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ingly, duringthe years of this transitionera itself, the years also of Steward'sprofessional
career, the analytic view that developed, and that he himself did much to shape and
express, was largely dualistic in perspective as relationshipswere recognized between
select cultural practicesand particularbiological and environmentalfactors. In Steward's
work this dualism was patterned in severalways. Aspects of culture could be combined
with interpretationsof the naturalenvironmentto create a single paradigmwith which to
analyze a given society, as in the concept of "culturalecology." As a corollary to this
approach we find a reworkingof the holistic concept of culture to provide a contrast
between the environmentallyrelated "culturalcore" and additionalnonadaptive"secondary" cultural features. Environmentalfactors and cultural factors also could be applied
in different degrees to differing types of society, as in Steward'sview of nativeor tribal
peoples as primarilysubject to ecological requirementswhile complex societies were more
stronglyshapedby purely cultural(nonbiological,nonenvironmental)features.
In accordance with the general anthropologicalclimate of opinion of the postwar
years, however, Steward's dualism had distinct leaningstoward the cultural side of the
equation; which is to say, the usefulness of concepts of ecology and environmentlay in
what they could tell about the nature of culture. Although the attraction of Steward's
concept of cultural ecology when it was first presentedlay in its emphasison opening the
concept of the superorganicto include noncultural,ecological perspectives,his intellectual roots in more traditionalculturalposturesof the disciplineremainedvisible throughout
his career (see Hatch 1973b:118-123). His acceptance of the heuristicvalue of a concept
of culture in general was clearly a legacy of his groundingin Boasiananthropologyas
interpretedby A. L. Kroeberand Robert Lowie, underwhose guidanceStewardpursued
graduate study at Berkeley in the late 1920s. Indeed, a really adequate analysis of
Steward'svariouscontributions also requiresassessmentof the work of both Lowie and
Kroeber.1Many of Steward'sbasic assumptionsregardingquestions of typology and the
classificationof cultures, the validity of cross-culturalcomparisons,the natureof "causation," and the character of "primitive"societies and complex civilizationswere firmly
rooted in Kroeber'sand Lowie's anthropology. Steward refinedand redirectedthe Kroeberian and Lowien positions on these matters and, most significantly, gave them (or
portions of them) a theoretical unity through concepts of environment and ecology
stimulated in part by his college major in zoology and geology and the influence of the
cultural geographerCarl Sauerat Berkeley.In so doing, Stewardsuccessfullytransformed
a number of prewar historical-particularisttopics into major concerns of a more functionalist postwaranthropology.
At the present time, however, when ecological studies of one type or anotherare the
focus of so much anthropological interest and work, Steward's pioneering efforts to
introduce environmentalfactors into the study of society are ratherinfrequentlycited in
specific ecological case studies, though prominently referredto in theoretical essays and
general surveys of the field. This situation, which was remarkedupon by Shimkin a
decade ago (1964:12-16), may reflect Steward'sstrong emphasison culture as the more
importantelement of his ecological equations. In recent years there has been a discernible
trend in anthropological circles toward narrowing the concept of culture "so that it
includes less and reveals more" (Keesing 1974:73). One finds among anthropological
ecologists in particularconsiderable variation in the degree to which the concept of
culture is used in contemporaryecological studies and uncertaintyas to its place, if any,
as a heuristic device in ecological analyses (see Damas 1969:180-183; Vayda and Rappaport 1968; and Anderson 1973). The tendency amongthe "new ecologists" is to delete a
concept of culture from ecological analyses as much as possible, or, perhapsbetter said,
to merge culture with environment so that distinctions between the two blur and fade
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and tend to disappear.Those aspectsof humanlife styles of interest to ecological anthropologists are reduced instead to another form of adaptive animal behavior and man
becomes another organismfilling a niche within the ecosystem. Culture,in turn, becomes
the referent primarily for the symbolic side of human behavior (see Anderson 1973:
212-215; Vayda and Rappaport1968:492-497; Keesing1974:74-77; Moore 1974).
Steward himself voiced concern for the implications of this current trend toward
interpretingthe behavior of mankindas relativelyrather than absolutely (qualitatively)
different from other animals (see Manners1973:895-896). He made it quite clear that, in
his opinion, man was distinctive as a culture-bearinganimal and, more importantly, the
study of his lifeways, includinghis materialneeds, was basicallya study of culture. "Man
enters the ecological scene . . . not merely as another organismwhich is related to other
organismsin terms of his physical characteristics.He introduces the superorganicfactor
of culture which also affects and is affected by the total web of life" (Steward1955:31).
"The heuristic value of the ecological viewpoint is to conceptualizenonculturalphenomena that are relevantto processes of cultural evolution" (p. 44). Furthermore,while the
human capacity for culture and the resultantculturalevolution rest on biologicalpreconditions, the fact that cultural evolution is an extension of biologicalevolution "does not
imply that culturalevolution follows the principlesof biologicalevolution" (p. 69).
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These biological principles could be modified and elaborated,but they could rarely be
supersededor eliminated in the tribal world where purely culturological(sociopolitical)
principleshad not taken complete command.
Furthermore,it was in this milieu, where humansocieties were still strongly responsive
to "natural"principles,that culturalecology operatedmost effectively, for the particular
variations of family or kinship organization depended on the relationship between a
particulartechnology and environmentalfactors (pp. 5, 7, 76, 78). One also senses in this
perspective an implication that to Steward the concept of cultural ecology may have
carried, or was associated with, a more personalphilosophicalview of the essential simplicity or "naturalness"of unhamperednative life.
In complex states, however, Steward felt that culturalecology became "increasingly
subsidiaryto other processes that underliestate formation" (p.79), essentially,it appears,
becauseno single nation-wideculturalcore of ecological relationships(or, for that matter,
of any genuinely shared nationalbehavioror NationalCharacter)could be identified (pp.
87-99, 247, 262-263). Societies based on internal specialization and hereditarysocial
classes are coordinated by new principles of integration that are explicitly political in
nature and thus are entirely cultural. Significantfeaturesof peoples' lives are regimented
now by state controls, as power over people rather than over naturalresourcesbecomes
the focus of social organization.Although the family and householdmay continue to be
organizedat least in part by biological principlesof age and sex, these are suppressedor
overshadowedas the local community becomes part of a largersociety. Similarly,the
interactionwith the naturalenvironmentis modified by the largersocial context (pp. 53,
146, 147, 249).
The organizationand operation of complex societies in effect mirrorsthe influenceof
"man's creative capacity." This distinctly cultural ability is expressedin scientific knowledge, state administration,religiousand aesthetic developments,and the applicationof
"reason"in elaboratingtechnologicaldevelopments.These, in turn, providegreaterfreedom from environmental pressures and permit a wider range of latitude for various
sociopoliticaltypes (pp. 52, 80-81; Steward1955:40-42).
Ecological and political processesare, we realizenow, intimately interdependent.Elucidation of this point has come most strongly from analysis of the critical field of
centralized nonstate societies (rank societies, or chiefdoms) that bridgeegalitarianand
state organizationsin important respects and that were becomingrecognizedas a distinct
cultural "type" during the postwar years. Steward anticipated a number of definitive
ecological and political characteristicsof these societies but failed to grasp their functional relationship.He recognizedthat such societies were organizedlargely on the basis
of class and integratedby religiouspriest-templecomplexes. He noted that "special and
delimited" powers were accorded chiefs and other influential persons in particularcontexts. He recognizedthe correlationof chiefdoms with areasof rich and diverse natural
resourcescapable of producing"surpluses"above the needs of the immediatefamily. But
he attributed the existence and the operation of centralized authority to "historical
influences" that introducedclass structuringto a particularsociety and to diffused patterns of warfare and religious cults that introduced the priests who came to assume
secularcontrols (pp. 49, 138, 142; Steward 1949:673, 674). Alternatively,Stewardconsidered such societies to fall within the category of states, which, in his interpretation,
became a very broad classification of centralized societies including "chiefdoms" and
"statelets"as well as "sultanates,empiresand other varieties"(p. 140).
Steward appreciated that functional relationshipsexisted between the sociopolitical
and the economic-ecological,most notably in the context of the influence of complex
states on local communities, in which national interests and directivesaffected the adap-
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tations of the local group and the region. This theme appearsin a numberof his works,
includingthe Puerto Rican project and analyses of contact experiences of variousnative
American groups. He also expressed this perspective more broadly in the ratherselect
context of Wittfogelian-inspiredcorrelations concerning population and community
growth, managerialcontrol of irrigationagriculture,and the developmentof early civilizations in the Middle East, Asia, and native America (1955:178-209). In light of the
findings of later research Steward eventually recognized the need for revision in the
specifics of Wittfogel'shyphothesis and in his own original"trialformulation,"although
he cautioned subsequent researchersnot to err in the opposite direction by discounting
too greatly the importance of water control in their investigationsof the complex processes underlyingthe originsand operationsof ancient states (pp. 87-99, 106, 129).
diversity redux
In actuality, of course, the significanceof Steward'sinitial study of complex societies
(irrigationcivilizations) lay not so much in the matterof economic-politicalconjunctions
but in its strong exemplification of his particularconcept of "multilinearevolution.",3
The utility of the "method and theory" of cultural ecology lay in the elucidation of
examples of multilinearevolution in terms of parallelecological adaptations.This is to
say (again) that in Steward'sview the anthropologicalsignificanceof the naturalenvironment and those elements of culture directly involvedwith its exploitation (culturalcore)
lay in the greater ease and clarity with which functional order could be analytically
perceivedthere (see Murphy1970), in contrast to the seemingly particularisticwelter of
most of the other social, political, and religious traits composing a given society or
appearingcross-culturally.Indeed, the lesson to be learnedfrom the consistent and "relevant" cross-culturalregularities(similarities)in ecological adaptation that were revealed
by cases of multilinearevolution was that they seemingly stood significantlyoutside the
vicissitudes of a random and fortuitous historical particularismthat formed the basis of
Boasian classifications based on culturally unique differences. Through recognition of
similar ecological adaptations or cultural cores constituting cross-culturallysignificant
social "types," which revealeda limited numberof forms of "socioculturalintegration,"
the nature of culture emerged instead as controlled diversity (p. 152; Steward1955:5-6,
43-63, 87-92, 1940:669, 1973:46-52).
Yet recognition of the diversity of cultural traits and expressionshas tended to maintain the upper hand, both for Stewardand for us. As is well known, Steward'sown sense
of the specificity of history and the general emphasis on cultural diversificationand
uniquenessstill characteristicof much of the anthropologicaldiscipline in which he was
trained (and expressed in his own acceptance of "secondaryfeatures") made his claims
for cross-culturalcomparabilitiesratherhesitant (pp. 70-72). Although he recognizedthat
"there are typological similarities between societies of the differing cultural traditions
representedin the majorworld areas,"he felt that considerablecomparativestudy would
be necessary to isolate the definitive "dynamicsof developmentalprocess and of structural-functionaltypes" and that the varietiesof culturespast and presentdiffer so greatly
that cross-culturalregularitieswould be valid only in a limited sense (pp. 230, 236).4
This cautionary stance has been applaudedby some and criticized by others, for the
problemsof typology and classification,of order and diversity, are still with us, indeed,
will always be with us (see Lehman1964). Admittedly, the underlyingclimate of opinion
has changed somewhat.The fundamentalperspectiveof an empiricallyrecognizableorder
in cultural materialsand operationsthat Stewardchampionedand that lay at the heartof
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Steward's work on Carrier"acculturation"and his analysis with Murphyof the contact experiences of the Mundurucuand Montagnaiswere not written with this problem
directly in mind.7 But by emphasizingthe wider realm of state influence as part of the
environmentto which adaptationsare effected and showing how even the earliest,most
marginalcontact may begin to influence local social organizations,they point in the right
direction.8 Steward'semphasison adaptationsover time also encouragesconsiderationof
how change continuously affects structureand organization.As a corollary,the developing social forms appear not just as a melange of old and new traits but as emergent
"types" of society evidencing cross-culturalregularitiesin the developmentallines they
take (see also Steward'spenetratingdiscussion of these issuesas they affected the Indian
New Deal, pp. 333-346).
It is unfortunatethat Steward'srecognitionof the importanceof "social adaptation"
has not been more influential among ecological anthropologists. Although the social
environmentmay be recognizedin general in ecological studies, analysis tends to center
on the relationshipbetween a population and its physical and/or biotic context. All too
often the conceptual frameworkis not extended to include interactionswith other sociocultural units (see Sahlins 1977:217). This omission may be most serioussince the social
environmentmay be relativelyless stable than the biologicaland physicalworld and has a
high probability of initiating adjustments in the ecological system and of determining
change (see Segraves1975:115, note 3).
The contributions of the Carrierstudies and the Tapper and Trapperanalysis are
attributableto Steward'srecognitionof the relevanceof culturehistory to anthropological enquiries. It was his general opinion that multilinearevolution "is inevitably concerned also with historical reconstruction"(1955:18). This perspective,though essential
to concern with process and change, is neglected by many contemporaryethnologists
who persist in subscribingat least in practice to the misguidedcontrastof science versus
history. The issue is a continuation of the problemthat bedeviledBoasiananthropology,
that is, how to order accurate ethnographicdata into ethnologically useful categories,
how to recognize structuralforms and processes, not only in the traits characteristicof
existing cultures but also in the details of past historical particularsrevealedby written
records and the memory of aged informants.The Boasianemphasison data control by
direct observationand participationthroughfieldworkstill constitutes the heartof ethnological research,which, as a result,continues to assumea stronglysynchronicperspective.
Insightsinto processes producingsuccessionsof forms, which requirea diachronicdimension in research methods, have been difficult to achieve largely because of unsolved
problemsof data control. Consequently,historicalperspectivesare still all too frequently
summarizedin an introductory chapter or concluding appendix on culture contact and
then largelyignoredin the study itself.
Yet the problem reflects a more fundamental dilemma. Although the difficulties of
interpreting live human behavior in its infinite variety are easily as great as those of
historical research,the vagariesof humanbehaviorare consideredmore readilyovercome
by anthropologistscum fieldworkersthan are the problemsof imperfecthistoricalrecords
by anthropologistscum ethnohistorians.Since most anthropologistsare almost as poorly
trained for ethnographicfieldwork as they are for historical research,this position in
favor of participant-observationobviously representsnot only a methodologicalstance
but also an ideological support for anthropology as a discipline, comparable in this
respect to the traditionalconcept of culture. Historicalinterests,in contrast,still bearas
ideological taint the methodological problemsassociated with nineteenth century evolutionism.
One of Steward's strengths as an anthropologist lay in his ability to combine, on
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occasion, ethnographic particularsof fieldwork with those derived from historical research.Although as a professionalhe was hesitant to extend his cross-culturalfindings too
broadly, his personalvision, like that of his mentors, Lowie and Kroeber,encompasseda
certain breadth of human affairs, a strong sense of time, and an appreciation of the
ongoing stream of cultures through time. Steward also sought to strengthenthe methodological value of this perspectivefor anthropology by advocatingthe concept of cultural
ecology as a means to bring ethnologically significantorder to the chaotic diversity of
documentarydata.
He focused this researchstrategemon early historic periods, viewing them as vantage
points from which to move, via documentary researchand historic archaeology, both
forward through the contact era to contemporaryethnographyand backwardinto the
prehistoricpast. Steward'sespousal of the so-called "direct historicalapproach"to archaeology is recognizedas a definitive statement on the value of coordinatingarchaeological, ethnohistoric, and ethnographicmethods so as to place the study of prehistoricand
historic peoples into a common processualframework(pp. 201-214). Equallyimportant,
though less widely recognized, is his cognizance that "historicalacculturationstudies,"
also utilizing documentaryevidenceand historic archaeology,can place historicallydocumented peoples and ethnographicallyknown societies into a common ethnologicalframework, thereby elucidatingaspects of culture changeand adaptationin ethnology (p. 205).
Steward committed himself to the major anthropological issues of his day and
advancedthem significantly. He did not solve them, but it is unreasonableto expect that
he might have. Most of the problems Steward grappled with are issues that are never
settled. They are instead redefined, to be approachedeither with greaterrigor or from
distinctly different perspectives. At the present time both directions are observableas
contemporaryanthropologistseither continue to investigatethe potential of the concept
of cultural ecology, in the processemphasizingparticularlyits culturalfocus (see Murphy
1970) or turn to the perspectiveof the "new ecology" that places man firmly within the
naturalor physical environment. Both lines of investigationhave furtheredthe study of
particular issues of interest to Steward and both have benefited from his thought.
Steward himself recognized that, while many of the specific directivesgenerated in the
course of a scholarlylife will be found wantingunder laterexamination,such light as may
be cast on problems will, nonetheless, illuminate the steps of successors.He wrote, "a
scholar's contributions to science should be judged more by the stimulus he gives to
research-by the natureof the problemshe raisesand the interestshe creates-than by the
enduring qualities of his provisionalhypotheses." (p. 87). These words were penned in
appreciationof his friend and colleague, KarlWittfogel.They stand equally well as tribute
to julian Stewardhimself.
notes
'Steward himself has contributed to this goal with his interpretation of Kroeber's life and works.
See Steward 1973; also Murphy 1972; Harris 1968:337-341.
2The contrast between the cultural core and secondary features is closely related, although with
different emphasis, to Kroeber's contrast between reality culture and value culture. See Hatch 1973b:
107, 109, 116-117.
3According to Murphy 1972:75, Steward adopted this term from Lowie, who originally coined it
in reference to his argument for multiple lines of development of social organization. The context of
parallel processes intended by Steward in his use of this phrase was initially impressed upon him by
Wittfogel's work on hydraulic societies.
'Steward viewed his classificatory devices primarily as tools for area research and as correctives to
the traditional delineation of culture areas, which he criticized as merely a descriptive catch-all device
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for the collection of data and a technique that perpetuated the emphasis on cultural differences rather
than providing an "integrating concept" for anthropological analysis of similarities (p. 220; Steward
1955:52, 78-97).
'Admittedly notable efforts have been made in cross-cultural studies by some ecologically minded
anthropologists. See, for example, the studies summarized in Heider 1972:213-21 7.
6This perspective probably increased in American anthropology during the years following World
War II, when American anthropologists began to do fieldwork abroad in countries where disruption of
native lifeways by European colonialism was not as obvious as it was in some portions of North
America.
7 Indeed, some of Steward's ecological analyses have been appropriately criticized for his failure to
consider the possible effects of earlier state contact on social organization (see Service 1971b:46-98).
8These studies also emphasize again Steward's recognition of the unavoidable cultural element in
ecological anthropology, for the environmental resources such as rubber trees and beaver pelts utilized
in these cases became appropriate for local exploitation only when identified as such by contact agents
of the state.
references cited
Anderson, James N.
1973 Ecological Anthropology and Anthropological Ecology. In Handbook of Social and Cultural
Anthropology. John J. Honigmann, Ed. Chicago: Rand McNally. pp. 179-239.
Damas, David, Ed.
1969 Contributions to Anthropology: Ecological Essays. National Museums of Canada, Bulletin
230. Anthropological Series, no. 86. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada.
Diamond, Stanley
1961 Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia University Press.
Fried, Morton H.
1975 The Notion of Tribe. Menlo Park, CA: Cummings.
Goldschmidt, Walter, and Harry Hoijer, Eds.
1970 The Social Anthropology of Latin America: Essays in Honor of Ralph L. Beals. Los Angeles:
Latin American Center, University of California Press.
Harris, Marvin
1968 The Rise of Anthropological Theory. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
Hatch, Elvin
1973a The Growth of Economic, Subsistence, and Ecological Studies in American Anthropology.
Journal of Anthropological Research 29:221-243.
1973b Theories of Man and Culture. New York: Columbia Press.
Heider, Karl G.
1972 Environment, Subsistence, and Society. In Annual Review of Anthropology 1. B. J. Siegel,
Ed. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews. pp. 207-226.
Kaplan, David
1965 The Superorganic: Science or Metaphysics? American Anthropologist 67:958-976.
Keesing, Roger M.
1974 Theories of Culture. In Annual Review of Anthropology 3. B. J. Siegel, Ed. Palo Alto, CA:
Annual Reviews. pp. 73-98.
Kottak, Conrad
1975 Some Thoughts about Links between Materialist, Marxist, and Structural Approaches in
Anthropology. Michigan Discussions in Anthropology 1. Ann Arbor: Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan. pp. 96-108.
Lehman, Frederick K.
1964 Typology and the Classification of Sociocultural Systems. In Process and Pattern in Culture:
Essays in Honor of Julian H. Steward. Robert A. Manners, Ed. Chicago: Aldine. pp. 376-396.
Lowie, Robert H.
1947 Primitive Society. New York: Liveright.
1940 Introduction to Cultural Anthropology. Second Edition. New York: Farrarand Rinehart.
Manners, Robert
1973 Obituary of Julian Haynes Steward. American Anthropologist 75:886-903.
Moore, John H.
1974 The Culture Concept as Ideology. American Ethnologist 1:537-549.
Murphy, Robert F.
1970 Basin Ethnography and Ecological Theory. In Languages and Cultures of Western North
America: Essays in Honor of Sven S. Liljeblad. Earl H. Swanson, Jr., Ed. Pocatello: Idaho State
University Press. pp. 152-171.
1971 The Dialectics of Social Life: Alarms and Excursions in Anthropological Theory. New York:
Basic Books.
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