BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA,

petitioners, vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), et al.
respondents.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
Facts:
The action in question was

upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza,
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran

filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting
Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint
alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing
the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their
right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from
pursuing the union activities. The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of
unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico
Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an
agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion asking for a preliminary hearing on
the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the
determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in
an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing
are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having
been also denied by the court in banc.
Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such
instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and
is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the
National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of
Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its
appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it
is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
Issue:
Whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the
Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. It
is true that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in
nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau
depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended
that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said
proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
Department of Agriculture vs. National Labor Relations Commission NLRC
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
Facts:
Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided
by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in
the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non payment of 13th
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages before the
Regional
Arbitration
Branch
X
of
CDOC
against
the
DA
and
the security
agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of
money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision

became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the
property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
DA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction with NLRC alleging that the
writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and therefore, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution. 1.) that The enforcement and
execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC are temporarily suspended for a period of two months. 2.) , petitioner is
ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the
aggregate amount. 3.) petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersede as bond equivalent to at
least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award. 4) City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of
petitioner. 5.) . The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments made.
Finally, the petition for injunction is dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months but not
extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by
petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in
intervention is Denied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff is Note.
The petitioner filed to the Supreme Court a case charging the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash or reject
the writ of execution. The petitioner fault the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which,
it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC
has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a
service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue: Whether

or

not

the

doctrine

of

non-suability

of

the

State

applies

in

the

case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less
than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other
contracting
party
and
to
have
divested
itself
of
its
sovereign
immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into
the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the
consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on
Audit.
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition of the petitioner. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public
respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant
to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
NOTES:
petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered

annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands
hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied,
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 - AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THEREFROM
SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor
General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said
accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted
from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him. With respect to the accounts of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one hundred days after their submission, Sundays and holidays
excepted.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1445 - ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Section 49. Period for rendering decisions of the Commission. The Commission shall decide any case brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for resolution. If the account or claim involved in the case needs reference to other
persons or offices, or to a party interested, the period shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper
decision is received by it.
Section 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved by any decision, order or ruling of the Commission
may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law
and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the interest of any government agency, the appeal
may be taken by the proper head of that agency.
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding
officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the
NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The
hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the
statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven,
according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under
oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could
hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the
change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained
libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary
rights.
Respondents filed a case in Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against petitioners; plaintiffs
claimed that letters contained libelous imputations. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that acts complained of were
performed by them in their discharge of official duties; consequently, court has no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of
state immunity. Petitioners motion was denied on ground that petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were
official in nature and not personal torts.
An order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filling of a P10,000 bond on plaintiffs, against properties
of Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines.

Moreau was declared in default. Petitioners Motion to lift the default order was dismissed on ground that Moreaus failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some understanding. Motion for reconsideration of the denial motion was also
dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers
of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority.
Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By
the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act
imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not
only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in
the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will
have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This
will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount
to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes
the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of
states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate
from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Republic vs. Sandoval (Consti1)
(Two petitions consolidated.)
En Banc
Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993
Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background: Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao
group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug
8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the
Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their personal and official capacity, holding
them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands such as:
1. giving lands for free to farmers
2. zero retention of lands by landlords
3. stop amortizations of land payments
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the
January 21 Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day
The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the employees from going inside
their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to
Malacanang to air their demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an
insurrection was impending

 Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola

The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries
The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law
The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire (prohibited by law)
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were
not put into operation because:
o there was no order to use them
o they were incorrectly prepositioned
o they were out of range of the marchers
The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in
pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers
The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District (WPD) and
Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to make effective use of their skill and
experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
Col. Cezar Nazareno
Maj. Filemon Gasmin
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the
military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and
victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
Holding:
No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
No.
Ratio:
1) Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not
bind the State immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
2) Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:

When the Republic is sued by name;

When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the
officer but to the government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions during the incident, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.
Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the crowd instead

No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc.
responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the
boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all
members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to
perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the
subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of
the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is
dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil
(sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to

the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.

RCBC v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49 (1988)

FACTS:
In an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) ordered to pay BADOC
Planters Inc. within 48 hours.
Upon Motion of BADOC, a writ of execution was issued.
Accordingly, Special sheriff Faustino Rigor issued a notice of garnishment addressed to the Gen. Manager and/or cahier of
Rizal Banking Corporation.
Upon receipt of such notice RCBC duly informed PVTA thereof, to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for its
protection.
On the very next day, however, RCBC was served with the order requiring it to deliver in check the amountgarnished to the
designated sheriff and sheriff in turn, to cash the check and deliver the amount to judgement creditor.
RCBC complied and delivered a certified check.-PVTA filed a motion for reconsideration
BADOC failed to appear on the scheduled dates of hearing.
The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute and BADOC and RCBC were ordered to jointly and severallyrestore the
account of PVTA with RCBC.
Only RCBC filed a petition for review of the order of CFI.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the bank should be held solidarily liable with the judgment creditor for reimbursement of the garnished funds
delivered to the sheriff who in turn delivered it to the judgment creditor in compliance with a court order.
HELD:
There was nothing irregular in the delivery of the funds of PVTA by check to the sheriff, whose custody isequivalent to the
custody of the court, he being a court officer. The order of the court was composed of two parts, requiring:
1) RCBC to deliver in check the amount garnished to the designated sheriff and
2) The sheriff in turn tocash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record. It must be
noted that in delivering the garnished amount in check to the sheriff, the RCBC did not thereby make any payment, for thelaw
mandates that delivery of a check does not produce the effect of payment until it has been cashed. [Article1249, Civil Code.]
Moreover, by virtue of the order of garnishment, the same was placed in
custodia legis and therefore, from that timeon, RCBC was holding the funds subject to the orders of the courta quoThat the sheriff,
upon delivery of the checkto him by RCBC encashed it and turned over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff was no longer the
concern of RCBC as the responsibility over the garnished funds passed to the court. Thus, no breach of trust or dereliction of duty
can be attributed to RCBC in delivering its depositor's funds pursuant to a court order which was merely in theexercise of its
power of control over such funds.
... The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastensupon the property a lien by
which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuingthe writ. It is brought into custodia legis, under the sole
control of such court
It may be concluded that the charge of breach of trust and/or dereliction of duty as well as lack of prudence ineffecting the
immediate payment of the garnished amount is totally unfounded. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishment, RCBC duly
informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for its protection. However, right on the very next day after
its receipt of such notice, RCBC was already served with the Order requiring delivery of the garnished amount. Confronted, as it
was with a mandatory directive, disobedience to whichexposed it to a contempt order, it had no choice but to comply.

Municipality of Makati vs CA 190 SCRA 206

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
FACTS
An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner, against the private property of Arceli Jo.
In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account under its name at PNB depositing an amount of P417,510.00. The
court fixed the appraised value of the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced payment was made in the amount
of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the decision becomes final and executory, the private respondent moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account. A
manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private respondent was no longer the true owner of the
expropriated property. The court consolidated the ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private
respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to

immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated
property. The PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality of Makati
contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or levied upon execution for to do so would result to the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically opened for the
expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the lower courts
decision. A petition for review with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A temporary restraining order was
issued by the S.C.
Issue
Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding
Held
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A was the one intended for the
expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because
account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is
unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose.
Thus the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse however should the
petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.
TITLE: Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486
CAPTION:
Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla, Petitioners, vs.
Hon Inocencio D. Maliaman and National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Respondent.
G.R. No. L 55963
December 1, 1989
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. For Spouses Fontanilla
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for National Irrigation Administration
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
1. Aug. 21, 1976 at about 6:30pm, a pick-up owned and operated by NIA, a government agency bearing a plate No. IN 651, then
driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of the said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of the herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for Treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
2. April 17, 1978, the petitioners sued the respondent NIA demanding for damages before the then court of First Instance Nueva
Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose city, in connection with the accident.
3. March 20, 1980, the court directed respondent NIA to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to the petitioner.
4. April 21, 1980, NIA filed a motion for consideration on the decision at the same court which was denied June 13, 1980
5. NIA filed an appeal to the court of Appeals where it filed its brief for the appellant in support of its position.
6. Instead on filing the required brief in the aforecited court of appeals case, petitioner filed an instant petition to the supreme
court.
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency
performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco
Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIAs driver employee
Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim;
P3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and attorneys fees of
20% of the total award.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act
of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990. NIA
believes this bases this on:
PD 552 amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers Union
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function
because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to bring to the Government any special

corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising
proprietary functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same
would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid
cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which
came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the liability will fall to the said agency or to the driver of the agency who actually incurred damages.
RULING:
The respondent National Irrigation Administration was directed to pay the petitioner for damages.
RATIO DECINDI:
The question on whether or not it is legally proper for the petitioner to be awarded moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees can easily be answered by Art. 2176 and 2180 of the new civil code.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The NIA is a government corporation with judicial personality and not merely agency of the government. Since it is a corporate
body performing non-government functions, it now becomes liable for the damages caused by the accident resulting from the
tortuous act of its driver-employee. In this case, The NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such
becomes liable for damages.
According to the definition of the government of the Philippines, government owned and controlled corporation engaged in
propriety functions cannot be considered part of the government for the purpose of exeption from application of the statute o f
limitation.
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The
former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was
essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the
NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation
projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these
functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by
the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation
Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business
in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for
emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:

(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration,
such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover
the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or
portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a
special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised
thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be
removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation
Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): .
. . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above
powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from
tort committed by its employees, is still another thing. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may
be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951,
& 183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the
GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamorodefined as the
present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City,
as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then
granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP
and the BJE as associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it
with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to
information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE.
The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents
to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

Issues and Ruling:

1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional
amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal
framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments. Because although the Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included
in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

W/N there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III,
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:
EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society;
RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the
environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment;
RA No. 8371 (Idigenous Peoples Right Act) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
2.

3.

W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a
clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the
MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry
with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the
Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through
internal self-determinationa peoples pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework
of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right
to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
does not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision.
As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments
and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are
present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community
by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international
intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.