A.C. No.

6296 November 22, 2005

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of
(a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her
uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to
have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled
"Sumbong",1 to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings
conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special
Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter,
accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents
appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a
lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that
her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is
appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to
prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before
the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-infact. This is what complainant said in her complaint: 2
5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the
complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that
[complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon .
Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident
recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex "A"
6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with
the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read,
[respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because

only her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made to
include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She also signed as "saksi" in
the minutes .
7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong") sent to the Punong Barangay dated
December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as "Family Legal Counsel
of Inos Family", a copy of the letter is attached as Annex "C" . . . . (Words in bracket
added.)
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her
answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.3
The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order
of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due
time.4
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the
Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and
heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or
a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent
submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan
pambarangayproceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance
was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
In her report dated October 6, 2003,5 Commissioner Maala stated that the "charge of
complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence" and, on that
basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession
for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the
investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,6 a
lighter penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, with modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in
violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by
lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is
hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 19917, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of
the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be
assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties
in katarungan pambarangayconciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or
representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable
the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,8 the
exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no
quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their
disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of
lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.9 Worse still,
the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal
knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings
was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415
of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay
captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at
best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the
end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed
her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs
the Lupong Tagapamayapa.10
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan
barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)11 the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation
process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened
in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two
parties.
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its
determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415
of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be
modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose
of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was when

respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued

appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of
impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167261

March 2, 2007

ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner,

vs.
CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and
FLORENTINA MANACNES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019,
dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and reinstated the
Resolution3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain
Province dismissing herein petitioners action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award and
Damages.
The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4 for recovery of possession of real
property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner
before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November 1994, against
the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein
respondent.
On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of
Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were suspended,
and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6

Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to
the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and
their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as
well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter
for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award
thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for
Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue
an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that,
the case must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10
May 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses
Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved,
Leoncios widow,7 Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her
repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished with
copies of the Arbitration Award.
On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the
Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the
MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of
possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration
Award issued by the Lupon.
Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the
latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied Florentina
Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that since the movant
failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period provided for under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final and
executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an
Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the
Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of
Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein
petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration
Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses.8 The
heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the
Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been personally
signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in
English a language not understood by the parties.

In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for
Enforcement of Arbitration Award in this wise:
x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa concerned?
The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon
concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that
a null and void act could always be questioned at any time as the action or defense
based upon it is imprescriptible.
The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the
pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:
"Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing
that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x
x x"
The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which
provides:
"Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
next-of-kin who are not lawyers."
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in
conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the
execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties
themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed the
agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus, it is very
clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are violated.
Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the agreement per instruction of
her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be in the negative. As
provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to an
assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a minor or incompetent.
Here, there is no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were incompetent. Perhaps
very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides is assistance, not
signing of agreements or settlements.

Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of
their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to
arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the personal appearance of the
parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.
In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned
agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions
of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the respondentsspouses [Manacnis] who signed it.
The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much to
be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering that
the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the
arbitration award which emanated from it is also inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration
Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is valid, will readily
show that it does not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:
"Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a
language or dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do not
use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language
known to them."
Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:
"Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by mediation,
conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the
parties. x x x"
It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the scenic
and serene community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the Kankanaey language.
Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been written in the Kankanaey language.
However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written in English language which
the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed.9
Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an
Appeal before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and
remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:

As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of
the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the
Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the
respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the
instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid
predecessors-in-interest therein were not personally affixed by the latter or are
falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the document on the ground that
the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by fraud. Indulging the
Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of the matter,
the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said original
defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in question in
accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5) days from Feb. 6,
1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP
Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on the
part of the defendants spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on
the ground that their consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3,
KP Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now deceased original
defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo under the equitable
principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time in the present case
(Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995,
written in English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4 of
the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that the English
language is not known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who are Igorots. Said
Appellee contends that the document should have been written in Kankana-ey, the
dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP
Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of the
self-serving mere say-so of the representative of the Appellee that her predecessors
did not speak or understand English. As a matter of judicial notice, American
Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada, Mountain Province as early as 1902 and
continuously stayed in the place by turns, co-mingling with the indigenous people
thereat, instructing and educating them, and converting most to the Christian faith,
among other things, until the former left about twenty years ago. By constant
association with the white folks, the natives too old to go to school somehow learned
the Kings English by ear and can effectively speak and communicate in that language.
Any which way, even granting arguendo that the defendants spouses Manacnis were
the exceptions and indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the
Arbitration award in issue on such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of
the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10,
1995, the date of the document. Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the Arbitration
Award acquired the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA 7160;

Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil
Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.
In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for
Arbitration and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in the
first place been given due course by the court a quo. In which case, it would not have
in the logical flow of things declared both documents "inefficacious"; without which
pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.
Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution
appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.10
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the
appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision, to wit:
After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that
the spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent Panget. Thus, We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be
enforced by respondent Pang-ets subsequent action before the MCTC.
There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the
same remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was
allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels during
the pre-trial conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that the
agreement to arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly,
when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their
thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should instead
go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a certificate to file
action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to "render an
arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late Beket
Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed property. While Pang-et
offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the spouses Manacnes, the
latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right to the subject property.
Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration award which favored
respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again
remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any
compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the
Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing, We

find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for
arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of the
Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI,
thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case.
However, according to the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995,
the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.
Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the Pangkat
Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the settlement
arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two hearings show
that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to
repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since the
Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily
entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement
validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action or
defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but agree
with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly, the
arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the agreement is also void.
WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the
MCTC Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of Arbitration
Award is REINSTATED.11
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et
filed the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked
material facts that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed Decision. According to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the original parties, as
represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed to
submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag.
Petitioner insists that the parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their
counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement as any representation made by the
lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their clients. Furthermore, petitioner
maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an amicable
settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first instance, which
was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered that the case be
remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.

We do not agree with the petitioner.

First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that,
during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes
declined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings
before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As reflected in the Minutes12 of
the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the signature of
Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement
for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be
the spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To
resolve the issue, the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they
wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention in the
Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes spouses did
not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case go to court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due
to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the
following: 1) that there was personal confrontation between the parties before the
Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
was constituted but the personal confrontation before the Pangkat failed likewise
because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration and insist that
said case will go to court.13Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the
records of the case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an arbitration award, explaining that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an
"Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled case.
However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may now be
brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned by
the court.14
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily
and freely entered into by the parties.15Through this mechanism, the parties are
encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring the rigors of court litigation.
Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy during
the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead
find recourse in the courts16 in the event that no true compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to

submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award
or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of
a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding
settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the
MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the
arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes
refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for
arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the
parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the
Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary
acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a
confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that
a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as
attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the
authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication. 18 In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case
falling within the authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is
that there has been personal confrontation between the parties but despite earnest
efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be
emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon during the
initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement for
Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for
arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the
confrontation before the Pangkat failed because the spouses Manacnes refused to
submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case should go to court, the MCTC
should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery of possession
which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the
case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels
agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable
settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was
the remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings
and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may
only be compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to
sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally

appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had
already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the case for
conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is already their
acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to the Lupon for
conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual confrontation between the
parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement was reached due to the spouses
Manacnes refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses
Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind
the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have
agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the
Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to
arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract
cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to
it.19 In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to
settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the
spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement
for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for
Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any
agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED
to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession of Real
Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]

PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY,
Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO
REYES, Respondents.
Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner.
Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE

PERIOD; ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. Under Article 1147 of the

Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and
this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de
Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated
August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September
16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at
least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of
the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed
for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should
take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months-ample time
indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation
efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us
to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to
course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. Under Section
4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where
the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases
involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such
as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY

LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere
nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it
is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an
estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No.
R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical
person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file
the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon
for arbitration.
DECISION

ESCOLIN, J.:
Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial
Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the
plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the
deceaseds name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased
and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00
payable in advance within the first five days of the month.
On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the
estate and a resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she
pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982,
and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes
instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the
Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent judge.
On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among
others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are
residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner contended that the
court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes
to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise
known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the
acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that
the case was docketed in the civil division of this court could be considered as meeting
the requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court would not have
accepted the filing of the case especially that there is a standing circular from the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the
President of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain exceptions
must not be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order dated December 14,
1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).

Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through
this petition for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent
admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified
such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing
of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of
Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of
the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1
and this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. 2
In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint
for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less
than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the
prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure
outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding
before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days.
Giving private respondent nine (9) months ample time indeed within which to
bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be
truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case
would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level
a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies.
For this reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST
INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND
THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on
November 9, 1979. Said Circular reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government
and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions
have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay
system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of
said Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library
While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he
nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to
allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any

circumstance as would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he
insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by
the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome
by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action
from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD
No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the
parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases
involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such
as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing
in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate
estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed
to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try
and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60367 September 30, 1982
ATTY. VENUSTIANO T. TAVORA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSARIO R. VELOSO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
III of the City Court of Manila, and JULIETA CAPATI, respondents.
PLANA, J.:
Venustiano T. Tavora, a resident of Marikina, Metro Manila, owns an apartment in
Quiapo, Manila which he has leased to Julieta Capati, a resident of Quiapo. On account
of alleged violations of the lease agreement by the lessee (unauthorized subleasing
and failure to pay rent), the lessor filed on January 12, 1981 an ejectment suit (Civil
Case No. 060828) in the City Court of Manila. The defendant filed a motion t/ dismiss
on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff to bring the dispute

first to the barangay court for possible amicable settlement under PD 1508.
Parenthetically, there is no question that there has been no attempt to amicably settle
the dispute between Tavora and Capati at the barangay level.
After denying the motion to dismiss as well as a subsequent motion for
reconsideration, the municipal court reversed itself and dismissed the ejectment case.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Tavora
has come to this Court on certiorari and mandamus praying that the order of dismissal
be set aside and that respondent judge be ordered to hear and decide the case.
The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge
barred from taking cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec-6 of PD 1508
establishing a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level? The section
reads:
SECTION 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated
... (Emphasis supplied.)
For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the
jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the
relevant provisions of PD 1508 are:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00;

(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
SECTION 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually
residing in the same barangayshall be brought for amicable settlement
before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in
the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually
resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which
involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
(2) involving real property located in different municipalities. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which
the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for
amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the
same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the
disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays
within the same city or municipality unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall
have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction
over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or
municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each
other,
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take
cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:
However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part
thereof is situated.

Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate
as such. The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function,
which is to restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its
scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except something
from the enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or
in part; or to exclude from the scope of the statute that which otherwise
would be within its terms. (73 Am Jur 2d 467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on
venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus:
Although venue is generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes
involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any
part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the
same city/municipality.
In the instant case, the plaintiff in the ejectment case (petitioner herein) is a resident
of Marikina, while the defendant (private respondent) is a resident of Quiapo. No
Lupon therefore is authorized to take cognizance of their dispute.
Finding the petition to be meritorious, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 060828
(ejectment) by the respondent Judge being predicated upon a misconstruction of PD
1508, the same should be granted. (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672.)
Accordingly, the assailed order of dismissal dated February 22, 1982 as well as the
order dated March 23, 1982 denying reconsideration thereof, are hereby set aside; and
the respondent Judge is directed to hear and decide the aforesaid ejectment case on
its merits. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76836 June 23, 1988

TRIUMFO GARCES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DAISY ESCALANTE, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Triumfo Garces (plaintiff below) is owner of an apartment building located at

No. 1603 Indiana Street, now General Malvar Street, Malate, Metropolitan Manila. On
14 August 1984, he filed with Branch 13 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila a
Complaint for ejectment 1 (docketed as Civil Case No. 102100-CV) against respondent
Daisy Escalante (defendant below), the lessee of Room B in that apartment building.
Petitioner Garces claimed in his complaint that the verbal contract of lease with
respondent Escalante, being on a month-to-month basis, had already expired, but that
the latter had unreasonably refused to vacate the leased premises despite oral and
written demands. In an Amended Complaint dated 15 October 1984 2 it was further
alleged, as an additional ground for eviction, that respondent Escalante had converted
the leased premises into a boarding house without the prior consent or approval of
petitioner Garces, in violation of the terms and conditions of their verbal lease
agreement.
On 30 August 1985, the Metropolitan Trial Court, in accordance with the Rule on
Summary Procedure, rendered a Decision 3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff [Garces] and against the defendant [Escalante], ordering
the latter:
(a) and as others claiming rights or title under her to vacate the premises
known as Room B of a residential house designated as No. 1603 Indiana
Street, Malate, Manila;
(b) to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
(c) to pay the costs of suit.
For utter lack of merit, defendant's answer with counterclaim is hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Escalante subsequently interposed an appeal (docketed as Civil Case No.
85-33232) with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which, in a Decision
dated 28 January 1986 4 reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the
following manner:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from as well as the writ
of execution issued pursuant thereto, are hereby set aside for failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action and/or want of jurisdiction on the part
of the court a quo to take cognizance of the instant case by reason thereof.

The regional trial judge, noting that both parties were then residents of Manila, based
his decision on the finding that there had been a failure on the part of plaintiff to
comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 i.e., the
controversy had not been submitted for conciliation before the barangay Lupong
Tagapayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, and no Certification to File Action had
been issued by the appropriate barangay official, prior to the institution of ejectment
proceedings in court.
On 22 September 1986, upon Petition for Review filed by plaintiff Garces (docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 08386), the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division) affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. 5 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently denied for having been filed late. 6
The present Petition for Review was filed on 14 January 1987. After a Comment
thereon and a Reply to the comment had been submitted by respondent Escalante and
petitioner Garces, respectively, the Court, in a Resolution dated 22 July 1987, gave due
course to the Petition. The parties have since then filed their respective memoranda.
After careful consideration of the record, we find, however, that the Petition must fail.
In paragraph 1 of both the Complainant and the Amended Complaint filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, it was alleged that "plaintiff [i.e., petitioner Garces] is a
Filipino of legal age, and residing at 2363 Jacobo Street, Singalong, Manila, while
defendant [i.e., respondent Escalante] is, likewise, of legal age, Filipino and residing at
1603 Indiana, Malate, Manila, where she may be served with summons and other
court processes. 7 A similar allegation appeared in the Petition for Review filed by
plaintiff Garces with the Court of Appeals. 8 Furthermore, the record of this case
indicates that no Certificate to File Action was issued by the barangay official
concerned prior to the initial filing by petitioner Garces of his complaint in court.
Clearly, therefore, dismissal of the ejectment suit ordered initially by the Regional
Trial Court and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals was not improper, especially
considering that, per allegations of complainant himself in his pleadings, both parties
were then in fact residents of barangays situated "in the same city or municipality." 9
Petitioner Garces, however, in order to justify non-application in this case of P.D. 1508,
would now urge the Court to reverse the dismissal of his complaint on the assertion
that the leased apartment unit in Malate "is only the place where (respondent stays)
during workdays as respondent Daisy Escalante is working in Manila" i.e.,
"(respondent's) intention to establish residence is in Cavite where she has her
house." 10 The argument is not persuasive. Section 3 of P.D. 1508 specifically provides
that the Decree shall be applicable to disputes "between or among persons actually
residing in the same barangay" and to disputes "involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality." We think it clear, and so hold, that

P.D. 1508 does not refer here to one's legal residence ordomicile which, for differing
purposes may differ from the actual or physical habitation of a litigant. The policy of
the law is evidently to promote dispute settlement through non-litigious, compulsory
conciliation procedures and disputes arise where people actually or physically reside.
The fact that respondent Escalante stays in the apartment unit in Malate five (5) days
a week, every week, is more than adequate proof that, within the meaning of the
Decree, respondent "actually resides" in Manila.
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure
required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with
which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over
the person of the defendant. 11 Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and
non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the
court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper. 12 We
note from the record that respondent Escalante had filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court a total of four (4) pleadings an Answer, a Motion for Opposition of Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, an Amended Answer, and a Position Paper
before a decision was rendered in this case. In those four pleadings, respondent, then
defendant argued, among other things, that the procedural requirement under Section
6 of P.D. 1508 had been improperly by passed by the plaintiff Garces. It should also be
borne in mind that this case was, before the Metropolitan Trial Court, governed by the
Rule on Summary Procedure and that under Section 15 (a) and (g) of that Rule, no
motion to dismiss and no petition for certiorari or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the trial court, is possible. Thus, respondent Escalante could not have
moved to dismiss, in the Metropolitan Trial Court, upon the ground of failure to comply
with the requirements of P.D. 1508. Neither could respondent Escalante have gone on
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court at anytime before rendition by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of its decision. We conclude that respondent Escalante
(contrary to the suggestion of petitioner) had not waived expressly or impliedly the
procedural requirement under P.D. 1508 and that, since the Decree is applicable in the
present case, petitioner Garces' complaint should have been dismissed outright.
The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508
where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies: the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity;
the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. 13 The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. 14
It is not without reluctance that we reach the conclusion set forth above which would
require petitioner to start again from the beginning, considering that the Metropolitan
Trial Court had rendered a decision on the merits of the case. The facts of the present
case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the Petition for Review under
these circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to P.D. 1508 and to wiping

it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do that.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila dated 30 August 1985 is SET ASIDE and the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 102100-CV is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70245 May 5, 1989

ELEUTERIO DOMINGO, petitioner
vs.
HON. ALFREDO A. ROSERO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVI, Naga City; LEONILO BERCASIO and CANDIDA DELA
TORRE, respondents.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.

Tirso P. Mariano for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The correct appreciation and application of the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508, more commonly known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, particularly
Section 6 thereof, which mandate the submission of certain disputes before the
barangay Lupong Tagapayapa for conciliation and, if possible, amicable settlement
between the parties, prior to the filing of the controversy in the courts of justice, is,
again, the concern of this special civil action for certiorari. The petitioner assails the
public respondent, Judge Alfredo A. Rosero of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
for allegedly acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing on November 23, 1984, the resolution 1 ordering the dismissal of
his (petitioner's) complaint in Civil Case No. 84295, entitled, "Eleuterio Domingo vs.
Leonilo Bercasio, et al.," then pending in the respondent judge's sala.
There is no controversy as to the facts.
On February 7, 1984, the petitioner, as plaintiff, filed a complaint 2 for declaration of
ownership with damages against the private respondent, the spouses Leonilo Bercasio
and Candida dela Torre. Seventeen days thereafter, or on February 24, 1984, to be
exact, the private respondents-defendants filed their answer (with counterclaim) 3 to
the complaint. Still much later, on November 11, 1984, the private respondents moved

for the dismissal of the complaint against them on the sole ground that the petitioner
allegedly failed to comply with the provisions of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1508 which require conciliation proceedings before the barangay Lupong
Tagapayapa as a pre- condition to the filing of a case in court. 4 The petitioner lost no
time in submitting an opposition to the private respondents' motion to dismiss. The
respondent judge, to whose sala the case was raffled, on November 23, 1984, issued
the questioned resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. A motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's resolution was filed, the petitioner-movant arguing
that the case does not come within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508 inasmuch as the parties
thereto reside in different provinces. Alternatively, the petitioner insisted that even
granting that there was indeed a need to submit the case first before the barangay
court, the private respondents' failure to seasonably raise that ground in a motion to
dismiss before they filed their answer, or in their answer itself, constitutes a waiver of
the said ground. 5Apparently, the petitioner's supplications fell on deaf ears because
the respondent trial court judge, on February 6, 1985, denied the motion for
reconsideration for allegedly being "devoid of merit." 6
From the trial court, the petitioner came straight to us vigorously maintaining, as
earlier adverted to, that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing his complaint.
We grant the petition.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 itself, from which the respondent jugde based his rulings
categorically states that it should be taken in conjunction with the provisions of Section
2 of the same decree.
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary

injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente
lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508, on the other hand provides:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof:
(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exeeding P200.00:
(4) Offenses where there is private offended party;
(5) Such other classes of dispute which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, Section 3 thereof states that:
SECTION 3. Venue Dispute between or among persons actually residing
in the same barangay shall be brought to amicable settlement of different
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of
the complainant. However, all dispute which involve real property or
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or
any part thereof is situated.

The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, it is crystal clear
that only disputes between parties who are actual residents of barangays located in
the same city or municipality, or residents of adjoining barangays located in two
different municipalities, are within the jurisdiction of the barangay court.
Unfortunately, the respondent judge failed to see the error of his position divesting
himself of jurisdiction and insisting that the complaint should first be presented before
the barangay court.
The petitioner (plaintiff), avers in paragraph 1 of his complaint' that his residence and
postal address is at 660 T. Solit Street, Pateros, Metro Manila, while the defendants
(private respondents) are residents of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Pacasao, Camarines
Sur. This avernment is specifically admitted by the defendants (private respondents) in
paragraph 1 of their Answer with Counterclaim. 8 The parties are therefore not only
residents of different barangays and municipalities but are also, in fact, residents of
different provinces. P.D. No. 1508 only applies to residents of the same municipalities
or at most, under par. 1 of Section 3 thereof, residents of adjoining barangays situated
in two different municipalities. 9 It would therefore be absurd if the compulsory
conciliation process is made to apply to residents of different and distant provinces, as
the parties herein, when the law itself is inapplicable to residents of different
municipalities unless they are from adjacent barangays. Undoubtedly, the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent is beyond the jurisdiction of any
barangay court and could immediately be filed in the regular courts of justice as the
petitioner here did.
The private respondents submit that the subject dispute between them and the
petitioner is cognizable by the barangay Lupon. They premise their contention on the
allegation that at the time the petitioner filed his complaint, he was temporarily
residing in Barangay Sto. Domingo, in Pacasao, Camarines Sur. 10 But even if the
foregoing allegation were a fact, the private respondents' argument remains seriously
flawed. Residence in a barangay within the same municipality if only transient or
temporary is not enough to vest jurisdiction upon the barangay Lupon.

In the case of Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 11 we have had the occasion to rule
that residence as contemplated in P.D. No. 1508 compels not only actual residence but
also membership in the barangay. Here, it has not been shown that the petitioner
became a member of Barangay Sto. Domingo during his brief sojourn in Pacasao,
Camarines Sur. It follows, lacking in that qualification, that he could not then be
considered, for the purpose of applying the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, as an actual
resident of Barangay Sto. Domingo. There is therefore no need for the dispute
between him and the private respondents to be brought before a barangay Lupon.
At any rate, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the dispute is cognizable by a barangay court, the requirement of
submission or referral to the Lupong Tagapayapa under P.D. 1508 is merely a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court 12 and not jurisdictional. 13 It
is the Judiciary Revamp Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) and the Judiciary Act of 1948,
and not P.D. No. 1508, which vest jurisdiction. 14Accordingly, the failure of the private
respondents to raise timely this ground in a motion to dismiss filed before their answer
to the complaint, or in their answer, constitutes a waiver thereof. 15 We have
consistently adhered to that rule and we see no cogent reason to deviate from it now.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated September 23, 1984 and the Order dated February
6, 1985 of the public respondent, Judge Alfredo A. Rosero dismissing the petitioner's
Complaint, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the trial court is ordered to
REINSTATE Civil Case No. 84-295 thereof. No cost.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70261 February 28, 1990

MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CXLVI,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MAKATI, METRO
MANILA and MA. ROSARIO ARANETA BLARDONY,respondents.

Recto Law Offices for petitioner.

Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for private respondent.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner seeks a review of the orders dated August 9, 1983, and February 20,
1985, of respondent Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,

Branch CXLVI, amending the order of his predecessor, Judge Segundo Soza, (which
dismissed private respondent's petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
partition of conjugal properties) by requiring petitioner to submit an accounting of his
salaries, allowances, bonuses and commissions.
The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were married on April 30,
1975. During their marriage, they begot one child named Patricia Araneta Blardony,
who was born on November 10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and
private respondent separated in March, 1981.
On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the support of their
child, Patricia;
(b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the Compromise of
Settlement of Advances claimed by private respondent from petitioner;
(c) The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa;
and
(d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in favor of
petitioner over a property situated in Calatagan, Batangas. (p. 25, Rollo.)
On May 3, 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and
Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXXVI, in Makati, where it was docketed as Sp. No. 9711.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal home since
March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their
respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability to agree upon the equitable
partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to order "a
fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." (p.
74, Rollo.)
On October 8, 1982, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional
grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as
provided in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of the same Municipality of Makati.
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, Judge Segundo Soza
dismissed her petition on October 8, 1982 for her failure, as plaintiff, to comply with
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.

Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the courts were
reorganized and the case was transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr.
On August 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and
required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses,
and commissions. The latter's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied by
the court on February 20, 1985. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that
respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction:
1. in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior referral to the Lupon
Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508; and
2. in declaring that the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of
personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of the parties are
essentially involved in the petition, hence, the parties could go directly to
court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this Court to
the effect that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition
precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its noncompliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31,
1988; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation
procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the
complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to
make an equitable partition of the conjugal properties.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they
instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. ... . Upon this premise, petitioners cannot be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. (Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470.)
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a
competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases:

SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No

complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment,delivery of personal
properly and support pendente lite; and
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Judge correctly observed that:
... the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not coupled in the strict
sense of the word with the instant petition, are essentially involved in this
petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta Blardony
who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or
decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete without
a clear cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties
of the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper
parties. (p. 20, Rollo.)
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders complained of, the petition for
certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983

SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR.,
Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.

Amado G. Olis for petitioners.

Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.

ESCOLIN., J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of arbitration at the
Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, Petitioners contend
that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not
only by the city and municipal courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and
municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial
courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit its coverage only to those cases
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal
trial courts.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and
Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent
Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma.
Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all
residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor,
the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay
conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by
the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by
the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order
dated October 3, 1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the
provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which
the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat,
shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for execution of the same,
and considering that from the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the
pre- condition to the filing of a complaint as provided for in Section 6
thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered opinion of this Court
that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable
by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants, of the order of September 2. 1982, denying their motion to
dismiss, is hereby denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].
From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated
December 2, 1982, We required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to
file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.
We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman
or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal
liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and

[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of

Limitations
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon
has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually
reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction
whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at
the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by
paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in
defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in
consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law
does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compelling the disputants to
settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other
respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court
litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity
and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at
the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in
court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the
quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited
to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective.

Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in
an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his
claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby
avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek
to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial
courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could
not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored
tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level
without judicial resources would promote the speedy administration of
justice and implement the constitutional mandate to preserve and develop
Filipino culture and to strengthen the family as a basic social institution;
WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice
contributes heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets,
thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice;
WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion
and thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is
deemed desirable to formally organize and institutionalize a system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority
to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant to the
Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the
optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be halfmet and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof
the following rule on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or
any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real
property or and part thereof is situated.

for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases
involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases,
has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the
law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or
execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this
circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the
Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section
2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal
with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at
the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the
jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the
amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the
context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in
other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT
CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS,
COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS
AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT
SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local
Government and Community Development that all the barangays within
your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of
settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons.
Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent modified.
This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal
courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts,
juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional
trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E.
Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of
which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving
the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the
investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate
implementation be made by all government officials and offices concerned of the
system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the
conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition
for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the
exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989.*

NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH
DIVISION) AND ARMIE ELMA, respondents.

Camilo Cario Dionio, Jr. for petitioner.

Cedo, Ferrer & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The familiar story in the Old Testament is of how King Solomon settled the dispute
between two women over a child by deciding that the child be cut into two for them to
share. The real mother full of love implored that the King not kill the child and give the

child to the other woman. The latter asked the King not to give it to either of them and
to go on, cut the child into two.
This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between
the parties. But the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private
respondent is happy with his half. This is the impasse that must be resolved.
The center of controversy is Lot 5989, Ts-217 with an area of about 270 square
meters situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City. This lot was titled in the name of
Paulino Elma under Original Certificate of Title No. (P-29947) (P-11503) P-1987 issued
by the Office of the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-635. A reversion case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato docketed as Civil Case
No. 950, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on January 29, 1973 declaring
the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same was ordered cancelled. The lot
was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving
preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare.
This decision was affirmed by this Court when We dismissed the petition for review on
certiorari filed by the heirs of Elma on March 13, 1974 in G.R. No. L-38069. Thereafter,
the writ of execution was issued and the title of Elma to the property was cancelled.
Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the Board of
Liquidators (Board for short) in 1975. On June 15, 1976, Resolution No. 606, Series of
1976 was passed by the Board disposing of the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a
negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in Civil Case No. 950. Private
respondent protested against the application of petitioner and on August 8, 1978, the
Board adopted Resolution No. 611, Series of 1978 denying private respondent's protest
for the same reason. A request for reconsideration of private respondent was referred
by the Board to Mr. Artemio Garlit, liquidator-designee, General Santos Branch, for
verification and investigation. After hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report to the
Manila office recommending division of the lot to the parties. Nevertheless, on March
13, 1981, the Board denied the protest because the case had already been decided by
the court.
However, a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably
considered by the Board in Resolution No. 233, Series of 1981 dated July 8, 1981.
Thus, the Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and area
of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that only private respondent was the
actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the property
between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 14, 1981, the Board passed Resolution No. 272, Series of 1981 approving
said recommendation by dividing the lot equally between the parties at 135.5 square
meters each to be disposed to them by negotiated sale.
Both parties appealed to the Office of the President but in a decision dated March 25,
1984, both appeals were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied on May 29,1984.
Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the issuance of a
patent. In Resolution No. 185, Series of 1985 adopted on October 7, 1985, the Board
gave due course to the application of private respondent and for the issuance of a
patent to 1/2 portion of the lot. Petitioner was also advised to file his application and
pay for his portion. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4261 and Original Certificate
of Title No. P-5139 were issued to private respondent.
On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed an action for "Annulment and Cancellation of
Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and
Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and 185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void"
against private respondent and the Board. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No.
3270 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
On February 11, 1985, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) petitioner
has no capacity to sue; (3) petitioner is not a real party-in-interest; and (4) the action
is barred by prior judgment. Private respondent added another ground (5) lack of
conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The motion
was granted in an order dated March 18, 1986.
On April 3, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an opposition
was filed by private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an
order of April 21, 1986 and private respondent was required to file his responsive
pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On July 10, 1986, private respondent
asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to dismiss in his
affirmative defenses. This was denied on July 24, 1986.
Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals questioning the said orders of the trial court dated April 21, 1986 and July 24,
1986. In due course, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on March 16,
1988 granting the petition, declaring the questioned orders null and void, and directing
the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, without pronouncement
as to costs. An urgent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a
resolution dated May 31, 1988. 1

Thus, the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues--FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CA-G.R. SP
NO. 12183 WITHOUTFIRST SERVING SUMMONS AND A COPY
OF THE PETITION TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
SAID CASE (NOW PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE),
THUS,DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION OF ARMIE ELMA IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) ORDERS SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE PETITION ARE INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO.
3270.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 3270
FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 1508 BEFORE FILING HIS
COMPLAINT IN COURT. 2
The petition is devoid of any merit.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner alleges that he was not served summons and
a copy of the petition so that he was deprived of due process and the respondent
court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Private respondent disputes this claim by showing that it was at the address of
petitioner appearing in the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant and Disco Pub,
Ilang-Ilang Street, General Santos City, where petitioner was served a copy of private
respondent's "Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution. 3 Petitioner's counsel was
also served a copy of the resolution dated June 28, 1987, 4 "Motion for Restraining
Order" dated July 28, 1987 and Manifestation dated December 1, 1987. 5 Indeed,

petitioner's counsel filed a motion dated April 4, 1988 seeking a reconsideration of the
decision of respondent court 6 which was denied on May 31, 1988. Obviously,
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the respondent court and was
never deprived of due process. 7
Under the second and third assigned errors, petitioner contends that the appellate
court erred in giving due course to the petition that assailed the two orders of the
court a quo which are interlocutory in character and in holding that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3270.
It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it acts
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or if the trial court judge otherwise acted with
grave abuse of discretion that the extraordinary writ of certiorari or prohibition is
afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is available even in respect to interlocutory
orders. 8
The appellate court correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with purely
administrative matters rendered by administrative bodies or officials acting within the
scope of their power and authority. The discretionary power vested in the proper
executive official in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse so as to go beyond the
statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of the courts and
is treated with finality. 9
When Board Resolution No. 272 was passed in 1981, petitioner appealed to the Office
of the President. After his appeal was denied on March 26, 1984, he did not file a
petition for review in this court. Thus, the said decision became final and it was duly
implemented. We agree that when petitioner filed Civil Case No. 3270, the trial court
should have refrained from interfering with said administrative disposition of the chief
executive absent any showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.
Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower court. The
real party-in-interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant is the government
or the state. 10
Under the fourth and last assigned error, petitioner argues that it was erroneous for
the appellate court to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for
failure to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing the
complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said case for one of the parties
therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof which is
excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.

True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private
respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same
barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it
provides--Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences
amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or
subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the
contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90643 June 25, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN FORTES Y GARRA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 91155 June 25, 1993.
AGUSTIN G. FORTES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE EUGENIO C. GUAN,. JR. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 55, Irosin, Sorsogon, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Gavino L. Barlin for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape of a young girl described by the
trial court as "a guileless lass of only 13, [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in a barangay of
rural atmosphere," and the denial by the trial court of his application for bail pending
his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in these consolidated cases.
In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of Branch 55 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) at Irosin, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 219. The court a quo, in its
Decision dated 18 November 1988 but promulgated on 25 January 1989, found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 to answer for
damages and costs. 1
In G.R. No. 91155, the accused seeks to annul and set aside two (2) related orders of
the said trial court denying his application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure
his provisional liberty pending the resolution of his appeal.
The records disclose these antecedents:
On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police
station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the
accused at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of that day. Following this, the
accused was forthwith apprehended.
Thereupon, on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a
complaint 2 for rape against the accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in Matnog, Sorsogon. 3 The accusatory portion
thereof reads as follows:
That on or about 11:00 in the morning of November 26, 1983, at Barangay
Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with deliberate intent and without the consent of the victim MERELYN
GINE, and by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) armed with a bolo threatened (sic) and
dragged (sic) the victim MERELYN GINE, and there the said accused
committed the acts of rape inside the nipa hut owned by Leovegildo (sic)
Garra, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned offended party.
Act contrary to law. 4
Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary examination was conducted, the
MCTC issued on 9 December 1983 an order for the arrest of the accused. 5 The bond

for the latter's temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced
to P25,000.00 6 upon motion of the accused. The latter then put up the required bond;
upon its approval, the court ordered his release on 15 December 1983. 7
When the case was finally called for preliminary investigation on 5 December 1984, the
accused, through his counsel de oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his
right thereto. The court then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. 8
On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Manuel C. Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a
complaint for rape against the accused, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about, the 26th day of November, 1983, in the Municipality of
Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd design (sic), and armed with a bolo and (sic)
threatened her with harm and dragged to a hut the victim and there have
(sic) carnal knowledge with one Merelyn Gine against her will and consent,
to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 219.
Accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 28 February 1985. 10 The
protracted trial began on 26 June 1985 and ended nearly three (3) years later when
the case was finally submitted for decision on 22 February 1988. 11 The witnesses
presented by the prosecution were Merelyn Gine, her father Agripino and Dr. Eddie
Dorotan. The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, were the accused himself,
Leovegildo Garra and Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan, Matnog,
Sorsogon.
On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the accused of
the crime charged. 12 The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as
damages and to pay the costs. The accused is ordered committed to the
Sorsogon Provincial Jail through the Provincial Warden or through any of
his provincial guards and eventually committed to the National Penitentiary
in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

13

On the same day, the accused filed his notice of appeal 14 wherein he requested that
the amount of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The following day, 26
January 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal 15 but did not resolve the
request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April 1989, the accused filed an
"Application for Bail on Appeal" 16reiterating his earlier request that the bail bond for
his provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was subsequently denied by the trial
court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that ". . . the accused has already
been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and sentenced
to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from the decision already approved by the Court
. . . ." 17 Thereupon, on 19 August 1989, the trial court issued a Commitment of Final
Sentence turning over the person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. 18
On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989
Order denying his application for bail pending appeal, 19 but the same was denied in
the Order of 6 September 1989. 20
In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to this Court the
records of criminal Case No. 219. We received the same on 16 November 1989 and
docketed the appeal as G.R. No. 90643.
On 9 December 1989, the accused filed with this Court a special civil action
for certiorari to set aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court denying his
application for bail and his motion to reconsider the said denial. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 91155. In the Resolution of 20 December 1989, 21 this Court
required the respondents to comment on the petition.
Then, on 18 June 1990, the said case was ordered consolidated with G.R. No.
90643. 22 The records of G.R. No. 91155 do not disclose if the respondents had
actually filed the required comment.
G.R. No. 91155
We shall first resolve G.R. No. 91155. Accused assails the trial court's refusal to grant
his application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the same amounted to an
undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. He contends that before his conviction
by final judgment, he enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence, and is
therefore entitled to bail as a matter of right.
There is no merit in the said petition.

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, 24 that:

23

and Section 3, Rule

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a

matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . .
. 25
The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetuais convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer
such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only
determined that the evidence of guilt is
strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en
bancResolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, 26 ruled that:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no
longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to
this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt
of the offense charged is strong.
In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable
by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was
convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident
that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the
appeal.
G.R. No. 90643
We now turn to the accused's appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The inculpatory facts, proven by the prosecution and upon which the trial court based
its judgment of conviction, are summarized by the trial court in its decision. Finding the
same to be fully supported by the evidence adduced, We hereby adopt the said
summary as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of 26
November 1983, Merelyn Gine accompanied her father Agripino Gine to
Barangay Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon, where he was going to work in
the farm of Patrolman Nonito Galeria. Her father left her in the nipa hut of
one Leovegildo Garra so she can cook his meal for lunch. She was alone in
the hut.
(4) While she was preparing to cook the meal, accused appeared from
nowhere and inserted his T-shirt inside her mouth. Accused also held her
hands and tore her pedal pant (sic). She tried to kick him but to no avail.
After he was able to remove her pedal, she was threatened with a bolo and
was warned that he will kill her if she shouted. The bolo which was
presented in evidence as Exhibit C (sic) was 23 inches long including the
handle. The sharp end of the bolo was pointed by the accused to her
throat. Accused laid her down and it was in this position when (sic) the
accused had sexually abused her by inserting his penis through her (sic)
panty she was wearing which was torn and stained with her (Exhibits B, B1
and B2). She suffered extreme pain and her vagina started bleeding. She
cried and wished that her father were around so that she could ask him to
kill the accused.
(5) Just as the accused consummated the rape, her father returned from
the farm to inquire whether his meal was cooked already. He called for his
daughter but she did not answer during the first call and on the second call
he heard her answer "po" (meaning yes). Suddenly, the accused jumped
out of the window with his short pants on but leaving behind in his hurry to
escape, the T-shirt which he inserted inside the mouth of the victim and
the bolo he used to threaten her. Her father gave chase but was not able
to catch up with the accused.
(6) When her father went gave inside the hut, he found her in a state of
shock and (sic) was trying to get up but was swaying for she could hardly
stand. It was at this instance when his daughter narrated to him the
dastardly act perpetrated upon her by the accused.

(7) On the same day, she and her father reported the incident to the police
authorities in Matnog, Sorsogon, and an investigation was made. On that
same day, the accused was apprehended.
(8) From the police, went to the Irosin District Hospital for medical
examination. Thereat, she was subjected to a medical examination by a
certain Dr. Tito Garrido but he did not issue her a medical certificate. So
she had another medical examination by Dr. Eddie Dorotan of the same
hospital who issued her a medical certificate which was introduced in
evidence as E and E1.
(9) At the time she was sexually abused, Merelyn Gine was only 13 years
old (Exhibit D). She demonstrated to the Court the position in which she
was raped by the accused. She felt so ashamed after the rape and
underwent so much suffering and pain like her father, which could not be
compensated with money alone and wants justice done. 27
On the other hand, the accused capsulated his version of the incident in this manner:
On November 26, 1983 at about 8:30 in the morning, accused Fortes on
his way to the Nipa Hut which he used as a rest house met Agripino Gine,
father of Complainant Merelyn Gine in the ricefield at Bgy. Naburacan,
Matnog, Sorsogon where they both work and cultivate their respective
ricelands. In that meeting Agripino asked permission from accused if her
(sic) daughter, Merelyn, could cook their lunch at the Nipa Hut, ("Payag" in
local dialect), owned by the grandfather of accused Leovegeldo (sic) Garra.
Accused who is a neighbor and family friend of Agripino (sic) in Bgy.
Camachilis where they both reside gave his permission. Accused proceeded
to the Nipa Hut owned by his grandfather for the purpose of preparing his
own lunch. When accused arrived in the Nipa Hut, he saw Merelyn
preparing their lunch.
Accused waited for his turn while Merelyn was preparing their lunch.
Accused spent his waiting time in repairing the plow (araro) which he used
in the cultivation of the riceland. At this point in time his grandfather
Leovegeldo (sic) Garra arrived. Merelyn Gine and accused who are known
to each other being neighbors and family friends exchanged pleasanties
(sic) and jokes. In the process, accused accidentally dropped the fish which
he was about to cook for lunch outside the window. Accused passed
through the window which is about half () meter from the ground to
pick-up the fish.

At this juncture, Agripino (sic) arrived from the ricefield at about 11:00 in
the morning and called his daughter, Merelyn, to inquire if lunch was
ready. Merelyn answered in the negative. Agripino got angry and scolded
his daughter, Merelyn for failing to cook the lunch on time.
In the meantime, accused-appellant returned to the ricefield to pick-up his
bottle of drinking water. He returned back to the Nipa Hut at about 12:00
noon and he saw inside the nipa hut, the following people: Agripino Gine,
Joel, Mondoy, sons of Agripino and Dick Galeria son the owner of the
riceland being cultivated, by Agripino Gine eating their lunch. 28
To bolster his defense, the accused presented two (2) other witnesses, namely
Leovegildo Garra, his grandfather, and Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of
Naburacan, Matnog.
The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the prosecution's version; it was
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Merelyn fell victim to a sexual assault on the
morning of 26 November 1983 which was perpetrated through force and intimidation.
On that same day, both she and her father immediately reported the incident to the
police authorities. She then submitted to a medical examination.
There seems to be no logical reason for her or her father to concoct the charge of rape
against the accused. During her testimony, Merelyn "showed an unmistakable
determination to exact justice, from the man who had forcibly violated her and caused
her early loss of virginity." She "has no motive other than to bring to justice the culprit
who had grievously wronged her." 29
In his Brief, the accused, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, urges this Court to
reverse his conviction and acquit him on the ground that the trial court erred in:
I . . . GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY
OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
SHOWING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT SEXUALLY ABUSED
ON NOVEMBER 26, 1983.
III . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE BGY.
CAPTAIN WHERE THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED.
IV . . . NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HIS GUILT
HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 30

For his first assigned error, the appellant contends that the rape for which he was
charged and subsequently convicted was not established by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. He claims that the complainant's statement that she had her
panty on while she was being raped is incredible, as "[E]xperience will show that it is
physically [I]mpossible to perform and execute the act of sexual intercourse to woman
with her panty on." 31
In support of the second assigned error, he asserts that the medical examination
conducted by Eddie Dorotan, a government physician assigned to the Irosin District
Hospital, which revealed that "there was no bleeding" and "no
spermatozoa" 32 present, conclusively proved that the accused did not commit the
crime of rape. The latter further contends that the trial court erred in believing the
complainant's declaration that her panty was stained with her blood because, as he
points out, there was no "corroborated (sic) evidence to prove that indeed the alleged
blood stain is indeed the blood coming from the vagina of complainant." 33
As to his third ascribed error, the appellant faults the trial court for not giving due
weight to the testimony of the Barangay Captain of the locality wherein the rape was
committed. He further contends that since Barangay Captain Celso Gardon testified
that he (Gordon) passed by the nipa hut and saw the complainant and her father
Agripino together with other persons at around lunch time the time of the
commission of the alleged rape Agripino should have immediately reported the
sexual assault to him as he is the barangay captain.
The appellant additionally assails the credibility of Agripino Gine, claiming that the
latter failed to corroborate his daughter's story that there was blood on the spot where
she was purportedly raped and that her panty and pants were torn by the appellant.
Moreover, it is averred that Agripino did not even describe to the court his daughter's
attire when he found her in the nipa hut. Appellant then faults the trial court for
concluding that he had presented the defense of alibi when the records reveals that no
such defense was offered by him.
Appellant's last assigned error is but a summation of the previous three (3) errors; he
concludes that the totality of the prosecution's evidence creates sufficient doubt as to
his guilt. Hence, he concludes that he is entitled to an acquittal.
Our careful review of the records and painstaking evaluation of the evidence adduced
by the parties yield nothing to support the assigned errors, and lead Us to the
inevitable conclusion that the culpability of the appellant has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. This appeal must therefore be dismissed for palpable lack of merit.
The victim narrated her ordeal in a simple, yet candid and straightforward manner as
evidenced by the transcripts of her testimony, the pertinent portions of which read:

FISCAL GENOVA
What happened while you were getting the kettle preparatory
to cooking your meal?
A Suddenly, this Agustin Fortes appeared from nowhere and
tried to embrace me.
Q In what part of your body?
A He tried to insert his T-shirt in my mouth.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after you were held and a piece of T-shirt
put (sic) inside your mouth?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q Before he had sexual intercourse with you, what did he do?
A He torn (sic) my panty and my pedal.
Q Do you mean to tell this Court that you were dressed during
that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how did Agustin Fortes tried (sic) to torn (sic) your pedal
and panty?
A When he was trying to hold my hands, he was pulling my
panty at the same time tearing my pedal and I was kicking him.
Q I am showing to you clothes from the Police Station labeled
"Criminal Case No. 3226" which I presumed is the criminal case
number . . . a panty with dark stain and a pedal. I am showing
to you these in connection to what you just stated. This is from
the Police Station of Matnog.
A This is the pedal I was wearing at the time.
Q When you were wearing this, was it already torn?
A Not yet.

Q How about this panty of yours, is this already in this kind

(sic)?
A No, sir.
Q What is this dark stain here . . . which you could see?
A That is a blood.
Q Whose blood?
A Mine.
Q How was this torn? The pedal . . . no the panty?
A He was the one who torn (sic) my panty.
Q And in the process this was removed from your body?
A Yes sir.
Q What happened now after this pedal also was removed?
A I was able to shout but he warned me that he is going to kill
me.
Q When he stated that he was going to kill you, what was in his
possession?
A A bolo.
Q I am showing to you a bolo wrapped in a coupon bond, 23
inches labelled "People of the Philippines versus Agustin Fortes
November 26, 1983." What is the relation of this bolo to the
bolo that was used?
A This is the bolo that was used.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, how was this bolo being used in your body?
A He was trying to thrust it below my neck.
Q With what hand was the accused using this?

A Left.
Q When you say it was being poked in your body, which part of
the bolo?
A The sharp end.
Q On what part of your body was it being poked?
A On my neck.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said you were sexually abused by Agustin fortes,
how was this sexual abuse made in (sic) your body?
A By holding my hands and laying me down on the floor and he
lied (sic) down on top of me . . . and then he performed the
sexual intercourse.
Q When you said "ikiti" (sexual intercourse), my question is, did
the penis of the accused penetrate your vagina?
A Yes sir.
Q And while he was on that act of sexual intercourse with his
penis inside your vagina, what happened then?
A I felt pain. And my vagina started bleeding.
Q And what happened next?
A And then I cried and I remembered that if only my father is
there I will ask him to kill the accused.
Q Did your father arrive?
A Yes sir and Agustin Fortes jumped out of the window.

34

The jumping of the appellant out of the window was witnessed by Merelyn's father
whose testimony thereon was further bolstered during cross-examination:
ATTY. ZULUETA:
xxx xxx xxx

Q When you returned to the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what

happened?
A When I was about in a distance of (sic) three meters from
the house of Leovegildo (sic) Garra, I called for my daughter.
My first call, there was no answer, and on my second call, there
was an answer "po", then, suddenly, somebody jumped out of
the window in the person of Agustin Fortes.
Q When you saw the alleged accused in this case jumped (sic)
out of the window of the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what did you
do?
A Instead of trying to run after Agustin Fortes, I felt
apprehensive, and so, I went to the succor of my daughter
which (sic) was speechless.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you went to the house of Leovegildo Garra, what
happened there?
A That (sic) my daughter was raped.
Q How come that you knew that your daughter was raped?
A Because my daughter herself told me.

35

Agripino's daughter was in a sitting position and could hardly stand when he saw
her. 36 He thus decided to report the incident to the police authorities immediately.
Thus, both he and Merelyn proceeded to the police station
where they were consequently interrogated. Thereafter, the appellant was
apprehended. 37
From Merelyn's testimony, it is evident that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her
through force and intimidation. He gagged her first with a
t-shirt and then forced her into the sexual act by threatening to kill her with his bolo.
Her testimony on this point was even further strengthened and enhanced when, during
cross-examination, counsel for the appellant gambled on the fate of the latter by
asking Merelyn to show how the rape was committed. Merelyn then demonstrated how
the appellant gripped her hands and pointed the bolo to her neck. 38
As to the alleged impossibility of the commission of the sexual act because of the fact
that Merelyn's panty was not actually removed, the appellant seems to have forgotten

that it was he, through the cross-examination of his lawyer, who elicited from Merelyn
the declaration that his penis was inserted through a hold in the said panty. Thus:
ATTY ZULUETA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You have said that the accused had forcefully made sexual
intercourse with you. How come that (sic) the penis penetrated
your vagina?
A When his right hand was holding my hands he unzipped his
pants and put out his penis and inserted his penis to (sic) my
vagina.
Q When the accused conducted sexual intercourse with you, do
(sic) you have your panty?
A Yes sir. There is a hole in my panty where he inserted his
penis to (sic) my vagina.
Q While the accused was having sexual intercourse with you,
what happened next?
A My vagina was bleeding because it was very painful.

39

Neither may the medical certificate (Exhibit "E") issued by Dr. Eddie Dorotan be of any
help to the appellant. The said certificate does not, contrary to the latter's claim, prove
that Merelyn did not have sexual intercourse because of the findings therein reported
that there was no bleeding, the vagina admitted two (2) fingers and the vaginal fluid
contained no spermatozoa. Again, the appellant conveniently forgot that Dr. Dorotan
examined Merelyn only on 28 November 1983 at 9:45 o'clock in the morning, 40 or two
(2) days after the incident. By that time, the bleeding, which had taken place earlier,
may no longer have been noticeable and the spermatozoa may no longer have been
present. It is settled that the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the
consummation of rape. The important consideration is not the emission of semen, but
the penetration by the male organ. 41 It must likewise be emphasized that Dr. Tito
Garrido of the District Hospital of Irosin, the physician who examined Merelyn in the
afternoon of 26 November 1983, did not issue a medical certificate, although he
promised to deliver one in Matnog. It has been shown that Dr. Garrido reneged on this
pledge. Furthermore, during trial, complainant's father claimed that he had later
learned that Dr. Garrido is related to the appellant. 42 This assertion was not even
rebutted by the defense.

Moving on, this Court is not persuaded by the appellant's contention that if Merelyn
had in fact been raped, then either she or her father should have first informed the
barangay captain about the incident. Suffice it to say, reporting the commission of a
crime to a barangay captain is not a prerequisite for the formal institution of criminal
charges. Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing law then, rapes was not among the
crimes which required referral to the Barangay Lupon for the purpose of seeking an
amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among those excepted from such a
referral considering that the penalty imposable is more than thirty (30) days
imprisonment. 43 If the complainant and her father seemed to have "by-passed" the
barangay captain and instead reported the incident directly to the police, it is quite
obvious that they wanted immediate action to ensure the appellant's arrest and
forestall any possible escape on his part.
Finally, the appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously characterized his
defense as one of alibi, is without any basis. The trial court actually characterized the
appellant's defense as one of "alibi and absolute denial." 44 Besides, the "alibi" aspect
thereof is not entirely inaccurate for in fact, as shown by his own story, the appellant
went back to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking water before returning to
the nipa hut at around 12:00 o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he was not at
the scene of the crime at the time the sexual assault was committed.
All told, We have in this case a 13-year old barrio lass who: immediately revealed the
commission of the heinous crime to her father just as the appellant consummated the
act and jumped out of the window to escape, forthwith reported it to the police
authorities who, after having heard her
story, apprehended the appellant; thereafter, in the afternoon of the same day,
voluntarily submitted to a medical examination of her private parts; submitted again to
a second medical examination on her private parts on 28 November 1983; underwent
the ordeal of a public trial; and, upon demand
by the appellant's counsel, even demonstrated as part of the cross-examination
how she was raped. We need no further evidence to convince Us that indeed, the
complainant was raped by the appellant. We have repeatedly held that when a woman
admits that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape had been committed. A complainant would make public the offense, undergo the
troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the
gory details if she had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly
admit that she has been raped unless it is the truth. 45
Moreover, the appellant has not shown that the complainant and her father were
actuated by any ulterior motives which could have induced them to falsely implicate
him in the commission of the crime. It is settled that when there is no evidence to
show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely
against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed, and

their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 46 Indeed, if an accused had really
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human
nature and against the presumption of good faith that the prosecution witness would
falsely testify against the former. 47
We thus affirm the decision appealed from except as to the matter of the indemnity,
which is hereby increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 pursuant to the current
policy of the Court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) In G.R. No. 90643, AFFIRMING the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 219 of
Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, at Irosin, Sorsogon, with
the modification of the indemnity which is increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00;
and
2) In G.R. No. 91155, DENYING, for lack of merit, the petition.
Costs against appellant Agustin Fortes y Garra in both cases.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82211-12 March 21, 1989

TERESITA MONTOYA, petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA ESCAYO, JOY ESCAYO, AIDA GANANCIAL, MARY ANN CAPE,
CECILIA CORREJADO, ERLINDA PAYPON and ROSALIE VERDE, AND
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Rolando N. Medalla and Segundo Y Chua for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Archie S. Baribar for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks the annullment and setting aside of the
resolution 1 9dated August 20, 1987 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Third Division, which reversed and set aside the order dated September 27,

1985 of Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera of the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch
No. VI, Bacolod City, dismissing the complaint filed by the private respondents against
the petitioner. This petition raises a singular issue, i.e., the applicability of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, more commonly known as the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, to labor disputes.
The chronology of events leading to the present controversy is as follows:
The private respondents were all formerly employed as salesgirls in the petitioner's
store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store," in Bacolod City. On different dates, they
separately filed complaints for the collection of sums of money against the petitioner
for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and service
leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and attorney's
fees. The complaints, which were originally treated as separate cases, were
subsequently consolidated on account of the similarity in their nature. On August 1,
1984, the petitioner-employer moved (Annex "C" of Petition) for the dismissal of the
complaints, claiming that among others, the private respondents failed to refer the
dispute to the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the
certification required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the
Labor Arbiter. These actions were allegedly violative of the provisions of P.D. No. 1508,
which apply to the parties who are all residents of Bacolod City.
Acting favorably on the petitioner's motion, Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera, on
September 27, 1985, ordered the dismissal of the complaints. The private respondents
sought the reversal of the Labor Arbiter's order before the respondent NLRC. On
August 20, 1987, the public respondent rendered the assailed resolution reversing the
order of Ovejera, and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but this was denied for lack of
merit on October 28, 1987. Hence, this petition.
It is the petitioner's contention that the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law (P.D. No. 1508) relative to the prior amicable settlement proceedings before the
Lupong Tagapayapa as a jurisdictional requirement at the trial level apply to labor
cases. More particularly, the petitioner insists that the failure of the private
respondents to first submit their complaints for possible conciliation and amicable
settlement in the proper barangay court in Bacolod City and to secure a certification
from the Lupon Chairman prior to their filing with the Labor Arbiter, divests the Labor
Arbiter, as well as the respondent Commission itself, of jurisdiction over these labor
controversies and renders their judgments thereon null and void.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, as counsel for the public respondent NLRC, in
his comment, strongly argues and convincingly against the applicability of P.D. No.
1508 to labor cases.

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit, there being no satisfactory showing of any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent.
The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before the
barangay Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other government
offices are not applicable to labor cases.
For a better understanding of the issue in this case, the provisions of P.D. No. 1508
invoked by the petitioner are quoted:
SEC. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of per sonal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente
lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment to the petition, even
from the three "WHEREAS" clauses of P.D. No. 1508 can be gleaned clearly the
decree's intended applicability only to courts of justice, and not to labor relations
commissions or labor arbitrators' offices. The express reference to "judicial resources",
to "courts of justice", "court dockets", or simply to "courts" are significant. On the
other band, there is no mention at all of labor relations or controversies and labor
arbiters or commissions in the clauses involved.
These "WHEREAS" clauses state:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored
tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and barangay

members at the barangay level without judicial resources would promote

the speedy administration of justice and implement the constitutional
mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen the
family as a basic social institution;
WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of
justice contributes heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court
dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice;
WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion
and thereby enhance the quality of Justice dispensed by the courts, it is
deemed desirable to formally organize and institutionalize a system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level; (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, Letter of Instructions No. 956 and Letter of Implementation No. 105, both
issued on November 12, 1979 by the former President in connection with the
implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, affirm this conclusion. These
Letters were addressed only to the following officials: all judges of the Courts of first

Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Courts of
Agrarian Relations, City Courts and Municipal Courts, and all Fiscals and other
Prosecuting Officers. These presidential issuances make clear that the only official

directed to oversee the implementation of the provisions of the Katarungang

Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 1508) are the then Minister of Justice, the then Minister of
Local Governments and Community Development, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. If the contention of the petitioner were correct, the then Minister (now
Secretary) of Labor and Employment would have been included in the list, and the two
presidential issuances also would have been addressed to the labor relations officers,
labor arbiters, and the members of the National Labor Relations Commission. Expressio

unius est exclusio alterius.

Nor can we accept the petitioner's contention that the "other government office"
referred to in Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 includes the Office of the Labor Arbiter and
the Med-Arbiter. The declared concern of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law is "to help
relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby enhance the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts." Thus, the" other government office" mentioned in Section 6
of P.D. No. 1508 refers only to such offices as the Fiscal's Office or, in localities where
there is no fiscal, the Municipal Trial Courts, where complaints for crimes (such as
those punishable by imprisonment of not more than 30 days or a, fine of not more
than P 200.00) falling under the jurisdiction of the barangay court but which are not
amicably settled, are subsequently filed for proper disposition.
But, the opinion of the Honorable Minister of Justice (Opinion No. 59, s. 1983) to the
contrary notwithstanding, all doubts on this score are dispelled by The Labor Code Of

The Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended) itself. Article 226 thereof
grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over the conciliation and mediation of
disputes, grievances, or problems in the regional offices of the Department of Labor
and Employ- ment. It is the said Bureau and its divisions, and not the barangay
Lupong Tagapayapa, which are vested by law with originaland exclusive authority to
conduct conciliation and mediation proceedings on labor controversies before their
endorsement to the appropriate Labor Arbiter for adjudication. Article 226, previously
adverted to is clear on this regard. It provides:
ART. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations.- The Bureau of Labor Relations and
the Labor relations divisions in the regional officer of the Department of
Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own
initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from
or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether
agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which
shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on all labor cases,
subject to extension by agreement of the parties, after which the Bureau
shall certify the cases to the appropriate Labor Arbiters. The 15-working
day deadline, however, shall not apply to cases involving deadlocks in
collective bargaining which the Bureau shall certify to the appropriate
Labor Arbiters only after all possibilities of voluntary settlement shall have
been tried.
Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts would defeat the
very salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at
expeditious settlement or referral to the proper court or office to decide it finally, the
position taken by the petitioner would only duplicate the conciliation proceedings and
unduly delay the disposition of the labor case. The fallacy of the petitioner's
submission can readily be seen by following it to its logical conclusion. For then, if the
procedure suggested is complied with, the private respondent would have to lodge first
their complaint with the barangay court, and then if not settled there, they would have
to go to the labor relations division at the Regional Office of Region VI of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in Bacolod City, for another round of
conciliation proceedings. Failing there, their long travail would continue to the Office of
the Labor Arbiter, then to the NLRC, and finally to us. This suggested procedure would
destroy the salutary purposes of P.D. 1508 and of The Labor Code Of The Philippines.
And labor would then be given another unnecessary obstacle to hurdle. We reject the
petitioner's submission. It does violence to the constitutionally mandated policy of the
State to afford full protection to labor. 2

Finally, it is already well-settled that the ordinary rules on procedure are merely
suppletory in character vis-a-vis labor disputes which are primarily governed by labor
laws. 3 And "(A)ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code
(Labor), including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor. 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157830 November 17, 2005

DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILOU M. PASCUAL, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on motion of
herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her brotherherein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented by his attorney-in-fact Reymel R.
Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre condition to
filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code).
Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as
his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271656 issued
in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Dec.
No. 639; Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or Reconveyance at the
appropriate court;
2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;
3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of
payment/and/or dispute resolution;
4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be
necessary relative to the above acts.

x x x1
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at
Roxas a complaint entitled "Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and
Register of Deeds, Defendants," docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.2
To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to
Dismiss3 on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement
under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,4 she contending that there is no
showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed
in court.
By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,5 Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas
granted respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay provides under Section 409 "All disputes involving real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated." Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A.
7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is involved, the dispute
shall be filed before the barangay where the property is located, regardless of the
residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not
residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas,
Isabela, and he substitute (sic)Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power
of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the dispute before
barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. In the case of Royales
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470, "Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity."6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration7 of the above-said order was denied by Order
of March 24, 2003:8
xxx
Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions
of the Special Power of Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is
therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of

the Rules of Court provides that "Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest.
xxx
Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring the necessary
complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and appear in person as if he is the
owner of the land.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition questioning "the palpable legal errors" of the RTC.
Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in
interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to
pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citingAgbayani v. Belen.10
Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the Local
Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same Code the
latter of which provides that "[a]ll disputes involving real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property is located," hence,
the use of the word "shall" makes it mandatory for the bringing of the dispute before
the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers,
respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon,
for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting
in his own name for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal,
being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.
Respondents submissions do not lie.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of
each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon; and
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon
under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to
the lupon concerned for amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay .
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at
the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may
be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose
ruling thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis supplied)
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,11 this Court held that where the parties are
not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is
no requirement for them to submit their dispute to thelupon as provided for in Section
6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction
over disputes where the partiesare not actual residents of the same city or
municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each
other. (Underscoring supplied)
In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,12 this Court, noting that the Tavora ruling,
reiterated in other cases including the 1996 case of Agbayani13 cited by petitioner, was
decided under the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which
were, except for some modifications, echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local
Government Code which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that the Tavora ruling
remained.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the
meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997
Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but
misread and misunderstood by respondent.
In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an
actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the
local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for
conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well
as the March 24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela at Roxas is SET ASIDE. Said court is accordingly
directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its docket and take appropriate action
thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265

April 6, 2000

VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin
and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed against Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez of the Fifth Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, charging her with grave
abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which
complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros for
recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela,
Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality, while
complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case
was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
However, this matter was raised by defendant in her answer as an affirmative defense,
and respondent, in her order of July 15, 1997, ordered the dismissal of the case
without prejudice to the prosecution of the counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in
her answer. In support of her order, respondent cited P.D. No. 1508, 3 of which
provides:

Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay

shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality
shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents
actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve
real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real
property or any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added)
Complainant and his wife moved for a reconsideration, citing the following provisions
of R.A. 7160, "The Local Government Code of 1991":
SEC. 408. Subject matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of
each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government of any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine
exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. marie
The court in which the non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon
under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to
the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
SEC. 409. Venue. - (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city
of municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in
the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or
at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may
be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose
ruling thereon shall be binding.

They argued that under 408(f), in relation to 409(c), where the parties to a dispute
involving real property or any interest therein are not actual residents of the same city
or municipality or of adjoining barangays, prior resort to barangay conciliation is not
required.
However, respondent denied the motion. In her order dated September 9, 1997,
respondent stated:
The Court after taking into consideration the Motion for Reconsideration and the
ground relied upon by the counsel finds that counsel for the plaintiffs failed to
correlate Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 and to consider Rule VIII,
paragraph (a) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, the rules and regulations [of]
which were promulgated to implement Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One Book
III and Section 515, Book IV of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, to wit:
"RULE VIII - PRE-CONDITION FOR FORMAL ADJUDICATION
Conciliation, pre-condition for filing of complaint in court or government office. novero
(a) No individual may go directly to court or to any government office for adjudication
of his dispute with another individual upon any matter falling within the authority of
the Punong Barangay or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo to settle under these Rules,
unless, after personal confrontation of the parties before them earnest efforts to
conciliate have failed to result in a settlement or such settlement has been effectively
repudiated."
and also Rule VI, Section 3 paragraph (c) of the same Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules which provides:
"Rule VI - Amicable Settlement of Disputes
Section 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:
....
(c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay
where the real property or larger portion thereof is situated.
From the provisions of the above-cited Rules it was very clear that parties whose
disputes involved real property should first br[ing] the said dispute before the
barangay where the property was located, and that [because of] failure to bring the
dispute before the Barangay for conciliation no action may be filed in court for final
adjudication of the said dispute.

That parties should first comply with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law before the Court can acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. That non-compliance
of the plaintiff to the requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law was admitted
by her in paragraph 3 of the complaint. Her allegation of non-compliance with the
mandatory requirement of Lupon Conciliation before the filing of the complaint, in a
way divest[s] the Court of its jurisdiction over the case. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (j) provides:
"That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with"
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
denied.
Complainant alleges that in dismissing Civil Case No. 295, respondent judge committed
"(a) Grave abuse of authority by knowingly rendering an unjust and unlawful order;
(b) Ignorance of the law in its highest order, she being a judge; (c) Grave
disobedience to the jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on the matter of exemption of lupon conciliation of contending parties who are not
residen[ts] of the same city or municipality." He states that respondent "practically
threw several decisions of the Supreme Court on the matter out of the window and
obviously followed hook, line and sinker the arguments of the [defendant] Daria
Galleros."
In answer, respondent judge claims that she merely followed the law in dismissing the
case. She prays that the complaint against her be dismissed and that complainant be
ordered to stop harassing her just because he had not been able to obtain the relief he
wanted in Civil Case No. 295. nigel
In its memorandum dated February 29, 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommends the dismissal of this case on the ground that the "issue [raised] is purely
judicial and is best resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction" and that, even if
respondent had erred, she should not be held administratively liable since there is no
allegation that she acted in bad faith or knowingly rendered an unjust judgment.
In Tavora v. Veloso,1 this Court already ruled that where parties do not reside in the
same city or municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them
to submit their dispute involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. As
explained in that case:
The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge
barred from taking cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1508
establishing a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level? The section
reads:

"SECTION. 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. - No complaint, petition,

action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . ."
(Italics supplied)
For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the
jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the
relevant provisions of PD 1508 are:
"SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;
(4) Offenses were there is no private offended party;
(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government. ella
"SECTION 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city
or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes
which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay
where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and

(2) involving real property located in different municipalities." (Italics supplied)

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which
the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for
amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the
same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the
disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays
within the same city or municipality" unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall
have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction
over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or
municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each
other.
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take
cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:
"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate
as such. marinella
The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is
to restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in
the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.2
To be sure, the Court was interpreting in that case the provisions of P.D. No. 1508
which, except for some modifications, are applicable to the case before respondent
judge because they are now found in 408-409 of R.A. No. 7160 which took effect on
January 1, 1992. The ruling in Tavora v. Veloso, reiterated in other cases,3should be
familiar to the bench and the bar. As we have held in Espiritu v. Jovellanos,4 the
phrase "Ignorance of the law excuses no one" has a special application to judges who,
under the injunction of Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence." In Bacar v. De Guzman,5 it
was held that when the law violated is basic, the failure to observe it constitutes gross
ignorance. Reiterating this ruling, it was emphasized in Almeron v. Sardido6 that the
disregard of an established rule of law amounts to gross ignorance of the law and
makes the judge subject to disciplinary action.

In the case at bar, respondent showed patent ignorance if not disregard of this
Courts rulings on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa by her erroneous
quotations of the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing R.A.
No. 7160. While a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders, his error may be so gross or patent that he
should be administratively disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
In this case, respondent at first cited P.D. No. 1508, 3 as basis of her action. When
her attention was called to the fact that this had been repealed by 409(c) of R.A. No.
7160, respondent, who obviously was more intent in justifying her previous order than
correcting her error, quoted out of context the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of R.A.
No. 7160. She thus violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides
that "In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear of criticism."
Contrary to respondents interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not
necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in
adjoining barangays. Rule VI of the same states in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of
proceedings for amicable settlement under these rules except the following
enumerated cases:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof; alonzo
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment
exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the

parties thereto to agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an

appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The foregoing exceptions notwithstanding, the court in which non-criminal cases not
falling within the authority of the lupon under these Katarungang Pambarangay Law
and Rules are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the
lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
SECTION 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:
(a) Where the parties reside in the same barangay, the dispute shall be brought
for settlement in said barangay;
(b) Where the parties reside in different barangays in the same city or
municipality, the dispute shall be settled in the barangay where the respondent
or any one of the respondents actually resides, at the choice of the complainant;
(c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the
barangay where the real property or larger portion thereof is situated;
(d) Disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed
or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in
the barangay where such workplace or institution is located;
(e) Any objection relating to venue shall be raised before the Punong Barangay
during the mediation proceedings before him. Failure to do so shall be deemed a
waiver of such objection;
(f) Any legal question which may confront the Punong Barangay in resolving
objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of
Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be
binding. brando
(Emphasis added)
Indeed, these provisions, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been
authoritatively interpreted by this Court, and the duty of respondent judge was to
follow the rulings of this Court. Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can
only be due either to an ignorance of this Courts ruling or to an utter disregard
thereof. We choose to believe that her failure to apply our rulings to the case before
her was simply due to gross ignorance which, nevertheless, is inexcusable. In

accordance with the ruling in Ting v. Atal,7 in which a judge who was similarly found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law was fined P2,000.00, respondent judge should
likewise be fined the same amount.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS with a
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994

FELICIDAD UY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial
Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE
JAVIER, respondents.

Albon & Serrano Law Office for petitioner.

Ramon M. Velez for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the order
dated 2 July 1993 of public respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras of Branch 61 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati, Metro Manila, denying the petitioner's motion
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for slight physical injuries. The
motion to dismiss is based on the failure of the private respondents, as the offended
parties therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of disputes to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of the proper barangay.
At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be
resolved in the light of the revised law on katarungang pambarangay provided for in
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January
1992, 1 this Court would have declined to accept the invocation of its original
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already ruled that while
it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained

freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor may be directed. There is
a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve as
a general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner and her lawyers
ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial Court. 2
The antecedent facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not complicated.
Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde (hereinafter Atayde) the other
half of the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets,
Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. 3
The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner was not able
to remove all her movable properties.
On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the
former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable
properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an
airconditioning casing. 4 The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the
petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including
private respondent Winnie Javier (hereinafter Javier), on the other.
On 21 April 1993, the private respondent had themselves medically examined for the
alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner. 5
On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain
of Valenzuela, Makati, which was docketed as Barangay Cases Nos. 1023 6 and 1024. 7
The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April
1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset
the confrontation to 26 May 1993. 8
On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations
for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 and assigned to Branch 61
thereof.
On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the
petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.
On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counteraffidavits. 9 In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the
prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation
proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila. 10 She also

attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18

May 1993, that there was an ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in
Barangay Case No. 1023. 11
On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234 for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the
motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which read:
The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit. In the first place,
the offense subject of these cases accussed in Makati, Metro Manila on
April 17, 1993; that Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had
started the conciliation proceedings between the parties but as of May 18,
1993 nothing has been achieved by the barangay (Annex "2" of the
Counter-Affidavit of the accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed
directly with this court by the public prosecutor on May 11, 1993; and the
accused and her witnesses had already filed their counter-affidavits and
documents. At this stage of the proceedings, the court believes that the
accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before
the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering that accused and
complainant are residents of different barangays; that the offense charged
occurred in the Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is about to
prescribe.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes, and so holds, that
the complainants may go directly to the court where their complaint is
about to prescribe or barred by statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6
of PD 1508." 12
A motion to reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.
Hence this special civil action for certiorari. The petitioner contends that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private
respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now
embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required
under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the motion to
dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in

the case of private respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents of
barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities
or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of private
respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the
requirement.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 should be dismissed for non-compliance with
Sections 408, 409, 410, and 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to
Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.
The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and of the Office of
the Solicitor General. The private respondents filed a rejoinder to the petitioner's reply
to their comment and a reply to the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.
In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which the petitioner and
the private respondents complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General, in view of
its prior submission, moved that it be excused from filing a memorandum.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. No. 1508
which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991,
specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof, 13 revised the law on the katarungang
pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly
repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of Chapter 7, Title
I, Book III thereof read as follows:
Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.
The luppon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences
to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each
other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in
the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of
the lupon under this Code are filed may, at anytime before trial, motu
proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
Sec. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent
or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion
thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study
shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the
punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal
question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections
to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or
his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.
Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is
under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for
offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon
filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption
shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court.
No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any
other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the
pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by
the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly
to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal
liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such
as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property, and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and

incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not

lawyers.
Pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the Secretary
of Justice promulgated theKatarungang Pambarangay Rules to implement the revised
law on katarungang pambarangay. Sections 8 and 11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement
of Disputes) thereof provide in part as follows:
SECTION 8. Failure to appear.
a. Sanctions
The complaint may be dismissed when complainant, after due
notice, refuses or willfully fails to appear without justifiable
reason on the date set for mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
Such dismissal ordered by the Punong Barangay/Pangkat
Chairman after giving the complainant an opportunity to explain
his non-appearance shall be certified to by the Lupon or
Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, and shall bar the
complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause
of action as that dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and cause of action.
The prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing
laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong
Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods shall resume upon
receipts by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary:
Provided, however, that such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days
from the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. After the
expiration of the aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing of the case in
court or government office for adjudication shall be subject to the provision
of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII of these Rules.
It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least
three new significant features, to wit:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not
exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the

contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties
are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses
during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process.
Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some
ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon
receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation
or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the
complaint is unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight.
Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations
issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not
found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period
shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the
pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.
The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the
mediation and conciliation process at that level would be effectively pursued, few
cases would reach the regular courts, justice would be achieved at less expense to the
litigants, cordial relationships among protagonists in a small community would be
restored, and peace and order therein enhanced.
The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local
Government code, also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that
appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or
institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to
the parties. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a
fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a
result.14 Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison d'etre of the rule on venue.
The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral
to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the
proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also
affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less
emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of
their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the

difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive litigation

between the parties.
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the
jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to
the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior
referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

In Peregrina vs. Panis, 15 this Court stated:

Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs.
Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the
conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the
filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause
of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits
between family members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are
actual residents in the same barangay and their disputes does not fall
under any of the excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in Garces vs.
Court of Appeals: 16
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement,
non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either
over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where,
however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of such
procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first
taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.
xxx xxx xxx
The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of
P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by nonexhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted
with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss. (emphasis omitted)

There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant
to seasonably invoke non-referral to the appropriate lupon operated as a waiver
thereof. 17 Furthermore, when such defect was initially present when the case was first
filed in the trial court, the subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the
barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured
the defect. 18
On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. 19 Section 18 thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be
dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply
to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and the respondent had in
mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18.
None knew of the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in
her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the
weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to
what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they
assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner before the
barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." 20 Yet, in a
deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the
virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before
the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of
barangays in the same city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the
action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and
(c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence
to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary
before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local
Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang
pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful
that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required

to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. 21 He
should have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the Local
Government Code of 1991. Had he done so, this petition would not have reached us
and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more
important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation
on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for
slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before
such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said
court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of
the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the
motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge
under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local
Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court
where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to
paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically
suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private
respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela,
Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the
body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of
the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and
instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for
to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the
offense for which she may be liable would only be slight physical injuries under
paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that per the medical
certificates 22 the injuries sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in nine
days "in the absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries
incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The
penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and
censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and
would prescribe in two monthspursuant to Article 90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor
would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the
filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on

23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June
1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of
suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private
respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal
complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the
respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the
Local Government Code.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner
"had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of
Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and the complainant are residents of
different barangays." The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings
before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to
the lupon in her counter-affidavit. 23
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that the parties
could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain
to issue a certification to file action. 24 The request is dated 23 June 1993, 25 or nearly
one and a half months after Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with
the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention in the said court
that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at
the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to
demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the
revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay
level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing
or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by
the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law,
government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with
it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for noncompliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2
July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 1452334, both
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are hereby SET ASIDE and the
respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy of this decision.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169129

March 28, 2007

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F.

SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F.
SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose
Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati,
Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F.
Santos, dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal
filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses
Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati,
Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F.
Santos to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay
the latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for
lack of merit.
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the
legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20
October 1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the
daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged
owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought
from Rita during her lifetime.
The facts of the present case are as follows:

On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased
mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the first
occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate
through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979.4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document
was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed
therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the
land as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9
January 1981.5
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as
exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property,
respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her
lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary
documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses
Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao
alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could
not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by
her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and
in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement,6 adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the
estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal
demand letter8 to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still
failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses
Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages9before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had
been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly
published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to
comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which repealed Presidential
Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.

Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint because
they discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum
of P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of
TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer to the allegation of the petitioners
that they failed to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the Complaint was filed directly in court
in order that prescription or the Statute of Limitations may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and
Carolina Morales as their witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the testimony
of petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest,
[respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the
amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the
suit.11
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8 June
2005, the appellate court rendered a Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of
the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig
City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum
of P30,000.00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.12
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but
it was denied in the Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of
merit.
Hence, this Petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:

I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE
PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF LACHES,
HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE "DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED
BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE
SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH
DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH
AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAOS] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS
DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508,
AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES.
Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because
they claim that the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are
conflicting. They allege that the findings of fact by the trial court revealed that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known
as "Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence, this finding runs counter to the conclusion made by the
appellate court. And even assuming that they were witnesses to the aforesaid
documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the reconveyance
of the subject property because they were guilty of laches for their failure to assert
their rights for an unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao
had slept on their rights for a period of more than 12 years reckoned from the date of

execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would be unjust and unfair to the
petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the subject property.
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement because even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness, Carolina Morales,
testified that neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the
execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981.
Petitioners affirm that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a
newspaper of general circulation to give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of
partition to contest the same within the period prescribed by law. Since no claimant
appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a title to the subject
property was then issued in favor of the petitioners; hence, they are considered as
holders in good faith and therefore cannot be barred from entering into any
subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa" because the same were null and void for the following reasons: 1)
for being falsified documents because one of those documents made it appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared
personally before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the
identities of the properties in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 in relation to the subject property in litigation were not established by
the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had already
been barred through estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbaos
claim over the subject property had already prescribed.
Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by
respondents Spouses Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with the
mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No. 7160,
particularly Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as
follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by
respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the
mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and
enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbaos
action for reconveyance with damages.

III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the
"Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently,
reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the court
is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Court.13 But, the rule is not without exceptions. There are several recognized
exceptions14 in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these
exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial
court. This exception is present in the case at bar.
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners that
the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao
should be dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings as
mandated by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No.
7160. This argument cannot be sustained.
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-9315 provide that
all disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are
subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before
filing a complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the said
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.16
While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig
City) and the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute
should have been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of the
controversy, is located, which happens to be the same city where the contending
parties reside. In the event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with
the said condition precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages can be
dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses Lumbaos non-compliance with
the aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners
alleged in their answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by
respondents spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely instituted and
the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion
to Dismiss the said complaint.

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial
court from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss.
However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively participated in
the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the
witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the
active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is
tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the courts
jurisdiction.17 It is also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may
therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.18 Hence,
herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the
barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when
they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is
made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of
the said documents and that the identities of the properties in those documents in
relation to the subject property has not been established by the evidence of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those
documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.
It is the petitioners incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their
allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness Carolina Morales proved
that said petitioners were not present during the execution of the aforementioned
documents. This is specious.
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo
appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made
an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.19However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said
"Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having
knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same
as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had
passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in support thereof, his testimony in the

cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the respondents Spouses Lumbao is

quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont know about this
document which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does
not have any knowledge but not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Being you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS:
A. No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of
this document Virgilio Santos, will you please go over the same and tell the court
whose signature is this?
A. I dont remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.
Q. But that is your signature?
A. I dont have eyeglasses My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?
A. I dont remember.20
As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that
party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An
answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is
not evidence.21 And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading,
the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. 22 However, in
the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners]
had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their [A]nswer
that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17
August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x
x."23 Virgilios answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the

admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies
in this case.
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness Carolina Morales, this
Court adopts the findings made by the appellate court. Thus [T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during crossexamination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor
[Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out that earlier in the direct
examination of said witness, she confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao]
actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness positively identified
and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents
spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not automatically imply that
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of
sale attesting to their mothers voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her
deceased mothers property. The rule is that testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or
isolated passages therein.24
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 were duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document25 that enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.26 To
overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and
convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld.27 In addition, one
who denies the due execution of a deed where ones signature appears has the burden
of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the
present case petitioners denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their
claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned
presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated
in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan
ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property
were not established by respondents Spouses Lumbaos evidence is likewise not
acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet
divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the

only description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and
9 January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time.
Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents
Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically
held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership
of their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage them.28 The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is
represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case,
the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se
render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the
selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon
the termination of the co-ownership.29
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986
by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the
mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from
the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in
this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because
the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during the
lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents
was described as "a portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-01801674," while the subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the
property described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment because in the
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was
only one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the
petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and
the property mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is,
thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674
and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.
The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action
for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another persons name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the
one with a better right. It is, indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of
registered property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription.

However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription

cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings
could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of
another.30
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance
does not prescribe because the latter have been and are still in actual possession and
occupation as owners of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not
been refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses
Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the very start that they bought
the 107-square meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly
asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during her
lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy
excuse that the lot had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the
entire estate of Maria, petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot in their
inheritance which they divided among themselves despite their knowledge of the
contracts of sale between their mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made
the basis of the respondents Spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The failure of
respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not affect
its validity and enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is not a
requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of
registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is
merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the
property had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him.31 Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their
provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely valid between and among the
parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the
basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way
of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent
to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot
escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-ininterest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their

deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid
and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party
does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the
rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when
the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.34
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they are still bound to comply
with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the
107-square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners mother. And as
correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses
Lumbao attorneys fees and litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate
and incur expenses to protect their interest.35 On this matter, we do not find reasons
to reverse the said findings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorneys
fees and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155713

May 5, 2006

MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN,* Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
April 12, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 and its
Resolution2 dated October 14, 2002, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The salient facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,3 are as follows:

Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot 19-A, Block 2844 with
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 193264, located in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. On
February 20, 1995, she leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of
three years with a monthly rental of P5,000. The parties also agreed that there will be
a 10% annual increase in rent for the succeeding two years, i.e., 1996 and 1997,4 and
the leased premises will be used exclusively for the respondents fastfood business,
unless any other use is given, with the petitioners prior written consent.5
While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood business, he later used the
premises as residence without the petitioners prior written consent. He also failed to
pay the 10% annual increase in rent of P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month
in 1997 to the present. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent
refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises.
On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans
office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then
issued a Certificate to File Action.6
On December 8, 1997, the petitioner filed against the respondent an action for
Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 157922-CV. It was raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 6. On December 15, 1997, the
respondent received the summons and copy of the complaint. On December 24, 1997,
he filed his Answer by mail. Before the MeTC could receive the respondents Answer,
the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 7, 1998.7 Acting
upon this motion, the MeTC rendered a decision8 on January 15, 1998, ordering the
respondent to vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises; to pay the
petitioner the amount of P46,000 as unpaid rentals with legal interest until fully paid;
and to pay the petitionerP5,000 as attorneys fees plus cost of the suit.
The respondent then filed a Manifestation calling the attention of the MeTC to the fact
that his Answer was filed on time and praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC
denied the prayer, ruling that the Manifestation was in the nature of a motion for
reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
38, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-87311. On July 8, 1998, the RTC rendered its
decision9 setting aside the MeTC decision. The RTC directed the parties to go back to
the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly
with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the
entire records of the case will be remanded to MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, for it to
decide the case anew.

The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion in an Order
dated March 15, 1999. Thus, he sought relief from the Court of Appeals through a
petition for review.10 On April 12, 2002, the appellate court promulgated a decision,
reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the ejectment case.
The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the
mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been complied
with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to the court of
origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite proceedings.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this present petition.
In the meantime, while this petition was pending before this Court, the parties went
through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila, Branch
38. Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to issue
an Order11 remanding the case to the MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, where the
proceedings took place anew. On April 25, 2000, the MeTC rendered a second
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the merits is hereby rendered for the
plaintiff as follows:
1. Ordering defendant and all persons claiming right of possession under him to
voluntarily vacate the property located at Lot 19-A Block 2844, Gagalangin,
Tondo, Manila and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of P387,512.00 as actual
damages in the form of unpaid rentals and its agreed increase up to January
2000 and to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the same is
actually vacated;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees plus cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
The respondent appealed the foregoing decision.1avvphil.net The case was raffled to
RTC of Manila, Branch 22, and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98173. The RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal. The respondent elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals, where it is now pending.
The sole issue for our resolution is:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

COMPLAINT FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY
LEVEL.13
With the parties subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay
for further conciliation proceedings, the procedural defect was cured. Nevertheless, if
only to clear any lingering doubt why the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
complaint, we shall delve on the issue.
The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay conciliation
proceedings to settle their dispute as shown by the Certificate to File Action issued by
the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman. The
respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was defective compliance
or no compliance at all with the required conciliation, the case should have been
dismissed.
The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules,14 is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which
has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain
this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 716015 requires the parties to
undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court,16 thus:
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the
lupon or pangkat chairman.
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the
Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While
admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the
office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of the Barangay
Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although
no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law. It
is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before
the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for
filing the case in court.17This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of
the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his
mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412, as

well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is
significant that the Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of
the Lupon under the Local Government Code.18
Finally, this Court is aware that the resolution of the substantial issues in this case is
pending with the Court of Appeals. While ordinarily, we would have determined the
validity of the parties substantial claims since to await the appellate courts decision
will only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all
probability the case would end up with this Court, we find that we cannot do so in the
instant case.
It must be underscored that supervening events have taken place before the lower
courts where the parties have been adequately heard, and all the issues have been
ventilated. Since the records of those proceedings are with the Court of Appeals, it is
in a better position to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties. To rely on the records
before this Court would prevent us from rendering a sound judgment in this case.
Thus, we are left with no alternative but to leave the matter of ruling on the merits to
the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Civil Case No. 98-87311
is AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal in CA G.R. No. 73453
and decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 156228. December 10, 2003]

MA.

VIDAL, LULU MARQUEZ, and CARLOS SOBREMONTE,

petitioners, vs. MA. TERESA O. ESCUETA, represented by HERMAN O.
ESCUETA, respondent.
TERESA

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] dated July 23, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 68895 which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208, which reversed and set aside the
decision[3] of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City (MTC), Branch 60; and
granted the motion for execution filed by private respondent Ma. Teresa O. Escueta in
Civil Case No. 17520.
The petition at bar stemmed from the following antecedents:
When Abelardo Escueta died intestate on December 3, 1994, he was survived by
his widow Remedios Escueta and their six children, including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta
and her brother Herman O. Escueta. Part of his estate was a parcel of land located at
No.
14
Sierra
Madre
corner
Kanlaon
Streets,
Barangay
Highway
Hills, Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (77083) 27568, and the house thereon. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet
the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate over
the property. They also executed a special power of attorney authorizing Ma. Teresa
Escueta to sell the said property.[4]
Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an
ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before the Lupon of Barangay
Highway Hills, docketed as Barangay Case No. 99-09.[5]
In the meantime, on April 15, 1999, the heirs of Abelardo Escueta executed a deed
of conditional sale[6] over the property including the house thereon, to Mary Liza
Santos forP13,300,000.00 payable as follows:
Down payment ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P1,500,000.00) which
the HEIRS-SELLERS acknowledged receipt thereof with complete and full satisfaction;
Second payment - TEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P10,800,000.00)
after publication of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Abelardo
Escueta and payment of the taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue by the
Attorney-in-Fact; and

The balance of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) upon vacation of all the occupants of
the subject property within SIX (6) months from date hereof.[7]
The parties further agreed that:
Ms. Maria Teresa Escueta shall deliver unto the BUYER the Owners Duplicate Copy of
the title upon receipt of the down payment while the original copies of the Special
Power of Attorney shall be delivered upon payment of the Second Payment stated
above.
The ATTORNEY-IN-FACT-SELLER shall be responsible for the ejectment of all the
tenants in the said subject property.
The ATTORNEY-IN-FACT-SELLER shall pay the estate tax, capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax including the telephone, water and Meralco bills and the
publication for the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the late ABELARDO
ESCUETA while the registration and transfer fees shall be shouldered by the BUYER.[8]
On May 5, 1999, Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable
Settlement,[9] where they agreed that (a) the owners of the property would no longer
collect the rentals due from the respondents therein (lessee and sub-lessees) starting
May 1999, with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property
on or before December 1999; (b) time was the essence of the agreement, and that
consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property on or
before December 1999, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court
order to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the property.[10] The
amicable settlement was attested byPangkat Chairman Jose Acong. The parties did
not repudiate the amicable settlement within ten days from the execution thereof.
Neither did any of the parties file any petition to repudiate the settlement.
The vendees having paid the down payment and second installment of the price of
the property, the vendors caused the cancellation on December 17, 1999, of TCT No.
27568 and the issuance of TCT No. 15324 to and under the names of the vendees
Mary Liza Santos, Susana Lim and Johnny Lim.[11] However, Escueta and the other
vendors had yet to receive the balance of the purchase price of P1,000,000.00
because the respondents were still in the property.
Llanera vacated the leased premises. Later, twenty of the sub-lessees also vacated
the property. By January 2000, five sub-lessees, namely, Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu
Marquez, Marcelo Trinidad, Carlos Sobremonte,[12] and Jingkee Ang remained in the
property, and requested Escueta for extensions to vacate the property. Escueta
agreed, but despite the lapse of the extensions granted them, the five sub-lessees
refused to vacate the property.

Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through the Punong Barangay as
provided for in the amicable settlement. Neither did she file a motion with
the Punong Barangay for the enforcement of the settlement. Instead, she filed on May
12, 2000, a verified Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sub-lessees with the
MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of
execution. The pleading was docketed as Civil Case No. 17520, with Teresa Escueta as
plaintiff, and the sub-lessees as defendants.[13]
The defendants opposed the motion[14] alleging that they were enveigled into
executing the amicable settlement despite the fact that they had not violated any of
the terms and conditions of the verbal lease of the property; they were coerced and
forced to enter into such amicable settlement as it was the only way of prolonging
their stay in the leased premises; and that they had been paying faithfully and
religiously the monthly rentals in advance.
They also contended that the plaintiff came to court with unclean hands, as the
property had been sold by the co-owners thereof on June 8, 1999, without notifying
them. The real parties-in-interest as plaintiffs, would be the new owners of the
property, and not the Escuetas. The defendants further asserted that the amicable
settlement was not elevated to or approved by the MTC as required by Section 419 of
the Local Government Code (LGC), nor approved by a competent court; hence, there
was no judgment to enforce by a new motion for a writ of execution. As such, the
plaintiffs motion was premature and procedurally improper. The defendants asserted
that the plaintiff must first secure a certification to file action from the barangay and
thereafter, file an action for ejectment against them as required by Section 417 of the
LGC. The amicable settlement of the parties before the Luponcannot be a substitute
for an action for ejectment. Finally, they averred that they had been sub-lessees for
more than ten years already; hence, had the right of first refusal under Section 6 of
the Urban Land Reform Law (P.D. No. 1517). For her part, the plaintiff asserted that
there having been no execution of the amicable settlement on or before November 6,
1999 by the Lupon, the settlement may now be enforced by action in the proper city
or municipal court.
On February 22, 2001, the court issued an Order[15] denying the Motion for
Execution. The court held that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest as the
subject property had already been sold and titled to Susana Lim, Johnny Lim and Mary
Liza Santos. Only the vendees had the right to demand the ejectment of the
defendants from the said property. The court further ruled that the defendants had the
right of first refusal to purchase the property under Presidential Decree No. 1517. The
MTC, however, did not rule on the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs motion for
execution was premature.
Aggrieved, the plaintiff, now the appellant, appealed the order to the RTC where
she contended that:

THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT COMMITTED THE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

FINDING AND IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NO LONGER THE REAL PARTY-ININTEREST.
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT COMMITTED THE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING AND IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE EJECTED AND CAN
EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL.
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT COMMITTED THE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING AND IN NOT MAKING THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE
VIOLATED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY THE WRITTEN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
BETWEEN PARTIES EXECUTED IN THEIR BARANGAY CONFRONTATION.
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT COMMITTED THE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS AND IN NOT ORDERING SAID
DEFENDANTS TO PAY THEIR ARREARAGES IN RENTAL PAYMENTS FROM MAY 1999
UP TO THE DAY THEY ACTUALLY LEAVE THE PREMISES AS WELL AS ATTORNEYS
FEES AND DAMAGES.[16]
On August 31, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision holding that the plaintiffappellant was still the owner of the property when the ejectment case was filed in the
office of the barangay captain, and, as such, was the real party-in-interest as the
plaintiff in the MTC. Moreover, under the deed of conditional sale between her and the
buyers, it was stipulated therein that the purchase price of P1,000,000.00 would be
delivered to the vendors only upon the vacation of all the occupants of the subject
property within six (6) months from date hereof. She was duty-bound to cause the
eviction of the defendant from the property; hence, the appellant, as a co-owner, had
a substantial interest in the property. The MTC further held that the sale, having been
executed while the appellants complaint was pending with the Lupon, the action in the
MTC may be continued by the plaintiff-appellant.
As to the right of first refusal being asserted by the appellees, the court ruled
that there was no showing that the land leased had been proclaimed to be within a
specific Urban Land Reform Zone. In fact, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board had certified that the subject property was outside the area for priority
development; thus, the appellees may not claim that they had been deprived of their
preemptive right when no such right existed in the first place. The court did not rule
on the third and fourth issues on the ground that the said issues were never raised by
the parties. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated February 2,
2001 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, in Civil
Case No. 17520 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered
granting the Motion for Execution.

Let the Record of this case be remanded to the court a quo for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[17]
A petition for review under Rule 42 was filed with the Court of Appeals by three of
the appellees, now petitioners Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu Marquez and Carlos
Sobremonte. The court, however, dismissed the petition on (1) procedural grounds,
and (2) for lack of merit. [18]
On procedural grounds, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to indicate the
specific material dates, showing that their petition was filed on time as required by the
rules, and in declaring that they failed to justify their failure to do so.
On the merits of the petition, the appellate court upheld the ruling of the RTC. The
decretal portion of the decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208, rendered in Civil Case No.
MC01-333-A, dated August 31, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[19]
In their petition at bar, the petitioners assert that the CA erred as follows: (1) in
not applying the rules of procedure liberally; (2) in declaring that there was no need
for the respondents to file an ejectment case for the eviction of the petitioners; (3)
that the real parties-in-interest as plaintiffs in the MTC were the new owners of the
property, Susana Lim, Johnny Lim and Mary Liza Santos; (4) in not finding that the
Amicable Settlement was obtained through deceit and fraud; and (5) in ruling that the
petitioners had no right of first refusal in the purchase and sale of the subject property
under Presidential Decree No. 1517.
The petition is bereft of merit.
On the procedural issue, the CA dismissed the petition before it for the petitioners
failure to comply with Section 2, par. 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[20] The CA ratiocinated that there was no justification for a relaxation of the
Rules, thus:
Petitioners cited decisions of the Supreme Court where a relaxation of procedural rules
was allowed. However, a reading of those cases shows that they are not exactly
similar with the present case. In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority vs. Francisco Cuizon Mangubat, the Supreme Court allowed the late payment
of docket fee by the Solicitor General on the ground that the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure regarding payment of docket fees was still new at that time. The same
cannot be said in the present case. The petition was filed on February 28, 2002,

almost five years from the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
circumstances of typhoon and holiday for failure to obtain a certified true copy of the
DOJs Decision, in the case of Hagonoy Market Vendor Association
vs.Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, were present in the instant petition. The case of
Salazar vs. Court of Appeals is also not similar with the present case.[21]
The petitioners aver in this case that the failure of their counsel to include the
material dates in their petition with the CA was, as stated in their Amended
Manifestation, because the said counsel was suffering from a slight heart attack. The
Court finds the petitioners pretext flimsy. If the petitioners counsel was able to
prepare their petition despite her condition, there was no valid reason why she failed
to include the material dates required under the Rules of Court. Besides, the
petitioners stated in their petition that they had appended a copy of their Amended
Manifestation, but failed to do so. If the rules were to be applied strictly, the CA could
not be faulted for dismissing the petition.
However, in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive dispensation of every action and proceedings, the Rules are to be liberally
construed.[22]Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat substantial
justice and, therefore, should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. This
Court ruled in Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[23] that appeal is an essential part
of our judicial system and trial courts and the Court of Appeals are advised to proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and that every party
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. The Court has given due
course to petitions where to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.[24] In this case, the Court opts to apply the
rules liberally to enable it to delve into and resolve the cogent substantial issues posed
by the petitioners.
We agree with the contention of the petitioners that under Section 416 of the LGC,
the amicable settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon on the arbitration
award has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of
ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless the settlement is repudiated within the
period therefor, where the consent is vitiated by force, violence or intimidation, or a
petition to nullify the award is filed before the proper city or municipal court.[25] The
repudiation of the settlement shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a certification
to file a complaint.[26]
We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the
settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under
Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies
thereof.[27] The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period therefor
may be enforced by execution by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay within a

time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the
lapse of the said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or
municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced
by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After
the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or
municipal court. (Underlining supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the
enforcement of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a twotiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before
the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and summary in nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled thereto;[28] and
(b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the
proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing
Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to
determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give
the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under
the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules
of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by
operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Section 417 of the LGC grants a party a period of six months to enforce the
amicable settlement by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party
may resort to filing an action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison d
etre of the law is to afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy
and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.
The time line of six months is for the benefit not only of the complainant, but also
of the respondent. Going by the plain words of Section 417 of the LGC, the time line
of six months should be computed from the date of settlement. However, if applied to
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstance, the computation of the time line
from the date of the settlement may be arbitrary and unjust and contrary to the intent
of the law. To illustrate: Under an amicable settlement made by the parties before
the Lupon dated January 15, 2003, the respondents were obliged to vacate the subject
property on or before September 15, 2003. If the time line of six months under
Section 417 were to be strictly and literally followed, the complainant may enforce the
settlement through the Lupon only up to July 15, 2003. But under the settlement, the
respondent was not obliged to vacate the property on or before July 15, 2003; hence,
the settlement cannot as yet be enforced. The settlement could be enforced only
after September 15, 2003, when the respondent was obliged to vacate the
property. By then, the six months under Section 417 shall have already elapsed. The

complainant can no longer enforce the settlement through the Lupon, but had to
enforce the same through an action in the MTC, in derogation of the objective of
Section 417 of the LGC. The law should be construed and applied in such a way as to
reflect the will of the legislature and attain its objective, and not to cause an injustice.
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes aptly said, courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of the law where these words support a policy that goes beyond
them. The Court should not defer to the latter that killeth but to the spirit that
vivifieth.[29]
In light of the foregoing considerations, the time line in Section 417 should be
construed to mean that if the obligation in the settlement to be enforced is due and
demandable on the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted
from the date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due and
demandable on a date other than the date of the settlement, the six-month period
should be counted from the date the obligation becomes due and demandable.
Parenthetically,
the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing
Regulations, Rule VII, Section 2 provides:

Rules

and

SECTION 2. Modes of Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may

be enforced by execution by the Lupon within six [6] months from date of the
settlement or date of receipt of the award or from the date the obligation stipulated in
the settlement or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and
demandable. After the lapse of such time, the settlement or award may be enforced
by the appropriate local trial court pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court . An amicable settlement reached in a case referred by the Court having
jurisdiction over the case to the Lupon shall be enforced by execution by the said
court. (Underlining supplied).
By express provision of Section 417 of the LGC, an action for the enforcement of
the settlement should be instituted in the proper municipal or city court. This is
regardless of the nature of the complaint before the Lupon, and the relief prayed for
therein. The venue for such actions is governed by Rule 4, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. An action for the enforcement of a settlement is not
one of those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure in civil cases;[30] hence, the
rules on regular procedure shall apply, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended.[31]
As to the requisite legal fees for the filing of an action in the first level court under
Section 417 of the Local Government Code, indigents-litigants (a) whose gross income
and that of their immediate family do not exceed ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos a
month if residing in Metro Manila, and five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos a month if
residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed
value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the

payment of legal fees. Section 18, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, is hereby further amended accordingly.
In this case, the parties executed their Amicable Settlement on May 5,
1999. However, the petitioners were obliged to vacate the property only in January
2000, or seven months after the date of the settlement; hence, the respondent may
enforce the settlement through the Punong Barangay within six months from January
2000 or until June 2000, when the obligation of the petitioners to vacate the property
became due. The respondent was precluded from enforcing the settlement via an
action with the MTC before June 2000. However, the respondent filed on May 12,
2000 a motion for execution with the MTC and not with the Punong Barangay. Clearly,
the respondent adopted the wrong remedy. Although the MTC denied the
respondents motion for a writ of execution, it was for a reason other than the
impropriety of the remedy resorted to by the respondent. The RTC erred in granting
the respondents motion for a writ of execution, and the CA erred in denying the
petitioners petition for review.
Normally, the Court would remand the case to the Punong Barangay for further
proceedings. However, the Court may resolve the issues posed by the petitioners,
based on the pleadings of the parties to serve the ends of justice. It is an accepted
rule of procedure for the Court to strive to settle the existing controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[32]
In this case, there is no question that the petitioners were obliged under the
settlement to vacate the premises in January 2000. They refused, despite the
extensions granted by the respondent, to allow their stay in the property. For the court
to remand the case to the Lupon and require the respondent to refile her motion for
execution with the Lupon would be an idle ceremony. It would only unduly prolong
the petitioners unlawful retention of the premises.[33]
The RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the respondent is the real party-in-interest to
enforce amicable settlement. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
reads:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
The party-in-interest applies not only to the plaintiff but also to the
defendant. Interest within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[34] A real party in interest is one
who has a legal right.[35] Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto

as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest,
either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract.[36] The action
must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to
be enforced.[37] In this case, the respondent was the party in the amicable
settlement. She is the real party-in-interest to enforce the terms of the settlement
because unless the petitioners vacate the property, the respondent and the other
vendors should not be paid the balance of P1,000,000.00 of the purchase price of the
property under the Deed of Conditional Sale.
The petitioners are estopped from assailing the amicable settlement on the ground
of deceit and fraud. First. The petitioners failed to repudiate the settlement within the
period therefor. Second. The petitioners were benefited by the amicable
settlement. They were allowed to remain in the property without any rentals therefor
until December 1998. They were even granted extensions to continue in possession of
the property. It was only when the respondent filed the motion for execution that the
petitioners alleged for the first time that the respondents deceived them into executing
the amicable settlement.[38]
On the petitioners claim that they were entitled to the right of first refusal under
P.D. No. 1517, we agree with the disquisition of the trial court, as quoted by the Court
of Appeals:
We likewise find no reversible error on the part of [the] RTC in rejecting that the
petitioners have a right of first refusal in the purchase and sale of the subject
property. As ratiocinated by the court:
xxx. Presidential Decree No. 1517 (The Urban Land Reform Law) does not apply
where there is no showing that the land leased has been proclaimed to be within a
specific Urban Land Reform Zone. In the instant case, the annex attached to the
Proclamation 1967 creating the areas declared as priority development and urban land
reform zone ... does not indicate that the barangay where the subject property is
located is included therein. This is bolstered by the certification issued by the Housing
and Land Regulatory Board to the effect that the location of the property is outside the
area of Priority Development. It is therefore a reversible error for the lower court to
conclude that defendants-appellees were deprived of their preemptive right when no
right exists in the first place.
Indeed, before a preemptive right under PD 1517 can be exercised, the disputed land
should be situated in an area declared to be both an APD (Areas for Priority
Development) and a ULRZ (Urban Land Reform Zones). Records show, and as not
disputed by the petitioners, the disputed property is not covered by the
aforementioned areas and zones.[39]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The petitioners

and all those acting for and in their behalf are directed to vacate, at their own
expense, the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15324 of the
Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City and deliver possession of the property to the
vendees Mary Liza Santos, Susana Lim and Johnny Lim. This is without prejudice to
the right of the vendees to recover from the petitioners reasonable compensation for
their possession of the property from January 2000 until such time that they vacate
the property. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 125082. September 18, 2000]

ROMEO YU, vs. CA, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT 18
2000.

G.R. No. 125082 (Romeo Yu, vs. Court of Appeals and Gabriel Trocio, Jr.,

respondents.)

Subject of the present petition for review on certiorari is the decision dated December
29, 1995 of the Court of Appeals 1 Eight Division, penned by Justice Jaime M. Lantin,
concurred in by Justices Eduardo G. Montenegro, and Jose C. De la Rama. denying due
course to petitioner's petition for review for being insufficient in substance, and the
Resolution dated April 10, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration.
At the root of the present controversy is the following factual milieu:
Sometime in May of 1993, herein respondent Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr., lodged a complaint
for forcible entry against petitioner Romeo Yu before the Office of the Barangay
Captain of Luray 2, Toledo City.2 Docketed as Barangay Case No. 93-29.Respondent
Trocio claimed that a portion of his property was included in the portion fenced in by
petitioner Yu where a line of coconut trees stood.
On May 16, 1993, said respondent and petitioner entered into an amicable settlement
agreeing that "the fence made of coconut slabs will not be demolished in the
meantime and the parties will wait until the same would rot, but when the fence will
be repaired, the same should be done in such a manner that the line of coconut (in

question) shall be outside of the said fence." 3 The amicable settlement reads: "Ang

koral nga slab nga lubi dili lang usa hilabtan, hulatun anus a madugta ug inig ayo sa
koral, ang usa ka laray nga lubi, ipagawas sa maong koral." CA Rollo, Annex B.

On June 25, 1994, respondent discovered that petitioner constructed a concrete fence
on the very spot where the old fence stood, and in the process destroyed the coconut
trees. When respondent confronted the petitioner, the latter hurled invectives at him.
On July 5, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution of the
Amicable Settlement with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Toledo City, docketed as
Barangy Case No. B-05, praying that petitioner be ordered to demolish at his expense
the illegally constructed fence, to pay for the damages caused to the coconut bearing
trees, and to clear the area subject of the controversy.
On September 16, 1994, the MTCC issued an Order 4 Annex "I" to the Petition, Rollo,
pp. 205-207.denying respondent's motion for issuance of a writ of execution. The
MTCC ruled that since the motion for execution was filed more than six months after
the date of the amicable settlement, the proper remedy was to file an ordinary action
in court for execution of the judgment.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, rendered a decision 5 Annex "K" to
the Petition,Rollo, pp. 220-222.reversing the MTCC decision. The RTC ruled that WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the lower court
denying the Issuance of a Writ of Execution is hereby reversed and the
said lower court is hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution for the
enforcement of Compromise Settlement entered into by and between the
parties in the Barangay Court on May 6, 1993.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. On December 29, 1995, the
CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition for being insufficient in substance and
denying due course thereto.
Hence, the present appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner, in his memorandum, 6 Rollo, pp. 280-303.contends that both the CA and
RTC erred in allowing the filing of the motion for execution with the MTCC within the
six month period. Petitioner claims that the motion for execution should have been
filed with the Lupon pursuant to Sections 3-12 of Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Petitioner therefore argues. that
the proceedings before the MTCC are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover,
even assuming that the motion for execution could be filed in the MTCC, petitioner
seeks to stop the execution considering that supervening events transpired which

would render the execution unjust and inequitable. Petitioner claims that a relocation
survey would prove that the property subject of the dispute actually falls within his
land.
Respondent, in his memorandum, 7 Rollo, pp. 305-383.avers that the CA correctly
ruled that the MTCC should be ordered to issue the writ of execution.
The sole issue is whether or not the CA and the RTC correctly ordered the MTCC to
issue the writ of execution.
Section 416 of the Local Govermnent Code 8 See Sec. 1 of Rule VII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. provides that Sec. 416. Effects of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration
Award- The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless
repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to
nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court. xxx
Section 417 of the Local Govermnent Code further provides that Sec. 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or
arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon
within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the
lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in
the appropriate city or municipal court.
Section 2 of Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law further clarifies that Sec. 2. Modes of execution. - The amicable settlement or
arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Lupon
within six (6) months from date of the settlement or date of
receipt of the award or from the date the obligation stipulated in
the settlement or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due
and demandable. After the lapse of such time, the settlement or
award may be enforced by the appropriate local trial court
pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. An
amicable settlement reached in a case referred by the Court
having jurisdiction over the case to the Lupon shall be enforced
by execution by the said court.

In this case, the CA held that .The six-month period could not be reckoned from the date of the
settlement since during the said period there was no violation of
the compromise agreement, the violation occurring only after the
lapse of the period of six (6) months from settlement. It would
be absurd on the part of respondent to move for execution within
the period of six (6) months from settlement, when there was no
violation yet of the compromise agreement. Respondent was not
in a position to anticipate when the violation of the compromise
agreement would occur, and would only be in a position to
enforce the compromise agreement only upon its violation.
After a careful consideration of the records of the case, including the memoranda of
the parties, we find the appellate court' s reasoned conclusion correct, in the light of
the circumstances of this controversy between neighbors. Moreover, its holding is in
line with the spirit of the law promoting speedy and inexpensive settlement of dispute
at the barangay level. The cited amicable settlement was already in force and ought to
have been faithfully complied with.
Section 2 of Rule I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law provides that "these rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object of assisting disputants to obtajn a just, speedy and inexpensive
amicable settlement at the barangay level." 9Sec. 2, Rule I, Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules, stress supplied.The amicable settlement having attained the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court, it could be enforced by filing a motion for execution with
the proper court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Clerk of Court

G.R. No. 159411. March 18, 2005

TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACINTO S. TRILLANA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the Decision dated April 2, 20031 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 590232 which modified the Decision dated December 15,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, in Civil Case No.
5139-V-97, as well as its Resolution dated August 8, 20033 which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered
into a contract of lease4whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio
Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years commencing from
October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was two million
two hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon signing of the contract. The balance was
payable as follows:
b. That, after six (6) months and/or, on or before one (1) year from the date of
signing this contract, the amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND
(P344,000.00) pesos shall be paid on April 23, 1995 and/or, on or before October 23,
1995 shall be paid by the LESSEE to the LESSOR.
c. That, the LESSEE, shall pay the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND (P448,000.00) pesos x x x to the LESSOR on April 23, 1997 and/or, on or
before October 23, 1997, and on April 23, 1998 and/or, on or before October 23, 1998
the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND (P448,000.00) pesos x x x.
Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all
construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed
during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject
fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the

water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by
a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with
the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of
petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of
the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the
unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the
leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting
lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached, viz.:

KASUNDUAN
Napagkasunduan ngayong araw na to ika-17 ng Setyembre ng nagpabuwis Teodoro
Chavez at bumubuwis na si G. Jay Trillana na ibabalik ni G. Chavez ang
halagang P150,000.00 kay G. Trillana bilang sukli sa natitirang panahon ng buwisan.
Ngunit kung maibibigay ni G. Chavez ang halagang P100,000.00 bago sumapit o
pagsapit ng ika-23 ng Setyembre, taong kasalukuyan, to ay nangangahulugan ng
buong kabayaran at hindi P150,000.00.
Kung sakali at hindi maibigay ang P100,000.00 ang magiging kabayaran ay
mananatiling P150,000.00 na may paraan ng pagbabayad ng sumusunod:
Ang P50,000.00 ay ibibigay bago sumapit o pagsapit ng ika-31 ng Oktubre 1996 at ang
balanseng P100,000.00 ay ibibigay sa loob ng isang taon subalit magbibigay ng
promissory note si G. Chavez at kung mabubuwisang ang kanyang palaisdaan ay
ibibigay lahat ni G. Chavez ang buong P150,000.00 sa lalong madaling panahon.
Kung magkakaroon ng sapat at total na kabayaran si G. Chavez kay G. Trillana ang
huli ay lalagda sa kasulatan bilang waiver o walang anumang paghahabol sa nabanggit
na buwisan.
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing
"Kasunduan," respondent filed a complaint on February 7, 1997 against petitioner
before the RTC of Valenzuela City, docketed as Civil Case No. 5139-V-97. Respondent
prayed that the following amounts be awarded him, viz.: (a) P300,000.00 as
reimbursement for rentals of the leased premises corresponding to the unexpired
portion of the lease contract; (b)P500,000.00 as unrealized profits; (c) P200,000.00 as
moral damages; (d) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, (e) P100,000.00 as
attorneys fees plus P1,000.00 for each court appearance of respondents counsel.
Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and to attend
the pretrial conference. On October 21, 1997, respondent was allowed to present his

evidence ex-parte before the Acting Branch Clerk of Court.5 On the basis thereof, a
decision was rendered on December 15, 19976 in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Ordering the defendant to reimburse to the plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00
representing rental payment of the leased premises for the unused period of lease;
(2) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 representing
unrealized profit as a result of the unlawful deprivation by the defendant of the
possession of the subject premises;
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
(4) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
(5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees, plus costs of suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial
court by deleting the award ofP500,000.00 for unrealized profits for lack of basis, and
by reducing the award for attorneys fees to P50,000.00.7Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela
City had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject
matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already
amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan,
Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for
enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. Assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction, it cannot
award more than the amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan" which isP150,000.00. In
any event, no factual or legal basis existed for the reimbursement of alleged advance
rentals for the unexpired portion of the lease contract as well as for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law8 provides that an amicable
settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed
before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date.9 It further
provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong
tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city

or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.10 This special provision follows the
general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there
shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law
between the parties themselves.11 It has upon them the effect and authority of res
judicata even if not judicially approved,12 and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed
except for vices of consent and forgery.13
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos,14 we clarified that the broad precept
enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may
either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.
We explained, viz:
[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind compromise
agreements. Where a party violated the terms of a compromise agreement, the only
recourse open to the other party was to enforce the terms thereof.
When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x created for the first
time the right of rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to
"either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand." Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept
enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata. (underscoring ours)
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he
chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had
never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for
rescission.15 This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded16 by
the breach thereof of the other party.
Thus, in Morales v. National Labor Relations Commission17 we upheld the
National Labor Relations Commission when it heeded the original demand of four (4)
workers for reinstatement upon their employers failure to comply with its obligation to
pay their monetary benefits within the period prescribed under the amicable
settlement. We reiterated the rule that the aggrieved party may either (1) enforce the
compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded and so insist upon his

original demand upon the other partys failure or refusal to abide by the compromise.
We also recognized the options in Mabale v. Apalisok,18 Canonizado v.
Benitez,19 and Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,20 to name a few cases.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a
two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by
the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of
the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is
judicial.21However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission
under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent
from the wording of Sec. 41722 itself which provides that the amicable settlement
"may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the
word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law directory23 or merely optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the
Office of the Barangay Captainhad the force and effect of a final judgment of a court,
petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which
respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case
No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance
rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Respondent was not
limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in
the"Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of
liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending
litigation24 which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions,
adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of
losing.25 Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of
all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his
obligations thereunder.26 It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not.
Having affirmed the RTCs jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent, we now
resolve petitioners remaining contention. Petitioner contends that no factual or legal
basis exists for the reimbursement of alleged advance rentals, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees awarded by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals.
The rule is that actual damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty.27In the case at bar, we agree with petitioner that no
competent proof was presented to prove that respondent had paid P300,000.00 as
advance rentals for the unexpired period of the lease contract. On the contrary, the
lease contract itself provided that the remaining rentals of P448,000.00 shall be paid

"on April 23, 1997 and/or, on or before October 23, 1997, and on April 23, 1998
and/or, on or before October 23, 1998 the amount P448,000.00." Respondent filed his
complaint on February 7, 1997. No receipt or other competent proof, aside from
respondents self-serving assertion, was presented to prove that respondent paid the
rentals which were not yet due. No proof was even presented by respondent to show
that he had already paid P1,000,000.00 upon signing of the lease contract, as
stipulated therein. Petitioner, in paragraphs 2 and 7 of his answer,28 specifically denied
that respondent did so. Courts must base actual damages suffered upon competent
proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.29
As to moral damages, Art. 2220 of the Civil Code provides that same may be
awarded in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. In the case at bar, respondent alleged that petitioner made unauthorized repairs
in the leased premises and ousted his personnel therefrom despite their valid and
subsisting lease agreement. Petitioner alleged, by way of defense, that he undertook
the repairs because respondent abandoned the leased premises and left it in a state of
disrepair. However, petitioner presented no evidence to prove his allegation, as he did
not attend the pretrial conference and was consequently declared in default. What
remains undisputed therefore is that petitioner had a valid and subsisting lease
contract with respondent which he refused to honor by giving back possession of the
leased premises to respondent. We therefore sustain the conclusion of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that an award of moral damages is justified under the
circumstances. We likewise sustain the award for exemplary damages considering
petitioners propensity not to honor his contractual obligations, first under the lease
contract and second, under the amicable settlement executed before the Office of the
Barangay Captain. Since respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to
protect his interest on account of petitioners refusal to comply with his contractual
obligations,30 the award of attorneys fees has to be sustained.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated April 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59023 is modified by
deleting the award of P300,000.00 as reimbursement of advance rentals. The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.