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FORCED MIGRATION

IN INDONESIA :
HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES

by
Graeme Hugo
Federation Fellow,
Professor of Geography
and Director of the National Centre for
Social Applications of GIS, The University of Adelaide
Email: graeme.hugo@adelaide.edu.au
URL: http//www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/socialsciences/people/ges/ghugo.html
http://www.gisca.adelaide.edu.au/gisca/flash.html

Revised paper presented to International Conference on Toward New


Perspectives on Forced Migration In Southeast Asia, organised by
Research Centre for Society and Culture (PMB) at the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) at the
University of Oxford, Jakarta, 25-26 November 2004
For consideration by Asia and Pacific Migration Journal
May 2005

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that an historical perspective is important in the understanding of
contemporary forced migration in Indonesia. It demonstrates this through an analysis of the
major pre 1965 forced migrations in the country.

It shows that many contemporary

population flows both forced and unforced have their origins in historical forced migration.
For example, urbanization in Indonesia in the immediate post independence decades was in a
major way a function of forced migration. Forced migration also has created chain migration
linkages between origin and destination along which later non-forced movements occur. It is
also shown that historical forces are often responsible for the political, economic and social
inequalities which are an important influence on contemporary patterns of migration.
INTRODUCTION
Migration on a permanent or temporary basis has long been one of the most important
survival strategies adopted by Indonesians in the face of natural or human-caused disasters.
However, our contemporary understanding of this form of movement remains limited.
Perhaps because the underlying cause of movement is apparently self-evident in the term
forced migration there has not been as much research attention devoted as to so-called
voluntary migrations.

This is wrong for at least two reasons.

Firstly, while the

forced/voluntary dichotomy does obviously have some basis in reality, it is by no means as


clear-cut as it appears and it conceals a great deal of complexity in the nature, causes and
impact of forced migrations. Moreover it is apparent that even where migration is triggered
by a response to the onset of physical disasters or conflict of some kind the deeper underlying
fundamental causes of the movement have not been those events so much as inequalities in
access to power and resources between groups. These deeper underlying forces create a
vulnerability to the impact of disasters. In Indonesia, attention has been directed toward the
movements of population since the major political and economic changes of the late 1990s
which have been attributed to conflict, especially ethnic based conflict (Hugo, 2002).

However, forced migration has a longer history in Indonesia and the present paper seeks to
summarise the major patterns of forced migration, which occurred in Indonesia before gaining
independence and in the early post independence period.

These migrations provide an

important context for examining contemporary forced migration in Indonesia.

DEFINING AND CATEGORISING INVOLUNTARY MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES


The migration literature is replete with typologies which differentiate migrants and
migrations according to the relative permanency of the move, the distance traversed, the
nature of the boundaries crossed, the causes of the move, the characteristics of the movers,
etc. One of the pervasive distinctions made between types of population movements is that
between voluntary and forced migrations which dates back 80 years to Fairchild's (1925)
migration classification. Perhaps the most frequently quoted typology of migration is that of
Peterson (1958) in which one of the most fundamental divisions employed is the degree to
which a move is "forced". However, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
migration is not as clear-cut as it would appear at first glance. As Speare (1974:89) points
out ... "In the strictest sense migration can be considered to be involuntary only when a person
is physically transported from a country and has no opportunity to escape from those
transporting him. Movement under threat, even the immediate threat to life, contains a
voluntary element, as long as there is an option to escape to another part of the country, go
into hiding or to remain and hope to avoid persecution." On the other hand, some scholars of
migration, especially those of the Marxian school, argued that much of the population
mobility which is conventionally seen as being voluntary occurs in situations in which in fact
the migrants have little or no choice. Amin (1974:100), for example, in his discussion of
contemporary migration in Western Africa states that... "A comparative costs and benefits
analysis, conducted at the individual level of the migrant, has no significance. In fact it only
gives the appearance of objective rationality to a 'choice' (that of the migrant) which in reality

does not exist because, in a given system, he has no alternatives". Indeed the early typology
developed by Peterson referred to above recognised this degree of overlap between voluntary
and involuntary movement and distinguished an intermediate category. He differentiated
between impelled migration when the migrants retain some power to decide whether or
not to leave and forced migration when they do not have this power" (Peterson, 1958:261).
These are in turn separated from free migration in which the will of the migrants is the
decisive element initiating movement.
There is also diversity in the literature with respect to what particular types of
involuntary migration can be identified. Much of this centres around the issue of defining the
term refugee. While the term refugee migration is in some cases used as a synonym for
involuntary migration, others apply it only to a very restricted sub-set of all such movements.
The 1967 United Nations Protocol on Refugees considers a refugee as every person who,
owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country."(Keely, 1981:6).
An alternative approach, which is more congruent with the day to day use of the term
refugee, is that which distinguishes refugees from other migrants by the causes of their
movement. A good example of such a definition is that provided by Olson (1979:130)...
"Refugees differ from other, spontaneous or sponsored migrants, largely in the
circumstances of their movement out of one area to another, and the effects these
have on them in the settlement and adjustment phases of their relocation. Refugees
are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which
makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an
external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere."

This definition stresses the involuntary, forced nature of the move, the "uprooting"
suddenness of most refugee moves and the externality to the mover of the force or forces
impelling the move. It also implies a substantial degree of powerlessness among the movers
in the decision to move and selection of destination. There is no consideration in this
definition of the distance the refugees move or whether or not they cross an international
boundary, although Olson points out these spatial factors do affect refugees' adjustment after
flight". This definition is clearly more holistic and sees refugee moves as a subset of all
population mobility rather than of international migration.
Olson's definition is also broader than that of the U.N. with respect to the nature of the
external force or forces, the threat or presence of which impels refugee movements. Again, the
United Nations definition is somewhat restrictive in that it refers only to persecution or fear of
persecution as initiating refugee movement. Keely (1981:6) points out that this excludes
people fleeing the ravages of war, and who are usually considered refugees, although the
broader definitions in wider use usually include such groups. More commonly, persons who
are displaced by civil conflict or war are also categorized as refugees. Some writers, however,
have extended the recognition of forces which create refugee movements even further and go
beyond the conflicts created by human agents to include people displaced from their home
areas by natural disasters. Olson (1979:130), for example, identifies the following five types
of external compulsions that alone or in concert create refugees...
1

Physical dangers (e.g. floods, volcanic eruptions etc.)

2.

Economic insufficiency (e.g. drought, famine)

3.

Religious persecution

4.

Ethnic persecution

5.

Ideological persecution.
While it recognised that there are elements of force in much of the movement

characterised as voluntary, the concentration here is on movers where there has been some

compulsion to move by the sudden onset of life threatening conditions (Zolberg and Suhrke
(1984:1).

These can be divided firstly (Hugo and Chan, 1990) into those initiated by

natural disasters although it is recognised that these often have an underlying political,
economic and social cause. These are migrants who are forced to flee their home areas by the
onset of (or the fear of) a natural calamity or disaster which include the first two categories of
Olson's (1979) classification of external compulsions to migration listed above and covers not
only the migrations initiated by the sudden and violent onset of floods, earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions etc. but also the "silent violence" (Spitz, 1978) of drought, famine and severe food
shortage.
The second category of forced migration identified here are the largely involuntary
movements initiated by the onset or threat of some form of externally imposed conflict which
make it impossible for people to continue life as they have known it were they to remain at
their home place. This means that conflict or the threat of conflict is seen as being the key
condition. Zolberg and Suhrke (1984:2) stress the life threatening nature of the forces
initiating such movements as being
characterised by the immediacy of life threatening compulsion, its relative
deliberate exercise by some agent and the inability of persons affected by it to rely
on their government for even nominal protection.
It must be stressed, however, that we are referring here to the immediate cause which triggers
the forced migration, not necessarily the deeper underlying long term determinants. For
example, many "natural" disasters have their root causes in long term political, social,
economic or agricultural practices or policies.
In both of the types of forced movement identified here external pressures are
paramount in initiating moves - without the sudden introduction of particular external forces
the move would not have occurred. As Kunz (1973:130) points out ... "It is the reluctance to
uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which

characterises all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrants."
In fact Kunz goes on to recognize two distinct "kinetic" types of refugee movement in which
the chief distinction is the strength of the external forces impinging upon the potential
refugee.
(a)

Anticipatory refugee movements involve people moving before the deterioration of the
military or political situation becomes overwhelming, preventing an orderly departure.

(b)

Acute refugee movements, where the emphasis is on unplanned flight en masse or in


bursts of individual or group escapes where the overwhelming objective is to reach a
haven of safety.

This differentiation is equally applicable to Natural Disaster Migrants. These definitions, of


course, are far from clear-cut and there remain areas of overlap. However, they do have
meaning in the Indonesian context.

PRE COLONIAL FORCED MIGRATIONS


In the traditional society of pre-colonial times mobility was greatly constrained for most
Indonesians although some significant movements, especially of the agricultural colonization,
seasonal and trading types, occurred (Hugo, 1980:97-100). The pre-colonial class structure,
the rise and fall of inland kingdoms and coastal sultanates, the regular incidence of famine,
the development of various trading patterns through the Indonesian archipelago, the spread of
new types of agriculture and various environmental disasters all shaped the patterns and levels
of the movements which did occur. However, for the large part movement outside of the well
trodden local area was prevented by lack of transport infrastructure, the obvious difficulties of
moving between the regions of Indonesias more than 200 separate ethno-linguistic groups
and in some areas the political constraints exerted by the control of elite groups.

The Dutch historians Vollenhoven (1918, II:123-5) and van Leur (1955:100-1) have
summarised patterns of migration in pre-colonial Indonesia as being of three main types each
of which involved some elements of forced migration
(a)

migration to cities which pre dated European contact.

(b)

colonisation by a large group of migrants from one region who settled in another region.

(c)

establishment of authority in foreign regions.

Taking first the movement to cities, pre-colonial urbanisation took two main forms (McGee,
1967). First were the traditional inland kingdoms based on exacting tribute from intensive
agricultural populations in their hinterlands of which the temple complex of Borobudur in
Central Java is a remaining vestige. Second, were the more ephemeral and smaller trading
cities along the coasts of islands such as Java and Sumatra (Hugo, 1980). The taking of slaves
was a substantial element in both types of cities. This is reflected in the data presented in
Table 1, which relate to Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1673. Although this was after the Dutch had
established themselves in the city (1596) and taken control (1619), it is indicative. In the
inland kingdoms the cities also had substantial numbers of slaves, often from areas conquered
by the kingdoms.

Table 1:
Source:

Composition of Population of Batavia, 1673


Dagh Register, 1674; Batavia, 1902:27-30 quoted in Castles 1967:157

Europeans and Part-Europeans


Chinese
Mardijkers
Javans
Balinese
Malays
Slaves
Total

No.
2,750
2,747
5,362
6,339
981
611
13,278
32,068

%
8.6
8.6
16.7
19.8
3.1
1.9
41.4
100.1

Substantial agricultural colonisation occurred in the pre-European period. This was in


large part a response to the build up of population pressure in origin areas so there was an
element of force in this mobility as well. In some cases, such moves were triggered by the
onset of physical disasters in the place of origin. An example of such movement was that of
Javanese from heavily settled wet rice (sawah) areas of Central Java to more lightly settled
shifting dry field cultivation (ladang) areas of West Java. This involved ethnic Javanese
people settling in areas dominated by Sundanese and has been examined elsewhere (Hugo,
1975; 1980). The main flow occurring in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are shown
in Figure 1.

Figure 1:
Source:

Major Paths of Migration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries in


Western Java
Hugo, 1975:81

The third type of mobility identified by van Leur and Vollenhoven was the
establishment of authority in foreign regions. This created forced movements both in
displacement of preexisting populations as well as the taking of massive numbers of slaves.
They provide a number of examples but another was in the early seventeenth century when

the Central Javanese kingdom of Mataram extended its influence over Cirebon in West Java
making it a vassal in 1619 (Hugo, 1975:82). De Haan (1912, III:39) explains that the
Mataram attacks produced a flood of Sundanese refugees from the region to the Citarum
River region in Krawang (West Java) where they settled. The links established between
Sumedang (Central Java) and Cirebon on the one hand, and Sumedang and Krawang on the
other, during this period, are still reflected in contemporary population movement patterns
(Hugo, 1975).

FORCED MIGRATION IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD


Migration in the East Indies was transformed by the gradual penetration of capitalism
via the step by step growth in European control of Indonesia, culminating in the taking of
virtual total control in the nineteenth century. As European influence and control increased in
Indonesia during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century, so did their impact on
population movement (Hugo, 1980:100-102), but it was with the imposition of direct colonial
rule by the Dutch (and for a short time British) government in the nineteenth century, which
saw the most dramatic effects. Some of these effects were as follows:
*.

There was probably a greater degree of peace and order, which at least in part removed
the fears associated with forced movement between regions.

The whole pattern and availability of transport underwent a revolution which greatly
reduced the friction of distance.

*.

The structure of the economy was changed drastically in line with the exploitative
colonial aims concentrating job opportunities in new and different types of areas than in
the past.

*.

There were direct colonially imposed laws to encourage or discourage particular types
of movement.

*.

There was a range of forced and semi-forced labour schemes.

10

The introduction of an "externally oriented trading system" (Riddell, 1980:116), saw the
development of urban centres and migration toward them.

*.

The introduction of various schemes of taxation had effects on population movement.

The encouragement of immigration of non-Indonesian foreigners.

The introduction of wage employment of various kinds.

The reduction in mortality and perhaps even an increase in fertility (White, 1973) led to
increasing population pressure in rural areas.

The introduction, albeit in an extremely limited way, of primary and to a lesser extent
secondary schools.

While the movement asterisked influenced forced migration in Indonesia, it could be argued
that the enforced imposition of colonialism meant that virtually all mobility in the colonial
period could not be considered voluntary. Some scholars (e.g Amin, 1974; Gregory and
Piche, 1978; 1980; Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978; Gerald-Scheepers and Van Binsbergen,
1978) see colonial population movement patterns and levels as a response to broader sociostructural changes associated with the uneven penetration of capitalism, which have
substantial sectoral, class and spatial inequalities. The argument is that the fundamentally
exploitative colonial system designed to control the local population and expedite the
extraction of raw materials in the most cost-efficient way shaped the pattern of mobility in
very distinctive ways that in some senses have yet to be altered. However, here we will focus
on those movements which fit the definition discussed earlier of migrations being triggered by
crisis events and which migrants moved because their life was endangered if they stayed.
The types of forced mobility, which occurred in Indonesia during the colonial period,
are demonstrated here with reference to a single Indonesian province West Java. Firstly, in
the early years of Dutch penetration, the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie East
India Company) were entirely mercantilist in their aim to extract the maximum in the way of
saleable export crops with the minimum expenditure of their resources. The traditional

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aristocracy was installed as regents and became the medium through which the people of
Priangan were forced to grow coffee. The so-called "compulsory crops" system, through the
agency of the regents who Geertz (1963:51) styles "labour contractors", inflicted much
hardship on the Sundanese and had an important impact on patterns of population movement.
One effect was for local populations to flee the heavy exactions of the compulsory crop
system. Raffles (1817, I:64-65) states that the oppression and degradation imposed by the
Dutch, led to depopulation in parts of Priangan as well as the Banten and Cirebon regions:
"Every new act of rigour, every unexpected exaction, occasioned a further migration,
and cultivation was transferred to tracts which had previously scarcely a family on them".
During the early years of European penetration, the slave trade in the East Indies
continued and proliferated. Slavery was not abolished in the Netherlands East Indies until
1860 and prior to that the taking of slaves as forced labour was widespread practice. Writing
in 1815, Raffles (1817) mentions that Dutch enforcement of compulsory labour for road and
harbour construction and coffee and pepper cultivation was particularly oppressive in the
Bantam part of West Java, producing severe and prolonged opposition and heavy
outmigration. The latter, is reflected in the low sex ratio of 867 which characterised the
population in 1815 (Hugo, 1975). After 1830 the Dutch initiated a series of politico-economic
policies which were designed to make Java a 'mammoth state plantation' (Geertz, 1963:53).
The 'Cultivation System', introduced in 1830, involved 'the remission of the peasant's land
taxes in favor of his undertaking to cultivate government owned export crops on one fifth of
his fields or, alternatively, to work sixty-six days of the year on government owned estates or
other projects' (Geertz, 1963:52-3). The latter alternative predominated in West Java, where
similar systems had been practiced for a century and the system came to be known as the
Preanger System (Hugo, 1975). It is apparent that substantial population movements occurred
with people moving away from areas where the cultivation system had been introduced to
government lands not subject to it or to lands held by private individuals (see Day, 1904:315

12

for examples of such movements). In many areas the hardships visited on the population by
the system were sufficient to impel them to flee. Bailey (1962) suggests that overpopulation
in the Gunung Kidul region of Yogyakarta (well known as one of the poorest areas in
contemporary Java) dates from the time when the Cultivation System was introduced. He
suggests this caused people to flee from better agricultural areas suitable for cash cropping to
Gunung Kidul, which as a poor lime stone area had been left alone by the Dutch.
Day (1904:316) argues that the system caused a diminished food supply, which in turn
produced famines such as that of 1849-50 in which one third of a million people perished.
There was also migration associated with the inequalities in the cultivation system as Day
(1904:265) has shown
it distributed burdens so unequally that it pressed many of the inhabitants to the
verge of failure while it bore so lightly on others and left some entirely untouched
The indigo culture was especially oppressive requiring an immense amount of
care and labour; and natives in the indigo districts migrated to other sections
where only coffee and sugar were cultivated."
Elson (1986:144) explains that in the nineteenth century the expansion in the number of
factories in Java the colonial government allowed forced labour to be recruited for factories.
He shows (1986:153) that the most common practice, especially in East Java, was for local
officials to designate the villages within a 5-10 km radius of a factory to provide workers.
Other evidence of the flight of inhabitants of regions elsewhere in Java in which the exactions
of the colonial regime were especially severe is produced by Widjojo (1970:36-7) and
Schrieke (1957:300). There are also cases where the military intervention of the colonial
regime produced forced migrations. For example in West Java the crushing of the Bantamese
insurrection in Cilegon in 1888 led to significant outmigration (Gelder, 1900:783). Gooszen
(1999:28) reports that in the mid nineteenth century many Banjarese were forced to flee their

13

homeland of South Kalimantan due to the effects of a war with the Dutch. He also explains
that many Acenese moved to Malacca after losing a war with the Dutch in 1903 (1999:29).
One part of West Java the particuliere landerijen (private lands) in the immediate
hinterland of Batavia comprised extensive tracts of land sold to individuals between 1639 and
1829 and within which a feudal system prevailed until the close of the colonial period.
Although slavery was abolished in 1860, the tuan tanah (landlords) had almost unbridled
power within their estates and many forcibly prevented tenants from leaving. In effect there
was a forced staying in these areas.
It is apparent that there were also forced migrations in colonial times associated with
physical disasters. In 1883 the violent evisceration of the crater of Krakatoa caused several
great waves which submerged the entire northern and western Banten coasts, destroying 61
villages completely and a further 96 partially, as well as killing a minimum of 23,917 people
(Furneaux, 1965:182). The destruction wrought by the waves and volcanic ash was so
complete in several areas that the fleeing inhabitants could not return for several years by
which time many of the refugees had established themselves elsewhere and did not wish to
return. In the worst mid area of Caringan, inhabitants could not return until 1891.
The forced outmigration caused when there were crop failures in Java continued,
especially during the nineteenth century (Kroef, 1956:746). The introduction of the so-called
ethical policy at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, undoubtedly reduced this
type of forced migration. The ethical policy had an emphasis on education, irrigation and
emigration in order to stop the acknowledged deterioration of living standards of the
indigenous population that had accompanied the mounting pressure of population on
resources in Java (Hugo, 1975:116).

Elements in this system included upgrading local

irrigation systems and put in place systems to deal with seasonal local famine and food
shortage. Van der Muelen (1940:151) reports on the impact in one West Java district where
previously a total crop failure occurred every four or five years and crop yields were 1,400

14

kgm/ha, the new irrigation works resulted in an average yield of 3,090 kgm/ha and the fear of
crop failure was completely removed.

The ethical policy also saw the removal of the

compulsory labour requirements and the beginnings of the colonisation (later transmigration)
program, which sought to resettle Javans from heavily populated areas to the Outer Islands.
The colonial period saw a major increase in the urban population of the East Indies,
especially Java. In bringing their plundering of Javas raw materials to new heights of
efficiency, the Dutch created a system of colonial cities and towns, which functioned as key
devices in expediting the production and delivery of those products. Much of the population
growth up to 1870 involved forced and semi forced migration with slaves being a significant
but declining element in cities like Batavia (Hugo, 1975:44). Castles (1967:155-6) says that
slaves outnumbered free settlers for the initial centuries of Dutch settlement in Batavia.
Initially slaves were brought in from South Asia (Coromandel Coast, Malabar, Bengal and
Arakan) but in the second half of the seventeenth century this gradually gave way to other
East Indian sources. Castles (1967:156) explains, at various times Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores,
Timor, Nias, Kalimantan and Pampanga in Luzon made their contributions; but the
consistently important sources were Bali and South Sulawesi. The high death rates in
Batavia meant that the population had to be constantly replenished. De Haan (1935, I:371)
reports that in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, 4,000 slaves were being imported
annually. Raffles (1817, II:270) reports that 14,249 of the 47,217 population of Batavia were
slaves. The slave population were an important part of the diverse Indonesian ethnic groups
who by the end of the nineteenth century had merged to form a distinct new sukubangsa
(ethnic group) known during colonial times as the Batavians but now are referred to as the
Betawi (Castles, 1967:156).
Critical to the whole colonial system were policies toward labour supply and it is clear
that these had a significant influence on migration. It was imperative to ensure that there was
an adequate labour supply at the places where resources were being exploited. In many cases

15

this labour was not available locally either because the areas suitable for cash cropping,
mining etc. were ecologically not favoured for semi-subsistence traditional activities or
because the local populations were in some way considered not suitable for work on
plantations or mines. Accordingly, there were many schemes throughout the colonial period
to bring labour to areas of exploitation of resources. In the early days of the VOC, slavery
was rife and thereafter various types of contract labour schemes were introduced as well as
schemes whereby labour was provided on plantations, roads and other works, etc. in lieu of
paying taxation to the colonial regime. These movements are considered in some detail
elsewhere (Hugo, 1980).
After 1870 private Europeans and Chinese were permitted to obtain long term leases
over land and there was a tremendous expansion of capital intensive plantation agriculture.
This expansion occurred initially in Java "thanks to its transport facilities, greater public
security and abundant labour supply" (Fisher, 1964:259). However, in the irrigated lowlands
of Java the density of settlement left little land available for plantation development and as a
result most of the new plantations were established in the central highlands of Java. By the
late nineteenth century the growing congestion in Java forced colonial planters to turn to the
Outer Islands. Prior to 1870, Dutch colonial exploitation of the Outer Islands had been
limited to some coffee cultivation and coal and tin mining. However, in the latter years of the
century the fertile northeastern lowlands of Sumatra located on the major sea route to Europe
were developed for tobacco and later for rubber, tea, palm oil and sisal. Hence, this region
became a major new centre of colonial activity. The scarcity of labour in the region led
planters to initially recruit Chinese coolies to work on the plantations and later Javanese and
Sundanese workers from Java. The result was the introduction of the contract coolie system
whereby agents recruited workers for planters. As Furnival (1948:346) has pointed out "a
private agent dependent for his livelihood on the number of recruits is less scrupulous than an
official in his relations with both employers and labourers. Heavy penal sanctions were

16

applied to contract coolies and severe exploitation and mistreatment were commonplace until
recruitment was placed under government supervision in 1909 as part of the ethical policy.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there were elements of force both in recruiting and in restrictions
placed on the contract coolies in destination areas.
The importance of these contract labour movements in interprovincial migration in the
Netherlands East Indies in the later part of the colonial period is evident in Figure 2, which
indicates that migration from Java (especially Central and East Java) to North Sumatra was by
far the largest interprovincial flow in the years preceding the 1930 census. The bulk of this
mobility was associated with the contract coolie system. The significance of contract coolie
movements to Sumatra is reflected in the fact that one tenth of the indigenous population of
Sumatra were born in Java-Madura (Volkstelling IV, 1936).

Figure 2:
Source:

Indonesia: Major Interprovincial Lifetime Migration Streams (Those with


more than 5,000 Persons) 1930
Volkstelling VIII, 1936

17

The contract coolie movements were made on both permanent and temporary bases, but
it was difficult to distinguish between them because temporary migration often involved
absences of several years. Between 1913 and 1925 some 327,700 kulikontrak (contract
coolies) left Java for Tanah Sebrang (the land beyond), representing some 15% of Java's
population growth during the same period (Scheltema, 1926:873-4). Although many contract
coolies returned to Java, an unknown but significant number settled in the outer islands and
this is reflected in the fact that at the 1971 census, 10 percent of North Sumatra's population
had lived in another province and more than two thirds of them had lived in North Sumatra
for more than 10 years. This underestimates the impact of migration from Java-Madura since
it excludes the Sumatran born children of Javan migrants. At the time of the 1930 Census
enumeration, there were 379,000 coolies working on European estates in Sumatra, of which
290,000 were Javanese and 30,000 Sundanese (Volkstelling VIII, 1936:34).
There was also an international extension of the contract coolie system. A small number
of Java-born persons moved out of Indonesia during the last century of colonial rule, under
"contract-coolie" recruitment programmes to obtain cheap labour for plantations. In 1930, for
example, there were 89,735 Java-born persons (Bahrin, 1967:280) and 170,000 ethnic
Javanese (Volkstelling 1936, VIII:45) in Malaya, 31,000 emigrants in the Dutch colony of
Surinam and 6,000 in New Caledonia (Volkstelling 1933, VIII:45). Smaller numbers moved
to Siam (3,000 Java-born persons in 1920), British North Boreno (5,237 in 1922) and to a
lesser extent Sarawak, Cochin China and Queensland, Australia (Scheltema, 1926:874).
Before 1931 there were some experimental attempts to establish agricultural colonies of
settlers from Java in the Outer Islands, mainly Sumatra, but the two major colonies in 1930
had a total population of only 31,759 persons (Pelzer, 1945:191-210). However, when the
depression of the 1930's forced curtailment of plantation industries and reduced the demand
for Javanese labour, the government turned to colonization to replace contract-labour schemes
as a measure to relieve population pressure in Java (Pelzer, 1945:228). Hence, between 1936

18

and 1940 the number of colonists in the Outer Islands trebled from 66,600 to 206,020 (Pelzer,
1945:202). It is clear that the colonists were predominantly from Central and East Java and
Madura. This was the precursor of transmigration in Indonesia and although there is much
discussion of force in this system there was no evidence of force being used in colonisation in
the colonial period.
By the time the Dutch were evicted by the Japanese in 1941, European colonialism had
transformed the East Indies economy, society and demography. Major changes in population
mobility as both a cause and consequence of this transformation included movers in which
there was a significant element of force. The short Japanese occupation period was one in
which there was significant forced migration. In addition to the massive evacuation of the
Dutch, other European and Eurasian population in the face of the Japanese invasion and those
remaining were put in internment camps. On Java there was a significant increase in the
populations of several cities such as Batavia and Bandung from an influx of rural dwellers
fleeing from the harsh requisitioning of agricultural products and labour recruitment
policies of the Japanese (Kroef, 1954:157-8; Heeren, 1955:204). Smail (1964:12) notes that
during the occupation, the disappearance of jobs on plantations with the Dutch withdrawal,
forced delivery of large quantities of rice and forced recruitment of workers (the romusha
scheme) there was a substantial amount of forced migration through the Japanese period. In a
village surveyed by the writer in 1973 in West Java, it was reported that the Japanese killed or
scared off all of the substantial Chinese population which lived there in the 1940s,
requisitioned 60 percent of the rice crop so that villagers had to each cassava and they took
away approximately 100 young men as romusha labourers, none of whom returned at the end
of the war (Hugo, 1975:253).

The taking of forced labour under the romusha scheme

practiced by the Japanese in the East Indies as well as other parts of Southeast Asia resulted in
the enslaving of many thousands of young men. They were sent to work not only elsewhere

19

in the East Indies but also in Japan and in other countries. There were, for example, many
Indonesian romusha who worked on the infamous Burma railway.

POSTWAR INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION IN INDONESIA


Conflict was an important element in the population mobility, which occurred in
Indonesia in the two decades following the declaration of independence in 1945. Suhrke
(1981) developed a model of refugee movements in which seven types of conflicts are
identified as producing refugees. In discussing this model, Keely (1981:17) points out that it
is especially appropriate to Third World situations where the conflicts are often associated
with evolving processes of state, nation and regime-building. In Table 2, the seven categories
of refugee-producing conflicts put forward by Suhrke are listed supplemented with two
additional categories. In the table selected, examples from Indonesia in its first three decades
of independence are given. It has been argued elsewhere (Hugo, 1987:20) that whereas
conflict induced migration across international boundaries has a considerable literature
internal migrations resulting from insecurity have attracted much less attention, although the
scale of it has been substantial and the problems and consequences flowing from it have often
been as significant as those of international refugee flows (Cohen and Francis (eds.), 1998a
and b; Sorensen and Marc, 2001).
While the mandate of the UNHCR only includes refugees fleeing for their lives across
international boundaries, it has increasingly became involved in providing assistance to those
displaced within nations. However, as they (UNHCR, 1997:99) point out:
'... Doubts have been raised with regard to the very, concept of "internally
displaced people" and the wisdom of institutionalising this notion in international
law. Although a number of international organisations have contributed to the
welfare of internally displaced persons during the past few years, no single
humanitarian agency has been given statutory responsibility for their protection'.

20

Table 2:
Source:

Types of Conflict Initiating Refugee Movements with Examples from


Indonesia in the 1940s, 1950s, 160s and 1970s
Categories modified and extended from Suhrke, 1981:17-23; Hugo and Chan,
1990

Type of Conflict
1.
Independence Struggles

Indonesian Examples
Evacuation of virtually the entire Indonesian population
(approximately half a million people) from the City of Bandung
1946-48 (Hugo, 1975:254). In West Sumatra the large scale
evacuation of people from Dutch occupied coastal areas to the
republican territories of the interior (Naim, 1973:135).

2.

Ethnic Conflicts with Autonomy/


Separatist Dimensions

Separatist movements in Irian Jaya have at times initiated refugee


flows, some of them into neighbouring New Guinea (Garnaut and
Manning, 1974:23; Roosman, 1980).

3.

Internal Ethnic Conflict Not


Related to Separatists/Autonomy/
Struggles

In 1967 some 60,000 ethnic Chinese were forced out of the interior
areas of West Kalimantan due to long-standing hostility against the
Chinese (Ward and Ward, 1974:28). Similarly displacement of
Chinese occurred in West Java in the 1950s (Hugo, 1975:245)

4.

Class Conflict

Persons displaced by the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) events


of 1965.

5.

Inter-Elite Power Struggles

The PRRI and Permesta Rebellions in Central Sumatra and North


Sulawesi during the 1950s were against the authority of Jakarta and
were supported mainly by the educated elite. It caused substantial
movements both during the rebellions and after authority was
restored (McNicoll, 1968:44; Naim, 1973:139).

6.

State Intervention Conflicts

The Indonesian annexation of East-Timor in 1975 resulted in its


people suffering great violence and dislocation such that its
population in 1980 of 552,954 was less than in 1970 (610,541).
Perhaps up to a half of the population were displaced during the late
1970's (Jenkins, 1978; 1979a and b, Rodgers, 1979; 1981).

7.

International Wars

The Second World War initiated many refugee flows throughout the
entire region. Since then the compounding of internal struggle by
external intervention has produced huge involuntary displacements
of people, as for example in Vietnam and Cambodia (Keely,
1981:17). Some boat people came to Indonesia.

8.

Religious Based Conflict

In Indonesia rebellions aimed at making Indonesia an Islamic state


erupted in West Java (1948-62), South/Southeast Sulawesi (195165), Aceh (1953-57; 1959-61) and South Kalimantan (1950-60).
These initiated substantial migration flows (McNicoll 1968:43-8;
Hugo, 1975; Harvey, 1974).

9.

Colonial Based Conflicts

Colonial rule tended to favour some groups over others. with


decolonisation conflicts based upon these differences can initiate
refugee movements. In Indonesia several groups from Maluku
were fiercely loyal to the Dutch and after Independence there was
an attempt to set up a Republic of the South Moluccas causing
refugee movements (McNicoll, 1968:43). In fact many South
Moluccans followed their colonial masters back to the Netherlands
where they settled (Kraak, 1957:350).

21

They point out that there is no formal or legal definition of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) and they use the term to refer to:
... those persons who, as a result of persecution, armed conflict or violence, have
been forced to abandon their homes and leave their usual place of residence, and
who remain within the borders of their own country.
This definition is relevant when considering forced migrations within Indonesia in the early
post independence period.
Before looking at these migrations, however, it needs to be reiterated that the single
cause explanations evident in the Table 2 classification are overly-simplistic. While ethnic,
religious and political factors may be the triggers of forced movement there are more
fundamental elements such as inequalities, power imbalances, discriminations and inequity in
access to resources which cause forced migration. Nevertheless, it provides a convenient
framework to consider involuntary migrations in early independent Indonesia. The major
conflicts, which produced significant forced migrations during the first three decades of
independence, are depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3:
Source:

Conflicts Creating Outmigration in Indonesia, 1950-65


Compiled from information in McNicoll, 1968

Daud Beureuh Aceh 1953-57


1959-61
Permesta Rebellion
1958-61

Padang
Revolutionary Govt
of the Republic
Ibnu Hadjar
of Indonesia
1950-60
1958-61
Republic of South
South Kalimantan
Maluku
Weslerling
Kahar Muzakar
1950
Rebellion
South & South East
1950
Sulawesi
1951-1965
Darul Islam
0 kms
500 Kartosuwirjo
Revolt of Ardi Aziz
West Java
1950
1948-62

22

It is indicative that the main review of internal migration in Indonesia over the period
under consideration here gives particular prominence to forced migration (McNicoll, 1968).
This makes a distinction between long term persistent migratory flows and sudden large scale
movements. The latter, predominantly forced migrations are termed non migrations. One of
the distinctive patterns of forced migration not only in Indonesia but elsewhere in the region
is pointed out elsewhere (Hugo, 1982:89) there have been important instances of forced
rural-to-urban migration of refugees in Southeast Asian urbanisation In times of political
and military insecurity in rural areas, cities are often fortified havens of safety which attract
flows of refugees." In his review of the growth of Indonesia's cities over the 1930-61 period,
Goantiang (1965) stresses the importance of refugee movements in swelling the population of
many of Indonesia's cities over that period. For example, he reports a field survey undertaken
in Jakarta in 1954/55 thus ... "The findings prove that the main reason why people move to
Djakarta is the prevalence of lawless disturbances in the interior." The case par excellence of
forced migration being a major element in rapid urban and metropolitan growth in Indonesia,
however, is that of Bandung in West Java and we shall briefly examine its postwar population
change and the role of forced migrations in that growth.
Bandung was Indonesia's fastest growing city between the census of 1930 when its
population was 166,815 and that of 1961 when it had reached 972,566. The pattern during the
intervening period, however, was one of massive fluctuations. As was the case in Jakarta,
Bandung experienced marked growth during the Japanese occupation due to the "push"
exerted by the social and economic disruption wrought by the Japanese (Hugo, 1975:252).
In 1945-6 the Japanese surrender, the declaration of Indonesian independence and
arrival of allied troops in Bandung, initiated much population movement. First there was a
massive in-movement from all over West Java of Dutch persons freed from Japanese
internment camps so that there were 60,000 Europeans in the city in November 1945 (Smail,
1964:99) - more than twice the pre-war peak. For the following two years Bandung was

23

effectively divided into two cities, separated by the railway tracks passing through the city
centre. To the north was the European enclave guarded by British troops and to the south the
Indonesian section. Between November 1945 and March 1946 when fighting was at its
height, 100,000 Indonesians moved out of the north sector while Europeans and some
Chinese settled in the north. In addition, there were substantial evacuations from the southern
sector into villages in the southern part of Bandung Kabupaten. Women, children and older
people made up the bulk of these movers and they were replaced by young men coming from
all over Priangan to take part in the struggle against the Europeans. The latter numbered some
thousands (Smail, 1964:121). An additional group moving to Bandung from surrounding rural
areas at this time were village officials who were unpopular for enacting oppressive Japanese
policies and sought refuge in the city (Smail, 1964:122).
In March 1946 following an ultimatum by the British, Bandung was evacuated of
Indonesians and large sections of it destroyed. "South Bandung, except for the parts of it with
a large Chinese population, became and remained for a year and a half a dead city with grass
growing in its streets" (Smail, 1964:151). Within four months approximately half a million
people had moved from Bandung and its environs into rural areas of Priangan. After the
evacuation the Indonesian struggle for independence continued, Bandung remained an
essentially European- Chinese city until the beginning of 1948 when much of West Java was
put under Dutch control. Many Sundanese men followed the Republican army to Yogyakarta
or joined guerilla units operating in mountainous parts of the Province, particularly in the
Sukabumi region. Despite these moves Bandung's population grew rapidly during the period
of Dutch occupation.
With the transfer of sovereignty there began a decade of rapid growth for Bandung
which saw its population almost double. Official figures of natural increase and net migration
(Abdurachim, 1970:5) show that, on average, 62.5% of each year's growth was due to net
migration gain. Initially there was a return of soldiers and evacuees who had left when the

24

Dutch had reoccupied Bandung as well as those who, after the excitement of life as a guerilla,
were unwilling to return to their village. Throughout the decade, particularly in the mid-50s,
population movement to Bandung, as well as to other West Java urban centres, was initiated
as a result of the insecurity of many rural areas due to the Darul Islam (D.I.) rebellion which
lasted from 1948 until 1962.
The D.I. revolt began when a group of soldiers who had previously fought against the
Dutch rebelled against the newly independent government to make Indonesia become an
Islamic state. There were similar revolts in South/Southeast Sulawesi, Aceh and South
Kalimantan loosely associated with the D.I. rebellion (McNicoll, 1968:44).

The D.I.

established control over much of the Eastern highland section of West Java and adjacent areas
of Central Java, although at its height, its impact was felt all over West Java. Figure 4 shows
the Indonesian Armys official view as to which areas were in D.I. hands in May 1954 and
this is indicative of the area which experienced the brunt of the impact of the rebellion. The
D.I. adopted a campaign of terror and sabotage initially against the government but as the
years went by they degenerated increasingly into "terrorizing and plundering gangs which
could not return to normal life in society" (Boland, 1971:61). They caused much devastation
of life (averaging 1,500 deaths per year) and property (9,000 houses destroyed per year) and
"economic opportunities inevitably shrank in rebel-threatened or rebel-controlled areas, as
roads and railways became unsafe and as peasants limited their output of food crops in
response to rebel requisitions" (McNicoll, 1968:44).

This produced substantial refugee

movement toward areas protected by the army - particularly to local towns such as Garut and
Tasikmalaya and to the City of Bandung. As with most such movements, accurate figures of
the numbers are not available but provincial authorities put the total number of refugees at
215,700 over the 1951-6 period and at 52,672 in the last quarter of 1951 alone (McNicoll,
1968:44).

25

Figure 4:
Source:

West Java: Location of Areas Under Darul Islam Control in 1954


Hugo, 1975

The influx of refugees to West Java's cities in the 1950s resulted in them recording
exceptionally rapid growth rates over the 1930-61 intercensal period.

The population

registration figures for Bandung show the city's population increasing from 592,825 in 1949
to 1,028,245 in 1960 (Abdurachim, 1970:5). However, these undoubtedly understate the
influx of refugees since many refugees did not register and others subsequently returned to
their homes. The rapid increase in population and build-up of urban refugees placed great
strain on Bandung's resources. In 1957 a labour force sample survey in Bandung found that
only 62.7 percent of males aged 12 years and over were employed (Indonesia, Direktorat
Tenaga Kerja, 1958:589). Housing was another area under stress - in 1959 for example, there
were 12 persons in Bandung for every house (Rasjid, 1972:4) and it was estimated by Lontoh
(1964:51) that in 1964 at least 11,000 houses in the city were rumah liar (illegal housing built
without permission on government or private land). The seriousness of the urban refugee
problem and the growing pressure on city resources moved the authorities to attempt to

26

membendung (dam up) the flow of people by declaring Bandung a "closed city" on 1st March
1954. Although the regulation stayed in force until September 1964, its major effect like the
more recent attempt in Jakarta, was to dissuade migrants from registering as permanent
residents.
Figure 5 shows the impact of forced migration on Bandung's growth. The top graph
depicts net migration gains calculated by Abdurachim (1970) from registration statistics
maintained by authorities of the City of Bandung. The lower graph presents results from a

Figure 5:
Source:

A. Kotamadya Bandung: Annual Net Migration 1950-1968


City Registration Statistics, quoted in Abdurachim, 1970.

Source:

B. Kotamadya Bandung, Kecamatan Astanaanjar and Lengkong: Year of


Arrival of Resident Lifetime Migrants, 1969
Population Registers

27

study undertaken in 1969 of Population Registers in the sub-districts of Bandung in which the
year of arrival in Bandung of migrants still living in those two sub-districts is 1969. Both
sources are incomplete but they indicate the major patterns of forced migration to the city.
Peaks of inmovement are evident at the time of the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, the
onset of the D.I. rebellion in the early 1950s and the mid 1950s decline in registration due to
the "closing" of the city. It will be noted also that there was an upswing in inmigration in
1965. This was again largely due to refugee movements, on this occasion people displaced by
the violence and disruption caused during the attempted coup, although this dislocation was
not as great in West Java as elsewhere in Java and Bali.
The implications of the IDP movement to Bandung during the 1950s are considerable.
Above all they gave the city perhaps the most rapid rate of growth of any major city in
Southeast Asia during the 1950s. In fact population projections of the world's million cities
made in the early 1970s by the United Nations Population Division (Frejika, 1974:10-11;
Bose, 1974:40-41) designated Bandung as the fastest growing city in the world.
It is clear that the refugee movements were a major catalyst in the growth of Bandung.
It was suggested that the impact of such influxes of refugees is essentially temporary
(McNicoll, 1968:45) but field investigation in Bandung would indicate that this is not the
case. Although it was clear that most rural-urban refugees moved to Bandung with the
intention of returning to their home village when security is restored, there is evidence that the
longer the period of insecurity in the home place, the more likely they are to settle
permanently in their urban refuge. Certainly many refugees to Bandung returned to their
villages as soon as security was restored, but Figure 5 shows no massive net migration loss
from Bandung when normalcy returned in its hinterland. Thus, at least among those refugees
who were sufficiently committed to Bandung to register as citizens of the city, it was very
common to remain in the city after security was restored in their home villages. Indeed
fieldwork in Bandung during 1973 showed that many of the linkages between that city and

28

particular parts of rural West Java which are major areas of origin for contemporary
permanent and temporary migrants to the City, were originally established by refugee moves
made during the 1950s. These consisted firstly of links with Bandung-based family members
who had moved in as refugees, settled and remained but still maintain strong contacts with
their natal village. Secondly, even among refugees who returned to their home village it was
common for them to do so with a greatly enhanced knowledge of the City, the opportunities
located there and some contacts with urban-based people. This frequently meant that regular
visits to Bandung to work on a seasonal or other temporary basis were within their calculus of
conscious choice and indeed many became regular "circular" migrants between village and
city (Hugo, 1975; 1978).
Although less substantial, there were forced movements of D.I. displaced persons in
other parts of Indonesia during the 1950s. The smallest was in the province of South
Kalimantan where insecurity in the mountainous interior area of Hulusungai precipitated
refugee migrations to the cities of Banjarmasin (McNicoll, 1968:48) and Samarinda
(Goantiang, 1965:56). Both cities recorded very rapid rates of growth between the 1930 and
1961 censuses, with Banjarmasin's population more than trebling to 214,096 persons and
Samarinda growing by more than 600 percent to a population of 69,715. The rebellion in
Aceh in 1953 created a flow of refugees, estimated at around 60,000 persons (McNicoll,
1968:47), into neighbouring North Sumatra. Although most returned to Aceh in the late
1950s it is apparent that a significant minority remained and settled in North Sumatra. There
was also, as in the other cases studied above, significant displacement of refugees to the towns
and cities of Aceh, and this is reflected in their very high rates of intercensal population
growth.
The other area to experience an Islamic rebellion was South/Southeast Sulawesi (Figure
6), where the insecurity extended from 1951 until 1965. The rebellion was accompanied by

29

Figure 6:
Source:

Sulawesi: Showing Areas Influenced by Rebels 1956-57


Harvey, 1974, 265

30

much terrorization of the local population, not only by the rebels but also wild gangs which
roamed the countryside (Harvey, 1974:268). The main areas influenced by the conflict are
shown in Figure 6, but at the peak of their power they controlled the bulk of the countryside
and had the major cities encircled and it was only Makassar which was effectively under
government control.

No data are available concerning the scale of refugee movements

associated with the rebellion, in fact at the time of the 1961 census, enumerators could not
enter many areas due to insecurity only two of the 25 regencies could be completely
enumerated (McNicoll, 1968:47). What is apparent, however, is that the scale of movement
was substantial. In a single 1957 offensive in Southeast Sulawesi, for example, 40,000
refugees were forced to flee to the city of Kendari (Harvey, 1974:376). As with other internal
refugee movements in Indonesia, much of the migration was directed toward the towns and
cities which were in government hands. Accordingly these urban areas recorded some of the
most rapid rates of population growth between 1930 and 1961 of all cities in Indonesia.
Makassar more than quadrupled its population from 84,855 to 384,159 and recorded an
average annual growth rate of 4.9 percent. Throughout the 1950s its annual rate of population
growth approached 10 percent, due primarily to the influx of refugees. The growth of Parepare (7.7 percent per annum) was even more rapid as Goantiang (1965:106) expresses...
"The reason that lawlessness in the interior swells the population of a small town
may be aptly applied to Pare-pare ... Disorder, terrorism and torture, perpetuated
(sic) by gangs of outlaws, drive people out of the interior of Central and South
Sulawesi and force them to find asylum in coastal towns. Within 30 years Parepare was transformed from a sleepy community of 4,000 inhabitants into a
bustling town of 68,000 people .... Such seventeen fold growth is astonishing
indeed!"
Similar rapid rates of growth were recorded in other local urban areas such as Watampone
(8.3 percent per annum) and Barbau (6.9 percent). Fieldwork in Ujung Pandang in the late

31

1970s indicated that, as in Bandung, many of the "migration chains" along which permanent
and temporary migrants are moving to the city were established by IDPs during the years of
the rebellion.
The latter not only applies to intra-provincial movements but also to much of the
movement of Bugis and Makassarese people out of South Sulawesi, especially to Jakarta and
the east coasts of Sumatra and Kalimantan. McNicoll (1968:46) quotes reports of 10,000
Sulawesi born refugees in the provinces of Jambi and Riau in 1956 and another 5,000 along
the coast of East Kalimantan. He also shows that this was a period of increased Bugis
migration to Jakarta.

Lineton (1975a:180-1) quotes a Bugis businessman who arranged

accommodation and transport for most Bugis migrants passing through Jakarta from the early
1950s and who claimed that "the rebellion led to a flood of emigration which reached its peak
in 1955: in this year, more than 10,000 migrants passed through Tanjung Priok (the port of
Jakarta) on their way to Sumatra, generally traveling in large parties of 45 or more".
Linetons own fieldwork in both South Sumatra and Wajo and Bone in South Sulawesi
confirmed this. She quotes another of her informants thus (Lineton, 1975b:24)
"During the rebellion, three quarters of Wajo was in the hands of the rebels ... If
people did not want to join them, they had to move to Senkang or Makassar or
merantau (move outside of the province). In Peneki (on the coast) practically all
the houses were destroyed the rebels burnt the houses of those who did not join
them, then the army burnt the houses of those who did."
Lineton explains that both fishermen and peasant families were involved in the migration and
she points out that even with the return of security ... "emigration continued of people
attached to migrant areas by the tales of kin and friends who had gone before them" (Lineton,
1975b:24). Also after the return of security some former guerillas could not return to their
home villages and joined the migration. Some refugees returned to South Sulawesi once the

32

rebellion had been crushed, but the majority appears to have settled at their destinations and
attracted family and friends from South Sulawesi to join them.
Several other conflict-induced refugee migrations in Indonesia have been referred to in
Table 2 and Figure 3. These include several moves which were associated with the struggle
for Independence against the Dutch. In Java much movement focused on the capital of the
guerillas, Yogyakarta. Elsewhere the typical pattern was for people to flee to the interior
away from the Dutch controlled coastal areas as Naim (1973:135) has described for West
Sumatra. There were several short lived rebellions involving former members of the colonial
army immediately following the granting of independence which initiated refugee flows.
These were located in the provinces of West Java, South Sulawesi and Maluku (McNicoll,
1968:43). This initiated the refugee flow of some 4,000 Ambonese (South Moluccans)
soldiers and their families (totaling 12,500 persons) to the Netherlands, along with a larger
number of Indonesians of mixed Dutch-Indonesian parentage. By the early 1980s the South
Moluccans in the Netherlands had grown to number 35,000 (Woldring, 1980:55). Another
group of refugee flows are those associated with the PRRI and Permesta rebellions in Central
Sumatra and North/Central Sulawesi respectively (Figure 1). These were separatist rebellions
inspired by the belief that the Java-focused central government neglected the interests of
smaller numerical groups located in the periphery zone of the Other Islands. McNicoll
(1968:48) and Naim (1973:139) have shown that although these conflicts were fairly shortlived they initiated some significant refugee flows. McNicoll (1968:49) points out that these
flows tended to be dominated by the educated sections of the population, while those forced
to move by the Darul Islam rebellions tended to be generally representative of the total
resident population in the areas of conflict. Activities of separatist movements such as the
"Free Papua Movement" (OPM) have also initiated refugee flows from Irian Jaya. These
have not only occurred within that province but a substantial flow occurred into neighbouring
New Guinea (Garnaut and Manning, 1974; Roosman, 1980).

33

For many conflict-induced movements there is little or no information available. In


1965, for example, there was an attempted coup by elements of the Communist Party of
Indonesia and it was quickly suppressed by the army.

However, "For several months

afterwards, violent and widespread reprisals against members of the Party and affiliated
organisations occurred" (McNicoll and Mamas, 1973:15). This led to significant refugee
flows as well as large numbers of suspects being imprisoned without trial, many of them on
the isolated island of Buru in Maluku. More recently Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in
1975 resulted in its inhabitants suffering great violence and dislocation. In fact its population
at the 1980 census was considerably less than it was in 1970 (552,954 compared to 610,541).
It seems that up to half of the population of East Timor were displaced during the second half
of the 1970s. It appears that some 20,000 fled overseas after the outbreak of violence in 1975,
most going to Portugal and Australia (Rodgers, 1981:18). Many fled to West Timor in 1975
and it was reported that there were still 25,000 there in 1979 (Rodgers, 1979:5). In late 1978
it was estimated that 125,000 East Timorese had passed through or were still living "in squalid
refugee camps and officials estimate there could be as many as 100,000 more people hiding in
the mountains" (Jenkins, 1978:29). The scale of displacement was and is huge as is the
despair and suffering of those involved. By 1979 malnutrition and hunger were rife and death
commonplace - the condition of more than half the population living in East Timor was
described by experienced relief agency workers as "bad to critical" (Jenkins, 1979b:24). The
desperate situation is well summed up by a contemporary observer ...
"The current suffering in East Timor is a direct outcome of the civil war which
erupted in the Portuguese province in August 1975 and of the subsequent
Indonesian invasion. At that time hundreds of thousands of Timorese took refuge
in the mountains fearing for their lives as the fighting, often involving great
brutality, ebbed and flowed through the major towns and villages.

As in

Kampuchea, the result was that normal agriculture virtually ceased in many parts

34

of the province. East Timor, an area of acute deprivation at the best of times, fell
victim not only to War but to starvation and disease as well' (Jenkins, 1979b:24).
A final group that needs to be considered in any comprehensive discussion of forced
migration in Indonesia is the Chinese. While some Chinese settlement and sojourning in
Indonesia predated European contact, it wasnt until the full development of colonialism that
the Chinese were encouraged to move in large numbers to the East Indies. In colonial times
there were various restrictions on where they could settle.

They were concentrated

particularly in urban areas but also were spread through rural areas as well. They tended to be
employed in commercial activity medium and small-scale trade, foremen and white collar
occupations.

In the post-Independence period there were pressures on the Chinese

population, which in some cases produced migration. It is apparent that the growth of Jakarta
and Bandung in the 1950s was assisted by the displacement of Chinese from West Java.
Chinese were subject to great pressure in several rural parts of West Java and indeed at the
end of the decade legislation was passed which forbade Chinese and other foreigners to
operate a business or own land in rural parts of the Province. Hence, all remaining Chinese
were forced to migrate into the cities (Hugo, 1978:53). In 1960 also Chinese residents in
Indonesia were forced to choose between Chinese and Indonesian citizenship and as a result
many Chinese returned to China. There was a net emigration of 142,653 Chinese nationals
between 1952 and 1961, 102,297 in 1960 (Hugo et al., 1982).
It is clear that the movement of Chinese was one of the elements of forced migration
which contributed substantially to urbanisation in Indonesia in the first post Independence
quarter century. For example, there was also substantial migration of Chinese to Jakarta due
to "financial uncertainty and maltreatment in the villages' (Kroef, 1954:158). Chinese internal
migrants interviewed by Heeren (1955:710-712) were predominantly from West Java,
particularly Tanggerang and Bogor. Purcell (1951:556) reports that anti-Chinese incidents in
that region in June 1946 caused some 25,000 Chinese to flee to Jakarta. Further urbanization

35

of Chinese occurred in 1959 after the promulgation of new regulations prohibiting aliens from
engaging in retail trade in rural areas and a special army ordinance forced aliens outside the
towns to relocate (Skinner, 1963:115). Thus, in contemporary West Java it is an extremely
rare occurrence to encounter Chinese in villages.

This movement to the cities

counterbalanced to some extent an outflow of repatriated Chinese city dwellers to China.


Another major movement of Chinese refugees is referred to in Table 2, namely that in
West Kalimantan where Dyak insurrections against Chinese traders in the interior of the
province forced most of the Chinese living there to flee to Pontianak, Jakarta or to emigrate.
At the end of 1967, it was estimated that there were 25,669 refugees in Pontianak City and
22,622 in the neighbouring regency of Sambas (Ward and Ward, 1973:41). It is estimated that
a third of the total refugee population were forced to move (around 75,000) with about half
settling in the major towns, and most of the rest were established on land close to the towns.
Very few Chinese now remain in the Dyak areas. Ward and Ward (1973:49-50) suggest that
the abandonment of the interior by the Chinese has resulted in much wet rice land going out
of production and production of cash crops like pepper and rubber has also declined due to the
absence of their capital and skill. It is clear too that the rapid growth of Pontianak between
the 1961 and 1971 censuses (3.8 percent per annum, or nearly twice the provincial growth
rate) is largely due to this forced refugee migration from the city's hinterland.
The focus here has been on conflict induced migration but other forms of forced
migration have also occurred in post independence Indonesia.

There have been many

examples of people being forced to migrate because of the fear or onset of a natural or
physical disaster. Indonesia has more than 70 active volcanoes which have caused calamities
at an average of around once every three years causing 140,000 recorded deaths (Awanohara,
1982:42). The number of people displaced by volcanic eruptions, however, has been many
times greater. The 1963 eruption of Mt. Agung in Bali displaced 85,000 people, while that of
Mt. Galunggung in West Java during 1982 has forced some 30,000 people to migrate to

36

Indonesia's Outer Islands and placed some 300,000 more residents at risk of evacuation
(Awanohara, 1982:42-3).

Lucardie's (1979) study of the people of Makian in Maluku

province of Indonesia has documented the repeated abandonment of settlements after volcanic
eruptions and for fear of new eruptions over the last 300 years. His study focuses especially
upon a government scheme to gradually evacuate the entire 16,000 resident population of the
island because vulcanologists have predicted the eventual eruption of Makian's volcano which
would lead to a disaster comparable to that of the evisceration of Krakatoa in 1883. Lucardie
(1979) documents the opposition of residents of Makian to the government program to
resettle them on another island to escape from the risk of the eruption of the island volcano.
Other more or less forced migrations initiated by government policy decisions are also of
relevance here. The construction of large scale developments like dams usually involves
substantial forced displacements of the residents. The building of large dams like Jatiluhur
near Jakarta have resulted in substantial forced migration.

LINKS BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION


It is apparent that forced migration played a significant role in Indonesias history.
Indeed for substantial periods of its history it has been more significant than voluntary
movement although, as was explained at the outset, separation of voluntary and forced
mobility is often difficult. Moreover, it is clear that forced migration is influential in shaping
subsequent voluntary mobility. Many conflict and physical disaster induced population flows
led to the establishment, when normalcy returned to the areas of former insecurity, of chain
migration linkages between areas which acted as conduits for later migration. Hence, the
imprint of these forced movements is still evident in contemporary migration flows. Forced
flows usually set up linkages between the place left behind and the place of refuge along
which information, money, goods and people can and do move. The latter is of particular
importance in several of the Indonesian cases we have considered in this paper. For example,

37

the massive refugee flows to the city of Bandung initiated by the Darul Islam rebellion in the
1950s were important in encouraging the growth and expansion of that city. However, this
impact should not just be measured in terms of the large number of refugees which remained
behind in the city since it is clear that once security returned chain migration of permanent
and temporary movers continued to Bandung from the former Darul Islam areas and that the
pioneers of these chains were refugees. Another example in Indonesia is that of migration
from Bali to the Outer Islands of Indonesia, especially Sulawesi and Southern Sumatra. The
first major transmigration from Bali occurred due to the forced evacuation of people displaced
by the eruption of Mt. Agung volcano in 1963. However, the success of these transmigrants
has greatly encouraged family and friends to follow them. The information flow, money
remittances, visits etc., which have followed the forced migration, have led to the
establishment of a much larger spontaneous flow. Linetons (1975a and b) study of Bugis
migration from South Sulawesi to the east coast of Sumatra produced similar findings.
In addition, the role of forced migrations in lifting the level of urbanization in Indonesia
should also be stressed. This is especially true in that much of this impetus was given during
the early postwar period when the levels of urbanization were very low in most countries of
the region. In Indonesia, flows of internally displaced persons played a major part in the
massive growth during the 1950s of cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Makassar and a host of
smaller fast growing cities. This makes it all the more surprising that such mobility gets little
if any attention in research relating to rural urban migration and urbanization not only in
Indonesia but Southeast Asia more generally. As Goodman and Franks (1975:199) point out,
"Despite the fact that internal wars have occurred in every country in Southeast
Asia, most research on urbanization does not assess either the relative importance
of internal warfare for overall rates of migration or the impact such warfare has on
the pattern of urban growth."

38

It is apparent therefore that an historical understanding is important in seeking to


understand contemporary migration patterns. This is not however restricted to taking into
account past patterns of forced migration. Historical forces, which have influenced patterns
of inequality, have been an important influence upon contemporary patterns of forced
migration within Indonesia. Once example of such historical forces lies in the inequalities
influencing migration, which European colonialism created between different groups in the
East Indies and their continuation during the independence era.

For example with the

expansion of colonial exploitation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there
was a corresponding increase in the demand for soldiers, police and low-level administrative
staff recruited from among the indigenous population. In this recruiting the Dutch had a
policy of concentrating on particular Outer Island ethnic groups, especially those who had
been Christianised. Fisher (1964:265) points out that the educational and medical work
carried out by Christian missionaries was invariably superior to that provided by the colonial
government, so that the ethnic groups influenced by missionaries were, from the government's
viewpoint, far better equipped and trained to take up skilled and semiskilled employment in
the colonial service than were Javanese, Malays and other Muslim groups. Accordingly many
of these Christians emigrated out of their home areas to various parts of the archipelago in
which European investment and colonial activity were concentrated.
In particular, Menadonese (from North Sulawesi) have gone to Java as officials,
clerks and accountants, and have provided a major component in the Netherlands
Indies army in modern times, while Ambonese (from Maluku), besides serving in
the army, have found employment as teachers and hospital attendants all over the
country, and many Bataks have gone as clerks and overseers to the Cultuurgebied
(Plantations in Northeast Sumatra) and as domestic servants to Batavia (Fisher,
1964:265).

39

Although the numbers of people involved in this type of migration were by no means as
large as, for example, the contract coolie movements, they had a significant impact in the
homelands of the groups involved.

In 1930, for example, only 87.5 percent of ethnic

Minahassans from north Sulawesi were living in the Minahassan heartland (Jones, 1977:35). .
Some 5.5 percent of them were living in Java, where they formed a significant minority group
in colonial cities such as Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung. Gooszen (1997:36-37) points out
those who entered the colonial service as soldiers, officials or household servants were
integrated into the Western culture which tended to alleviate them from their countrymen.
There have been echo effects of these policies in contemporary migrations. Firstly,
there was a significant number of Moluccans from Ambon who remained loyal to the Dutch
and upon independence went to the Netherlands and their children remain a significant
minority group there. It could be too that antipathies between these groups and some other
Indonesian groups could have been influenced by their different colonial histories. Similarly,
the privileged position given to the Chinese in the colonial political-economic structure
undoubtedly has been an element in shaping anti-Chinese conflict in independent Indonesia.
Moreover, it is argued elsewhere (Hugo, 2002) that understanding historical migrations
in Indonesia are an important influence upon contemporary conflict-induced migrations. The
causes of these movements are complex but often involve perceptions that one group has
greater access to resources than others. These inequalities, perceived and real, result in
tensions between ethnic and religious groups which usually have an element of newcomers
versus longer established residents in them. The 'newcomers' in many cases are not first
generation immigrants but are descendants of earlier generations of immigrants who are of a
different ethnicity and/or religion of the local population. Accordingly, an interesting
dimension of the forced movements is that in many cases they represent a reversal of earlier
flows, although many of those involved may never have lived in their area of origin and may
not retain linkages with family in that area.

40

The most discussed group among the 'newcomers' who have been made IDPs are former
transmigrants from Java and their descendants that have been forced to leave and enter local
refugee camps or return to the area that they or their ancestors had left several decades ago.
The areas where transmigrants have come into conflict with local populations have been in
West and Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and West Papua. These are areas where a
predominantly Muslim transmigrant population from Java has come into contact with a local
Christian or animist local population. However, in all cases it is far too simplistic to portray
the conflict as a Muslim-Christian confrontation.

There have been elements of the

newcomers being seen as intruders and given privileges denied longstanding residents, coastal
dwellers versus inlanders, ethnolinguistic differences mixed with long simmering local
resentments released with the national political transformations and the activities of criminal
groups. The transmigrant:local clashes have perhaps been greatest in Kalimantan where the
predominantly Madurese newcomers have been settling in West and Central Kalimantan, both
under the auspices of the transmigration program and spontaneously, for a century.
Hence, while the conflict induced IDPs are often depicted as an example of the effects
of clashes between Islam and Christianity, this is greatly oversimplifying a complex and
deeply concerning situation. The linkages between past migrations leading to a confrontation
of groups with vastly different economies, cultures, modes of livelihood, ethnicities,
languages as well as religions and the contemporary IDP movements, however, are strong.

CONCLUSION
Indonesia has been a region of conflict during the colonial and post colonial periods
under the influence of processes of nation building, internal and international power struggles,
colonial and neo-colonial forces, changing class, cultural, ethnic and religious relationships.
These conflicts and Indonesias proneness to physical disasters have meant that forced
migrations have been significant throughout its history. However, this mobility has not

41

attracted the attention of researchers and this has been a significant oversight. As Olson
(1979) has argued, persuasively, the examination of internal displacement of population in a
developing country context can have significant implications for economic development and
social change within those nations. A comprehensive understanding of these movements can
inform the development and elaboration of population redistribution strategies which seek to
redistribute population to achieve more equitable distributions of access to resources and
wealth. It is crucial that the neglect of historical forced migrations is not duplicated in
contemporary Indonesia where the element of force is an important and complex element in
population mobility.

42

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