Aidan McGarry-Who Speaks For Roma - Political Representation of A Transnational Minority Community-Continuum (2010)

Who Speaks for Roma?
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Who Speaks for Roma?

Political Representation of a Transnational
Minority Community
Aidan McGarry
2010
The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc
80 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038
The Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd
The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX
www.continuumbooks.com
Copyright 2010 by Aidan McGarry
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publishers.
ISBN: HB: 978-0-8264-2880-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
McGarry, Aidan.
Who speaks for Roma? : political representation of a transnational minority community /
by Aidan McGarry.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-2880-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-8264-2880-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. RomaniesEurope, EasternSocial conditions. 2. RomaniesEurope,
EasternPolitics and government. 3. RomaniesEurope, EasternEthnic identity.
4. Political participationEurope, Eastern. 5. Europe, EasternEthnic relations.
6. Europe, EasternPolitics and government. I. Title.
DX210.M34 2010
323.119149704dc22
2009051367
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India

Printed in the United States of America
For Rowan
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Acknowledgements
List of Acronyms
x
xi
xii
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ROMA IN EUROPE 7

A Passage from India
7
Arrival in Europe
10
Roma and Travellers
12
Persecution and Romanticism
15
O Baro Porrajmos: The Holocaust
20
Roma under Communism
24
Post-communism: Romani Awakening
28
CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND
REPRESENTATION OF ROMA
Objectives, Assumptions and Rationale
Theoretical Basis
Methodological Approach
Mobilization, Political Participation and Representation
Minorities, the Democratic State and International Law
The Roma Social Movement
Determining Legitimacy
33
35
36
38
41
47
49
52
CHAPTER 3 AMBIVALENT DISCOURSE: RIGHTS-BASED

THEORIES ON MINORITIES
Introduction
Rights-based Approaches to Minority Issues
59
59
59
vii
viii
CONTENTS
Minority Rights: Analytical and Cultural Presuppositives

A Rights versus Justice Conception of Minority Protection
Citizenship Rights and Roma
Political Rights and the Pursuit of Representation
Representing People and Representing Interests
Rights versus Interests
Key Concepts
CHAPTER 4 WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA? ORGANIZING
STRUCTURES OF REPRESENTATION
IN ROMANIA
Introduction
Interests of Roma in Romania
lite Representation of Roma
Monopolizing Roma Representation
Localized Legitimacy through Civil Society
Conclusion
Ethnic Mobilization
Political Participation
Interest Articulation
Legitimate Representation
Hypotheses
CHAPTER 5 SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INTEREST
REPRESENTATION IN HUNGARY: A WRONG
STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?
Introduction
Shared Interests of Roma in Hungary
The Minority Self-Government System: Political Participation
in a Cultural Institution
The Needle in the Haystack: lite Romani Representatives
The Absence of Ethnopolitics: Let Sleeping Dogs Lie
Plugging the Hole: Romani Civil Society Organizations
Conclusion
Ethnic Mobilization
Hypotheses
Hungary and Romania Compared
61
63
66
70
72
75
79
83
83
84
89
93
97
101
101
102
103
104
105
109
109
110
114
118
120
122
125
125
126
127
128
129
130
Contents
CHAPTER 6 ROMA REPRESENTATION IN THE

TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT
Introduction
A European Minority
The Transnational Roma Social Movement
Transnational Roma Interests
International Romani Union (IRU)
Roma National Congress (RNC)
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)
Open Society Institute-Roma Participation Programme
(OSI-RPP)
European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF)
Notes on Legitimacy of Transnational Organizing Structures of
Representation
The European Unions Policy on Roma
European Roma Information Oce (ERIO)
Conclusion
Ethnic Mobilization
ix
136
136
137
140
142
143
143
145
145
146
147
148
152
157
157
158
158
159
CONCLUSION
Assessing the Hypotheses
H1: Political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma
representation
H2: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation
in the domestic political context, transnational Romani
activity increases
Contested Ethnic Group Identity and Shared Interests
163
165
Glossary
References
Index
176
178
195
165
168
170
List of Figures and Tables

Figure 2.1 Hypothesis 1: Decentralization increases the
legitimacy of representation structures
40
Figure 2.2 The political participation of Roma in the

domestic political context
46
Table 4.1 Key features of organizing structures of

representation in Romania
100
Table 5.1 Key features of organizing structures of

representation in Hungary
124
Acknowledgements
This book has beneted from critical and constructive engagement from a
number of friends and colleagues. My sincere thanks go to my mentor,
Antje Wiener, whose vigorous critique was matched by valuable insights
and encouragement. My thanks also to David Phinnemore for providing
expertise, particularly on Romania, as well as practical suggestions. The
manuscript in whole or in part has proted from the input from several
friends and colleagues during its gestation including Laura Cashman,
Margaret Hagan, Erhan Iener, Jennifer Jackson-Preece, Thomas Pster,
Cathal McCall, Guido Schwellnus and Diana Schmidt-Pster.
I am grateful to all support sta within the School of Politics and
International Studies and the library sta at Queens University, Belfast for
all their help. My research has been nancially supported by a Department
of Education and Learning Grant, the British International Studies Association Founders Fund Award, the William and Betty MacQuitty Fellowship
and the Romanian Embassy in the UK Language Scholarship.
I am indebted to the many Roma representatives, activists, and advocates who I interviewed over the course of this research. Their insights and
knowledge was generously shared and their hospitality warmly remembered.
A word of thanks too to those academics working on Roma, particularly
the political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists whose research has
laid the foundation for this book.
Special thanks also to Marie-Claire Antoine at Continuum who recognized the value of the book and provided indispensable advice throughout.
Finally, my thanks go to my family for their unwavering support, in
particular my parents, James and Philomena, and to my partner Rowan.
Aidan McGarry
Brighton, 2009
xi
List of Acronyms
CEDIME-SE
CEEC
CoE
DG
DRI
ECRI
ENAR
ERIO
ERPC
ERRC
ERTF
EU
EUMC
FCNM
GT-ROMS
H1
H2
HRW
ICCPR
IRU
MG-S-ROM
MSG
MSzP
NAR
NCCD
NGO
Centre for Documentation and Information on

Minorities in Europe South-Eastern Europe
Central and Eastern European Country
Council of Europe
Directorate General
Department for Inter-Ethnic Relations
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
European Network Against Racism
European Roma Information Oce
European Roma Policy Coalition
European Roma Rights Centre
European Roma and Traveller Forum
European Union
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia
Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities
Working Party on Roma
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 2
Human Rights Watch
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
International Romani Union
Group of Specialists on Roma/Gypsies
Minority Self-Government
Hungarian Socialist Party
National Agency for Roma
National Council for Combating Discrimination
Non-Governmental Organization
xii
List of Acronyms
OSCE
OSCE-ODIHR
OSI
OSI-RPP
PER
RM
RNC
RPPE
RSM
SDP
TAN
UK
UN
UNICEF
USA
xiii
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Oce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
Open Society Institute
Open Society Institute-Roma Participation
Programme
Project on Ethnic Relations
Resource Mobilization
Roma National Congress
Roma Party Pro-Europe
Roma Social Movement
Social Democratic Party
Transnational Advocacy Network
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Childrens Fund
United States of America
Introduction
No other minority community generates such a polarized response as
Roma. On the one hand, Roma signify an intriguing object of fascination
with a unique history and culture, while on the other hand, Roma are
excluded and persecuted wherever they live. While Roma are widely dispersed across the world, they are a European minority, found in every
state on the continent, though located principally in Central and Eastern
Europe. It is estimated that the population of Roma in Europe is between
1012 million, comparable to Greece. Roma are not indigenous and are
thought to have originated from India where they left approximately one
thousand years ago, though their origin and migratory route are contested
due to the lack of written evidence documenting their existence prior to
their arrival in Europe in the thirteenth century. It must be remembered
that Roma are not one homogenous block, they are extremely heterogeneous but they do share one commonality everywhere they reside they are
faced with discrimination and marginalization.
I have always been fascinated by minority communities probably because
of my own experience growing up as a minority that is, in a non-dominant
position in Northern Ireland. For this reason, issues of justice and equality have informed both my research and activism and I became interested
in how minority communities t into societies, particularly how they
dene their needs and articulate their interests. I rst became aware of the
plight of Roma in the 1990s when the international political spotlight xed
on issues of ethnicity in Eastern Europe and the more I learned about
Roma, the more complex their situation revealed itself. They are experiencing explicit discrimination and racism resulting in extreme socio-economic
deprivation and suppression of cultural identity. Exclusion and persecution
characterize the lives of many Roma, much of which is based on stereotypes which construct them as thieves and beggars who are not to be
trusted. I wanted to understand why Roma are treated so badly by various
state agencies as well as by mainstream society but unfortunately to fully
explain this phenomenon was beyond the scope of this book citing their
1
WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?
perceived dierence is too simplistic. For this reason, I focused on one

aspect which at once both explained their situation and oered a means to
rectify it: their political representation, and lack thereof. I am not Romani,
therefore my perspectives and insights are those of an outsiders looking in
but I hope to contribute to the debate through research which is robust,
honest and useful. It is my intention to shed some light on who Roma are
in terms of the political space they occupy because it is through political
structures that the voice of Roma is heard.
There have been various attempts to explain and understand the situation of Roma but these have often failed to fully take account of the
particular heterogeneous quality of this ethnic minority group. Roma are
unlike other ethnic minority groups as they are a transnational minority
without a kin state. Additionally, they are not united along linguistic, religious, familial, occupational and class lines and they are not territorially
concentrated. As ethnicity and ethno-nationalism were embraced by
minority actors across Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, Roma
were increasingly ignored by the state. Most research on minorities has
focused on ethnic conict and resolution but because Roma have never
risen up or used violence, they have been neglected in academic and political discourse.
Issues surrounding minority representation and participation continue
to prompt questions about accommodating diversity in democratic systems.
No state in Europe is ethnically homogeneous despite claims to the contrary and this book argues that acknowledging the value and contribution
of the Romani community creates a rich and textured society. International
organizations, states and societies have had to address those minority
groups, who, due to their ethnic identity and cultural aliations remain
marginalized in public life. Such issues demand greater attention by policymakers which invariably centre on recognition, justice and access to rights.
Representation of Roma has been given increasing credence by states and
international organizations particularly since the collapse of communism
however this attention has thus far failed to capture the subtle dynamics
of this unique minority group. Crucially this raises questions about how
the Romani community has attempted to seize control of their situation
by creating organizing structures of representation in domestic and transnational political contexts. For this reason, I inate the role of the Roma
social movement in order to capture processes of ethnic mobilization and
interest articulation.
Most analyses of Roma have examined their relationship with the state,
discussing various approaches and divergent expectations and usually
Introduction
involve prescriptive analysis and attempts to solve the Roma issue.

According to this problem-solving view minority groups must balance
competing preferences: the desire to be integrated and enjoy equal rights
with other citizens is balanced by the desire to enjoy their ethno-cultural
group characteristics without fear of persecution. In seeking a more just
and equitable society it is therefore necessary to allow certain provisions
for minority groups to access citizenship rights and human rights. From
an academic point of view, Roma fall through the cracks of conventional
theories on minorities which have so far failed to account for this diverse
community; therefore, I attempt to shed light on the political life of Roma
and borrow insights from social movement, citizenship and social constructivist literatures. In order to gain a hold on the domestic and transnational
empirical case studies I employ the key concepts of ethnic mobilization,
political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation.
These concepts act as a prism through which to gain a fuller understanding
of the situation of Roma in domestic and transnational political contexts.
The main puzzle starts from the question: Who speaks for Roma? Given
that they are a dispersed and heterogeneous minority group, we may ask
how do Roma organize themselves in public life? It is posited that any organizing structure of representation remains hollow unless it is vested with
legitimacy, and this legitimacy must come from the Romani community.
However, legitimacy cannot be attained or measured in a positivist sense
thus this book attempts to evaluate the legitimacy claims of domestic
and transnational organizing structures of representation by contextualizing socio-political interactions. This necessitates a broad understanding of
representation and legitimacy because a variety of organizing structures
of representation are created by the Roma social movement including
lite, ethnic political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
advocacy networks and other political fora. In this sense representation
constitutes more than formal state structures such as parliamentary representation and means I must examine organizing structures of representation
which Roma create. These structures are considered as organizing as the
term purposively captures a continuous (in the sense of never conclusively
completed) process involving mutually constitutive interactions between
agency and structure. Legitimacy is thus not conceptualized as an output
category, or something which is earned through political status, but is
conferred by the Romani community itself onto organizing structures of
representation.
This book inquires whether a common ethnic identity is a prerequisite
for legitimate representation. The role of the state, international organizations
and gaje (non-Roma) lite is acknowledged but ultimately downplayed as

the empirical focus centres on how (not why) Roma organize themselves
politically through stalagmite mobilization, that is, societal processes from
below. Roma cannot depend on the benevolent will of majorities which
frequently suppress minority interests therefore they create their own
organizing structures of representation. These organizing structures of
representation are created with reference to the ethnic group identity of
Roma and provide a platform through which Roma can articulate their
shared interests communicating to policy-makers the most pertinent
socio-economic and political interests of the group. In this respect, I examine how the Romani community engages in the gaje-constructed political
world.
I assess the domestic as well as transnational political contexts because
collectively Roma are a transnational minority yet individually they are
citizens of nation states. Only by analysing both domestic and transnational contexts is it possible to fully understand the situation of Roma. The
day-to-day existence of Roma is shaped by relations with the state and
mainstream society and for the most part these encounters are negative
thus it is the responsibility of government to implement eective legislation and policy which improves the lives of Roma. However, particularly
since the 1990s there has been increasing advocacy by Romani lite in
international organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Council
of Europe (CoE), the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) which set standards on minority
protection. The international political context has proved a vital space for
Roma to gain leverage over domestic opposition, articulate their interests,
and improve their socio-economic and political situation. Yet despite
noticeable successes and the creation of transnational organizing structures
of representation, Roma continue to be marginalized in their respective
home states.
Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of Roma in Europe including
when they arrived and the persecution which they faced. This chapter relies
on existing research conducted by historians and anthropologists and
traces the migration of Roma from India approximately one thousand
years ago. Necessarily this overview is highly selective but it is intended to
provide the reader with a foundational understanding of key developments
for the Romani community including: the Holocaust; their situation under
communism; and their experience post-1989. It is argued that a rise in
political consciousness and collective action emerged due to the persecution and marginalization suered by Roma following the collapse of
Introduction
communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 2 introduces the

rationale of the book by highlighting the importance of political participation for Roma including how Roma establish organizing structures of
representation to articulate their interests. Processes of ethnic mobilization
and participation are situated in a broader theoretical discussion of minorities in Europe and how the situation of Roma is unique in that they
constitute a nation without a territory. Political participation is presented
as crucial if Roma are to have a voice in society and ensure that their
interests are taken into account by policy-makers to redress their dire
socio-economic situation. Chapter 3 argues that the academic literature
on minorities focuses on rights, that is, the rights and duties of minority
communities. However, the discussion ends at state policy and legislation
which means that the importance of an interest-based approach is often
ignored. By locating the debate on interests, I examine political processes
and minority community representation. Thus this book asks: what is it
that Roma want, in terms of interests, and how do they express these interests? This requires an analysis of political participation and representation
which the minority rights literature overlooks. Additionally, it is inquired
whether there is a dierence between representing people and representing
interests in the case of Roma.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 comprise the empirical content with Chapter 4
exploring the situation of Roma in Romania. It examines how Romania
has attempted to integrate the interests of minorities, including Roma,
through constitutional provisions and legislation. Through interviews and
document analysis the interests of Roma in Romania are outlined and
evaluated. The chapter details three organizing structures of representation
in Romania in turn: lite; political parties; and civil society organizations
which claim to speak on behalf of Roma, and each organizing structure
of representation is assessed in terms of its activities and legitimacy. This
chapter evaluates the political participation and ethnic mobilization of
Roma in Romania as well as the capacity of organizing structures of representation to articulate interests. Chapter 5 focuses on Hungary and begins
by assessing the minority self-government system in Hungary which is one
of the most progressive minority regimes in Europe. However, the minority
self-government system favours cultural interests, such as language and
education, which are not as relevant for Roma whose interests are primarily socio-economic and political. The interests of Roma are determined
through an analysis of policy documents and interviews. The chapter then
focuses on three organizing structures of representation: lite; political
parties; and civil society organizations and the claims of these structures
to be legitimate representatives of Roma are assessed in turn. It is asked

whether a common ethnic identity is enough to determine legitimate representation and assesses the phenomenon of ethnopolitics. Common
themes and issues with regard to the ethnic mobilization, political participation and interest articulation of Roma in Romania and Hungary are
highlighted and assessed. Chapter 6 provides the nal empirical case-study.
It is argued that Roma are a transnational minority and therefore require
an eective voice at the transnational level. Indeed, the transnational
political context has acted as a receptive environment in which Roma can
advance their claims. This chapter begins with a historical analysis of the
development of Romani activism in the transnational political context and
highlights the role and impact of international NGOs and transnational
advocacy networks. The impact of the EU as an ally of Roma is examined
by focusing on policy developments as well as Romani activism and mobilization based in Brussels; in particular, the role of the European Roma
Information Oce. The conclusion is presented in the nal chapter. It is
argued that the ethnic group identity of Roma is contested which hinders
the creation and development of legitimate organizing structures of representation. The question of Who speaks for Roma? is answered within a
focused discussion on the political representation of minorities and it is
argued that organizing structures of representation in the transnational
political context are less legitimate than domestic representation structures
however they carry more inuence and normative power.
1
Historical Overview of Roma in Europe
A Passage from India
Roma are often described as a people without a history but the truth is that
the story of Roma is a journey which has not been written down, and for
that reason there exists room for speculation and myth. It is now widely
acknowledged that India, specically North India, formed the cradle of the
Gypsy nation (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 13) though some commentators
dissent from this view (Okely 1983; Mayall 2004). However, the Indian supposition is one of the least controversial facets of Romani history because
competing theories have been put forward to explain who they were in
India, why they left, when they left and when they arrived in Europe.
Because no documented account of their migration westward exists with
which we can trace and scrutinize it leaves us postulating various hypotheses based on conjecture and little more until they arrived in Europe and
the settled Europeans recorded the presence of these strange and exotic
people from the east. The real danger is that academics, due to the absence
of primary evidence, treat ction as fact which in turn becomes the de
facto truth due to publication and citation (Matras 2009). The perspective
oered here is based on a careful reading of existing theories and ideas
formulated by academics principally historians and linguists. In this
respect I present a potted account of Romani history over 1,000 years, a
period which is characterized by nomadism, persecution, assimilation and
marginalization. Condensing a millennias history into one chapter is a task
fraught with hazards and has resulted in a highly selective account centring
on key events and developments.
Indian society, then as now, was dominated by the caste system. It has
been argued that Roma probably existed as a loose amalgamation of
nomadic tribes and therefore remained outside of the rigid caste system
(Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 13). Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 1) supports this
nomadic identier: They are, and they always have been, wanderers. Such
a view suggests that Roma were nomadic before their stay in India but no
insights are proered into where they might have migrated from and when.
I steer clear of such an idea primarily due to the clear correlation between
words in Romani and the ancient Indian language of Sanskrit which indicates that Roma were in India for an extensive period, and could well be
indigenous. Language has proven an eective tool when attempting to
uncover Romani history. Indeed it was language which made the initial
link between Roma and India in the eighteenth century displacing the
commonly held view, cultivated and nurtured by Roma themselves that
Roma hailed from Egypt. The idea that language could be used as a tool to
trace the migratory route of Roma was popularized by Sampson (1923)
and continues today (Hancock 2002). Linguistic evidence suggests that
Roma left India approximately 1,000 years ago and spent a relatively short
time in the Middle East. It has also been suggested that Roma did not move
in one solid mass from east to west; rather, they pursued dierent trajectories over the years and not all of these ended in Europe.
Media and literature have consistently portrayed these migrations as
expressing inherent nomadism rather than as being historically motivated
(Lemon 2000, 9) particularly since the dramatic rise of interest in, and
corresponding romanticism of, Roma in nineteenth-century literature. An
image was constructed of Roma as wild and free who had descended from
untouchable castes of entertainers. To support such claims historians and
Gypsiologists have sometimes fallen into the trap of accepting any possible
shred of evidence as the objective truth without subjecting such data to the
rigour of intellectual inquiry. One such piece of evidence indicates that
Roma left India long before AD 1000. The Persian poet Firdausi and the
Arab writer Hamza, both writing in the tenth century, refer to the monarch
Bahrm who imported 12,000 musicians into Persia of both sexes from
India about AD 420, and some historians have drawn the causal arrow
from these musicians to Roma. Others have dismissed the assertion that
these musicians are Roma and instead argue that they constitute the Dom
community found today in the Middle East (Hancock 1987).
In terms of migratory patterns it has been suggested that three migratory routes were taken: for Roma (the European Gypsy); for Lom (the
Armenian Gypsy); and Dom (the Syrian and Persian Gypsy). Sampson
(1923) argues that each nomenclature corresponds with the Sanskrit doma
and the modern Indian dom which refers to a man of low caste who makes
his living singing and dancing. Furthermore, he argues that Roma left
India as one group in the tenth century but separated after passing through
Persia. According to this hypothesis, the rst group (Dom) remained in the
Near East, the second group (Lom) migrated towards Armenia and the
third group (Rom) continued towards Europe through Anatolia (presentday Turkey). However, this theory is founded on the assumption that each
groups language derives from one common stem but Ian Hancock, a prominent Romani academic, disagrees. Hancock (2002, 6) argues that these
groups did not leave India en masse as Sampson suggests but actually left at
dierent times and under dierent circumstances with lexicon commonalities between Romani and Domari highlighted to corroborate this assertion.
Historical evidence testies to a series of military invasions in India in
the eleventh century. Between 1000 and 1027, India endured a succession
of Afghani and Turk attacks led by Mahmud of Ghazni, who was attempting to spread Islam. The same area was also conquered by the Seljuk Turks
who could have taken Roma as prisoners of war and brought them back to
the north coast of Turkey. It is possible that Roma joined the conquering
armies though probably not as soldiers because armies were often accompanied by a large number of followers who erected tents, cleared the
battleeld and cooked and entertained the soldiers. Hancock states (2002,
11) that these followers, did not belong to the Kshatriya (warrior) caste,
but together with the Rajputs, whether as prisoners of war or with victors
routing the enemy, they left India. Roma then moved westwards along
the silk-road after these military invasions towards Persia and Armenia.
As noted previously, Roma did not move in a solid block and pursued a
number of trajectories, some went west while others went north to Russia,
others still continued south after Persia. Linguistic evidence is instructive
at this point Roma probably did not remain in Persia too long due to the
negligible impact of Persian on their language. However, some authors
warn against relying on language to trace the history of Roma because it is
based on speculation and teleological thinking (Lucassen et al. 1998).
Despite the dierent paths taken by Roma groups, it is certain that most
Roma found their way to Byzantium and would later cross the Bosphorus
into Europe in the late thirteenth century. They likely remained in Byzantium for several centuries which can be witnessed in the perceptible
incidence of Greek words found in Romani; indeed, it is estimated that 250
Romani words nd their origins from Greek and there is also evidence of
Greek grammar impacting on Romani. When Roma did move again into
10
Europe such movement was probably due to military conquest again, this
time by the Ottoman Turks. As Hancock (2002, 8) argues:
Just as Islam had spread eastwards into India, initiating the move of
our ancestors out of that part of the world, Muslim expansion towards
the West, particularly initiated by the Seljuk Turks, was also the primary reason why they moved into Europe.
From 1071 onwards, the Byzantine Empire began to be encroached by
Muslim invaders and in 1453 Mohammed II defeated Emperor Constantine
and the city of Byzantium (Istanbul) fell to the Ottoman Turks. There is
evidence of a Romani presence in Europe from 1283 in a document from
Constantine referring to taxes collected from the so-called Egyptians and
Tsigani which is the earliest ocial recording of Roma in Europe. It is
almost certain that Roma were conscripted into the Turkish army and
many entered Europe that way and by the fourteenth century there were
Romani settlements in southern Greece. The idea that Roma came to
Europe because of accidental wanderings seems highly implausible Roma
came to Europe because they had to.
Arrival in Europe
Roma arrived in Europe from a number of directions but by the end of the
fourteenth century a large proportion of Roma in Eastern Europe had settled. A signicant number of Roma would have crossed the Bosphorus into
the Balkans, while others came from Greece, following the pilgrims route
across Crete and records attest to a Roma presence in Crete in 1322. Some
Roma even came via North Africa and settled on the Iberian peninsula.
Throughout their history Roma have demonstrated malleability, constantly
adapting to their surroundings and this durability is because of occupations which allowed them to negotiate dicult terrain prior to their arrival
in Europe. The key economic niche of Roma has traditionally been metal
work of various forms as well as craftwork and musicianship with other
occupations, such as bear-training and palmistry, playing a much less
important role. Despite this, the fortune-telling Gypsy has proven a dicult image to shake and has led to mistrust and suspicion on the part of
the settled European society. The Greeks referred to them as the heretical
sect Astingani and from this derived other exonyms including Zigeuner
(Germany), Ciganyok (Hungary), Tsigani (Bulgaria), Tigani (Romania),
Zingari (Italy), Zingali and Gitanos (Spain) and Ciganos (Portugal). It should
11
be noted that the English word Gypsy stems from Egyptian, the moniker
which many Roma were known as across Europe from the Middle Ages.
Roma settled in south-eastern Europe from the late thirteenth century
and remained for many years in the Balkans as well as in Moldavia and
Wallachia (present-day Romania) and they did not begin to move across
Europe until the fteenth century. From 1417 onwards written documents
and municipal accounts allow us to trace their journey. Roma began to
move into Central and Eastern Europe because their provinces had been
invaded or were directly threatened by the rapidly advancing Ottoman
Empire. They spread across Europe in waves with the rst group numbering only a few hundred which Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 12) suggests was a
reconnaissance party charged with the duty of spying out the land.
The ability of Roma to adapt to their surroundings is one of the key
reasons for their demographical success and presence across the world.
One aspect has been their willingness, and canniness, to practise the dominant religion wherever they found themselves. In early Medieval Europe
Christianity was the dominant religion and the Church, along with monarchs, were key actors who controlled all aspects of social and economic
life. When Roma arrived in Europe they soon became Christians and
adopted names which armed this status. When they migrated across
Europe in the early fteenth century they presented themselves as pilgrims
who were banished from their homeland and had been instructed to
penance for their sins. Claiming Egyptian origins, the pilgrims explained
that they were lapsed Christians who reverted to Islam but had now found
their way back onto the Christian path. This band of pilgrims had supporting letters of recommendation from the emperor of Sigismund, and later
on the pope, which conrmed their status meaning that various dukes
and counts as well as mainstream society welcomed these pilgrims and
provided them with food. Their position as pilgrims ensured that they were
provided a safe conduct in spite of their appearance.
Europeans in the fourteenth century would not have seen anything quite
like a Rom before. Their dark skin and hair, along with colourful clothes
and jewellery would have stood out, but their standing as pilgrims ensured
that, initially at least, they were treated as a harmless curiosity. These Roma
soon traversed German lands and headed towards Italy. In 1414 they were
in Basle, in 1416 in Meissen and in 1418 in Saxony. By 1422 they were in
Bologna and Rome. There is a strong suggestion that Roma secured an
audience with Pope Martin V (although Vatican archives have no record
of it) because later in the year they were back again in Switzerland and
they had with them papal, as well as imperial, safe-conducts. The prospect
12
that this document, like the previous letters of recommendation, was a forgery is not beyond the realms of possibility though it would have required
an extraordinary amount of skill. When they arrived in Paris in 1427 they
brought with them their story of pilgrimage and penitence and explained
that the Pope had instructed them to roam for seven years following about
the world, without sleeping in a bed in order to atone for their sins (cited
in Clbert 1963, 35). However the warm welcome they received did not last
long and a veil of suspicion soon informed their treatment by authorities
and society.
The rst wave of Roma had travelled across Europe in relatively small
numbers followed by more wandering bands which meandered across the
continent in the intervening years but by 1438 thousands of Roma rapidly
spread across Europe and in particular Germany, Italy and France. By 1447
they were in Spain, by 1501 in Poland, the Baltics and Russia, and by 1512,
in Sweden. It is important to note that these dates signify the ocial date
which the presence of Roma appeared in recorded documents and does
not mean that Roma were not present before these dates. In what would
come to typify the Romani experience in Europe, repressive legislation and
persecution soon followed. Across Europe Roma were not permitted to
conduct business with shopkeepers and soon turned to petty theft to feed
their families. Additionally, the practice of fortune-telling meant that they
were accused of sorcery and feared by those who they came into contact
with. It is possible that they exploited certain professions such as fortunetelling which was consistent with their construction as a magical ethnic
other from Egypt. This negative construction substantiated other accusations levelled at Roma that they were dirty and impure: forbidden to use
town pumps or wells, denied water by fearful householders, uncleanliness
became a part of the stereotype (Hancock 1991, 5) the importance of
cleansing rituals or Romaniya was not common knowledge to gaje. Roma
were at this point a sizeable presence in Europe and migrated northwards
to the United Kingdom where they encountered a similar nomadic community called Travellers.
Roma and Travellers

There is much debate as to the relationship between Roma and Travellers
do they share the same heritage or are they distinct ethnicities? The truth
is somewhere in between. The rst ocial record of Roma was in Scotland
in 1505 among the accounts of the Lord High Treasurer: 1505, Apr. 22.
Item to the Egyptians be the Kinges command vii lib., while the rst
13
authenticated record of their presence in England was in Lambeth in 1514

(Kenrick and Clark 1995, 24). It is likely that this group of Egyptians were
part of the pilgrimage which had traversed Europe in the previous century,
and therefore are Roma in that they retain an Indic origin. Travellers
are found on the islands of the United Kingdom and retain one of a selection of pronouns: English; Irish; Scottish; and Welsh. Some Travellers
left the United Kingdom and are nowadays found in Canada, the USA
and Australia, but many remain. The reason why comparisons are drawn
between the two is quite clear. Travellers are nomadic (in spring and
summer usually) and experience persecution from mainstream society.
Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 20) accepts the inconclusive evidence pertaining
to the origins of Travellers that is, if Travellers are indigenous or if they
are Roma: we do not know how long before nor do we know for certain if
we had gypsies in these islands before the great invasion swept across
Europe. Arguments persist that Roma and Travellers are the same, that
is, they possess the same Indian genealogy thus any cultural dierences
between Roma and Travellers is explained by identity corruption and
assimilation, and strategies for cultural survival. Anthropologist Judith
Okely (1983) argues that we should be sceptical of the construction of
a common homeland in India but acknowledges the importance of such a
construction, particularly in building international solidarity among Roma.
The reasons for her scepticism are based on the dangers of such a linkage,
that it has led to divisions in Britain between the true blooded Romany
and the rest, including the counterfeit or drop-out, half-blood or mere
Traveller (Okely 1983, 13). One of the leading British Gypsiologists,
Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 33) draws a distinct line between Roma, or as he
calls them gypsies and Irish Travellers, the latter he refers to as tinkers:
The wandering folk of Ireland are tinkers and they are quite distinct from
gypsies. The term tinker is used to refer to the itinerant smiths and tin-men
of the British Isles who live in similar conditions to those of Roma (Clbert
1963, 82). Mayall (1988, 45) notes that any dierences between Travellers
and Roma were marginal in the eyes of the settled society and the commonalities were more important, united by a common life-style which
revolved around nomadism and self-employment, and by a shared day-today existence and the experience of marginality vis--vis settled society.
Though when Roma arrived in the United Kingdom they would have
encountered nomadic families travelling the roads, practising traditional
occupations.
Gypsies has been the exonym traditionally invoked to describe all Roma
and Travellers. According to the majority society there was no distinction
14
to be made: they were dirty thieves who stole children, cast spells and
were not to be trusted. Traveller is an endonym which is now used due to
extensive advocacy and lobbying by Traveller organizations in the United
Kingdom and Ireland; however, neither nomenclature captures the heterogeneity of these communities in the United Kingdom. There is a school
of thought which argues that Irish and Scottish Travellers are indigenous
to the United Kingdom (known as Minceir) while English and Welsh
Travellers are thought to originate from India (known as Romanichals).
A sceptical Okely (1983, 18) explains:
The English and especially the Welsh Gypsies are given the exotic
Indian or Romany origin, while it is said that the Irish and Scottish
Travellers or Tinkers are merely descendants of vagrants and victims
of the Great famine or the Highland clearances.
To be a Traveller refers to a nomadic identity and those Irish and Scottish
Travellers tend not to adopt the exonym Gypsy as it is loaded with negative
associations. Often they are described as Tinkers which springs from their
traditional economic work with metal and they have their own Cant, or
language, including Shelta and Gammon. Of course, we must be careful not
to conate ethnicity with language or race because no group can be reied
so easily. Irish Travellers have been constructed as an indigenous minority
with discussions of racial signiers such as colour, genes or blood, largely
absent from Traveller-related discussions (Helleiner 2000, 8). There are two
dominant narratives which persist to account for the presence of Travellers
in Ireland. First, they are portrayed as descendants of peasants forced into
itinerancy by evictions and famines which the Irish endured under British
rule. The second narrative maintains that Travellers have been present
for much longer (Joyce and Farmar 1985, 1) as records refer to wandering
people in pre-colonial Ireland. Notably, there were close ties between Irish
and Scottish Travellers as there was constant trac across the Irish Sea.
The resilience and endurance of Roma is one of the most remarkable
aspects of their history. Today Roma are present all over the world including North and South America, Africa, Australia and parts of Asia. In her
seminal study of Roma in the USA, Anne Sutherland argues that there are
approximately one million Roma scattered across the country, the largest
group being the Vlax-speaking Roma which constitute around 500,000
and who tend to reside in large cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles
(Sutherland 1986, xv; see also Lockwood and Salo 1994). Additionally, there
are pockets of other sub-groups including Romanichals, Irish and Scottish
15
Travellers, Hungarian-Slovak, Ludar, Boyash, Lovara and Sinti. Many Roma

in the southern states of the USA are descended from Travellers who left
Ireland during the potato famine in the mid-nineteenth century (Helleiner
2000, 33). Given that vagabonds and itinerants were a target group for the
Draconian transportation law of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury England (Lee 1997, 73), there is a good chance that Roma were
aboard the rst eet of convicts which arrived in Australia in 1788. After
1945, migratory streams owed towards Australia and New Zealand and
many Roma appeared within this migration stream but they are now relatively integrated into society. Smaller groups of Roma are to be found in
Africa including in Sudan and Egypt, as well as in South and East Africa
while in Asia their presence is modest and scattered. Finally here, South
America houses several Romani communities which are found mainly in
Brazil, Peru and Chile.
There is a risk that such geographic diusion fuels the imposed ascription of Roma as wanderers who cannot help but stay on the road, that
somehow this wanderlust is part of their nature, in the blood. The truth is
that once they arrived in Europe, Roma were before long met with resistance and persecution. And the imperial powers of the age, in particular
England, France, Spain and Portugal ensured that these undesirable elements were sent o to the far-ung outposts of the empire. Even when
Roma did migrate by choice it was an attempt to escape, hoping that the
next land oered a better life. Yet, once those Roma arrived they invariably
faced opposition and many responded by attempting to integrate in order
to escape persecution.
Persecution and Romanticism

The initial arrival of Roma in Europe was characterized by tentative acceptance and curiosity on the part of settled Europeans. Soon however, the
mood shifted and Roma found themselves targeted by repressive measures
described as sustained genocidal persecution and enslavement (Gheorghe
and Acton 1995, 31), which began in earnest from the early sixteenth century. Deportation was one way which authorities attempted to purge the
Roma pest but there were other courses of action too. At one point or
another, Roma have been banished from almost every European state:
Germany did so in 1497, Spain in 1499, France in 1504, England in 1531,
Denmark in 1536, Moravia in 1538, Scotland in 1541, Poland in 1557, Venice
in 1549, 1558 and 1588, and so on (Vesey-Fitzgerald 1963, 31). These measures treated Roma as a social category of vagabonds and beggars and not
16
as a distinct ethnic group, though that status would change under the Nazi
regime with devastating consequences. The cloak of Christianity oered
temporary protection but without it Roma were exposed to persecution
with banishment and refusal of safe passage becoming the norm by the end
of the sixteenth century across Europe the veneer of tolerance could not
be sustained by the settled Europeans.
The situation of Roma became more perilous in the sixteenth century
and lasted to the owering of romanticism and Gypsiology in the nineteenth century. In their historical analysis, Kenrick and Puxon (1972) ignore
political frontiers and therefore do not follow national trends in anti-Roma
thought and action, arguing instead that it is a European phenomenon.
While I agree with this to an extent I think it is useful to have an overview
of the historical persecution in European states. There was no systematic
co-ordinated eort on the part of European rulers to repress their respective Romani populations but it is striking how many European states
enacted hostile legislation and how quickly societies turned against Roma.
The following overview is based on the work of Clbert whose attention to
detail and ocial discourse provides an authoritative account of Roma
across Europe. As we shall see, Roma were faced with a choice between
expulsion or death. Several states enacted legislation which imposed death
simply for being Roma: English law imposed death for being Romani in
1554 while in Prussia, all Romani men and women over 18 faced death.
Other state responses were cruel and brutal including in eighteenthcentury Holland where the state organized nationwide hunts to expel Roma
and nineteenth-century Denmark which hunted Roma like foxes (Kenrick
and Puxon 1972, 46).
The Balkans oered a relatively safe haven where Roma were able to
move without much interference due to the fact that the native inhabitants
of the region were also of Asiatic origin as a result of the Ottoman invasion.
Moving north we nd the situation of Roma more restrictive than in the
Balkans. In Moldavia and Wallachia landowners who encountered Roma
would turn them into slaves which began in the sixteenth century, evidence
suggesting that it could have been an early as 1541. Some slaves belonged
to the State and others to the Church though both fates were equally dire.
Their duties included gold-washing and bear-training while many toiled
the land. Slavery in Moldavia and Wallachia persisted well into the nineteenth century and in 1818 new edicts were incorporated into the Wallachian
Penal Code which stated that Gypsies are born slaves. It was external
events which nally saw the abolition of slavery in 1855, with complete
legal freedom secured in 1864. The Industrial Revolution was impacting on
17
agricultural practices and was matched by changing social values, thus

slavery was increasingly regarded as cruel and outdated. Roma were also
slaves in England, Russia, Hungary, Portugal and Spain but such measures
were usually temporary and ad hoc, based on the whims of incumbent
leaders.
The situation of Roma in Hungary was marginally better given that
slavery was not as prevalent; however, Roma were still subject to barbarous
punishments for crimes the abduction of children, rape, cannibalism
which were never proven. An aggressive assimilationist policy was pursued
by Maria Theresa from 1761 as she attempted to suppress Romani culture.
This included prohibiting Roma from sleeping in tents, speaking their
language and engaging in traditional occupations such as horse-dealing.
Forced sedentarization was a core tenet of the new state policy: Reformers
saw nomadism as the core reason for Gypsy backwardness and sought to
restrict their movement through legislation and the police (Crowe 1995,
236). Empress Maria Theresa banned the word Gypsy as she found it
insulting and Roma were re-branded Neo-Hungarians. Children were
made to go to school and many Romani children were taken from their
families to be reared by Hungarian families who would socialize the youngsters. Such a policy is premised on the idea that civility can be learned and
being Roma can be forgotten. This well-intentioned policy was continued
by Maria Theresas son and successor, Joseph II but assimilation demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the interests of Roma. After
the death of Joseph II in 1790, Roma quickly returned to their traditional
lifestyle. All in all, assimilation did not completely eradicate Romani culture, mainly because of its short tenure, but ensured it remained dormant.
In Germany, the tide of good will towards the pilgrims soon subsided:
The halo did not stand up for long against the sensational number of thefts,
acts of scrounging and deceit, and swindles of every kind which marked
the passage of these pilgrims (Clbert 1963, 75). The local population began
to fear Roma and soon the authorities, with the backing of the Church,
began to pass hostile laws which severely restricted the ability of Roma to
roam or make a living. The Age of the Enlightenment did not extend to
the treatment of Roma who were banned from various Germanic lands
and some were put to death. In sixteenth-century Poland various Diets
attempted to banish Roma but this changed by the end of the eighteenth
century thus Roma were able to prosper and integrate to some extent.
Moreover, such was the presence of Roma in the second half of the seventeenth century that the Polish Crown appointed a King of the Gypsies.
In the Baltic states from the sixteenth century onwards repressive decrees
18
were repealed resulting in the ourishing of Romani communities. The

harsh terrain and climate of Scandinavia did not deter Roma from migrating northwards but some Romani families attempting to enter Finland in
the sixteenth century were driven back (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 44).
In contrast, Roma arrived in Russia from 1500 in small numbers and
enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence and while Catherine the Great made
Roma slaves of the Crown, she did not persecute them.
From 1514 Roma were banned from Swiss lands, and in 1701 Austria
outlawed Roma completely. Despite their early connection with the pope,
by 1568 Pope Pius V drove them out of the domains of the Church and
ordered that all male Roma were to be sent to the gallows. In France their
arrival in Paris was greeted almost immediately with repressive targeted
legislation and the rst act of the Bishop in 1427 was to excommunicate
them and drive them out. There are several reasons why Roma were persecuted: they were blamed for thefts, exactions and dupery. They were
accused of engaging in black magic, of living by their wits, but above all
with being foreigners (Clbert 1963, 59). In France, this cocktail of charges
levelled at Roma translated into widespread fear and enmity, which culminated in renewed arrest and expulsion orders against Roma issued by
Henry IV in 1607.
At the same time, a sizeable population of Roma are to be found in Spain
and Portugal. Roma arrived on the Iberian peninsula from two directions:
one group arrived from the north which was recorded in Barcelona in 1447
and certainly denotes the group which carried the papal papers. The second group (Gitanos) arrived from North Africa and signify a group which
separated from the European Roma in the Middle East many centuries
prior. Interestingly, these Roma had actually come via Egypt but it is not
known when they crossed the straits of Gibraltar though it is likely that
they were present in Spain before 1447. Furthermore, it is unclear when
and where the two groups rst encountered one another. In terms of distinctions, Gitanos are Roma yet there are signicant dierences between
the two groups (Gay y Blasco 1999); for example, the dialects are so dierent they are mutually unintelligible. The earliest mention of Roma in
Portugal is 1571. The Iberian peninsula was not immune from the pandemic of hostile legislation which had trailed Roma in their wake. In 1528
vagabond Roma were threatened and in 1692 Charles II forbade Roma
from living in towns with less than 1,000 hearths. A more liberal policy of
assimilation was born in 1783 under Charles III which was fashioned la
Maria Theresa and Roma were re-branded as neo-Castilians.
19
One of the most remarkable twists in the history of Roma was their
apparent, and very unexpected, redemption. Though relatively short lived
it recast them as heroes rather than villains although Bancroft (2005, 40)
notes that romanticization of Roma co-exists with the demonization of this
pariah out-group. An accidental linguistic discovery in the eighteenth century at the University of Leiden dramatically changed the fortunes of Roma.
A Hungarian linguist noticed that a signicant number of Romani words
were identical to words from the ancient Indian language of Sanskrit but it
was not until 1783 when Heinrich Grellman published his thesis that the
link to India became more widely accepted. Academics argued that Romani
was actually an Indo-Aryan language and that Roma were originally from
India, not Egypt. As debate raged about who Roma were and where they
come from, literary images were constructed which announced Roma as
a bon sauvage. A rising tide of sentiment towards Roma was principally
witnessed in the arts if not in state legislation and popular attitudes. Therefore, from the nineteenth century onwards alongside the stereotype dirty,
dishonest, child-stealing villain we have the dark, handsome violin-playing
lover Gypsy (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 41). Neither is accurate however
and both constructions have been hard to shake o, persisting to this day.
Renewed interest in Roma came in the second half of the nineteenth
century as a wave of Roma from the Balkans and Hungary entered Central
Europe attracted by economic opportunity (Lewy 2000, 4). Notably, the
Gypsy Lore Society was founded in 1888 with the purpose of preserving
the decaying language and culture including songs and ballads. It was not
concerned with advocating on behalf of this persecuted and marginalized
community nor did it waste too much ink on the disputed origins of Roma.
Instead it was a reaction against the perceived erosion of Romani culture
and thus attempted to detail Romani culture from the central idea that
Roma were a specic race. Mayall (1988, 78) argues that because Roma
were constructed as a separate race, dened by hereditary and cultural
characteristics, they were distanced from the settled population as well
as from other wandering groups. The creation of the Gypsy Lore Society
was an important development because Romani culture was oral, it was
not written down. Gypsiologists were preoccupied with occupation and
distinctions between the various groups as well as by linguistic issues.
The elevation of Roma as romanticized protagonists was conrmed with
the publication of work by George Burrow, D. H. Lawrence and Charles
Dickens. Such a caricature centres on extravagant dress with vivid colours
that metaphorically mirror the wild untamed spirit of Roma. Despite such
20
developments, widespread societal prejudice towards Roma persisted but

the twentieth century would witness the single most devastating event in
Romani history.
O Baro Porrajmos: The Holocaust

It is estimated that between 250,000 and 1.5 million Roma perished in
O Baro Porrajmos, which literally translates as the great devouring. Remarkably, despite the evidence, Roma are constantly ghting to prove that Nazi
policy towards them constitutes genocide and not merely a crime against
humanity. Roma were exterminated because of their ethnicity, perception
of racial origin and purity, not because they were dierent or asocial.
Roma are forgotten victims of the Holocaust with Jews commanding more
attention due to the sheer numbers of Jews murdered by the Nazi regime as
well as a strong transnational intelligentsia to lobby and advocate on behalf
of the Jewish community. The Nazi policy towards Roma was informed
by ideas of racial purity and a hierarchy with Aryans at the top and Jews
and Roma at the bottom. The Nazis intended to construct a new Germany
that was ethnically pure; thus it was necessary to expunge any undesirable
elements. Policy towards Roma was gradually formulated until the decision was made in early 1942 to exterminate all Roma in Germany and
annexed territories. This section will examine the key events of O Baro
Porrajmos arguing that Roma were treated as a racial group, not as a social
group, and this distinction is crucial as it has implications for issues of
remembrance and inclusion post-1945.
The previous section highlighted issues of persecution and marginalization facing Roma in Europe the upshot being when the Nazis came to
power in 1933 there already existed an extensive catalogue of anti-Roma
legislation in Germany, as elsewhere. Nazi ideology was informed by armations of racial hierarchy with Aryan Germans at the top of the heap but
they never recognized Roma as true Aryans even though Romani is an
Aryan language. Most importantly, such a link did not prevent Roma being
sent to concentration camps (Willems 1997). Kenrick and Puxon (1972, 60)
argue that Roma were treated as a distinct, and undesirable, race in Nazi
Germany evidenced in the fact that they wore brown triangles in some
camps and the letter Z (for Zigeuner) was emblazoned on their armbands.
It has been suggested that Roma were treated as anti-socials rather than
as a distinct race but such a conception is inaccurate and harmful as we
shall see.
21
From the outset of the Nazi regime Roma, like Jews, received disproportionate attention from state institutions which was manifest in legislation
and policy. In 1933 Hitlers cabinet passed a law against the propagation
of lives not worthy of life (Lebensunwertesleben) and ordered sterilization
for certain groups of people including Roma (Hancock 1991, 15). Between
1934 and the outbreak of the war in 1939, Roma were subject to an array of
laws and regulations which created a web of restrictions that set Gypsies
apart and severely restricted their ability, individually and collectively to
survive (Huttenbach 1991, 33). In 1935 the Nuremberg Law(s) for the
Protection of Blood and Honour forbade inter-marriage or sexual relations
between Aryan and non-Aryan peoples, declaring Roma and Jews alien
People. In 1937 an order was released which stipulated that anyone who
was prone to criminal activity (whether they had committed a crime or
not) due to racial predisposition could be incarcerated. This seemingly
innocuous order was targeted at Roma specically and led to the rounding-up of Roma from 1937 who were subsequently sent to camps. At this
point the fate of Roma had not been decided though certainly the walls
were beginning to close in on German Roma and Sinti. In 1933, the Nazis
contacted the Romani academic, Dr. Sigmund Wolf, and requested information pertaining to Roma genealogy; specically he was asked to trace
the lineage of lists of Roma to their eight great-grand-parents. It is clear
that the Nazis were interested in blood lines of Roma from the beginning.
A key appointment came in 1937 when Dr. Robert Ritter became head of
the Racial Hygiene and Population Biology Research Unit of the Ministry
of Health. The aim of Ritter was to have les on every German Roma which
meant that research activities included the genealogical categorization of
Roma as pure or mixed race.
It was not until 4 December 1938 and the issuing of Combating the
Gypsy Menace, that a comprehensive enquiry began. This circular is clearly
couched in the language of race; for example, it refers to race-biological
research on Roma as well as the racial anity of every Roma in Germany
(Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 73; Kenrick and Puxon 2009, 2324). Lewy
(2000, 36) argues that this law marks a turning point in policy towards
Roma because prior to this Roma had been treated as an asocial element
but now the conviction that Roma constituted an alien and inferior race
was added, introducing a powerful new catalyst for anti-Gypsy legislation.
Specically the decree maintains that the issue of Roma be challenged in
terms of the inner characteristics of that race. By 1942 Ritter had les of
approximately 30,000 Roma, and these les were used to determine who
22
was Romani and who was not. The hunting of Roma was motivated by
Ritter who regarded Roma as primitive and mentally backward (Fraser
1992, 260). In fact, his denition of who was Roma was stricter that than
of who was Jewish: two Romani great-great-grandparents while for Jews it
was one great-great-grandparent. It seems that Ritter wanted to catch all
Roma including those who had integrated there would be no escape.
A paradox emerges in terms of how Roma were classied, and by extension how they were treated. Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo and
the Waen-SS suggested that distinctions need to be made between pure
Roma and those who were tainted by foreign blood in the years before they
arrived in Germany. On the one hand, the Lalleri (German Roma because
of their long residence in the country) and the racially pure Sinti who
comprised approximately 10 per cent of all Roma in the Reich were to be
declared Aryan, and thus would enjoy preferential treatment (at least
this was the idea at the outset). On the other hand, Roma who had arrived
more recently from the Balkans were considered to be stained with racial
impurities having inter-married with non-Aryans before they arrived in
Germany. On the surface at least, this policy was diametrically opposed to
prevailing racial policy and ideas of purity because if Sinti were considered
Aryans who had originated in India and had not inter-married, then they
were considered racially pure and ought to be ranked alongside German
Aryans. However such distinctions were quickly abandoned when the
opportunity to purge Germany of the Roma menace presented itself in
early 1942. At the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 the ocial decision was taken to implement the Final Solution of racial undesirables
including Jews and in December 1942, Himmler ordered that all Roma
were to be sent to camps with most being sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau.
From 1939, ocial policy towards Roma was formulated on advice from
the Oce of Racial Hygiene with Johannes Behrendt declaring that all
Gypsies should be treated as hereditarily sick; the only solution is extermination (Hancock 1991, 18). The ocial decision to exterminate Roma is
thought to have resulted from pressure from the lower ranks of the Nazi
party who considered the War an ideal opportunity to rid Germany and
conquered territories of Roma. At the upper echelons of Nazi power structures Hitler remained relatively silent on Roma: Mein Kampf makes no
reference to Roma and in the 12 years as German ruler he mentions Roma
only twice, in relation to Roma serving in the military (Lewy 2000, 38).
It seems as though events had been building to such a climax. The
increasingly repressive legislation, the collecting of data on blood lines and
the detention of Roma and placing them in concentration camps provided
23
the opportunity for the Third Reich to deal with Roma, once and for all, as
it was dealing with Jews. Roma were regarded as dangerous because of their
contaminated blood and assumptions of criminality, consequently there
was no place for them in the Reich. Furthermore, Germany would expand
across Europe meaning deportation was not an option either. The research
at the Racial Hygiene and Population Biology Unit had created the conviction that Roma were inferior due to race, that is, because they were Romani.
As a result, Roma could not be helped. They were biologically polluting
social parasites who had to exterminated, and all subsequent government
policy was informed by this conviction.
While Roma were detained and deported prior to 1939, the outbreak of
WWII heralded an intensication of Nazi policy on Roma. State agencies
hounded Roma across German territories and deported them to various
assembly points including Berlin, Prague and Munich, while those not
deported were held in Mauthausen. It was this concentration camp which
witnessed the largest number of Roma deaths though many Roma perished
in Treblinka and Auschwitz-Birkenau as the latter housed the largest
number of Roma. On the night of 31 July1 August 1944, the bulk of Roma
at Auschwitz were gassed in what has come to be known as the Zigeunernacht
(the Night of the Gypsies). The exact number of Roma who were murdered
in the Holocaust can only be estimated though the gure ranges from a
conservative low of 250,000 (Gilbert 1985, 824) to 500,000 (Yoors 1967, 7;
Huttenbach 1991, 45; Kenrick and Puxon 2009, 153) while others put the
gure much higher closer to 1.5 million (Heine cited in Hancock, 2002).
In annexed territories Roma met a similar fate with thousands of Roma
dying in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Greece, Holland, Poland,
Latvia, Estonia and Belarus.
The genocide of Roma by the Nazis received almost no attention following the defeat of Germany in 1945. The Nuremberg Trials were silent as
regards the fate of Roma due to the lack of written evidence compared with
documentation on the Final Solution of Jews. The deaths suered by Roma
were not denied per se but were treated as a crime against humanity by the
Allied Powers and it was not until the 1962 Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem
that the rst charge against any Nazi was brought (Huttenbach 1991, 48).
The term genocide continues to be reserved for Jews and while there is no
question that the Jews suered genocide at the hands of Nazi Germany, the
same fate was extended to Roma. Roma were targeted and identied
through genealogical records compiled by Nazis, they were persecuted
through legislation including prohibiting inter-marriage with pure Germans,
endured forced sterilizations and medical experiments, and nally, they
24
were murdered because of their perceived racial impurity. Thus the systematic extermination of Roma was intended to rid Europe of its Gypsies
and the guiding ideology of racial purity meant that Roma suered genocide during WWII.
In 1945 a shell-shocked Europe slowly came to terms with the Nazis
policy on Jews and to a lesser extent, in terms of sheer numbers, on Roma,
homosexuals and the disabled. Despite this, not one Rom was ever called to
testify at the Nuremberg Trials. It must also be remembered that during
WWII most European Roma had been murdered up to 70 per cent of
European Roma were killed. Villages had been wiped out and families
scattered across the continent; therefore, all social and cultural organization had disappeared. Not surprisingly, Roma found themselves lacking
agency with which to voice their concerns and as a result found themselves
excluded from the pursuit of justice. In order for justice to be served it
was necessary to make a clear link between Nazi policy on Roma and race,
that is, that Roma were exterminated because they were ethnically Roma
and thus an inferior race. However, reparations are resisted because it is
argued that Roma were not targeted because of racial identication but
rather because of their perceived criminality. Put simply, Roma would not
be treated the same as Jews because they were singled out for the same fate
(extermination) but for dierent reasons. This ignores the fact that by 1939
being Romani meant incarceration and certain deportation to a concentration camp. Moreover, Nazi ideology contributed an increased emphasis
on the hereditary character of crime (Lewy 2000, 25), which meant that
criminality and racial origin were conated in the case of Roma. Romani
activists have had to ght to establish any sort of parity in terms of ocial
recognition. Indeed, the US Holocaust Memorial Council was established
in Washington in 1980 with 65 members though not one of these was
Romani. Today O Baro Porrajmos is remembered in ceremonies across
the world but the UN excluded Romani participants from the Holocaust
Remembrance Day ceremony on 27 January 2009, exacerbating feelings of
unworthiness.
Roma under Communism

As one unfortunate chapter closed on Roma history, another one opened.
This section concentrates on the treatment of Roma in Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) under communist regimes. Following the end
of WWII, the Allied Powers conspired to split the continent in two with
Western Europe pursuing the ideal of liberal democracy and capitalism
25
while Eastern Europe came under the inuence of the Soviet Union with
communism acting as the central guiding principle for social, economic
and political life. After the end of the War most surviving Roma were
located in Central and Eastern Europe and with restrictions placed on
cross-border movement, they remained there. As with previous authorities,
both well-meaning and malevolent, the newly installed communist authorities soon attempted to deal with Roma according to their own Marxist
vision of equality and utility. Tong (1995, 251) accurately notes that, people
at all points in the political spectrum have wanted to change the Gypsies
and communist regimes were no dierent, convinced as they were that
social engineering could rescue Roma through assimilation.
From the beginning Roma did not t the mould of what a good socialist
citizen should be because some spoke their own language, they dressed
distinctively and maintained their own economic niche through selfemployment. Stewart (1997a, 87) explains that, the very existence of
autonomous Gypsy communities apparently quite beyond the inuence
of state organs was construed as a threat to political stability and ideological hegemony, a carnivalesque incitement to disorder. Confronted with
such a threat within their borders communist leaders across Central and
Eastern Europe attempted to assimilate Roma. Integration was regarded as
weak and not appropriate therefore assimilation became the organizing
principle for the socialist states treatment of Roma. Roma were culturally
and economically dierent, therefore, the agenda of socialism included the
gradual suppression of cultural identity and forced-work programmes.
While communist authorities did not seek to eradicate whole scale Roma
populations as the Nazis succeeded in doing, they did attempt a more subtle policy which severely impacted on the cultural identity and way of life
for many Roma. The idea here was that if Roma could be put to work and
their children sent to school, then their inherent socio-cultural particularities would cease to exist and they would become another cog in the state
machine, no dierent from every other citizen. As Stewart (1997b, 5) succinctly explains, repression and discrimination could not have been further
from the thoughts of early Communist reformers. But the desired end was
surprisingly close to the fascist dream: The Gypsies were to disappear.
While such a pursuit remained in place until the collapse of communism
in 1989, many Roma resisted and continued to speak their language, practice cultural traditions and engage in ad hoc self-employment.
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe acknowledged the
importance in assisting under-developed groups. However, policies and
programmes were shaped by administrations with little knowledge of
26
the needs and no insights into the aspirations of Romani people (Puxon
1973, 13). The lack of recognition as a national minority impeded the protection of Romani identity because ocial status as a national minority
would have been accompanied by certain rights. It was argued that because
Roma lacked one or more of Stalins criteria for national status, which
included common language, territory, economy and culture, they forfeited
all claims to recognition other than as a social problem (Puxon 1973, 13).
In 1961, the Hungarian Communist Party Congress passed a resolution
stating that Roma lacked a common language, culture and beliefs, territory
and economy, and therefore did not constitute a separate nationality. This
implies that the lack of a specic culture meant that Roma were part of the
homogeneous Hungarian nation and could be assimilated. The same assimilation policy was initiated across CEECs to varying degrees. Roma did not
t into communist ideas on cultural and social organization and their existence posed a major challenge to the communist project; therefore, forced
sedentarization became the norm. Socialist authorities responded by
embarking on a policy of social engineering (Stewart 1997b, 2) which
attempted to assimilate millions of Roma across CEECs. There was no
transnational decision-making body guiding communist policy on Roma;
rather, state activities were informed by a commitment to Marxist ideology
which regarded the presence of Roma as a threat. Instead of expelling
Roma communities, successive communist authorities across CEECs
viewed them as an opportunity to instigate wide-ranging reform and social
transformation.
At this point in their journey, Roma were on the lowest rung on the
ladder of social hierarchy. They had been hunted during WWII and so were
rightfully distrustful of the so-called benevolent policies of communist
authorities which promised to alleviate their socio-economic positioning.
Many Roma did not have jobs and their children did not tend to go to
school. As a general rule, opportunities for social mobility did not exist
due to the lack of formal education completed by Romani children and
to compound matters, Roma were discriminated against and marginalized
by mainstream society, continuing a practice maintained for centuries.
Communist authorities avowed to combat this discrimination by guaranteeing jobs for Roma as well as a home and education for their children.
This development kept the wolves from the door and ensured a noticeable
improvement in the living conditions of many Roma communities across
CEECs. It was hoped that the discipline and collective spirit of the statesponsored work in the factory or on the eld would galvanize Roma to
participate equally in social life as Roma shed their cultural identity and
27
traditions, mainstream society would accept Roma as part of the communist ideal.
Work was the bedrock of the communist ideal. Suce to say, the type
of work traditionally conducted by Roma was regarded as backward and
self-serving and did not t with the proletarian vision. Stewart (1997b, 123)
argues that the fact that Roma regarded themselves as sons of the market
meant that they were seen as traders and middlemen out to turn a prot,
and such entrepreneurial pursuits were soon quashed thus,viable life-styles,
developed over many decades and based on self-suciency and prized
skills, were destroyed (Brearley 1996, 11). For the most part, communist
authorities created jobs for Roma (and the rest of society) in factories and
farms which meant that Roma would work alongside other Hungarians/
Romanians/Poles doing mundane and repetitive tasks for a xed wage.
Ultimately however, the rewards were minimal and the hours worked were
long and tough; so, naturally many sought to nd self-employment such as
horse-trading and metal work whenever opportunities presented themselves. Work served several complementary functions: it would fuel the
state economy which was controlled completely by the communist authorities; it would instil a sense of ownership and belonging to Roma; and it
would breakdown previously held negative stereotypes of Roma as workshy wanderers. In the end though, it resulted in Roma becoming more
dependent on the state to provide goods and services whereas in the past
Roma had been relatively self-reliant.
Political representation of Roma was, as one might imagine, negligible
under communist regimes. It was possible for Roma to rise through the
party ranks but only if cultural identiers such as language were hidden.
In order to advance in social and political life some Roma realized the
necessity of shedding their cultural baggage with this practice remaining
prominent today. Despite the prevalence of assimilation national congresses were established in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the latter being
one of the most hospitable socialist regimes for Roma. Across CEECs, a
small number of Roma found their way onto coalitions of political parties,
government agencies and voluntary bodies and seats on governmental
committees dealing with Romani issues (Puxon 1973, 14). A owering of
Romani advocacy in Western Europe emerged at this time and led to the
creation of the World Romani Congress (now called the International
Romani Union) in London in 1971. This was the rst transnational institution which used nationalism as a tool to mobilize Roma across Europe.
It was created by Roma to secure a measure of control over their own destiny and provide a platform to articulate their interests. A Paris-based
28
Secretariat, Comit International Rom, founded in 1967 linked Romani

organizations across Europe however meetings and advocacy remained
the preserve of Western Romani organizations, such as the Roma National
Congress, established in Hamburg in 1982 to articulate the interests of
German Sinti. These developments ensured that Roma had a voice: because
of their lack of political power much of the violence and inhuman oppression they encounter is left unreported (Yoors 1967, 7).
Under communism, Roma were, ocially at least, not discriminated
against and did not suer targeted violence because open antagonism
toward Roma was not tolerated. Prejudice towards Roma did not disappear
of course. Such embedded negative ascriptions of Romani identity and
culture cannot be broken down in a generation or two, but following the
collapse of communism in 1989 Roma increasingly found themselves
the victims of targeted racist attacks and violence. Thus, Roma were cast
in the familiar role of scapegoats as blame was laid at their door for socioeconomic ills caused by the tumultuous transition to democracy. Roma,
lacking eective agency and a voice to defend themselves, were subject to
ill-treatment, murder and pogroms by mainstream society as well as the
authorities, in particular the police. Without doubt, the collapse of communism also oered hope and opportunity which was seized upon by the
thin stratum of Romani intellectuals.
Post-communism: Romani Awakening

The collapse of communism brought new opportunities to all but also
witnessed the emergence of hostility and violence directed at Roma. More
Roma were murdered in racist attacks and had their houses burned down
in the immediate free years after 1989 than in all the time that had passed
from the end of WWII. The transition to democracy was mired with diculties but of all the communities it was Roma who suered most. It was
Roma who found themselves increasingly isolated, no longer aorded the
protection of a paternalist state which resulted in high unemployment,
sub-standard accommodation and inadequate sanitation and health care.
Moreover, with a low education level and lacking basic skills to compete in
the emerging free market economy the situation of many Roma actually
deteriorated throughout the 1990s. Because of the high levels of unemployment of Roma and their resulting dependence on state welfare in the early
1990s, mainstream society treated Roma as an unwanted and unnecessary
appendage. This was made worse when Roma were forced into begging
and ocked to urban areas where resentment towards them intensied
29
(Ligeois and Gheorghe 1995). At the same time, across CEECs, mainstream politicians promulgated right-wing discourse espousing nationalist
rhetoric which inamed the virulence directed at Roma and led to cases
of violence, pogroms and murder: the collapse of totalitarianism in the
east brought a resurgence of feelings which had been held in check since
the war (Fraser 1992, 289). Instances of violence towards Roma occurred
across CEECs thus many Roma responded by migrating to Western Europe
but again they were met with discrimination and marginalization. The situation required a clear response and that came from within the Romani
community as well as from sympathetic gaje.
Roma organizations began to ourish after 1989 and some Roma stood
for election in the rst free elections across CEECs. The emergence of
prominent lite and intellectuals who embraced their Romani identity
and advocated on behalf of Romani communities marked a signicant
departure from the past. These Romani lite were a legacy of compulsory
education in communist regimes and they lled the political space vacated
by the socialist state. In order to mobilize the Romani community, lite
attempted to foster a collective identity by highlighting common issues
facing many communities. Such endeavours were, and continue to be,
impeded by the heterogeneity of Roma and complex issues of ethnicity and
belonging. The interests of the Romani community are diverse but a coordinated strategy has been elaborated across CEECs:
[T]he Romani movement, consisting of numerous nongovernmental
organizations in post-communist countries and in Western Europe,
attempted a re-evaluation of its cultural heritage and past, a redenition and construction of its own minority identity, and a rejection
of its imposed and stigmatized name, as well as the emancipation of
the Romani masses. (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 10)
International organizations and NGOs shone a spotlight onto the dire
living conditions of Roma, particularly in CEECs, and the violence which
was being directed at them. Ringold et al. (2005, xvi) explain that, Roma
issues have gained increasing attention over the past decade because of
emerging evidence of human rights violations and seriously deteriorating
socio-economic conditions within many Roma communities. International
organizations and advocacy networks began to frame their activities in
terms of human rights violations which were supported by international
law. Gaje-funded projects were established across CEECs and in some
instances legislation was enacted which ensured protection of minorities,
30
including Roma. Complementing these advancements in policy and legislation, the carrot of EU membership induced state behaviour to be more
accommodating of minorities within their borders, which came against a
backdrop of inter-ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia. But despite
these developments in the 1990s, Roma remain a powerless minority and
the most vulnerable and poorest of Europes peoples within the new
market economy (Brearley 1996, 13). The importance of having a political
presence is clear if Roma are able to have a voice then they are able to
inuence decisions and policies which aect them directly, meaning they
cannot be ignored. Through mobilization and participation Roma are more
likely to retain independence and control over their distinct ethno-cultural
heritage, as well as to improve their socio-economic situation.
It is possible to draw a causal arrow between the discrimination and
violence which Roma experienced after the collapse of communism and
the creation of organizations to represent Romani communities. This
ethnic awakening and mobilization (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 3) can be
witnessed in the proliferation of NGOs and other bodies at a local, national
and transnational level. Needless to say, international organizations did not
take up the cause of Roma by chance. It was the rst wave of Romani
organizations and individuals which lobbied and advocated the international community, particularly in the OSCE, the CoE, the UN and the EU
which ensure that Romani issues are embedded in the agendas and practices of these organizations and have resulted in some notable successes
such as the creation of specic transnational organizing structures of
representation which work on behalf of Roma with international support.
These include the Strasbourg-based MG-S-ROM and the ERTF in the
Council of Europe, the Warsaw-based Contact Point for Roma and Sinti
Issues in the OSCE and the Brussels-based European Roma Information
Oce which lobbies the EU. These organizations work with other transnational bodies created by gaje such as the European Roma Rights Centre and
the Open Society Institute, both based in Budapest. These transnational
organizing structures of representation are of particular interest to my
research due to their recent emergence and questions they raise about
political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation.
Ultimately however, the optimism generated by the involvement of the
international community is of little importance if it is not matched by
concerted eorts to improve the situation of Roma across Europe. Roma
are citizens of the state in which they reside and in order to be equal citizens Roma must be able to access the full catalogue of citizenship rights
31
including civil, political and social rights but it is access where Roma
experience the most problems.
The prospects facing Romani lite are daunting. Some issues emerged as
particularly prominent in the transnational political context. First, the use
of Roma was widely propagated and exonyms such as Gypsy, Zigeuner
and Gitanos were rejected. The reclamation of nomenclature is regarded as
one of the rst steps in building transnational solidarity and heralds an
ownership over dominant narratives that did not exist before: Names have
the potential to hold the seeds of prejudice, even malice, which in turn
bring upon the Romani people an unfolded hostility (Puxon 1973, 21).
Additionally, it arms that Roma are a distinct ethnic minority who
require recognition and protection by the state because recognition as an
ethnic minority certainly culminates in more agreements pertaining to
specic rights (Willems 1997, 307). Second, Romani organizations across
Europe began to target repressive state policies and demand full recognition and equity with mainstream society. Necessarily this involved the
questioning of prevailing norms and practices such as racism, poverty,
injustice and discrimination which disproportionately aect Romani communities. Such practices are explicitly linked to the dire socio-economic
conditions which many Roma endure including sub-standard health,
accommodation and education provisions. Roma are excluded from society literally banished to ghettos on the outskirts of major towns and cities
where they lack basic sanitation and housing. Thirdly, resources such as
international organizations have proven vital to the burgeoning Roma
social movement thus calls for recognition and protection for this persecuted ethnic minority have resonated with goals of inclusion and equality.
The persecution and marginalization of Roma are not just historical artefacts they are real for many communities and are experienced through
memory and everyday life.
The politics of representation is tied to issues of visibility and survival.
In order to survive as a culture, Roma must develop organizing structures
of representation where they can have a voice in dening who they are and
their interests (Lee 2001). Accordingly, political participation and mobilization are crucial if the voice of this heterogeneous community is to be
heard. Moreover, battles are being fought on issues of recognition, specically the importance of being recognized as a distinct ethnic group (Mayall
2004, chapter 7). Gheorghe (1997, 158) argues that a process of ethnogenesis has taken place whereby a group occupying a despised and inferior
position moves to a position of respectability and equality with other
32
groups on the basis of a revised perception of their identity. The Roma

social movement has been crucial in this transformation though prejudices
and negative associations still persist in abundance and any respectability
of Roma is only in evidence in international organizations where the
Romani community has been transformed into a political project. Organizations act as sites of discussion and debate between Romani representatives
and activists, a place to contest ideas and to formulate demands. With
political power and capital has come fragmentation among Romani lite
because competing ideas exist on how best to remedy the situation of
Roma. Inevitably, perhaps, the issue of legitimacy has arisen: Who has the
legitimate right to speak on behalf of Roma? And how can we determine
who is legitimate or not, and according to what criteria? Many of the
Romani lite which emerged in the 1990s did not live so-called traditional
Romani lives and some are not ethnically Romani. This is where my investigation really begins. It starts from quite a simplistic question who speaks
for Roma? navigating a journey encompassing issues such as ethnic
mobilization and political representation in order to capture the most
recent chapter in Romani political history.
2
Political Participation and
Representation of Roma
Roma are the most disparate and disadvantaged minority group in Europe,
and due to political, legal and social factors they continue to be marginalized.
I am careful not to prescribe mechanisms to rectify this perceived injustice,
but I do attempt to understand the vicious cycle of under-representation1
in which Roma nd themselves, and oer both theoretical and empirical
insights into this state of aairs. Theoretically, the research seeks to advance
understandings of the complex relationship between ethnic mobilization,
interest articulation and legitimate representation with regard to minorities, and empirically, it details the case of Romani political participation2
in Hungary and Romania, as well as the role and impact of transnational
organizing structures of representation. The Roma issue has become more
salient on the international and domestic political agenda since 1989, when
the collapse of communism facilitated a resurgence of ethno-nationalism
across CEECs. Its development from a marginal to a signicant concern
can be understood in the broader context of academic debates on human
rights and minority rights.
The interests of minority groups are invariably squeezed out by the
majority and if the state does not provide adequate representation or preferential treatment then minority communities often mobilize and create their
own organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests.
Marginalized minority groups ought to be adequately represented in processes of policy-making and decision-making if they are to enjoy equality
and justice, meaning that they should have input into the policy-making
process particularly on decisions which aect them directly. While there
have been numerous attempts to accommodate minorities by incorporating
33
34
their interests into existing state structures or by creating new ones, the
current national assemblies in CEECs are not truly representative of many
minority groups because electoral democracy will always be an expression
of majoritarian norms and preferences; furthermore, there are structural
and practical barriers for minority groups which impede full participatory
democracy.
Roma are of particular signicance, not least because, the goal of creating eective and legitimate Roma representation is making its way to
the forefront of national and international concerns (Klmov 2002, 104).
Roma are an appropriate group for a case study because they have a legitimate claim to under-representation, they have been historically excluded
from political rights, seen as unt to rule and have experienced mistrust
with non-Roma (Klmov-Alexander 2004, 600). Furthermore, their socioeconomic and political marginalization has been highlighted by a number
of non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations reports (HRW
1993; Ligeois 1994; Van der Stoel 2000; ERRC 2001a; 2001b; 2002a;
2002b; 2003a; 2003b; 2004a; 2004b; OSCE 2003; OSCE-ODIHR 2003; EU
Commission 2004; ERRC 2006; EUMC 2006; ERRC 2007a; ENAR 2008;
OSCE 2009). The need to create organizing structures of representation in
the domestic and transnational political contexts on the one hand arms
Romas lack of voice and, on the other, acts as a conduit through which
Roma can articulate their interests.
I argue that there are two main ways for Roma to increase their political
participation: through parliamentary representation and through civil
society organizations. First, in seeking parliamentary representation, there
are several alternatives open to Romani political activists. These include:
(a) the organization of Romani political parties; (b) an individual Rom
standing as an independent candidate; and (c) Romani candidates standing on the party lists of mainstream parties. Although there are a number
of Romani political parties in CEECs, their participation in representative
bodies has been limited mostly to the local level, and they have been unable
to secure sucient electoral support at the national level. One alternative
is that a Rom may also run independently as a candidate in a particular
electoral district while another possibility is for Roma candidates to run on
the party lists of mainstream parties however it is questionable whether a
minority parliamentarian who is elected into a national parliament on the
list of a mainstream political party can legitimately represent and articulate
the interests of his or her minority community.
Secondly, a lack of political experience and diering visions among
Roma activists has led to a fragmentation of the recently emerged Romani
Political Participation and Representation of Roma
35
movement in CEECs. The civil society arena which had been suppressed
under communist regimes oered new, yet ambiguous, possibilities.
Establishing Romani civil society organizations allowed for the pursuit of
policy advocacy outside of the formal political arena, where actors competed over resources and jostled for position, and facilitated the creation of
new organizing structures of representation to articulate Roma interests.
The new Romani political lite had to learn the rules of the game and frequently found their voices drowned out by other competitive forces in the
transition to democracy. This meant that the NGO sector oered an attractive alternative especially as Western donors such as the Soros Foundation
and the EU presented the material resources needed to pursue policy advocacy and project implementation to the burgeoning civil society sector.
This chapter begins by outlining the main objectives and assumptions
of the research including the theoretical basis and the methodological
approach. The mobilization and political participation of minorities is
subsequently assessed oering insights into the representation of Roma.
The relationship between minorities, the state and international law is then
unpacked before an overview of the Roma social movement is provided.
Finally, I developed an understanding of legitimacy and how it can be
determined.
Objectives, Assumptions and Rationale

This book represents an attempt to contribute to the debate on Roma from
a political scientists perspective. I build on the research and investigations
on Roma conducted by Acton, Gheorghe, Guy, Klmov-Alexander, Kovats,
Ligeois and Vermeersch, among others, and add new empirical data as
well as analytical insights. The guiding question which informs the research
is who speaks for Roma? I began my research asking this question yet
soon realized that in order to adequately answer it, other inter-related
aspects of participation and representation demanded attention thus I aim
to: (a) highlight how the representation of Roma can only be understood
in both the domestic and transnational political contexts. Roma are a
transnational minority and require transnational as well as domestic organizing structures of representation; (b) argue that Roma constitute a social
movement. Despite their heterogeneity Roma engage in traditional social
movement activities such as symbolic protests, solidarity demonstrations,
petitions and the creation of organizations to articulate interests, the latter
being a central focus of my research; (c) focus more attention on the interests of Roma rather than the rights of Roma therefore Romani participation
36
and voice rather than the role of the state becomes the critical component;
(d) question the legitimacy of those who represent Roma in public life, be
they lite, political parties, civil society organizations or international
NGOs. Notably, a thin stratum of Romani activists and intellectuals has
emerged since the collapse of communism and these are often self-appointed.
Moreover most Roma are not aware of the plethora of organizing structures of representation which articulate their interests in domestic and
transnational contexts which impedes claims to legitimate representation;
(e) elucidate the link between identity and interests. I maintain that, in the
case of Roma, identity and interests are insoluble as one informs the other
and due to the heterogeneity and fragmented collective identity of Roma,
it is more dicult to formulate and articulate shared interests.
I argue that eective participation is not necessarily limited to public
aairs, and can also pertain to cultural, social and economic life. Without
denying the importance of other areas of the public domain, the analysis
will focus its conceptual lens on participation in public aairs. This
provides an opportunity to uncover patterns of institutional interaction
and forms of political participation which successive Hungarian and
Romanian governments have pursued to rectify the perceived deciency
in Roma representation. The role of the transnational political context is
crucial and the impact of the EU as a site and ally of Romani mobilization
is evaluated in turn. Furthermore, this framework permits an analysis
of the relationship between minority identity and interest formation.
Crucially I aim to discern the relationship between interest formation
and interest articulation. In this respect the interests of Roma are articulated3 by several competing organizing structures of representation
including: lite; ethnic political parties; and domestic and transnational
civil society organizations which oer an access point for analysing ethnic
mobilization from below. Since the analysis is based on the assumption that
the Romani community cannot rely on the state to establish organizing
structures of representation, I focus principally on the Roma social movement and how it has attempted to augment representativity and political
participation.
Theoretical Basis
This research aims to move beyond conceptual dichotomies in the literature on minority rights (Glazer 1983; Freeman 1995; Galenkamp 1996 and
1998; Wright 1999). To that end it seeks to provide existing academic discourse on minority rights with fresh impetus so as to advance understandings
on minority political participation and representation. Most research on
37
minority rights in Europe has focused on how CEECs have responded

to international norm compliance (Liebich 1998; De Witte 2000; Gl
2000; Toggenburg 2000; Pentasuglia 2001; Brusis 2003; Vermeersch 2004;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schwellnus 2005; Toggenburg 2006;
Kriszn 2009); and studies which focus prominently on the role of the state
(Kymlicka 1995; Tesser 2003), thus negating other political contexts. In
addition, it is observed that the academic literature on Roma has yet to
produce a satisfactory explanation or understanding of the deplorable
situation that Roma nd themselves in. Research on Roma has involved
emotive pleas to address their relative socio-economic standing in society
(Revenga et al. 2002; Ringold et al. 2005; Pogny 2004) which has typically
involved analysing how and why CEECs have complied with various international organizations attempts to put minority protection on the domestic
agenda (Hughes and Sasse 2003). However, a move has been made to
account for their lack of political participation in the organizing structures
of the state, especially in CEECs (Vermeersch 2001; Weber 2001; Sobotka
2002; National Democratic Institute 2003; Vermeersch 2003a; Baclija and
Haek 2007; McGarry 2008a), and how the state has attempted to integrate
Romani communities (Cashman 2008). Additionally, the transnational
political context has been attracting attention of late which highlights the
importance of the international political context for Roma (Jenne 2000;
Gheorghe and Acton 2001; Sobotka 2003; Vermeersch 2003b; Goodwin 2004;
Klmov-Alexander 2004; Guglielmo and William Waters 2005; KlmovAlexander 2005; Simhandl 2006; McGarry 2008b; Trehan and Sigona 2009).
The historical situation of Roma has been well-documented (Puxon 1973;
Fraser 1992; Ligeois and Gheorghe 1995; Mirga and Gheorghe 1997;
Crowe 1999; Mayall 2004; Bancroft 2005) which provides a strong empirical base with which to embark on more analytical investigations.
The increase in the number of Roma organizations and individuals
engaged in public political activity over the last 20 years has coincided with
the dramatic decline in the living conditions and social status, that is, the
interests, of most of Roma (Kovats 2003). The obvious conclusion is that
Roma politics is ineective in articulating the interests of the Romani community. Some scholars have pointed out the failure of Roma to enhance
their political participation (Barany 1995; Kovats 1997) but have not oered
any insights into why the growing political signicance of Roma issue does
not reect the political capacity of the Romani community, nor indeed,
what the interests of Roma actually are. This is the theoretical access point
from which a true understanding of Roma political participation and representation can be constructed and takes into account the role of ethnic
group identity and interests.
38
Methodological Approach
In determining who can legitimately represent and articulate the interests
of Roma, this research proceeds in three steps in the domestic case studies.
First, the interests of Roma are outlined. Secondly, the role and function
of organizing structures of representation are examined and the view
that lite/individuals can articulate the interests of Roma in the domestic
political context is assessed; the role and impact of ethnic political parties
is examined; and the purpose of Romani civil society organizations in the
representation of Roma interests is gauged. Thirdly, the legitimacy of these
organizing structures of representation in articulating the interests of
Roma is considered. Then the focus shifts to the articulation and representation of Roma beyond the state. Mobilization beyond the state raises
substantive issues pertaining to representation and political participation.
It is determined whether transnational organizing structures of representation have a legitimate claim to Roma representation.
In order to understand the political representation of Roma, I select two
CEECs, Hungary and Romania, both of which have large Romani communities which are under-represented in public life.4 A comparison of the two
domestic case studies is justied on several grounds. First, Hungary and
Romania have developed unique and far-reaching legislative and policy
provisions to improve the political participation of minorities, including
Roma. Secondly, both have established governmental agencies to address
the needs (and interests) of Roma. Thirdly, Hungary and Romania have
signed a number of documents which set regional standards in the eld
of minority protection.5 Fourthly, minority status laws have been developed by Hungary and Romania with the input of Romani lite and civil
society organizations, although the minority status law thus far remains
un-codied in Romania. Fifthly, both states house an increasingly active
and vibrant Romani civil society community. Finally, ethnic mobilization
has resulted in the establishment of very dierent organizing structures of
representation which have their respective advantages and disadvantages.
Taken together these case studies provide fertile ground for comparison
of ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and
legitimate representation.
Since the early 1990s there has been a turn towards ethnic identication
as a framework for political mobilization (Vermeersch 2006). However,
there is a need for a comprehensive study of the transformation of minority
political inclusion including how ethnic minority political mobilization
39
is manifest, and how Roma in particular have developed tactics and

repertoires to ensure their voice is heard. This research highlights the
extent to which political participation has evolved outside of conventional
political arenas, for example, through ethnic minority mobilization and
the creation of civil society organizations. In the case of Roma, this can
only be fully understood by examining how ethnic identication has
motivated political participation and representation in the domestic and
transnational political contexts.
My research is based on primary sources with interviews and eldwork
in Hungary and Romania, as well as Dublin, Strasbourg and Brussels,
having been conducted between 2004 and 2009. It brings together information published in a variety of sources, arranging the information so as to
pose a number of hypotheses and preliminary questions, and identifying
the controversies and gaps in the research. Necessarily this involves synergizing data relating to political participation and representation in Hungary
and Romania, of particular relevance are the legislative provisions such as
electoral law, legislation to establish political parties and NGOs, reports of
governmental agencies, government policies, civil society organizations
reports and mandates, and statements made by lite.
The following three propositions inform and guide my research. First,
it is posited that representation increases with the active involvement of
Romani civil society organizations in a political context. The utilitarian
principles underpinning liberal democracy imply that certain groups,
notably minorities, do not have access to adequate representation structures in the domestic political context. As a result, minorities are forced to
develop alternative organizing structures of representation to facilitate the
articulation of their interests meaning that civil society organizations are
often the most legitimate and authoritative voice in Roma representation,
despite lacking a democratic mandate. Secondly, the increasing proliferation of individuals, groups and organizations which claim to represent
the interests of Roma has an adverse eect on Roma representation. The
Romani community possesses a contested group identity which results
in fragmented interest formulation and articulation. This has created a
situation in which numerous actors claim to represent the interests of
Roma, and has led to a degree of dilution and confusion surrounding
legitimate Roma representation. Thirdly, it is assumed that lite, though
individuals, can represent the interests of Roma provided they are vested
with a democratic mandate or they regarded as legitimate by Roma. These
political leaders often articulate the interests of the Romani community as
40
a whole therefore an individual can have a legitimate claim to represent the

interests of the Romani community.
Two hypotheses guide this thesis:
H1: Political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma
representation.
Political and policy decisions which are taken at an abstract level rarely
reect the preferences and interests of the demos. If adequate representation structures are in place in the domestic political context, then minority
groups have the potential to articulate their interests. Political decentralization, which can take a variety of forms, is often the best way for minorities
to make their voices heard in a democratic system. However, I argue that
the role and impact of Romani transnational mobilization and activism has
created a situation whereby the interests of Roma are articulated beyond
the connes of the state, and this creates problems for legitimacy. Crucially
I understand decentralization as more than a system of local administration over decision-making processes, rather decentralization is a system
which increases political participation and representation, and helps to
ensure local ownership and stakeholder involvement over policies and
decisions which aect communities directly. Decentralization increases the
capacity to foster social relationships and intersubjective interaction which
is necessary for legitimacy. (See Figure 2.1.)
Roma Social Movement
Domestic organizing
structures of representation
higher
Transnational organizing
Legitimacy
lower
Figure 2.1 Hypothesis 1: Decentralization Increases the Legitimacy of Representation Structures
41
H2: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani activity increases.
I examine transnational organizing structures of representation including international Romani NGOs and transnational advocacy networks.
The state employs a diverse range of representation structures to ensure
that the interests of Roma are taken into account and domestic Romani
actors also create organizing structures of representation such as NGOs.
However, many of these are inherently awed, and result in Roma constructing other avenues to articulate their interests, including transnational
civil society organizations. Transnational advocacy networks (Keck and
Sikkink 1998a; Risse et al. 1999) have proliferated in recent years and oer
a new organizing structure of representation for Roma to articulate their
interests. These transnational advocacy networks do not claim to represent
Roma in the strictest sense as they are often gaje institutions which advocate for human rights (examples include the Open Society Institute (OSI)
and the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)). Also, Roma have created
international NGOs with a specic Romani focus which uses ethnic identity as a means to mobilize support (examples include the International
Romani Union (IRU), the Roma National Congress (RNC), the European
Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF)). While acknowledging the importance
of each structure I focus on the role of the European Roma Information
Oce (ERIO) based in Brussels and assess its capacity to articulate the
interests of Roma in the transnational political context.
Mobilization, Political Participation and Representation

The paternalistic attitude of communist leaders ensured that Roma enjoyed
a degree of security from persecution; however, after the collapse of communism, Roma began to mobilize politically as they realized they could
seize the opportunity to participate in public aairs and ensure that their
voice was heard. This urry of civil society activity extended to other
minority communities in Central and Eastern Europe though these communities, including the Hungarian and German minorities found vocal
support from a kin state eager to lobby on behalf of their Diaspora.6 Across
CEECs, democracy became the norm but it quickly became clear that
Roma would have to create new organizing structures of representation
which were specic to their interests because the embedded utilitarian
principles of democracy necessarily marginalize minority interests.
42
At the heart of the debate surrounding political participation and representation lies mobilization. The traditional understanding of political
mobilization has been the deliberative activity of a group of individuals for
the realization of political objectives (Barany 1998, 309). In addition, these
goals generally encompass enhanced interest representation; the cessation
of political, social; economic and other types of discrimination; and the
improvement of the given collectives conditions and relative standing in
society (Barany 1998, 309310). Furthermore, Gurr (1993, 123) understands ethnic mobilization as being fuelled by peoples grievances about
their relative deprivation and their determination to pursue political interests. What Barany and Gurr term interests can more accurately understood
as preferences, as the latter concept is loaded with rational intentions and
motivations. The rational language of mobilization to attain goals does not
tell the whole story as political mobilization is more than a simple means
end calculation. Ethnicity retains no conceptual or contextual autonomy
meaning that ethnic groups such as Roma can mobilize around their ethnicity to articulate their interests. While some political theorists explain
that culture provides a conditioning element for action (Nettl 1967, 27),
this line of thought pursues the functional attribution of politics where
goal attainment is its primary purpose. However, it is more appropriate to
understand ethnicity as a point of reference for minorities as they mobilize
politically whereby ethnicity serves as a unifying agent or glue which holds
the social movement together. The real function of ethnic mobilization lies
in its ability to turn the Romani community into an eective pressure and
interest group, as national-ethnic groups are by denition in the contemporary world indeed, the future of the Romani community depends on its
successful development into such a group, conscious of its rights, interests
and power (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 33). Of course, ethnic mobilization
alone does not guarantee success because successful mobilization will usually depend on a number of variables or conditions being in place including:
a strong ethnic identity; the eectiveness of the group (through its organizations and leadership); and the actions of the state (Barany 1998).7 Each of
these indicators is considered in turn.
It is necessary to caution against assuming that a distinctive ethnic group
possesses a strong and well-developed identity. Thus while Roma are the
largest and most geographically dispersed minority group in Europe, they
do not share a cohesive identity. This is due to dierences in, among others,
income, geography, occupation, language, religion and familial ties. This
has resulted in a contested group identity, and often Roma themselves are
unwilling to identify themselves as Roma due to the perception that this
43
will result in further persecution.8 This is not to say that identity cannot be
constructed as actors continually attempt to negotiate identities which are
achieved through intersubjective interaction through and between groups.9
In the transnational political context this has resulted in attempts by the
IRU and the RNC to foster Romani nationalism as a stateless nation. This
research contends that there is a direct link between identity and interests
and reconciling this conceptual cleavage involves theorizing the political
participation of Romani actors within existing and emerging organizing
structures of representation.
The eectiveness of a group will determine the success of mobilization
which is primarily centred on the role of leaders and organizations. First,
as Barany (1998, 311) rightly points out, the importance of the leader(s) is
dicult to overestimate for those in a leadership position may determine
the success or failure of the organization or movement. Leaders frequently
set the agenda and goals of an ethnic group, and determine the strategies
which the group as a whole will pursue. Whether an ethnic group concerns
itself primarily with cultural issues (education); political issues (securing
members in parliament); economic issues (equal opportunities in the
workplace); or with social issues (access to adequate housing) is usually
the prerogative of the leader. Sometimes interests are general (addressing
discrimination) and sometimes they are specic (preventing the perpetuation of negative stereotypes in the media), but as a rule ethnic identication
will dictate which interests are formed. Because Roma retain many interests, both proximate and ultimate, the role of organizations becomes
important for it is through these that interests nd expression. The institutional form through which mobilization itself is communicated is a crucial
determinant of successful ethnic mobilization. Each of the new constitutions of CEECs guarantees the freedom of association, be they political
parties or civil society organizations, and formal organizations have been
created in the transnational political context. There has been a proliferation
of organizing structures of representation which lobby and advocate on
behalf of Roma in CEECs, and the fragmentation which characterizes all
social movements can be found in the Roma social movement too.
The state is usually, but not always, the target of ethnic mobilization
therefore it plays a key role in determining the success or failure of ethnic
mobilization. The state must be sure that it is dealing with the legitimate
representatives of the ethnic community meaning that it must be convinced
that the ethnic groups leaders, organizations and political parties enjoy
some degree of authority within the ethnic group, and articulate its interests (Gurr 1993, 68). In spite of the large number of Romani organizations
44
in Hungary and Romania, their communities have benetted from increasing state consideration in the form of concrete programmes designed to
rectify past injustices. The impact of the EUs accession criteria10 on CEECs
has, of course, been instrumental in determining the direction of state
policy on minority protection. However academic discourse has inated
the importance of the EU at the expense of structural adjustments occurring within the state (De Witte 2000; Toggenburg 2000). Yet there have
been some moves recently to analyse these structural adjustments occurring within the state which domestic actors respond to (Vermeersch 2006).
This includes a change in government which provides the opportunity
for domestic Romani lite entrepreneurs to strategically engage and manipulate the socio-political situation for their own organizations benet.
Usually the state is both the site and target for social movement activity but
Chapter 6 demonstrates that transnational organizing structures of representation circumvent state structures when articulating interests to an
international audience, albeit one with strong normative power.
A number of initiatives to enhance political representation of minorities, including Roma, can be identied in Hungary and Romania. In
Romania, the constitution guarantees every national minority representation in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1993, a Council for National Minorities
was established by the government which co-ordinates the programmes of
various state authorities and provides a special forum for the articulation
of minority issues. The Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE) has a monopoly
on Roma representation and receives designated government funding as
the voice of Roma in formal political structures. In 2001 the government
elaborated the Roma Strategy to address Roma problems over a ten-year
period. Additionally, despite eorts on the part of the Hungarian minority,
the status law on minorities in Romania has not been passed through the
Chamber of Deputies. In Hungary, the Minorities Law was adopted in 1993
which provides a far-reaching system of local and national self-government.
In 1995, a Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) for National and
Ethnic Minorities was established, and the incumbent is a Rom. However,
there is no Romani representative in the Hungarian parliament who
attained the position on an ethnic ticket although several have been
included and elected on mainstream party lists.
It is necessary to consider each of these indicators when attempting to
understand the political participation of Roma, and who can legitimately
claim to represent and articulate their interests. At the heart of the matter
sits ethnic mobilization. The act of mobilizing suggests an attempt to unite
in order to achieve a goal. However, it is argued here that ethnic mobilization
45
is more complicated than a simple meansend calculation, and therefore,

other factors must be considered: What is the role of identity?11 Who articulates the interests of Roma? What structures have Hungary and Romania
created to alleviate the problems faced by Roma? How is ethnic mobilization secured in the transnational political context? Of particular concern
for this research is to uncover the relationship between political participation and representation to determine who represents the interests of Roma,
and who can claim to do so legitimately.
Examining political participation and organizing structures of representation is useful because the results and impact are tangible the rewards
are specied through legislation or by the direct allocation of rights and
privileges. The very nature of interest-group rivalry, where a plurality of
identities overlap, means that the political context becomes the most signicant in the competition for the values and interests of a minority group.
But politics is more than just the arena of interests, or of social transformation through mobilization. Politics is also a highly emotive arena, where
heightened political competition over interests can spill over into outright
hostility. Here interests can morph into causes which invite violent conict
and even war (Bell 1975, 162). Yet Roma are an ethnic group who have
never risen up12 to realize their goals, so when we understand interests
here, they refer to a non-violent intra-group competition to eect political
change. Brass (1996, 86) points out that identity is used by an ethnic
group to create internal cohesion and dierentiate themselves from other
groups and is frequently invoked to generate support for an individual or
organization, and such a conception of identity is in tune with Roma representation in both the domestic and transnational political contexts.
Ethnic groups which use ethnicity to make demands in the political context for a change in their status, economic opportunities, or in their civil
rights are engaged in a form of interest group politics which became prominent in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s (Piven and Cloward 1977;
McAdam 1982), which attempted to improve the well-being of group
members as individuals.
We might presume to know why ethnic minorities mobilize but less is
known about how they mobilize. There are numerous ways in which an
ethnic minority can mobilize, but as with all social movements, the role
of civil society is of paramount importance. In her exploration of new
social movements, Cohen (1985, 682) determines that civil society has
become the indispensable terrain on which social actors assemble, organize and mobilize and details how the institutional structures of the state
change through new social movements and interaction, deconstructs the
46
epistemological divide in new social movement research, and highlights

the reasons why actors mobilize to secure recognition through various
forms of representation, the most important being civil society (1985,
663716). Representation is only possible once actors mobilize around
a common identity, however as has been noted already, Romani identity
is contested which makes ethnic mobilization, interest articulation and
legitimate representation all the more dicult.
I acknowledge, though deliberately downplay, the role of exogenous
actors such as the state, international organizations and donor agencies,
and concentrate instead on mobilization by Roma themselves.13 Are
organizing structures of representation the result/expression/product of
mobilization or are they just part of the process, like social partners? The
simplied diagram below (Figure 2.2) is broken up into two areas: the
majority and the minority. Of concern here are those elements contained
within the minority arena (for the moment the role and impact of transnational organizing structures of representation are sidelined). The process
starts with ethnic mobilization which results in the creation of organizing
structures of representation, and is sustained due to social interaction
between the Romani community and the organizing structures of representation. These organizing structures of representation are not legitimate
from the outset but can be legitimated only by the minority community in
a variety of ways. The interests of the minority community are articulated
by the organizing structures of representation, and appear both inside
the minority and majority arenas because interests are articulated to the
Majority
Minority
Legitimacy
Ethnic
mobilization
Legitimacy
Organizing structures
of representation
Legitimacy
Interest
articulation
Legitimacy
Figure 2.2 The Political Participation of Roma in the Domestic Political Context
47
majority as well as the minority. It is worth noting that there is no

direct linkage between ethnic mobilization and legitimacy. Legitimacy can
only be conferred on the organizing structures of representation by the
minority and because the arrows ow into the organizing structures of representation, it shows that this is an input legitimacy. The next logical step in
a scientic inquiry would be to determine whether the interests of Roma
are secured and under what conditions, however due to spatial constraints
I do not pursue this particular path.
Minorities, the Democratic State and International Law

Minority rights protection does not always boil down to rights, because
politics often plays a more critical role. Unlike the freedom from torture14
which the state must ensure, the state has no obligation to guarantee political participation for minorities.15 The issues aecting minorities involve
not only a question of human and minority rights, but also raise questions
about modes of governance. Certain individuals, because of their membership in a national or ethnic group are persecuted or marginalized; however,
this does not legitimize positive discrimination, either in constitutional
restructuring, or in other contexts.16 Such an approach is incompatible with
the prevailing individualist ethos which has informed the discourse on
human rights and minority rights. The democratic state is obliged to implement human rights to all its citizens, and appropriate minority rights to
persons belonging to national minorities. Wheatley (1999, 203) explains
the importance of this dynamic, such rights provide the parameters for the
political discourse within a democracy, providing the grounds upon which
the political debate may legitimately be held and framing the context within
which arguments may be formed.
A general right to political participation17 is contained in Article 25 of
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which
provides that all citizens enjoy, without discrimination as to race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion or national origin: (a) the
right to take part in the conduct of public aairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. While
this right is clearly a treaty obligation guided by the principle of pacta sunt
servanda, it has also been claimed as a general rule of customary international law (Fox 1992, 539). In Europe, the right is reected in the regional
standards produced by the CoE and the OSCE18 and may therefore be
considered as a regional custom.
48
Under the traditional model of democracy, no special measures are

required by the state to take into account the demands of a multi-ethnic
society, in which an ethnically or linguistically distinct majority and minority must co-exist, nor is the state required to create the institutional
framework for political debate, open paths to political participation which
would otherwise be blocked (Steiner 1988, 109110). Wheatley (1999, 204)
points out that liberal democracy [. . .] allows all groups the right to compete freely with the advancement of their particular ideas and opinions.
Still, the obvious consequence of this system is that the minority interest
will always be out-bid by the majority. The preamble to the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) states a
pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging
to a national minority, but also create the appropriate conditions enabling
them to express, preserve and develop this identity which means that
the interests of the minority polis need to be reected and cultivated.
Obviously, governments which are elected by the majority are likely to
reect the interests of the majority which can be witnessed both in the
formulation of policy and its implementation. This is the very reason why
ethnic mobilization and interest articulation are so important for minorities. They create organizing structures of representation through stalagmite
mobilization and through these they can articulate their interests.
The Explanatory Report to the FCNM suggests measures which the
state may adopt to ensure the eective participation of national minorities
inter alia:
consultation by the state with members of national minorities
through representation institutions when the state is contemplating
administrative or legislative measures likely to have a direct eect on
the national minority; involving the national minority in the preparation and implementation of regional development activity likely to
aect them; allowing eective participation by persons belonging
to national minority into the decision making proves at national and
regional level.19
The right to political participation, to have a voice, does not prescribe one
particular mechanism through which persons belonging to the national
minority group may participate in the public life of the state, but it does
demand that the right be eectively implemented. Therefore the government must set up adequate organizing structures of representation. Such
formal mechanisms will inevitably vary from state to state, depending
49
upon the constitutional history, that is, the cultural path, and institutions of
the state. Hungary and Romania have pursued innovative and divergent
representation structures when accommodating their minorities, including Roma however I primarily focus on the organizing structures of
representation which are the result of stalagmite mobilization both within
and beyond the state because it is only through these structures that we can
determine the interests of Roma.
The Roma Social Movement

The Roma social movement is a multifaceted phenomenon and requires a
combination of theoretical perspectives in order to gain a greater purchase
on it. No single ready-made theoretical model can provide all the tools
necessary to explain the political participation and representation structures of Roma. I do not whimsically tip theoretical propositions into a
metaphorical shopping cart but parasitically (Evans 1996, 5) draw on
analytical distinctions and insights from a variety of theoretical positions
in sociology, political science and international relations. The basic puzzle
is, how do Roma make their voice heard in a liberal democratic system
which teleologically suppresses minority interests? Roma slip through the
cracks of conventional political theories because one unied theory cannot
be imported and applied to understand their situation. Therefore I draw on
several literatures and theoretical insights to uncover patterns and instances
legitimate representation. This middle-way has been shown to be useful for
researchers who pursue theoretically informed empirical political analysis
through diverse conceptual lenses (Kohli 1996, 2).
My conceptual framework draws mainly on understandings in the
academic discourse on representation, social movements, citizenship and
minority rights. The evolving concept of representation bridges political
participation and interests (Birch 1971; Hindess 2001) and I maintain that
representation can only be understood as being of interests, and not of
persons. The social movement literature stresses the role of identity for
mobilization and creating organizing structures of representation. The
citizenship literature provides an insight into the relationship between
Roma and the state by focusing on access to citizenship (Marshall 1950;
Turner 1990), and the struggle for citizenship rights (Tilly 1978). The
minority rights literature houses numerous innovative concepts with which
to apply to the case of Roma including ethnicity, justice, anti-discrimination
and cultural identity. Despite this, the task inevitably falls to the interpretive skills of the researcher to make sense of Roma representation. A holistic
50
and systemic approach is not analytical dilute but actually strengthens the
capacity of the theory to make sense of the empirics.
By analysing organizing structures of representation it is possible to
understand the nature of the Roma social movement and its relationship to
wider society. But what is a social movement and do Roma constitute such
a phenomenon? Tarrow (1998, 4) maintains that social movements are
collective challenges, based on common purposes and solidarities, in sustained interaction with lite, opponents and authorities, which means the
shoe ts. The political practices of social movements construct the interests
they represent (Laclau and Moe 1985; cited in Foweraker 1995, 13) and
the group identity of Roma provides a cultural space in which intersubjective processes can reproduce identity and interests. This insight is signicant
as a social movement is not an objective fact but must be understood as
a process. The importance and relevance of a social movement lies in civic
activism and community mobilization which occurs outside of formal
political and legal channels which has steadily increased, particularly since
the 1960s. Furthermore, as Mayer (1991, 63) explains, social movements
are no longer apart from mainstream political parties, lobbies, and interest
groups, but rather, they share space with them as legitimate partners. The
traditional structural perspective examines the organizations themselves
including their functions and capabilities, although organizations are only
one expression of a social movement. Sidestepping issues of power and tactics in formal structures allows the analysis to concentrate on identity and
the socio-cultural context in which identity is both constructed and embedded. In this respect formal organizations are an expression of culture and
identity (Lomnitz 1982, 569570). The research on social movements has
been dominated by two paradigms built on competing epistemological
foundations: one is resource mobilization (RM) which puts emphasis on
leaders and societal lite in the political opportunity structure; while the
other is the macrosociological approach which focuses on identity. Since
these two approaches have dominated research on social movements, their
specic propositions and insights are discussed with reference to the ethnic
mobilization of Roma.
The foundations for the RM approach were laid by Olsons (1965) theory
of collective action which stresses the importance of rational calculating
actors in social movements. The building blocks of the RM approach are
resources, formal organization, tactics and political opportunities. It proved
useful in analysing the relevance of organization in a social movement
(Piven and Cloward 1977), studies on the relationship between social
movements and political opportunity structures (Eisinger 1973; Tarrow
51
1983), studies on the development of specic contemporary movements

such as the womens movement (Freeman 1975) and the civil rights
movement (McAdam 1982), and attempts have been made to bolster the
structural element of the RM approach (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1992; Snow and
Benford 1992). Nonetheless, several criticisms have been levelled at the RM
approach because: (1) it says little about the emergence and denitions of
interests which it treats as given and stable; (2) it uses overly simplistic
rational actor models; (3) it tends to overestimate the importance of formal
organizations for collective mobilization (Kitschelt 1991, 330). In response
to these shortcomings the macrosociological approach has attempted to
reduce the role of agency by analysing societal structures. In this sense,
organization is not simply an instrumental facilitator of collective action, but
also an expression of the movement practices and aspirations themselves:
the medium can be the message (Kitschelt 1991, 336: emphasis added).
I primarily examine formal organizations leaving other expressive action
repertoires (Rucht 1990, 164) such as demonstration and protest to one
side. In order to compensate for the attention given to formal organizations,
I bring identity and interests into the discussion. Organizations articulate
interests that have been constructed according to ideological anities and
circumstances but the relationship between identity and interests is not
progeny; rather, the interests and identity of Roma are insoluble. Actors
are grounded in a context and culture which produces shared interests;
however, to focus on actors alone, as the RM approach does, is to miss the
bigger picture and the aspect most relevant to the macrosociological
approach the societal framework, which permits the interplay of agency
and structure. The macrosociological approach points to socio-political
context in which Romani identity and interests are constructed and reproduced through interaction.
If RM approaches show how movements mobilize for their claims
then macrosociological theories explain why certain movements emerge
and develop (Melucci 1985), by focusing on identity. Some scholars have
emphasized that identity is a strategy (Rucht 1990, 161164) while others
have suggested that identity is a choice, something which the individual
can opt into (Friedman and McAdam 1992, 157), ignoring identitys constructed and relational qualities. But identity is not understood as a cause
in the positivist sense rather it is a necessary precondition for social movements. In addition, identity always works in relationship to, and interacts
with other social processes and variables (Adler and Crawford 2002, 5)
which is why it is futile to analytically separate identity from interests in the
Roma social movement. These new social movements (Melucci 1980; 1985;
52
1992) stress participatory decision-making, a decentralized structure, and

opposition to bureaucratic procedures (Dalton et al. 1990, 5). The role of
values, identity and interests emerge prominently in the macrosociological
approach and it is postulated that the (re)construction of identity becomes
a key task of any social movement. A social movement is a socially constructed collective reality (Melucci 1992, 5) and Roma construct this
reality with reference to their group identity and shared interests. Political
processes and the creation of institutions demonstrate the importance of
avoiding groupism in which the group becomes the fundamental unit
of analysis (Brubaker 2004), showing how ethnicity works in context. A
key task of my research is to problematize and question the identity and
interests of Roma in domestic and transnational socio-political contexts,
demonstrating that these soft institutions are not xed or given, and crucially that they are inextricably linked.
Determining Legitimacy
Questioning the legitimacy of Roma representatives might seem an easy
target. Indeed, what political authority can claim to be legitimate due to
infrequent elections and declining voter turnout at the ballot box across
Europe? I do not place these structures on trial rather I investigate the
legitimacy of Roma representatives in the domestic and transnational
political contexts because these structures, for better or worse, have the
capacity to formulate and articulate the needs of Roma to the broader
community as well as to the state and inter-governmental organizations.
Legitimacy has become a hotly contested issue in the international relations literature (Atack 1999; Clark 2003; Collingwood 2006). I am primarily
concerned with legitimate representation as opposed to legitimate behaviour or authority; therefore, institutions are the key. Furthermore, I am not
convinced by Webers understanding of the concept whereby the subjective
perception of legitimacy is the crucial determinant. An individuals perception of legitimacy is of no use because no normative yardstick exists with
which to evaluate legitimacy claims. Transnational organizing structures of
representation lack many of the characteristics used by liberal theorists to
justify legitimacys exercise, such as democratic representation or accountability to the public. Collingwood (2006, 448) holds that a legitimate
government in the modern liberal sense is chosen by its citizens, operates
within the limits of a written constitution or detailed customary and legal
rules, and is expected to full (within reason) its electoral promises.
It follows that if transnational organizing structures of representation are
53
representing and articulating the interests of Roma then they should be

subject to particular rules or standards such as norms of transparency or
accountability. The substance of legitimacy is quite distinct in the domestic
and transnational political contexts thus a exible understanding of legitimacy is required in order to accommodate both contexts.
One of the key contributions of this book is to provide a clearer conception of who or what can legitimately represent Roma. However the concept
of legitimacy itself needs some explication. Representation is often not
enough on its own, there must be legitimacy too or else representation is
a hollow structure. Legitimacy can be determined in a number of ways, the
most obvious being that a person or institution is vested with a democratic
mandate. One interpretation of legitimacy is provided by Nettl (1967, 261)
who states that traditional forms of legitimacy are characterized in terms
of an analogy with the theatre; the relationship between rulers and ruled
being presented as an actor-audience relationship. The classic contribution
to the understanding of legitimacy as a sociological phenomenon was set
out by Weber who argues that legitimacy is a willingness to comply with
a system of rules regardless of how this is achieved.
Following Weber, legitimacy means a belief in legitimacy, in other words,
a belief in the right to rule. Weber identied three types of political legitimacy based upon: history and customs (traditional authority); the power
of personality (charismatic authority); and a framework of formal, legal
rules (legal-rational authority). A Weberian understanding of legitimacy
considers a polity to be legitimate if the governed accept the fundamental
norms and principles of the legal and political system (Merquior 1980).
However, legitimacy is not a rule in and of itself as it cannot be objectively
determined. This research understands legitimacy as part of a process
involving social recognition and interaction (Tully 1995; Wiener 2007),
because legitimacy is more than constituents following rules or obeying
a charismatic leader. Social interaction, such as the creation of organizing
structures of representation, brings in a community who share tacit understandings about appropriate and legitimate organizing structures of
representation. When a population mobilizes, for whatever reasons, its
cultural and social characteristics such as ethnicity acquire a new importance through the process of articulating interests in organizing structures
of representation.
With the emergence of formal organizations, a new type of Romani
leadership has come into existence which has raised questions of legitimacy.
Should leadership devolve from the traditional power structure (i.e. through
familial ties) or from the constituency of a formal organization and from
54
the state authorities (Jimenez 1995)? Mirga and Gheorghe (1997, 11) maintain that, there is no doubting the legitimacy of leadership drawn from
within the traditional power structure. Nevertheless, these leaders are
not usually well prepared for participation in the modern bureaucratic
structures such as government and public administration. A modern and
democratic leadership legitimized by the constituency of a formal organization is an ideal not yet well rooted in Romani communities. These
understandings of legitimacy can only take us so far as legitimacy is more
complex than an X on the ballot sheet or obeying a leader.
It is useful at this point to highlight two understandings of legitimacy:
output and input.20 Output legitimacy refers to an organizing structure of
representations capability to oer so-called deliverables to a community;
for example, economic prosperity. Output legitimacy relies on rational
inference based on tangible and measurable outcomes in which legitimacy
can be reduced to performance. As a corollary, input legitimacy emphasizes
the ownership which a community has over its representative institutions,
and is dependent on this community being united by a common identity.
Constituents thus have a stake in the decision-making process, without
being in control of it. Decentralization is important for input legitimacy as
constituents can participate directly in policy and decision-making which
impact upon them. At a local level, constituents can become involved and
this social recognition helps to foster legitimacy. Precisely because we are
dealing with a process whereby actors can confer consent on an organizing
structure of representation, it becomes equally important to conceive of
a reverse situation whereby actors can dissent, or express their disapproval
therefore deeming an organizing structure of representation to be
illegitimate.
Being embedded in a political context, interpreting interests based on
the substance of Romani identity brings consensus, reciprocity and participation into the fold. In this sense legitimacy means a community having
a stake in or access to those institutions which claim to represent them.
Tullys understanding of legitimacy comes from an inter-institutional dialogue where the conventions of mutual recognition and consent conspire
to bring about legitimacy, indeed, legitimacy [. . .] depends on this continuity, for it is the condition of Aboriginal consent to recognize them
(Tully 1995, 124).21 Legitimacy is not a rule, but a value which comes about
through interaction and practice. In this respect legitimacy is akin to a
custom where Tullys conventions of recognition and consent seem most
relevant. As legitimacy is constructed through interaction in socio-political
contexts and these relationships are based on tacit agreements of recognition, it is important to consider social processes such as mobilization which
55
allow legitimacy to be constructed. Nettl (1967, chapter 9) maintains that

mobilization impacts directly on legitimacy and points to the not necessarily exclusive processes of stalactite and stalagmite mobilization. Stalactite
mobilization is top down and the key actors are charismatic leaders, the
military and the civil bureaucracy. Stalagmite mobilization is bottom up
and represents cleavage-based mobilization against or towards an existing
authority and is a legitimizing function of a social movement. Romani
political participation and representation is primarily stalagmite mobilization witnessed in the creation of organizing structures of representation
above and beyond the state.
A useful understanding of how to determine legitimacy has been provided by Atack (1999, 855863) in his discussion of development NGOs
where he cites four criteria: representativeness; distinctive values; eectiveness; and empowerment. First, representativeness is procedural and is based
on modes of operation. In this respect, transnational organizing structures
of representation can be legitimate if they are transparent, accountable
and provide channels for participation. Secondly, distinctive values maintain that solidarity is a normative principle so legitimacy is based on shared
interests and needs rather than coercion. Thirdly, eectiveness highlights
the importance of programme deliverability and achieving goals, which
can be described as output legitimacy. Finally, empowerment emphasizes
self-help and self-reliance including collective decision-making. It is assumed
that each is relevant to varying degrees when assessing the legitimacy
claims of transnational organizing structures of representation working on
Romani issues although the role of distinctive values may prove more fruitful given that it centres on the constitutive components of the community
itself.
Any attempt to dene or confer legitimacy on a Romani actor or institution necessarily requires a degree of latitudinal interpretation. The legitimacy
of non-Roma governmental agencies can be increased due to interaction
and consultations with Romani civil society organizations on Roma-related
issues. An understanding of legitimacy as it relates to NGOs has been elaborated, having the right to be and to do something in society, a sense that
an organization is lawful, proper, admissible, and justied in doing what it
does and saying what it says, and that it continues to enjoy the support of
an identiable constituency (Edwards, M. 1999, 258). This understanding
of legitimacy is useful as it emphasizes that NGOs, as organizing structures
of representation, require the support of the Romani community in order
to be legitimate. That is, legitimacy is conferred on an organizing structure
of representation by a constituency particularly if the purpose of a structure is to represent an identiable constituency. For NGOs, the key is to
56
establish a relationship built on trust and recognition which can only be

secured through informal and formal localized interaction.
The underlying question is why are some institutions, organizations and
individuals perceived as legitimate by Roma, and others not? Subjective
perception of legitimacy is not enough in itself as legitimacy is a social
construct which is conferred on organizing structures of representation.
There are some elements in a society which inuence the legitimacy of
representation such as: authority; order; equality; justice; access; and shared
understandings. However, each of these elements depends upon social
recognition based on (inter) institutional practices. So, this situation is not
dichotomized into structural legitimacy or agency legitimacy, and is instead
a mix of both. Ultimately though, the agents (Roma) confer legitimacy on
the structure (organization structures of representation), which is realized
through political participation and engaging in socio-cultural embedded
practices. Essentially this book examines institutional legitimacy, which
can be determined in the domestic and transnational political contexts.
Collinwood (2006, 447448) lists seven sources of legitimacy which
transnational actors make reference to: notions of justice; reference to
international legal norms; impartiality nancial and political independence; an extensive membership; giving voice; expertise; partnership with
powerful actors. The most relevant of these sources of legitimacy to Roma
representation is giving voice particularly since the Roma social movement (RSM) has stepped up its lobbying activities and involvement with
norm-setting international organizations. In this respect, many Romani
transnational organizing structures of representation justify their actions
not in terms of democratic processes, accountability or transparency but
with reference to specic values and interests. Since legitimacy is dependent upon societal interaction for its existence, I contextualize the social and
political relationships within and beyond the state. By drawing up a framework which provides a structural connection between various factors such
as mobilization and decentralization, the discussion can move away from
output and performance-based legitimacy. One way to overcome the inherent diculties in determining input legitimacy is to dene the normative
criteria for legitimacy, for example, by providing qualitative data in a broad
perspective through reference to socio-political practices, while another is
to outline what an organizing structure of representation could do to
become more legitimate. I seek to determine who can legitimately claim to
represent the interests of Roma but do not provide a succinct, rigidly
dened and operational conception of legitimacy. It is maintained that this
is necessary in order to capture processes such as ethnic mobilization,
political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation
57
that necessarily occur across socio-political contexts. Asking who speaks

for Roma? does not go far enough because representation alone is a hollow
structure, legitimacy is necessary to invest the structure with meaning.
Therefore this research attempts to assess whether those who claim to represent the interests of Roma do so legitimately, something which has been
largely absent from academic discourse on Roma. It is held, following Tully
and others, that social interaction is key to creating legitimacy (Tully 1995;
Wiener 2007) thus I concentrate on interactions for example, the creation
of organizing structures of representation, and the articulation of shared
interests as it occurs across socio-political contexts.
Having established the contours of the book I will now highlight how
minorities have been addressed in academic discourse, arguing that rightsbased approaches have dominated theoretical understandings of minorities,
including Roma. This focus on rights has meant that the role of the state
in guaranteeing citizenship and human rights prevails. Investigations typically assess whether certain states are fullling their international and
domestic obligations to protect certain minority communities within their
borders. However I argue that because of the focus on rights the role of
interests has been ignored. The utility of examining interests instead of
rights means that stalagmite mobilization and the role of Roma themselves
can be inated which yields a more nuanced and complete picture of Roma
representation across political contexts.
Notes
1. Political representation denotes the duty of representing and articulating interests.
2. The term political participation is used here in the sense of a social activity, of taking
part with others in some socio-political process and it is intended as a non-restrictive term
meaning that it can be applied to all facets of public life.
3. This research maintains that interests are articulated, as opposed to secured. This is
because articulation suggests that interests are verbalized and given concrete expression by
organizing structures of representation, whereas securing interests is the nal destination
for interests. I am careful not to attempt to determine whether interests are secured or not,
and under what conditions which would involve conceptual mapping of structural circumstance in a given political context. It is the initial moves of interest formation and
articulation which are of primary concern.
4. Due to spatial constraints I do not examine Western Europe, although research on political representation of Roma/Travellers in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France and Germany
would be a welcome addition to the emerging academic discourse in political science.
5. Both Hungary and Romania have signed and ratied the Council of Europes
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) (1995) as well as
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992).
58
6. While Roma are territorially dispersed they are unlike other transnational Diaspora,
such as the Jewish community, because they lack a homeland. Roma are a nation without a
territory.
7. For a more comprehensive understanding of theoretical approaches to ethnic
mobilization see: Vermeersch 2006, 2843.
8. The census gures in many CEECs are regarded as unreliable for this reason (Ringold et al. 2005, 1).
9. I avoid an exclusive theoretical focus on the creation of group identity. Suce to say
that identity can be held by individuals and groups.
10. The Copenhagen criteria (1993) states that EU accession states must guarantee
respect for and protection of minorities. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/
intro/criteria.htm (accessed 10 May 2009).
11. See, for example, social movement theories which highlight the role identity plays in
social movements (Cohen 1985).
12. While the region was a tinderbox of ethnic tension and conict Roma never resorted
to violence. See: Crowe 2008.
13. This is termed stalagmite mobilization (bottom up), as opposed to stalactite mobilization (top down) (Nettl 1967, chapter 9).
14. Article 7, ICCPR (1966).
15. The importance of political participation for minorities is outlined in Article 2 (2)
and (3) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992); Article 15 of the FCNM (1995); and
Paras 33 and 35 of the OSCEs Copenhagen Document (1990). See: Packer 1996. States
certainly undertake duties towards minorities in the spheres of recognition, protection, and
promotion (of identity) while sidestepping the altogether more thorny issues of substantive
and procedural rights. For a discussion on political representation see: Pollak et al. 2009.
16. This is not to suggest that international law does not legitimize positive discrimination in the case of national minorities. See, for example, Article 4 FCNM (2) Parties
undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of
economic, social, political and cultural life, full and eective equality between persons
belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority.
17. For a detailed discussion on political participation in international law see: Fox
1992.
18. The OSCEs Lund Recommendations on the Eective Participation of National
Minorities in Public Life (1999) are not legally binding but represent strong political
commitments.
19. Explanatory Report on the FCNM, Council of Europe (1994) 10, Strasbourg,
November 1994, Para. 80.
20. This binary has become a sine qua non in most academic discussions on legitimacy.
For further see: Scharpf 1999, 228. Scharpf provides an understanding of input and output
oriented legitimacy as they relate to democratic governance in the EU.
21. The social dimension of Tullys understanding of recognition is highlighted by
Wiener 2006, 419420.
3
Ambivalent Discourse: Rights-based
Theories on Minorities
Introduction
Research on minorities requires a better understanding of political
participation and representation and it is argued that a clearer, though not
necessarily xed, conception of political participation and representation
would allow researchers to pursue selected investigative trajectories based
on more specic analytical assumptions. The minority and Roma rights
literatures have treated political participation and representation dierently to the extent that an accurate understanding of each has become lost
among wider philosophical debates on the status and protection of ethnic
minority groups. This chapter unpacks the relationship between rights and
interests, maintaining that both are distinct concepts but interests are more
useful in uncovering patterns of mobilization across political contexts.
It begins by analysing the dominant rights-based approaches to minorities
before exploring the rights and justice-based approaches to minority protection and argues that representation can only be understood as being of
interests, rather than persons before discussing the similarities and dierences of rights and interests. Finally, I introduce four key concepts which
are applied to the three subsequent empirical chapters.
Rights-based Approaches to Minority Issues

A right is an entitlement to act or be treated in a particular way and can
be divided into either legal or moral rights. Minority and Roma rights
are essentially moral rights, meaning a moral claim to social justice and
59
60
equality, which have been increasingly codied in international law, and

sometimes in domestic law. Rights can be further distinguished between
positive and negative rights (Schwellnus 2005). Positive rights are rights
that impose demands on others, and particularly the government, in terms
of the provision of resources or support. Negative rights are rights which
impose restrictions on the behaviour of others, including the government
and society. It is worth mentioning that the substantive content of both
minority and Roma rights discourse is a mixture of negative and positive
rights.
Certainly, political participation is a basic human right as is the right to
adequate representation, that is, the right to take part in political processes,
and the right to represent and to be represented. Both the minority and
Roma rights literatures have inated the importance of rights more generally, at the expense of other values, notably interests. Rights constitute a
person and endow her with the capacity to execute her distinct equal status
in a society, whereas interests are held by individuals and groups and can
be dierentiated between proximate and ultimate interests. These interests
generate a spark when they are represented or articulated on behalf of an
individual or group. The failure of both these literatures to address the
role of interests in any meaningful sense has resulted in academic discourse
being characterized by an over-emphasis on rights. Because of the contractarian emphasis on duties and responsibilities the main actor has invariably
been the state, for rights are a conduit for the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and its citizens. The rights-based literatures
conceive of minority problems which need to be solved, rights therefore
become a tool to x any number of pre-dened problems. This has negative implications and has resulted in the discourse directing all attention to
the reactive role of the state in rectifying minority issues (Zoon 2001). The
key point is that rights are accorded (secured and given), whereas interests
are intersubjectively constructed and articulated by the group themselves.
How one conceptualizes the academic literature on minorities is signicant, as the literature is often reective of the actual situation. The discourse
on minorities, as well as the separate discourse on Roma, is a rights-based
approach which centres on the role of the state in bringing about fundamental change for these persons. This means that minority rights are not
accorded for any other reason besides civic duty. These special rights are
usually bestowed on minority groups because of the disadvantageous social
position they nd themselves in relative to the rest of society, or because
of past perceived injustices thus it follows that the rights accorded to
Rights-based Theories on Minorities
61
Roma shares the same reasoning. The state is the authoritative polity which
accords rights, be they individual or collective, negative or positive, human
or citizenship.
Minority Rights: Analytical and Cultural Presuppositives

Minority rights theorists are primarily concerned with whether society
should recognize, accommodate or protect certain minorities within the
demos. The understanding in this instance is that a democratic society will
always look after the interests of the majority of the people, most of the
time. Minority rights theorists often begin by asking what a minority is
(Packer 1993; Gl 2000; Potier 2001) attempts to dene this group have
proven to be notoriously dicult (Capotorti 1977; Deschnes 1985)
before setting out to dene the ethics of recognizing, accommodating or
protecting diversity (Glazer 1983; Gutmann 1994; Taylor 1994). Among
minority rights theorists there is a tacit understanding that minorities must
be dealt with in an appropriate way. Indeed, if no recognition, accommodation or protection is accorded to minority groups, this absence of rights
must be based on suciently reasoned arguments. The most common
among such arguments holds that minorities do not require any special
rights because individual members of a minority group have access to
the full catalogue of human rights (Kymlicka 1995). These human rights
are universal and encapsulate all individuals irrespective of race, gender,
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and so forth. The behemothic liberalcommunitarian debate which has emerged in this discipline is, however, of
little use in providing analytical insights into what is essentially the right to
political participation and to be represented.
In attempting to rationalize an issue area as complex as minority rights,
theorists have proposed dierent solutions. The academic discourse on
minorities might focus on more searching philosophical questions including why there should be rights for minorities, arguing that minority groups
can secure their rights through international human rights law (Thornberry
1991; Steiner and Alston 2000). Other issues which minority rights theorists tackle include the existence of cultural rights (Kukathas 1995), ethnic
conict resolution (McGarry and OLeary 1996; Pentasuglia 2001; Weller
and Wol 2005) and variations of group-dierentiated rights, as well as
preferential treatment (Edwards, J. 1999). Minority rights theorists expend
much eort debating the virtues of group-dierentiated rights or special
rights which minorities ought to enjoy due to past perceived injustices.
62
Such a rationale maintains that it is the states responsibility to rectify a

minority groups disadvantageous social position, and most of this debate
has centred on preferential treatment.1 The central dilemma of preferential
treatment is that it appears to bestow benets on people for arbitrary reasons arguing that anti-discrimination legislation alone is not enough to
redress socio-economic and political inequalities. Preferential treatment is
essentially a group-based practice aimed to compensate or to provide equal
opportunity (Edwards, J. 1999, 149) which sustains the adage that equality
cannot be achieved by treating everyone the same (Cohen 2005, 1).
Ethnicity, in and of itself, does not automatically require rights claims
of any sort and if such claims can be derived from ethnicity, it must be
by virtue of discriminatory treatment that they endure because of ethnic
identication. Ethnicity therefore cannot be understood as an objective
category which demands rights. Such an argument reasons that Roma
could demand rights because of how they are treated by the state and society, their socio-economic and political exclusion, and negative perceptions
of Romani identity. Suce to say that rights can be accorded to a minority
group by virtue of being a minority (in the sense that they are numerically
inferior and occupy a non-dominant position) as well as how they are
treated and their specic needs. Roma are treated dierently because of
their ethnic identity and thus can command certain rights from the state
because of this. Even a wealthy Rom can suer discrimination and exclusion because of the perception and negative association of Romani ethnicity.
One way to change perceptions and stereotypes is through a positive
armation of ethnicity in public institutions.
Perhaps not surprisingly, ethnic groups are disproportionately represented in all public institutions. For example, Fiscus (1992, 27) claims that
all groups have a right to a representative in all oces, positions, jobs etc.
that is the same as their representation in the population as a whole.2
But it is impossible to determine what fair representation is and such an
approach would hold that if Roma had the same representation then this
would somehow alleviate their problems which it most certainly would
not. In addition, it is important to note that when dealing with Roma, the
issue of fair and adequate representation is further complicated by the fact
that there are no reliable statistics on the actual number of Roma in many
states, or indeed a willingness of Roma to declare themselves as such.
To summarize, the core problem with research on minorities lies in the
fact that it treats these groups as minorities. While this may seem obvious,
it is worth pointing out that according to prevailing understandings in the
63
academic discourse minorities only exist in a relational sense, that is, when
compared to majorities. The identity of a minority group is constructed
and armed in relation to the dierent qualities and experiences that they
share with the majority meaning that a social group exists and is dened
as a specic group only in social and interactive relation to others (Young
1995, 161). Of course, a minority is more than just a numerically inferior
group in a non-dominant position. It possesses an identity which is constructed through intersubjective interaction both with the majority and
with each other. It is through these interactive processes in which prevailing narratives and meanings of group identity are created and contested.
Having been informed by the dominant liberal paradigm, rights discourse has been primarily concerned with the relationship between the
individual and the state. As traditionally understood, the purpose of the
human rights project is to erect barriers between the individual and
the state, so as to protect human autonomy from being violated by state
structures. This is one of the reasons why minority rights discourse usually
places the state at the centre of all analyses. It is the state which guarantees
individual and special rights, but due to this focus on the state, other competing actors are sidelined. Particularly the role of the minority group in
mobilizing around its ethnic identity to secure more appropriate and adequate organizing structures of representation is neglected in rights-based
approaches. It is more benecial to approach minority issues in a locally
generated, context specic milieu. Moreover, minorities themselves create
organizing structures of representation which are, or at least should be,
beyond the remit of state responsibility and authority.
A Rights versus Justice Conception of Minority Protection

Demands for rights and justice are frequently articulated by ethnic minorities through political processes but rights and justice must be analytically
separated in order to account for divergent interpretations in these
post-material goods (Inglehart 1990). The literatures on minority rights
and Roma rights have always maintained that their respective subjects
are united by a common identity. This a priori supposition has resulted
in minority and Roma rights discourse being characterized by a focus on
rights and duties with little or no attention being given to issues of interest
articulation, justice and political process. I start from the view that minorities in general and Roma in particular, are not united by a common identity.
Indeed, I problematize this common assumption and hold that identity and
64
interests can be analytically related through reference to ethnic mobilization

and political participation. It would appear, prima facie, that there is a direct
link between the minority and Roma rights literatures, as both begin from
the ontological assumption that the subjects are united in a common identity, and crucially they are concerned with rights, as opposed to politics or
interests. However, rights get dened, rened, protected and respected
through various political processes which allow them to be tailored to
particular contexts (Bellamy 2001, 57), while justice is secured through
normative reasoning. Therefore the role of institutional and organizational
structures is inated to take account of these political processes which the
rights-based literatures negate. In the process of transforming the demands
of actors (inputs), into policy (outputs), several institutions may be involved
including political parties, civil society organizations, the legislature, the
executive, the courts and the bureaucracy, all of whom are components
of the political system.
Minority rights as a social, political and legal concept is found in a
multitude of political contexts, from international organizations, to nation
states, to sub-state governance structures. It can be found in academic discourse, political debates, international law and governmental initiatives.
A minority is usually understood to mean an ethnic, religious, political or
other group which are in a non-dominant position vis--vis other groups
in society. A right is typically understood to mean what is morally good,
legal or proper and is synonymous with privilege, duty and responsibility.
Taken together we can deduce that minority rights are claims made by
minority groups which enable them to enjoy or have access to certain privileges which they would not normally enjoy given their social, political or
economic marginalization, relative to other groups within a society. While
there has been rights-based research conducted in certain areas particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Jovanovic 2002; Singh Inder 2002),
most academic discourse focuses on international and regional organizations, treaties, instruments and laws.3 Thornberry (1991, 7) demonstrates
the ambiguity of minority rights, some minority rights look like process
rights (the development of identity and culture, the education continuum);
others look like civil and political rights speech, worship, participation,
names, contacts across frontiers. Therefore the rights accorded to minorities are manifest in a number of institutional fora, which only political
processes can take account of.
Ethnic mobilization results in the creation of diverse, though not necessarily competing, organizing structures of representation and governmental
strategies to address minority protection. These include:
65
minority self-governments; the granting of territorial or cultural autonomy to minority groups; the funding of activities and organizations
of national minorities; the introduction of particular forms of armative action, guaranteed representation, or consultation of minorities
in governmental institutions; and the funding of bilingual education
or mother-tongue instruction (Vermeersch 2003b, 12).
Each organizing structure of representation created by Roma is a microstructure which is part of the larger macro-structure of the Roma social
movement. I make no attempt to pass judgement on the correct policy path
which governments pursue in Hungary and Romania, rather I oer a means
to understand how Roma of Hungary and Romania have mobilized around
their ethnicity, to articulate their interests and the impact this has had on
political participation and the organizing structures of representation in
these states. As a further step the transnational political context is examined in which dierent organizing structures of representation have been
constructed by Romani lite.
Minority groups must balance competing struggles for inclusion on the
one hand and dierentiation on the other. Minorities want to be integrated
into society without being assimilated and they also want to be recognized
as dierent by retaining their cultural or ethnic aliations. Both of these
struggles make demands for recognition (Taylor 1994; Tully 1995; JacksonPreece 2005, 162) as well as distribution and justice. Ethnic mobilization, as
a crucial component of a social movement, necessarily creates organizing
structures of representation through which the interests of the minority
may be articulated. The Roma social movement struggles in the sense that
they mobilize for change in their socio-economic circumstances, protection
of their culture, access to political structures and to re-arm their identity.
Like every social movement they attempt to eect change (although this
is always non-violent), and assert their right to be dierent and not be persecuted because of this dierence. Tilly (1978) maintains that struggle is an
essential component of the political process in which to secure full citizenship. However citizenship rights such as civil, political and social rights
(Marshall 1950; Turner 1990) alone are not sucient because without full
access to these rights they are meaningless to those who occupy an unequal
position in society.
The utility of rights can be located in an individual and as well as a collective dimension. Communitarian approaches to minority rights place an
overly strong weight on the homogeneity of communities and the amount
of agreement on conceptions of the good life which these communities
66
pursue (Bellamy 2001, 54). While Roma share interests, these are multiple
and shifting because they are not a bounded internally homogeneous
group. In this respect it is important not to underestimate politics as some
rights-based theories do, as only politics can account for social processes
and social change. As Bellamy (2001, 54) notes though communitarians
give more weight to political deliberation than rights-based models, both
versions hold such deliberation assumes and promotes consensus on the
good through explicating shared understandings, thereby abstracting from
the very circumstances of dissent that make politics necessary. It follows
that dissent is likely to arise because actors in a given political context do
not share common experiences or a normative framework, and this is the
case with Roma who are not united by a common identity.
I start from the view that rights-based theories of minorities negate
political processes and an understanding of soft institutions such as ethnic
identity and interests. The concept of ethnic mobilization helps to demonstrate that these soft institutions are intersubjectively constructed and nd
expression in organizing structures of representation. Minorities constantly
struggle for concessions, such as rights, from the state, however a focus
on interests emphasizes the specic role of the Romani community and
their understandings of justice. Minorities engaged in social movements
nd themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand they want to
be recognized, respected and treated equally, but on the other hand,
they demand the right to be dierent which cannot be accommodated by
liberal-individualist ideas on justice.
Citizenship Rights and Roma

Roma are, ultimately, citizens of the states in which they reside and this
includes every state in Europe. When they vote at the national and local
elections, it is assumed that Roma are represented too, as they constitute
part of the vote-wielding public. However without actual access to citizenship rights, Roma are not full citizens. Indeed, gaje often perceive the
interests of Roma as diametrically opposed to their own, and vice versa.
Marshall described citizenship as three sets of rights: civil rights to liberty
and equality before the law, the political rights to vote and to participate in
the political processes, and the social rights to participate fully in the way
of life that is shared by the citizens as a whole (Marshall 1950; cited in
Sobotka 2002). However, more recently the concept of citizenship and thus
political participation has remained insensitive to groups from diverse
67
backgrounds such as women and ethnic minorities (Sobotka 2002, 4).

It follows that states must provide opportunities for minority groups to
access formal political structures and provide the space and capacity
for minorities to create alternative informal political structures. Since the
1990s human rights groups and advocacy organizations defending the
rights of Roma have framed their arguments with reference to the discrimination of Roma in all spheres of life. The ability of Roma to access
citizenship rights is impeded by societal marginalization, discrimination
and persecution which Romani communities continue to endure.
Sobotka (2002) correctly argues that even if Marshalls core elements of
citizenship, consisting of civil, political and social rights were implemented,
members of minority groups can still nd themselves excluded from the
full enjoyment of citizenship, that is, political participation. But political
participation is more than when Roma simply have a voice in the policies
and decisions which aect them. A crucial aspect of this participation is
representation and articulation of interests. In this view, the state would no
longer be the central focus but one of many actors ensuring more adequate
representation for citizens, including members of minority groups (Hindess
2001, 103). I argue that other actors would include lite, political parties,
civil society organizations, transnational advocacy networks and international Romani NGOs.
The political mobilization of Roma is the most obvious response to the
current situation of exclusion from the political processes (Barany 1998).
Ethnic mobilization has taken place in the past and has resulted in the
establishment of organizing structures of representation through which
Roma can articulate their interests. However, mobilization alone does not
suce to overcome the numerous barriers facing Roma in the political
sphere (Russinova 2003, 5). In order to tackle the accumulated problems
faced by Roma throughout history, a situation which is complicated by the
lack of a critical mass of Roma in politics and a dearth of instruments to
compensate for this structural weakness, more than grass-roots action is
required (Russinova 2003, 5). From the early 1990s, Roma have been one of
the most active social movements in Central and Eastern Europe as regards
political participation. Collective action repertoires range from local or
national elections, campaigning, membership of political parties, creation of
community-based organizations, advisory bodies to government, demonstrations, symbolic acts, letter writing and monitoring the implementation of
governmental policies. Sobotka (2002) contends that throughout the 1990s,
most Romani leaders were attracted by this form of political participation,
68
mainly civil and transnational society-based participation. As a result, the

formal political processes in the guise of periodic elections and political
party representation, suered. Romani lite found themselves buered by
the winds of countervailing forces, such as negative stereotypes, racism and
hostile political actors, which conspired to exclude Roma from the national
assembly and other formal political structures. The only path open to Roma
was civil society which was at once inward looking (focusing on the needs
and interests of Roma) and outward-looking (towards the sympathetic
third parties such as the international political community and private
donors). The impact of this approach was that the state was often by-passed
but it is the state which guarantees citizenship rights.
There are two important and relatively distinct ways of approaching
Roma issues from a theoretical point of view which have informed governmental and international policy towards Roma issues. These are the social
integration school and the racial discrimination path of thought.4 First,
the social integration school maintains that Roma are just un-integrated
into the mainstream society and they need to be forced to pursue education
and to work, becoming full citizens in the process. The crucial issue here is
that Roma should be assimilated into wider society and the results will no
doubt be benecial for the majority of the population. The social integration school has its roots in the Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth
century, but it was continued by dierent social currents including half
a century of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe during the
twentieth century. This school of thought resulted in Roma being framed
as natives. These natives are considered to be primitives therefore civilized
people have the moral duty to take these primitives to the level of Western
well-being. Communist leaders maintained that it was possible to transform Roma into new and improved members of society, through forced
sedentarization, education and employment (Stewart 1997b). Nowadays,
politically correct attitudes prohibit such an overt pursuit of the social
integration school of thought, and have been replaced by the more transparent euphemism of social inclusion, continuing the Enlightenment
tradition nonetheless. The paradigm of liberal individualism promotes an
assimilationalist ideal because it condemns group-based exclusions and
discriminations. This school of thought argues that people should be considered as individuals only, and not as members of a group therefore there
exists no categorical group-based dierences among persons. So, following
this line of reasoning, law and formal institutions make no distinction
among persons, and ensure moral and political equality. Certainly the
socio-economic exclusion of Roma is pervasive across CEECs; the danger
69
is that the preservation of cultural identity is negated or side-stepped in

favour of policies which target health, education, employment while language and cultural interests are left out in the cold.
It is an unintended irony that the current eorts of the World Bank,
Open Society Institute and several governments of Central and Eastern
Europe are the ospring of the same ideology, an ideology where there is
no place for Roma interests, only Roma problems (requiring obviously,
solutions). The World Banks Decade of Roma Inclusion (20052015)
focuses on housing, employment, education and health care; therefore the
main problems of Roma are related to poverty (e.g. illiteracy, lack of skills,
poor housing), and these problems may be solved by nancial assistance
from the World Bank and good will from enlightened political leaders
of CEECs, usually under the watchful eye of the EU. Attempts have thus
been made to integrate Roma into the fabric of society and the institutions
of the state; however, their ability to access citizenship rights has not yet
materialized. Notably most current eorts to integrate Roma across CEECs
are generated by external pressure rather than domestic political will.
The second school of thought concerning theoretical approaches to the
situation of Roma in Europe is the so-called racial discrimination one,
which is largely embraced by the most radical Romani activists, and it has
its roots in the soil of Romanticism. Contrary to the Enlightenment, the
Romantic attitude toward Roma places emphasis on the liberty of their
culture and lifestyle. The origins of such a thesis stems from Rousseau and
the Romantic idea of the bon sauvage. In this perspective, Roma are considered to be uncorrupted by mainstream society, and they represent the salt
of the earth meaning that the Roma problem is not the fault of Roma
themselves rather it is the gaje-constructed world which conspires against
them. It posits that Roma live in a society which is inherently racist and
intolerant of alternative cultures and so discriminates against them which
means Roma are unable to attend school or secure adequate employment.
The racial discrimination school of thought maintains that Roma are
under-represented in central and local institutions because of negative perceptions of their group identity. As regards their political representation,
they emerge as objects of manipulation and victims, and not active players,
though this does appear to be changing. This institutionalized racism has
many consequences including an increase in social stigma experienced
by Roma resulting in less Roma identifying themselves as Romani in the
national census, and the fact that many Romani high-achievers prefer not
to present themselves as Romani as they fear their ethnic identity will
hinder them as individuals, in accessing employment for example. A Rom
70
who is well educated and/or wealthy will still face discrimination due to
perceptions of her ethnicity and could be refused access to goods, facilities
and services. A word of caution is required here. Despite compelling evidence of its existence, pointing to racism is fraught with unintended
consequences. Activists and advocates might explain the situation of Roma
as a product of racism, embedded in institutions and public attitudes, and
apportion blame accordingly. But this allows governments to deect blame
away from social processes which create racism, which cannot be understood as an objective category or something which exists. Racism thus
becomes a tangible thing which permeates society but even the concept of
anti-racism can become a hindrance to political progress in this eld
because it fetishizes the concept of race (Gilroy 1987).
The situation of Roma is much more serious than that of other minorities in Hungary and Romania. The issues that they are facing (organizational,
social, educational, sanitary-medical, occupational, housing, discrimination etc.) are so multiple and multi-faceted that there cannot be quick-xes.
These issues are the same ones faced by the majority of the population in
Hungary and Romania too, but what makes the situation of Roma more
pronounced is they must deal also with racial discrimination due to their
ethnic identity in their day-to-day lives. One thing is certain though,
determined measures are required to signicantly improve the situation of
Roma in Hungary and Romania. Far from being only a matter of social
integration or racial discrimination the Roma issue is extremely complex.
In the transnational political context, no model exists to accommodate
Roma interests. Roma are treading on unchartered territory, taking opportunities if and when they arise, learning as they go, and creating organizing
structures of representation is an obvious way for Roma to improve their
lot. It follows that Roma pursue various avenues and access dierent
organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests.
Political Rights and the Pursuit of Representation

A conict arises in the academic discourse as to how representation should
be dened. First, political representation can be understood in narrow
terms, as in the mandate in the legislature and/or the executive at central
and/or local level. Secondly, participation in public aairs understood in
broader terms includes: participation in local or national elections; campaigning; membership in political parties; advisory bodies to government;
human rights activism; or community organization. Mirga and Gheorghe
(1997) point out that the term Romani representative is implicitly given a
71
broader meaning than merely elected ocials, due to the lack of elected
Romani leaders. I would argue that under the rubric of Roma representative fall civil society activists and advocates, traditional familial/clan leaders
and governmental advisors, all of whom lack a democratic mandate yet
such structures impact on the capacity of Roma to have a voice in the
public sphere.
States that have well-designed democratic political institutions are more
successful at managing conict and resolving political grievances, especially those that relate to national minorities. Accordingly, the design of the
political institutions and the electoral system in particular has an important role in ensuring eective participation in public life. Electoral systems
can be specically constructed to address the needs of particular groups in
society. By way of illustration, reserved seats for a particular minority may
ensure representation for this community but unless the underlying processes and mechanisms such as funding, training and education are provided,
that representation may have little impact. In most parts of Central and
Eastern Europe in the post-communist period there has been at least, and
often at most, one Romani representative elected to the national assembly
on the party list of a mainstream political party. In some instances, such as
in Romania for example, Roma have a single reserved seat guaranteed by a
constitutional provision. However, the practice of placing one or two Roma
representatives on national elected bodies has legitimized tokenism in
Roma representation. While Romani representatives, whose placement on
mainstream party lists is often advertised as an expression of the goodwill
of the party to tackle problems facing Roma, have increased the chances
of a given mainstream party winning Romani votes, their recruitment to
the respective party has almost never resulted in any meaningful role in
shaping the partys policy agenda with regard to Roma. Conversely, these
representatives often complain that they are only expected to voice their
opinions on Romani issues alone. Nor has the presence of Roma in mainstream political parties guaranteed any commitment by the respective
party to Roma policy. The inclusion of Roma in mainstream party lists
is perceived by outsiders to be motivated by political calculations rather
than a true commitment to formulating appropriate policy, tailored to the
interests of Roma.
Political rights and legitimate representation cannot be measured by
the existence of laws guaranteeing democratic principles rather account
needs to be taken primarily of the citizens capability to exercise these rights
(Russinova 2003, 5). Of course, a rule lies in its (social) practice in that
practice is, as it were, a continual interpretation and reinterpretation
72
of what the rule really means (Taylor 1993, 57) thus the state should full
its primary obligation to guarantee equal rights for all citizens. In the case
of Roma, this duty often translates into preferential treatment policies to
tackle racial discrimination in all spheres of social life, as well as policies
targeted at increasing the participation of Roma in public life, through
actions such as political education programmes to change embedded attitudes among party leaders and members, promotion of Roma minority
candidates for public oce, and voter education.
With this in mind it becomes clear that Roma need to be the instigators
of their own destiny. If it is left to the state then they could only expect the
lowest common denominator. It is not in the states interests to provide
adequate representation structures for Roma which are actually reective
of their demographic weight. It is important to remember that it is not
always about what the state accords Roma, crucially Roma must create
organizing structures of representation themselves, through mobilization.
Romani NGOs are one of the fundamental expressions of this (stalagmite)
mobilization but are not as apolitical as one might expect. Romani political
parties should not be viewed simply as ancillary institutions but they have
thus far failed to construct a coherent platform due to their fragmented
group identity which impacts negatively on their capacity to mobilize broad
support across the Romani electorate, and a political lite characterized by
competition and factionalism. Additionally, a contested nationalism based
on territorial and cultural claims, which motivates other ethnic communities is absent from Roma political party rhetoric (McGarry 2009a).
As a political principle, representation is a relationship through which
an individual or group stands for or acts on behalf of, a larger body of
people. But representation is more than simply representing a constituency
rather it is more appropriate to conceive of representation as being of
interests. Interests are constructed and shared by a group who share an
identity. In the case of Roma this is problematic, because the group identity
of Roma is contested which impedes the formulation and articulation of
shared interests. It has often been assumed that representative democracy
constitutes a limited and indirect form of democratic rule, provided that
representation links government and the governed in such a way that the
citizens interests are eectively articulated or their preferences secured.
Representing People and Representing Interests

Legitimizing representation is a problem which the modern polity faces
and this research attempts to deal with the issue of representation through
73
a normative enquiry. The fundamental questions are: Are Roma legitimately represented by X? and Does X articulate the interests of Roma?
These are questions of what should be, or is, actually represented. Pitkin
(1968, 39) argues that
there is a dierence within the category of practical representation
between what we might call the form and substance of representing,
between the question of whose ocial, authorized representative a
man is, on the one hand, and the question of who he really acts for,
consults, looks after, is responsive to in practice, on the other.
Does a representative represent individuals, or do they represent personal
interests, sectional interests or class interests? Moreover, is it possible to
represent an individual or indeed aggregated individuals in a polity? A representative might look after another persons interests, if these were clearly
known, but they could hardly formulate another persons will. Society is
composed of sections and groups with overlapping memberships, therefore a person is an individual but also a member of a bundle of interests
and aliations (Birch 1971, 78). In this view, political activity reveals neither a fundamental harmony of interests nor a fundamental conict, but
an oscillating series of clashes and compromises.
It is widely assumed among political theorists that a conict of interests
in society is inevitable and will lead to the development of factional disputes on political issues. Since the dominance of one faction, however large
or small, over others is considered undesirable steps must be taken to avoid
this, most notably, through the establishment of organizing structures of
representation. Due to the existence of sectional interests, compromise and
negotiation is always necessary. Political scientists who have tried to explain
political behaviour simply in terms of group pressure have been found
wanting because agency alone cannot capture the subtle nuances of political activity. As Birch (1971, 87) explains, equilibrium is never achieved in
the political system, as it has to give account not only to actual pressures
for sectional interests but also for potential pressures for general interests.
This continuous disequilibrium between representation and the Roma
social movement suggests that representation is constantly negotiated
through social interaction and is not something which is ever conclusively
attained.
Liberal theorists consider representation as being of individuals rather
than corporate bodies, interests or classes (Pitkin 1972, 190) but this ignores
the social dimension to the political identity of an individual, a view
74
advanced by Aristotle. The representation of people does not necessarily

mean the representation of all people; accordingly, I argue that it is more
appropriate to conceive of representation as being of interests, rather than
persons. It is held that one person or group cannot represent a society
but one person or group can, in principle, represent the shared interests
of a society. Interests are intersubjective, multiple and shifting alignments
and are something which groups have in common. The key distinction
I make is that the represented are not unique individuals, but repositories
of interests. Needless to say, ethnic minority groups will often share some
but not all of the same interests.
Individuals cannot represent the will of others but can represent the
common purposes or goals of an association, and therefore can act for a
group. Interests are more than aggregated units which reach a tipping point
and must be addressed. All societies have a universal interest which is
simply the sum of all the interests of the various members who compose
the society. Each person has proximate (self-regarding and private) and
ultimate (social and universal) interests, but which ought they pursue?5
For example, a Rom will have proximate interests (such as securing education for her daughter), and ultimate interests (such as the alleviation of
poverty). These are specic to her ethnicity in that they are informed by
and constructed through reference to her ethnic identication. Rationalists
maintain that only self-seeking proximate interests matter, whereas communitarians hold that, we are social animals therefore ultimate interests are
more important. Organizing structures of representation can only articulate shared interests which are intersubjectively constructed by the Romani
community, therefore these structures cannot articulate subjectively held
proximate interests. The implication being that a Romani political party or
civil society organization, can only articulate interests which are held by
many Roma.
A communitarian understanding of politics and society helps to understand the Romani communitys relationship to the majority. Sometimes
a section of society is systematically discriminated against on the basis
of their ethnicity and/or race and come to understand themselves as a targeted population or community. For instance, Simhandl (2006, 106) points
out that the EU explicitly links the discrimination that Roma face to their
way of life, that is, their ethnicity. The result of these processes of oppression can be that more attention is placed on community needs rather than
on the needs of individuals or sub-groups. In practice, this often means
that the representation of minority ethnic communities in the public
sphere functions in accordance with racial and ethnic stereotypes (Burlet
75
and Reid 1998, 273). This can provoke reactions such as passive resignation
whereby the group simply accepts this practice and acquiesces or they can
use ethnic identity to create a positive self-image which they can project
onto the majority in order to change their attitudes. The problem of representation can be summarized thus: if to represent as an activity is to have
substantive meaning, it must be to act in the interest of or to act according
to the wishes of but by denition no one can really act for or represent
another in public aairs.
Rights versus Interests

The academic discourse on Roma, and on ethnic minorities more generally,
focuses on the rights which those groups in a disadvantageous position
should enjoy and how nation states are failing in their obligation to guarantee special rights. These literatures share a similar departure point in that
they start from the supposition that minorities, including Roma, are often
marginalized and it is the states responsibility to rectify past perceived
injustices. The minority and Roma rights literatures consider that the
responsibilities that fall to the state are required by various international
and regional standards, which the state signs. Invariably these are rights
which ethnic minority groups should enjoy. However, due to a focus on
rights, the literature has worked through a catalogue of duties on the state
and therefore has failed to give credence to the role of interests. By working
through a directory of rights researchers have consistently shown that
some states fail to full their international obligations with regards to
minority protection, and proceed to document the reasons why this phenomenon persists, and the aggregated eect on minority groups (Gl 2000).
This is hardly surprising because actors in government who represent the
majority of the population tend to suppress interests that they deem less
important. So both the minority and Roma rights literatures, while skirting
around issues such as equality and justice, concentrate on the states shortcomings in attempting to secure rights for minorities.
These literatures have also failed to take account of the interests of the
minorities themselves. When interests are brought into the equation,
they are centred on the states interests to enact certain pieces of legislation
or policies, and how this maps with the rights of Roma. If rights and
interests are the same, which many in the eld assume they are, then we
will always be left in a situation where the state is the key actor, that is, its
role is to secure those rights and interests. However, if rights can be pushed
to one side then a focus on a minoritys interests can demonstrate how
76
minority actors mobilize around identity to articulate interests with a view

to securing rights. This research argues that a stronger focus on the interests of Roma can help uncover interactive processes and understandings
which the rights-based literature ignores.
Both rights and interests share some qualities: they are both held by
minorities; they are treated as a means and an end interchangeably in the
literature; and both carry a degree of oughtness in a moral sense. The differences are more prevalent and telling: rights are seen as the end-point as
far as policy-makers, lite, advocacy networks and researchers are concerned, whereas interests are assumed from the outset. Rights are collectively
conferred and designed to promote collective interests (Sunstein 1995,
336) so they are protected by social institutions for social reasons. It is
worth asking whether interests serve as a catalyst for rights, or if the reverse
is true? Both require social interaction to be realized but actors mobilize
around their identity to articulate their interests, whereas they struggle to
secure their rights. Rights are conferred on communities whereas interests
are intersubjectively constructed by the community in question: Roma
are not allocated their interests, they must dene them. The idea of
shared interests is obviously capacious, therefore a movement will split
into numerous trajectories, but each trajectory has the same goal an
enhanced representation structure to articulate their interests. Interests,
like rights, are often not served on a plate by benevolent majorities eager
to do the right thing, and we should not expect such altruistic activity.
It requires ethnic mobilization voiced through organizing structures of
representation to make others, such as state structures and international
organizations, take notice.
A common thread emerges representation and participation of minorities are vital to articulating interests. Due to the focus on rights which
ought to be secured, the literatures on minority and Roma rights fail to
accommodate the interplay and relationship between a minority, mobilization and representation. Of key concern for this research is how the minority
representation is actualized, which means examining the political participation of Roma. Any attempt to assess the political participation of
Roma has fallen short of the mark because either political participation
is treated as a monolithic structure/institution to secure certain rights, or
the academic discourse points out that the political participation of Roma
is inadequate, and sets out to uncover the reason why this situation has
arisen. The focus of this research is to examine the ways in which political
participation has been used by Roma to articulate their shared interests.
77
I draw a distinction between proximate and ultimate interests. Proximate

interests are held by individuals and relate to those interests which are of
primary concern to an individual while ultimate interests are held by a
group. Normally these interests are pursued for the benet of the group as
a whole and are more far-reaching and wider in scope than proximate
interests. For example, one of the ultimate interests of Roma is the eective
enforcement and monitoring of anti-discrimination. It is worth remembering that proximate and ultimate interests are not mutually exclusive and
are often complimentary and there can be many interests held within
a supposedly homogeneous group. This book is more concerned with ultimate interests which will be termed shared interests6 to highlight their
intersubjective quality because certain fundamental shared interests cannot be reduced to distinctly individual concerns (Heinze 1999, 29). Suce
to say, an organizing structure of representation cannot articulate proximate interests as these institutions are created to articulate the shared
interests of the Romani community.
Due to the concentration on the interests of Roma, some analytical
explanation is required. I do not treat interests as means to an end, that is,
Roma do not mobilize around specied interests to achieve political and
legislative objectives, rather, interests serve a dual function. First, contextualizing interests helps us to understand how Roma organize politically,
and secondly they determine their preferences and needs, that is, what
they want. In order to subjugate the concepts of identity and interests, it is
necessary to place them in a broader discussion of ethnic mobilization and
representation structures. Identity, by its very nature, suggests a cohesive
quality to unite a group. In the case of the Roma however, identity is
fragmented in the sub-national, national and transnational contexts.
Identity becomes important when we bring interests into the fold, and try
to understand how an ethnic minority mobilizes around identity, however
fragmented, and articulates its interests. I endeavour to show that, in the
case of Roma, identity and interests are mutually constitutive.
The rst crucial task of the empirical research is to determine what the
interests of Roma actually are in each context. Interests are intersubjectively constructed by actors because they do not exist out there in the
world and as such must be created and negotiated. However, it is not always
Romani actors who dene and articulate the interests of this community
because very often non-Roma (PER 2001; PER 2006) or un-elected actors
claim to represent the interests of Roma, which raises questions of legitimacy. On the surface the interests of Roma, like many minority communities,
78
would appear to be linked to socio-economic issues such as anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies, and access to adequate housing provisions
and education. Indeed, successive Hungarian and Romanian governments
(as well as international organizations) have often framed Roma policies as
being guided by these interests. Interests and representation structures
often reinforce each other since the routines of policy-making are usually
designed to reect a particular set of ideas about what can and should be
done in a sphere of policy; therefore, I examine the relationship between
interests and representation structures. Because these representation structures are organizing it suggests a process whereby this mutual constitution
is constantly shaped and renegotiated. Therefore organizing structures of
representation are malleable and adaptive in order to articulate multiple
shared interests at any one time capturing the heterogeneity of the Roma
social movement.
We can, therefore, ask how political participation is analytically linked
with shared interests? As this chapter has demonstrated, Roma need to participate in political life to enable the articulation of their shared interests.
Political participation is a right which Roma enjoy, and through political
participation, Roma secure representation to articulate their shared interests. In the following empirical chapters, it is necessary to determine what
the shared interests of Roma are in Hungary, Romania and the transnational political context, and how they pursue representation through
ethnic mobilization and political participation. The sparse attention which
is given to interests in the Roma rights discourse usually treats interests
as an a priori assumption. Normally, the research follows a similar path,
Roma have interests (often confused with rights) such as health, educational and economic opportunities, yet states fail to realize these in adequate
ways. Invariably, the discourse then examines the whys and wherefores of
this regrettable situation however interest formation and articulation are
sidelined. Contemporary academic discourse does not demonstrate how
Roma mobilize around their interests. Since it has been established why
Roma mobilize around their interests, the question really becomes how
do Roma articulate their shared interests? This requires an analysis of
organizing structures of representation and processes of political participation located in domestic and transnational political contexts. Before
embarking on the empirical investigation it is useful to revisit the four key
concepts which will be applied to each case study: ethnic mobilization;
political participation; interest articulation; and legitimate representation.
These concepts focus the research and provide a reference through which
to make sense of the domestic and transnational political contexts.
79
Key Concepts
I employ four concepts which are used both analytically and functionally
to help uncover understandings on the relationship between identity,
interests and representation as it relates to the Roma social movement
in the domestic as well as transnational political contexts. These are: ethnic
mobilization; political participation; interest articulation; and legitimate
representation. Furthermore, as pragmatic tools these concepts help ensure
the research remains disciplined and focused as the empirics are consistently referred back to these concepts to unearth relevant information. The
chapters on Romania, Hungary and the transnational political context each
concludes with an analysis of these key concepts, specically by discussing
how the empirical data enhances understandings on each of the concepts,
and vice versa.
Ethnic mobilization results in the creation of diverse though not necessarily competing organizing structures of representation. Roma in Hungary
and Romania mobilize around their ethnic identity, to articulate their
shared interests, which are informed by their ethnic aliation. For example,
the shared interest of addressing discrimination is directly linked to the
persecution Roma face as a result of their ethnic group identity, which in
turn aects the ability to gain employment. Ethnic mobilization is a key
component of the Roma social movement which emphasizes grass-roots
or stalagmite mobilization, and so relegates the importance of material
resources and structural conditions which makes mobilization more or less
likely. Here Roma use their ethnic identity as the stimulus to create organizing structures of representation and this ethnic identity acts as the glue
for the macro structure of the Roma social movement.
Political participation is used here in the sense of a social activity, of
taking part with others in some socio-political process. Political participation is the most obvious way for Roma to articulate their interests and
address pertinent legislative, cultural and socio-economic issues. The quantitative increase in the number of organizations and individuals engaged
in public political activity over the last 15 years has coincided with the
dramatic decline in the living conditions and social status, that is, the interests of most of Roma (Kovats 2003). The obvious conclusion is that Roma
politics is ineective in articulating the interests of the Romani community.
Considering their demographic weight, Roma are disproportionately represented in domestic and transnational political structures. There are
dierent modes of political participation including lite, political parties
and civil society organizations because establishing Roma representation is
80
problematic therefore a variety of organizing structures of representation

are considered.
I focus on interest articulation rather than securing interests as the latter
would necessarily involve analysing structural conditions which would
make securing interests more or less likely in a given context. Furthermore,
articulation suggests that interests are verbalized and given concrete
expression by organizing structures of representation whereas securing
interests is often the nal destination. It is the initial moves of interest
formation and interest articulation which are of primary concern. Society
is composed of sections and groups with overlapping memberships, therefore a person is an individual but also a member of bundles of interests
and aliations. In this view, political activity reveals neither a fundamental
harmony of interests nor a fundamental conict but rather an oscillating
series of clashes and compromises. Interest articulation denotes a process
which involves many voices being heard. It is posited that ethnic identity,
mobilization, representation, interests and legitimacy are related, and the
goal of this research is to understand that relationship, and the actors and
institutions involved.
Interests have remained a matter for conjecture in political science and
international organizations discourse, and this has resulted in inadequate
organizing structures and policies in the domestic and transnational political contexts.7 The interests of Roma are often assumed by policy-makers
and decision-makers therefore they have been increasingly been dened
in cultural terms, as a matter of discrimination, rather than by identifying
the causes of and eectively addressing the considerable objective problems faced by many Roma including poverty, health and unemployment.
Crucially, the interests of Roma are intersubjectively constructed by the
Romani community themselves, which means that only Roma can dene
these interests. Governmental policies and agencies must consult with the
Romani community (through their organizing structures of representation)
in order to be attuned to the needs and interests, tailoring policy accordingly. One of the chief tasks of my research is to nd a way of establishing
the actual interests of Roma, before determining who or what articulates
these interests, then ascertaining whether they can claim to do this legitimately. The interests of Roma can be established through reference to
constructed discourses namely: the mandates of Romani civil society
organizations, legislative interventions; interviews with prominent Romani
actors who work in governmental and non-governmental institutions; and
the states interpretation of Romas interests can be uncovered by analysing
Hungary and Romanias policies towards Roma since 1989. Of course,
81
dierent sources present competing conceptions of the interests of Roma

but it is presumed that dominant themes and issues can be identied.
By examining ethnic mobilization, political participation and interest
articulation it is expected that patterns of social interaction and legitimate
representation can be uncovered. A broad understanding of both legitimacy
and representation must be employed in order to accommodate the diverse
political contexts and organizing structures of representation employed
in the research. The tension between establishing a rigid denition of
legitimate representation and a broad denition to accommodate these
diverse structures is noted. To overcome this issue, both legitimacy and
representation must be understood as giving voice to the Romani community. Legitimacy cannot be measured, rather the Romani community
decide whether organizing structures of representation are legitimate or
not. Therefore, since legitimacy is dependent upon societal interaction for
its existence, I must contextualize the social and political relationships
within and beyond the state. Without legitimacy, institutions are hollow
structures indeed the issue of legitimacy for Roma representation has
gained in importance, the legitimacy issue remains key, since it is a prerequisite for full recognition of a Romani partner for dialogue, consultation,
and decision-making (PER 2002, 30).
Having laid the conceptual framework attention now turns to the case
studies. I selected the case studies of Romania and Hungary although other
states in Central and Eastern Europe would have yielded interesting results.
With the carrot of EU accession, all states in Central and Eastern Europe
have elaborated national policies to help integrate minorities, and several
have established policies targeting Roma, though with varying degrees of
success. As outlined previously Romania and Hungary have attempted to
integrate their minorities in innovative ways yet Roma continue to lack a
clear voice in public life which is at least contiguous with their demographic
weight.
Notes
1. Preferential treatment is distinct from armative action. While armative action is
usually a legally sanctioned practice which respects the criteria of merit, and sets only
targets, preferential treatment is much more widely proscribed, and deals with quotas.
Preferential treatment is the most well-dened and extensively used group practice aimed
at one or more minority group (Edwards J 1999, 155).
2. Armative action measures have been quite controversial in the United States and
have created unintended consequences in that the innocent victim invokes sympathies
82
from the majority. See Fottrells (1999, chapter 8) discussion on the 1978 case of Regents of
the University of California v Bakke.
3. There has been an accumulation of academic writing and research examining the role
of international and regional institutions as they attempt to manage minority rights and
much of this research has focused on the EU. The legal dimension of the EUs minority
rights policy has been detailed by legal scholars, who, by and large, nd the EUs system
lacking when it comes to minority protection. Invariably, this research has followed a
descriptive and historical format, and involves normative reasoning. See: Amato and Batt
1998; De Witte 2000; Toggenburg 2000; Pentasuglia 2001; Johns 2003. More recent analyses
have focused on legal implications; see: Vizi 2005; Toggenburg 2006 and shifting EU minority policy; and see: Schwellnus 2004; Guglielmo and William Waters 2005. Other research
has highlighted the EUs inability to foster a succinct minority rights policy, and one which
falls short of the mark: Schwellnus 2001.
4. My thanks to Dan Oprescu for pointing this out. Personal interview with Dan
Oprescu, senior advisor in Romanian National Agency for Roma, Bucharest, Romania,
27 September 2005. Dr Oprescus comments are his own and do not reect the views of
the National Agency for Roma.
5. People often believe it more important to consider the well-being of others before the
advancement of personal or proximate interests. Most prefer their proximate interests but
it is the job of the legislator to punish peoples self-regarding actions, and reward their
social actions so the latter becomes more desirable (Pitkin 1972, 199). It does not mean that
proximate and ultimate interests are mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is an argument that
anyones true interest is their share of the public or ultimate interest and when they pursue
their proximate interest they are misguided.
6. This is due to semantic preference. I make no distinction between shared, collective,
group and mutual interests.
7. Kovats (2001a) points out the negative impact of the CoEs and OSCEs presumptions of anti-racism as the prevailing Roma interest.
4
Who Speaks for Roma? Organizing
Structures of Representation in Romania1
Introduction
Romania houses an active and vibrant Romani community which has
seized the opportunity to develop organizing structures of representation
since the collapse of communism.2 The state too has responded to the needs
and interests of Roma who make up at least 3 per cent of the Romanian
population,3 and are geographically dispersed. The case study of Romania
presents some interesting legislative innovations which are unique to this
state and impact directly on how Roma mobilize politically, and articulate
their interests through organizing structures of representation. Despite
mobilization eorts, Roma remain woefully under-represented in public
life (Roma occupy two seats out of 334 in the Chamber of Deputies, despite
a population between 3 and 10 per cent). Furthermore, the contentious
Law on National Minorities which contains provisions for cultural autonomy continues to struggle through parliament and remains un-codied.
I hypothesize that political decentralization increases the legitimacy of
Romani representation (H1) and that due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani
activity increases (H2). It will not be possible to address these hypotheses
comprehensively in this chapter alone as the transnational organizing
structures of representation must be examined in Chapter 6 before H1 and
H2 can be suciently evaluated. This chapter applies the political concepts
legitimate representation to better understand the situation of Roma representation in Romania. I begin by outlining the interests of Roma in Romania
83
84
before examining the role of lite in representing Roma and articulating

their interests. In Romania, a representation system exists whereby all ocially recognized national minorities are guaranteed one seat in parliament
for an lite to occupy by virtue of the fact they are an ethnic minority.4
Additionally, NGO leaders and Romani activists have been appointed to
advisory and consultative positions within state institutions. An analysis of
ethnicity-based political parties is then detailed before the role of civil
society organizations as a means to articulate the interests of Roma is
uncovered. Finally, a conclusion elaborates on the key concepts of ethnic
mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate
representation.
Interests of Roma in Romania

It is necessary to identify the interests of Roma in Romania before the
legitimacy of organizing structures of representation can be assessed. It is
important that the interests discussed here are not exhaustive, but several
key shared interests appear to have more prominence than others when
a variety of sources (including policy documents, legislation, activities of
NGOs and interviews) are analysed, that is, certain shared interests and
general themes can be identied. It has been argued that the living conditions of Roma has deteriorated in the post-communist period; violence
against members of the community; as well as widespread prejudice had
become more and more frequent (Caluser 2008, 43) which has made the
specication of Roma interests and the creation of representation structures to articulate these interests all the more acute.
There have been a number of internationally sponsored programmes
in Romania which have identied the key interests of Roma. However,
demographic and social statistics, including statistics in income and living
conditions, need to be further developed in order to be of use to both
policy-makers and civil society.5 Understanding the cultural, political,
ethnic and linguistic needs particular to Romani communities are crucial
in order to protect their specic identity and their contribution to the
multicultural Romanian heritage, as well as to anchor this ethnic minority
within contemporary society. The main interests of Roma must be distinguished from problems facing Roma requiring, of course, solutions. This
rationale has informed much of the domestic political debate on how to
deal with Roma, and is often framed in negative terminology. By design
politics must be more than checklist problem-solving because it needs to
provide a discourse for struggle and debate. Interests serve a dual function:
they help to determine the conception of the good life which Roma have
Structures of Representation in Romania
85
for themselves; and they demonstrate how Roma organize themselves

politically. There are three broad approaches to conducting research on
Roma in Romania by public bodies as well as by academics6: (1) the socioeconomic approach which starts from the idea that the Romani community
is confronted with problems related to poverty and diculties in securing
adequate living conditions; (2) the relationship with authorities approach
which deals with aspects related to a presumed institutionalized discrimination against Roma in their relations with public authorities; (3) the
identity approach which considers the traditions and culture of Roma
which constitute this group and their identity. While I touch upon aspects
of all three approaches, the identity approach is considered particularly relevant because the negative association of Romani identity actually informs
their relative socio-economic position and the embedded discrimination
which they face. So, if we understand Roma as possessing shared interests,
which are inextricably linked to their ethnic group identity, then the debate
moves beyond simplistic checklist-solving and into more pragmatic ways
of macro-management for the domestic political lite as well as for the
Romani community themselves.
The main shared interests of Roma are education, health, employment
and social aairs including housing, and political participation. While these
are overtly socio-economic and political this does not diminish the importance of cultural interests and identity for Roma. The interests of Roma
have been determined by examining the mandates, publications and activities of Roma NGOs, interviews with prominent Roma lite and activists,
document analysis of research institutes, programmes of international
organizations and international donors, and through domestic discourse
analysis for example, the National Strategy for the Improvement in the
Situation of Roma (hereafter the National Strategy). The National Strategy
was adopted in 2001 and is a detailed programme that addresses the
multi-faceted experiences of Roma, incorporating measures at the central,
municipal and local government levels. The National Strategy was elaborated with the help of the Working Group of Roma Associations whose
consultations with the government began in 1998. Each shared interest is
considered in turn.
First, the level of formal education and professional qualication of
the Romani population is generally low. According to the Education Law,7
Romani students can learn Romani language and Romani history and
culture courses upon request which helps to sustain and perpetuate their
cultural heritage. It is worth noting that without a minimum of Grade VIII
education, Romanians cannot legally be hired by any employer and procure a work card (Carte de Munc) which theoretically entitles the holder
86
to a pension, unemployment and health insurance as well as a median wage

established by the government for that particular type of employment
(CEDIME-SE 2001, 43). By promoting equality in education and giving
equal opportunities to Romani students at all levels of education, graduates
should be able to secure employment on completion of education.8 So these
interests are often intertwined and therefore should not be dealt with in
isolation, meaning that eorts should be geared towards addressing all
shared interests.9 While the benets of an education are primarily felt by an
individual, there is also a diused benet to Roma education as it helps to
create an intelligentsia, one which is notably absent at present and impedes
development in other socio-economic and political areas. The mere
existence of rights, including rights to education, is not sucient because
without access to these rights, they are meaningless. A disconnection
between the substance and purpose of these rights on the one hand and the
practical capacity to access these rights on the other is symptomatic of
the more general situation of Roma in Romania.
Secondly, improvement in their access to health services such as
community health vaccinations, advice on family planning, providing of
health-related information, supporting pregnant Romani women and
new born children, and solving identication problems10 are a key shared
interest of the Romani community. The National Strategy focuses on the
need to improve access to public services for Roma (Zoon 2001). Some
Roma are excluded from public health care by virtue of the fact that they
lack birth certicates, identication cards, or other proofs of residence
(CEDIME-SE 2001, 27), so the shared interests of access to adequate
health care and identication documentation are closely linked because
one cannot be eectively addressed without the other. Health mediators
who work in local Romani communities are vital to address the issue of
identication as they can determine who has and who has not got the necessary documentation, and help them acquire these documents with the
help of Romani NGOs, such as Romani CRISS.
Thirdly, social inclusion, assistance and equal opportunities between
the majority and minority are of paramount importance to Roma. Social
inclusion programmes should as a matter of principle, include all vulnerable persons if structural inadequacies are to be addressed and full social
rights are to be enjoyed. By ghting discrimination in hiring Romani candidates11 and giving nancial support for small and medium enterprises
owned by Roma, inequalities are addressed through economic development.
A signicant element of social inclusion and assistance relates to housing
and studies have shown that higher levels of education are associated with
87
better housing conditions (OSI 2006, 65). Access to adequate housing

has become a contentious issue for Roma (Berescu and Celac 2006) and
arguments have been levelled at the government by Romani NGOs that
there have been attempts to ghettoize Roma. Romani ghettos are located on
the outskirts of urban areas and lack adequate sewerage and sanitation,
which in turn creates health problems. Furthermore, exclusion or excessive
distance from other settlements, public services such as quality schooling,
postal services, healthcare and other urban facilities are crucial for
quality-of-living standards (European Commission 2004, 25). Of course,
segregation is a breeding ground for contempt as it reinforces previously
held pejorative stereotypes, and exacerbates socio-economic divergence.
Finally, the equal and active participation of the Romani population
and civil society is required for legitimate representation and the articulation of interests. While some believe that Roma should be proportionally
represented in parliament in line with their demographic weight, this
idealistic view sidesteps more pertinent issues such as establishing the
appropriate proportion. Roma representation is controversial since there
seems to be no unity or consensus among the dierent Romani groups on
how it should be realized. Political participation is low at local and national
level and can be partly explained by low levels of education and high levels
of poverty. One of the most important aspects of the National Strategy
is its focus on the political participation of Roma. In particular, these
measures call for the establishment of local structures with Roma representatives to implement the National Strategy and ensure it meets the
needs of individual Romani communities. These measures have the potential to institutionalize Roma representation in local governance to create a
powerful network of Romani civil servants and to capitalize on the increasing number of Romani civil servants and Romani university graduates.
However, many of these oces have not yet been able to exert a signicant
inuence on decision-making processes as their activities and responsibilities in relation to other governmental bodies remain ambiguous. As a
community, Roma are slowly realizing they must mobilize and organize
politically in order to articulate their shared interests. This is impeded by
the absence of an intelligentsia who know how to articulate their interests
and can vote, train others and create new representation structures. As one
activist points out, We need diplomats, we need lobbyists, we need advocacy, we need think tanks.12 The example of the Hungarian community in
Romania is often used to illustrate how a minority can be eective if it has
an intelligentsia ready and able to engage in the structures of politics on its
behalf. This is impeded by the fact that many Roma who are educated
88
choose to assimilate and not to self-identify as Roma due to the discrimination and racism which they could face.
These shared interests have one common dimension: access.13 It is access
to education, housing, healthcare and the labour market which is of concern to Roma. One way to address the issue of access has been to provide
armative action and preferential treatment, for instance, guaranteeing
university places for Romani students. However, access to public goods is
hindered because of the poverty and racial discrimination which most
Roma are disproportionately aected by. While reducing poverty levels in
Romania is an interest of all Romanians more generally, it is a specic
shared interest of the Romani community. Social justice, marginalization
and stigmatization of Roma are key interests which need to be addressed as
they can help break the vicious cycle of poverty-exclusion-discrimination
and elevate the Romani communitys self-image. Roma have a negative
image in mainstream society which means discrimination has become a
major problem. Measures to prevent discrimination were enhanced by the
adoption of Law 48/2002 (previously 137/2000) on the elimination of all
forms of discrimination. This legislative intervention includes a broad denition of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, race and gender, and
stipulates equality in economic activity, employment, access to legal, administrative and public health services, access to education and the right to
personal dignity.14 The National Council for Combating Discrimination
(NCCD) was established in 2002 as part of the National Strategy and is
dedicated to eradicating all forms of discrimination and injustice. While
this institution is for all citizens of Romania, including other national
minorities, the bulk of cases brought before it concern Roma.15 National
minorities in Romania have their own interests usually related to the preservation of culture and language, and do not face widespread discrimination
as Roma do. Of the other 19 national minorities in Romania, 18 are demographically small and only the Hungarian community has a comparable
population size however, it has been able to mobilize politically, possesses
an intelligentsia, as well as a kin state to lobby and advocate on its behalf.
In what way can we understand interests as they relate to representation
especially since participating in public life and securing representation
is a specic interest of ethnic minorities? One shared interest of Roma is
to gain access to the organizing structures of representation to actually
articulate their shared interests. It is worth pointing out that a hierarchy of
interests does not exist indeed the interests of Roma are constructed and
constituted by their ethnic identity. Moreover, formulating interests in this
way leads us down a cul-de-sac, wherein the rationalist understanding of
89
interests prevails. If there is a hierarchy of interests, then some are

deemed more important than others in a given space and time, therefore
the interests concerned can be used strategically by motivated actors.
I maintain that shared interests are intersubjectively constructed by actors
who share a common ethnic identity. In this respect the Roma social movement mobilizes around its ethnicity to articulate its multiple and shifting
shared interests. Very often actors will engage in a social movement where
they receive no direct and tangible material benets through this community activism or advocacy. If they were self-seeking rational individuals
motivated by proximate interests they would not get involved in community activism (Gutmann 2003, 124), and would pursue individual material
interests. Those involved in the Roma social movement tend to be educated
compared to other Roma and signify only a small proportion of the
Romani community. Clearly, there exists numerous shared interests and
this section only details some of the most pertinent. These interests are
often intertwined and are articulated by several organizing structures of
representation including Romani lite, political parties and civil society
organizations.
lite Representation of Roma

There are a number of individuals and lite who claim to be political representatives of Roma in Romania. Those lite are considered in turn due
to their respective prominence in political life. The term representative
denotes an agent or spokesperson who acts on behalf of his or her principal, much like a lawyer or ambassador. However, following Birch (1971, 18),
a political representative is a person who, by custom or law, has the status
or role of a representative within a political system, whose job it is to ensure
the authoritative allocation of values in a society. In the case of ethnic
minorities, this person often symbolizes the identity or qualities of a group
of people meaning that they share a common ethnicity. A political representative does not act on behalf of a principal rather they represent and
articulate interests that a group of individuals share. It is assumed that
because ethnic minorities are united by a common ethnicity, they hold
many of the same shared interests. It is perhaps more accurate to conceive
of political representatives as representing bundles of interests and aliations rather than as spokespersons in the strictest sense.
The description of elected members of a political assembly as representatives is best understood as a specialized usage of the term, not
exactly equivalent to any non-political usage (Birch 1971, 19). The essential
90
characteristic of such persons is the manner of their selection, not their

behaviour or characteristics or symbolic value. This raises questions about
how one understands elections. Is an election a formal procedure or an
expression of freedom of choice? Indeed should the elected assembly be a
social microcosm of the nation reecting a spectrum of communities and
groups, each sharing specic interests? Advocates of this view have suggested that an assembly cannot be properly representative of the nation
if its social composition is conspicuously dierent from the electorate.
A public authority, such as a local or national assembly, derives its legitimacy from the process of election which its members have gone through.
Nowadays election by popular vote is the source of legitimacy that appears
to command the most respect, as those elected receive a mandate to
govern. The legitimizing function of elections can also be found when representatives are appointed rather than elected thus in political systems
where nepotism is rife, leadership legitimacy is generally regarded as low.
As a corollary where meritocracy is the norm, legitimacy is generally seen
to be high. Elections vest the representative in parliament with the legitimacy to articulate the interests of their constituents and to ensure that
policies and legislation have the necessary input of a sectional interest so
that they reect society as a whole. Signicantly, there is no nation state in
which free elections based on surage have produced an assembly which
could be fairly described as a social microcosm of the nation. Following
Pitkins (1972, 209) useful denition, representing here means acting in
the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them, it follows
that in an elected parliament the interests of the minority will always be
sidelined by the interests of the majority. A universalistic approach to representation and citizenship cannot accommodate dierence and has led
to calls for special political representation for minorities (Young 1990;
Kymlicka 1995).
It is assumed that elected representatives are capable of rising above the
promotion of their own proximate interests in order to articulate the shared
interests of their constituents. If politics is more than balancing group pressures, the elected representative, insofar as (s)he is a policy-maker, must
act as rather more than a delegate. If an elected representative of Roma
successfully articulates the interests of Roma then (s)he will be re-elected
back into public oce. Previous Deputies include: Gheorghe Rducanu
19921996; Mdlin Voicu 19962000; Nicolae Pun 20002004; 20042008
and 2008present, each of whom relied on the constitutional provision to
attain their seat, having failed to attain the 5 per cent threshold. It is worth
noting that each of these parliamentarians has come from the Roma Party
91
(Partida Romilor) which changed its name to the Social Democrat Roma
Party (prior to the 2004 elections), before settling on Roma Party ProEurope (from 2006). To reduce confusion, this political association will be
referred to as the Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE). In the 2008 parliamentary elections two Roma were elected for the rst time: Nicolae Pun
secured his third term of oce while Mdlin Voicu was elected on the
Social Democrat Party (SDP) party list.
Sometimes gaining access to representation means that a Rom must
stand on the party lists of mainstream political parties. In Romania, as
elsewhere, adding a Rom on the party list is not going to win many votes
from the majority of citizens but can help secure the Roma vote in an area
with a dense Roma demography.16 This also means that Roma are often not
re-elected as these individual Roma are swallowed up in the agendas of
their political parties. These individual Romani parliamentarians nd it
extremely dicult and frustrating to make any sort of impact on the policy-making process and also to articulate the interests of Roma as they are
not suciently empowered. As Petrova explains the typical phenomena is
that if a Roma is elected they only serve one mandate because they failed to
meet the very high expectations of their own supporters. That is why they
cannot get a second mandate.17 It is this failure to articulate the interests
of Roma which will impact directly on their time spent in public oce.
The ability of Roma to articulate their shared interests is crucial because
representation concerns interests and not advocacy. If Roma are unable to
articulate their interests through an institutional structure, then they cannot be considered full citizens as they are not being represented.
A representative of the people does not necessarily mean a representative of all the people. An elected representative who secures a seat in
parliament on an ethnic ticket represents the interests of that ethnic group,
and also society at large, with the idea that accommodating diversity is a
goal of most societies. Such a representative does not just represent the
shared interests of that ethnic group, so representation of an ethnic minority is not necessarily dependent upon a common ethnicity. There are many
individual representatives who could claim to articulate the interests of
Roma but they are usually primarily aliated to an organization or institution at a local level. There is no doubt that these individuals full an
important role in society however their reach is localized and specic so it
is dicult to argue that they can articulate the interests of the Romani
community.
The lack of legitimated political leaders is one of the greatest challenges
facing the Romani community at a local level (Bleahu and Frunzaru 2005).
92
The relative power and authority which traditional leaders exert over local
Romani communities must be considered if we are to fully appreciate
diverse organizing structures of representation that claim to represent
Roma. While the bulibaa is the informal leader of traditional Romani
communities such as the cldrari, argintari, spoitori, cortorari, their status
is usually dependent on charisma or wealth and is hereditary, an example
of Weberian legitimacy. At rst sight, these potestal institutions appear to
fall beyond the scope of reasoned political analysis; however, they become
relevant because they can inuence who the Romani electorate votes for
in local and national elections.18 While the bulibaa is a localized phenomenon, there have been instances when certain individuals have proclaimed
themselves to be International King of the Roma or The Emperor of all
Roma Everywhere. However even these leaders acknowledge that the
authority of the bulibaa is waning and some have even attempted to legitimate themselves by accessing national political structures. For example,
Florin Cioaba, the Roma King formed the Christian Centre of Roma
in Romania, and ran in the 2000 national elections for the Chamber of
Deputies securing 12,171 votes (Ionescu and Cace 2006, 35). Furthermore,
Florin Cioaba is one of the four Romanian delegates to the ERTF, a transnational organizing structure of representation aliated with the Council
of Europe.
All ethnic minorities in Romania (who are registered and members of
the Council of National Minorities)19 have the right to one representative
in the Chamber of Deputies, although the Hungarian minority regularly
surpasses the 5 per cent threshold. Nicolae Pun, who is the President
of the RPPE, is one of two Romani representatives in the Chamber of
Deputies having attained 43,884 votes (down from 56,076 in the 2004
elections), while Mdlin Voicu secured 6,385 votes, coming rst in his
precinct.20 Mr. Pun is the President of the Romani political association
which gained the most votes; however, he attained his seat through the
aforementioned constitutional provision. It is dicult to predict how and
whether a minority parliamentarian can articulate the interests of Roma,
even if (s)he can lay claim to some source of legitimacy by virtue of election.
Perhaps most signicantly, his interventions in parliament are primarily
related to Roma such as the commemoration of those Roma who perished
in the Holocaust21 and the celebration of International Roma Day.22 The
character, background and behaviour of Mr. Pun are not of primary concern to my research because this is a normative enquiry asking whether
an lite (as an individual) can legitimately articulate the interests of Roma.23
It is assumed that should there be a change of Romani representation in the
93
Chamber of Deputies at the next elections, that this enquiry would be no

less relevant.
At the governmental level, the National Agency for Roma (NAR) is
charged with policy-making and its role is to consult with government
on a range of issues related to Roma. Gruia Bumbu is the President of the
NAR and is a State Secretary, therefore a Deputy Minister, but acknowledges that Roma are not suciently represented in public life.24 While
some commentators are sceptical as to its power and purpose, it is the one
institution which could claim to articulate the interests of Roma at the
governmental level. It consults with the government on policies and decisions which aect the Romani community directly; however, the NAR
simply does not enjoy the resources or authority required to full its function adequately (ECRI 2006, 30). If it is to be more than a token institution
for Roma representation or a shop window for external observers then
it must be given competences which reect its elevated positioning.
Furthermore, it is the institution itself which is of primary concern when
dealing with representation, as the NAR is more than the sum of its parts,
therefore Bumbus successor will have no more or less legitimate claim to
representation than he does, providing that the structure and capabilities
of the NAR remain the same.
Another question which arises is whether non-Roma (gaje) can represent Roma or not? And if so, do they do so legitimately? This is a pertinent,
but prickly, question as it essentially asks if whether legitimacy is dependent on sharing an ethnic identity. Very often there are struggles of power
in local communities and this is usually for traditional institutions of
representation, who are Romani. At a national level, individuals can claim
to represent Roma and articulate their interests yet have no Romani
cultural characteristics or even speak Romani. Signicantly, there is no
non-Romani individual who occupies a prominent position in public life
who could legitimately claim to articulate the shared interests of Roma.
Monopolizing Roma Representation

First of all, there are no ethnic minority political parties in Romania though
political NGOs and organizations do exist. Horowitz (1985, 291) maintains
that an ethnic political party is a political formation which oscillates
between a classic political party and an interest group, gaining support
from a specic ethnic group(s) to serves their interests. The situation in
Romania concerning the legal status and formulation of national minority
organizations is complex. While the organizations are technically NGOs,
94
they are also permitted to run in parliamentary elections to receive one

of the seats set aside for the national minorities who fail to attain the
5 per cent threshold. Under Romanian NGO law, only three persons are
required to form an NGO25 and there is no special certication procedure
to ensure that a national minority organization is actually constituted of
that minority. This occurs not only because of the allocated parliamentary
seats for minorities but also because under Romanian political party
nance law the state distributes funds for any party/organization that runs
in the election (Decker and McGarry 2005, 19).
So, how is it possible for NGOs to have a political character? Minorities
have an extra right in order to rectify problems of representation,26
therefore national minorities are accorded a seat in parliament which does
not apply to other political parties. This does not mean that non-minority
parties have fewer rights. Rather the democratic system dictates that the
majority is always favoured; therefore, positive discrimination gives minorities a voice which would otherwise be drowned out. Minorities have
dierent views (preferences and interests) that are stronger than any political aliation. The rationale being that minorities require a special status
where their representatives are somewhere between a political party and
an NGO, which does not impact on freedom of association. The fact that an
NGO can be elected to the Chamber of Deputies is not considered to be an
issue or even worthy of debate for minority politicians, academics and
activists. The strength and utility of civil society comes from its independence as a public space which often assumes the form of an articulated
system of decision-making, negotiation and representation (Melucci 1992,
10). In Romania, there is no separation of the civil and political spheres
of society when it comes to minority participation and representation.
While Romani NGOs are clearly political in the sense that they are committed to action to combat discrimination and promote moral and political
norms which are embedded in society, they should not be political associations that compete for state power (Steiner 1991, 70). Indeed an NGOs
inability to remain detached from political life will impact on its claims to
legitimacy, particularly since in Romania the RPPE receives state funding
as a group represented in parliament. This lack of autonomy and independence vis--vis the state impacts negatively on the credibility and legitimacy
of the RPPE.
After 1989 many political organizations were set up including: the
Democratic Roma Union; the Ethical Federation of the Roma; the Roma
Party; the Roma Union. Romani lite split for a number of reasons including mutual distain, suspicion, in ghting and a marked inability to reach
95
compromises (Barany 2001, 3). Fragmentation characterizes most movements meaning that there may be agreement in terms of goals but
disagreement on how to achieve those goals. The Romanian governments
partnership with a single political organization, the RPPE has raised concerns about marginalization and exclusion of other organizations (OSI
2002, 480). The National Strategy created the position of local experts in
Roma aairs who work within the Mayors oce,27 but these experts have
mainly been appointed on the proposals made by the RPPE, without regard
to standard hiring procedures or taking into consideration proposals from
other representatives of Romani civil society organizations (Weber 2001).
Another perceived problem is that many of these so-called Roma experts
are not ethnically Romani. While it is debatable whether a non-Roma can
represent Roma, the issue here is that there exists an increasing pool of
Romani graduates and activists ready and able to ll these positions yet if
they are not aliated with the RPPE, they may not be hired. The RPPE has
come to be accepted as the sole (and authoritative) representative body for
the highly diverse Romani population, failing to take into account the
expertise and experience developed in Romani civil society.
Any objections that the government is overly reliant on the RPPE have
been routinely dismissed because there is no other political association
which can claim its electoral legitimacy or demographic reach. This issue
is compounded by the fact that those organizations which are represented
in the Council of National Minorities (and therefore in the Chamber of
Deputies) receive an annual stipend, as well as other facilities and resources.
These funds help to secure future electoral success and thus perpetuate
the cycle of national (and, therefore, local) representation, ensuring that
the RPPE have the resources to launch eective political campaigns. The
government legitimizes its Roma policy (i.e. its initiatives, decisions and
strategies) by consulting with the RPPE but no other Romani political
association is given credence which means that the government only hears
one Romani voice.
The lack of pluralism is a worrying aspect of ethnic politics, pluralism
should not be construed to produce a Sorcerers Apprentice phenomenon
of plethora organizations, voters choice is at the heart of democracy
(Venice Commission 2004, 10). As one might expect, there have been several attempts to challenge the supremacy of the RPPE over the years but all
challenges have failed for a number of reasons, mainly due to the ability of
RPPE to secure votes through their superior organizational capabilities.
Their representatives are visible at all political levels so most Romani voters
see the RPPE as the only option. The RPPE are regarded by government as
96
being the sole legitimate voice of the Romani community; therefore,

the shared interests articulated by RPPE are given the most credibility
at the national level. While the RPPE does not have a carte blanche to
articulate whatever interests it sees t, the interests it does articulate are
highly dependent on the opinions of senior ocials within this political
association.
Factionalism and fragmentation are issues which all social movements
must contend with at some stage or another (Mason 1989, 4158). While
diversity of opinion is at the heart of all civic democracies, this issue
is magnied with minorities due to their oft substandard positioning in
society. It is frequently assumed that ethnic minorities are bounded internally homogeneous communities with stable group identities meaning
their interests are assumed to be uniform because they share the same
ethnic identity. When new associations begin to form, they are not created
for the sake of it, rather they full a specic function, and they articulate a
shared interest of the community which they claim to represent; otherwise,
any edgling group will not survive. Tellingly most of the Romani political
associations were created at democracys rst breath between 1990 and
1992 and since then the propensity to establish Romani political associations has dissipated (Ionescu and Cace 2006, 3536). The absence of
mainstream political will coupled with the factionalism of the political lite
in the Roma social movement conspire to hamper attempts to improve the
representation of Roma. Moreover, the governments reliance on a single
political organization has given rise to concerns that other organizations
have been eectively excluded therefore I shed light on alternative forms of
representation outside of the conventional political channels which Roma
create to articulate their interests, providing a better understanding of how
Roma are disproportionately represented. Related to this, arguments have
been raised that governments dependence on one political organization to
represent all Roma political and civic associations has led to a fragmentation of the Romani communitys NGOs (OSI 2002).
Through each election, all political organizations representing the
Romani community cumulate in less than 1.4 per cent (this peak was in the
1996 elections) of the total national votes.28 Support for Roma candidates
in the 2008 elections dwindled meaning that in a political context where
Roma compose at least 3 per cent (and up to 10 per cent) of the population,
we can deduce that some Roma were either not voting or were transferring
their vote to another party. The Romani electorate have always held an
anity with the SDP, which deploys political rhetoric such as social assistance and social inclusion which resonates with Romani voters. The SDP
97
has openly courted the Roma vote and in 1999 and 2004 the SDP signed
protocols with the RPPE in which it pledged to solve Romas social problems. The SDP also put Romani candidates on their party lists and in return
in Presidential elections, Roma will often endorse the SDP candidate. The
election of Voicu is signicant though because it is the rst time a mainstream political party has placed a Romani candidate in a winnable seat
resulting in a Deputy in the national assembly. Despite this, two seats out of
334 is still not contiguous to their demographic weight an examination
of the Hungarian partys (UDMR) electoral success highlights how far
Roma have to go to improve their descriptive representation.29
Localized Legitimacy through Civil Society

There are hundreds of NGOs in Romania which promote Roma rights
and articulate shared Romani interests but most lack elemental resources
and self-sustainability. These NGOs are active in a number of areas in
numerous projects which aim to improve Romas enjoyment of civil,
social, political, economic and cultural rights. A fundamental law on registration exists30 and it is the registration process which separates NGOs
and political parties; however, in Romania an anomaly exists whereby an
NGO can have a political character. This only applies to minority NGOs.
In other countries the crucial point comes when a minority organization
must register its status, that is, as a political party or other, and determines
its precise form and function. The registration process is justied by the
need for formal recognition of an association as a political party. So, outside of legal channels, is it possible to make a distinction between a political
party and an NGO, if the latter can be elected to parliament? Or is it just a
case of the boundary between the two being blurred in Romania? And,
what does this mean for the role and purpose of national minority NGOs
and political parties? As an organizing structure of representation, a civil
society organization fulls a very dierent function from that of a political
party. The distinction between political party and NGO cannot be found by
examining whether it works for its own members (not constituents), or for
those outside the political system. An organizing structure of representation cannot represent an opinion (as that is subjective) but it can represent
and articulate interests as these are aggregated bundles of opinions and
aliations which are intersubjectively constructed by communities. There
are two main functions of a civil society organization: (a) to act as a check
on state institutions; and (b) to articulate shared interests. By fullling
its two primary functions an NGO articulates interests on behalf of a
98
community through project implementation,31 publications and consultations with international and national bodies. Notably, minority NGOs often
paint a more accurate (and less attering) portrait of the actual issues and
situation than state institutions.
During communism the persistence of state paternalism meant that
civil society was weak. After 1989, an old law, No. 21/1924, which had never
been abolished, was reinforced and has become the legal frame for the
newly emerging civil society and a few thousand NGOs have been created
since.32 The creation of NGOs after 1990 aimed at oering educational support, expressing Roma culture and traditions, community and economic
development, research and social interaction, combating the prejudices
and stereotypes (CEDIME-SE 2001, 14). Romani civil society organizations
grew in importance because Roma needed to reduce their dependence
on a state which could not support them adequately. After 1990, various
Romani NGOs were set up but their number, aptitude and longevity were
dependent on their capacity to secure funding and on the ability of leaders
to guide their respective organizations. Research has shown how the
geographical spread and intra-ethnic heterogeneity supported the simultaneous establishment of the organizations in more regions of the country
(Bleahu and Frunzaru 2005, 8). During this time, many NGOs were established to be antithetic to the chaotic political arena where Roma found
themselves increasingly marginalized.
Many professional and competitive Romani NGOs operate at national33
level, but at local level the Romani civil society appears to be fragile or not
eectively organized. The creation of Romani initiative groups at community level was stimulated by the possibility of accessing internal funds from
government, and external funds from international donors such as the EU
and the Soros Foundation. However despite their proliferation and geographical spread their eectiveness is questionable. The interests articulated
by Romani NGOs are multifarious and often depend on the geographical
and cultural context of their activity because some choose to focus on
human rights abuse, others on access to health, and others still on education of Romani children, among others. Agendas are often decided by the
leader or director of an NGO, or an NGO is created to articulate a shared
interest to increase awareness of an issue (e.g. Letiia Mark established the
Roma Womens Association in Timioara). The major national Romani
NGOs in Romania are Impreuna, Aven Amentza and Romani CRISS due to
their respective demographic and territorial reach. These NGOs can and
do articulate several interests at once; however, these shared interests are
not necessarily in competition with one another. This can be determined
99
by examining the organizational structure of Romani CRISS: there is a

health department, an education department, a human rights department
and a social department dealing with ID cards.34
There have been attempts to unify the Romani movement, but these
have usually been on an ad hoc temporary basis to serve a specic purpose,
for example in 1999, representatives from 80 Roma NGOs convened a
Working Group of Roma Associations to consult with the National Oce
for Roma (which was the previous incarnation of the National Agency for
Roma), to elaborate the National Strategy ensuring that legitimate representatives were articulating the interests of Roma. While examples of unity
are few and eeting in their existence, it shows that Romani NGOs can
work together at a national level to articulate their shared interests. The fact
that the Roma movement, like all social movements, is characterized by
fragmentation is not necessarily an impediment to the goals and purpose
of the movement itself. Rather, this fragmentation is indicative of the
diverse views and interests which are part and parcel of the heterogeneous
Romani community.
Complaints have been raised relating to the appointment of Romani
experts with local governments. Some representatives from Romani NGOs
have stated that the government has a dierent vision regarding the implementation of the National Strategy than their own, and have called for
more eective collaboration with civil society in its implementation.
Notably, where public institutions fail, NGOs may have greater success
(OSI 2002, 491). NGOs may not have the power of decision but they are
able to implement projects on a local level, and it is here where the real
importance of the NGO lies and its ability to represent and articulate
interests is cultivated. Grassroots development helps to establish a social
network of actors committed to establishing cultural change for Roma so
the cultural content of a social movement must be empirically grounded
(McClurg Mueller 1992, 917). Mushrooming Romani civil society organizations orientate their eorts towards articulating certain shared interests
and building the capacity of Romani communities as they implement
projects dealing with common issues such as building condence, ghting
prejudice and discrimination, and expanding employment, education,
housing and healthcare. While their respective contributions have been
invaluable, the results are insucient at present.
The lack of political participation is an ongoing concern but eorts are
being made to rectify this problem most notably through Romani NGOs.
One Romani NGO, Impreuna has become involved in a project to train 25
young Roma to become the next generation of political leaders, building
100
capacity for the future. However this needs to be complimented by more

concerted eorts at the grass roots level to engage and educate ordinary
Roma about the importance of political participation. On a more practical
level, as many Roma lack identity cards,35 they are unable to vote, which
means that they are not full citizens. The major Romani NGOs are constantly juggling their activities and do not concentrate solely on one shared
interest as this would be futile. Romani NGOs have quickly come to realize
that shared interests are inter-related and therefore their activities should
pursue a multi-pronged approach.
The most important role of a Romani NGO is to implement projects on
the ground, which can impact directly on the community. But an NGO, by
its very nature, is not elected. Yet it certainly can be viewed as representing
and articulating the interests of the Romani community legitimately. In the
strictest sense, this is not political representation, but it is the local community which empowers and legitimizes an NGO by gaining their trust.36
This signies more than an output or performance-based legitimacy when
NGOs implement projects which have an impact in local communities.
Their legitimacy derives from the process of organizing the local community
Table 4.1 Key Features of Organizing Structures of Representation in Romania
Organizing lite
structure of
representation
Political party
Key features
RPPE have
monopoly
over Roma
representation.
Support for RPPE

is not contiguous
with Roma
population.
Two Romani
representatives
in parliament.
Ethnicity is
important
but not a
prerequisite
for Roma
representation.
Authority
of bulibaa
waning.
Accusations
of tokenism in
governmental
agencies.
RPPE is technically
(legally registered
as) an NGO,
though stands in
elections.
Mainstream
political parties
such as SDP enjoy
support from
Roma.
Civil society
organization
z
National and local

NGOs work on a variety
of interest areas.
Romani CRISS and

Impreuna are two of
the most prominent.
NGOs pursue a multipronged approach to

articulating interests.
Capacity to foster social

relationships on local
level.
101
and articulating its shared interests, and is not dependent on electoral

results. Signicantly, some activists point out that it is easier to gain the
trust of Romani communities if the organization shares the same ethnicity
(similar to both political parties and lite). But a note of caution must
be exercised and the maxim he who pays the piper calls the tune is instructive here: NGOs survive through external funding meaning that projects
which are given the green light may not necessarily signify a shared interest
of Roma, but may reect the interests of the funding body in question.37
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the key features of organizing structures
of representation in Romania.
Conclusion
Ethnic Mobilization
Ethnic mobilization results in the creation of organizing structures of representation such as lite, political parties and civil society organizations,
and goes some way in explaining how Roma make their voices heard in
a liberal democratic system which suppresses minority interests. The disunity of the Romani community in Romania is primarily explained by the
large number of unique sub-groups present within it, as Mirga and Gheorghe
(1997, 4) explain, because of this division, Romani organizations with
competing claims to legitimacy have proliferated in recent years. There is
a lack of cohesive identity so they remain profoundly divided and consequently politically ineective. Even though they have a fragmented identity,
it is this ethnic identity which acts as a glue for the Roma social movement
as identity is the cornerstone of any social movement (Cohen 1985). This
has resulted in the formation of a multitude of organizations (both political and non-political) which claim to represent and articulate the multiple
and shifting shared interests of the Romani community. Institutions, primarily NGOs and to a considerably lesser extent political associations/
parties constitute the backbone of ethnic Romani mobilization. And there
has been some success with an increasing number of Roma occupying
positions of decision-making at the local level, and thousands have become
involved in public life, whether as volunteers working for NGOs or as representative of their communities. Major Romani NGOs such as Romani
CRISS and Impreuna would not become politicized as they believe they
can achieve more as an NGO. As a social movement Roma have enjoyed
most success outside of conventional political channels for participation
and representation.
102
Social movements frequently present a united front in order for their

interests to be taken seriously by government though Roma are keen to
stress their heterogeneous composition. At present, the state accepts and
endorses the system of community leaders negotiating and representing
the community as a whole on community matters such as resource provisions. Ethnic mobilization as part of a broader social movement must come
from below, that is, through stalagmite mobilization; however, there comes
a point when the state needs to reach out or initiate policies which impact
positively on the community. If the state sends out a positive signal, the
social movement deduces that its interests are being articulated in a hospitable atmosphere. Paradoxically it is only through ethnic mobilization
when Roma can articulate their shared interests through organizing structures of representation that the heterogeneity of the Romani community
becomes apparent. The diversity contained within the Romani community
is demonstrated by the rich array of Romani organizing structures of
representation and the shared interests which they articulate.
Political participation can take a variety of forms and must be understood
as a crucial component of the Roma social movement. By gaining access
to formal and informal political structures, Roma are able to articulate
shared interests. Importantly, in Romania, this political participation can
be delineated from above such as through guaranteed parliamentary representation for all minorities, or from below through struggle and mobilization,
such as through civil society organizations. Roma are represented in the
Chamber of Deputies by Nicolae Pun of the RPPE and by Mdlin Voicu
of the SDP but the fact that Roma have only two representatives in the
parliament means that localized representation and civil society mobilization has become more important. State institutions increasingly seek
Roma endorsement for various policies and initiatives, particularly those
concerning minorities. Roma are often dropped into committees, council,
ministries, and in some cases, it seems the participation of the Roma is
still only a matter of tokenism (PER 1999a, 18). This tokenism is epitomized by allocating national minorities a seat in the parliament without
bestowing that position with any signicant inuence on decisions which
impact on that minority directly. Indeed this undermines the legitimacy of
the States measures to accommodate the minority, allowing ethnic entrepreneurs to attack and thereby undermine the accommodation accorded
to the minority by the state (OSCE-ODIHR 2001, 21).
103
Roma have retained a long-standing indierence towards public and

political life and a reluctance to participate in it and Gruia Bumbu argues
that Roma do not realize the importance of their vote.38 The absence of
formal structures in Romani communities has been an obstacle to participation in the modern bureaucratic structures that increasingly characterize
government and public administration thus the community faces the challenge of building formal structures of representation and participation
(Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 4). This runs in tandem with the necessity of
constructing non-political organizing structures of representation such as
NGOs. What follows is a search for appropriate organizational structures
for political representation and action (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 5),
which Roma use to articulate shared interests. By and large, Roma are
relatively uninterested in formal political processes but whether this is the
cause or the consequence of their disproportionate representation is not
clear. On the one hand, many Roma do not believe that they can play a vital
role in the decision-making process while on the other hand there are those
Roma who are engaged with policy-making but outside of conventional
political channels such as civil society organizations. Added to this are
structural issues which impact negatively on Romani political participation
including societal marginalization and a lack of education.
In Romania the shared interests of Roma are directly connected to their
ethnic identity, which means that they are insoluble as one informs the
other. The main shared interests of Roma are education, health, employment and social aairs including housing, and political participation. While
reducing poverty levels in Romania is an interest of all Romanians more
generally, it is a specic shared interest of the Romani community. Roma
are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty-exclusion-discrimination which
harms their self-perception, and exacerbates their capacity to address these
shared interests so the main function of organizing structures of representation is to articulate these shared interests. Notably, Roma have quickly
learned that they must pursue a multi-pronged approach in articulating
these shared interests in order to address them in any meaningful sense.
For example, Romani CRISS addresses the shared interests of health and
lack of ocial identication in tandem through local projects registering
Roma with health mediators.39
The guiding principles of the National Strategy are: (a) social utility,
which means responding to the shared interests of the Romani community
104
(specically access to particular civic, socio-economic and cultural interests);

and (b) decentralization, which refers to specic responsibilities assigned
to public institutions at local level.40 I argue that a hierarchy of interests
does not exist however I am careful to focus on shared interests (which are
intersubjectively constructed) rather than proximate interests (which
are held by an individual). Additionally, it is the articulation of shared
interests which is relevant not whether these interests are successfully
secured or not. Finally, shared interests help show how Roma organize
politically and determine the competing vision of the good life which
Roma have for themselves.
The Romani communitys weak ethnic identity, inghting, poor leadership,
the propagation of organizations, lack of substantial resources and low
voter turnout and participation have thwarted their collective action and
impeded their ability to aect state policies (Barany 2001, 10). Representation and political participation is often not enough in itself, it needs to be
supplemented by other measures (resources or specially allocated seats),
but most importantly representation needs to be acknowledged as legitimate for constituents or else the representation itself is a hollow structure.
Legitimacy is a social construct, like interests or group identity, and is
something which must be tacitly agreed upon in order to have meaning.
It is not necessary to have a direct impact on policy and decisions, but
rather the articulation of interests itself is a purposeful and requisite value
in any democratic society. The crucial distinction is between those who
mobilize politically and create organizing structures of representation, and
those who hope that their elected representatives will do it on their behalf.
As one Romani political lite explains, The Gypsy must mobilize too, not
only to be at the will of the politicians.41 If the state creates an organizing
structure of representation, such as the NAR, then this will have less
legitimacy in the eyes of the Romani community than it would if Roma
had created an organizing structure of representation themselves through
a process of ethnic mobilization, for example, NGOs. These NGOs have the
potential to be legitimate representatives of Roma even though they have
not gone through a formal election process; therefore, legitimacy must be
more than an X on a ballot sheet. Conversely, even lite who attain the
highest number of votes in an election are not necessarily deemed to be
legitimate representatives of the Romani community.
My research conceives of both legitimacy and representation in broad
understandings. Rather than measuring legitimacy it is assumed that
105
legitimacy can be determined by contextualizing social and political relationships since legitimacy is dependent on societal interaction and recognition.
By providing an analysis of the role of lite, political parties and civil society organizations it is possible to determine that some organizing structures
of representation are more legitimate than others. However, there exist no
objective criteria or normative yardstick to measure this legitimacy thus
by assessing the actions of these organizing structures of representation,
relative legitimacy can be deduced. The one certainty is that Roma confer
legitimacy on organizing structures of representation; therefore, social
interaction is crucial. In many respects legitimacy comes from a practice
where Roma create the discourse of legitimacy and reconstitute this structure through formal and informal political practices. The process of Romani
mobilization and the capacity of organizing structures of representation
to give voice to the Romani community determine if an organizing structure of representation is legitimate or not.
lite such as Nicolae Pun and political parties such as the RPPE rely on
electoral legitimacy, whereas NGOs fall back on their proximity to the
Romani communities to become legitimate. However all three organizing
structures of representation are embedded in a socio-political discourse
that the Romani community reconstitutes which means that legitimacy
can be established through social interaction. Many of those claiming to
represent Roma are also of Romani ethnic origin therefore they share a
common identity. While the virtues of this ethnopolitical representation
are questionable, there is no doubt that a common ethnic identity remains
important for legitimate representation in the eyes of the Romani community. However, one could argue that legitimacy never really exists as there is
no tipping point to attain, so legitimacy is continually contested by Roma.
At the same time one cannot ignore the importance of these social interactions where Roma recognize an organizing structure of representation as
legitimate or not.
Hypotheses
At this stage only the rst hypothesis political decentralization increases the
legitimacy of Roma representation can be addressed in any meaningful
sense. On the one hand, there exists localized structures for representation
including NGOs who deliver projects, and establish social networks and
also political party oces. On the other hand, one of the key organizing
structures of representation is the constitutional provision which guarantees a seat for all minorities in Romania. This provision was bestowed on
Roma as they did not create this structure for themselves through processes
106
of ethnic mobilization; furthermore, it is debateable whether it is a legitimate organizing structure of representation. To fully address H1 it will be
necessary to analyse transnational organizing structures of representation
and ask whether legitimacy decreases as the structures become detached
from localized Romani communities in the domestic political context.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this chapter appears in the Journal on Ethnopolitics and
Minority Issues in Europe (McGarry 2008a).
2. The transition process has its social dimension, part of which is to ensure that the
politically determined social structure is based on non-discrimination and equal opportunity (Phinnemore and Light 2001, 2), which includes access to political structures
guaranteed by law for all citizens.
3. According to the last census gures in 2002, there are 555,250 Roma present in
Romania which signies 3 per cent approximately. Unocial estimates from international
organizations and NGOs estimate the gure to be between one and two million Roma in
Romania (meaning 510 per cent of the population of Romania approximately).
4. Constitution of Romania (revised) (2003): Article 62 (2) maintains, Organizations
of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for
representation in parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each, under the terms of
the electoral law. Citizens of a national minority are entitled to be represented by one
organization only. Full text in English available at: http://www.legislationline.org/upload/
legislations/72/cf/e3b89dda11209ec032c71c1a36a7.htm (accessed 17 June 2009). There are
20 ocially recognized minorities in Romania: Albanian; Armenian; Bulgarian; Czech;
Croat; Jewish; German; Greek; Italian; Macedonian; Hungarian; Pole; Roma; Lipovan;
Ruthenian; Serb; Slovak; Tatar; Turk; and Ukrainian.
5. There has not yet been any signicant or organized scientic attempt to map the
general and Roma specic interests at the national level, although there seems to be new
eorts in this direction. Various institutions, school inspectorates, Public Health Directorates, Local Employment Agencies, and sometimes local and national NGOs have collected
data on a variety of socio-economic indicators.
6. These are detailed in the Ministry of Public Information Report Research on the
Roma conducted by The Institute for Quality of Life (2001, 520), Bucharest.
7. Education Law 84/1995. Chapter XII makes provisions for minority education.
See Articles 118121. Full text available in English at: http://www.legislationline.org/
legislation.php?tid=168&lid=678 (accessed 13 June 2009).
8. This point was made by Letiia Mark, President of the Roma Womens Association
of Timioara For Our Children. Personal Interview. Timioara, Romania, 16 August
2004.
9. The necessity of this approach was highlighted by Ilie Dinca, Vice-President of the
RPPE. Personal Interview. Bucharest, Romania, 27 September 2005.
107
10. The National Strategy provides for urgent measures to draft an action plan for
issuing identity cards (National Strategy for the Improvement in the Situation of the Roma,
chapter XI, point 30).
11. Explicitly discriminatory job vacancy notices in mainstream newspapers have long
been identied as a problem. See: Advisory Committee on the FCNM 2001, Opinion on
Romania, page 406.
12. Personal interview with Gelu Duminica, Executive Director of Romani NGO,
Impreuna. Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006.
13. The seminal, and widely cited, account of citizenship developed by T. H. Marshall
details citizenship as political, social, and political rights (Marshall 1950). For a critique
see: Turner 1990. Access, along with rights and belonging form the triadic components of
citizenship (Wiener 1997).
14. See Government Ordinance 137/2000, chapters I, II, III, IV, V. English text available at:
http://www.minelres.lv/National/Legislation/Romania/Romania_antidiscrim_English.htm
(accessed 13 June 2009).
15. Personal interview with Csaba Ferenc Asztalos, President, National Council for
Combating Discrimination, Bucharest, Romania, 28 September 2005.
16. Putting a Rom on a mainstream partys list has been widely recognized as a liability
given widespread societal biases against Roma indeed as Barany points out for mainstream
parties one Romani vote means the loss of two others (Barany 2001, 4).
17. Personal interview with Dimitrina Petrova, Director of the ERRC, Budapest,
Hungary, 23 September 2005.
18. For insights into Romani voting patterns and specicities see: Barany 2001; Fox 2002.
19. The Council of National Minorities was established by Government Decision
No. 365 in July 2001. The Council includes representatives from all 20 ethnic minorities
living in Romania.
20. European Roma Information Oce (ERIO) (2008). E-News. 11 December 2008,
page 5.
21. Chamber of Deputies, 8 October 2008. Alocuiuni Consacrate Comemorrii
Holocaustului. For full text see: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6535
&idm=45&idl=1 (accessed 17 July 2009).
22. Chamber of Deputies, 7 April 2009. Declaraie Politic cu Ocazia Srbtoririi Zilei
Internaionale a Romilor. For full text see: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma
?ids=6611&idm=1,19&idl=1 (accessed 17 July 2009).
23. In 2007, while claiming to represent the Romani ethnic minority in the Romanian
parliament (In calitate de deputat, reprezentant al etniei rromilor in Parlamentul Romaniei),
Pun failed to condemn the racist comments of President Basescu when he referred to a journalist a lthy gypsy in a private conversation with his wife which had been accidently recorded,
Romnia Libera, 23 May 2007; see: http://www.romanialibera.ro/ (accessed 15 June 2009).
24. Personal interview with Griua Bumbu, Bucharest, Romania, 26 September 2005.
25. Ordinance on Associations and Foundations (2000), Article 4. #26/2000, O.G.
#39. Full text available at: http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=694
108
26. Attila Mark, State Secretary and Head of the Department for Inter-Ethnic Relations
(DRI). Statement made at a European Centre for Minority Issues conference Enhancing
Minority Governance In Romania in Sinai, Romania, March 2005.
27. National Strategy, chapter VIII, point 4.
28. Calculations based on the ocial data of the Central Electoral Oce. See:
http://www.bec2004.ro/documente/Tvot_CD.pdf and the National Institute for Statistics.
See: http://www.insse.ro/Statistici/statistica%20electorala.htm (accessed 12 June 2009).
29. Elsewhere I argue that it is the lack of a clearly dened Roma nationalism which
impacts negatively on the capacity of Romani political parties to secure votes from the
Romani community. See: McGarry 2009a.
30. Law on Legal Persons (Associations and Foundations) (1924). Law No. 21/1924,
O.G. Part I, No. 27.
31. The value of NGOs in a society cannot be underestimated particularly for marginalized groups, not least because it is harder for an individual to eect change. Moreover, in
practical terms it is easier to apply for a grant for a project as an NGO.
32. Constitution of Romania (1991): Article 37 states that citizens may freely associate
into political parties, trade unions and other forms of association. But, the framers of the
Constitution had no intention of enhancing the NGO sector and no explicit privileges were
granted to associations, foundations etc.
33. Transnational organizing structures of representation, including international
Romani NGOs, are discussed in Chapter 6.
34. My thanks to Cezara David of Romani CRISS for explaining the organizational
infrastructure. Personal interview, Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006.
35. There are numerous reasons why Roma lack identication documents including a
lack of trust in state structures or they do not see the value of documentation until the need
arises.
36. Condence and trust were mentioned by both Gelu Duminica, Executive Director
of Impreuna and Cezara David of Romani CRISS. Personal Interviews. Bucharest,
Romania, 16 May 2006 (both interviews). Thus it is possible for legitimacy to be conferred
on organizing structures of representation if they are respected for the work that they do in
the community, for the community.
37. For a discussion on the impact of external funders see: Trehan 2001.
38. Personal interview with Gruia Bumbu, Bucharest, Romania, 26 September 2005.
39. This was highlighted by Cezara David of Romani CRISS. Personal interview.
Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006.
40. Decentralization and the involvement of local level institutions are singled out by
the European Commission as important features of the Strategy (EU Regular Report on
Romania 2001, 29).
41. Mdlin Voicu, Divers, no. 132, September 2003.
5
Self-Government and Interest
Representation in Hungary: A Wrong Step
in the Right Direction?
Introduction
Hungary is the rst state to construct a nationwide network of legally
recognized, publicly nanced and democratically elected institutions for the
representation and articulation of ethnic minorities interests. Article 68 of
the Constitution provides the basis for the Minorities Act and guarantees
minorities the right to collective participation in public life.1 Though the
structural problems of the Romani population as a political interest group
may account for the decline in living standards of most Roma in Hungary,
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of organizations and
institutions set up to formally articulate the shared interests of the Romani
community. Hungarys seemingly progressive minority protection policy
is inuenced by its desire to serve as a good example to neighbouring
countries which house Hungarys Diaspora (Bessenyey-Williams 2002,
234; Deets 2008, 202203). The proliferation of bilateral agreements which
Hungary has negotiated with neighbouring countries is further testament
to its commitment to Hungarian minorities abroad (Pataki 2002). Roma
are one of 13 national and ethnic minorities2 recognized in Hungary and
constitute somewhere between 400,000 and 600,000 of the population.3
Often, the view from the outside perceives the situation of Roma in
Hungary to be less dire than in other CEECs but this chapter seeks to counter this misplaced condence in the Hungarian minority protection system
as it applies to Roma representation.
109
110
I begin by outlining the shared interests of Roma in Hungary that occupy

the time and eort of Romani activists and advocates. I then present an
overview of the minority self-government system as it relates to Roma
and discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages of this innovative
structure, in particular its role as an organizing structure of representation
which can only accommodate cultural interests. Following the same format
as the previous chapter I detail the lite who claim to legitimately represent
and articulate the interests of Roma and focus on two individuals: one is
the President of the National Roma Self-Government and the other is a
prominent civil rights leader. I ask whether the phenomenon of ethnopolitics is necessary or desirable in the case of Hungarian Roma. Subsequently,
the role and activities of civil society organizations working on Romani
interests are elucidated. Crucially, each organizing structure of representation is anchored in the current political context and its legitimacy is
assessed. A conclusion is oered which summarizes the main ndings, particularly those relating to legitimate representation before a comparison
between Hungary and Romania is elaborated upon which oers insights
into similarities and dierences between the two with regard to Roma
representation and participation.
Shared Interests of Roma in Hungary

The interests of Roma can be considered as those activities, policies and
initiatives of institutions such as NGOs, governmental agencies and international organizations which explicitly target Roma; however, Etzioni
(1985, 179) highlights the danger of this approach, if a social group has a
common or shared interest in the eyes of some social scientist, ipso facto it
constitutes a politically active group, which often it is not. Dening public
or general societal interest is precarious even if the search is focused in a
specic spatial and temporal context, whereas the shared interests of Roma
are somewhat more straightforward to determine, linked as they are to ethnic minority identity. Similar to Romania, these interests concern equity of
access, not equity of outcome. While poverty, discrimination and marginalization are pervasive and re-occurring shared interests for most Roma,
I argue social, economic, cultural and political interests to be of more relevance in the case of Hungary. Additionally, I consider the recent spike in
racism targeted at Roma and the implications of this for Roma inclusion.
After input from civil society organizations and the civil service, a governmental package was adopted in 2004 on Medium-Term Measures
intended to improve the living standards and social position of the Romani
population (Governmental Decree No. 1021/2004) which can be interpreted
Interest Representation in Hungary
111
as the interests of Roma according to the Hungarian state administration.

The main areas of the package include the enforcement of equal rights,
the extenuation of prejudices, the elimination of segregation in education,
the improvement of the quality of education, the development of employment opportunities, the improvement of life quality, health and housing
conditions as well as the preservation of Romani culture, identity and
languages. Within the Ministries of Education and Employment and
Labour, Ministerial Commissioners in charge of Roma aairs have been
appointed. There is an overlap between the interests according to government and the interests according to the Romani communities themselves
but this can be explained by the input government received from Romani
civil society organizations. In 2007, Hungary adopted the Roma Integration Decade Programme Strategy Plan for the period 20072015 which
sets out tasks in two-year action plans (Kaponyi 2007). As before, these
include concrete measures and monitoring tasks primarily in the eld of
employment, housing, education and health, although the government also
recognizes that legal measures and incentives are not enough; it is essential
to change attitudes and values system too which can only be achieved
in the long term. The rst two-year action plan (20082009) adopted by
Governmental Decree 1105/2007 contains projects with deadlines and
allocated resources (of 10 billion Hungarian Florint) in the priority areas
of: education; employment and development of enterprises; housing;
health; anti-discrimination; culture, media and sport; and gender equality
as a horizontal issue (rms 2008, 3).
Social interests such as access to adequate housing, sanitation and health
continue to be the most pressing for many Romani NGOs. Housing conditions are substandard for a large proportion of Roma and often do not
meet the most basic health and safety requirements. Continuing a trend
found across CEECs, Romani communities are frequently ghettoized on
the outskirts of major towns and cities which reinforces marginalization,
beyond physical detachment. The infrastructure in these ghettoes such as
roads, sanitation and communications is invariably poor and in desperate
need of regeneration.4 The lack of access to adequate housing has an adverse
impact in other social areas such as life expectancy which is, on average,
ten years less than for non-Roma (NEKH 2004, 12). Romani women are
frequently discriminated against when they try to receive medical care;
indeed, they have been subjected to forced sterilizations though this
number is decreasing and is not ocial state policy.5
The most prominent cultural interest is education.6 Unlike many national
minorities who demand mother-tongue education, Roma in Hungary
make no explicit claims in this respect because 70 per cent of Roma speak
112
Hungarian, and have been relatively assimilated as far as language is concerned (most of the younger generation of Roma have embraced Hungarian
as their primary language). Romani advocacy and activism systematically
addresses all levels of education, from nursery to tertiary. While it is claimed
that more funding is required for books and other resources, this claim
is not specic to Roma; however, Romani children are frequently treated
dierently by educational authorities which impacts directly and negatively
on the lives of many Romani children. As Majtnyi (2004, 84) explains,
the practice of systematically routing Roma children to special schools is
one of the most of the most widespread forms of segregation and discrimination in Hungary. One the most pressing interests related to education is
segregation7 which studies have shown reinforces previously held negative
associations8 which the majority have for Roma and which is detrimental
for Romani self-condence.9 At the governmental level, state scholarships
are available for Romani students which in time will create an intelligentsia, something which is currently missing. When dealing with minorities
and access to education eorts must be made to devise solutions that will
enhance inclusive education while respecting diversity and inter-cultural
sensitivity (Villalobos 2004, 19). Segregation is a form of racial discrimination which impacts negatively on the equity of access to adequate education
for Roma.
Various organizing structures of representation have linked the issue
of education with another shared interest: access to the labour market.
Without an adequate education an individual Rom will not have an
equitable chance when attempting to secure employment. They are disproportionately aected by unemployment compared to the majority, and
other minorities: unemployment of the Romani men stands at 74 per cent
while for women this gure is 83 per cent.10 In Romani ghettoes this can
rise to 90100 per cent (NEKH 2004, 12) and the global economic downturn is likely to have exacerbated matters though authoritative recent
statistics have not emerged. Roma are thus reliant on state welfare or they
face absolute poverty. In turn, this reinforces the image of Roma being
dependent on the state and/or resorting to begging, which forties widespread negative associations of Roma in society. Without an adequate
education, Romani individuals do not have equitable access to the labour
market and thus face a subset of related problems such as paying rent, or
being forced to live in ghettoes. Taken together, Roma are victims of a
vicious circle of disadvantage stimulating discrimination and prejudice,
which reinforces disadvantage.
113
Access to political structures is an important interest and remains

an eective way to articulate other shared interests. The minority selfgovernment system, although designed for promoting cultural autonomy
also contains scope for minority interest representation (Kovats 2001a, 8).
The pluralism of Romani politics represents another signicant challenge
for the self-government system. The main political interests include access
to the political structures, both mainstream and minority-oriented, and
enhanced capacity to articulate shared interests in a public forum. However, there is a lack of political mobilization and in a strict legal denition
no Romani political party exists in Hungary. In exercising their right to
participation, Roma are further enhancing their ability to exercise other
rights. The self-government system is an organizing structure of representation through which minorities can articulate their educational, cultural
and linguistic interests although there exist other organizing structures
of representation which Roma have created.
Discrimination hangs like a spectre over all the shared interests of Roma
and has the eect of magnifying and intensifying the problems associated
with securing these interests. The discrimination which Roma face is overt
and agrant. It reveals itself in an open and deliberate manner in normative acts, media reports and one-on-one interactions to such an extent that
the Minority Ombudsman has described this as institutionalized.11 Roma
face discrimination on a number of grounds, in particular in the elds of
education, employment and provision of goods, facilities and services. They
also face discrimination in relation to their treatment by police authorities
and are over-represented in the prison population. Crucially, the Minority
Ombudsman has found that the issues and interests of Roma are dierent
from other minorities due to the discrimination which they face; thus, the
shared interests of Roma are directly linked to their ethnic identity (and its
negative associations from the majority).
There has been a recent upsurge in racist discourse and attacks on Roma
resulting in destruction of property and death.12 The chief instigator of this
worrying trend has been the creation in 2007 of the Magyar Garda, an
extreme right wing political organization which has held several public
rallies in areas with a large Romani population, with intimidation its
sole purpose. Among the groups chief messages is the defence of ethnic
Hungarians against so-called Gypsy crime (ECRI 2009, 24). The rise of
extremism in Hungary, as elsewhere across Europe, has been exacerbated
by economic hardships endured by Hungarian citizens who have used
Roma as a scapegoat with frustrating predictability.13 In response, civil
114
society has been critical of the Hungarian authorities for failing to adequately address the rising number of hate crimes against Roma (ERRC
et al. 2009), calling attention to the growing number of Roma being murdered (ERTF 2009), and solidarity demonstrations have been held with
Roma and ethnic Hungarians in opposition to this wave of extremism.
Many shared interests are inextricably linked and must be understood
as systemic meaning they cannot be articulated in isolation if they are to
have any resonance with decision-makers and policy-makers. These shared
interests cannot be given an archimedean ordering or arranged on a onedimensional scale (Lucas 1976, 93), as a rationalist understanding would
maintain. The shared interests of Roma are not a public interest which
can be appealed to when justifying decisions; rather, it is specic to Roma
due to ethnic group identity. In this sense the shared interests of Roma are
never invoked by ethnic entrepreneurs as a strategy to change the institutional architecture; rather, the shared interests of Roma are directly
connected to Romani identity. In the case of Roma, both identity and interests are insoluble because each informs the other, indeed the shared interests
of Roma (e.g. poverty, racism and unequal access to social provisions) are
directly impacted by negative ascriptions on their ethnic identity.
The Minority Self-Government System: Political Participation

in a Cultural Institution
Act LXXVII of 1993 On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (hereafter Minorities Act) recognizes 13 national and ethnic minorities. The
nuance ethnic refers to Roma while the remaining 12 recognized groups
are dened as national minorities. The minority self-government system
responded to the perceived interests of all minorities in Hungary which
meant combating the assimilation process through delegating control over
cultural matters and ensuring some form of formalized representation.
Roma, who have no kin state, are the largest minority in Hungary and are
geographically dispersed. They can be divided into the Hungarian-speaking
Romungro (70 per cent), the Romani-speaking Olah (22 per cent) and the
Romanian-speaking Bas (8 per cent) (Kaltenbach 1998, 62).14 For most
Roma the cultural factor, particularly language, is not so relevant yet that is
what the Minority Self-Government (MSG) system was created to safeguard.
Certainly the linguistic aspect is of more relevance to the 12 national
minorities who have kin states and in many cases rely on the linguistic component of their identity to mark their specicity as a national minority.
115
The Hungarian minority protection system is based on the concept of

cultural autonomy (Eiler and Kovcs 2002, 176) which means a community living anywhere in the country can be joined together in an autonomous
organization on the basis of their common ethnic belonging and is recognized as a constitutional entity, namely nations with cultural sovereignty.
The cultural autonomy system in Hungary provides the platform for the
articulation of cultural interests related to language, preservation of tradition and heritage and education. Each national and ethnic minority has the
potential to create local, regional and national self-governments, or a
cultural parliament (Krizsn 2000, 251) which has exclusive legislative
authority in cultural matters, and also has a separate cultural ministry and
a national Secretary of State.
The Minorities Act declares the right of national and ethnic minorities
to establish self-government as a special community (i.e. collective) right at
local and national level. These local and national self-governments are
intended to be partners to regional governments at the local level, and to
co-operate with the executive and the legislature at the national level. The
relationship between the local minority self-governments and the municipal governments is imprecise. These institutions should be on an equal
footing but the dynamic between them is more akin to master-servant.15
The national self-government is a body of representatives supposedly representing the interests of the whole community throughout the country
(Krizsn 2000, 253) and is elected by delegates of the local minority selfgovernments. Local and national minority self-governments can participate
in legislative and administrative activities from the lowest to the highest
levels of governance, express their views on draft legal regulations and
request information from public administrative bodies and local government on issues aecting the minority they represent, and propose measures
to address. They have a right of veto on matters relating to education, culture, local media, eorts to sustain traditions and the use of minorities
languages; however, in other areas their function is consultative.
Despite the obvious benets of the minority self-government system
there are numerous disadvantages, besides competencies being restricted
to cultural interests.16 The rst disadvantage relates to the election and
selection of the respective local and national minority self-governments.
Initially the lack of registration for voters led to the ludicrous situation in
which representatives of minorities were not elected by the groups themselves and worse still some deliberately abused the electoral system so
non-Roma actually sit on the local self-governments17 meaning that a great
number of non-minority voters were voting in the minority self-government
116
elections (Majtnyi 2004, 81). In light of these serious deciencies in June

2005, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law (Bill T/9126) that brought
about important changes in the Hungarian legal framework aecting
the life of national and ethnic minorities. The rst period of the new
minority election process ended in July 2006 when those Hungarian citizens who were willing to declare their national or ethnic minority aliation
could register at the local electoral oce. Mr Heizer, the President of the
Oce for National and Ethnic Minorities declared that almost 200,000
voters asked for their inclusion in the minority voters register which
suggests that forecasts on ethnic registration were pessimistic, though still
decient.
Only those Hungarian citizens who have declared their aliation to
a minority community are entitled to vote through a registration process
at the local election oce. In the registration form potential voters must
explicitly state that they are members of that minority community.
Similarly, candidates elded are obliged to state that they are willing to
undertake the representation of the minority community and must have
the support of a Romani civil society organization which has been operating for three years which should increase the involvement of Roma NGOs
in politics (Burton 2007, 78), yet Burton also acknowledges that this could
lead to the entrenchment of Roma NGOs in so-called ethno-business.
Data protection norms18 govern this process meaning only the number of
citizens registered in the minority lists will be made public and the list
itself will be destroyed immediately after the electoral results are xed.
While the controversial issue of registration is acknowledged, it appears
the only way to fairly elect local minority self-governments. Particularly for
the Romani community, registration has the potential to increase the legitimacy of representation as those who are elected must declare their ethnic
aliation. This legislative intervention will also increase condence in the
system and substantially reduce the potential for fraudulent representation.
Furthermore, while local minority self-governments are directly elected,
the same is not true of national minority self-governments who are elected
by an electoral college made up largely of local minority self-government
representatives therefore Roma do not have a direct say in the composition
of the national minority self-government and therefore have no means to
call its members to account (Kovats 2001a, 18).
The second disadvantage relates to the lack of representation in the
national parliament for ethnic and national minorities. Paragraph 68 of
the Constitution states that the national and ethnic minorities living in the
Republic of Hungary share the power of the people and they are constituent
117
factors in the State while on the other hand, laws of the Republic of Hungary
ensure representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within
the territory of the country. So in the Constitution there is no explicit statement relating to a level of representation for national and ethnic minorities
therefore a literal reading of the Constitution suggests that even minority
self-governments could be an acceptable means of representation (Krizsn
2000, 258). Indeed the emphasis on cultural interests has had the unintended consequence of highlighting its political shortcomings. Namely,
how is it possible to manage and articulate shared socio-economic and
political interests through an institution primarily designed for establishing
the cultural autonomy of minority populations? By providing representation through the minority self-government system it suocates calls for
representation in parliament; however, the nature of representation in the
various organizing structures of representation is very dierent, for some it
is cultural and for others it is political.
The third disadvantage is the danger that the National Roma SelfGovernment could be used as a tool for the promotion of one faction in
Romani politics rather than acting as the representative body of the Roma
as a whole (Kovats 2001a, 8). Unlike parliamentary systems of representative
democracy, it provides no role for an opposition and seriously undermines
the status of unsuccessful candidates (Kovats 2001a, 9). The election
rules have made it possible for one organization to form a politically homogeneous national self-government, while excluding smaller yet inuential
organizations. Roma are a heterogeneous ethnic group and thus their
organizing structures of representation need to account for this diversity
in order to be legitimate.
While the Minorities Act includes a certain level of guaranteed participation and can therefore be seen as going some way to answering the
procedural question of how best to integrate minority concerns and interests, into overall policy and law (Walsh 2000, 8), it is necessary to ask if the
Hungarian minority self-government system is exible enough to accommodate various claims that emanate from dierent segments of Romani
groups? Any answer would need to consider: (a) the structural political
weakness of Roma; (b) what the precise role of Roma interest representation is with regards to political responsibility and; (c) the fact that the
Minorities Act relates almost exclusively to cultural interests. Yet despite
the inherent weaknesses of the Minorities Act, its shortcomings serve to
highlight the evolution of Roma from a disengaged oppressed minority
into a politically aware social movement. Roma are not mobilized by factors related to relative deprivation rather it is their ethnic identity which is
118
key when attempting to understand why Roma mobilize, creating organizing structures of representation to articulate their shared interests. The
main function of any organizing structure of representation is to render
visible and collective the questions raised by the movement (Melucci 1992,
11). The questions raised by the movement refer to their shared interests
which can only be determined in relation to the ethnic identity of Roma, to
which they are inextricably linked. In this sense Roma are not just concerned with non-material goods distribution but with the promotion and
armation of a collective group identity.
The Needle in the Haystack: lite Romani Representatives

Without adequate organizing structures of representation there is a likelihood that successive governments may make assumptions about the
interests of Roma which are at best inaccurate and at worst dangerous;
therefore, Roma need to be able to feed into political channels at all levels.
While parliamentarians belonging to the various minorities sit on the
benches of the parliamentary parties (including three Romani MPs on the
side of the opposition, Fidesz19-Hungarian Civic Union), the question of
guaranteed representation for the minorities in Parliament has remained
unresolved for some time yet it is a matter which regularly appears on the
agendas of successive governments. It is worth asking if it is possible for
Romani parliamentarians to divorce themselves from their group aliations and commitments that constitute their identities if we assume that
other parliamentarians can? In the case of Roma, can we really distinguish
between civic activity, on the one hand, and a private realm of an individuals particular identities, aliations and interests on the other? This line of
thought is precarious as it implies that shared ethnic identity is necessary
for legitimate representation.
Parliamentarians naturally see themselves as guardians of the public
interest, and come to regard those who oppose them as motivated by sectional or private interests inimical to the public interest. Interests enter
public discourse through discursive interventions and through organizing
structures of representation, that is, activities, reports and consultations
which are all actions but taken together become a process. Social movements consider issue identication and interest articulation as essential
components of the process (Foweraker 1995, 46). But what about the value
of the vote? Is it diminished at all? After all, parliament is supposed to represent the views of the governed to the government (Lucas 1976, 174) and
Roma are constitutive of the governed. If the democratic system suocates
119
minority interests then special procedures need to be brought in (Young

1990) whether this should mean guaranteed parliamentary representation
though is questionable. Due to the absence of a substantial Romani voice in
parliament, the role of other prominent public lite is inated.
In order to avoid exhaustive lists, this chapter considers only two individuals who could legitimately claim to represent and articulate the interests
of Roma.20 Orbn Kolompr is the President of the National Roma SelfGovernment based in Budapest and was selected by a college of electors
from the Local Roma Self-Governments; therefore, he was not directly
elected by the Romani people of Hungary. Kolompr is the most senior
ocial in Hungary for Roma representation but how representative is he?21
The National Roma Self-Government has no powers of decision but it can
consult and opine with government in certain policy areas, therefore it is
able to articulate the interests of Roma. The legitimacy of this organizing
structure of representation is dubious for a number of reasons including: (a)
it is indirectly elected; (b) it is detached from the Romani communities that
it claims to represent and; (c) it is rst and foremost a cultural institution.
The Local (and Medium-level) Roma Self-Governments work explicitly
with Romani communities and articulate their interests to local and municipal authorities, whereas the National Roma Self-Government acts as a
consultative rubber stamp on governmental policy. Through infrequent
meetings the Local Roma Self-Governments may articulate the interests of
Roma to the National Roma Self-Government which means that the
National Roma Self-Government is dependent on the legitimacy of the
Local Roma Self-Government for its own legitimacy.
There are occasions when an individual emerges who can legitimately
claim to represent the interests of Roma which goes beyond conventional
electoral legitimacy. This is a necessary dimension of the social movement
theory in that minorities will create their own organizing structures of representation when their interests are sidelined by formal political authorities.
For his part, Aladr Horvth is widely regarded as one of the most respected
voices in Roma politics in Hungary. In the rst free elections in 1990
he was elected as the rst Romani parliamentarian in the faction of the
Alliance of Free Democrats.22 While he sat on parliamentary committees
such as minority rights and human rights, a conict emerged as he began
to articulate the interests of the Romani community which at the time were
social and cultural interests, my voice was a civil rights voice not a political
party [. . .] it was not in the interests of the political parties.23 In 1995 he
established the inuential Roma Civil Rights Foundation which endeavours to secure rights for Roma (and others) based on the principle of civil
120
rights which considers that the problems encountered by Roma are also
the problems faced by other citizens of Hungary. His ideas have been
heavily inuenced by the black civil rights social movement in the United
States in the 1950s and 1960s, and have been reiterated by inuential
Romani advocates in international politics.24 That movement began to connect a diversity of issues to a system of institutionalized racism: from
education, to housing, to jobs, to police treatment (Young 1990, 89). Civil
rights can accommodate Romani identity and culture as well as socioeconomic and political interests the understanding being that through
the oppression and discrimination which the majority ascribes to the associations with ethnic minority identity, new forms of minority identity
expression and interest articulation are stunted. But the history of social
movements has shown that as much as oppression and discrimination can
suocate a minority group, it often has had the unintended consequence of
fostering coalition, and a sense of strength in adversity.
The Absence of Ethnopolitics: Let Sleeping Dogs Lie

A political party based solely on shared ethnic identication will always
attain a degree of support though its supporters are marking themselves
out as distinct from the majority of society, creating organizing structures
of representation because the mainstream political parties cannot, or will
not, articulate their interests. As the liberal democratic system cannot
accommodate the voices of all groups in society, sometimes minority
groups such as women and ethnic minorities create political parties to
articulate their shared interests with a view to securing representation
which is either non-existent or inadequate. This is not to say that all ethnic
minorities should create political parties to get their voice heard. Notably,
Roma have been slow to engage in party politics and are apathetic to
democratic processes. Similar to Romania, those Roma who vote do not
tend to particularly favour parties on the left or right of the political
spectrum.
Roma are divided among class, occupation, geography, language, as
well as along mainstream political party lines (between Fidesz and MSzP).
Both major mainstream political parties have courted the votes of the
Romani community who, according to some estimates, make up around
6 per cent of the countrys population and which could prove decisive in
the delicately balanced unicameral Parliament. Unlike in Romania, both the
main political parties publicly court the Romani vote but there is a discrepancy in the voting behaviour among Roma for mainstream political parties.
As in most post-communist societies, Roma share fond memories of the
121
paternalistic protection of the state pre-1989 when they enjoyed equal

employment opportunities, were relatively integrated and experienced
comparatively less direct persecution and discrimination. This has resulted
in many Roma voting for more left-wing or left-of-centre parties such as
MSzP; yet, it was Fidesz which returned three Romani parliamentarians
in the last elections owing its success to resonating with the conservative
sensibilities of the Romani community in Hungary.
It is not that Roma refuse to create a political party based on ethnicity
rather there are structural obstacles which impede their ability to be elected
to the Parliament (Vermeersch 2006, 115129), which begs the question:
what use is a political party if it cannot secure representation in the
Parliament? Roma are a heterogeneous group as divided and united as any
other section of society but the main diculties stem from dierences in
sub-group identity. As noted previously Roma can be divided into three
sub-groups in Hungary: Romungro; Olah; and Bas and the relationships
between these sub-groups are often contentious due to dierences in
income, language and specic cultural history,25 all of which conspire to
impede their ability to organize a coherent political platform.
Interests are useful in politics because they help to convey what groups
want. One-on-one testimonies by individuals are not logistically possible
in many societies; therefore, shared interests becomes important for governments to digest the sectional concerns of its citizens. In order to become
like-minded or nd common cause it is necessary to share some of the
same interests thus the creation of an organizing structure of representation such as an ethnic political party becomes an expression of shared
interests as much as it is an expression of identity. This representation is not
of Roma per se but of their shared interests. Ethnopolitics is often regarded
as representing a group of people who share a common ethnic identication which is true in a sense but ethnopolitics is rst and foremost
representation of shared interests which have been constructed due to
ethnic identication.
Developing a legislative framework for an electoral system that ensures
eective participation by national minorities in public life has been a goal
of successive Hungarian governments. It is guided by the premise that an
inclusive process helps to contribute to the legitimacy of the outcome
(OSCE-ODIHR 2001, 4). But is this really true? After all, the MSG system
is an institution for cultural representation which cannot articulate socioeconomic and political interests so the provisions of the Minorities Act do
not fully address the shared interests of the Romani community in Hungary.
Perhaps the minority self-government system has actually hindered the development of a Romani political party in Hungary. By creating the minority
122
self-government system Hungary has more than satised international

demands and created a template for other states to follow if they choose to
pursue a progressive minority protection policy. The downside is that the
existence of such a system means that Romani communities direct their
eorts to the local minority self-governments, at the expense of creating
other more appropriate organizing structures of representation.
Plugging the Hole: Romani Civil Society Organizations

Minorities have the right to establish civil society organizations,26 the main
purpose of which is to call government to account through monitoring and
evaluating governmental policies, and to conduct projects both locally and
nationally. The numerous Romani civil society organizations and associations testify to the culture of civic advocacy and activism in Hungary. This
is partly explained by the politico-civic atmosphere in Hungary after 1989
which was conducive to a high proliferation of NGOs when groups such as
Roma who were basically inactive politically, became politically aware.
Grass-roots activism is important as it empowers the Romani community
and reduces dependence on external institutions such as the state. Civil
society organizations privatize the citizens relationship to the state but this
does not result in a depoliticized ethnicity; rather, it ensures that citizens
including minorities organize themselves and take part in the monitoring
and implementing of policy measures beyond the control of the state. These
organizing structures of representation are part of a social movement on
the fringes of bureaucratic and administrative institutions which have
carved out a new social space. They articulate shared interests which have
been sidelined by state-controlled structures so their real quality lies not
just in their ability to eect social change or successfully impact on the
distribution of state funding, but in their capacity to articulate interests of
groups who are lacking a political voice. There have been moves in this
direction in Hungary though as can be witnessed in legislative interventions and governmental policies which are actions which express the
general will, that is, the interests of the whole of society.
Young (1990, 153) holds that social movements are involved in consciousness raising meaning that it is an outward-looking process whereby
experience, frustration and anxiety can be shared with the whole of society.
Exclusively articulating interests back into the Romani community is
myopic so Roma must make their voice heard to gaje who control formal
decision-making processes. Necessarily, successful mobilization is not solely
concerned with attaining representation in parliament as other organizing
123
structures of representation such as NGOs are important too. NGOs

provide a mechanism for political representation which supplements the
electoral process because elections are infrequent and the one person/one
vote principle is too utilitarian to benet minorities. Civil society allows
minorities to articulate their interests frequently and in a space where they
nd common cause with others. One of the main functions of this type of
organizing structure of representation is that it keeps its members informed,
politically aware, and active (Etzioni 1985, 183), all of which are key to the
ability of social movements to continue their work.
Political NGOs have a tenuous claim to legitimate representation of
the Romani community but do articulate the shared interests of Roma in
Hungary. On the one hand, they have a democratic mandate, but on the
other, the proportion of Romani votes is so small as to render its representation almost void of legitimacy. The two largest political organizations are
Lungo Drom and MCF Roma Union, the former being the largest political
Romani civil society organization in Hungary. It is political NGOs such as
Lungo Drom and MCF Roma Union which name candidates for local selfgovernment elections. In the April 2006 parliamentary elections, Lungo
Drom, in coalition with the right-of-centre Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union
grouping, secured three members of parliament (equalling the previous
elections) although they are in the opposition. Lungo Drom Chair Florian
Farkas and Jozsef Varga remain in parliament, while Mihaly Lukacs
place was taken over by Istvan Racz. The MCF Roma Union (MCF Roma
sszefogs), led by Orbn Kolompr attained only 0.08 per cent of total
votes at the 2006 parliamentary elections. MCF Roma Union was allied
with the socialist faction MSzP which won the most seats in Parliament;
however, no Roma were successfully elected on its lists.
NGOs also articulate the socio-economic interests of Roma engaging
in what Stroschein (2002, 12) describes as status raising strategies. The
state budget provides for statuary funding to help reintegrate Roma into
the labour market and the key partners in this endeavour are locally based
NGOs who, as representatives of the Romani minority, gather information
about who is employed and what qualications they have (Babusik 2004,
15). Locally based Romani NGOs are viewed as trusted partners by both
the state and the Romani community so are privy to data on those individuals who are registered with them in order to nd a job. One example is
the Autonmia Foundation which was established in 1990 with the aim of
helping the emerging civil society through implementing programmes and
developing projects including Employment Without Prejudice in Tolna
County in 2004/2005 which contributed to the ght against labour market
124
discrimination in a localized context.27 Furthermore, Autonmia mobilizes

the support of local communities by training leaders and assisting employment initiatives.28
As one would expect in such an important policy area, there exist a
plethora of NGOs working on Roma education, at all levels. One NGO,
Romaversitas, was set up in 1996 and helps Romani students complete
their academic studies whether at high school or university. As well as
having a foundation of knowledge which will benet students in the labour
market, its goal is to contribute to the establishment of a Romani intelligentsia and ensure that those individuals embrace their ethno-cultural
heritage and feel responsible for the well-being of all Roma. Another means
by which Romaversitas participants engender a sense of responsibility for
the Romani community and a sense of leadership is through meeting prominent Romani leaders and intellectuals and forming a close relationship
with them. Additionally, according to one former student Romaversitas
helps mobilization eorts for Hungarian Roma.29 Such activities t with
broader status raising strategies as NGOs focus their activity on integrating
Table 5.1 Key Features of Organizing Structures of Representation in Hungary

Organizing
structure of
representation
lite
Key features
Importance of
parliamentary
representation
is minimal.
Orbn
Kolompr and
Aladr Horvth
regarded
as most
legitimate.
Common
ethnicity
regarded as
crucial.
Political party
Sensu stricto,
no Romani
political
party exists in
Hungary.
Minority SelfGovernment
system
has stifled
development of
ethnopolitics as
minorities have
representation
in this cultural
institution.
Romani vote is
principally spilt
between Fidesz
and MSzP.
Civil society
organization
z
Political
associations
of MCF Roma
Union and Lungo
Drom are quasi
political parties
but lack electoral
support.
National
NGOs such as
Autonmia and
Romaversitas
implement
projects and
interact with
Romani
communities.
NGOs acquire a
de facto legitimacy
due to proximity.
125
the Roma and the development of minority government institutions

(Stroschein 2002, 15). Through education eorts and building up human
rights advocacy Romani communities become empowered and equipped
to foster community mobilization.
The legitimacy of NGOs is not to be found in its democratic selection so
legitimacy must be understood as relating to non-quantiable goods such
as trust, openness and accountability. Dissemination of information on
decisions, policies and activities help legitimate NGOs in the eyes of the
Romani communities on whose behalf they advocate. But legitimacy is
more than procedural norms and organizational idiosyncrasies. An appreciation of input legitimacy must account for the activities of NGOs which
moves beyond the basic understanding of deliverables for Romani communities. Locally based NGOs obtain de facto legitimacy due to proximity:
merely existing as an NGO is not enough to receive legitimacy and this
is where visibility and proximity become particularly relevant. Table 5.1
provides an overview of the key features of organizing structures of representation in Hungary.
Conclusion
Ethnic Mobilization
Roma use ethnic identity as the impetus to create diverse organizing
structures of representation to articulate their interests. Structures such as
Romani political lite and NGOs are the result of grass-roots stalagmite
mobilization; however, the most robust and legally entrenched structure is
the minority self-government system which was the result of a top-down
government initiative although Roma were involved in the consultations
and dialogues which established this system. Moreover, it can be argued
that the ethnic mobilization process has suered as a result of the minority
self-government system as grass-roots activity and resources are concentrated on this organizing structure of representation. This presents
additional problems as the minority self-government system focuses on
cultural interests which are of less concern to Roma as socio-economic and
political interests are deemed to be more pressing. Similar to the case of
Romania, NGOs represent the most important organizing structure of
representation in the Roma social movement because they cover a wide
range of interests from education (Romaversitas) to political representation (Autonmia). Such NGOs are usually established by Romani lite who
make up the intelligentsia and the agendas of these organizing structures
of representation are set by these lite. Ethnic mobilization has so far failed
126
to produce a successful Romani political party although political associations such as Lungo Drom and MCF Roma Union do exist, splitting the
Roma vote. This is primarily due to the lack of political will as well as a
clearly dened constituency and ideological vision. It would appear that
ethnicity alone is insucient to establish a political party for Roma which
enjoys widespread support.
Politics should not be an either/or choice between grass-roots interactions
at the local level, and the politics of the state. Since the 1990s the Romani
political lite in Hungary have been gradually moving away from traditional
modes of participation into conventional structures. The communitarian
understanding is instructive here, namely that national political institutions appear too distant from ordinary concerns, a feeling that we are at the
mercy of the political forces which govern our lives. The spirit of communitarianism is directly linked to decentralization as it involves an attempt to
recapture political control in local communities (Taves 1988, 2). Moreover
the process of decentralization strengthens local governance and can lead
to forms of self-government; so by bringing the political processes closer to
the citizen, participation of the citizen is automatically increased.
Subsidiarity means bringing the decision-making process as close as
possible to those aected by its outcome and in a similar vein, decentralization and self-government (some autonomy from governmental control in
certain policy spheres) help ensure more direct forms of participation for
citizens as they can feed into localized political channels. This means those
most aected by a governmental policy or legislative initiatives should have
some sort of input at the very least which makes for more eective governance in the long run. In Hungary, the MSG system allows Roma to articulate
their interests freely while still being part of the Hungarian population,
thus facilitating social cohesion. This system, however awed, brings politics
closer to the minorities by giving them a say, with regard to representation
in legislative, administrative and advisory bodies, Hungary has provided,
at the local level, guaranteed representation, veto and consultative rights
and reduced voting thresholds (Walsh 2000, 32). Furthermore, Burton
(2007, 73) argues that Roma now have access to representational rights that
promote their unique ethnic identity. In theory, Roma MSGs are elected and
run by ethnic Roma who have personal knowledge of the needs and concerns of the Roma community. Such a view suggests that Roma can only be
represented by other Roma because only they can know their needs and
127
concerns (i.e. the interests) but this reies the argument for ethnopolitics.
The interests of Roma can potentially be known by anyone but the key
distinction is that Roma actually formulate these interests while interests
can be articulated by gaje too. At the national level, there are no guaranteed
seats in the parliamentary assembly which means that the ability of
minorities to inuence and shape policy and legislation is hindered. The
guaranteed seat in parliament is a contentious issue. If we are to assume
that Roma constitute approximately 6 per cent of the Hungarian population then one seat is hardly adequate and perhaps attention should be
concentrated on increasing Romani parliamentary representation to something resembling its demographic weight.
Social interests such as access to adequate housing, education, sanitation
and health continue to be among the most pressing for Romani organizing
structures of representation. While poverty and persecution are present in
Hungary they are not as pronounced as in Romania, although racism has
become an unwelcome presence in Hungary of late. Combating discrimination is a shared interest as discrimination intensies the problems
associated with other shared interests. Roma are discriminated due to their
ethnic identity which directly impacts on their shared interests; therefore,
identity and interests are interlinked. In other words, in the case of Roma,
both identity and interests are insoluble because each informs the other,
and the shared interests of Roma (e.g. poverty and unequal access to social
provisions) are directly impacted by negative ascriptions on their ethnic
identity. The main political interests include access to political structures,
both mainstream and minority-oriented, and enhanced capacity to make
their voices heard in a public forum. Cultural interests are important to
minorities because they are often what mark this group out as dierent. It is
the group representation character of the MSG system in Hungary which is
widely regarded as so progressive. However, this organizing structure of
representation has been tailored to articulate the cultural interests of Roma
while at the same time inadvertently highlighting the dearth of political
participation and representation.
The importance of articulating shared interests is obvious, a common
structure or political action, articulated by autonomy and its related cluster
of rights and obligations species the framework of possible participation
in and through which people may enter and take a position in the fray
of public debate (Horn 1996, 155; cited in Walsh 2000). Young (1990, 119)
128
goes further, in a society dierentiated by social groups, occupations,

political positions, dierences of privilege and oppression, regions and so
on, the perception of anything like a common good can only be an outcome
of public interaction that expresses rather than submerges particularities.
These organizing structures of representation enable Roma to articulate
their shared interests and give them the capability to ensure their voice is
heard.
Representation can only be meaningful if it is deemed to be legitimate, and
this legitimacy must come from the Romani community. Therefore sociopolitical interactions are contextualized to understand the substance of
representation. Essentially Romani organizing structures of representation
rely on common cause and giving voice to be legitimate. These structures
signify concrete processes of interaction through which the shared interests of the Romani community are articulated. Since legitimacy is not
measured it must be gauged as only Roma can determine whether an
organizing structure of representation is legitimate or not. Localized representation increases legitimacy as it establishes societal relationships and
the legitimacy of NGOs demonstrates that Roma consider proximity to be
important for legitimate representation therefore legitimacy is established
through practice.
Any discussion on electoral legitimacy with reference to proportionality
and percentages is futile as there is no quota or benchmark for optimum
legitimacy. A conception of input legitimacy is benecial as it helps us to
focus on interactions and processes. Mobilization is rst necessary for the
creation of an organizing structure of representation and secondly for the
legitimacy itself. That is, input legitimacy comes with stalagmite mobilization and in other cases practice and interaction delineate legitimacy. Moves
towards representation based on ethnic aliation are not surprising and
can be seen in each of the organizing structures of representation although
the emergence of a Romani political party with meaningful support has
failed to materialize as yet. For many Romani communities, their representatives (be they lite, political parties or civil society organizations)
must also be Romani. In some instances the legitimacy of Romani lite, for
example, Aladr Horvth, is established through trust and respect which
Roma confer on this individual and can only be generated through social
interaction.
129
Inadequate representation structures are a leitmotif of the Roma social

movement in Hungary. On the one hand, Roma have secured representation
in Parliament and prominent individuals have emerged who claim to
represent their interests, on the other hand, this is insucient at present.
Romani NGOs have been created to articulate political and socio-economic
shared interests among others and work locally and nationally at implementing projects, raising awareness and monitoring governmental policy.
In Hungary, there has been no successful move towards ethnopolitics probably due to the inability of Roma to mobilize a coherent electoral mandate
which resonates with the heterogeneous Romani community.
Hypotheses
Having examined political participation and representation in Romania
and Hungary, it is clear that the two hypotheses cannot be sucient
addressed at present. First, H1 maintains that political decentralization
increases the legitimacy of Roma representation. In the case of Hungary it
depends which organizing structure of representation is being assessed.
On the one hand, there exists decentralized representation through local
minority self-government however this organizing structure of representation is primarily concerned with cultural matters so it is questionable
whether it could be described as political decentralization in any meaningful sense. On the other hand, local NGOs work directly with the community
establishing networks and delivering projects. These organizing structures
of representation lack an electoral mandate but are often regarded as legitimate by the communities they represent. Secondly, H2 which states that:
Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic
political context, transnational Romani activity increases which can only be
addressed by focusing on transnational Romani political participation and
organizing structures of representation beyond the state. By analysing the
transnational political context it is possible to ascertain whether this context lls the gap left by the domestic political context, that is, to what extent
does Romas inability to articulate their interests or to secure legitimate
representation in the domestic political context, impact on the creation of
transnational organizing structures of representation? As with the domestic political context this analysis will not attempt to measure legitimacy
employing a positivist epistemology rather the concept of legitimacy is
understood to be bound to the context of representation, institutional
interaction and societal relationships particularly between the Romani
130
community and the organizing structures of representation which it confers legitimacy upon. Following H1 it is presumed that due to the gurative
and metaphorical distance between transnational organizing structures of
representation and the Romani communities that they claim to represent,
they will have tenuous claim to legitimate representation even if they are
able to articulate the shared interests of Roma.
Hungary and Romania Compared

I have been careful to avoid analysing how the state has dealt with Romani
communities within its borders and purposively concentrated on organizing structures of representation which Roma have created to articulate their
shared interests. However before comparing the Romanian and Hungarian
cases of Roma representation and political participation it is necessary
to establish an understanding of the domestic political context which
necessarily involves focusing on political processes, cultural paths and constitutional provisions, as well as the impact of exogenous factors.
Broadly speaking there are two dominant approaches which states
take towards minorities (Schwellnus 2007, 6). First, whether a negative
or positive attitude towards minority protection is employed through
preferential treatment or special rights depends largely on the states
stance on multiculturalism. Secondly, the approach which rests on individualist or collective assumptions about the nature of nation, minorities
and their respective rights can be understood in the context of the wider
debate between liberal and communitarian conceptions of minority and
group rights. Both Hungary and Romania employ positive approaches to
minority protection more generally in that they do not deny the existence
of national or ethnic minorities, and make special provisions for those
ethnic groups within their borders. Hungary utilizes a communitarian
understanding of minority rights with special representation rights and
cultural autonomy for minorities in the area of media, language and education. Romania is a unitary state (similar to France) which holds that all
citizens are equal with no dierentials however a constitutional provision
has provided guaranteed representation in parliament for all national
minorities.
Exogenous factors such as EU conditionality have impacted on how
Hungary and Romania have dealt with minority groups within their
borders. The EU has no coherent approach towards minorities more generally and presently no EU standards exist on Roma rights. EU conditionality
ensures compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005); however, the
131
unspecied language of the Copenhagen criteria (1993) states that accession

states must have respect for and protection of minorities and resulted in
divergent policy and legal interpretations across CEECs including Hungary
and Romania. The EU found itself open to criticism from Hungary which
argued that the MSG system established by the Minorities Act was
more progressive than any other in Europe, including those states already
members of the EU. Hungary has been inuenced by its desire to ensure
protection for the Magyar Diaspora and has attempted to serve as an example on this front which has led to a far-reaching and legally entrenched
minority protection system.
The EU has been most vocal in its European Commission Regular
Reports which repeatedly mention Roma discrimination and encourage
EU accession states to develop policies and anti-discrimination legislation.
Romania created the National Strategy in 2001 to improve the situation
of Roma and also established the National Council for Combating Discrimination in the same year. Other exogenous factors include standards
elaborated by international organizations such as the CoE and OSCE. The
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities contains
provisions on states obligation to provide for participation of national
minorities; however, the implementation of this standard remains in the
hands of the signatory state. The OSCE Lund Recommendations reiterate
the importance of ensuring eective representation30 for national minorities; however, this is a political commitment and is not legally binding.
The shared interests of Roma do not map perfectly in Hungary and
Romania which suggests that Roma interests cannot be explained by objective factors such as their mere existence and size.31 This divergence can
be explained by the presence of a multitude of variables including the attitudes of the majority, a range of actors, the capacity to mobilize, a strong/
weak ethnic group identity and domestic norms. The historical experience
and cultural path of Romani communities in Hungary and Romania have
witnessed more general trends such as the abandonment of nomadism and
increasing attempts at societal integration particularly since the collapse of
communism. Despite this, attempts at integration have been frustrated by
attitudes of the majority towards Roma which ascribe negative associations
on the Romani group identity and have established a discourse of otherness epitomized by widespread racial discrimination and socio-economic
marginalization. In Hungary this has meant that Roma are frequently ghettoized on the outskirts of large towns and segregation continues between
Romani and gaje children in schools. Such practices buttress previously
held negative stereotypes and reinforce the majoritys perceptions of Roma
132
as second-class citizens. Additionally, the recent rise in racist discourse

and the emergence of the Magyar Garda is a cause for concern for Roma
who once again nd themselves as a target for societys ills. Low levels of
education and poverty levels relative to the majority of society means that
political mobilization eorts are impeded in Romania. Romani communities in Hungary and Romania continue to be hugely under-represented in
public life which would suggest this is a systemic weakness aicting all
Romani communities.
lite representation in Hungary and Romania is relatively distinctive.
Romanian Roma look towards parliamentary representation and public prominence, specically the RPPE parliamentarian, Nicolae Pun. Hungarian
Roma value what role lite play in politics with the civil rights leader Aladr
Horvth and the President of the National Roma Self-Government Orbn
Kolompr regarded as the most legitimate lite representatives. Their ability to articulate the shared interests comes from their interaction with
Romani citizens, becoming attuned to the interests of this minority group
in a way that governmental agencies with appointed Roma experts cannot.
When organizing structures of representation are created by the government, then these institutions invariably lack legitimacy. Since only Romani
communities can confer legitimacy on an organizing structure of representation, these structures must be adequately embedded in interactive
processes with Romani communities, for example, the National Agency for
Roma in Romania.
Voting behaviour has been characterized by the propensity to vote for
non-Roma in both Hungary and Romania which implies that common
ethnic aliation is not contingent for Roma representation. This can be
seen in the diminishing authority of traditional local representatives such
as the bulibaa in Romania, and the increasing number of Roma voting for
mainstream political parties such as the SDP in Romania. The capacity of
Roma to mobilize politically and vote is hampered by the lack of identication cards for Roma particularly in Romania. In the strictest sense neither
Hungary nor Romania have Romani ethnic political parties though both
have political associations that behave like political parties and are treated
as such. The political NGOs of Lungo Drom and MCF Union split the
Roma vote in Hungary whereas in Romania the RPPE monopolize Roma
representation. None of these organizing structures of representation attain
substantial support from Roma and any claims to electoral legitimacy are
tenuous, at best.
Civil society began to thrive in Hungary and Romania (as in other
CEECs) after 1989 and has proven a valuable space with which the edgling Roma social movement could begin to mobilize around their ethnic
133
identity, create NGOs and articulate their shared interests. Romani NGOs
have received funding from external private donors such as the Soros
Foundation, PHARE funding from the EU and the state. A diverse range of
Romani NGOs work on broad as well as focused issue areas from the local
to the national level. They implement projects on the ground (such as
Autonmia in Hungary and Impreuna in Romania) and help create an
intelligentsia through education (such as Romaversitas in Hungary). No
single NGO is assumed to be more important than another for Romani
communities but taken together they symbolize a capacity to address the
most pressing socio-economic and political interests of Roma.
The representation of Romani communities in Hungary and Romania
must be assessed on its own merits. It is dicult to determine conclusively
whether the Hungarian MSG system is more conducive to adequate political participation and legitimate representation than the Romanian system
of guaranteed parliamentary representation. Both Romani communities
are characterized by inadequate mobilization and remain in many respects
detached from political life. Roma require the state to provide a hospitable
environment through legislation and practice which will allow the voice
of Roma to be heard, and both Hungary and Romania have initiated policy
which addresses the needs and interests of their respective Romani communities. Ultimately the domestic context which allows the Roma social
movement to ourish and access formal and informal structures of politics
will provide the most eective and legitimate representation.
Notes
1. See: http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=168&lid=1748&less=false (accessed 29 June 2009).
2. The others are: Armenian; Bulgarian; Croatian; German; Greek; Polish; Ruthenia;
Romanian; Serb; Slovak; Slovene; and Ukrainian.
3. In the 2001 census, 190,000 individuals declared Romani ethnicity. Reports from
domestic NGOs and international organizations estimate this gure to be between 400,000
and 600,000 (Riba 1999, 1). The European Commission puts this gure at 550,000600,000
(EU Commission Regular Report on Hungary 2002, 31). The dierence between the estimated and declared gures can be explained by historical, social and psychological reasons
related to the history of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe.
4. Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights (NEKH)
Report (hereafter, Minority Ombudsman) 2005, chapter 4 on zd Htes ghetto. See: http://
www.obh.hu/nekh/en/reports/reports.htm (accessed 23 June 2009).
5. White, J. 2006. The Budapest Times, vol. 4 no. 37, 11 September. See: http://www.budapesttimes.hu/index.php?art=2042 (accessed 29 June 2009). ).One case from 2000 relates to
a woman who was sterilized without her consent, the hospital maintaining this was for
134
medical reasons. For details see: United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women 2006 CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004: http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/decisions-views/Decision%204-2004%20-%20
English.pdf (accessed 24 July 2009).
6. Article 45(2) of the Minorities Act states: to relieve the disadvantage of the Gypsy
minority in the eld of education, specic educational conditions may be introduced. For
full text see: http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=168&lid=1703&less=false
7. Logan, M. 2006. The Budapest Times, vol. 4 no. 19, 8 May, http://www.budapesttimes.
hu/index.php?art=1713 (accessed 29 June 2009).
8. See: Murray 1985. In this seminal study Murray conducted ethnographic research in
a controlled and maintained school in Northern Ireland and concluded that segregated
schooling may fuel mistrust and suspicion between students and within wider society.
9. For a discussion on how segregation impacts on Roma more generally see: Petrova
2002, 58.
10. Younge, G. 2003. The Guardian. 8 January. For full article see: http://www.guardian.
co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,870411,00.html (accessed 7 June 2009).
11. See note 1 above, chapter 5 (3.1) (accessed 29 June 2009).
12. A Romani man and his four-year-old son were shot dead in Tatrszentgyrgy on 23
February 2009 as they were trying to escape from their house that had been re-bombed
moments before (European Roma Rights Centre, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and
Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities) 2009.
13. Roma have also been victim of racist attacks recently in Italy and Northern Ireland.
14. For a historical perspective on Romani sub-groups in Hungary see: Marushiakova
and Popov 2001, 3839. This highlights the view that Romani identity refers to a cluster of
inter-related identities rather than one homogeneous ethnic identity.
15. Insights gained from personal interview with Istvn Kosztics. President of the Local
Roma Self-Government of Pcs, Pcs, Hungary, 8 May 2006.
16. See: McGarry 2009b.
17. Self-identication of ethnic aliation is an important (individual) right; however, in
practical terms this means that no minority group can exert a decisive inuence on the
outcome of a minority self-government election. See: Danka and Pallai 2003, 3745.
18. In particular: LXII Act of 1992 on Protection of Personal Data and Publication of
Public Interest Information.
19. Lvia Jrka, of Fidesz, is the sole Romani representative in the European Parliament
having successfully defended her seat in June 2009.
20. When asked: Which individual can legitimately claim to represent the interests of
Roma in Hungary? almost every interviewee cited Orbn Kolompr and/or Aladr
Horvth.
21. It is not Orbn Kolompr per se but the President of the National Roma SelfGovernment which is being evaluated. According to Orbn Kolompr, the National Roma
Self-Government and MCF Roma Union are the most legitimate representative structures
for Roma in Hungary. Personal interview, Budapest, Hungary, 11 May 2006.
135
22. In the 1990 Hungarian parliamentary elections three Romani MPs were elected;
in 1994, this fell to one. In the 1998 elections no Roma were elected to Parliament, while in
2002 this gure rose to four (Council of Europes Parliamentary Assembly Report 2002, 11).
The 2006 elections saw three Romani MPs elected to Parliament.
23. Personal interview with Aladr Horvth, Budapest, Hungary, 4 May 2006. Furthermore, Mr. Horvth believes that nobody in Hungary could legitimately claim to represent
the interests of Roma (including himself) and claims that he only represents those that vote
for the Roma Civil Rights Foundation. Tellingly, he is highly critical of the National Roma
Self-Government which he was once President of.
24. Speech made by Nicolae Gheorghe, 2006. For full text see: http://usinfo.state.gov/
xarchives/display.html?p=washle-english&y=2006&m=June&x=200606191319031CJsam
ohT0.3977625 (accessed 13 June 2009).
25. See: Olson 2000, 1830. This report discusses the problematic relationship between
the Romungro and Olah in the town of Tiszavasvari in Northeast Hungary.
26. Article 17 of the Minorities Act 1993. and, as a general right for all citizens, Act
on the Right to Association. 1989.
27. Autonmia Foundation Annual Report, 2004, page 21.
28. Personal Interview with Anna Csongor, President of Autonmia Foundation,
Budapest, Hungary, 3 May 2006.
29. Personal Interview with Peter Bogdan, Budapest, Hungary, 4 May 2006.
30. OSCE 1999, Lund Recommendations on the Eective Participation of National
Minorities in Public Life, September, Hague.
31. It follows that the interests of Roma are dierent still in the transnational political
context.
6
Roma Representation in the Transnational
Political Context
Introduction
This chapter takes a holistic approach to analysing transnational1 Roma
representation, in that it assesses various transnational organizing structures
of representation, isolating one for closer scrutiny, the European Roma
Information Oce (ERIO) in Brussels. Romani political parties and lite
do not gure prominently in the transnational political context, but civil
society organizations such as the International Romani Union (IRU) and
the Roma National Congress (RNC), as well as transnational advocacy networks such as the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and the Open
Society Institute (OSI) ensure that Roma have a voice transnationally. These
established transnational organizing structures of representation have been
joined more recently by the ERIO and the European Roma and Traveller
Forum (ERTF). Digesting this alphabet soup is imperative if we are to
understand the interests of the European Romani community and who
speaks for Roma in the transnational political context. One could argue
that these transnational organizing structures of representation lack legitimacy on several grounds including a lack of procedural checks and
balances, a lack of eectiveness, and because they tend to justify behaviour
in terms of values (Collingwood 2006, 454). Thus transnational organizing
structures of representation do not justify their representation or advocacy
in terms of democratic processes, or public accountability; they instead
emphasize specic values, group identity and shared interests.
Transnational organizing structures of representation help to foster
interaction and dialogue with external actors as well as across the broader
136
Roma in Transnational Political Context
137
social movement. Through the language of equality, justice and human rights
they attempt to address issues aecting Roma and articulate their shared
interests. However, as noted by two prominent Roma activists in 1997
despite its distinctly visible ethnicity, it has no political entity of its own
(Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 5). This chapter analyses the contemporary
Roma social movement and asks whether the situation has changed by
focusing on transnational organizing structures of representation. In many
ways these transnational structures operate as interest groups, their clients
being the oppressed and abused (Steiner 1991, 72), yet their strategies,
principles, action repertoires and objectives dier. I begin by providing
a foundational understanding of transnational social movements before
highlighting several transnational organizing structures of representation
which dene and articulate the interests of Roma. The empirical focus of
this chapter centres on the impact of the EU for Roma representation; thus,
I provide an overview of EU policy on Roma before examining the specic
role of the ERIO and evaluate its legitimacy. A conclusion assesses ethnic
mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate
representation in the transnational political context.
A European Minority
Roma are a transnational minority2 which has no kin state thus their
situation is not comparable with any other minority group in Europe.
Furthermore, some claim that Roma are Europes largest and most vulnerable minority (Ringold et al. 2005, 3), meaning that when analysing Roma
representation, the transnational political context cannot be ignored. The
relevance of transnational organizing structures of representation has
become more pronounced since the 1990s when the international political
community focused their spotlight on Roma in Central and Eastern Europe
and the knowledge of their discrimination and poverty became more
widespread. Roma rights have become a salient topic for international
organizations particularly the EU, the CoE, the UN and the OSCE. These
international organizations do not claim to represent Roma although they
intermittently encourage composite member states to integrate their respective Romani populations.
International organizations are comprised of states and exclude minority
communities from debates on minority protection (Jackson-Preece 1998,
22), meaning they often reect state preferences on minority protection.
Recently there have been concerted attempts to integrate governmental
policy on Roma, most notably through the Decade on Roma Inclusion.3
138
The key issue regarding international organizations and Romani communities relates to the lack of social interaction between them begging the
question, how can international organizations know the shared interests
of the Romani community if processes of dialogue and consultation are
minimal? Grass (2005, 6) notes that it is as if they were without a voice. By
which I mean that where the socio-political decisions get taken there is
no perception of them. There have been eorts to channel the Roma voice
into international organizations through the establishment of MG-S-ROM
and the creation of the ERTF, which are both aliated with the CoE. The
Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues which is linked to the OSCE was set
up in 2003 and the IRU has consultative status with the UN.4 The Roma voice
had been subdued in Brussels until 2003 when the ERIO was constituted
although intra-institutional structures exist such as the inter-departmental
commission and steering group on Roma. Furthermore, the European Roma
Policy Coalition (ERPC) is a network of transnational organizing structures
of representation and includes the ERIO as a member.
The lack of interaction has required international organizations to
assume the interests of Roma. Such an approach could be found in the EUs
2004 report Roma Situation in an Enlarged Europe drawn up at the request
of the European Commission by DG Employment and Social Aairs, which
states that Roma face more serious diculties than the rest of the population in the elds of education, employment, housing and health (European
Commission 2004). In terms of Romas civic and political action, the
report states there is an urgent need for capacity building of Romani organizations and representatives in order to increase their involvement in
initiating and sustaining projects and policies. In this report the EU clearly
assumes that Roma are a social problem which must be addressed through
social provisions, rather than dealing with the extreme racial prejudice
and discrimination which the Romani community endure.5 Ultimately the
relative absence of Romani grass-roots and stalagmite mobilization in the
transnational political context means that a legitimate Romani voice in
international organizations is dicult to detect consequently legislative
interventions and policy provisions cannot be tailored to address their
shared interests.
As the books title suggests, who speaks for Roma? is used as a starting
point for the investigation as it helps to capture the lack of adequate
representation. But the who refers to individuals and institutions subsumed under the conceptual categorization of organizing structures of
representation. It is assumed that transnational organizing structures of
representation are key in fostering interaction between Romani activists
139
and advocates, and the communities that they represent. It has been noted
that the success of the Roma social movement will be dependent on its
ability to bridge the gap between the narrow and often self-appointed
Romani lite and the inactive Romani masses (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997,
34). In this respect, stalagmite mobilization is not an a priori assumption.
Focusing on lite and the political opportunity structure, as Vermeersch
(2006) does, can account for processes of ethnic mobilization, political participation and interest articulation; however, it cannot capture legitimate
representation. Legitimacy is grounded in mobilization and interaction
outside of the political opportunity structure and must come from Roma
themselves.
Structures are enabling and constraining (Giddens 1979; 1984) and due
to their social construction they have the capacity to change. The political
opportunity structure (Eisinger 1973; Keck and Sikkink 1998a) has changed
over time and Romani political lite have adapted to these changes. Under
communist regimes, Roma were relatively comfortable as the command
economy ensured they were employed, had adequate accommodation,
and attended schools, but this came at a cost, the general aim of the
Communist policy was to make Gypsies equal citizens of their countries
but successful equalization was understood to mean complete assimilation
of Gypsies (Marushiakova and Popov 2001, 47). In the early 1990s an
increase in civic awareness of Roma resulted in attempts to dene their
interests and secure access to political structures, as well as create new
ones through ethnic mobilization (Guy 2001, 1315). Political opportunity
structures such as international organizations are stable yet exible which
the Roma social movement utilizes to articulate their interests. Signicantly,
while international organizations are the site of advocacy and mobilization
it is often member state governments which are the primary target of transnational activism because Roma are, ultimately, citizens of the states in
which they reside, meaning that tangible improvements in their situation
cannot be addressed solely in the transnational political context.
Perhaps necessarily, organizing structures of representation are constitutionally ambivalent in that procedural norms as well as underlying
principles are contested thus they can facilitate both representation and
participation, often concurrently. As Melucci explains,
representation means the possibility of presenting interests and
demands; but it also means remaining dierent and never being heard
entirely. Participation also has a double meaning. It means both taking part, that is, acting so as to promote the interests and the needs of
140
an actor as well as belonging to a system, identifying with the general

interests of the community. (Melucci 1992, 1011)
The true value of organizing structures of representation lies in their ambiguous and exible orientations. Transnational organizing structures of
representation can make reference to a number of sources of legitimacy
such as: notions of justice; reference to international legal norms; impartiality by virtue of nancial and political independence; extensive membership;
giving voice; expertise; and partnership with powerful actors (Collingwood
2006). The most relevant of these for the Roma social movement is legitimization through giving voice, particularly apropos for minority groups
whose interests are frequently suppressed in a liberal democratic system.
A word of caution is necessary here because by giving voice it means having a presence6 ensuring that the interests of Roma are taken into account
when designing policy although having a voice alone does not mean that
policy and legislation will automatically reect the interests of Roma. Roma
require a broad understanding of representation therefore giving voice
helps capture an aspect of this phenomenon, and is particularly relevant in
the transnational political context as we shall see. Suce to say, by creating
transnational organizing structures of representation, Roma demonstrate
that they have the potential to articulate their shared interests beyond the
domestic political context.
The Transnational Roma Social Movement

A transnational social movement denotes sustained contentious interactions
with opponents national or nonnational by connected networks of
challengers organized across national boundaries (Tarrow 1998, 184).
Supranational institutions such as the EU have emerged as an important
resource for transnational social movements. European integration has
certainly contributed to the remobilization of ethnic minorities in western
European states, providing them with a new interlocutor and new goals
(della Porta and Diani 2006, 44). This means that new opportunities
for mobilization and participation in the transnational political context
become more readily available for social movement actors (Tarrow 1995;
Marks and McAdam 1999: della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Zippel 2006;
Jutta and Locher 2009). Transnational social movement organizations are
engaged in explicit attempts to [change] some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution in society (Smith 1999, 591); thus through
collective action the Roma social movement struggles for the appropriation
141
of shared values and interests. The actors involved in the movement can
be described as united by a specic solidarity despite being derived from
a heterogeneous composition (Melucci 1980, 202). However, unlike social
movements of the past which have emphasized collective action being
dependent on leadership, organization, opportunities and material resources
(Freeman 1975; Piven and Cloward 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977) I argue
that the Roma social movement is dependent on identity. Though identity
is an important component of all social movements, in the case of Roma
it is considered to be the most important factor for ethnic mobilization
and interest articulation. As previously noted it is presumed that identity
and interests are insoluble both analytically and as social facts. Identity and
interests cannot be analytically separated in the case of Roma because the
interests of the Romani community are directly aected by perceptions of
their ethnic identity. Additionally, their experience of systemic exclusion
informs other shared interests such as access to the labour force or adequate health care provisions.
Ethnic identity acts as glue for this heterogeneous group and while
Roma are geographically dispersed and divided across religious, cultural,
occupational and linguistic lines, they are united by their ethnic identity
nonetheless. Consequently, ethnicity is not an objective given but must be
understood as a consequence of a social process (Barth 1969) furthermore
this ethnic identity is not static but is something which is constantly shaped
and reconstructed (Guy 2001, 5) in and across socio-political contexts.
The creation of organizing structures of representation based on shared
ethnicity enhances ethnic collective action on a large scale insofar as they
provide organizational infrastructures, leaders, and network links (Olzak
2004, 671). In the past there were attempts to construct Roma nationalism
in the transnational political context. Even in its earliest incarnation in the
nineteenth-century Roma nationalism drew on the example of Zionism
(Acton 1974, 233234) recognizing the importance of gaining the support
of national governments as well as the international community to achieve
their goals (Jenne 2000, 197). It is important to remember that the Roma
social movement has never demanded their own territory and state. Instead
nation remains a point of reference for many Romani political activists
(Vermeersch 2003b, 886889) but the idea of a territorial Romani nation,
a so-called Romanistan, is a utopian one and Roma, as a non-territorial
minority, have never made irredentist claims or demanded autonomy,
separation is not in their ideology (Acton and Klmov 2001, 216217;
Goodwin 2004, 1).7 Despite the benets of such an approach, Rvid (2009,
1314) warns of the pitfalls of constructing Roma as a transnational minority
142
principally because most Roma do not identify with such a construction

while Kovats (2003, 5) argues that Roma nationalism is not a product of,
but actually predates, the emergence of grassroots Roma politics, meaning
that the construction of Roma nationalism is driven by a few dozen international activists (both Roma and gaje), raising issues of who can legitimacy
claim to represent Roma. Gheorghe (1997, 155) points out that because
nation states are the building blocks of the intergovernmental political system, this adversely aects minorities such as the Roma who have no such
resource, no fatherland to back them up. Of course, such a conception of
nationalism does not t the case of Roma which yields succour to suggestions that Roma constitute a special case (Kymlicka 2001, 54), in the
politico-legal world of minority protection. One component of nationalism construction has been linking it to ethnicity which Brubaker et al.
(2006, 14) refer to as politicized ethnicity, and Romani political lite have
engaged in such processes. Signicantly, Gheorghe (1997, 161) suggests
that the uniqueness of Roma can be used to evolve in a dierent way from
nation states and national minorities, by interacting with non-national and
supranational institutions.
Transnational Roma Interests

Determining the interests of Roma is no easy feat, particularly when a
wealth of information exists relating to the multiple issues which Roma
face. Moreover, years of marginalization and exclusion has resulted in a
myriad of interests, some of which are more pressing at a given time and in
a given space. I take a more pragmatic approach in determining the shared
interests of Roma by focusing on formal organizations which lobby or
speak on their behalf because the medium can be the message (Kitschelt
1991). Through the activities, publications and public pronouncements
of transnational organizing structures of representation it is possible to
build-up a picture of those interests most relevant for Roma transnationally. These do not necessarily map with domestic interests of Roma because
some are more transnational in orientation such as the standardization
of language or migration issues. Kovats (2003: 3) maintains that their
linguistic/communal diversity and a lack of common interests, makes it
unlikely that Roma could ever be politically united in any given state, the
same logic suggesting that such an enterprise would prove impossible at
the transnational level. Roma may not be politically united at the transnational level due to their heterogeneity but this does not preclude the
formation of shared interests.
143
International Romani Union (IRU)

The Prague-based IRU is the executive body of the International Romani
Congress which rst convened in London in 1971, although the IRU
was formally established in 1977. It is charged with lobbying and negotiating with and within the international community on Romani issues and
through it, traditional sources of nation-building including a ag and
anthem have materialized. Serious attempts were also made to develop a
standardized Romani language with support from the CoE. It propagates
the construction of Roma as a nation without a territory,8 the argument
being that as Roma are a non-territorial nation, they should possess the
same rights as other nations, including representation in intergovernmental organizations (Klmov-Alexander 2007a: 401).9
At the rst World Romani Congress in 1971, the key demands related to
war crimes, language standardization and culture, and social aairs (Foszt
2003, 112). Since the early 1990s the IRU has become a more prominent
pressure group representing the Romani community at seminars and
conferences with international organizations including the OSCE, CoE
and the EU (Ligeois and Gheorghe 1995, 26). The Fifth10 World Romani
Congress in Prague in 2000 provided participants the opportunity to come
together and articulate their shared interests. The most reliable indication
of these shared interests can be found in the organizing of specialized
working groups which met separately from the plenary meeting. These
working groups included: Education and Culture; Standardization of the
Romani Language; Migration; Holocaust Restitution Issues; Kosovo; the
Media; International Politics and Relations; Economic and Social issues;
and the proposed new IRU Statutes and Charter (Acton and Klmov 2001,
173187). The resulting Declaration of the Roma Nation has been presented to Heads of State and the UN Commission on Human Rights.11
While the Charter expresses the grand ambition to be the political representative of all Roma in the World including Sinti, Lovari, Chorichani,
Rumungre, Vlach, Manush etc. (Acton and Klmov, 2001, 201) its appeal
to representation is not grounded in the language of democratic accountability and these shortcomings have not been addressed in subsequent
World Congresses in Lanciano (2004) or Zagreb (2008).
Roma National Congress (RNC)

In many ways the Hamburg-based RNC echoes the work of the IRU in that
it calls for the Roma to be recognized as a nation. A key tenet of its work
144
has been pushing for the establishment of a European Romani Rights

Charter which was rst proposed in 1994 and would include a catalogue of
legally binding cultural and political rights. The Charter would dene the
legal position of the Roma in Europe and is intended to prevent the legal
gaps which in the past have led to the displacement of Romani persons
across Europe.12 The RNC maintains that this robust legislative intervention would help combat anti-Gypsism, help protect Romani communities
in signatory states, and serve as an instrument in securing long-term emancipation and integration. The cornerstone of the RNC ideology is that
Roma should not be treated as a social problem by states and international
organizations which can be remedied through education, rather it maintains
that addressing anti-Gypsism is the most important factor in improving
the situation of Roma. This anti-Gypsism is embedded in the social practices of the majority of society which constructs negative associations of
Romani identity. Therefore, it is only by addressing anti-Gypsism through
pragmatic measures that the exogenously imposed negative interpretation
of Romani identity can be challenged.
The RNC was set up in 1982 as an umbrella organization as it was felt
that the interests of the German Sinti clashed with the interests of the
immigrant Roma in Germany (Acton and Klmov 2001, 161). They maintain that the Sinti had a distinct identity, as a Volksgruppe (Sobotka 2003, 6)
and therefore had their own shared interests. This schism highlights the
tension in the Roma social movement because Roma are often treated as
a cohesive unit with a common group identity without due accord to the
dierences within this heterogeneous minority group. By arguing that
Roma occupy a unique position both historically and politically as one
of Europes legitimate nations, the RNC holds this group as a vulnerable
and culturally oppressed group.13 Accordingly, their emancipation process
needs to draw on common roots and common perspectives beyond citizenship, group aliation, or country of origin.14 Thus, being a stateless and
non-territorial nation in Europe, confronted with racism and persecution
throughout their history, the Romani minority requires special protection.
The RNC also holds that, traditional policies directed at the Roma have
failed, and while the process of European unication is advancing, human
rights standards for the Roma have deteriorated. This paradoxical development can only be resolved by regulating a rm legal status for the Roma in
Europe.15
International NGOs such as IRU and the RNC are complimented by
transnational advocacy networks, such as the ERRC and the OSI. Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are those relevant actors working
145
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a

common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services
(Risse and Sikkink 1999, 18). These TANs represent more than a moral
crusade (Eder 1985) and although they often include activists who are part
of social movements, they represent ideas, not constituencies (Keck and
Sikkink 1998a, 236). As a network it facilitates the exchange of information
between the local and transnational political context and engages in lobbying, targeting key political lite, and the media. TANs are a crucial element
in the Roma social movement as they can oer knowledge and expertise on
a given issue or community.
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)

The Budapest-based ERRC was established in 1996 and works to combat
prejudice and discrimination against Roma, and to promote genuine equality of treatment and respect. The ERRC is a public interest organization
which argues before domestic and transnational courts to criticize domestic law or conduct as violating international norms, particularly in the
area of discrimination. As Vermeersch (2006, 202) explains, besides documenting and publicizing the systematic lack of human rights protection
and sending protest letters to shame governments, the ERRC also started
to provide targeted legal help, including litigation, to Romani victims of
human rights violations. One recent notable success of the ERRC was the
case of D. H. and Others v. The Czech Republic. In 2007, the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that segregated schooling between
Roma and non-Roma was discriminatory.16 The ERRC are particularly
adept at information gathering and dissemination by employing a variety
of media to communicate their message and activity which draws attention
to transnational issues aecting Roma such as poverty (2002a) or unemployment (2007b).
Open Society Institute-Roma Participation Programme (OSI-RPP)

This TAN provides institutional support grants for Romani NGOs, provides training and internship opportunities for young Romani activists and
helps promotes civic advocacy. The projects which the OSI-RPP supports
are dened by Romani leaders and it only funds Romani NGOs. By agitating for stalagmite mobilization it ensures that the OSI does not force the
agenda,17 and its credibility as an eective organizing structure of representation is dependent on its avoidance of a paternalistic relationship with
146
Roma communities. It has a long-term vision of creating a better future for

the Roma by training tomorrows leaders and activists.18 The Roma voice in
the transnational political context has been amplied by the presence of
TANs and has been strengthened by the creation of ambitious structures
such as the ERTF.
European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF)

In December 2004, Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe
stated, with the creation of this forum, Roma and Travellers will now have
a voice at the pan-European level. For the rst time in their history, they
will be able to inuence the decision-making which aects them.19 The
aims of this organizing structure of representation are outlined in its
founding statutes and include facilitating the integration of these populations into European societies and their participation in public life and in
the decision-making process.20 The ERTF is purposively dierent from
other transnational Roma organizing structures of representation not
least because of its size and geographic distribution. Ambitiously, it brings
together more than 20 ethnic Romani groups including, among others:
Sinti; Beas; Kalderas; Traveller/Pavee; Kale; Lovara; Jenish; and Resande.
The interests of the Romani community are not the same as the interests of
the Traveller community however both communities do share a common
history as being a despised and marginalized minority group.21 One of the
key general principles of the ERTF is to promote the interests of Roma22
and endeavours to promote the struggle against racism and discrimination
and facilitate the integration of these populations into the European societies and their participation in public life and in the decision-making
process.23
At the second plenary session of the ERTF in November 2006 each
delegate gave a testimonial on the situation of Roma and Travellers.24 Some
delegates used this opportunity to specify individual cases of discrimination or anti-Gypsism which they felt were indicative of the entire Romani
community, while others pointed to more systemic problems. Recurrent
interests which were articulated included: discrimination; unemployment;
police brutality; historical persecution; sedentarization; social exclusion;
housing; eviction; poverty; racism; marginalization; the position of women
and children; and education. However when taken together a pattern often
emerges concerning several shared interests which impact on Roma. Three
working groups were established which can be taken together to reect the
shared interest of Roma at the European level. One dealt with human rights
147
and covered anti-Gypsism, migration, refugees and Kosovo while another

focused on social issues and covered cohesion, traditions, the regions and
Travellers. The nal working group examined civil society which included
discussions on education, culture, the Holocaust, nancing and enlargement.
A Concept Paper was produced which contains interests which should be
included in a European Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Roma. This
list-like document is unavoidably exhaustive and includes points on: the
importance of robust anti-discrimination legislation; the prevalence of
deteriorated living conditions; the failure of many states to adhere to the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; the lack
of monitoring after EU enlargement; the practice of asylum-seeking claims
being treated as bogus; the dearth of political participation in the domestic
and international political context; the lack of protection for Kosovar
Roma; the limited teaching of Romani language; entrenched inequality
aecting Roma; equal access to the labour market; armative action measures to be adopted; the recognition of Romani as a European language; and
the lack of research on the Holocaust.
Notes on Legitimacy of Transnational Organizing

Structures of Representation
No transnational organizing structure of representation is directly elected
by Roma. Some commentators point out that civil society organizations,
such as the IRU and the RNC, cannot represent interests as they are not a
community of values, like states (Held 1995; cited in Collingwood 2006,
450). The obvious criticism of this position is how it condemns NGOs
by holding it up to the normative yardstick of the democratic state. This
common, yet misguided, academic practice misses the point. The real value
of international NGOs comes from their autonomy and independence not
from their state-like characteristics or form. Oe (1985, 819) points out
that the politics of social movements seeks to politicize the institutions of
civil society in ways that are not constrained by the channels of representative-bureaucratic political institutions, and non-political spheres of action
exonerate political authority and provide it with sources of legitimacy. One
criticism levelled at these structures is that their centralized hierarchical
leadership is detached from Romani communities and thus any legitimacy
is based on giving voice in the transnational political context. Legitimacy
must be conferred on organizing structures of representation by Roma
themselves but this is problematic in the case of Romani international
NGOs as there is no interaction and process to link the two together. In this
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regard, Sobotka (2003, 8) explains, while Roma, involved in policy formation processes have to some extent feedback to real Romani constituencies,
Roma active at the transnational level, by the rules of the game [. . .] have
no such feedback from Romani grassroots.
There have been accusations that TANs are lite institutions, managed
bureaucratically by bourgeois intellectuals and activists, socially and
culturally isolated from the constituencies [. . .] that they assist (Steiner
1991, 74). One of the distinctive features of TANs is that they do not claim
to represent Roma in that they are advocacy organizations. Their purpose
is to advocate policy changes which cannot be easily linked to rationalist
understanding of their own interests as advocates plead the cause of others
(Keck and Sikkink 1998b, 89). Trehan (2001) has criticized transnational
Roma organizing structures of representation because they have tended to
act only according to their normative agenda. Moreover, very often their
activists and employees are drawn from those engaged in broader social
movements such as anti-racism, and human and minority rights advocacy,
and are not Romani in ethnic origin. The lack of a common ethnic identication creates hurdles to ethnic mobilization because TANs cannot know
the shared interests of the Romani community for certain because they do
not share a common ethnic identity. It is worth reiterating that interests
are constructed by the Romani community themselves through reference
to their ethnic group identity. However, TANs are quick to acknowledge
that they do not represent Roma but they do speak on their behalf.25
As with other transnational organizing structures of representation,
the legitimacy of the ERTF is questionable for several reasons. On the one
hand, the ERTF certainly gives voice to the dispersed Roma community
but it can be accused of being too far removed from the communities which
it claims to represent. This lack of proximity means there is no process
which links the political contexts (local, domestic and transnational)
together. The ERTF unashamedly makes its intentions and purposes clear:
it is there to represent Roma in the transnational political context and
claims that its delegates derive legitimacy from national delegates who
themselves are appointed rather than elected by the Roma community.
Sharing a common ethnic identity is not sucient in and of itself for legitimate representation because social interaction is crucial in establishing
legitimacy.
The European Unions Policy on Roma

A number of questions had been asked in the European Parliament during
the 1970s and led to research on the educational provision for Roma in
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European Community member states in the 1980s. Early European Union

(EU) discourse on Roma focused on the perceived nomadic aspect of their
ethnic identity when reference was made to persons of no xed abode
(European Parliament 1984), and applied the exonym Gypsy to these
persons. The pan-European policy paradigm did not emerge until the early
1990s and now there is certainly a transnational dimension to Roma issues
(Kovats 2001b, 106). With the accession of eight CEECs (A8) to the EU in
2004 and a further two (A2) in 2007, there were serious concerns that the
situation of Roma would be forgotten. The Copenhagen criteria (1993) for
accession demands that states must have respect for and protection of
minorities. In its annual reports which monitored the progress of potential
EU states, Roma were regularly singled out as deserving particular attention in the sections on minorities.26 The 1999 accession partnerships
specied integration of Roma as a priority for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, and the Commission devoted considerable
attention to its regular reports minority rights section to Roma, detailing
infringements of their civil, political, economic and social rights, but making no reference to migration (Guglielmo and Waters 2005, 771). Thus the
EU sought to improve the socio-economic and political situation of Roma
prior to accession. However, with accession secured the message that was
sent to the new EU member states was that enough had been done for
Roma, and as members of the club, there was no longer the carrot or stick
of EU membership to force governments to improve the situation of Roma
within their borders.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the EU has actually given more attention to
Roma since 2004 than anytime previously. In 2004, the European Commissions DG Employment and Social Aairs published The Situation of Roma
in an Enlarged European Union (European Commission 2004) outlining
the EUs policy framework on Roma which focused on anti-discrimination,
human rights, structural funds, employment and the impact of eastern
enlargement. A key feature of EU Roma policy has been the categorization
of Roma in social rather than ethnic or cultural terms resulting in policy
which focuses on the consequences of a given situation (such as health
problems, poverty, illiteracy etc.) rather than on their root causes (rejection, inappropriate provision) (Ligeois and Gheorghe 1995, 13). In 2005,
the European Parliament (EP) delivered a Resolution on the Situation of
the Roma in the European Union (EP 2005) which acknowledges the racial
discrimination which Roma face in relation to accessing health care, segregated schooling and unemployment as well as recognizes the need to ensure
eective participation of Roma in political life. The EP, in particular, has
been a vocal and consistent supporter of Roma by elaborating Resolutions
150
on the situation of Roma women who face multiple discrimination (EP 2006)
and the need for a coherent EU Strategy on Roma (EP 2008a), the latter of
which:
urges the Commission to develop a European Framework Strategy
on Roma Inclusion aimed at providing policy coherence at EU level
as regards the social inclusion of Roma and urges the Commission
at the same time to shape a comprehensive Community Action Plan
on Roma Inclusion with the task of providing nancial support for
realising the objective of the European Framework Strategy on Roma
Inclusion. (EP 2008a)
The EP responded to growing antagonism towards Roma in Italy by conducting a debate on the Italian Roma crisis and a Resolution on the ethnic
proling of Roma in Italy (European Parliament 2008b). Certainly, Roma
are one of the most vilied and excluded minority groups in Europe, and a
Eurobarometer (69. 1) poll (European Commission 2008a) conrmed this
pariah status with 24 per cent EU-wide stating that they would not feel
comfortable with a Rom as a neighbour.
Other institutions have contributed to Roma discourse at the EU level
including a High Level Advisory Group of Experts on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Participation in the Labour Market,
which acknowledges that the integration of Roma is a process which
must address the diversity of Roma people (HLG 2007). In July 2008, the
European Commission produced a Sta Working Paper on Roma which
details the interests of Roma across Europe. This document begins by
detailing the challenge facing the EU in integrating Roma, conceding that
core issues of Roma inclusion education, employment, public health,
housing and infrastructure and the ght against poverty fall mainly under
the responsibility of member states (European Commission 2008b, 4).
Furthermore, it maintains that it must avoid an exclusive focus on social
problems which would risk losing sight of the specic challenges that Roma
face while at the same time avoiding a purely ethnically-dened approach
which forgoes the advantages of mainstreaming Roma issues in the main
policy strands (European Commission 2008b, 4). It is the incoherence of
EU policy on Roma which contributes to continued marginalization across
member states. The EU might regard its role as co-ordinating a supranational
policy on Roma but in the absence of a targeted strategy with the accompanying resources, Roma will continue to be excluded and discriminated.
Put simply, political will at the EU level is not sucient and current policy
151
is not appropriate to the task of improving the situation of Roma across

Europe.
The EU has been reluctant to treat Roma as a specic ethnic group with
particular interests and instead relies on mainstreaming the interests of
Roma into existing community policy. The success of such an approach
depends on the ability of the EU to co-ordinate diverse departments and
funds.27 Such an approach is wary of ghettoizing Roma further by creating
specic instruments to address the interests of Roma such as a specic
Roma Unit, a Directive or a Strategy. Moreover, the benets of creating
targeted measures are not clear because it is argued that the outcome would
be no dierent: what should be included in a Directive or Strategy that
goes beyond what we have already?28 Another example is the European
Social Fund which cannot be targeted exclusively towards Roma but can
focus on issues which aect Roma such as social exclusion and antidiscrimination, thus people are not dened by their ethnicity or gender but
dened because they have common problems.29 Such an approach misses
the point though. The interests of Roma are informed by negative perceptions of their ethnic group identity, therefore policy cannot detach the
interests of Roma from their ethnicity because it is their ethnicity which
generates hostility from authorities and society across Europe.
In September 2008, the EU held its rst Roma Summit in Brussels bringing together over 400 delegates, the purpose of which was to examine
measures to combat the persistent discrimination of Roma and to promote
a rm commitment to tackling concrete problems faced by Roma. While
the event itself was symbolically signicant, it was also hoped that it would
yield tangible benets, namely, the creation of an EU Strategy for Roma.30
Such a development was not forthcoming, the EU instead announcing
the creation of a EU Platform for Roma which left Roma activists and
advocates hugely disappointed. What exactly is a Platform and what is
its purpose? In April 2009, the European Platform for Roma Inclusion,
bringing together Roma advocates and representatives and EU institutions,
met in Prague to decide common basic principles.31 Acknowledging the
core values of the EU including human rights, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity and economic development, it declared that Roma
inclusion policies should be integrated with mainstream policies in the
elds of education, employment, social aairs, housing, health and security
(Principle 1). Thus Roma-focused interventions would not be separated from
broader policy initiatives (Principle 2) and would be mainstreamed (Principle 4). The practical delivery of policies concerning Roma inclusion will
rest with EU member states, in particular with regions and municipalities,
152
with close co-operation with Roma civil society (Principle 9). Finally, it states
that Roma involvement must take place at both national and European
levels through the input of expertise from Roma experts and civil servants,
as well as by consultation with a range of Roma stakeholders in the design,
implementation and evaluation of policy initiatives recognizing that
support for the full participation of Roma people in public life . . . is also
essential (Principle 10).
It is too soon to tell whether increased attention at the EU level will yield
notable improvements in the situation of European Roma. Roma have
a presence in Brussels but EU institutions continue to pursue an ethnicityblind approach relying on anti-discrimination legislation as a tool to
address the social problems. It is not clear if this approach is t for purpose
because it ignores underlying structural problems facing Roma meaning
that a tailored policy with funding, objectives, deadlines, and monitoring
and evaluation instruments could be the only way to meet the substantial
challenges.
European Roma Information Ofce (ERIO)

The ERIO is an international advocacy organization which promotes
political and public discussion on Roma issues by providing factual and
in-depth information on a range of policy issues to EU institutions, Roma
civil society organizations, government authorities and inter-governmental
bodies.32 It was set up in 2003 to provide the Romani community in Europe
with a voice by co-operating with a large network of organizations and acts
to combat racial discrimination and social exclusion through raising awareness of the issues aecting Roma, lobbying and policy development.
Crucially, it does not claim to represent the Romani community but advocates on its behalf. It promotes the participation of Roma communities in
decision-making processes at the European, national and local levels. By
advocating for the rights of Roma it ensures that the interests of Roma are
included on the policy-making and decision-making agendas of EU institutions, and by extension, of EU member states. Additionally, it asserts that
its main focus is anti-discrimination policies in the eld of education,
employment, health care and housing.33 The ERIO maintains that it acts as
an interlocutor between Roma and EU institutions as an informational
platform, ERIO ensures that the voices of all European Roma are heard
by the EU and governmental ocials.34 Nevertheless, its role has changed
somewhat since its inception, and while disseminating information ostensibly from Roma vertically to EU institutions remains a key activity, it
153
nds itself lobbying more and more, responding to crises when they
inevitably arise.
Gamson (1990, 6466) has shown that the presence of inuential allies
is crucial to a movements success; therefore, the ERIO targets EU institutions because it has proven an eective ally of Roma and a receptive
environment to advance claims and articulate interests. The sole Romani
Member of European Parliament (MEP), Lvia Jrka, argues:
It is indispensable to have a strong and united voice in Europe, so that
we can articulate our demands towards the authorities and decisionmakers. It is necessary to disseminate direct information among the
institutions and to make them realise that Roma communities share
more or less the same woes throughout Europe. Given the persistently
growing responsibility of the European Union in the eld of social
inclusion and combating poverty it is vital to develop a strong Roma
advocacy on the international level, in order to be true partners with
the governing institutions in all relevant phases of policy-making, in
design, implementation and monitoring.35
Furthermore, the European Parliament in particular has held formal
exchanges of information with various types of associations (Marks and
McAdam 1999; Lahusen 2004; della Salla and Ruzza 2007) and the ERIO
has attempted to capitalize on this open door to civic advocacy.
The most consistently articulated interest has been the need for a coherent EU policy on Roma which focuses on the twin goals of equality and
meaningful integration. Roma are the most discriminated and marginalized minority community in the EU and clearly past eorts to improve
the situation across the EU have failed for a number of reasons including
lack of political will and ill-considered policy approaches. The EU has
taken a minimal approach to integrating Roma focusing principally on the
construction of anti-discrimination legislation. While such legislative
interventions are welcomed by the ERIO, it lobbies EU institutions arguing
that Roma require special measures due to their historical exclusion. One
of the key reasons for past failures in improving the situation of Roma has
been the lack of input into EU policies by Roma themselves: patronizing
policies which assume the Roma to be passive recipients of policy benets
have to be stopped (ERIO 2008b, 1), though evidence suggests that this
practice continues.
On the occasion of the International Roma Day on 8 April 2008, at an
event in the EP, the Director of ERIO, Ivan Ivanov, declared that it is
154
increasingly acknowledged that the situation of the Roma is among the

primary human rights issues in Europe (ERIO 2008b, 1). Couching the
interests of Roma in the language of human rights is useful because rights
have become a master frame (Snow and Benford 1992) among social
movements and certainly resonate with the international political community. But human rights are universally applied and ought to be cultureblind meaning that a human-rights approach must ignore ethnicity and
special treatment. Thus the tool of human rights will be useful in securing
basic protection of Roma through international law but cannot be wielded
to comprehensively address the complex situation facing Roma across
Europe.
In order for Roma to enjoy equality and integration in the EU, the following interests must be addressed: eective protection of the fundamental
civil rights of Roma including the right to non-discrimination; equal access
to quality education; equal access to employment and self-employment
opportunities; equal access to goods, facilities and services, particularly
health care and housing; and full participation on an equal basis with nonRoma in economic, social, political and cultural life (ERIO 2008b, 8). These
are the shared interests of Roma and have been presented ad hoc to EU
institutions in various guises over the years. However, with the demand for
the creation of an EU Strategy on Roma, these interests will be subsumed
into a co-ordinated weapon which Roma activists and advocates could
deploy against member states and EU institutions. The creation of an EU
Strategy would be the clearest indicator yet of the desire of the EU to eectively address the deplorable living conditions of many Roma. It was in the
shadow on the unfolding Italian Roma crisis (Amnesty International 2008)
that the EU held its rst EU Roma Summit in Brussels on 16 September
2008. This event was co-organized by the ERIO and signied an opportunity for Roma to amplify their concerns on current EU policy we hope the
Summit will not be just a g leaf placed over the lack of concrete action
which is needed to promote inclusion of the most deprived and largest
minority in Europe. The Summit must instead be the rst brick in the foundation for a solid and consistent European Strategy for Roma (ERIO 2008c).
The ERIO regularly seizes the opportunity to raise awareness of Roma
issues ensuring that the voice of Roma is heard through diverse media.
This includes: reacting to developments in the EU; organizing events in
collaboration with EU institutions; attending events related to Roma issues;
disseminating news bulletins and updates to Roma activists and advocates;
and lobbying EU institutions. Each activity is considered in turn. The ERIO
regularly reacts to developments in the EU. In July 2008, the European
155
Commission announced the launch of the new Social Agenda and the
ERIO argued that this document could be seen as a rst step in the direction of a substantial and consistent European Strategy for Roma to improve
the level of protection and integration of Roma in their societies (ERIO
2008d). Furthermore, the ERIO publishes recommendations to the sixmonthly rotating Council Presidency which are useful to monitor the key
interests of Roma and how the voice of Roma changes over time. The
recommendations to the Czech Presidency in January 2009 called for the
elaboration of an EU Strategy on Roma, as well as the capacity of Roma to
move freely across the EU (ERIO 2009a) while those to the Swedish Presidency in July 2009 re-iterated calls for an EU Strategy and warned of the
resurgence of the far-right and anti-Gypsism across Europe (ERIO 2009b).
In April 2009, ERIO organized the conference Roma Access to Political
Participation at the European Parliament which focused on the participation of Roma in politics. The purpose of this event was to debunk certain
myths surrounding and impeding the political participation of Roma and
to draw attention to the fact that Roma are under-represented in public life
in every EU member state and in some states, they are not represented at
all. The Chair of ERIOs board, Pedro Aguilera, reminded delegates that
political participation is crucial because through political participation
and voting the population can inuence the shaping of policies (ERIO
2009c, 1). Other participants argued that proportionally the EP should
have 24 Roma representatives, yet just two Roma secured seats in the 2004
2009 assembly (Lvia Jrka and Viktria Mohcsi, both from Hungary),
with only the former getting re-elected in the 2009 EP elections. Various
participants linked the lack of political participation to social inclusion
such as Enrika Chiozza of DG Employment, Social Aairs and Equal
Opportunities, and to poor living conditions and unemployment, such as
MEP Jean Lambert. As well as organizing events, the ERIO is represented
in events organized by other institutions which work on issues such as
equality and rights including with the EU Fundamental Rights Agency
(July 2008) and the launch of the European Platform for Roma Inclusion
(April 2009).
One of the key roles of the ERIO is to ensure that events and developments in the EU which relate to Roma are regularly disseminated to the
Roma social movement network including Roma NGOs and national
agencies across Europe.36 Often the ERIO will draw attention to incidents
aecting Romani communities across Europe relating to discrimination
or racism. Some events are monitored over a period of time such as the rise
of the Magyar Garda in Hungary or the unfolding Roma crisis in Italy.
156
Information gathering and dissemination is a key feature of the work of the

ERIO and remains a crucial component however more recently ERIO has
found itself lobbying and advocating directly with EU institutions. The
ERIO lobbies with the EP which has proven a powerful ally for European
Roma, so much so that the ERIO presented an award to the President of the
EP on International Roma Day 2009 to acknowledge its valued support.
The European Commission is another focal point of ERIO advocacy in
particular DG Employment, Social Aairs and Equal Opportunities where
the main expertise on Roma at the EU level is located. Other Directorates
General are important though including DG Enlargement, DG Regional
Development, DG Education and Culture, and DG Justice, Freedom and
Security.
One indicator of the success of a social movement is its ability to form
alliances thus Roma activists have established links with Members of the
European Parliament, Commission ocials, and political lite in member
states meaning that the EU provides an environment where Roma can
express themselves.37 Social movements create and sustain networks (Diani
and McAdam 2003) which facilitate co-operation across institutions and
political contexts. To be successful the ERIO must be able to take advantage
of opportunities when they arise and to do this they frame demands in
ways that chime with political authorities in the EU, their core supporters
and the media, and deploy action repertoires which resonate with political
authorities and increase their visibility. The ERIO certainly made its presence felt during the unfolding Italian Roma crisis from 2007 onwards though
initially this was to inform the Roma social movement network about events
in Italy and to warn national governments and EU institutions what was
happening. During 2007 and 2008 the Italian authorities embarked on a
systematic programme targeting Roma through policy and discursive
interventions, including hate speech. Following the decree adopted in Italy
in November 2007 which allows for the expulsion of EU citizens who are
criminals, the ERIO issued a statement accusing the Italian authorities
of pursuing an aggressive racist campaign against Roma in Italy (ERIO
2007). Forced evictions of Romani communities, anti-Roma statements by
political authorities and the media, nger-printing of Roma (including
children), and authoritarian security measures cultivated an atmosphere
of antagonism and hostility towards Romani communities in Italy in which
anti-Romani violence is tolerated and is on the rise. While it was the ethnic
proling of Romani communities in camps which caused outrage among
Romani activists as well as EU ocials, it was actually the legality of expulsions to other EU states, particularly Romania, which allowed the EU to
157
nally intervene. Signicantly, MEPs such as Viktria Mohcsi, Magor Csibi

and Claude Moraes joined the ERIO in condemning the Italian authorities
although Commission ocials were reluctant to publicly denounce a member state. The ERIO also used the Italian Roma crisis to ask the European
Commission to ensure that the principle of equal treatment is strictly followed by each member state, to adopt a horizontal approach concerning
Romas situation in Europe and to propose as soon as possible a specic
European Roma policy (ERIO 2008e).
The ERIO has evolved, as most representation structures do, responding
the developments in the EU. Ivan Ivanov notes that:
the purpose of ERIO was to provide information about Roma across
the whole of the European Union to show that the Roma situation
is not just an issue in Eastern Europe but is an issue in Western Europe
also. But, you know, they [the EU] realized that providing them with
information is not enough. They needed someone to make recommendations, proposals and so on, so this is how the ERIO moved from
being a purely information oce, and this is our main aim in fact.38
The ERIO is careful to argue that it does not represent Roma: we dont
represent because we have not been elected by Roma, but we advocate on
their behalf before European institutions and national governments.39
Legitimate representation is thus equated with a democratic mandate
applying domestic conventions of legitimacy to the transnational political
context. However, Ruiz highlights the importance of having a voice in the
EU: I have seen how ERIOs presence has contributed to keep the Roma
issue at the top of the agenda for European institutions and for civil society
and that was why it was created in 2003. Having a presence in Brussels has
clearly improved the capacity to ensure that the voice of Roma is heard and
is dicult to imagine that the recent urry of policy and activity on Roma
issues emanating from the EP and the European Commission has not been
the result of advocacy by the ERIO.
Conclusion
Ethnic Mobilization
Transnational organizing structures of representation reect the various
strategies and capabilities of the Roma social movement. Each shares a
common ethnic group identity (this is less applicable to TANs) which is
158
the glue that holds the structure as well as the macro-structure of the social
movement together. Creating organizing structures of representation is a
key element of all social movements as it provides a platform through
which the movement can make its voice heard. Roma are a transnational
minority who have been persecuted and marginalized because of negative
ascriptions of their ethnic identity. Crucially, their identity and interests are
insoluble as the interests of Roma are determined by their group identity,
and their experiences as an oppressed group. The construction of ethnic
group identity is particularly relevant as this must take place in a political
context. Since the 1990s Romani activists and advocates have increased
their eorts towards the transnational political context in order to inuence policy aecting Roma and ensure that the interests of Roma are taken
into account.
Participating in public and civic structures allows the interests of Roma
to be heard which otherwise could be either forgotten or dened by gaje
institutions. This participation takes a variety of forms including shaming,
lobbying, networking, information dissemination, consulting, training and
researching and each is considered relevant for the Roma social movement.
Transnational organizing structures of representation are not duplicitous
or in direct competition with one another, rather they should be understood as fullling specics requirements in the broader Roma social
movement. Formal representation at the transnational level is negligible
which means that the principal role of transnational organizing structures
of representation is to ensure the voice of Roma is heard.
There exists a multitude of shared interests which are articulated by these
organizing structures of representation although some can be highlighted
as being particularly important to the Roma social movement. First, Roma
demand to be recognized as a nation in their own right. Roma have no kin
state and make no territorial claims, yet being recognized as a nation would
acknowledge the validity of this group and could lead to positive concessions in the future. Secondly, discrimination against Roma is widespread
and even when favourable legislation exists, in practice violations are a
persistent occurrence. Thirdly, poverty disproportionately aects Roma
and intensies social marginalization as many Roma are unemployed, live
159
in substandard housing, and do not have access to adequate medical care.

Due to a general absence of access to education they are unable to change
their current circumstances for themselves. Finally, calls for an EU Strategy
on Roma, which would address other shared interests, have been invoked
more regularly particularly since EU enlargement in 2004. Shared interests
have been articulated by the transnational organizing structures of representation, often by several concurrently. It is widely accepted that one
way to improve the situation of Roma is to increase their political participation in the transnational political context, even if this is not direct power
and inuence, and is only weaker forms of advocacy such as consulting,
lobbying, networking and advising.
The legitimacy of these structures is questionable because their activities
are often abstracted from Roma, which means that ethnic mobilization
is driven mainly by lite from within the movement who are able to set
the agenda. A leading Romani intellectual, Nicolae Gheorghe, (1997, 157)
acknowledges the crisis of legitimacy with regard to the construction of
Romani identity in the transnational political context arguing that Roma
are in a process of ethnogenesis (158), moving from a position of inferiority to one where they enjoy more equal treatment with other communities.
But who is pulling the strings at this critical juncture of Roma history? The
only visible manifestation of Roma representation in the transnational
political context is organizing structures of representation led by a thin
stratum of Romani intellectuals. In this respect it is unlikely that the drive
to be recognized as a nation came from a groundswell of Roma support, so
the elaboration of Roma as a stateless nation is an lite construct. Another
concern is that democratic accountability or critical engagement from the
wider Romani community is nominal, meaning that interests articulated
by transnational structures are presented, however well-intentioned, to
international organizations and the European Romani community as a
fait accompli.
The centralized hierarchical leadership of the IRU and RNC is detached
from Romani communities, so their claims to legitimacy are based on
shared values and giving voice to Roma in the transnational political context. Legitimacy is conferred on organizing structures of representation
by the Romani community so social interaction establishes a legitimacy
discourse, and Roma input into this discourse. However there is a disconnection between transnational organizing structures of representation and
160
the Romani community which makes legitimacy dicult to establish. TANs

are a crucial element in the social movement as they oer specialist skills
and knowledge such as familiarity and expertise on a given issue or community. The utility of TANs lies in their capacity to empower local Romani
communities through training and funding (OSI-RPP) and their ability to
induce domestic political actors to uphold international norms including
anti-discrimination and anti-racism (ERRC). The creation of the ERTF
should be understood as tting into the broader European-wide Roma
social movement which has been gathering momentum since the early
1990s. There is no question that it gives voice to Roma in a transnational
political context which is both receptive and attentive and the same applies
to ERIO, which it is not an umbrella organization like the IRU, RNC or
ERTF. In addition, ERIO does not claim to represent or unite all Roma but
exists to lobby the EU and raise the prole of issues aecting European
Roma.40 A shared solidarity means that organizing structures of representation can give voice to Roma as a political platform which necessarily
involves dierent goals, repertoires, strategies of action as well as networks
of alliance and organizing structures of representation.
Notes
1. Transnational is used to characterize regular activity crossing national borders that
involves one non-state actor, while international would only suggest increasing interactions
among states (Risse-Kappen 1995, 3; cited in Clark et al. 1998, 3).
2. There are currently 12 million Roma in Europe, mostly (though not exclusively)
located in Central and Eastern Europe (Kawczynski 2000). The Council of Europes
Commissioner for Human Rights 2005 Report on the Human Rights Situation of the Roma,
Sinti, and Travellers in Europe maintains there are ten million Roma, and that they are a
truly pan-European minority. For full text see: http://www.human-rights.hr/dokumenti/
CoE%20CHR%20Roma%202005%5B2%5D.htm (accessed 8 August 2009). Additionally,
the Council of Europe issued a Recommendation (1203) in January 1993 stating: Gypsies
are a true European minority.
3. The Decade of Roma Inclusion (20052015) brings together 12 states: Albania;
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; the Czech Republic; Hungary; Macedonia;
Montenegro; Romania; Serbia; Slovakia; and Spain. It focuses on education, employment,
health and housing, and commits governments to take into account the other core issues of
poverty, discrimination and gender mainstreaming aecting Roma communities. For more
information see: http://www.romadecade.org/
4. In 1979 the IRU was given consultative status at the United Nations Economic and
Social Council. In 1993, it was promoted to Category II Special Consultative Status at
the UN, which in eect recognizes its authority in amplifying the voice of Roma at an international level. For further see: Klmov-Alexander 2005, chapter 3.
161
5. For an understanding of why Roma are treated as a social problem see: Thelen 2005,
2935.
6. On the politics of presence see: Phillips 1998.
7. Recognition of Roma as a transnational nation with a specic group identity is
the rst step for the Roma social movement to be empowered to articulate these interests.
The importance of recognition of minorities is expressed by Taylor 1994.
8. This was explicitly articulated in the Declaration of Nation at the fth Romani
World Congress in 2000. Full text reproduced by Acton and Klmov 2001.
9. The historical development of transnational mobilization in the second half of the
twentieth century are detailed by Puxon 1973; Jenne 2000; Klmov-Alexander 2007a; Klmov-Alexander 2007b.
10. The previous congresses were held in 1971, 1978, 1981 and 1990 respectively.
11. Oral statement by the IRU, an NGO in Special Consultative Status, delivered by
Paolo Pietrosanti. Fifty-seventh session, March-April 2001. For full text see: http://www.
radicalparty.org/humanrights/gy_comm_57_pietrosanti.htm (accessed 12 June 2009).
12. Kawczynski 2000. Report on the Condition of the Roma in Europe. Report
commissioned by the OSCE.
13. The Roma National Congress. General Principles. See: http://romanationalcongress.
webs.com/whoweare.htm (accessed 14 August 2009).
14. See note 12 above.
15. Roma National Congress. 1994; cited in Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 20.
16. For details of the case and its impact see: http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2945
(accessed 14 August 2009).
17. Personal interview, Bernard Rorke, Director of the OSI-RPP, Budapest, Hungary, 3
May 2006.
18. Personal interview, Gyula Vamosi, Romani activist, Pc, Hungary, 8 May 2006.
19. For full text of speech see: http://www.ertf.org/01/media/downloads/english/
Terry%20Davies,%20Opening.doc (accessed 19 July 2009).
20. Article 2.1. For statutes in full see: http://ertf.org/01/en/dyn/about_us/general/
statutes_of_the_ertf.html (accessed 28 August 2009).
21. This commonality between Roma and Travellers was expressed separately by Catherine Joyce of the Blanchardstown Development Project and Martin Collins, the Irish
delegate to the ERTF. Personal interviews, Dublin, Ireland. 10 October 2006.
22. See note 20 above, Article 3.1.
23. See note 20 above, Article 2.1.
24. The author attended the second plenary session of the ERTF.
25. Personal interviews with Dimitrina Petrova, Director of the ERRC, Budapest,
23 September 2005; Claude Cahn, Programmes Director of the ERRC, Budapest, 11 May
2006; and Bernard Rorke, Director of the OSI-RPP, Budapest, 3 May 2006.
26. For more on EU policy and Roma see: Simhandl 2006.
27. Personal Interview with Belinda Pyke, Director, DG Employment, Social Aairs and
Equal Opportunities on Anti-Discrimination, Brussels, 4 November 2008.
28. Personal Interview with Joachim Ott, Co-ordinator of the Roma Action Group,
Brussels, 4 November 2008.
162
29. Personal Interview with Peter Stub-Joergensen, Director of the European Social
Fund, Brussels, 6 November 2008.
30. The necessity of creating an EU Strategy is detailed by the European Roma Policy
Coalition 2008.
31. For the full text of the Common Basic Principles see: Council of the European
Union 2009, Annex: 58.
32. ERIO prole. www.erionet.org (accessed 9 August 2009).
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Electronic communication with Lvia Jrka, Member of the European Parliament,
24 July 2009.
36. These can be accessed from www.erio.org.net.
37. Personal Interview with Joachim Ott, Co-ordinator, Roma Policy Coalition,
DG Employment, Social Aairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels, 4 November 2008.
38. Personal Interview with Ivan Ivanov, Director of ERIO, Brussels, 5 November 2009.
39. Personal interview with Guillermo Ruiz, Policy Ocer of ERIO, Brussels,
5 November 2009.
40. Interestingly, EU institutions actually derive legitimacy for their policy on Roma by
consulting with the ERIO, the Roma voice in Brussels.
Conclusion
Roma have lived in Europe for over 700 years yet they continue to be treated
as outsiders, as though they do not belong. Systematic persecution from
authorities and wider society has met them throughout their history yet
they have survived, ourished and their cultural identity remains strong.
Roma are present in every state in Europe, most residing in Central and
Eastern Europe; however, in every state Roma are the most marginalized
and excluded community, consistently harassed and vilied even today
with justice and equality out of reach. What makes Roma such a fascinating
case among the European mosaic of minority communities is that they are
unique. They do not speak the same language,1 or practice the same religion and possess divergent levels of wealth and education, although broadly
speaking discrimination and racism is a common experience. They are a
transnational minority without a kin state, and despite enduring persecution they have never used violence to change their circumstances. This does
not signify passive acquiescence in the face of constant exclusion because
more recently Roma have begun to make their voice heard in the domestic
and transnational political contexts. Now more than ever Roma appear to
have the potential to make their interests known and a chance to improve
their situation across Europe.
The purpose of representation is to make present what is absent (Birch
1971; Pitkin 1972). In the case of Roma it is their interests which have been
missing for various reasons meaning that state policies have ignored them,
exacerbating existing problems. In liberal democratic systems we select
and authorize representatives on grounds of identity, common interests or
expertise (ONeill 2001). I have argued that Roma share interests which are
informed by their experience as being a marginalized minority community,
meaning that identity and interests are insoluble. Their interests are overwhelmingly socio-economic and political such as access to adequate health,
education, employment, housing, as well as combating discrimination.
This does not mean that the cultural interests are unimportant; rather, the
163
164
situation of Roma across Europe is so precarious that socio-economic

interests are more pressing. If European governments commit to improve
the situation of Roma then we would surely witness a signicant increase
in demands for preservation of culture. Moreover, the lack of a political
voice is an interest for it is through political participation that Roma can
ensure their interests are accounted for when formulating policy. Clearly,
the lack of ethnic mobilization in the past has hindered attempted to give
Roma a voice in the domestic and transnational political contexts. The
implications of this approach are obvious: policies which are worked out
for rather than with Roma are unlikely to reect their real needs and interests. Roma must therefore be able to input and decide on policy which
aects them directly as well as the capacity to monitor and evaluate its
implementation.
As the case studies of the domestic and transnational political contexts
have shown, Roma are increasingly nding a political voice and are not
relying solely on liberal democratic processes. Parliamentary representation
of Roma does not reect their demographic weight thus the burgeoning
Roma social movement has created civil society organizations at the local,
national and transnational level to articulate their interests. Despite encouraging evidence of stalagmite mobilization, tangible improvements in the
living conditions of Roma remain out of reach, which indicates that state
policies are ineective or that the historical exclusion of Roma is so embedded that more must be done. As Roma are a transnational minority, the
transnational political context oers an opportunity to advance claims
beyond state borders where traditionally governments have been unwilling
to alleviate the problems faced by Romani communities.
My research was motivated by the desire to shed light on how a
disenfranchised minority group can change their circumstances through
representation. It analysed the case of Roma representation in Hungary
and Romania and hypothesized that localized representation increased
legitimacy (H1), and that transnational Romani activity increased due
to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic
political context (H2). I argued that to fully understand who speaks for
Roma it is necessary to account for both the domestic and transnational
political contexts. The case studies found that Roma are under-represented
in political life and therefore create organizing structures of representation
to articulate their shared interests which are constructed in a variety of
political contexts.
Conclusion
165
Assessing the Hypotheses

H1: Political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma representation
Political decentralization is a non-restrictive term and refers to localized
civic activity including formal and informal modes of participation and
representation including lite, NGOs and political parties. Proximity
between the Romani community and organizing structures of representation is vital because legitimacy can only be conferred by the Romani
community and this is problematic at the transnational level. Lvia Jrka,
Member of the European Parliament, argues that:
local implementation is the crucial factor of all initiatives, so any
transnational Roma representation claiming legitimacy must operate
in a bottom-up approach, gathering grass-roots information and
concluding it in clear and specic policy recommendations for the
authorities. Roma communities can therefore be involved in policies
aecting them from the grassroots level up to the international
consultation NGOs, in all aspects of planning, implementation and
supervision. It is also vital to be strapped with the necessary nancial, academic and human resources and also, of course, advocacy
must be independent in order to play their role as watchdogs of the
Roma communities.2
In the case of Roma this appears particularly relevant because often Roma
representation is not based on electoral legitimacy. Historically Roma have
relied on local representation alone such as the charismatic traditional
leadership of the bulibaa in Romania but since the collapse of communism
the growth in civil society and political pluralism meant new opportunities
presented themselves for Roma, as well as for the wider society. The proliferation of Romani organizing structures of representation in the 1990s has
been characterized by the fragmentation and factionalism of Romani
political lite as they compete over material and non-material goods.
In the domestic political context, ethnic political parties continue to be
regarded as the most legitimate organizing structure of representation, as it
attains direct and quantiable electoral legitimacy. However, even here the
Roma vote is split with many opting for mainstream political parties, who
deploy socio-economic rhetoric which resonates with Roma at the ballot box.
166
The RPPE has established a monopoly over Roma representation in

Romania which it is able to perpetuate through governmental funding. The
RPPE has a presence in every county in every region in Romania which
eectively means it has become so entrenched it could be described as
monopolizing Roma representation. In both Hungary and Romania, Roma
political parties/political associations do not secure electoral support contiguous to their demographic weight for a number of reasons including
inadequate education among Romani communities, poverty, lack of identication documents, distrust of electoral democracy and political lite,
and the fact that many Roma do not see the value of the vote. For these
reasons, the role and impact of the NGO sector is imperative for Roma in
the domestic political context because NGOs potentially provide a trusted
medium through which Roma articulate their interests and external private donors lter funding, help implement projects and deliver services.
The real value of the NGO sector derives from its capacity to represent
without a mandate. NGOs are not elected but in the case of Roma they act
legitimately in articulating their shared interests; therefore, legitimacy must
be more than an X on a ballot sheet. More than any other organizing structure of representation, NGOs work closely with the Romani community,
day-in and day-out, which enables them to build up relationships of trust.
Crucially it is not the deliverables of the projects which are of primary
concern but the relationships and interactive processes which can only
be constructed on a local level. Legitimacy is conferred on NGOs by the
Romani community because they are able to give voice to this minority.
Transnational organizing structures of representation are created beyond
the state for a purpose. Their role and substance is necessarily distinct from
those found in the domestic political context however they remain subject
to the same evaluations as any structure. So are some transnational organizing structures of representation more legitimate than others? Or are these
structures so hollow in legitimacy as to render them obsolete? As with the
cases of Hungary and Romania, I examine legitimacy of representation,
rather than legitimacy of inuence or legitimacy of behaviour and make
no attempt to rank these organizing structures of representation in terms
of their respective legitimacy rather I draw attention to the social construction of legitimacy.
The IRU and RNC are two of the most far-reaching attempts to secure
Roma representation in the transnational political context, both being created by Roma, for Roma. The Romani political lite who drive this process
intend to establish a platform through which Roma can make their concerns known, to the dispersed Romani communities around the world as
Conclusion
167
well as to third-parties such as international organizations and the state.

Up until the 1970s, Roma mobilization was absent and it was through these
structures that nation-building eorts began in earnest. The IRU and RNC
helped to create an understanding of Roma as a stateless nation, and for
the rst time articulated their shared interests. However, accusations have
been levelled at these structures for being litist which are too far removed
from the constituencies they claim to represent. There is no interaction or
relationship between the governing Romani political lite and the Romani
community thus the actual role of Romani communities is minimal in
both the IRU and RNC. The interests which are articulated are specied by
the political lite, not by Roma, even though lite often share a common
ethnicity. Neither the ERRC nor the OSI-RPP attempt to represent Roma
as a constituency or their shared interests. In many respects they full a
vital function by shaming norm-violating states through judicial proceedings (ERRC) or by stimulating ethnic mobilization through training and
project creation (OSI-RPP). These transnational organizing structures of
representation are gaje institutions and as such suer from a lack of conferred legitimacy despite the laudable activism, advocacy and research
which they conduct. The key function of the ERTF is to provide a voice for
Roma in Europe where it can articulate its shared interests to a receptive
audience including international organizations, and the same is true of the
ERIO. Unlike the ERTF, the ERIO claims it does not represent Roma, but
lobbies and advocates on its behalf, fullling a crucial role by inuencing
policy and legislation at the transnational level.
By providing a voice in the transnational political context, transnational
organizing structures of representation ensure that Roma cannot be completely ignored, although current EU policy on Roma is not reective of
their needs. The EU has thus far ignored calls for an EU Strategy and pursues an ethnicity-blind approach to Roma by mainstreaming the interests
of Roma such as education and unemployment into existing policy instruments. At present and perhaps for the rst time in a long history on the
continent, Roma have access to the corridors of power but they do not hold
decision-making capacity and therefore their destinies remain in the hands
of others. Outreach programmes and community involvement are necessary so that there are channels of consultation open in order that Romas
shared interests are fed in. At the moment no transnational organizing
structure of representation can be cited as doing enough in this respect.
Concerted eorts must be made to improve and revolutionize the ow of
information and to institutionalize the socio-political interactions with
local Romani communities. Of course, stalagmite mobilization comes from
168
below to create these organizations but a new culture of representation and

participation must be promoted if the transnational organizing structures
of representation are to have meaningful legitimacy and impact.
H2: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic

political context, transnational Romani activity increases
The poor socio-political and economic situation of Roma has been historically ingrained. It is doubtful whether years of poverty, discrimination and
marginalization which Roma have endured could be erased by policies
espousing citizenship, equality and human rights. This experience has created a unique identity for Roma and a common reference point in their
shared heritage. Particularly since the 1990s concerted attempts have
been made to improve the situation of Roma through the creation of organizing structures of representation. Many Roma in Hungary and Romania
live in substandard housing, cannot access adequate healthcare, are overrepresented in unemployment gures and lack foundational education.
They are discriminated, socially marginalized and live in relative poverty,
thus it is not surprising that recent eorts to address the situation have
been found wanting. Initiatives such as self-government and control over
cultural interests as in Hungary, or a guaranteed seat in Parliament as found
in Romania, are not appropriate to the task at hand. Even targeted policies
on Roma such as the National Strategy in Romania have not been adequately resourced or allocated appropriate decision-making authority. It is
dicult to imagine how this situation can be rectied in the domestic
political context without mobilization including a substantial increase in
parliamentary representation, at least contiguous to Romas demographic
weight.
Throughout the 1990s Roma found its most vocal support emanating
from the international political community: international organizations;
international NGOs; private donors; and sympathetic Western states. Not
surprisingly, attention shifted to the transnational political context as a
means to increase their political participation and articulate their shared
interests. Recently there has been a noticeable increase in the number of
Romani transnational organizing structures of representation which do
not directly address the problems experienced by Roma in their respective
home states or act as a substitute to domestic representation structures. The
creation of both the IRU and RNC was focused on the perceived necessity
of giving a voice for Roma (and Sinti) in the transnational political context.
Conclusion
169
Both the IRU and RNC were created and driven by Romani political lite
who used their group identity, attracted attention to their cause and secured
resources. Their creation signies the beginning of the Roma social movement which did not gather pace until after 1989 when civil society more
generally began to ourish in Central and Eastern Europe. Although, there
is no evidence to suggest that the IRU and the RNC were created due to
inadequate structures of representation in the domestic political context.
The ERRC and the OSI-RPP are more concerned with the domestic
situation of Roma as they concentrate their eorts within state borders.
Although the international political community is an important audience
for these TANs, the domestic political context is where Roma live therefore
this is where they focus their attention. The ERRC is adept at ensuring that
practice follows the rule regarding domestic legislation, particularly those
laws concerning anti-discrimination. There are frequent violations of antidiscrimination (and other) laws against Roma so the ERRC was created as
a public interest organization to ensure more uniform adherence with the
law particularly as it relates to public bodies. The OSI-RPP, for its part, helps
to equip the Romani community with the necessary tools (leadership,
training, skills and knowledge) today so that they may positively aect
the future tomorrow. The ERTF can be seen as the next logical step in the
evolution of transnational Romani representation as it is more politicized
and legally entrenched than the IRU or RNC. Delegates understand their
role as more than simply symbolic as it oers the possibility of articulating
the shared interests of the Romani community. These shared interests are
aggregates of the composite issues and problems which Roma face across
Europe but are unable to adequately address in the domestic political context
due to unfavourable structural conditions. A shared history of oppression,
disadvantage and persecution has meant that a Rom from Albania can
identify with a Traveller from Ireland. Sometimes their interests are the
same, sometimes they are dierent but identity provides the ultimate reference point for the Roma social movement. It could be seen as part of a
general trend in the Roma social movement to transnationalize their shared
interests as the international political community have heretofore provided
a receptive audience to the situation of Roma across Europe. The ERIO
began as an information-gathering and dissemination nexus but increasingly found itself lobbying and providing consultancy to EU institutions,
notably the EP and Commission, conscious of the power of the EU to adopt
legislation which has direct eect in member states. There are no explicit
causal arrows which ow from the domestic to the transnational political
170
context so it is dicult to determine whether increased Roma advocacy

and activism is the result of inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context.
There is no question that transnational Romani activity has increased
recently but there are two further possible explanations. First, Melucci
(1992, 9) claims that social movements have a tendency to acquire a transnational dimension which implies that this activity is simply part of
a broader macro-structure of activity and certainly this explanation is difcult to refute. Secondly, Roma are a transnational minority; consequently,
the transnational political context provides a natural forum and receptive
environment for this group without a kin state to ght on their behalf.
Extreme poverty, discrimination and marginalization have galvanized
Roma to create transnational organizing structures of representation to
articulate their interests. This nal explanation is the most convincing as it
emphasizes how Roma themselves create transnational organizing structures of representation which are most appropriate to their socio-political
situation as a heterogeneous transnational ethnic minority group. Despite
decades of transnational activism, perceptible improvements in the situation of Roma across Europe cannot be detected and recent events in Italy,
Hungary and Northern Ireland demonstrate that Roma continue to be
targeted by hostile legislation and societal discrimination.
Contested Ethnic Group Identity and Shared Interests

Although widely assumed to possess a stable group identity, Roma are a heterogeneous minority community with multiple subgroups which impedes
eorts to secure representation and articulate interests in the domestic and
transnational political contexts. It can be argued that some degree of commonality exists due to a collective history and experience as outsiders
(as they have been variously termed as Zigeuner, Tigani, Cigany, Gypsy and
Traveller in dierent political contexts), as well as shared values. While
Roma can be described as possessing multiple identities, ethnic identity
does appear to be a key factor in the mobilization process. Organizing
structures of representation are an expression of Romani group identity
reecting the heterogeneity and diversity within this ethnic community.
It can determine who is in and who is out and establishes parameters
of shared experience, tacit understandings and common values. It is a mistake, however, to assume that a distinctive ethnic group possesses a strong
and well-developed identity. After all, Roma are the largest and most geographically dispersed ethnic minority group in Europe which has resulted
Conclusion
171
in a fragmented identity. Additionally, all minority groups experience a

tension between private self-identication and public ethnic identity armation. On the one hand, minorities aspire to be recognized as dierent
and on the other hand they maintain a desire to be treated equally and
socially integrated, without being assimilated. This creates a challenge for
state structures and society, but also a problem for minority groups such as
how to establish organizing structures of representation which can accommodate these divergent aspirations.
Ethnic identity does not exist a priori and then Roma parasitically attach
themselves onto it, rather it is necessary to capture an identitys constructed
and relational quality. People participate in ethnicity, rather than simply
constitute members of a particular group therefore it is a relational phenomenon, not simply as substance (Calhoun 2003, 560). The ethnic identity
of Roma is directly linked to their shared interests which are publicly
articulated in both the domestic and transnational political contexts. Roma
constantly renegotiate their ethnic group identity and representation structures which provides for the possibility of change and adaptation in the
future. Representation is not something which is ever attained as it is not
a monolithic institution, rather it can more accurately be described as
something which is pursued.
Roma are a social movement which means that through collective
action they struggle for the appropriation of shared values and interests.
The actors involved in the movement can be described as united by a specic solidarity despite being derived from a heterogeneous composition
(Melucci 1980, 202). This solidarity denotes the improvement in the living
conditions of all Roma. Though identity is an important component of all
social movements, in the case of Roma it is considered to be the most
important factor for securing representation and articulating interests. The
interests articulated by the Roma social movement in the domestic and
transnational political context are informed by their ethnic group identity and
processes of mobilization which include participation and representation.
Creating organizing structures of representation is a key element of social
movements as it provides a platform through which the movement can
make its voice heard. Ethnic mobilization and stalagmite social processes
are imperative for these structures to be able to legitimately represent the
interests of Roma. Only the Romani community can know what their
interests actually are as they are intersubjectively constructed with reference
to their ethnic group identity. Subjectively held proximate interests have
no place in organizing structures of representation because these structures are created to articulate intersubjectively constructed shared interests.
172
Rights-based theories have dominated academic discourse on minorities;

therefore, I have emphasized the role of interests as a counterweight. Both
rights and interests are socially constructed and as such are constantly
being reshaped and renegotiated. Like interests, rights get dened and
rened through social interaction but interests carry with them an expression of groupness as a substance created by stalagmite collective action.
The historical situation of Roma is illuminating for socio-political
researchers, not least because it shows how rapidly the Roma social movement has advanced. During the communist era many minorities, including
Roma, were tolerated and to some extent assimilated. Indeed, the paternalistic attitude of the communist leaders and the structure of the command
economy ensured that Roma were employed and enjoyed a degree of security from persecution. In the early 1990s, after the collapse of communism,
Roma were increasingly used as scapegoats for the socio-economic problems experienced in the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe
(Barany 1998), and as a result suered targeted persecution and violence.
This galvanized Roma to mobilize politically as they realized they could
seize the opportunity to participate in the organizing structures of the state,
as well as in the emerging civil society, and since then there has been a turn
towards ethnic identication as a framework for political mobilization
(Vermeersch 2006). The key goals of Roma mobilization generally encompass enhanced interest representation; the cessation of political, social,
economic and other types of discrimination; and the improvement of the
given collectives conditions and relative standing in society (Barany 1998,
309310).
The diversity within the Romani community is demonstrated by the
rich array of domestic and transnational organizing structures of representation and the interests which they articulate. The Roma social movement
has instigated the proliferation of organizing structures of representation
in the domestic and transnational political contexts. I examined the role
of lite, political parties and civil society organizations in Hungary and
Romania which the Romani community use to articulate their shared
interests and necessarily employed a broad understanding of representation
to accommodate the diversity contained within the Roma social movement
and the organizing structures of representation which it has created. While
focusing on one single mode of representation such as parliamentary
representation would have yielded valuable results, I am concerned with
understanding who speaks for Roma? and therefore must consider a diverse
range of representation structures. Similar to the domestic organizing
structures, transnational organizing structures of representation use ethnic
Conclusion
173
identity as the impetus for mobilization. These structures should not be

conceived of as competing against each other rather in many ways they
complement one another through their respective focus, membership,
territorial reach, funding resources, mandates and ideologies. They often
operate on parallel tracks, reinforcing and validating the eort of other
structures without falling victim to duplicity.
The array of constructed organizing structures of representation is
reective of the multiple and shifting shared interests of the Romani
communities. Interests can be held by individuals (proximate interests)
and held by groups (shared interests) at the same time. Unlike subjectively
held proximate interests, shared interests are intersubjectively constructed
and relate to the well-being of all group members. Only shared interests
can be articulated by an organizing structure of representation as proximate interests involve rationalist means-end calculations by individuals.
While interests help locate the needs and preferences of Roma, as a conceptual tool they illustrate how Roma are represented because Roma articulate
divergent interests in each political context. It is the interests of Roma
which are represented not the community itself. The shared interests of
Roma are multiple and shifting due to their contextual construction with
the result that they have the capacity to be articulated by a number of
organizing structures of representation (such as TANs, political parties and
NGOs) and in distinct socio-political contexts (both domestic and transnational). Interests in the domestic context do not map perfectly with those of
the transnational political context although some interests are articulated
primarily in the transnational political context such as migration, standardization of language and anti-Gypsism. The interests articulated in the
domestic political context relate primarily to access to social goods such as
education, health and employment as well as combating discrimination
though this is not to say that discrimination and societal marginalization
are not important or should not be dealt with in the transnational political
context. Access to political structures is a shared interest in its own right
but political participation is nominal in the domestic and transnational
political contexts and can be partly explained by low standards of education, poverty, as well as fragmentation and factionalism.
Analysing the domestic political context alone is not adequate in order
to determine who speaks for Roma? There is no simple straightforward
answer to this question which is reective of a number of factors including:
the relative substandard socio-economic position vis--vis the majority
of society; their shared experience of persecution, marginalization and
discrimination; the absence of a bounded, internally homogeneous ethnic
174
group identity; and a dispersed population. Taken together, these factors

stie the voice of Roma and restrict their capacity to articulate their shared
interests. Signicantly, the articulation of interests through these organizing structures of representation in the domestic and transnational political
contexts contest dominant narratives and norms constructed by gaje. The
expression of interests through giving voice becomes part of the political
discourse and is informed by political processes and interactions involving
a multitude of actors and institutions. Furthermore these organizing structures of representation do not represent the Roma constituency per se but
represent the interests of this community which are shifting and multiple.
However to speak for or to give voice to Roma does not tell us enough
about the various organizing structures of representation, because legitimacy is essential in order for a structure to be seen as authoritative and
valid.
The transnational political context has provided Roma with a receptive
environment in which to articulate their interests. The Roma social movement has increased its activity in the transnational political context since
the early 1990s by creating transnational organizing structures of representation, lobbying and networking in international organizations, and
targeting domestic governments which fail to uphold democratic values
and international standards on minority protection. Transnational organizing structures of representation demonstrate that ethnicity is not as
crucial for legitimacy as it is in the domestic political context, as these
structures rely on sharing values and giving voice. These transnational
organizing structures of representation do not justify their representativity
in terms of democratic processes, or public accountability; they instead
emphasize specic values, group identity and shared interests. Accumulatively they give voice to the Romani community by establishing a political
platform which governments and international organizations increasingly
take seriously. Civil society tends to function more eectively in localized
settings so when transnational organizing structures of representation are
created there is a disconnect between these institutions and the constituencies which they claim to represent, that is, there is modest societal interaction
therefore the construction of legitimacy is hindered. In many respects it is
not possible to determine who speaks for Roma because representation
is necessarily complex and intangible. In modern democratic polities we
increasingly nd the participation of actors who are un-elected, and this is
particularly true of communities such as Roma who lack the opportunity,
resources and capacity to be democratically elected. Institutions are the
Conclusion
175
preserve of gaje thus Roma are learning the gaje world of political representation, from elaborating Roma nationalism and a sense of solidarity
to create formal organizations. In the process, Roma social movement
actors must learn the rules of the game to challenge dominant narratives
and rearm their identity in European society.
Notes
1. Romani was recognized by the Council of Europes (1992) Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages. Numerous dialects are found across the continent and many Roma
were assimilated under communism, speaking the tongue of the host state.
2. Electronic communication with Lvia Jrka, 24 July 2009.
Glossary
Gaje
Gaje is a noun which refers collectively to all those who are non-Roma.
A gajo is an individual who is not Romani.
Gypsy
Gypsy is an exonym ascribed onto Roma and normally carries with it
negative associations. This politically incorrect term is no longer in common usage, certainly in academic discourse and in the language of elites in
the international political community, although its usage still persists across
Central and Eastern Europe and in the UK. Its etymology derives from
when Roma rst arrived in Europe and proclaimed themselves to be
from Egypt.
Roma
Roma is a noun and refers to the plurality of the members of this minority,
that is, the group as a whole. Romani refers to the language spoken by this
group and is also used as an adjective to describe an ethnic identication.
A Rom is an individual member of the Romani community (Mirga and
Gheorghe 1997, 3). Roma is an endonym which has been constructed by
Romani activists eager to foster a positive armation of Romani ethnicity.
All Roma share a history of assimilation, persecution, integration and
oppression at various points in time. While many sub-groups fall under the
aegis of Roma, it signies a political category which is heterogeneous.
Traveller
Travellers are found predominantly in the UK and Ireland, though they are
also present in sizeable numbers in North America. They can be further
176
Glossary
177
subdivided into Irish and Scottish Travellers (known as Minceir) as well as

English and Welsh Travellers (known as Romanichals). Travellers tend to
be more nomadic and their advocacy usually centres on access to halting
sites and demands for equality. In their own languages the Welsh, English,
Scottish and Irish Travellers are known respectively as, Kale, Romanichals,
Nawkens and Minceirs.
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Index
access to public goods 1634, 168
Hungary 11112
Romania 88
armative action 81n. 12, 88
Aguilera, Peter 155
Alliance of Free Democrats
(Hungary) 119
Armenian gypsy see Lom community
assimilationist policy
18th century Hungary 17
CEEC communist regimes 258,
139, 172
see also social integration
Australia
Roma migration to 15
Autonmia Foundation (Hungary)
123, 133
Aven Amentza (Romanian NGO) 98
Roma under paternalistic state

protection of 249, 1201, 139, 172
Christian Centre of Roma (Romania) 92
Cioaba, Florin 92
citizenship rights 6670
civil society organizations 345, 456,
1323, 164, 174
functions 97
Hungary 1224
Romania 97101
CoE see Council of Europe
collective action 67, 171
Olsons theory 50
Comit International Rom 278
communist regimes
Roma and 249, 1201, 139, 172
community leaders 102
Contact Point for Roma and
Sinti Issues 30, 138
Council for National Minorities
(Romania) 44
Council of Europe (CoE) 30, 138
FCNM 48, 57n. 5, 58n. 1516, 131, 147
Csibi, Magor 157
cultural autonomy 115, 130
Bahrm V, King of Persia 8

Bumbu, Gruia 93, 103
Byzantium
Catherine the Great, Tsarina of
Russia 18
CEEC see Central and Eastern European
Countries
Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC)
impact of EU accession criteria on 44,
1301, 149
Roma organizations proliferation
29, 30
Roma position post-communism
in 2932
Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015)

69, 137, 160n. 3
Declaration of the Roma Nation 143
democracy
minority protection and 48, 612
Dom community 8, 9
education
Hungary 11112, 124
Romania 856
195
196
INDEX
Egypt
claims of Roma origin from 8, 11,
19, 176
Roma migration via 1213, 18
Roma presence in 15
elections and electoral systems
legitimacy 90, 1656
political representation and 71
voting behaviour and patterns in
Hungary 11516, 121, 132, 134n. 22
voting behaviour and patterns in
Romania 967, 132
lite 3940
CEECs 29, 36
challenging issues facing 312
Hungary 11820, 128, 129, 132
politicized ethnicity 142
Romania 8993, 100, 105, 132
transnational context 159, 1667
see also gaje
employment
communist regimes 27
Hungarian NGOs Employment
Without Prejudice
programme 1234
Hungary 112
English Travellers 14
ERIO see European Roma Information
Oce
ERPC see European Roma Policy
Coalition
ERRC see European Roma Rights Centre
ERTF see European Roma and Traveller
Forum
ethnic identity 34, 45, 46, 141, 1701
discrimination and 6970, 74, 1112
minority rights and 62
political participation and 389
shared interests and 1715
ethnic mobilization 445, 79
domestic context 1012, 1246
minority protection and 645
modes of 456
notion 42
social movement and 65, 1012
state and 434
transnational context 1578
ethnogenesis 312
ethnopolitics 6, 132, 1656
Hungary 1202, 126
Romania 934, 166
EU see European Union
Europe
persecution of Roma 1520
Roma arrival in 1012
Roma population 160n. 2
European Commission 156, 169
Sta Working Paper on Roma 150
European gypsy see Roma
European Parliament 14950, 153, 169
Roma Access to Political Participation
conference 155
Roma representation in 155
European Platform for Roma
Inclusion 151
European Roma and Traveller Forum
(ERTF) 30, 41, 138, 1467, 169
legitimacy 148, 160, 167
European Roma Information Oce
(ERIO) 6, 30, 41, 138, 160
event organization in collaboration
with EU institutions 155
information dissemination 1556
Italian Roma crisis and 1567
lobbying role 156
reacting to developments in EU
1545, 1567
role 1524, 167, 168
European Romani Rights Charter 144
European Roma Policy Coalition
(ERPC) 138
European Roma Rights Centre
(ERRC) 30, 144, 145, 167, 169
European Social Fund 151
European Union (EU) 6, 30, 36
EU Strategy for Roma 154, 155
rst Roma Summit (2008) 151, 154
impact of Copenhagen criteria on
minority protection 44, 1301, 149
need for coherent Roma policy 153,
167
role in Roma development and
anti-discrimination policies 131
Roma policy 137, 14852
Index
The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged
European Union report 138, 149
Farkas, Florian 123
FCNM see Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities
FideszHungarian Civic Union 118, 120,
121, 123, 134n. 19
Firdausi 8
Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities
(FCNM) 48, 57n. 5, 58n. 1516,
131, 147
France
gaje 29
Roma representation and 93
gaje institutions 30, 41, 158
legitimacy 167
see also individual organizations,
e.g., European Roma Rights Centre
(ERRC)
Germany
extermination of Roma during Nazi
regime 204
ghettos 87, 111
Gitanos 18
Grellman, Heinrich 19
gypsy see Roma
Gypsy Lore Society 19
Hamza 8
Himmler, Heinrich 22
history of Roma 45
arrival in Europe 1012
geographic diusion 1415
Indic origin 78, 13, 19
migration from India 810
Hitler, Adolf 22
the Holocaust see O Baro Porrajmos
Horvth, Aladr 11920, 127, 132,
133n. 20
housing conditions and facilities
Hungary 111
Romania 867
197
human rights 47, 61, 154

Hungary 56, 38
access to public goods 11113
assimilationist policy of
Maria Theresa 17
constitutional provision for minority
protection and representation 44,
109, 11617, 122
discrimination 11112, 1312
ethnic mobilization 1246
interest articulation 1234, 1278
legitimate representation 1289, 132
Medium-Term Measures (2004) 11011
minority protection 115, 130
political aliation 1201
political participation in a cultural
institution 11418, 1267, 130
racist attacks 11314, 132, 134n. 12
Roma Integration Decade Programme
Strategy Plan (20072015) 111
Roma population 109, 133n. 3
status raising strategies of
NGOs 1234
voter registration 11516
ICCPR see International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights
identity
interests and 36, 423, 77, 127
linguistic component of 114
of minority groups 63
minority rights and 634
social movement and 512, 141
socio-economic position and 85
see also ethnic identity
Impreuna (Romanian NGO) 98, 101, 133
political leadership training 99100
India
Romas migration from 810
Romas origin 78, 13, 19
input legitimacy 54, 56, 128
intelligentsia 86, 878, 112, 124, 133
see also elite
interest(s) 5, 356, 37, 59, 778, 80,
16342
Hungarian legal recognition 109
identity and 36, 423, 77, 127
198
INDEX
interest(s) (Contd)
international organizations and 1378
representation of 725
rights vs. 758
signicance of 60
transnational 142
see also shared interests
interest articulation 36, 57n. 3, 801
domestic context 91, 1034, 1234,
1278, 1734
political participation and 76, 78
transnational context 1589, 1745
International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 25 47
international law
on political participation 47, 58n. 15
international organizations 168
Roma rights and 1378
Roma voice 138
see also transnational organizing
International Romani Union (IRU) 41,
138, 143, 147, 1689
consultative status to ECOSOC 160n. 4
Irish Travellers 13, 14
in southern states of US 15
IRU see International Romani Union
Italy
Roma crisis 150, 1567
Jrka, Lvia 155
Kolompr, Orbn 119, 123, 132, 133n. 20
Lalleri community 22
language
Roma identity and 114
as tool to trace migratory route 8
leaders and leadership
bulibaa/traditional leaders 534,
92, 165
community leaders 102
importance 43
legitimacy 534
Romanian NGOs political leadership
training programme 99100
legislation
Bill T/9126 (Hungary) 116
Law 21/1924 (Romania) 98
Law 48/2002 (Romania) 88
Law on National Minorities
(Romania) 83
Nuremberg Laws (Germany) 21
On the Rights o National and Ethnic
Minorities (Hungary) 44, 114, 115,
117
notion and types 53
legitimate representation 3, 32, 36, 39,
525, 81
criterion for 557
decentralization and 40, 1056, 129,
1658
domestic context 912, 97101,
1045, 1289
ethnic mobilization and 467
transnational context 1478, 15960,
1667
Lom community 8, 10
Lukacs, Mihaly 123
Lungo Drom (Hungarian political
NGO) 123, 126
macrosociological approach 50, 512
Magyar Garda (Hungarian political
organization) 113, 132, 155
Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria 17
Martin V, Pope 11
MCF Roma Union (Hungarian political
NGO) 123, 126
medical care 111
MG-S-ROM 30, 138
migration of Roma 810
Minceir 14
Minorities Act of 1993 (Hungary) 44,
114, 115, 117
minority groups
demands for recognition 65, 66
notion 64
minority rights 5, 367, 47
ambiguity of 64
communitarian approaches 656
Hungary and Romania
compared 1303
Index
impact of EUs accession criteria on
protection of 44, 1301
vs. interests 758
vs. justice conception of minority
protection 636
liberal democracy and 48
notion 64
rationalization 612
states approaches 130
see also rights-based approaches
minority self-government system of
Hungary 11415, 1267, 131, 133
ethnopolitics and 1212
legitimacy 129
local level 116, 117
national level 116, 117
shortcomings 11517
Mohcsi, Viktria 155, 157
Moraes, Claude 157
moral rights 5960
MSzP (Hungarian Socialist Party) 120,
121, 123
NAR see National Agency for Roma
(Romania)
National Agency for Roma (NAR)
(Romania) 93, 99, 132
National Council for Combating
Discrimination (NCCD)
(Romania) 88, 131
national minority organizations,
Romanian
legal status and formulation 934, 97
see also non-governmental
organizations (NGO), Romanian
National Roma Self-Government
(Hungary) 117, 119
National Strategy for the Improvement
in the Situation of Roma
(Romania) 85, 86, 99, 131, 168
guiding principles 1034
NCCD see National Council for
Combating Discrimination
(Romania)
negative rights 60
NGO see non-governmental
organizations
nomenclature of Roma 89, 31
199
non-governmental organizations
(NGO) 72
funding 133, 145
international 41
legitimacy 556, 166
proliferation 30
non-governmental organizations (NGO),
Hungarian 125
legitimacy 124, 129
proliferation 122
status raising strategies 1234
non-governmental organizations (NGO),
Romanian 101
criticism of governments housing
policy 87
local level 98, 99
national level 989, 1023
political character and
legitimacy 934, 97101, 104, 105
proliferation 98
Roma representation and 947
O Baro Porrajmos 204
On the Rights of National and Ethnic
Minorities (Hungary) see
Minorities Act of 1993 (Hungary)
Open Society Institute (OSI) 30, 41,
69, 144
Open Society Institute-Roma
Participation Programme
(OSI-RPP) 1456, 167, 169
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
30, 138
Lund Recommendations 131
organizing structures of
representation 34, 56, 30, 31, 51,
13940
CEECs 29
Hungary 1245
proliferation 37, 1723
Romania 100
Western Romani advocacy 278
see also specic structures, e.g., elite;
transnational organizing structures
of representation
OSCE see Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
200
INDEX
OSI see Open Society Institute

OSI-RPP see Open Society InstituteRoma Participation Programme
output legitimacy 54, 55
papal and imperial safe-conducts 1112
parliamentary representation 34
European Parliament 155
Hungarian NGOs 123
Hungary 11617, 11819
Romania 71, 91, 92, 1056, 133
Romanian NGOs 94, 967, 1023
Pun, Nicolae 90, 92, 102, 105,
107n. 23, 132
Persia
Roma migration to 8
Persian gypsy see Dom community
Pius V, Pope 18
pluralism
lack in Romanian ethnic politics 947
Poland
Roma in 17
political decentralization 104
legitimate representation and 40,
1056, 129, 1658
self-government and 126
political mobilization
notion 412
political participation 5, 36
democratic state and 489
domestic context 878, 99101,
1023, 1267
ethnic identity and 389
interest articulation and 76, 78
international law on 47, 58n. 15
notion 57n. 2, 7980
right to 60
Roma Access to Political Participation
conference 155
ways to increase 345
political parties
Roma representation and 71, 91,
967, 100
and Roma vote bank in
Hungary 1201
Romanian NGOs and 97
political representation
disproportionateness 62, 79
elections and 90
enhancement in Hungary 44
enhancement in Romania 44
IRU and 143
notion 57n. 1, 70
pursuit of 702
Romania 87
under communist regimes 278
political representative(s)
denition and notion 8990
Romani representative 701, 902
Portugal
Roma in 18
positive rights 60
preferential treatment 33, 612, 72,
81n. 1, 88, 130
process rights 64
proximate interests 74, 77, 171
public health care 86
racial discrimination 149
ethnic identity and 6970, 74, 112
Hungarian context 1312
Hungarian educational sector 112
Hungarian medical care 111
legislative intervention in Romania 88
Roma issues and 6970
see also European Roma Rights Centre
(ERRC)
racist attacks
Hungary 11314, 132, 134n. 12
Racz, Istvan 123
Rducanu, Gheorghe 90
representation 35, 39, 1634
impact of actors of representation
on 39
legitimacy and 467, 567
notion 734
of people vs. interests 724
see also legitimate representation
resource mobilization 501
rights
citizenship 6670
of minorities see minority rights
moral 5960
negative 60
Index
notion 64
positive 60
process 64
rights-based theories 57, 5961, 172
Ritter, Robert 212
RNC see Roma National Congress
Roma 13, 163
historical overview 45, 710
indierence towards public and
political life 103
as natives 68
as pilgrims and penitents 1112
reclamation of nomenclature 31
as social problem 26, 689, 84, 138, 150
sub-groups in Hungary 114, 121
Travellers and 1215
Roma Civil Rights Foundation
(Hungary) 11920
Roma Integration Decade Programme
Strategy Plan (20072015)
(Hungary) 111
Roma National Congress (RNC) 28, 41,
1434, 147, 1689
critique of elitism 167
Roma nationalism 43, 1412
Romania 5, 38, 834, 130
access to public goods 859
constitutional provision for Romani
political representation 71, 92,
1056, 106n. 4
ethnic mobilization 1012
interest articulation 91, 1034
legitimate representation 1045, 132
localized legitimacy 912, 97101
political participation 878
political participation and
NGOs 99101, 1023
political representation 903
political representation
enhancement 44
Roma population 96, 106n. 3
supremacy of RPPE 947, 166
Romanichals 14
Romani CRISS 989, 101, 103
romanticization of Roma 1920, 69
Roma Party (Partida Romilor)
(Romania) 91
201
Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE)

(Romania) 44, 92, 100, 105
monopolization over Roma
representation 947, 166
Roma Situation in an Enlarged Europe
report 138
Romaversitas (Hungarian NGO) 124
Rousseau, Jean Jacques 69
RPPE see Roma Party Pro-Europe
(Romania)
Russia
Roma in 18
Scottish Travellers 14
shared interests 77, 84, 103, 104, 121,
169, 173
ethnic identity and 1715
Hungary 11014, 131
political participation and 78
Romania 849, 103, 131
transnational 1467
see also interest(s)
Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor 11
Sinti community 22, 28, 144
The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged
Europe Union 138, 149
slavery of Roma 1617, 18
Social Democrat Party (Romania) 91
Roma anity 967, 132
Social Democrat Roma Party
(Romania) 91
see also Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE)
social inclusion 68
programmes in Romania 867
social integration 25, 689, 150
Hungary 111, 131
see also assimilationist policy
social movement 312, 35, 456, 4952
factionalism and fragmentation in
Romania 956, 99, 101
identity and 512, 101, 141
notion 50
organizing structures of representation
and 1723
transnational dimension 170
social utility 1034
202
INDEX
Soros Foundation 35
Spain
stalactite mobilization 55
stalagmite mobilization 4, 49, 55, 128,
138, 139, 145, 1678
state
approaches to minorities 130
primary obligation of equal rights 72
rights-based approaches and 57, 601,
62, 63
sterilization 111, 133n. 5
Syrian gypsy see Dom community
Tinkers 13, 14
transnational advocacy networks 6, 41,
136, 1446, 160, 169
criticism of 148
transnational minority 6, 13740, 163, 170
transnational organizing structures of
representation 30, 401, 1367,
1389
interest articulation and 1589
legitimacy 523, 56, 1478, 15960,
1667
political participation 158

proliferation 40, 83, 129, 164, 16870
relevance 137
Roma voice and 140, 146, 160
see also international organizations
Travellers 1215, 146, 169
Tully, J. 54
ultimate interests 74, 77
see also shared interests
UN see United Nations
United Nations (UN) 30
US Holocaust Memorial Council 24
Varga, Jozsef 123
Vlax-speaking Roma 14
Voicu, Mdlin 90, 91, 92, 97, 102
Weber, R. 52, 53
Welsh Travellers 14
Wolf, Sigmund 21
Working Group of Roma Association
(Romania) 85, 99
World Bank 69
World Romani Congress 278, 143
see also International Romani Union
(IRU)

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Who Speaks for Roma?

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Who Speaks for Roma?

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CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ROMA IN EUROPE 7

CHAPTER 3 AMBIVALENT DISCOURSE: RIGHTS-BASED

Minority Rights: Analytical and Cultural Presuppositives

CHAPTER 6 ROMA REPRESENTATION IN THE

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 2.2 The political participation of Roma in the

Table 4.1 Key features of organizing structures of

Table 5.1 Key features of organizing structures of

Centre for Documentation and Information on

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

perceived dierence is too simplistic. For this reason, I focused on one

involve prescriptive analysis and attempts to solve the Roma issue.

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

and gaje (non-Roma) lite is acknowledged but ultimately downplayed as

communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 2 introduces the

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

to be legitimate representatives of Roma are assessed in turn. It is asked

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Roma and Travellers

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

authenticated record of their presence in England was in Lambeth in 1514

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

Travellers, Hungarian-Slovak, Ludar, Boyash, Lovara and Sinti. Many Roma

Persecution and Romanticism

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

agricultural practices and was matched by changing social values, thus

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

were repealed resulting in the ourishing of Romani communities. The

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

developments, widespread societal prejudice towards Roma persisted but

O Baro Porrajmos: The Holocaust

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Roma under Communism

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Secretariat, Comit International Rom, founded in 1967 linked Romani

Post-communism: Romani Awakening

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

groups on the basis of a revised perception of their identity. The Roma

WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

Political Participation and Representation of Roma