PHILO AND KINDNESS TOWARDS ANIMALS

(DE VIRTUTIBUS 125-147)

KATELL BERTHELOT
The Studia Philonica Annual 14 (2002), 48-65.

[p. 48]
Philos De Virtutibus is divided into four parts, each one being dedicated to a virtue
( or courage, or humaneness, or repentance, or
nobility). The treatise on is by far the longest (123 paragraphs out of 227).
Its apologetic dimension has not been emphasized very often, probably because it was
considered to be obvious. Paragraph 1411 in particular shows that Philo was aware of the
accusations of misanthropy () directed against the Jews, accusations which
developed with particular intensity during the first century B.C.E. and the first century C.E.2
Before I tackle the specific issue at hand here, I have to summarize briefly the structure of
Philos demonstration concerning the of Moses and the Mosaic Law. First,
Philo tries to demonstrate Moses by describing several episodes from his
life, showing how much he was concerned with the welfare of his people, and did not
behave as a tyrant. Then Philo tries to demonstrate that the Law of Moses stipulates that the
Jewish people should behave in a humane way towards all human beings. Interestingly
enough, he doesnt quote Leviticus 19:18 (you shall love your neighbour as yourself);
actually, there is ample evidence that Philo understood neighbour as referring to Jews
only.3
His strategy consists in dividing the category humankind into several contrasting pairs:
Jews and foreigners, freemen and slaves, friends and enemies. [...] not only towards [...]
enemies
[p. 49]
towards Jews, but also towards such categories as foreigners, enemies and slaves. But he
does not stop there. On the contrary, he pursues his argument by saying that the
in the Law of Moses may be shown through the fair treatment ( )
of animals and plants which it requires.4
Leaving aside the case of plants (which only backs up the point made with animals), I will
focus on the case of animals, which is described in 125 to 147. Although the number of
paragraphs is not the only factor which allows us to determine the importance of an
argument, one should note that the section on animals and plants is neatly as long as the
section dealing with human beings. This insistence is rather peculiar. My purpose will thus
be to answer two questions: 1) Why does Philo introduce this section? What is its apologetic
function? 2) What kind of influences are at work here? What is the basis of the argument?
1

Where Philo writes: After this, let those clever libellers continue, if they can, to accuse the nation of
misanthropy and charge the laws with enjoining unsociable and unfriendly practices, when these laws so
clearly extend their compassion to flocks and herds, and our people through the instructions of the law learn
from their earliest years to correct any wilfulness of souls to gentle behaviour. All translations of Philos and
Josephus texts are from the LCL edition.
2
On the history of ancient antijudaism, see I. Heinemann, Antisemitismus, PW Suppl. V (1931) 3-43, and
more recently P. Schfer, Judeophobia. Attitudes towards the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge - London
1997), and Z. Yavetz, Judenfeindschaft in der Antike (Mnchen 1997).
3
See G. Dautzenberg, Mt 5:43 und die antike Tradition von der jdischen Misanthropie, in L. Schenke (ed.)
Studien zum Matthasevangelium: Festschrift fr Wilhelm Pesch (Stuttgart 1988) 76.
4
See the table at the end of this article.

1. Fair treatment () towards animals in the Law of Moses

After concluding that the Law of Moses prescribes towards all human
beings, Philo writes:
But he [Moses] carries on the idea of moderation and gentleness ( ) to the sphere of
irrational animals, and grants them, too, a draught of goodness ( ), as from a sweet and grateful
spring (125).

Then Philo evokes several Mosaic laws such as Lv 22:27 (which forbids separating the newborn bull, sheep or goat from its mother for at least seven days) (126-133). Lv 22:28 (not
killing the mother and her offspring on the same day)5 (134-140), Dt 14:21b (not boiling
a kid in its mothers milk) (142-144).6 Dt 25:4 (Thou shall not muzzle an ox when it
treads out
[p. 50]
the grain) (145), or Dt 22:10 (Thou shall not plow with an ox and an ass together)
(146-147).
These laws not only serve to show the gentleness of the Mosaic Law towards animals (the
first and obvious purpose for which they are mentioned here), but are used by Philo in order
to convince his readers that the Mosaic Law advocates towards all human
beings. In order to reach this goal, Philo mainly uses two kinds of arguments: the first one
may be described as an analogical argument, and the second one is a a minori ad maius
argument, from the lesser to the greater.
2. The analogical argument
When he refers to the law of Dt 22:10, Philo explains that it is inappropriate to put the ass
and the ox together because the former is weaker than the latter, and the ass would suffer
discomfort and oppression from the ox (146). He also mentions the fact that the ox is
pure, whereas the ass is impure, and it is not fitting to put together creatures so alien in
status. Having given these two reasons for the prohibition referred to in Dt 22:10, Philo
adds that the Law
did not despise the weakness of the unclean, nor permit the clean to employ strength rather than justice.
Those whose souls have ears can almost hear it speaking plainly in a voice loud and insistent that we should do
5
According to G. Alon, the ban on sacrifying a pregnant female animal is not to be found in the Torah, but
corresponds to an oral tradition (see On Philos Halakha, in Jews, Judaism and the Classical World
(Jerusalem 1977) 89-137; see especially 90, n. 5).
6
Philo gets indignant about the fact that one uses the mothers milk, while everywhere there are herds of
cattle innumerable, which are milked every day by cow-herds, goat-herds and shepherds (...), and one could
thus perfectly use another kind of milk to cook (see 144). Here Philo does not speak from the kashruts point
of view, but only from a moral point of view; cooking a young animal in its mothers milk seems very cruel
to him; in Philos perspective, it clearly shows a lack of compassion. But one should not deduce from Philos
apparent concession at the beginning of 144 (If indeed anyone thinks good to boil flesh in milk, let him do
so without cruelty and keeping clear of impiety) that it did not represent in Philos eyes a violation of the
dietary rules of the Torah. In the De Virtutibus, he is adressing both Jews and non-Jews. Nevertheless, S.
Belkin thinks that the Jews in the diaspora did not know at that time the halakhic prescription forbidding the
mixture of meat and milk in general, and that it explains [p. 50] Philos position in that passage; see Philo and
the Oral Law. The Philonic Interpretation of Biblical Law in Relation to the Palestinian Halakah (Cambridge
1940) 22.

no wrongs to men of other nations, if we can accuse them of nothing save the difference of race (
) which is no matter for accusation, since nothing which is neither vice nor springs from vice is
liable to any impeachment (147).

In a symbolic way, the pure ox represents the Jewish people and the impure ass the men of
other nations, whose foreign nature should not be despised, and who should be treated
justly.7 F.H. Colson writes in the footnotes of the LCL edition that Philo probably had the
proselytes in mind, but I see no reason to understand the men of other nations as
proselytes, since Philo considers the latter as people who have become citizens of the
Mosaic politeia and underlines several times in his work that [...] 8 9
[p. 51]
doesnt merely advocate justice towards proselytes, but warm love.10 Actually, what Philo
writes in this context echoes what is written in the Letter of Aristeas, that the Law
commands the Jews to act justly towards all men.11 But the biblical verse to which Philo
refers could actually have been considered as offensive for non-Jews (since they are
compared to an impure ass): but it doesnt seem that Philo was aware of the pejorative
connotation of the comparison.
Anyway, this example shows how Philo could refer to a law concerning animals in order
to show that the Mosaic Law does not incite Jews to hate non-Jews, but stipulates that they
should treat them with justice, in a way which could also be described as humane.
3. The a minori ad maius argument
This second argument implies no pejorative connotation; and here the idea of
(and not merely justice) is clearly expressed.
Philo uses this argument in the middle of the section devoted to the laws concerning
animals and, more precisely, in connection with the law which forbids killing the mother
goat and her kid on the same day. He considers that the pagan lawgivers who ordered that
the execution of a pregnant woman sentenced to death should be deferred until the childs
birth, were inspired by this Mosaic principle. But he insists on the superiority of Moses
over these lawgivers by underlying that:
These decrees of theirs apply to human beings, but Moses rising to a further height extended the duty of fair
treatment ( ) even to irrational animals, so that by practising on creature of dissimilar kind (
) we may show humanity in a far fuller measure to beings of like kind to ourselves, abstaining
from strokes and counter-strokes to vex each other, and not hoarding our personal good things as treasures,
but throwing them into the common stock for all in every place, as for kinsmen and brothers by nature
(140).12

In the parallel passage of the De Specialibus Legibus (4.205-206), Philos argument is similar, but the ass
represents analogically the meanly born, whom the judges should not set at a disadvantage in their
judgements, when the point under examination is not concerned with birth but with good and bad conduct. So
here the emphasis is more on social than on ethnical differences.
8
See for example Virt. 219.
9
See for example Virt. 179.
10
In 104 Philo clearly writes that one should love the proselyte as oneself; this can be logically deduced from
Lv 19:34 LXX, which refers to the [...]
11
(...) (...)
(Letter of Aristeas 168; see also 147).
12
...
.

[p. 52]
Philos reasoning is clear: if the Law enjoins to behave fairly towards irrational animals
with whom according to the Stoics as well as Philos perspective human beings have no
obligation to act justly,13 than all the more so towards human beings. To adopt a kind
attitude towards animals represents a form of training (the verb to exercise, train
is used) for the practice of towards human beings. Moreover, the
opposition between the genus of the animals (defined as irrational beings) and the human
race (defined as a rational genus, which shares in the logos)14 allows Philo to conclude that
the advocated by the Law of Moses is truly universal, directed towards
human beings in general and not only Jews.
Philo clearly considered that this argument was particularly convincing, since immediately
after the above-mentioned paragraph he protests against the accusations of misanthropy
directed against the Jews, claiming them to be inept. How can one accuse the Jews of
misanthropy, Philo writes, when these laws so clearly extend their compassion to flocks
and herds (...) (141). This is a clear reference to the a minori ad maius argument which
he has just quoted.
It even seems to me that this argument is Philos trump card in his discussion of Jewish
. It closes the whole demonstration (which is only followed by some final
considerations about the damage caused by arrogance and self-importance, and the necessity
for the virtous man to make those who surround him virtuous too). The section dealing with
the laws for plants (where Philo refers to Dt 20:19 the interdiction on destroying the
vegetation of the enemys country (150-154) , and to Lv 19:23-24 at the time of
settling in the land, one should not pluck the fruits until the fourth year, and one should first
dedicate them to God (155-159) ) backs up the point made in the section dealing with the
laws for animals, and ends up with the same a minori ad maius argument.
You see how great is the kindness and graciousness ( ) which he shows, and how
liberally he has spread it on every kind, first of men, even though it

[p. 53]
be an alien or an enemy, then of irrational animals, even though they be unclean, and last of all of sown crops
and also trees. For he who has first learnt the lesson of fairness () in dealing with the unconscious
forms of existence will not offend against any that are endued with animal life ( ), and he who does
not set himself to molest the animal creation is trained by implication to extend his care to reasonable beings
( ) (160).

This paragraph is only a further development of the idea expressed in 140. But here we
find a more complete presentation of the hierarchy of created beings: plants are inferior to
The words have been added according to the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, who
quotes or paraphrases nearly this entire section of the De Virtutibus in the Stromata. Clement of Alexandria is
actually our more ancient witness to the text of the De Virtutibus; see A. van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria
and his Use of Philo in the [p. 52]Stromateis: An Early Christian Reshaping of a Jewish Model (Leiden 1988)
94. (Stromata II.93.4). On the value of Clements testimony for a textually critical approach of the De
Virtutibus, see D.T. Runia, Underneath Cohn and Colson; the Text of Philos De Virtutibus, in E.H.
Lovering (ed.), SBL 1991 Seminar Papers (Atlanta 1991) 116-134 (see especially 124-127); this article has
been reprinted in Philo and the Greek Fathers: A Collection of Papers, S 32 (Leiden 1995) 77-101.
13
See Philos Alexander and A. Terians analysis of that treatise in Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus (Chico
1981) 46-53, which has also been translated into French in the introduction to the corresponding volume in the
French edition of Philos works (PAPM), 62-72 (see especially 70).
14
See Spec. 4.14 (kinship between human beings and God is founded on the with the logos).

animals, since they possess no phantasia, no capacity to have a mental image of the reality
around them; animals are inferior to human beings because they do not possess the logos,
the ability to think in a rational way. One can notice that Philo uses the word
when plants and animals are concerned, while he speaks of in the context of
relationships between human beings.15
The section on in the De Virtutibus is not the only example of Philos use
of the a minori ad maius argument. In connection with the shabbatical laws (dealing with
the seventh years rest of the earth and the jubilee as well as the shabbat itself), Philo
writes:
men should absolutely abstain from putting any oppressive burden upon anyone. For if the different parts of
the earth which cannot share in any sensations of pain or pleasure yet have to be given respite, how much
more must this be the case with men who not only possess the sense which is common also to the irrational
animals but even the special gift of reason through which the painful feelings caused by toil and labour stamp
and record themselves in mental pictures more vivid than mere sensation ! (Spec. 2.89).16

Here Philo refers once more to the hierarchy between earth/plants, animals and human
beings. According to Philo, who uses here an a minori ad maius argument, one of the
reasons justifying the law on the the seventh years rest of the earth is that it teaches us that
we must give some rest to human beings too. Going a little bit further, he adds that it also
teaches us to be fair in the collecting of taxes, and not to act with cruelty
(Spec. 2.93). This is then opposed to and (see the end of
93). This is not surprising since in Hellenistic literature is often associated with
. Philo further accuses tax-collectors of being cruel and inhuman and of
having rooted out from their souls all
[p. 54]
kindly and humane feelings ( ), in complete
opposition to the Jewish laws, which have relieved even the land from its yearly tolls and
provided it with a rest and respite (96). Once more, the a minori ad maius argument
underlies Philos reasoning.
These examples are enough to show that the a minori ad maius argument is an important
rhetorical tool in Philos demonstration of the humane character of the Mosaic laws,17
especially when he has to prove that these laws stipulate that one must behave in a humane
way towards all human beings.18
One has now to deal with the origin of the a minori ad maius argument used by Philo. If
one takes into account the fact that the principle a minori ad maius was well-known in

15

See P. Borgens remark: When Philo in Virt. 125-60 moves on to animals and plants, he holds to the
proper meaning of , as love to men, and does not identify Moses regulations for mans
treatment of animals or mans handling of plants as in themselves to be . But mans attitude
towards animals and plants should be one of moderation and gentleness (Philo of Alexandria. An Exegete for
his Time (Leiden 1997) 259).
16
Compare to Spec. 4.218.
17
Philo uses it in other contexts too; see the examples given by I. Heinemann in Philons griechische und
jdische Bildung.
18
In his article A Rhetorical Analysis of Philos De Virtutibus (Euphrosune 21 (1993) 9-28), Manuel
Alexandre seems to percieve the importance of the argument pertaining to animals and plants (he especially
insists on the case of plants, and compares that passage with Mt 6:30; see p. 24), but he does not explain what
the nature and the function of the argument are; his very technical analysis of the De Virtutibus rhetorics does
not really help to clarify the meaning of the text.

rabbinic tradition under the name of qal vahomer,19 it first seems rather logical to suppose
that Philo was acquainted with this exegetical technique. Nevertheless, D. Daube for
example has suggested that both Hillel and Cicero drew their knowledge of the argument
from the Hellenistic schools of rhetoric. He would therefore consider that Philos use of the
argument would be better explained by his acquaintance with the Hellenistic culture in
Alexandria than by the influence of Palestinian Judaism. In any case, one has to
acknowledge that the idea of a minori ad maius was very widespread in the ancient world,
and did not constitute a specifically Jewish argument. As far as the formulation of this
argument in De Virtutibus 140 is concerned, I would like to argue that Philo gained
inspiration from a Greek tradition which may have a Pythagorean origin.
4. A Pythagorean argument?
In the third book of his De Abstinentia, Porphyry tries to refute the Stoic thesis according to
which human beings do not have any obligation to be just to animals, since justice can only
exist within a community whose
[p. 55]
members are rational beings (like gods and humans).20 The Stoics argued that if one
extended the concept of justice in order to include animals, this would destroy the very idea
of justice. But according to Porphyry, to refuse to extend the concept of justice to animals
only preserves pleasure, which is the enemy of justice (3.26.5). He continues
demonstrating his point in the following terms:
Surely it is obvious that justice is increased by abstinence? One who abstains from all animate creatures
( ), even those that do not make a social contract with him (
), will abstain all the more from harm to his own kind (
). The friend of the genus ( ), will not hate the species (
), but rather, inasmuch as the genus of animals ( ) is bigger, the more
he will safeguard justice towards the part and towards that which is appropriate to him (3.26.6).21

stands for those who belong to the human race () and are bound together in
a . But they also belong to a bigger genos, the genos of living beings to which the
third sentence refers. Within this more general genos human beings represent one species
(). Logically, ones affection for the whole genos should also be beneficial to the
species which are contained in it. A few paragraphs before, Porphyry also defends the idea
(already formulated by Theophrastus) that there is a bond of kinship between human beings
and animals,22 but here this idea is not evoked, and not even necessary for the argument to
be valid. It is enough to include humans and animals in the common genos of living beings.

19

As Belkin for example thinks (op. cit. (n.6) 32-33). This expression refers to one of the seven hermeneutic
rules attributed to Hillel. I. Heinemann underlines that this concept can also be found in Hellenistic
jurisprudence (according to Diodorus 1.77.6, it could even be one of the juridical principles used in the
Egyptian legal system); see op. cit. (n.17) 493, n.6.
20
In the Stoa, the idea that there is no relation of justice between human beings and animals is already
attributed to Chrysippus; see Cicero, Fin. 3.67 (SVF 3.371); Diogenes Laertius 7.129 (SVF 3.367).
21
Translation by G. Clark, Porphyry. On Abstinence from Killing Animals (Ithaca 2000) 97.
22
See De Abstinentia 3.25.3-4. Theophrastus (if we suppose that Porphyry is quoting him literally) uses the
terms and for the relationship between human beings and animals.

In another passage, Porphyry goes as far as including plants in the category of living beings
toward which one should behave with justice.23
All this reminds us very much of Philos De Virtutibus. Could it be that Philo and
Porphyry shared the same sources, although being chronologically quite far from each
other? Actually, the a minori ad maius argument used by Porphyry in the third book of the
De Abstinentia can be found again in a passage of the second book (2.31.3), where
Porphyry writes that if people refrain from killing animals
[p. 56]
[...] between human beings). There is a difference between the terminology used in the
passage previously mentioned and the one used in this passage (human beings now form a
tribe within the group made up of by all living creatures), but the argument remains
identical to the one expressed in the third book of Porphyrys De Abstinentia or in the De
Virtutibus. Now some scholars have argued that in this passage Theophrastus is Porphyrys
most probably source. According to J. Bouffartigues analysis in his introduction to Book
2,24 the whole passage from 26.1 to 32.2 should be attributed to Theophrastus, except 31.2,
which he considers a Porphyrian addition. Porphyry himself acknowledges in 32.3, when
he concludes the section borrowed from Theophrastus, that he both shortened and enriched
Theophrastus text, and it is difficult to state to which extent Porphyry reformulates
Theophrasus ideas, as well as to determine when he develops his own personal thought.
Paragraph 31.5, where Empedocles is referred to, is probably due to Porphyry. In 31.2 the
focus on the issue of food (instead of sacrifice), as well as the reference to pollution,
indicate that this paragraph has a Porphyrian origin, too. As a matter of fact, most scholars
have chosen not to include 31.2-6 in their lists of the Theophrastean fragments of the treaty
On Piety.25
Thus, it seems preferable not to affirm too quickly, on the sole basis of Porphyrys De
Abstinentia, that the a minori ad maius argument can be attributed to Theophrastus. Other
texts indicate that the origin of the argument may go back to a Pythagorean tradition, and
that the transmission of these ideas was made in Pythagorean circles rather than in
Peripatetic circles.
In Porphyrys De Abstinentia, the a minori ad maius argument which we are studying is
once more mentioned in a passage which is a quite accurate quotation from Plutarchs treaty
De sollertia animalium (960 a), where the argument is clearly connected to the
Pythagoreans.26 The same argument can also be found in the De esu carnium, where
Plutarch declares that it is
[p. 57]
healthy to abstain from meat, because although it fortifies the body, it weakens the soul; and
then he exclaims:

23

3.27.2: (...) someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other
animals, is more like god; and if extension to plants is possible, he preserves the image even more
(translation by G. Clark, op. cit. (n.21) 98-99).
24
See the French edition (C.U.F.) of the De Abstinentia (Paris 1979) 25-26 and 29.
25
See J. Bernays, Theophrastos Schrift ber Frmmigkeit (Berlin 1866); W. Ptscher, Theophrastos
, Leiden 1964.
26
(...) It was in this way, on the contrary, that the Pythagoreans, to inculcate humanity and compassion,
made a practice of kindness to animals ( ); for habituation has a strange power to
lead men onward by a gradual familiarization of the feelings (Plutarch, De sollertia animalium 959 f 960 a,
translation by W. C. Helmbold, LCL, 323-325).

But apart from these considerations, do you not find here a wonderful means of training in love for
humankind ()? Who could wrong a human being when he found himself so gently and
humanely ( ) disposed toward creatures which are foreign to him () and do
not belong to the same species ()? (De esu carnium 996 a, translation by W.C. Helmbold, LCL,
557-559, slightly modified).

Here Plutarch speaks about behaving in a humane way even towards animals, whereas Philo
in De Virtutibus 140 prefers to speak about toward animals: but apart from that
minor difference, the argument is exactly the same. Now Plutarch can hardly depend on
Philo.27 Taking into account the above-mentioned passage from the De sollertia animalium,
where Plutarch explicitly refers to the Pythagoreans, and the fact that the De esu carnium is
a book written during Plutarchs youth, when he was strongly influenced by Pythagorism, I
would rather conclude that Plutarch relies on a Pythagorean tradition, which is probably
Philo s source of inspiration, too.
Another text tends to support this conclusion. In his Epistles (Epistulae Morales), Seneca
mentions a very interesting word of Sotion, a Pythagorean philosopher of Augustus time.28
According to Sotion, Q. Sextius the Ancient,29 who was a Stoic trained in Pythagorism,30
believed that man had enough sustenance without resorting to blood, and that a habit of cruelty is
formed whenever butchery is practiced for pleasure. Moreover, he thought we should curtail the
sources of our luxury; he argued that a varied diet was contrary to the laws of health, and was
unsuited to our constitutions. Pythagoras, on the other hand, held that all beings were interrelated,
and that there was a system of exchange between souls which transmigrated from one bodily shape into
another. (Epistle 108.18-19, translation by K. M. Gummere, LCL, p. 241).

Now the idea that a habit of cruelty is formed whenever butchery is practiced for pleasure
is also mentioned in Plutarchs De sollertia animalium (959 f), where it is followed by its
logical positive counterpart, the idea that
[p. 58]
kindness towards animals (as opposed to butchery) leads to humaneness and compassion (as
opposed to cruelty).31
Thus, Sotions testimony represents another indication that the argument was well-known
before Philo. It also confirms that this argument was connected to Pythagorean circles. At
the same time, we see that the idea was welcomed by some Stoics who had contacts with
these circles (lets remember that Seneca himself had been convinced by Pythagorean ideas
in his youth, and had practised vegetarianism).32 From a purely Stoic point of view,
abstinence from meat could be considered positively, as a measure promoting temperance

27

I do not intend to say that Plutarch could not have known about Philos work at all. But in this specific
context, where Plutarch himself explicitly writes that he is referring to a Pythagorean tradition, Philo cannot
be Plutarchs source.
28
See F. Prchac, La date de naissance de Snque, REL 12 (1934) 360-375.
29
He was a contemporary of Caesar, and refused the honors which the latter wanted to award to him (see
Epistulae Morales 98.13; see also 64 and 73). Seneca read him and appreciated him very much (see 59.7: I
am currently reading Sextius: (with his) keen mind, this philosopher expounds Roman morals in Greek
language).
30
See Epistulae Morales, LCL vol.1, 412.
31
See n. 26.
32
See Epist. 108.

and self-control.33 But it is hardly by chance that a Stoic philosopher chose to refer himself
to our a minori ad maius argument and not to the other one evoked by Sotion in connection
to Pythagoras, the doctrine of the transmigration of the souls. As mentioned above,
according to the Stoics animals were not rational beings, and there was neither kinship nor
justice between human beings and animals. Thanks to the De Animalibus, we know that
Philo supported the point of view of the Stoics.34 This treatise also shows us that Philo was
well-acquainted with the arguments in favour of animals which one also finds in Plutarchs
or Porphyrys works. It is therefore not surprising to discover that Philo knew the a minori
ad maius argument; and like the Stoics, he could use it without contradicting Jewish
teaching concerning the relationship between human beings and animals.
5. The a minori ad maius argument and other Jewish references to laws concerning animals
In the Hypothetica, a clearly apologetic work partly preserved by Eusebius, Philo once
again argues that the Mosaic Law contains several humane precepts, comparable to the
Greek unwritten laws associated with the
[p. 59]
figure of Buzyges.35 In that context he mentions the fact that there must be no maltreatment
of animals contrary to what is appointed by God or even by a law-giver; no destroying of
their seed nor defrauding of their offspring (7.7). In another paragraph (7.9) he adds that
beside the important laws that he has just mentioned, one also finds little things of casual
occurence which are also supposed to illustrate the humane character of the Law: Do not
render desolate the nesting home of birds or make the appeals of animals of none effect
when they seem to fly to you for help as they sometime do.36 (...) These things are of
nothing worth, you may say, yet great is the law which ordains them and ever watchful is
the care which it demands. Philo certainly refers here to the biblical prohibition to take
from a nest both the eggs and the mother bird (Dt 22:6). But he also introduces a concept
which is not to be found in Jewish literature before him, that of animals which one should
welcome and protect as if they were suppliants. A. Terian has suggested that Philo

33

R. Sorabji considers that there was an ascetic stream in the Stoa, which prescribed vegetarianism: one of its
representatives would have been Musonius Rufus (see Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the
Western Debate (New York 1993) 125 and n. 22).
34
On these ideas in Philos work, see P. Borgen, Mans Sovereignty over Animals and Nature according to
Philo of Alexandria, in T. Fornberg and D. Hellholm (edd.), Texts and Contexts (Oslo 1995) 369-389. As A.
Terian pointed out, Philos agreement with Stoic ideas fundamentally derives from his Biblical and Jewish
culture. The creation story in Genesis 1-2 justifies the domination of animals by human beings, and one of the
traditional exegesis of Gn 1:26 consists in interpreting the creation of human beings in the image of God in
terms of sovereignty over all the other creatures (see A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus, Studies
in Hellenistic Judaism 1 (Chico, California 1981) 46-53, as well as his introduction to the Alexander, PAPM
36, 62-72).
35
Such as: to give water or fire to those who ask for it, to show the way to the traveller, to bury the dead, and
so on. See Hypoth. 7.6-8, concluding with Philos exclamation: What need in heavens name have we of your
Buzyges and his precepts?. See also J. Bernays fundamental article, Philons Hypothetika und die
Verwnschungen des Buzyges in Athen, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen (Berlin 1885), vol.1, 262-282. In the
first century C.E., the precepts associated with Buzyges were considered as the concrete expression of
or humanitas. As a consequence, it is clear that Philo is trying to show that Jewish laws are
humane; but in this section the word [...]
36
[...]

actually refers to the biblical law forbidding to kill impure birds (Lv 11:13-19 and Dt 14:1120).37
He also interprets what Philo writes in Anim. 2238 as referring to this biblical law. But in
that passage the speaker is Alexander, Philos renegade nephew whose ideas on animals
were similar to the ones expressed in Plutarchs and Porphyrys works. And what he says,
as Terian himself makes clear in note 12, shows that he is influenced by Plato much more
than by biblical traditions.39 A close parallel to the idea expressed in the Hypothetica and the
De Animalibus may also be found, as I. Lvy already noticed, in a Pythagorean
which forbids one to touch and to sacrifice white cocks, for the reason that they are
suppliants.40 Diogenes Laertius writes: Another of his precepts was not to eat white cocks,
as
[p. 60]
being sacred to the Month and wearing suppliant garb (8.34).41 If we can rely on Diogenes
late testimony (whose source is not clearly identified) and if it reflects an ancient tradition,
the very idea of considering an animal as a suppliant may have a Pythagorean origin.
Obviously, this hypothesis is all the more interesting as we have seen that Philo was using
another Pythagorean tradition in the passage of the De Virtutibus pertaining to animals.42
The reference to Dt 22:6 and especially the fact that Philo mentions it as being among the
least among the commandments, reminds us of later rabbinic texts dealing with the same
verse. According to Deut. Rabbah 6:2, the weightiest of the commandments is to honour
ones parents, while the least weighty is Dt 22:6; but the fact that their observance is linked
to the same blessing (that thy days may be long, Ex 20:12) shows that the least weighty of
the commandments has to be observed just as the most important one (in other words, all
the commandments of the Torah should be observed with great care). It is interesting to
note that the importance attributed to Dt 22:6 in this rabbinic text is connected to the
exegetical method of [...], and has nothing to do with Philos apologetic use of the verse.43
Now one should also underline that in Hypoth. 7.9, there is no explicit a minori ad maius
argument. The fact that Philo refers to several important written and unwritten laws
showing the humane character of the Jewish laws, and then to one of the less [...] On the
other hand, in view of Philos use of the a minori ad maius argument in
the De Virtutibus in a similar context, one may suggest that there also is an implicit a minori
ad maius argument at work in the Hypothetica.44 Especially, one could argue
37

See Some Stock Arguments for the Magnanimity of the Law in Hellenistic Jewish Apologetics, Jewish
Law Association Studies 1 (1985) 141-149 (see 143-144 in particular).
38
Speaking of the swallow or house martin, Alexander says: Fleeing from the menace of vultures, it appelas
to man first of all and seeks shelter like those who take refuge in temples.
39
See Plato, Leges 814b.
40
See I. Lvy, Sur quelques points de contact entre le Contre Apion et luvre de Philon dAlexandrie, in
Recherches essniennes et pythagoriciennes (Genve Paris 1965) 51-56.
41
, (...). Compare with Iamblichus
Protrepticus 21, n17, which forbids to eat and sacrifice cocks, but he does not explicitly present
them as suppliants.
42
One should also note that in his defense of the Jewish dietary laws, the author of the Letter of Aristeas
inspires himself from the Pythagorean symbolic interpretation of the akousmata. But he does not use any kind
of a minori ad maius argument. See my article Linterprtation symbolique des lois alimentaires dans la
Lettre dAriste: une influence pythagoricienne, JJS 52/2 (2001) 253-268.
43
For other rabbinic references to Dt 22:6, see b. Kidd. 39b, b. Hullin 142a, Tos. Hullin 10:16 (512).
44
Although he did not draw any comparison between the Hypothetica and the De Virtutibus, S. Belkin
considered that there was an implicit a minori ad maius argument at work in the Hypothetica. See The
Alexandrian Source for Contra Apionem II, JQR 27 (1936-37) 7.

[p. 61]
that when Philo claims that Jewish laws prescribe welcoming animals who behave like
suppliants, he has an implicit qal vahomer in mind, implying that Jewish laws prescribe
welcoming and respecting human suppliants. It would mean that Jewish laws are in
agreement with a Greek fundamental value; as a matter of fact, this is exactly the point
Philo wants to make in this whole section of the Hypothetica.
In the last part of the Against Apion, Josephus undertakes to defend the Mosaic Law
against the accusations which Apollonius Molon, Apion and other writers formulated
against the Jews. One of these accusations was misanthropy, as 2.148 makes clear. Among
other arguments mentioned by Josephus to counter this accusation, one finds the following
reasoning:
So thorough a lesson has he given us in gentleness and humanity that he does not overlook even the brute
beasts, authorizing their use only in accordance with the Law, and forbidding all other employment of them.
Creatures which take refuge in our houses like suppliants we are forbidden to kill. He would not suffer us to
take the parent birds with their young, and bade us even in an enemys country to spare and not to kill the
beasts employed in labour45 (2.213).46

To the best of my knowledge, this is the only Jewish text apart from Philos De Virtutibus
which states that the Mosaic commandments pertaining to animals illustrate the
of the Mosaic legislation. There is no explicit a minori ad maius argument in
Josephus text, but one could argue that it is implicit, especially since Josephus seems to be
directly dependent on Philo. We know that Josephus knew about Philo and his work,47 and
it should not surprise us that while writing a book where he had to defend Judaism against
charges of misanthropy, [...]
[p. 62]
Philo to be Josephus direct source.48 What Josephus writes about the fact that Moses
authorized the use of animals only in accordance with the Law closely parallels what Philo
writes in Hypoth. 7.7: There must be no maltreatment of animals contrary to what is
appointed by God or even by a law-giver. This affirmation in CA 2.213 is then followed by
the two example Philo gives in Hypoth. 7.9, the reference to Dt 22:6 and the idea that
animals who behave like suppliants should not be killed but protected. This combination of
arguments is unique to Philo and Josephus. Furthermore, the context in which it occurs and
45

[...]
[...]
47
[...] Motzo, B. R. Le [p. 62] di Filone, Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di
Torino 47 (1911) 556-573; P. Krger, Philo und Josephus als Apologeten des Judentums (Leipzig 1906) 5160; I. Hienemann, op. cit. (n. 17) 530 and n. 1; I. Lvy, La lgende de Pythagore de Grce en Palestine
(Paris 1927) 211-212; T. Reinach, Contre Apion (Paris 1972) 83, n. 1; E. Kamlah, Frmmigkeit und Tugens.
Die Gesetzesapologie des Josephus in C. Apion 2, 145-295, in O. Betz, K. Haacker and M. Hengel (edd.),
Josephus-Studien. Untersuchungen zu Josephus, dem antiken Judentum und dem Neuen Testament (Gttingen
1974) 220, n. 3; A. Terian, art. cit. (n. [...]
48
Several scholars have reached this conclusion; see S. Rappaport, Agada und Exegese bei Flavius Josephus
(Wien 1930) 18; S. Belkin, art. cit. (n. 44); A. Momigliano, Un apologia del giudaismo: il Contro Apione di
Flavio Giuseppe, in Pagine Ebraiche (Torino 1987) 63-71, and Intorno al Contro Apione, in Quinto
contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome 1975) 768-769; L. Troiani, Commento
storico al Contro Apione di Giuseppe (Pisa 1977) 56-60 (with caution); T. Rajak, The Against Apion and the
Continuities in Josephus Political Thought, in S. N. Mason (ed.) Understanding Josephus: Seven
Perspectives (Sheffield 1998) 227. But the traditional opinion among scholars is that Philo and Josephus shared
a common source; see P. Wendland, Le [...]
46

the function of the argumentation are in both cases identical: the context is the defense of
the Mosaic Law against charges of misanthropy, with a specific reference to Buzyges
precepts, and [...] It is not the case in other Jewish texts referring to Dt 22:6, such as
Pseudo-Phocylides Sentences, which I shall analyze infra.
Another reason to consider Josephus as directly indebted to Philo can be deduced from a
more general examination of the texts where Josephus speaks about the of
the Mosaic Law.49 Strangely enough, there are only four passages in Josephus work which
fit into this category. Apart from the very general statement in CA 2.146 that the Law
promotes
[p. 63]
humaneness, Josephus mentions it only once in AJ (1.24) and twice in CA (2.213
and 2.261). In these three instances, one can show that there is a connection between what
Josephus writes and some of Philos works. In AJ 1.24, Josephus is influenced by Philos
De Opificio Mundi.50 In CA 2.213, as we have seen, he is most probably influenced by
Philos De Virtutibus and Hypothetica. [...] It seems that Josephus, contrary to Philo, was
first reluctant to speak about the [...] Pseudo-Phocylides Sentences,51 a pseudepigraphic
didactic poem which belongs to the genre of sapiential writings, and was probably written at
the end of the first century B.C.E. or during the first century C.E.52 Among other moral
teachings, one reads in vv.83-85:
Never be a relentless creditor to a poor man.
One should not take all the birds from a nest at the same time.
But leave the mother-bird behind, in order to get young from her again.53

As W. T. Wilson underlines, the point common to v.83 and to vv.84-85 (as well as to v.91)
concerns the necessity of exercising restraint when taking something from others.54 In note
100 (p.102) he adds: Perhaps vv.84-85 is [...]
[p. 64]
not pressure the poor man too much. This reasoning corresponds to a very practical
approach to ones interest as a creditor, but does not reflect any kind of humanistic concern.
It could eventually show the reasonable character of the Mosaic legislation, but not its
. In a more general way, the Sentences can not be apologetic at all, since
Pseudo-Phocylides never explicitly presents his ethics as Jewish.55 We are thus in a
completely different context than those of Philos and Josephus works. Even if in the
Sentences, one finds other commandments also referred to by Philo and Josephus, such as
the obligation to bury the dead,56 they are not combined together as they are in the Hypoth.
49

[...]
See G.E. Sterling, [...] The Studia Philonica Annual 11 (1999) 27-29.
51
See for example P.W. Van der Horst, who writes: it is an established fact that Pseudo-Phocylides drew
upon a source which was also used by Philo and Josephus, and that writings like those of these three authors
were, in turn, sources for some New Testament authors (Pseudo-Phocylides and the New Testament, ZNW
69 (1978) 197).
52
[...] Sentences (Paris 1986) lxi-lxvi; P.W. Van der Horst, Pseudo-Phocylides Revisited, JSPS 3 (1988) 15;
J.J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (Edinburgh 1998) 158.
53
Translation by P.W. Van der Horst, The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides (Leiden 1978) 92-93.
54
See The Mysteries of Righteousness. The Literary Composition and Genre of the Sentences of PseudoPhocylides (Tbingen 1994) 102.
55
[...]
56
[...]
50

and the CA, where they are mentioned among other Buzygian precepts, and have a precise
apologetic function. As a consequence, Pseudo-Phocylides can be said to have a general
ethical background in common with Philo and Josephus, but his work displays no clear
parallel to their works, and has a completely different scope and meaning.
In conclusion, one can say in the first place that Philos reference to the humane character
of the Mosaic laws concerning animals and plants is a crucial part of Philos demonstration
that the Law of Moses does not advocate hating non-Jews; secondly, that Philo took his
main argument from a Pythagorean tradition which was also well-known in Stoic circles,
and which helped him circumvent the difficulty of finding an unambiguous biblical text
advocating kindness to all human beings. The a minori ad maius argument used by Philo
fitted very well into Jewish tradition, but the fact remains that Philo was the first Jewish
writer to explicitly use a qal vahomer argument based on the laws pertaining to animals to
show the philanthropic character of the Law to a non-Jewish audience.
CNRS, Paris
[p. 65]
The philanthrpia of the Mosaic laws according to the De Virtutibus:
Towards fellow Jews

( (101))
Towards foreigners (proselytes)
Towards enemies
Towards slaves
Towards animals
Towards plants

82-101
102-108
109-120
121-124
125-147
148-160