JUDICIARY

Santiago vs Bautista
FACTS: SERO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his
parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against
the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD
claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become
academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part
of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions,
under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function can be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the
not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine
FELIPE VS LEUTERIO
Facts: On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was held in Naga City. Felipe was one
of the Judges and was the chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the second price.
Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict and alleged that one of the
judges committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board refused to amend their
rd
award, Imperial filed a complaint in court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3 place in the vote,
which makes her score 9 or the First place.
Issue: Whether the RTC may reverse the decision of the board of judges to obtain a new award?
Held: Members of the court sometimes are members of the board of judges in an oratorical contest. But it
is UNWRITTEN in the law that in such contests the decisions of the board of judges be final and cannot

be appealed. The contestants do not have the right to the prizes because theirs is only a privilege to
compete for the prize and did not become a demandable right. The respondent judge erred in his
reasoning that where there is a wrong there is remedy. To quote The flaw in his reasoning lies in the
assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there
was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as
used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a
contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees
or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum
absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different
proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently
or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
FORTICH VS CORONA
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land
from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries
staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in
October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for
the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
C. Corona issued the so-called, politically motivated, win-win resolution on November 7,
1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the win-win resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory,
had any legal effect.
HELD:
No. When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final
and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had
lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office
of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996.
And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious
cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have
been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President
in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become
final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations.
ECHEGARAY VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled
on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that

the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of
the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered
that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.

HELD:
The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of
the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
comform to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the
same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing
the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other
for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

PEOPLE VS MATEO

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10
counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the
CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice
finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does
not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

FABIAN VS DESIERTO

Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects,
and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an
amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted
PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered
that the private respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he
inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent. Deputy Ombudsman who
exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
valid

Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought
through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art.
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

IN RE: MANZANO
Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo
Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential
Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an
abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as
a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any
agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the
work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of
parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its
performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of
executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element
of positive action, of supervision or control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on
Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely
advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences
of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
CONCOM

CSC VS DBM
FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was
P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their no report, no release policy.
Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year
2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBMs policy, no report, no release is constitutional
HELD: DBMs act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed.
Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5
of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined
as an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share
accruing to them from the national coffers.
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a
no report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds
in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on
equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction
established by the Constitution.