2015 Presidential Election in

Sri Lanka: An Initial Forecast

by Dr. Siri Gamage

- on 01/02/2015
As we approach the final week of campaigning for the Presidential election,
the political messages of both coalitions are becoming clearer. So are the
strategies of both coalitions and trends in voter sentiment as revealed
through some surveys and public attendance in political rallies. Defections
from the ruling coalition have dominated the political stage though there
have been some notable defections from the opposition to the government
side also sparingly. As a result of nearly 26 MPS defecting from the ruling
coalition, including those from the SLFP and other parties, the stage is set
for a sharper contest between Rajapakses and the rest who are opposing
them. The emerging trend seems to be for a change in the governance of
Sri Lanka rather than maintaining the status quo. People who I have spoken

to in the country and elsewhere refer to a discernible mood change among

the voters even though some admire the development work accomplished
by the Rajapakses during their rein. They also refer to a greater sense of
frustration among the average folk due to the reported corruption of
politicians, partisan nature of governance, family rule, cost of living
pressures and the disregard for rule of law by those in authority.
One side is arguing for change in the governance style and processes
adopted under the executive presidential system in the midst of charges of
nepotism, corruption, bad governance, and politicisation of institutions
while the other side is arguing for stability and national security against
perceived enemies of the nation, i.e. Western countries and Tamil diaspora
elements. The opposition coalition has been strengthened by the support it
is receiving from a range of minor parties and civic groups while there are
reported signs of considerable erosion of the support base of the ruling
coalition reflected in the well-planned defections of its allies. Early signs of
voter intentions are also starting to creep into the public view via various
sources.
The information of this author is that there is a growing mood for change
in the cities and the countryside. This is based on the sense of injustices
experienced by people in public life, trend toward authoritarianism, and a
whole host of other factors. Instead of voter apathy, a high degree of
enthusiasm among voters including in the countryside has been generated
by the contest for power led by two SLFP stalwarts leading two coalitions.
Will all this translates into a victory by the opposition coalition led by
Maithripala? Or will the incumbent be able to pull out a rabbit out of the hat
in the last week of electioneering against all odds and be able to surprise
everybody? To gain an insight, we ought to reflect on the kind of regime in
place and the changes opposition parties are seeking.
According to Sasanka Perera who reviews a book by Laksiri Jayasuriya on
Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka and the elections, a hybrid regime has been

established after the 2010 Presidential and subsequent parliamentary

elections (The Island January 15, 2013):
Jayasuriya suggests that the 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections
established what he describes as a hybrid regime similar to the models
that have emerged in South East Asian countries such as Singapore and
Malaysia (140; 169). Quoting Levitsky and Way, what Jayasuriya means by
this terminology is a regime that is a mix of authoritarian and democratic
elements where formal democratic processes combine with a strong
incumbent party that seeks to limit the organizational capacity of the
opposition (169). As Jayasuriya further notes, although formal democratic
institutions such as the legal system and the electoral process are
functional and operative, we note, however, that they can be skillfully
manipulated in gaining power and maintaining regime dominance (169).
Perera then states that this observation succinctly places in context the
current political climate in Sri Lanka. The net result of this electoral process
and its manipulation, as suggested by Jayasuriya is the emergence and
consolidation of a veritable one party government where the dominant
party (which in this case is the Rajapaksa-led SLFP government) due to a
large parliamentary majority at its disposal accompanied by a weakened
opposition, gives the government of the day complete access to, and
control of, key state institutions and resources which are used to entrench
the dominant party (168). It is in such a context that the 2015 Presidential
election campaign is being prosecuted by the ruling coalition led by
Rajapakses and the opposition coalition led by Sirisena. Obviously, since the
premature announcement of a new election by the President, things have
changed. The opposition coalition has been strengthened and the ruling
coalition has been weakened by the defections of high profile figures and
provincial activists. Political blunders committed by way of arrogant
behavior in nationally broadcast TV shows and reported attacks on artists

and opposition events and stages can only register negative images of a
government campaigning primarily on external factors rather than the
oppositions main complaint about good governance (yaha palanaya),
corruption, waste, politicization of the judiciary, public service, academia
and even the security forces. Militarisation has been a key issue of
discussion along with the restricted freedoms for the media, and wider
public.
Forecasting
It is not possible to forecast the results of an election without systematically
conducted surveys of voter intentions like in other countries by reputed
polling agencies. Nonetheless, we can analyse the results of previous
elections and set the outcome of such analysis against the developing
context by taking some relevant factors into account.
Thus, one way to forecast the results of forthcoming election is to examine
closely the results of the 2010 Presidential election to see where the
contestants drew their strengths. The results from 2010 election can be
contrasted with politically significant events and issues dominating 2015
election in order to formulate a view about where the trend is? Thus in this
article, I am making an attempt to find out the provinces and districts that
the current President Mahinda Rajapakse had a clear, overwhelming
majority or a reasonable majority while paying attention to the provinces
and districts where the opposition candidate at the time Sarath Fonseka
had a majority. Then on the basis of the currently dominant defections,
other political issues and events, I make a tentative prediction about the
result of the forthcoming election.
In the 2010 elections, Mahinda Rajapakse received a total of 6,015,934
votes (57.88%) and Sarath Fonseka 4,173,185 votes (40.15%). A gap of
about 17.5% points existed between the two. The total polled was 74.49%
(Department of Elections 2010). All other candidates secured between 1.002.00% of total votes only.

Province and District-wise results of the 2010 Presidential election show the
following:
Provinces Where SF was a clear favourite
Eastern Province
Batticaloa (MR 68.93% SF 26.27%)
Digamadulla (MR 47.92% SF 49.94%)
Trincomalee (MR 43.04% SF 54.09%)
(SF was the favourite except in Batticaloa)
Northern Province
Jaffna (MR 24.75% SF 63.84%)
Vanni (MR 27.31% SF 66.86%)
(SF was the clear favourite)
Provinces where MR was a clear favourite
Central Province
Kandy (MR 54.16% SF 43.89%)
Matale (MR 59.74% SF 38.01%)
Nuwara Eliya (MR 43.77% SF 52.14%)
(MR was the favourite except in Nuwara Eliya)
Southern Province
Hambantota (MR 67.21% SF 31.20%)
Matara (MR 65.53% SF 32.86%)
Galle (MR 63.69% SF 34.83%)
(MR was the clear favourite)
Western province
Colombo (MR 52.93% SF 45.90%)
Gampaha (MR 61.66% SF 37.28%)
Kalutara (MR 63.06% SF 35.43%)
(MR was the clear favourite. Colombo was just above the line)
North Western province
Kurunegala (MR 63.08% SF 35.46%)

Puttalam (MR 58.70% SF 39.59%)

(MR was the clear favourite)
North Central Province
Anuradhapura (MR 66.32% SF 31.94%)
Polonnaruwa (MR 64.92% SF 33.62%)
(MR was the clear favourite)
Uva Province
Badulla (MR 53.23% SF 44.55%
Monaragala (MR 69.01% SF 29.10%)
(MR was the clear favourite in Monaragala. Just above the line in Badulla)
Sabaragamuwa Province
Ratnapura (MR 63.76% SF 34.36%)
Kegalle (MR 61.80% SF 36.44%)
(MR was the clear favourite)
The districts where MR had a marginal showing (i.e. above 50 but below 60)
were Kandy, Matale, Colombo, Puttalam, and Badulla. In short, MR polled
relatively well in 5 districts. However, in Nuwara Eliya MR polled well below
50%.
Districts where MR had a clear and overwhelming majority (i.e. above 60%)
were Hambantota, Matara, Galle in the Southern province, Gampaha and
Kalutara in the Western province, Kurunegala in North Western Province,
Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa in the North Central province, Monaragala
in the Uva province, and Rathnapura and Kegalle in the Sabaragamuwa
province. In all, 11 districts MR polled very well.
Given these results from the 2010 Presidential elections, and all that has
happened since then in the country in terms of key issues being canvassed
in the election campaign for 2015 as well as the defections from the ruling
party to the opposition and vice versa, a key question to ask is in which of
these districts MR will poll substantially below 50%?
To begin with, it is reasonable to assume that in those 5 districts where he

polled relatively well (i.e. above 50% but below 60%) and in Nuwara Eliya,
the opposition coalition will have a better chance of reaching the goal of
moving above 50%. Added factors such as the defection of Navin
Dissanayake, some Tamil politicians etc. could contribute to this result along
with countrywide dissatisfaction with the regime due to the incumbent
factor and the Rajapakse vs the rest syndrome emerging in the electorate.
Winning by a large majority in these districts by the opposition can also add
substantially to its overall performance in the final countrywide result.
In the 11 districts that MR polled very well in 2010, the battle lines have
been drawn between the ruling coalition and the opposition based on
significant defections from the ruling party to the opposition. For example,
in the Colombo district defections of high profile representatives such as
Rajitha Senarathne, Hirunika Premachandra and others can swing the result
in the oppositions way considerably. In the North Central province, the
defection of Maithripala Sirisena and all those provincial and Pradesheeya
sabha members could have a significant impact on the voter base of MR.
This impact can spill over to surrounding provinces also. In the Eastern
province, the defections of Muslim Congress, and other Muslim politicians
can have a significant impact on the MR voter base. The impact of minor
parties likeJathika Hela Urumaya along with Arjuna and Chandrika factors
can have an impact on Gampaha district, which is considered part of the
Sinhalese Buddhist heartland. In the so-called Dharmapala Belt (suburbs
and districts in greater Colombo), this impact may be more visible. Given
the recent result of the Uva province council elections, it may be within the
reach of the opposition also.
Though there is Sajith Premadasa factor in the Hambantota district, I still
believe that MR will perform very well or in fact very well in districts such as
Hambantota, Matara, and Galle (due to the war hero factor, Rajapakse
factor and Southern development factor), Gampaha (he may still poll above
50% due to Basil factor), North Western Province and the Sabaragamuwa

province. (I am not in a position to forecast the effect of defections and any

province or district related factors that may contribute to a different
election outcome than what is predicted here because of my lack of first
hand knowledge about sub-district level political dynamics). Thus in my
view, MR could be a clear winner in three provinces (Southern, North
Western and Sabaragamuwa). The margin of victory in these three
provinces may contribute substantially to his showing in the final election
result. He may pick up some specific districts from other provinces also.e.g.
Monaragala, Gampaha.
According to this analysis, the provinces where Maithripala Sirisena (MS),
the common candidate, have a clear advantage at this stage seems to be
the Central province, Western province, North Central province, Uva
province, Eastern and Northern province. All in all, 6 provinces. However, he
may not gain a clear majority in some districts within them, e.g. Gampaha.
Given this scenario, the common candidate seems to have the upper hand
at this stage simply due to the significance of a series of defections,
formation of a broad coalition of parties and groups, the incumbency factor,
and the charges being made of MR government on various key issues that
is cutting into the voter imagination even though the government
controlled media seems to be working overtime to justify the continuation
of current regime. A factor that needs to be included in this scenario is the
extent of resources available to the ruling coalition for its election
propaganda and the use of state resources and personnel as reported in the
media recently. These can change the trends in voter sentiment as well as
voting in the final analysis. For example, if voters in districts where the
opposition candidate has an edge are prevented from voting by the use of
indirect force, this can seriously dent the anticipated results by the common
candidate in certain districts and polling areas, e.g. Northern Province,
remote polling booths in other districts.
The result from a recent sample survey conducted by two researchers,

including one from Colombo University, suggests a victory for the common
candidate though there is a significant portion of undecided voters at this
stage (see Colombo Telegraph 02.01.2015). They predict 53% for Sirisena
and 44% for Rajapakse. This is in broad correspondence with my own
prediction as mentioned above.
There is also some anecdotal evidence of a mood change in the broader
electorate this time. A village level supporter of Rajapakses in the Southern
Province recently acknowledged that there is a mood for change among
people this time around compared to 2010. He stated that people are
intelligent (buddhimat) though they are being bombarded with election
propaganda. He also admitted that the opposition candidate is being denied
access to public facilities for grounds, meeting halls etc. in the area.
Another person from Kandy province indicated that all the customers who
visit her shop criticise the present regime on various grounds. Some
university educated colleagues who returned from Sri Lanka to Australia
recently acknowledge that there is a mood for change but some believe
voters will also not forget the infrastructure development work by the
Rajapakses. For example, he cited the Colombo-Katunayake expressway
and Colombo-Matara highway. These have shortened travel time between
various locations. Yet these returnees were also concerned about the high
cost of highways and other mega projects as reported by ruling party
insiders who have now defected.
At the conclusion of his review of Jayasuriyas book, Perera says,
In the final analysis, it is clear that at the beginning of electoral politics in
the country and well into the mid 1970s, it was possible to witness a
blossoming of party politics in a bipolar party system (141). However,
the dream of democratic politics that was initiated by the early generations
of Sri Lankan political leaders and achieved up to a point, has been steadily
dismantled since the late 1970s..Within the script of this political tragedy

enacted not only by professional politicians but also by academics,

university vice chancellors, ordinary thugs, religious leaders and many
others, the oligarchic familial politics of the present regime which Jayasuriya
describes well in the last chapter of his book is merely the final and the
most dangerous moment in this downward spiral.
Given the clear signs emerging from across the country during the final
week of campaigning, it is highly probable that the larger electorate has
understood this message during the 2015 Presidential election more than it
did in the 2010 Presidential election.
I invite those with more intimate experience and knowledge about districts
within provinces to expand on this analysis and add more insights so that
we are able to obtain a clear picture about the emerging trend in regard to
whom out of the two SLFP stalwarts may win the Presidential election.
References
Department of Elections 2013. Presidential Election 2013, Official Results.
Colombo. http://www.slelections.gov.lk/presidential2010/AIVOT.html(Access
ed on 2 January 2015).
Gunaruwan, T.A. Jayaweera, D.S. 2015. A Victory for Maithripala is now
Probable: Colombo University Researchers, Colombo Telegraph, January 01,
2015 https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/a-victory-formaithripala-is-now-probable-colombo-university-researchers/(Accessed on
02.01.2015)
Jayasuriya, L. 2012. The Changing Face of Electoral Politics in Sri
Lanka(1994-2010) by Laksiri Jayasuriya. Colombo: Social Scientists
Association, 2012 (second edition).
Perera, S. 2013. Changing Facets of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka, Colombo
Telegraph, January 27
2013https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/changing-facets-ofelectoral-politics-in-sri-lanka/ (accessed on 2nd January 2015)
Perera, S. 2014. Changing Facets of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka (1994-

2010) book review, The Island, January 15,

2013. http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=articledetails&page=article-details&code_title=70444 (accessed on 02.01.2015)
Posted by Thavam