board approval. If the
by-laws were to be literally followed, the board should give its stamp of prior approval on all corporate
contracts. But that board itself, by its acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside the by-law
requirement of prior approval.
Under the given circumstances, the Kalaw contracts are valid corporate acts.

Page 90 of 116

179 Custodio v. CA
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
Topic: Damages; Definition and Concept; Damnum Absque Injuria
Doctrine:
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for
the injury caused by a breach or wrong. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of
some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering.
There can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own
property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable
loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria
FACTS: Pacifico Mabasa owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said property
was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. When
Mabasa bought the said property, he acknowledged the people living on the premises as tenants.
From P. Burgos St., going to Mabasas house, the row of houses will be as follows:
Spouses Custodio spouses Santos Mabasa Morato then a Septic Tank
As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasas residence to P.
Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is
about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and
with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width.
The Santoses first constructed the fence, along their property, which is also along the first passageway. Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the
public street. Mabasa then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way against Custodio,
Morato, and Santos.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in
turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php8,000 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, with

Page 91 of 116
modification, such that a right of way and an award of actual (Php65,000), moral (Php30,000) and exemplary
damages (php10,000) were given to the respondents (Heirs of Mabasa). Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: WON the award of damages is in order.
HELD: No. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of
the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
RATIO:
1. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private
respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of
Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico
Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by
reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for
the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering.
In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual
damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
2. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of
private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that
the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the
following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
3. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner

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the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the
right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property.

Prior to the decision granting a compulsory right of way in respondents favor, petitioners had an absolute right
over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform
in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is
damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of
action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although
such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is
damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner
in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of
having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere
consequence of community life.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the
act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause
of action arises in the latters favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque
injuria.

Page 93 of 116

180 PNOC vs CA
Doctrine: -two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: loss of what a person already possesses (dao
emergente) or failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him
Facts:
-

September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)
Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel
to be at fault
Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of
P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorneys fees and later on amended to add the
lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and unrealized profits and lost business opportunities
During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted
in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest plus
P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit
CA: affirmed in toto

Issue: WON the damage was adequately proved?

Held: Yes. affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor.
P2M nominal damages instead.

Ration:
-

In connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or

admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court.
If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or
ignoring them
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente)
failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him
in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as
a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that
regard must be had to existing and pending engagements
If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so
would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over.
if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profitearning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit
on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill.
damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne
proven through sole testimony of general manager without objection from LSC

Page 94 of 116
-

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether
or not it proves an issue
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is `entitled to
nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by
law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded.
damages in name only and not in fact
amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury
sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by
private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for
which it claimed compensation.
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended
complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower courts jurisdiction since the unpaid
docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment

Page 95 of 116

181 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA

GR No. 107518 | Oct. 8, 1998
Doctrine:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. To
recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with
a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual
amount thereof.
Facts:
In the early morning of Sept. 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp.
was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas. On its way to Navotas, it collided
with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
After investigation, Phil. Coast Guard Commandant Alejandro concluded that Petroparcel was at fault.
Maria Efigenia Fishing sued LSC and its captain, Edgardo Doruelo before the CFI Caloocan. It
prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat
equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV,with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as
attorney's fees
In the meantime, PNOC Shipping sought to be substituted in place of LSC since it already owned
Petroparcel, as evidenced by the Deed of Transfer.
Efigenia Fishing sought for the amendment of the complaint since the original complaint failed to plead
for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV amounting to P600K (actual value
of 800K less 200K from the insurance). The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting
from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel,
its equipment and its lost cargoes
Said amendment was granted by the court
During trial, PNOC only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard. He said that
the rice quotation of Efigenia Shipping is excessive.
- In its decision, the lower court noted that Lazaro did not even present such quotations of prices
from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it
was "a sort of secret scheme."
CFI Decision: Ordered PNOC to pay Efigenia Shipping the amount of P6.4Mn, which represents the
value of fishing boat and all its equipment + interests. Meanwhile, the case against Doruelo is
dismissed.
PNOC filed MR, arguing that the amount was not convincingly proved by Efigenia Fishing. At the same
time, they questioned whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case despite Efigenia
Fishings failure to pay the prescribed docket fee. Said MR was denied by the lower court.
CA Decision:
- The reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court.
- The alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by PNOCs own
sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro
- The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of appellee's
documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and which already included
the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended complaint
Hence, this present petition.
Issue: WON the award of P6.43Mn as actual damages was properly proved by Efigenia Shipping?
Ruling:

Page 96 of 116

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained.
It is based on sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty.
In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.
Two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
1. Loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente)
2. Failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante)
Therefore, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to
prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available. Damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an
award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne.
In this case, Efigenia Fishing proved its damages through testimony of their general manager plus
documentary evidence. These documentary evidence show similar items and equipment with
corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the collision. However, PNOC
did not object to these evidence. Rather, PNOCs witness merely commented that these were not duly
authenticated and that the general manager did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the
writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
Since there were no objections, the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due
weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
However, the price quotations are ordinary private writings since Efigenia Fishing did not present any
other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in the price quotations that became the
bases of the award. Del Rosario, the general manager, cannot have testified on the veracity of the
contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not
the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should
be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be
supported by independent evidence
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that
the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
At the same time, the price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario, are not commercial lists,
which can be an exception to the hearsay rule. These are not published in any list, register, periodical
or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations"
within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing
data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation."
In other words, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Therefore, it
follows that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
Still, this doesnt mean Efigenia Fishing is deprived of any redress for the loss of its vessel. As held in
Lufthansa vs. CA, In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is "entitled to nominal damages.
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded.
They are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an
equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to
the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages, and
may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case.

Page 97 of 116

In this case, allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a
fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as
it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of
P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically
petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case
has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) 59 in favor of
private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.

Page 98 of 116

182 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA
CUBA, respondents. [G.R. No. 118342. January 5,
1998]

AUTHOR: twinkle

LYDIA P. CUBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
AGRIPINA P. CAPERAL, respondents. [G.R. No.
118367. January 5, 1998]

In case asked:

TOPIC: Kinds of Damages: Certainty

PONENTE: Paredes, J.

NOTES: Two consolidated cases. I focused on

damages

SC: - the assignment of leasehold rights is a mortgage

contract based on stipulation of facts, a mortgage was
intended.
-

condition no. 12 of the deed of assignment

constituted pactum commissorium. Elements of
pactum commissorium not proven.

FACTS:
6. Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2083 (new) dated May 13, 1974
from the Government and obtained (3) loans from the DBP under the terms stated in Promissory
Notes.
7. Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights as security for her loans.
8. Cuba failed to pay her loan on the scheduled dates and without any foreclosure proceedings DBP
appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question and executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba over the same fishpond in question;
9. 7.
In the negotiation for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager
DBP, Dagupan City dated November 6, 1979 and December 20, 1979. DBP thereafter accepted the
offer to repurchase in a letter addressed to plaintiff dated February 1, 1982;
10. Thereafter, a Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba and a new Fishpond Lease
Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in favor of Cuba only, excluding her
husband;
11. Cuba, AGAIN FAILED TO PAY the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sale. Hence,
she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby she promised to make certain
payments as stated in temporary Arrangement;
12. Thereafter, DBP sent a Notice of Rescission, which was received by Cuba, and took possession of
the Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question;
13. DBP advertised in the SUNDAY PUNCH the public bidding to dispose of the property; DBP executed
a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of Agripina Caperal on August 16, 1984 and was awarded a
Fishpond Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
14. Because of DBPs action of appropriating the fishpond without any judicial or extra-judicial
proceeding, Cuba filed a complaint against DBP before RTC Pangasinan.
15. RTC: for Cuba. declaring that DBPs taking possession and ownership of the property without
foreclosure was plainly violative of Article 2088 of the Civil Code which provides as follows:

Page 99 of 116
16. ART. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or
dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
17. As to damages, the trial court found ample evidence on record that in 1984 the representatives of
DBP ejected CUBA and her caretakers not only from the fishpond area but also from the adjoining
big house; and that when CUBAs son and caretaker went there on 15 September 1985, they found
the said house unoccupied and destroyed and CUBAs personal belongings, machineries,
equipment, tools, and other articles used in fishpond operation which were kept in the house were
missing. The missing items were valued at about P550,000. It further found that when CUBA and
her men were ejected by DBP for the first time in 1979, CUBA had stocked the fishpond with
250,000 pieces of bangus fish (milkfish), all of which died because the DBP representatives
prevented CUBAs men from feeding the fish. At the conservative price of P3.00 per fish, the gross
value would have been P690,000, and after deducting 25% of said value as reasonable allowance
for the cost of feeds, CUBA suffered a loss of P517,500. It then set the aggregate of the actual
damages sustained by CUBA at P1,067,500.
18. CA: declared as valid the following: (1) the act of DBP in appropriating Cubas leasehold rights and
interest under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2083; (2) the deeds of assignment executed by Cuba
in favor of DBP; (3) the deed of conditional sale between CUBA and DBP; and (4) the deed of
conditional sale between DBP and Caperal, the Fishpond Lease Agreement in favor of Caperal, and
the assignment of leasehold rights executed by Caperal in favor of DBP. It then ordered DBP to
turn over possession of the property to Caperal as lawful holder of the leasehold rights and
to pay CUBA the following amounts: (a) P1,067,500 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P50,000 as attorneys fees.
19. In its petition (G.R. No. 118342), DBP assails the award of actual and moral damages and attorneys
fees in favor of CUBA.
ISSUE(S): whether the award of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees proper
HELD: Actual damages was not proved by clear evidence, therefore not recoverable. Moral damages reduced.
Exemplary or corrective damages and attorneys fees, reduced.

Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the 25 May 1994 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
26535 is hereby REVERSED, except as to the award of P50,000 as moral damages, which is hereby sustained.
The 31 January 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. A-1574
is MODIFIED setting aside the finding that condition no. 12 of the deed of assignment constituted pactum
commissorium and the award of actual damages; and by reducing the amounts of moral damages from
P100,000 to P50,000; the exemplary damages, from P50,000 to P25,000; and the attorneys fees, from
P100,000 to P20,000. The Development Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to render an accounting of
the income derived from the operation of the fishpond in question.

Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of the income statement of DBP, as well as the
statement of the account of Lydia P. Cuba, and for the determination of each partys financial obligation to one
another.
RATIO:
6) We shall now take up the issue of damages.
Article 2199 provides:

Page 100 of 116

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
7) Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured
party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts
which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
8) In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting
of P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which
represented the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected
CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house. This award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear
evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence
of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was not
inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project which sometimes, if not
most often, is left to the care of other persons. Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition
presented.
Curiously, in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included losses of property as among the
damages resulting from DBPs take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985 when her
son and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining house that she came to know of the alleged
loss of several articles. Such claim for losses of property, having been made before knowledge of the
alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere
afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages.
9) With regard to the award of P517,000 representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus
which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in March 1979, the same was not called for.
Such loss was not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until
after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the
alleged loss. In fact, in her letter dated 24 October 1979, she declared:
1. That from February to May 1978, I was then seriously ill in Manila and within the same period I
neglected the management and supervision of the cultivation and harvest of the produce of the
aforesaid fishpond thereby resulting to the irreparable loss in the produce of the same in the amount of
about P500,000.00 to my great damage and prejudice due to fraudulent acts of some of my fishpond
workers.
Nowhere in the said letter, which was written seven months after DBP took possession of the fishpond,
did CUBA intimate that upon DBPs take-over there was a total of 230,000 pieces of bangus, but all of
which died because of DBPs representatives prevented her men from feeding the fish.
The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis.

10) In view, however, of DBPs act of appropriating CUBAs leasehold rights which was contrary to law and
public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
that it had foreclosed the mortgage, an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is in
order conformably with Article 2219(10), in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code. Exemplary or
corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or

Page 101 of 116

correction for the public good. There being an award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees are
also recoverable
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: 7) Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured
party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which
could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

Page 102 of 116

183 Fuentes v. CA
ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 111692

February 9, 1996

professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr.,
seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.
four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok
and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Trento, Agusan del Sur.
Petitioner, Alejandro called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I
saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair."
Suddenly Alejandro stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Alejandro fled.
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr.,
stabbed him.
Dr. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina, reported that death
was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and large
intestines."
Alejandro's claims:
it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina;
when the victim was killed Alejandro was conversing with him;
Alejandro was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill
all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place;
since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;"
"Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the
latter untied his gloves and punched him;
many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the window;
Jonie was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the
barangay.5
RTC of Agusan del Sur GUILTY - ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.
CA Affirmed
Petitioner contends that CA erred when it held
positively and categorically identified as the killer

Page 103 of 116

holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim.
inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the
effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the
attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.
assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual
damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without
any tangible document to support such claim
Issue: WON CA is correct to award actual damages
Held: NO. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of
MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs
is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion
perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.
(Ito na yung buong discussion ng damages sa full text.)
This is a valid point. in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.18 To seek recovery for actual damages it is
essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 19 Courts cannot simply, rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.20
The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We
have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in
connection with the death of Malaspina. 21 However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in
court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by
receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since
the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.22

Page 104 of 116

184
Title: ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA
RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS,
ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON
RAYMOND
RAMOS,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS
MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA
and
DRA.
PERFECTA
GUTIERREZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Topic: Personal Injury and Death

Quick Notes:( Included in this digest) A motion for reconsideration was filed with the SC after this
decision was promulgated in 1999. The decision on the MR
was promulgated on 2002, the decision only modified the
findings on the liability only of DLSMC and the damages
awarded.

Facts:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy).
They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC).
Hosaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr.
Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist botched the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol
Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The
petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in
not exercising reasonable care in intubating Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying Ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient, the surgeon
was remiss in his obligation to provide a good anesthesiologist and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital
is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive
on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages
to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

Issues: Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable for the unfortunate
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy

Held:
Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary rule which means the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a
medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the attending
physician was negligent.

Page 105 of 116

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered
her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from the
gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and
brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in
the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an
anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here].
The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the
operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the captain of
the ship in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he
did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of
the hiring and firing of their consultants. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert
significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of
an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.**
**On a motion for reconsideration (SC Decision April 11, 2002)
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a consultant, but rather,
accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the
hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications, such as
accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship and references. Second, it is not
the hospital but the patient who pays the consultants fee for services rendered by the latter.iii Third, a
hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges
granted by the hospital. Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a
hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. The hospitals obligation is
limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications
prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the
services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctors orders are carried
out strictly.
After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent hospitals
position on this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs.
Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Damages
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the time of its decision would be
grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated
amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it
reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring
home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a
hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing
a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount of
actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost
of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid
bankruptcy.

Page 106 of 116

Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury
suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated.
However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting
injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to
occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the
unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable - and
certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory
damages previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. In the
instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the
amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests
of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their
loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would
be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband
and children, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile,
the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to
quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition remains
unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live
with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have
fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into
account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility
of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the
foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to
award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as
actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of
P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as
moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.**
**On a motion for reconsideration (SC Decision April 11, 2002)
However, subsequent to the promulgation of the Decision, the Court was informed by petitioner Rogelio that
petitioner Erlinda died on August 3, 1999. In view of this supervening event, the award of temperate
damages in addition to the actual or compensatory damages would no longer be justified since the
actual damages awarded in the Decision are sufficient to cover the medical expenses incurred by
petitioners for the patient. Hence, only the amounts representing actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit should be awarded to petitioners.

Page 107 of 116

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby modified as follows:

(1) Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center is hereby absolved from liability arising from the injury
suffered by petitioner Erlinda Ramos on June 17, 1985;
(2) Private respondents Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez are hereby declared to be solidarily
liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda on June 17, 1985 and are ordered to pay petitioners
(a)

P1,352,000.00 as actual damages;

(b)

P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(c)

P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(d)

P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

(e)

the costs of the suit.

Ratio :
Dispositive Portion:

Relation/Pertinent Law :

Page 108 of 116

185 G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent Delim's "Thames" mini bus
at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in
Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. Petitioner was found to have
sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
Petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular
mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead. She also
alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had
already been paid [for her medical expenses] and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against
him (private respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
Issue:
1) Whether or not private respondent Delim has successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-busAnswer: No.
2) Whether actual or compensatory damages should be awarded to petitioner Gatchalian for the surgical
removal of the scar on her foreheadAnswer: Yes.
3) Whether moral damages should be awarded to Petitioner GatchalianAnswer: Yes.
Held:
1) The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier.
In her direct examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle went off the road
and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers,
an old woman, cried out, "What happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied,
nonchalantly, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same
"snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus
had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound"
which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it.
2) A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a
violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. In view
of the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be
expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we
consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.
3) Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown.
Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her
physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of
P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Pronouncement of the SC as to the validity of the waiver:
The terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and
unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner

Page 109 of 116

Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular
accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint
Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that,
seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without
bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial
doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of
private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers
in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such
purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be
contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute
and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to
render that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

Page 110 of 116

[186]JOHN C. QUIRANTE and DANTE CRUZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MANUEL C. CASASOLA, and ESTRELLITA C. CASASOLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73886 January 31, 1989
TOPIC
Attorneys fees
DOCTRINE
an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of
recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been
recovered from which the fee is to be paid
FACTS
Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building contractor named Norman
GUERRERO.
The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for
GUERRERO.
In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio
Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN before the Court of
first Instance of Manila, now the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a
cross-claim against GUERRERO for indemnification.
RTC: ruled in favor of the Atty. Quirante by rescinding the contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to
pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P129,430.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00; ordering
Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and
ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00
The trial court thereafter issued a writ of execution.
A petition was filed in AC-G.R. No. 00202 with the Intermediate Appellate Court for the quashal of the writ of
execution and to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal.
The petition was dismissed on May 4, 1983 so the case was elevated to this Court in G.R. No. 64334.
In the meantime, on November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as
survivors.
On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his
attorney's fees:
there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees,
which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the
two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno.
avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as follows:
A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned
counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be
divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
ISSUE/HELD

Page 111 of 116

Whether or not Atty. Quirantes attorneys fees may be confirmed? NO. confirmation of attorney's fees is
premature
RATIO
Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in
which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the
Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case
in which the services of counsel have been rendered ." It also rests on the assumption that the court trying the
case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule against
multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved.
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an
item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of
the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may
enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an
alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the
debtors.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same
action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent
court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for
review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R. No. 64834) "may or may not ultimately result in the
granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. This especially
true in the light of subsequent developments in G.R. No. 64334. In a decision promulgated on May 21, 1987,
the Court rendered judgment setting aside the decision of May 4, 1983 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
AC-G.R. No. 00202 and ordering the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila to certify the appeal of
PHILAMGEN from said trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 122920 to the Court of Appeal. Said decision of
the Court became final and executory on June 25, 1987.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become
final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in
abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's
fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Thus, it was
ruled that:
... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of
recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been
recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that
the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. It is subject to the condition that the
fee shall be P30,000.00 in case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case
the award is in excess of said P120,000.00 bond, on the sharing basis hereinbefore stated.
With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the heirs of the
deceased. We are of the considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be
likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in
determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein.
The court below will be in a better position, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated, inclusive of any
liability of PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs of Dr. Casasola in the award, to determine
with evidentiary support such matters like the basis for the entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz and
as to whether the agreement allegedly entered into with the late Dr. Casasola would be binding on all his heirs,
as contended by petitioner Quirante.

Page 112 of 116

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present
recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.

Page 113 of 116

Crismina Garments, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No.128721| (March 9, 1999)
CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY; RATE OF INTEREST OF THE AMOUNT DUE IN
A CASE ARISING FROM A CONTRACT FOR A PIECE OF WORK, NOT FROM A LOAN OR
FORBEARANCE OF MONEY SHOULD BE THE LEGAL INTEREST OF SIX PERCENT (6%) PER ANNUM
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2209 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Because the amount due in this case arose from a
contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty
when the Complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said
Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest
should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%) per year. Private respondent maintains that the twelve percent
(12%) interest should be imposed, because the obligation arose from a forbearance of money. This is
erroneous. In Eastern Shipping, the Court observed that a "forbearance" in the context of the usury law is a
"contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower
or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable." Using this standard, the obligation in this case was
obviously not a forbearance of money, goods or credit.
Facts:
Petitioner (Crismina Garments) contracted the services of the respondent (DWilmar Garments) for sewing
20,762 pairs of denims. The total of which amounted to 76,410.
Petitioner failed to pay the aforesaid amount. As a result, Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
the collection of payment. Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner to pay the sum
of 76,140 with interest at 12% per annum. CA affirmed the trial Courts ruling. Hence, a Petition for review was
filed.
Petitioner submits that the interest rate should be 6% pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand private respondent maintains that the interest rate should be 12% per annum in accordance with Central
bank Act, since the money sought to be recovered by her is in the form of forbearance.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to impose interest at the rate of 12% per annum for an obligation that does
not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties.
Held: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or
forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied.
Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the complaint was
filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said complaint. But after the
judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at
twelve percent (12%) per year.
Private respondent maintains that the twelve percent (12%) interest should be imposed, because the obligation
arose from a forbearance of money. This is erroneous. In Eastern Shipping, the Court observed that
forbearance in the context of the usury law is a contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during a
given period of time, from requiring

Page 114 of 116

188 Crismina Garmnets v. CA

Facts:
1) Crismina Garments entered into a contract for a piece of work for 20,762 girls denim pants with D
Wilmar Garments, through its sole proprietress Norma Siapno. The contract amounted to Php76,410.
2) From Feb1979- May 1979, D Wilmar Garments sent 13 various deliveries to comply with the
Petitioners orders. The delivery receipts are accepted and acknowledged to be in good order condition.
3) Later, Crismina informed D Wilmar Garments of the defective pants delivered. D Wilmar Garments
offered to take delivery of the defective pants, however Crisminas representative said the goods were
good and PR just have to send back her check for P76,410.
4) The problem arose when Crismina failed to pay D Wilmar Garments even after being sent a demand
letter. Hence DWilmar filed a complaint for collection of payment against Crismina.
5) The court ruled in favor of DWilmar and ordered Crismina to pay the sum of P76,410 with interest of
12% per annum. The CA affirmed the ruling of the TC but modified to delete the Attys fees.. Hence a
petition of review was filed.
6) Crisimina contend the interest rate should be 6% pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code.
7) DWilmar however contends that the interest rate should be 12% per annum in accordance with Central
Bank Act, since the money sought to be recovered by her is in the form of forebearance.
Issue:
Won the interest should be 12% or 6% per annum for an obligation that does not involve a loan or
forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties.
Held:
The interest should be 6% per annum because the obligation arose from a contract for a piece of work,
and not from a loan or forbearance of money.
Ratio:
Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or
forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since
the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six percent
(6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final
and exuecutory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (%12) per
year.
Notes:
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court gave the following guidelines for the application
of the proper interest rates:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
"Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the
rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

Page 115 of 116

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until
the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be . . . the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to
forbearance of credit. 19
In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. CA, 20 we also ruled that the monetary award shall earn interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until its satisfaction, regardless of
whether or not the case involves a loan of forbearance of money. The interim period is deemed to be
equivalent to a forbearance of a credit. 21

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