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Organizational
Analysis
Acknowledgements
The material presented in this textbook consists of lecture notes that agglomerated into
their present form after nearly a decade of teaching organizational analysis at Stanford University. If there are positive features of the text and the course, then we think it fair to attribute such accolades to the scholars we heavily draw upon. In particular, the theoretical
work of Dick Scott, Graham Allison, Herbert Simon, James G. March, John Kingdon, John
Seely Brown, Paul Duguid, Joanne Martin, Deborah Meyerson, Gideon Kunda, Jerey Pfeffer, Gerry Salancik, John Padgett, Mark Granovetter, Paul Dimaggio, Woody Powell, Arthur
Stinchcombe, Michael Hannan, John Freeman and Glenn Carroll (and many more!) have all
been an inspiration to us and we have relied heavily on their work and its insights. We encourage all the readers of this text to go out and study these authors primary works and to
take their classes wherever and whenever possible.
DM and CG
September 2013.
Copyright Notice
The authors have made a concerted eort to ensure all appropriate attributions have
been made and copyright clearances obtained prior to publication of this work. If you find
any errors and copyright concerns please contact the lead author. We will make special
eorts to correct errors and address concerns as quickly as possible. Similarly, if you
have any comments, or would like to request permission to use this work or a part of it,
please contact the lead author (mcfarland@stanford.edu). And thank you for your interest
in Organizational Analysis!
Front Cover Source http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2/23/Hong_Kong_Skyline_Restitch_-_Dec_2007.jp
g
ii
Table of Contents
!
!
1
Introduction to
Organizational Analysis
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Skyscrapers_of_Shinjuku_2_7_Desember_2003.jpg
Organizational Analysis
In this introductory chapter, you will be introduced
to the concept of an organization. In so doing, it
will become clear that organizations are everywhere and come in many different forms. Their
ubiquity means that many pressing social problems are organizational in nature. Their variability
and complexity require study. And this is why we
need courses on organizations all so we develop
a better understanding of the world we live in and
how to better manage it.
What Is and Is Not an Organization?
Let us begin with our preconceptions and understandings. What is an organization? What is
not an organization? When most of us consider
organizations, we think of hospitals, schools, businesses, stores, companies and factories. But what
about families, various voluntary associations, and
even street gangs? What qualities make something an organization or not?
One of the best writers on organizations has
been Richard Scott, whose work we will draw on
heavily from time to time. Scott defines organizations this way: Organizations are conceived as social structures created by individuals to support the
collaborative pursuit of specified goals (Scott
2003: 11). There is a lot packed in here, so lets
simplify it some. What Scott means is that organizations are groups whose members coordinate
their behavior in order to accomplish shared goals
or to put out a product. Given this, lets reconsider
what is and is not an organization.
At some point, we encounter cases that are
unclear. Some features of the definition may be
lacking, while other features may be present. Take
for example, a social movement. Many social
movements have specified goals, but the social
structure - or pattern by which participants associate - is emergent and can change dramatically
from one event to the next. As we reach ambiguous cases like these, the key features defining an
organization grow unclear they are less of a
group, involve less coordination, and /or are less
goal-oriented. And then in cases that are not organizations, we see all these features no longer apply.
Examples
Organizations
Not
Organizations
Ambiguous
Cases
Qualities
Companies,
schools,
Roles, rules, goals,
families and recurring behaviors,
voluntary
clear boundaries.
associations
Random
collections
of persons,
isolated
individuals
Street
gangs,
friendship
groups,
social
movements
No roles, rules,
goals, pattern of
recurrence, or
boundary.
Varieties of Organizations
subcontracting has grown; and so forth. The organizational world we live in is changing right
underneath us.
Organizational Problems and Reform
To this point I have presented a working definition of organizations and explained just how
common they are. Now I want to sell you on why
organizations matter: learning about organizations,
reflecting on how they operate, and considering a
variety of means by which they can be managed is
an important skill most everyone today should develop. We live in an organizational society, and
many of the problems we confront are organizational in nature. We need to better understand and
manage organizations if we are to evolve as a society.
This course attempts to provide you with
such training. It is an introductory course on organizations that helps you grapple with the complexity of institutional life. The course focuses on
actual cases of non-profits, educational institutions, government agencies, private firms and the
policies aimed at changing them. The course material is designed for advanced undergraduates, masters students, and PhDs interested in organizations.
So lets cut to the chase what is the utility
of this course to managers, policymakers and analysts? Why should you care? Organizations are
everywhere! You cannot change society or understand much of it without knowing something about
organizations and how they work. Unfortunately,
the social reality of organizational life is pretty
messy and complex. Therefore, we need conceptual frameworks to help us make sense of it. For
example, what should you pay attention to? What
matters? What does not? Where do you begin if
you want to study and change them? This course
Features of Organizations
We will now identify some core analytic features
of organizations. These analytic features give us a
language or terminology we can use to make sense
of firms, their various forms, and their prevailing
problems.
Elements of an Organization
EN
VI
RO
NM
EN
T)
EN
VIR
ORGANIZATION)
ON
ME
NT
)
Social Structure
Social)Structures)
Technology)
Goals)
VI
EN
Par6cipants)
RO
T)
EN
NM
M
ON
R
I
V
EN
T)
EN
Social structures are more than recurring behavioral patterns they are also cultural systems
that entail normative principles and cognitive beliefs (Scott 1995). In fact, these cultural aspects of
social structure often guide behavioral patterns.
For example, adults in classrooms often follow
norms and ideals concerning how a teacher or manager should interact with others. That is, we have
a sense of better and worse role-performances, and
organizations tend to reward performance that
most coincide with the ideal.
Social structure can run even deeper and reflect cultural cognitive beliefs and understandings.
For example, we find it hard to imagine schools
without teachers and students, and this belief is distinct from our sense of better or worse ways to perform those roles. The belief that every school has
to have those roles is a deeply ingrained belief.
The belief may invoke particular behavioral norms
of teaching (say traditional or progressive), and in
turn, this may partly shape the behavioral patterns
witnessed in an organization like a school. But it
need not do so perfectly. Other social structures
are at play like those of gender roles, class differences, peer cultures, etc., and they can cloud the
clean appearance of prescribed forms of behav-
(Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:5/54/Citiipblogo.gif)
Technology
Last is the Environment: the physical, technological, cultural and social context in which an organization is embedded. For example, what is the environment a school confronts? Schools are often dependent on state and city governments for resources and funds, they rely on trained workers
and teachers from local universities, they depend
on the neighborhood they are situated in for clients
and student populations, etc.
Environments can vary culturally in the
sense that Euro-Disney initially did not work because an American version of Disneyland could
not just be plopped down in Europe without some
changes. Environments can vary technologically
such as having an office in Silicon Valley where
everything is wired for internet access and videoconferencing, in comparison to say my parents
home where they are still figuring out a compact
disc player. Physical environments also matter
consider for a second something as basic as your
firms location in a cold region versus a hot dessert. Very different pressures emerge because of
these distinctive physical environments.
Elements
Description
Actors / Participants Organizational participants that make
contributions to and derive benefits from the
organization.
Social Structure
Persistent relations existing among
participants in an organization.
Goals
Desired ends that participants attempt to
achieve through the performance of task
activities.
Technology / Tasks Means by which organizations accomplish
work or render inputs into outputs.
Environment
The physical, technological, cultural, and
social context in which an organization is
embedded.
Environment Linkages
All the organizational elements tend to have various relationships with one another. While we
only list the interrelations with environment, it is
feasible to consider the linkages between goals
and participants, such as how goals can lead participants to self-select into a firm, and for it to
form a company reputation and identity. In effect, with each case, one can find that these features of organizations form a system of interdependence. By identifying that system, the analyst acquires a deeper understanding for form
functioning, behavior and management.
Degree of Ambiguity
These abstract elements are seldom clean, simple features in real world cases, however. In
fact, ambiguity is more often the reality we confront. For example, schools are often described
as having uncertain technologies for accomplishing technical and moral socialization. We
have courses or course labels, but its far from
clear that particular tasks and lessons lead to certain desired outcomes and which do so more effectively over others. Also, we have ambiguous
indicators of accomplishing said goals e.g., do
we use achievement tests or citizen tests? Are
these tests biased and inaccurate? Furthermore,
participants can belong to multiple organizations, so the question becomes which organization most influences them. Children spend most
of their day in school, so it is a relatively contained environment in comparison with other organizations. Nonetheless, children bring with
them all sorts of baggage and experiences from
elsewhere (family), and these can influence their
behavior in school.
How Can All of These Elements Work Together
as a System?
Fortunately, Richard Scotts review of organizational research not only identifies organizational
elements, but it also describes how theories in
different eras focused on certain organizational
elements over others and characterized their in-
terrelation in certain patterns (Scott 2003: 2630). In short, he recognized three classes of organizational theory.
The earliest class of theories regarded organizations as rational systems Here, the theories characterized an organization as a collectivity oriented toward the pursuit of specific goals
and whose behavior exhibits a formalized structure. These theories tended to focus on the administrative units of organizations and their process of rational decision-making.
An ensuing class of organizational theories
characterized organizations as natural systems
here, the theories related an organization as collectivities whose participants pursue multiple interests, forged in conflict and consensus, but
who recognize the value of perpetuating the organization as an important resource (they want
to survive). In a natural system, it is the unplanned, emergent relations and coalitions
which matter: the informal structure of relations
that develops among participations is more influential in guiding behavior than the formal structures role expectations and guiding principles.
This class of theories regarded an organization
as an adaptive organism.
Most recently, organizational theories have
come to characterize organizations as open systems here, organizations are congeries of interdependent flows and activities linking shifting
coalitions of participants embedded in wider
material-resource and institutional environments. This class of theory focuses more on the
environment than any other organizational feature.
Now one could argue that these theories
reflect the organizations of their day. But I am
not sure that is the case. Most organizations still
entail all these features and the processes that rational, natural and open system perspectives entail. Another view might be that organizational
theories expanded their focus as our understanding of firms and instrumental social groups
grew. All these features were likely there, and
perhaps shifted some in salience, but to this day
rational, natural, and open system qualities persist in many organizations.
Rational
Single organization, or
administrative unit
(organization as unitary
actor)
Natural
Open
Single organization
Multiple organizations
w/multiple actors and
(organizational field)
divisions (organization as
coalition)
Actors /
Participants
Leaders, organization
(admin unit)
Social
Structure
Goals
Specific missions /
objectives
Multiple, conflicting
goals
Survival / legitimacy in
environment
Technology /
Tasks
Environment
Ignored
Major role
Primary Unit
of Analysis
Organizing
Concepts
Minor role
School Character
Metz reports that teachers focused their attention on their work with students. Their energy was
directed toward planning and teaching, running
lots of extra-curricular activities, and so on.
Rather than speak of students in terms of IGE,
they spoke of them in terms of their relationships
with the students. The school was notable in that
potentially volatile relations were not evident, and
instead positive relations persisted between the faculty, parents, and students. There were exceptions
that suggested a harder past (in years 1-2), but the
school was mostly in harmony by year 3.
Classes were heterogeneous in composition,
but as stated earlier, they were internally divided
into groups on the basis of skills development with
relation to each learning objective. Lower skill
groups had more African Americans, but they remained relatively heterogeneous and the interactions between students and teacher with students
were task-oriented and respectful for the most part.
Students themselves reported having interracial
friends and seemed open to heterogenous relationships.
There was a general absence of conflict at
Adams Avenue. Discipline was often a simple matter. Faculty issued yellow cards as warnings, and
then formal referrals to administrators for discipline which was noted in the childs record. Metz
reports that these yellow cards were issued less
than two times a day for all 300 children over the
course of the year, and suspensions totaled less
than 1 out of 10 kids. Disciplinary problems were
more common than these formal indicators suggest, but they were handled informally (and this in
turn reinforced positive relations).
If there was any conflict it was likely between the principal and some teachers. This conflict goes back to the end of year 1 when some
teachers did not strike with the rest (and sided with
the principal). The union leaders were especially
bitter over this.
The program in practice
The IGE curriculum removed grade-level differentiation from view. Instructional differentiation
was rendered more individualized, and it removed
both the stigma placed on a student performing at
4th or 5th grade level and enabled accelerated students to work at a level beyond grade level. All
that matters was forward movement for every kid,
not where they were moving forward from.
12
units enabled the teachers to know students individually and have a healthy rapport with one another.
Faculty culture and school ethos
Physical space
13
Organizational
Elements in Adams
Avenue School
14
References
Teacher resistance
15
2
Decision-Making in
Organizations
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:EXCOMM_meeting%2C_Cuban_Missile_Crisis%2C_29_October_1962.jpg
Decision-Making in Organizations
In this chapter, I will present a general introduction and discussion to decision-making in organizations. In the lecture, I will relate various rational system views of organizations that tend to
focus on administrative units, or leaders of organizations. A simple example of organizational decisions can be found in the following figure showing
a decision tree. The choice is whether to upload a
picture or not onto my Coursera course. A variety
of criteria apply and help us decide. Fortunately,
this particular image of a decision tree was taken
off Creative Commons, and freely viewed, so we
are okay. Nonetheless, it gives you an initial sense
of what we mean by decision-making.
Logic of Consequences - Rational Choice Theory
17
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310&
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+8&
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)&
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McFarland&Lectures&
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18
Dont&Ask&Out&
Ask&Out&
No#(90%)#
Yes#(10%)#
Net#Expected#U4lity#
+2&
.8&
(2*0.9)&&(8*0.1)&=&1&
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Ambiguity)or)uncertainty)
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about)consequences)and)costs?))
EU=&.9.0&
19
By contrast, if we actually ask attractive people out, then given the probability that they will
say no and that we would be mortified, we have an
unexpected utility of negative eight. That's pretty
severe, so of course we just avoid the whole effort
altogether.
Thus far, we have related two simple examples of decision trees. You can extend this to organizations, their types of decisions, and their
kinds of options. For example, if a company does
X, then a competitor or client has a probability of
reacting in a certain way. Later, the Cuban Missile
Crisis will be discussed as an example of this. In
that case there are clear choices, potential consequences, and preferences affixed to each one.
That will bring this closer to a real world organizational case.
In all these cases there is clearly a ton of ambiguity. Weather reports are not that accurate,
plus, we really have little evidence to go on in deciding if someone might be receptive to being
asked out or not. Thus far, the rational actor
model is an idealized model that assumes herculean abilities of decision makers. In reality, most
of us are boundedly rational.
So what would a bounded rationality model
look like? Whats the choice process there? There
an actor is uncertain about consequences and
costs. Moreover, the ordering of preferences is not
so clear. To depict this, Herbert Simon related a
theory of satisficing as a potential alternative, one
that may offer a more accurate description of how
we usually make decisions as boundedly rational
persons. Instead of calculating all the alternatives
(would we ever really ask out everyone in a
room?), we start with one that is most near us e.g., not bringing an umbrella or not asking someone out like we always do - and then we see if that
option has a satisfactory consequence.
In most instances of satisficing behavior, we
think about a choice threshold, and we stop somewhere along our sequential search of options when
we find a choice that is good enough. But if we
do not meet our threshold, then we move on to the
next option down the list. So search is stimulated
by a failure to achieve a goal and it continues ex-
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McFarland)Lectures)
Logic of Appropriateness
So far, we have discussed the logic of consequence, or rational actor models. But there is a second class of models, or a second class of decision
making, that March relates. He calls it the logic
of appropriateness. Most of the time in organizations, people follow rules even if it is not obviously in their self-interest to do so. For example,
when we follow orders in war and march to our
20
Let's take a moment to think about what this involves. Three factors are involved in the sort of
rule following that characterizes the logic of appropriateness.
(1) Situations are classified into categories associated with rules and identities (roles).
What kind of problem is it? Who usually
addresses it? How has it been addressed
in the past?
(2) Decision-makers have official identities
and roles that are evoked in particular
situations. Who usually addresses this
kind of stuff? Who's the appropriate person?
(3) Decision makers match rules to what they
see as appropriate to their role in the classified situation. They match rules and
identities to kinds of situations. They
say this is an x situation for y people to
manage.
One notices rule-following and the logic of appropriateness being used in organizational decisions whenever people follow traditions (path dependence), hunches, cultural norms, advice of others, pre-existent rules or standard procedures, and
heuristics (like rules of thumb). Decision-making
via rules can be as ambiguous as decision making
by means-end calculation. However, the ambiguity here does not concern consequences and preferences, but rather a lack of clarity and ambiguity in
agreements, experience, imitation, and change. In
addition, rule-following is a less conscious form of
decision-making than means-end rational calculation. Rule-following behavior is intentional behavior, but the type of inference being performed is
frequently implicit and taken-for-granted. It is intended action we do not reflect deeply upon.
When ambiguous, the rule-following process is
less about finding a desired outcome than making
sense of situations and discerning what rules apply
and why (e.g., sense-making and meaningmaking). The primary product of decision-making
may be less the decision outcome, than the decision process establishing social meanings and the
identities of participants. So one can say here, the
decision process or theory explaining organizational dynamics suggests they do not necessarily
arise for reasons of improving consequences but
for engaging in a meaningful process. This process will be most evident in 4th-6th chapters of this
textbook when we discuss processes of organized
anarchy, organizational learning, and organizational culture.
March also alludes to the fact that both the
logic of consequence and appropriateness get further complicated when one considers that most organizations are composed of multiple actors with
inconsistent and often conflicting preferences /
identities. Here the theory of coalitions comes
into play as does the negotiation and bargaining
process (This will be akin to Graham Allisons
Bureaucratic Politics Model and reviewed in the
next chapter). March suggests that a two-stage decision model is often inaccurately depicted: stage
1 is the process of bargaining and coming to consensus; and stage 2 is the decision when understandings are executed. Unfortunately, these two
stages are seldom discrete. There are many compounding decision moments and consensus waxes
and wanes. The setup of a system and its implementation are intertwined. Hence, the world of alliances is not one of precision and formality, but
one of informal, loose understandings and expectations.
Last, in his reference to temporal orderings,
March evokes the theory of Organized Anarchy
(Garbage Can Theory), which is the depiction of
decision making from a fully dynamic perspective.
Here we are just remarking on these theories in
21
passing decision in coalitions and organized anarchies but please note them, as we will come back
to them over the next few chapters.
Figure. U2 Planes
(Source http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U2_Image_of_Cuban_Missile_Crisis.jpg)
22
to sea, because Kennedy and his Naval commanders were worried about mistakes, and boarding any
craft that might trigger a nuclear war. Tensions
were pretty high at this point, and Kennedy raised
military readiness to DEFCON two on the 25h.
On the 26th EX-COMM received a letter
from Khrushchev proposing the removal of Soviet
missiles and personnel if the US could guarantee
they would not invade Cuba. On October 27 a U2 was shot down over Cuba and EX-COMM received a second letter from Khrushchev demanding the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles in Cuba. At this point
the Trollope ploy was done where the United
States responded to the first letter accepting the
conditions and both sides largely agreed. It is
kind of an interesting ploy and an effort to get an
advantage in a compromise situation.
Tensions eased on October 28 when Khrushchev publicly announced he would dismantle the
installations and return the missiles to the Soviet
Union, expressing his trust that the United States
would not invade Cuba. Further negotiations
arose to implement the October 28 agreement and
the US secretly removed missiles from Turkey.
at_Cuban_Missile_Crisis_1962.jpg)
The Cuban Missile Crisis is a case of an international crisis that almost led to war, and is describes the kinds of actions that occurred during
this conflict. Graham Allison does this interesting
thing which is very emblematic of the this courses
ambition in teaching you to apply multiple theories to the same phenomenon, and acquiring very
different perspectives of it. In so doing, he comes
to a deeper understanding of what happened that
informs policy experts and persons in such crises.
Allison presents three models that he thought
were the most useful, prevailing models at the
time: (1) the rational actor model (i.e., logic of consequence model), (2) the organizational process
model (i.e., logic of appropriateness model), and
(3) the coalition model (multiple actors with inconsistent preferences).
On October 22, Kennedy announced the discovery of the missile installations to the public and
his decision to quarantine the island. He also proclaimed that any nuclear missile launched from
Cuba would be regarded as an attack on the United
States by the Soviet Union and demanded that the
Soviets remove all of their offensive weapons
from Cuba. Once the crisis was public, tensions
grew. Kennedy ordered low-level reconnaissance
missions once every two hours. On October 23,
Khrushchev wrote Kennedy stating that the quarantine constituted an act of aggression, propelling humankind into the abyss of a world nuclear missile
war. On the twenty-fourth, Russian vessels turned
away from the blockade so, they saw eyeball to
eyeball, as Dean Rusk said. And then on the
twenty-fifth, the blockade was pulled out further
23
a cost here -- The Soviets outflank the early warning system, they reverse the United States advantage of power at time, America loses credibility in
Europe, and so on. Second, we have another option which is, we can make a diplomatic response.
And the cost here is that the UN veto is probable
because the Soviets hold a seat. Time matters, and
the missiles are already deployed, so we cannot
really wait. A third option is that we approach Castro. And, the cost here is that the Soviets are in
control of the missiles in Cuba, so Castro's influence is somewhat moot it seems. The fourth option is to invade, and the costs here are that the Soviets could parallel with an invasion in Berlin, or a
retaliatory strike is possible with nuclear weapons.
A fifth option is an airstrike, and here the cost is
the probability of knocking out all the nuclear
weapons is only 90 percent since they are spread
out all over the island. Moreover, retaliation is, is
highly likely and a massive strike would be
needed to make that option succeed. So there's big
risk there. The sixth option is a blockade. The
cost of the blockade is that they could retaliate
with a blockade of Berlin. The benefits are that
you get extra time, and Khrushchev has time to
think and consider that a nuclear holocaust is possible. And last, a naval engagement in the Carib-
The Paradigm
Model 1
National government
Identified state
Personified state
Dominant Inference
Pattern
General Propositions
!
24
Model 2
National Government
Leaders!
Basic Unit of
Analysis
Organizing
Concepts
B!
C!
D!
E!
F!
A!
25
to organizational parochialism where each organizations conducts its affairs according to its own interests and defines success by whether they meet
those objectives. To accomplish objectives, organizations rely on standard operating procedures
(SOP), which means they have built in routines
they tend to train with and follow repeatedly, and
they get good at them. Larger programs are then
clusters or repertoires of SOP (e.g., fighting entails
multiple SOPs). Organizations attempt to reduce
uncertainty by ignoring details, having regularized
contact, and conventionalized means of processing
information. However, this all leads to distorted
information. Organizations also perform problemdirected searches, whereby each search is guided
by available and familiar organizational routines.
Coordination and control across different organizations and their SOP clusters is always an issue
(e.g., how do you get the Air Force and Navy to
coordinate their activity?). Executives merely call
into play different organizations and their SOPs.
Let me give an example: It took a long time
for the report on sighted nuclear missiles to reach
to president. This information was lost in tons of
inaccurate information, and the transfer of the actual message took a long time because it followed
standard operating procedures. The first photos
were taken on September 12, over a month before
the actual report was made to the president. On
September 19, analysis of the photos suggested the
presence of the missile silos. On October 4 they
began to believe there were missiles there. At that
point, there is territory dispute between the Air
Force and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
In addition, there is a mechanical delay fro ensuing U-2 flights over Cuba to confirm these suspicions. Only on October 14 was there a flight that
confirmed their presence of missiles and that is
used to inform the president.
Another example: The EX-COMM leaders
are organizational representatives. When each one
is asked their opinion, they respond as organizational representatives and state what a representative of their organization could do. The Air Force
is a proponent of an airstrike and the Navy a blockade. That is said even when there are clear problems with each proposal. The Air Force could not
The bureaucratic politics model asks the following: Is the government composed of multiple
actors with different problems and objectives? Is
the choice an outcome of bargaining games that
unfold over time? Was power and skill a factor
that was involved? What compromises were had?
What overlapping games were being played?
Who were the leaders, followers, staffers, and ad
hoc players?
26
The Paradigm
Model 3
National Government
A!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!B!
!!!z!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!r!
!!!y!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!y!
C!!!!!!!!!!!!D!!!!!!!!!!!E!
!!!n!!!!!!!!!!!!t!!!!!!!!!!!!!z!
!!!x!!!!!!!!!!!!y!!!!!!!!!!!!!f!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!F!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!p!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!r!
Basic Unit of
Analysis
Organizing
Concepts
Dominant
Inference
Pattern
General
Propositions
27
28
Summary or Basic
Argument
Management
Strategies
Environment
Dominant Pattern of
Inference
Know SOPs, what problems they go with (matching), and who cues them. Improve
rules and matching with problems. Management by rules.
Action = output close to prior output (path dependence), cueing of SOPs appropriate
to problem.
NA
Organizational positions
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social Structure
Technology (how
solutions get
decided)
Participants
29
30
31
Technology
Environment
1b (Wane-1994)
Creation of fiscal problems
Social Structure
Key Actors
Phases
ELEMENTS
Goals
1a (1986-Wax)
Anti-Bureaucracy
This time: Part I -- look for evidence of theories in the Chicago case (see handout).
2b (Wane-2001)
Problems of implementation
2a (1994-Wax)
Managerialism
32
Coalition /
Bargaining
Org Process
Phases
Rational Actor
THEORIES
1a (1986-)
1b (-1994)
Anti-Bureaucracy
Creation of fiscal problems
Actor: Washington & Chicago Public Schools
Problem: low performing schools
Action as RC:
Goal Reform schools and get rid of red tape
Options fight, form coalition of IBEC and LSCs,
Democrats and community activists dominate, etc.
Consequences no consensus, coalition forms and action
taken, legislature rejects (Republican minority rejects) /
no $ acquired, etc
Choice coalition of IBEC and LSCs arises
No data Shipps does not discuss this much - inferred.
Organizations: mayor office, legislature, Union, IBEC, SBNC
Problem broken up: LSCs break up problem of reform to be
handled locally.
Missions vary and LSCs move by their own SOPs without
coordination divergence of standards and costs soar.
Players and positions: IBEC and Community Activists
unlikely bedfellows.
Parochial Priorities: businesses want to implement
Reaganomics, and LSC sought greater control/power.
Goals / Interests: better city for business, better schools for
educators and students.
Deadline: mayor dies, new one elected, etc.
Game: negotiating legislation of power, then implementation.
Problem with decoupling and resource allocation.
2a (1994-)
2b (-2001)
Managerialism
Problems of implementation
Actor: Daley & Chicago Public Schools
Problem: broke, bad schools
Action as RC:
Goal Reform for results and accountability
Options Daley and Business dominate, prior alliance, etc.
Consequences $ gotten & action taken, legislature rejects /
no $ acquired / no action taken, etc
Choice new more centralized coalition forms
33
Now that we have described all the organizational elements relevant to this case, we can begin
to consider their analysis. Let's begin again with
the first era of Mayor Washington and apply each
of our theoretical models to the case of Mayor
Washington, and his effort at reform. The first
phase entails an anti-bureaucracy movement that
waxes and wanes. If we apply the rational actor
model, we would focus on particular actors in administrative circles, like mayor Washington. The
core problem that commences the need for a decision is low performing schools. The goal would
be to reform the schools and get rid of red tape,
sine that was regarded as the problem that was preventing achievement and preventing buy-in to the
schools. The various options that they could consider were (a) fight this reform effort, or fight each
other in terms of how resources are allocated. For
example, the legislature could combat the unions.
(b) Another option is to form a coalition, such as
one forged between IBEC and the local school
councils. The Democrats could form a coalition
with community activists and dominate because
the democrats were in charge of local and state
politics at the time. With each option there are
likely consequences. If groups fight, then there is
likely no consensus and it just creates a difficult
environment for every side. If you form a coalition (IBEC and local school councils) and take action, then that makes some sense. There may be
certain kinds of cost to that and you may offend
the legislature in power. The legislature could reject everything. We can only estimate the likely
risks (we are boundedly rational!) and probabilities for success here, and use that in our decision
calculus. But conflict and stalemates have huge
costs, so we probably want to work with the Republican minority. for all we know , they could
filibuster any political coalitions efforts and stop
them dead in their tracks. That said, to some degree, it is reasonable to predict how certain camps
will behave depending on the kind of options before them, right?
34
If we apply coalition theory or the bureaucratic politics model, we have a different perspective as well. We have to think about the players
and their positions. So, IBEC and community activists have parochial interests. The IBEC wants
to support local business; the community activists
want their local communities to do well. As a result, they are strange bedfellows in a way (one republican and the other democrat). The community
activists want support for their neighborhoods and
to serve the interests of their local schools. IBEC
is composed of representatives from larger Chicago corporations, so their interests are not so local. Instead, they had the redevelopment of Chicago in mind as a means of not only making
schools better, but so as to have a potential pool of
more qualified employees, that will improve their
business. So, in spite of their different political
leanings, they had shared interests they could form
a coalition around.
Nevertheless, parochial priorities surfaced.
The business leaders wanted to implement Reaganomics, which was a trendy economic policy
of the 1980s -- it entailed less government, less
red tape, etc. Surprisingly, this aligned with the
parochial interests of local school councils that
wanted greater local control over neighborhood
schools. As such, in spite of their differences, the
two found overlapping interests, and this enabled
them to develop a coalition.
There is a deadline in all this, of course. In
the first period, Mayor Washington dies. It was an
untimely death and unexpected, and this led to a
new election and a shift toward recognizing problems with his reforms. In addition, there were different political games going on during this period.
There was a problem with decoupling and resource allocation to some extent. THe decoupling
arose because local school councils were given
power, and it was difficult to coordinate all their
decentralized efforts. As such, governance at the
city and state level decoupled from the local level.
When fiscal concerns arose and requests for accountability emerged, the decentralized system
failed to coordinate and they offered a cacophony
of responses. The decentralized system was great
for political games like power sharing and legisla-
35
standard operating procedures of the school system. Instead, they adopted the kind of procedures
they had become accustomed to in managing their
businesses. The schools on the other hand hold a
different view and a different set of standard operating procedures. There is a disconnect in these
perspectives and procedures that creates tensions
and problems. The educators didn't understand the
standard operating procedures that business leaders wanted to impose on the education system. In
addition, the lack of educational experience in management led to kind of decoupling of understandings and unfamiliarity with educational routines
used to keep schools operating and teachers happy.
From an organizational standpoint, this later period of mismatch across organizations and or, organizational routines from different kinds of leaders helps explain the troubles encountered in the
managerial era.
Finally, a coalition or bargaining perspective
also highlights certain qualities of the case. From
a coalition-bargaining view, we see that certain
players and positions matter more than others.
The Republican legislature and IBEC propose reforms and they form a coalition with the mayor.
As a result of his participation, they afford him
power and resources. This centralization of power
completely undermines the community activists.
They're pushed out. In addition, the mayor coopts the union leaders in various ways (see Bryk
2003).
Parochial interests come through though.
Members of IBEC press the interests of the citys
business and economy. They feel that an educational model and community activism failed, so
their new model should work. They centralize and
regulate, and they emphasize distinct goals of
achievement and efficiency.
With each phase there's an election. The
new mayor falls back on their parochial interests
(re-election and getting power), and then as the reform moves forward, other kinds of parochial interest come into play and compete. As such, the bargaining model offers a more dynamic, political
characterization of the reform process. Organizations arent just actor optimizing or organizations
following rules, it's an a loose confederation of ac-
tors and organizations with shifting interests dependent on the timing and particular leaders involved.
A key factor in the coalition / bargaining
model is timing or deadlines. Here, of course,
deadlines are dictated by election cycles, contract
renewals, and fiscal years when budgets get done.
Those all have schedules with punctuated effects
on relationships and actors interests.
With each phase, the game shifts. In the initial period, the objective is to gain power. As
such, the new Republican legislature comes in and
wants to change the system for the better by centralizing authority. If they give money to the
mayor, then they can hold the mayor accountable.
If he fails, he will not be re-elected. In the later
phase, decoupling actually helps. If administrative
efforts are carefully linked to the ground level reform efforts, then the mayor is accountable. So
are the legislatures. But if things do not go well
and they cannot find results that validate the accountability model, then they start to hide it. And
this is exactly what happens., Through interactions
with the media and press reports, the mayors office and CEO of Chicago schools try to withhold
certain kinds of information that might show the
model was not effective. They do this for parochial interests -- i.e., the mayor is trying to get reelected, and so are other politicians. And so, it is
not just a matter of meeting the goals, or enacting
operating, standard operating procedures that fit
different groups. Now it becomes a matter of
adapting the implementation process to different
purposes and the reporting of their accomplishments for different purposes. Some of these purposes fit some actors more than others, and at certain times more than others.
In sum, each of our three models has applicability here. If we line them up, we can see how
they compare and which one seems to explain certain phases of the reform era more than others.
But now we come a big question -- which explanation works best?
This is a good case to use the forum on.
There, we can ask things like, does the rational actor model work better in a centralized phase like
Daley's? Or, does the rational actor model only su-
36
perficially apply? Or we can ask if most of the decisions followed an organizational process model
of heuristics and routines?
Rather than me telling you what the right answer is, I think it is best to leave it up to you and
see how you grapple with the issue. Trying to implement these theories to actual cases and seeing
evidence for one over the other is an exercise in
itself, as is arguing one theory works best under
particular circumstances and phases, or two theories complement one another in some way to afford a richer understanding of how Chicago public
school reforms manifested and died.
References
Allison, Graham T. 1969. Conceptual Models
and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science Review 63, 3:689-718.
Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikov. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis (2nd edition). New York: Addison Wesley
Longman.
Bryk, Tony. 2003. No Child Left Behind,
Chicago-Style. In Peterson, P. W., and West, M.
The Politics and Practice of School Accountability, pp. 242-268. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
March, James G. 1994. A Primer on Decision
Making: How Decisions Happen. NY: The Free
Press.
March, James G. 1999. The Pursuit of Organizational Intelligence. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
Shipps, Dorothy. 2003. The Businessmans Educator: Mayoral Takeover and Nontraditional Leadership in Chicago, in Powerful Reforms with
Shallow Roots, ed. Larry Cuban and Michael Usdan, pp. 16-34. NY: Teachers College Press.
37
3
Coalition Theory
(Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sikh_Coalition_Im.JPG/)
When does it
apply?
Summary or Basic
Argument
Coalitions /
Bureaucratic Politics (BP)
Exists when there are multiple actors with inconsistent
preferences and identities, and none of whom can go
it alone without assistance of others.
Participants
Organizational positions
Players in positions
Goals (what
probs to resolve)
Social Structure
Coalitions enemy/friend
Environment
NA
Dominant Pattern
of Inference
Management
Strategies
39
As a manager using a rational actor approach, you will want to consider alternatives and
their consequences. You will want to improve the
quality of information you receive so you can
make a wise decision based on the consequences
you expect each option to have.
As a manager adopting an organizational
process approach, you will need to know what organizations are involved, what standard operating
procedures they have in place, and then assign
them pieces of the problem they are best suited to
address. Your job is to match pieces of the problem to organizations capable of addressing them
effectively.
As a manager adopting a bureaucratic politics approach, you are more of a negotiator. You
will identify the key players, learn their interests,
identify points of leverage and weaknesses so you
can successfully bargain with them, and then make
exchanges to acquire their support. You will work
relationships and alignments to your advantage.
So each theory implies a different sort of
managerial strategy. With that in mind, lets consider a new case and use it as a thought experiment
for trying out these managerial styles. With every
new example we consider, hopefully you will form
a more concrete sense on how to apply theories to
real world cases.
In this chapter, I want to take the example of
Hurricane Katrina, which hit the city of New Orleans in 2005. Hurricane Katrina was the costliest
natural disaster for the United States (estimated at
81 billion dollars in damage) and in its wake, over
1800 people died, and 80% of New Orleans was
flooded. Lawsuits were filed afterwards against
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who designed
and built the levee systems that failed, and there
was an investigation into the responses of federal,
state, and local governments, resulting in the resignation of Federal Emergency Management
Agencys director, Michael Brown, and New Orleans Police Department Superintendent Eddie
Compass. Several agencies performed well and
I know it is an event that has already happened, and there has been a great deal written
about it online. I also know we have 20-20 vision
in hindsight. But it is often hard to acquire adequate amounts of material on a case that reflects
the depth of knowledge that leaders and analysts
might have on an organizational crisis and decision they are immediately involved with. The information we can glean on Katrina from reading
online material begins to approach what I think involved participants or experts might have on the
ground floor. But the point is not to achieve perfection here. It is pedagogical. I want you to get
used to applying theories as lenses to cases.
40
41
Coalition Theory
In the second chapter of the course you got a
good sense for how the rational actor perspective
and organizational process perspectives differed.
Those theories nicely corresponded with Marchs
notions of decisions by the logic of consequence
and decisions by the logic of appropriateness. You
probably walked away with a less clear understanding of the bureaucratic politics model. This chapter will give a more elaborate depiction of that
model, and focus on its core process of exchange
and coalition formation. Within organizations,
42
Examples of Coalitions
43
Looking back to our table of Allisons theories and the outline of the Bureaucratic Politics
Model, we see there are multiple players in different positions. There are various factors that shape
their preferences and stands e.g., their particular
interests, stakes specific to them, the goals of
someone in their position, and the deadlines rushing them to decide. Each actor has certain resources or power (things people want), and they
enter a game of exchange or bargaining according
to rules. The end decision or organizational action
is the result of bargaining across these actors.
March describes coalitions in a nice way that
compliments Allisons Bureaucratic Politics
Model and Hulas notion of coalitions (Allison
1969; Hula 1999; March 1962, 1994). His focus,
however, is more on the central organizing process
of a coalition the process that creates and sustains a coalition. March argues that scholars describe coalitional decisions or coalition formation
as following one of two processes (among others).
The first process which I want to relate as background, not as something you need to learn has
been called a power-struggle, and it has sometimes
been analyzed and operationalized as a simple
force model. A force model is an extension of the
expected utility calculations we did for individuals
last week, except this time we have multiple actors
with different preferences (or different values
placed on the outcome) and they are given different weight in making decisions. To calculate the
decision a coalition makes by the force model, we
simply add up the expected utilities weighting
those of more important or powerful actors.
For example, take our old example of the umbrella and the expected utility of bringing it or not
(or even the dating example of asking someone
out or not). If we calculate that for each of you
and then weight your score by the relative power
you have, then add everyone up we should have
our collective decision. The problem with this procedure is that power is depicted as a stable personal trait we can actually measure. But power is
not a personal trait (think triads [dependent notions of rank]) and it changes over time. It is also
a tautological model and explanation: when people
get what they want, power is seen as explaining
why they got it. Plus, power can refer to many different things persons acquire. As such, it is hard
to measure as one construct everyone agrees upon.
So the force idea of just extending our pure Rational Actor Model to sets of people does not
really apply well.
Exchange Model
44
Now that we have a better sense of the exchange process and how to manage and win it,
lets go back to coalitions and explain how they
work (keep in mind that exchange is the generative process of a coalition). Keep in mind that,
that exchange is still the generative process of coalition formation. That has not changed. All we
wanted to talk about now is the larger context of
multiple exchanges or a larger group. Here, coalitions are social systems wherein decisions are
made and reforms are pursued within a context of
potential conflict. That means, coalitions entail actors with mixed preferences and identities that do
not always align. They are often juxtaposed so
they require bargaining. Second, the objective of
members is to form a coalition capable of making
decisions favorable to them. This is obviously difficult because of all the internal inconsistencies.
Participants have parochial interest, and this is obviously difficult, because of all the internal consistencies within the group. The third is that people
therefore have to make exchanges, deals, agreements as to what decisions we made by the coalition. This follows the core process we described
above of exchange. And finally, resources are extracted through such coordinated action and distributed to competing coalition members. This is
what members get in return for joining a coalition.
The resources Hula will cite are strategic incentives, information, and symbolic benefits - Something we will discuss more in the next lecture.
These four characteristics help us understand
the nature of larger coalitions and how the process
of exchange sustains them. However, some important questions follow: Who will be in the coalition? And how are the spoils divided?
This can follow both the Logic of Consequence (which seems primary here) and the Logic
of Appropriateness. As an instrumental actor, you
join the minimal winning coalition so you can reap
the most rewards. As a rule-follower you seek coalitions that match your identity and the standards
you adhere to.
If we look back at the Bureaucratic Politics
model, we will see all the same features I am relating here were coarsely related there. It is just that
here I have tried to anchor the description more in
the process of bargaining or exchange. Above we
described some of the means of controlling exchange which can be extended to controlling a coalition. However, most coalitions will require negotiation and bargaining more than anything else.
Hence, within the context of a coalition, the manager or developer of a coalition is primarily con-
45
When the rubber hits the road, or when the coalition actually begins to adopt and implements
things, it begins to fall apart. All these weakly
aligned people find that once the initial formation
is hard, they no longer care to continue offering
support.
Coalitions, therefore, exhibit an odd dynamic. They start strong and end weak, or worse,
fall apart in implementation. Building them requires constant bargaining (e.g., log-rolling, wrangling, horse trading, etc). Maintaining them requires ambiguity and control over resources until
implementation is complete.
Case - Kevin Hula and Lobbying
46
47
48
49
50
Management
Strategies
NA
Organizational positions
Dominant Pattern
of Inference
Environment
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social Structure
Technology
(how solutions
get decided)
Participants
Summary or Basic
Argument
When does it
apply?
Coalitions enemy/friend
Players in positions
Coalitions /
Bureaucratic Politics (BP)
References
Allison, Graham T. 1969. Conceptual Models
and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science Review 63, 3:689-718 review 3rd
model from last time.
Caro, Robert. 1975. The Power Broker (especially ch. 33, pp. 703-754). Vintage Press.
Cyert, Richard and James G. March. 1963
[1992]. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.
Prentice-Hall, Ch. 3-7.
Emerson, Richard. 1962. "Power-Dependence Relations." American Sociological Review 27:31-40.
Hula, Kevin W. 1999. Lobbying Together: Interest Group Coalitions in Legislative Politics. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press (chapters 1-5, 7, and 9 [pp.1-77, 93-107, 122-135]).
March, James G. 1962. "The Business Firm as a
Political Coalition," Journal of Politics 24: 662678.
March, James G. 1994. A Primer on Decision
Making: How Decisions Happen. NY: The Free
Press. Chapter 4, Pp. 139-174.
Scott, Richard. 2003 (5th ed). Goals, Power, and
Control, Chapter 11 (pp. 291-324) of Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, 5th
Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
51
4
Organized Anarchy
(Source: http://nopsa.hiit.fi/pmg/viewer/images/photo_2801526484_6f0480b4a2_t.jpg)
achievement for businesses), while others mentioned several problems (educators). And then
they presented the problems in different orders.
The same occurred for solutions. Groups created additional solutions to those arising in the Milwaukee case (e.g., sliding scale Vouchers). Some
solutions they never took up (do nothing). None
of the solutions and problems seemed to arrive as
set pairs. Instead, the solutions were matched with
multiple problems and those connections were negotiated. Each group tried to make a case for why
another groups problems could be addressed by
their solution. As such, the bargaining was in connecting solutions and problems in a way that convinced other groups.
The debates and decisions also followed a
temporal dynamic. Some of the students got up
and went to the restroom and their voice was lost
in pushing for certain problems and solutions.
Some pairs of groups took longer to finish their exchange and were rushed to make a deal before
their time was up and that seemed to affect decision outcomes. Some groups even back-tracked
on prior deals when they saw a better solution and
coalition emerge. Many students felt the ordering
of pair-wise meetings greatly affected which bargains arose and which were dropped.
Garbage Can Model
A lot of what I have described pertains to an
organized anarchy view of organizational
decision-making, or what some organizational
theorists call the Garbage Can Model. This theory was proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen
(1972), and throughout this chapter we will draw
heavily on their conceptualization (March 1994:
Chapter 5).
Most organizational theories underestimate
the confusion and complexity surrounding actual
decision-making. Many things happen at once;
technologies (or tasks) are uncertain and poorly understood; preferences and identities change and are
indeterminate; problems, solutions, opportunities,
ideas, situations, people, and outcomes are mixed
together in ways that make their interpretation un-
53
54
55
stream, politics). In the government arena, politics determines what actors show up, what interests are represented. Even if a decision is good for
a congresspersons constituents, they may pass up
on the meeting due to political concerns).
So there are these three streams, but they
mean little until a choice opportunity arises. All
too often, the opportunity just is not there. There
is no meeting, most people lack access to it, etc.
And even if there is a meeting, the right confluence of flows may not arise. The right problem
and solutions enter, but all the wrong participants
are there and the decision lacks energy and momentum. This is why timing and finding the right moment matters so much!
Now the outcome of choice arenas can vary.
In many cases, you can hold a meeting and no one
can agree on a problem or solution. One idea after
another is shot down and thrown away. On many
occasion, no decision gets made. In other instances, the solutions adopted do not address a
problem. This can arise in two ways. The first is
by Oversight: sometimes choice opportunities arrive and no problems are attached to them. Why
might this happen? It can happen if all problems
are attached to other choice arenas. In these instances, people make choices and select solutions
before problems reach the meeting. Later, we will
show you such a case where the school board and
the administrators of a district cannot attend meetings about a desegregation court order and its implementation because they must focus on other
concerns like a teacher strike.
The second means by which an adopted solution fails to affix to a problem is by Flight: Here
problems are affixed to choice opportunities for a
while and exceed the energy of the decision makers attuned to them. Hence, the original problem
may move to another choice arena (like another
meeting or department). In these instances, people
wait for the problem to go away in order to pick a
solution. So, in these cases you will see later, people table a decision or send it off into a subcommittee. In both of these instances, the problems do
not get attached to a solution.
Of course, the case we are most interested in
as managers of organized anarchies is when a
problem actually gets resolved: these are instances where problems are brought up in a choice
opportunity or meeting, and the decision makers
attending that meeting bring enough energy/ability
to meet the demands of the problems. Here a
choice is made and the problem is resolved.
Each garbage can, choice opportunity, or
meeting, has different access rules. In particular,
every choice arena has an access structure or social boundary of sorts that influences which persons, problems, and solution can enter or not. The
loosest structure allows for unrestricted access.
All the problems, solutions, and people are allowed to enter, and this creates more energy, but it
also allows problems, solutions and participants to
interfere with each other. This increases conflicts
and time devoted to problems you get greater anarchy! Another structure entails hierarchical access. Here, important actors, problems and solutions are given priority access. For example, big
decisions may occur in executive meetings, while
unimportant issues are addressed by the rank and
file employees.
Finally, there is specialized access. This occurs when special problems and solutions have access to certain meetings. For example, in my
school, the costs students incur when printing their
papers on school printers may be an issue that
goes to the schools technology committee, while
journal costs might be brought up in the library
committee. Therefore, certain specialists have access to certain choices that fit their expertise (e.g.,
engineers with technology concerns).
The diagram below shows the differing access structures for participants.
57
Problems
Participants
(who attends)
(space needs) p1
a1 (dean)
($ needed) p2
p1
(ctr decline) p4
(endowment!) p5
a2 (assoc dean)
a1
(std advising) p3
p2
a2
p5
s2
a3 (fac memb1)
a4 (fac memb2)
s1
(minority recruitment) s1
(increase MA enrollment) s2
(new tenure policy) s3
s1 s2 s3 s4
Solutions
Decision Situation
Managing Organized Anarchy
With all this in mind, we come to the question of how to manage organized anarchies. If we
see an organization that resembles a garbage can,
how do we approach it?
Several types of reactions can emerge.
First, you can try and be a Reformer: eliminate garbage can elements from decisions. Reformers create greater systematicity, order, and control. In a
way, this is what Daley and Vallas did in the Chicago public school case centralize, rationalize,
fix streams and access, etc.
Oppositely, you can be an Enthusiast: here
you try to discover a new vision of decision making within garbage can processes.. This is sort of
what March & Birnbaum argue people should do
in choice arenas like the faculty senate. Here, the
58
59
Participants (a1-6)
Problems (p1-10)
Problems that never
enter but draw SFUSD
to other arenas
p7 Tch-Std Boycott
p8 LatAmerOrg Sues
p9 Financial Probs
p10 Teacher Strike
s1 Tristar (3 zones
bussing / more deseg)
s2 Horseshoe (7 zones,
respects comm / less deseg)
Deadline!
In many regards this is an instance of organized anarchy. First, it is ambiguous as to what desegregation means. The problems and preferences
for desegregation are unclear and it is ambiguous
how to accomplish desegregation. How does one
know desegregation has been accomplished? In
effect, there is an unclear solution and an unclear
technology or means of bringing it about.. Moreover, there is a tight deadline and the participants in
this case keep changing judges turnover, different committees form and dissolve, etc. Only the
threat of a lawsuit creates a choice opportunity!
So the case of SFUSD has many qualities that suggest it is a case of organized anarchy.
Lets identify the problems mentioned in the
case as related by Steve Weiner. The figure on the
prior page identifies the problems, solutions, and
actors involved with SFUSD desegregation. The
focal arena is the Community Advisory Committee, since it is the arena in which a decision is ultimately made. The key problem for this arena is
that of desegregating the elementary schools p6.
At the outset, the participants were not sure what
integration should look like. They eventually
adopt a state standard that is very strong. All the
schools need to have a racial compositions within
15% of the district average.
A bunch of problems enter the CAC choice
arena and are interrelated by participants:
p1 - Keeping integrity of school complexes
p2 - Bilingual education needed
p3 - Bussing disliked by whites (white flight)
p4 - SES integration wanted
61
most active CAC members tend to be white middle class women (stay at home moms), while working men and minorities are unable to attend due to
their day jobs (less energy to devote it). And finally, the SFUSD consultants and administrators
are drawn away by other problems that do not enter the choice arena for desegregation (a4 attend to
p7-p10). Only a1-3 attend the meetings.
At the actual meetings, these participants
raise and discuss a variety of solutions: twentyfour of them to be exact (too many to list). Here
are a few:
s1s24 Twenty-four solutions developed
and narrowed down to two.
s1 - Tristar (3-zone plan written by technocrats)
s2 - Horseshoe (7-zone plan less drastic)
What is not considered is the solution of simple
cross-town busing.
62
So you have all kinds of other actors and participants that can affect the legislative process and
they turnover somewhat rather variably.
Next what is the process of policy formation? In what ways can we consider how a policy
originates and develops? Here, Kingdon considers
a few different models by which scholars have
characterized policy formation. The first concerns
origins. Where did the idea and policy come
from? How did the idea spread? The assumption
here is that it started somewhere and got taken up
more and more. We have an initial origin and if
we follow that origin, we will have some understanding for its development. A second view is
that of rational choice: We saw this earlier in the
course. Here, the view is that we define the goals,
identify alternatives, and choose the optimal alternative e.g., the policy in question. Therefore, its
adoption should be based on predictions of the policys consequences. A third view is that of incrementalism. Rather than starting from scratch, new
policies build on existing policies. Changes are
made at the margins and what we see today is an
adaptation of prior ones.
Kingdon argues that each of these descriptions has some value, but they do not describe the
process of policy formation as completely as Garbage Can Theory (GCT). Kingdon asks how does
agenda setting resemble an organized anarchy?
Lets take a step back like we did in the
SFUSD case and see if it fits the criteria. First, we
ask, is it a context of problematic preferences (inconsistent, ill-defined)? And here, the answer is
yes - Action is often taken before identifying preferences. Participants even disagree on their preferences and priorities. Second, we ask is there unclear technology? Kingdon says how the government attempts to solve problems is often unclear.
There is not a clearly defined way to desegregate
schools, eliminate the achievement gap, end child
poverty: its not like making widgets (2003:85).
Third, there is Fluid participation and there is a
63
64
he does a wonderful job applying theory to this particular instance of agenda setting. Rather than rehash his application of GCT to particular instances
of agenda setting, I want to apply garbage can theory to a new case many of you might not be familiar with in this way I can afford you numerous
examples so you see how the theory can be applied in many instances, not just one.
No Child Left Behind
My last example will concern a recent policy
decision: Title V of the No Child Left Behind Act
the Promotion of Informed Parental Choice And
Innovative Programs (or NCLB). Briefly, NCLB
is the name of the 2001 reauthorization of the
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(which was part of President Lyndon Johnsons
War on Poverty). When originally passed, the
primary focus of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act was on improving the education for
economically disadvantaged students who met federal definitions of poverty. Over time, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was expanded
to include bilingual education, education to indigenous communities, education in correction facilities, magnet schools, foreign language programs,
midnight basketball, and migrant education.
The Elementary and Secondary Education
Act has been reauthorized several times since its
original passage in 1964, usually for approximately four- to six-year periods. President George
Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act of
20011 into law on January 8, 2002. Title V provides federal grant support for Innovative Programs and Public Charter Schools. It also adds a
new incentive program to help charter schools
meet their facility needs. Included in this section
is a provision that provides transportation and
other support that allows students attending
schools that do not meet adequate yearly progress for two years to transfer to a charter school
or other public school.
So, how would we use Kingdons model to
describe how Title V entered the agenda and ultimately became law? First we would look at the
problem stream. At any given time, a set of problems may rise in prominence and capture the attention of governments, often not because of political
pressure but because of systematic indicators that
purport to prove the existence of a problem. That
is, problems may not necessarily be true problems. They merely have to be problems in the
minds of some subsection of the public in order to
be considered.
What problems could Title V purport to solve?
! Failing schools with no sign of improvement.
! Lack of innovation in public schools (charter
schools may be an incubator of innovation)
Public
! There is a lack of competition.
schools are not pressured to improve.
! Unequal opportunity for lower income children (these families have fewer options because they cant afford private schools. Charters are free public schools of choice.)
! Charter school funding (Claim by charter
school proponents that they receive a disproportionate amount of per pupil funding from
the state).
In most cases we would agree that these problems
are probably true. However, I want you to understand that it does not necessarily matter if you
think it is true or not. What matters is that a subsection of a population does - that there is energy
behind it, and actors are affixed to these kinds of
problems.
What are some of the indicators to this problem?
! International comparisons (USA behind)
! Achievement gap literature (by race, income,
urbanicity - disparities exist)
! Government evaluations and other studies
show many problems in schooling
All these indicators suggest the problems of our
education system are more than our biased view,
and exist beyond our own opinion.
What is the publics perception of this problem?
65
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(Source - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nochild.jpg)
66
67
dency in its particular form and not well before under a different guise and during Clintons era.
68
69
Environment
Management Strategies
Social Structure
Action = Maximization of
means to ends.
Goals
(what probs to resolve)
Participants
NA
Actors in hierarchical
organizational positions. Cue
sequential routines that accomplish
task or solve problem by routines
available (supply issue).
Organizational positions
Coalitions enemy/friend
Players in positions
Coalitions /
Bureaucratic Politics (BP)
Organized Anarchies /
Garbage Can (GC)
References
Birnbaum, Robert. 1989. The Latent Organizational Functions of the Academic Senate: Why Senates Do Not Work But Will Not Go Away? Journal of Higher Education 60 (July/August) 4: 423443.
Cohen, Michael D, March, James G. and Olsen,
Johan P. 1972. A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly
17(1): 1-25.
Kingdon, J. W. 2003 (1995). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, second edition. Longman.
March, James G. 1994. A Primer on Decision
Making: How Decisions Happen. NY: The Free
Press. Chapter 5, pp. 175-218.
Weiner, Stephen S. 1976. Participation, Deadlines, and Choice Chapter 11 (pp. 225-250) in
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. (eds)
March, James and Johan Olsen. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget
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5
Organizational
Learning
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Organizational_Learning_and_KM.jpg
Organizational Learning
In this chapter I will describe the theory of
organizational learning and what it entails. Before
I begin, I want to briefly revisit our theory of organized anarchy by retelling how one of our inclass exercises went. As a capstone experience of
organized anarchy, I try to create a garbage can
situation for students to experience in class. Every
year, I call a meeting with the students and ask
them to discuss the course and its grading policy.
I even tell them I will adopt a new class format
and grading procedure if they can all agree on one
and convince me it will improve the learning experience. To help with the process, I ask them to
identify various problems (i.e., a problem stream
is created). The problems they identify are as follows: there is too much reading; lecture materials
go by too quickly; not enough time for individualized projects; not enough time for group projects
and discussion; etc. I then ask students to create a
list of policy changes they would like in the course
(i.e., a solution stream is created): often they ask I
allow them to rewrite papers; sometimes they ask
that everyone gets 10 points added to their grade;
or that my lectures be posted online; or exemplary
papers be shared.
All too often, there is little connection between the problems and solutions they select. For
example, the first two solutions of rewriting papers for a better grade and giving everyone 10
more points do not address any of the problems
they listed earlier. And the last one: what does the
posting of exemplary papers solve? Only the solution of posting lectures actually addresses a problem they list that my lectures go by too quick.
Anyhow, the next thing we do is discuss each solution. Very quickly we see the energy affixed to certain solutions, but then in discussion, it dissipates
as people identify additional problems the solutions may incur. For example, what does the policy of giving everyone 10 points do if they are
graded on a curve? Someone may even notice that
if everyone gets an A that it creates another problem: how will I write recommendations for students hoping to get into doctoral programs, or jobs
if everyone got an A? What distinguishes them?
Source - http://www.flickr.com/photos/usfwssoutheast/8392695372
Organizational
Learning - Practice,
Understanding, and
Organizational
Memory
learning perspective? In the most general terms, the organizational learning perspective concerns adaptation and learning from experience. But
how does an organization learn? Organizations learn by encoding inferences from history into organizational structures (so best practices into
rules, routines, and roles), people, technologies (curricula), and culture
(norms, beliefs) that guide behavior. That is, organizations reflect on
what works well or not, and then encode that knowledge into its organizational elements (participants, technology/tasks, social structure) so it can
remember.
It is important to emphasize that organizational learning occurs at
the organizational level. There is no doubt that individual and team learning are related, but we need to keep in mind that it is the formal organization and firm that is making efforts to learn from experience and pass on
that knowledge to its employees in the hopes of constantly improving performance. In my discussion of the organizational learning perspective, I
draw on the writings of many writers from John Seely Brown and Paul
Duguid (1991; 2000), to James March (Levitt and March 1988; March
1991; 1994; March et al 1991), Linda Argote (1999), Lucy Suchman
(2007), Julian Orr (1996), and others. I merely want to afford you a general framework you can get your mind around and apply in the organizational settings you participate.
One text in particular, Brown and Duguid (2000), contrast organizational learning with an organizational process model (if you recall, this
was Allisons Organizational Process Model where organizations are
73
viewed as following routines and standard operating procedures). Brown and Duguid describe two
characterizations of routines or SOPs On the
one hand they are ostensive rules applied as a
guide and computer program (SOP ~ organizational process model); on the other, they are enacted practices (the heart of understanding or
knowledge). According to Brown and Duguid, a
manager of organizational processes will get a
company to streamline their SOPs to those concerned with the core task and then spell them out
so they are clear. They remove SOPs that are redundant, those that are in conflict with each other,
and those that are pointless.
A good example of a pointless rule might
be what we term blue-laws in the United States.
These are laws created many years ago that are
still in the legal texts even though they no longer
apply nor are they enforced. For example: in Kansas there is a law saying you can not eat snakes on
Sunday; in Connecticut you can not eat pickles on
Sunday; and in Massachusetts, Cows can not graze
in the Boston Commons. The organizational learning perspective agrees that organizational processes and SOPs matter, but it focuses on the practice of these procedures, and argues it is through
their practice that they have meaning, relevance,
and effect (and conversely, it is their lack of practice that make routines irrelevant and forgotten).
In fact, many organizational procedures can
not be looked up in a book or manual. And even if
they can be found in a manual, merely reading
about them does not result in understanding and
knowledge for most persons. Finding the right routine is hard (it may not even exist), and enacting it
well is even harder as each new situation will differ from the one before. You constantly have to
adapt rules and procedures so as to fit changing
situations and actual work experiences. Without
practice and experience, you have no real knowledge about working.
Take the example of self-defense routines.
They are learned as a routine, but then they are
practiced in bouts and used in relation to other routines. That is, they are not just read in a book, but
are practiced and applied before the student becomes an expert fighter. As such, organizational
learning differs from the organizational process approach in that it regards experiential learning
learning by doing (not learning about) - as the central means to making complex organizations work.
Now arguably, learning of this sort may not matter
much for simple tasks like procurement, shipping,
receiving, warehousing and billing as this band
of operations have really well-defined processes
with measurable inputs and outputs. But experiential learning will matter dearly for management,
and research and development where life is less
sequential and linear, where inputs and outputs
are unclear. Here, making sense, interpreting, and
understanding are points of contention and highly
valued. To get at this, one needs to look at the actual activity and practice within routines and work
processes.
74
Source - http://www.flickr.com/photos/kretyen/2460134871
Xerox and
Organizational
Practices
76
Vehicle&and&Cumula3ve&Output&
Cumulative
test score gains
Cumula3ve&Output&
77
the organization but they are less stable than curricula. For example, team teaching might be a new
routine that has great returns in some cases, but
how it is enacted may vary greatly and the same
positive return may not be observed elsewhere.
Personnel (faculty) are great storage units and
transfer vehicles, but they leave and take knowledge with them if they leave! Organizational memory is not just a database of ideas, it is a database
of knowers with experience. You need ideas and
cultivators of them who are in the know, so retaining key personnel who train others is a very important means to engineering organizational memory
and especially if the sort of knowledge needed is
tacit or implicit and hard to codify and make sense
of in rule-books. Last, Cultural features like stories and community ceremonies can be great
means of preserving organizational memory, but
they might be prone to forgetting (as oral culture
can be) and it might focus too much on particular
individuals (exemplars and pariahs) than situations
so you might want a database created by working people. And again, with computing we now
have the capacity to collect and store practitioner
knowledge.
As I said before, websites like
Quora.com and curriki.org are feasible models to
use. There a searchable repository and demo presentations and materials can be stored.
Communities of Practice
78
One needs to look outside the local community to form bridges with other communities and
prevent group think. To overcome these shortcomings, organizational learning theorists speak of networks of practice and knowledge transfer. Networks of practice (NOP) are like professional communities (secondary groups) where people may
never get to know each other but adopt similar
practices, similar resources, and similar identities
(technician, sociologists, etc). Here knowledge
about practice can travel rapidly and be assimilated readily. The reach of knowledge is greatly
expanded. Whereas members of a COP learn by
doing practices together, in the NOP, member
79
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Networks of
Practice
learn about ostensive rules by way of books and inter-organizational networks (Learning by talking and sharing).In contrast with COP, NOPs have
reach. They span COPs. The inter-COP linkages is viable because members share identities. This allows actors to communicate in relatively similar
ways (info sharing across groups that bridge capital).
How might we generate a network of practice? One way is to Headhunt for experts in other firms. You poach talent, so to say. Another way is
to send your personnel off for training in a new technology (Bootcamp or
summer school!). Many firms will perform reverse engineering of a product
they will look at another firms product and take it apart looking to understand how it can be made for their own COP. Firms can also build NOP by
making sure people transfer across units (people across departments), products, and even organizations. Last, firms can employ people who bridge
communities of practice and facilitate knowledge transfer across them. In
schools, one can find this with professional development leaders who work
at multiple schools trying to retrain teachers.
However, just like COPs, NOPs have shortcomings:
1. No community is had, only reach.
2. More learning about than learning to be.
3. Local adaptations are less of an emphasis.
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The technology or means by which org learning occurs is via internal adaptation, where
actors alter routines to fit local realities (what
Brown and Duguid called knowledge).
2.
The participants are members within the organization performing the routines and enacting practices.
3.
4.
5.
Organizational Elements
Technology
Advisory Council of teachers and parents, Curriculum Committee, Reading
(what brings
Recovery, grade level teams (6) and faculty study groups (2) to coordinate
about org
curriculum, flexible staffing, teacher involvement in hiring, team teaching.
learning)
Restructuring Roundup for conferences ! all develops teacher interaction and
within-school networks of practices.
Participants
Teachers, Principal, Parents
Goals
Increase student learning and improve teaching
Social Structure
36 teachers (moderate size) organized in a semi-horizontal fashion (see
committees above). Relations are collaborative teachers are part of a team;
they have some decision-making power and leadership roles. Mrs. Cole, the
principal, is an intellectual leader. While listening to everyone, she still makes
some decisions autonomously.
Environment
Context of Desegregation and White Flight. District reforms include openenrollment magnet schools, school-based management, relief from state
curricula, personnel and testing regulations. 650 students.
by reflecting on their practice. The social structure is small, intimate, and the relationships are collaborative. The principal (leadership) facilitates
and mentors more than imposing her will. Moreover, her focus is on practice. Last, what we know
about the environment is related in the setup of the
school and its history. But the case makes little of
it. Instead, the case zones in on practice, social relations, and rituals fostering reflection and improvement on it. Some of these relations extend
into the environment, but only in order to draw in
or send out knowledge on instructional practice.
Now if we focus on management, we see that
the school instated several routines and institutional arrangements to foster such a learning community. These in turn are feasible managerial
strategies to use in other settings.
The second school Louis and Kruse discuss is
Okanagon Middle School. Okanagon Middle
School is much larger than the elementary school
and with just as disadvantaged a population. Okanagon school is divided into 9 families (also called
small schools); students and faculty of core sub-
83
Organizational Elements
Technology
Interdisciplinary Units - teachers collaborate on the units and work to fit the
(what brings
curriculum to their students learning needs. School divided into ten
about org
Families Core teacher family (science, history, etc.) and Discovery family
learning)
(language, band, special ed). School-wide Evaluation Committee. Community
Council for curriculum with teachers and principal ! all develops teacher
interaction and within-school networks of practice.
Participants
Teachers, Principal
Goals
Educational equity and opportunity for poor urban children.
Social Structure
84 teachers (large) organized in a horizontal fashion. Relations are
collaborative teachers have important decision-making power. Teacher
discretion over staffing, schedules, some resources, and even aspects of the
curriculum. Mr. Stone, the principal, is important but not as autonomous as in
Agassiz.
Environment
Okanagon Community School initially closed due to poor achievement.
Reopened as Okanagon Center for Advanced Academic Studies, a magnet
school focused on performing arts. 1,500 students.
Hence, information is found elsewhere and presented to the rest of the faculty.
There is some issue of coordination across the
families and some debate as to where organizational learning should focus and what standards to
pay special attention to. The school holds a yearly
retreat and the families do find some topics of
agreement. As a result, there has been a push for
greater school-wide coordination. This has created some tension, but it seems to be helping.
If we look to the organizational elements
again, we can begin to see how Okanagon is similar to and different from Agassiz (see table above).
The technology as before - are the tools used to
bring about organizational learning. These again
are all social structural reforms: the school is divided into smaller family units, they form a variety
of different committees and councils that encourage frequent interaction and assessment over practice and achievement. All of Okanagans means of
engaging in learning are relational and cultural just
as it was for Agassiz. The participants of this case
are members of the school staff. Students and par-
84
ents are not really mentioned. The goal of Okanagon is slightly different in that it has a equality and
social justice concern more than Agassiz did. The
social structure is large, but dividing into smaller
units. Relationships are collaborative and the
teachers / families have great influence, whereas
the principal at Agassiz had greater say. Last,
what we know about the environment is related in
the setup of the school and its history. But the
case makes little of it. Instead, just as with Agassiz, the case on Okanagon zones in on practice and
the social relations, culture and rituals fostering reflection and improvement on it. Some of these relations extend into the environment, but only as a
means to drawing in or sending out knowledge on
instructional practice.
Looking at its management, we see that the
school instated several routines and institutional
arrangements to foster such a learning community.
They encourage constant improvement and features of both community of practice (COP) and networks of practice (NOP).
So what do we see in general at these reputed
Learning Schools? The schools frequently seek
out internal and external bases of knowledge in
both local peers and experts beyond the setting.
They both have processes in place that help transfer individual knowledge and expertise (e.g., Agassizs prof development showcase). Both schools
create knowledge via self-appraisal and selfassessment (Okanagons focus on state testing and
the creation of their own standards is evidence of
this.). Both settings search for expertise and
knowledge beyond the school and they seek to disseminate their own beyond their own walls.
Hence, teachers read and attend external groups
and then report back, demonstrating, running seminars, etc in their own school on those topics. Last,
there is systematic learning via structures that facilitate constant contact (Agassizs grade level
meetings, Faculty Study Committees, Restructuring Roundup; or at Okanagons many committees,
Curriculum Committee, Evaluation Committee,
Portfolio Committee).
In the end these schools are cases for how
features of a COP and NOP can be formed, heightening identities and worker commitment, and gar-
nering improvements in organizational performance. It also sounds like a lot of work! - these
teachers are showing up on weekends and staying
late into the evening (4-7pm) so as to improve
their practice. Louis and Kruse argue they arent
experiencing burn out, but is this sustainable?
Will they eventually burn out? Or is this a model
that will sustain commitment and fulfill identities?
Now that we have some sense of an application to
real organizations like schools, what about its relevance to an organization online, in a less traditional case of an organization, like say, the World
of Warcraft?
World of Warcraft
Some of you may have no idea what I am talking about here, so let me explain. The World of
Warcraft (WOW) is a massive multiplayer online
role-playing game (MMORPG) that was created
by Blizzard Entertainment. It is currently the
world's most-subscribed MMORPG (9.1 Million).
85
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:b/be/Ware_guild_original_
logo.png
John Seeley Brown does a nice job of discussing the WOW and why it is a sort of learning
organization. You can view his video directly
here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhuOzBS_OM
Brown argues that the guilds in the World of Warcraft resemble a community of practice and network or practice, and that they are such a learning
organization that they are able to confront a multitude of very complex problems, to coordinate their
efforts, and to collectively learn and remember
what worked well so they can train new personnel
to go out and collaborative solve the same and
new problems on their own. Rather than recount
Browns argument, take a look yourself and see
what you think!
86
87
Summary or Basic
Argument
Action = Maximization of
means to ends.
Dominant Pattern
of Inference
Management
Strategies
Actors in hierarchical
organizational positions. Cue
sequential routines that accomplish
task or solve problem by routines
available (supply issue).
NA
Environment
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social
Structure
Organizational positions
Dividing up problem,
coordinating / activating
organizational actors who have
special capacities / SOPs for parts
of problem, conducting sequential
attention to objectives (localized
searches until problems resolved).
Action guided by processes /
available routines.
Participants
When does it
apply?
Coalitions enemy/friend
Players in positions
Coalitions /
Bureaucratic Politics (BP)
Organized Anarchies /
Garbage Can (GC)
ters 4-5 (pp. 91-146 [and endnotes appended]) in The Social Life of Information.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School
Press.
Brown, John Seely and Paul Duguid.
1991. Organizational Learning and
Communities-of-Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation. Pp. 58-82 in Organizational Learning. Eds. Michael Cohen and Lee Sproull
March, James G. 1994. A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. NY:
The Free Press. Chapter 6, pp. 221-272.
March, James G., Lee Sproull, and Michael
Tamuz. 1991. Learning From Samples of
One or Fewer. Pp. 1-19 in Organizational
Learning. Eds. Michael Cohen and Lee
Sproull (also listed in Organization Science, 2(1), Feb. 1991.). London: Sage.
University Press.
88
6
Organizational Culture
(Source: http://farm3.staticflickr.com/2339/1807614622_61a0cdc0f1_z_d.jpg)
Organizational Culture
I often ask students in my class to perform
an exercise where they got together in small
groups and developed designs for a learning
school. Each group came up with different interesting designs. Their main efforts focused on creating opportunities for discussion about the core
technology of instructional practices -- e.g., having
small schools within schools, as well as gradelevel meetings, departmental meetings, and so on;
opportunities to transfer ideas -- e.g., speaker series, training sessions, rotating teachers through
assignments, mentoring programs; and means of
establishing organizational memory data collection, storage, and analysis, rule formation, mentoring, and so on.
All of their design suggestions established
interactional settings and routines through which
faculty could discuss and study their practice.
They forged a system wherein they could continually self-assess their performance and make sure
their core technology worked well. That said, a
problem became readily apparent. Their designs
assumed teachers would work extra hours, that
there were resources to fund their training, and
where resources were lacking, it was assumed that
the stakeholders would all come together and pick
up the slack. It became clear that a key assumption of the organizational learning approach was
that everyone shares the same values, is willing to
work extra hours, and is on the same page reformwise. In effect, it assumed participants all share
and buy into the same organizational culture. But
what is an organizational culture and how do you
study it? Thats what we will cover in this chapter.
Exploring Organizational Culture
Most of you recognize organizational cultures when you see them. Take Google for example theyre here in Silicon Valley and employ
many thousands of people, some of whom are in
this class from year to year. The company has a
clear logo, and it is emblazoned on all their
shwag, from pens, to shirts, to cars, to even lava
90
In many instances, the traces of cultural practices can be found in formal scripts or rules of conduct. When we reflect on societal cultures we
have certain things in mind, like a code of etiquette, or a procedure or script for dancing. We
may also notice informal customs that emerge and
are not planned, such as customs of style. Below
is a diagram showing changes in skirt fashion
showing hemlines have risen, thereby showing
changes in style.
91
What are the parallel practices within organizations? Within organizations, these practices can
be formal policies, rules, roles, and procedures
like job descriptions, pay distributions, performance assessments, and so on. Examples of formal
policies can also be found in organizational charts
(here the rules are about positions and their relation). But formal policies can also be standard operating procedures (e.g., like rules for promotion,
or as here, rules for processing prisoners). Or
even manuals for operating software or codes of
conduct in an organization. All are formal policies.
Figure - Manuals
(Source http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:KC85-HBS.jpg/800px-KC85-HBS.jpg)
92
Last, Martin and Meyerson argue that cultures differ in the content themes they highlight.
Content themes are abstractions used to organize
interpretations of an organizations practices and
artifacts. One can see these content themes or cultural abstractions being used in the 2012 American
Presidential Election. We hear two candidates
voicing ideological themes that highlight their different values and beliefs (they express normative
arguments vote for life and deregulation versus voting for choice and the middle class.
They express ideational themes that concern interpretations about the meaning of events. For example, that current unemployment is a result of the
prior presidents economic policies or this presidents; that economic reports are a sign of improvement or a sign of continued problems; and so on.
93
Cultural Content
Themes
Integrated
Fragmented
Ambiguity
That said, it is possible there are entrepreneurial firms and schools where
all the employees are committed to a common vision and purpose/ideology
they may actually have an integrated organizational culture.
Martin and Meyerson (1988) explore whether a single firm, OZCO,
has an integrated effort to develop egalitarianism. For there to be an integrated culture of egalitarianism, they would need to identify a series of cultural elements that reinforce and support this claim. Hence, they find that
the firm publicly claims to be egalitarian, has formal and informal practices in place to encourage it, has various stories, rituals, jargon and physical arrangements, that all seem to reinforce and support the existence of
egalitarianism.
A second perspective of organizational culture is that of differentiation or fragmentation. Here, one can regard an organizational culture like
an archipelago or as having different groups or camps with their own perspective and culture. Rather than a uniform culture, there is a differentiated one.
Turning to Martin and Meyerson again, we see them look for instances where egalitarianism is not seen uniformly and there are questions.
For example, egalitarianism as an affirmative action ideology does not fit
the perks and hiring practices being used. In many ways the differentiated
system is conflicted and has countering efforts, or at least efforts pulling
the organizational culture in different directions.
Schools are great examples of such a decoupled system: the administration of a school tends to show the external environment a schools test
95
97
As you can see, it is related in moral and normative terms with mentions of a strong relationships
with customers, mentions of trust, product quality
and universality. What is not to like about it!?
Expert authority is mostly enacted by internal experts. Such experts focus more on the requirements and attributes of a members role. As
insiders, experts give an aura of independence,
practicality, and scientific credibility. A good example of this expert view and identity portrayal
can be seen in the Kundas account of a native anthropologists study of Tech culture (Ellen Cohen).
Her register of speech is often open, pragmatic,
and critical/helpful so seemingly balanced. Her
moral tone is not evident and the ideological faade is acknowledged some. This view is consistent with a managerial perspective but it is less
ideal and more real. The expert even acknowledges downsides and her prescriptions are pragmatic. Role performance is more based on personal success and self-help. That said, the expert
is still viewed as partisan by employees.
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ager does a presentation, voices a slogan, or interacts in a meeting, they act as an employee (not as a
father or mother) and as an agent of the firm.
Even people listening in the audience play their
role complement, expecting professional behavior
and a style of interaction that makes the everyday
reality of living in Tech seem different from elsewhere but seemingly valid and natural.
We can see Tech rituals everywhere. We just
have to look. If you recall Martin and Meyersons
focus on cultural elements, you will see many of
the same elements discussed in Kunda. Ritual
presentations of self are most often observed in
persons behavioral displays. At many organizations, these are time-bound interactions specific to
a particular audience and setting. In these interactions, we see people present and attempt to establish a positive definition of their self. They wrangle and maneuver so as to do a good job and to
come off in certain ways. We see these displays
most frequently in presentations, question-&answer sessions, and meetings (notably, all are decision arenas).
They are also in the mundane, private, everyday chatter at lunch, in back offices, and at the water cooler. We can also see presentations of self in
artifactual displays when we walk by work spaces
or observe participants dress. These are standing
exhibits of self meant for passerbys and bystanders. At Tech these exhibits are found at desks
where they display personal mementos, Tech stuff
and humorous jokes about the company.
One can see distinct types of artifactual display at Stanford depending on which department
you walk through. For example, walk down the
hallway of the law school and the computer science departments. At the law school their offices
resemble a lawyers office with cherry wood, Lshaped desks, neat shelves, and so on. In addition,
they dress relatively formal in comparison to the
rest of campus. By contrast, in the computer science department, the faculty offices are casual,
toys and equipment are strewn about, and the professors dress in t-shirts and sneakers (or flipflops). A very different notion of organizational
self exists in those two parts of campus and one
can readily infer it from mere standing exhibits!
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We can capture and record behavioral and artifactual displays in a variety of ways through interviews we get personal accounts of self, through
observation and recording we get a record of talk,
interpersonal behavior, and exhibits. Through active note-taking and involvement, we can even
form understandings of these encounters as if we
are participants (as opposed to foreigners). All of
these devices help us compile evidence on how ritual interactions shape the workers organizational
self.
Upon observing many such interpersonal rituals and speaking with Tech employees, Kunda
comes to observe a persistent pattern or style to
these interactions. Tech rituals have at least two
features:
2. Tech ideology is one of openness, informality, individual initiative and real feelings.
Hence, symbolic power is often exerted subtly. It is revealed in brief episodes of social
drama, like question & answer sessions in
talks where some individuals seem to establish authority (and if you recall that can be
of several forms managerial, expert, and
external).
Some people just come off
smarter, they project a self and statements
others identify with, and in character-jousts
like disagreements, or debates they tend to
win.
rituals in meetings, talks, presentations, and the minor disagreements and gaffes, that persons come to
exert norms of behavior and guide presentations of
self so they reflect and reinforce Tech culture.
Individual Reactions to Organizational Culture
Thus far, we have described how Tech culture is a normative culture developed and imposed
as a means of normative control. The company engineers the culture to acquire greater worker commitment and to increase worker efficiency. And
this is accomplished by having members enact a
variety of behavioral displays or interpersonal rituals, where standards and identities are assessed
and redirected in ideological ways. In this manner, the firm hopes to go deep into the persons psyche to have them embrace their organizational
self as their virtual one and from this all sorts of
company gains will result. But how do Tech employees react to these presentation rituals of self
and the seeping in of an organizational culture and
identity? Are they fine with it? Do they dearly
value the organizational self they portray? Or do
they feel like a tool, or like they are just playing
a part? Do they resist and play an ambivalent self?
How do they respond to Tech culture?
Kunda writes that employees respond in
several ways. The most common outcome is the
expression of role-embracement here, this embracement is expressed whole-heartedly in talks by
top level management; it is reserved and tentative
in training workshops; and pragmatic / conflictual
in work group meetings. Participants who embrace their role (like managers) may experience
some emotional dissonance. In those instances
their perception of an acted role and the experience of an authentic self, become hard to disentangle. They find it hard to have an identity distinct
from the one they have at work.
A second reaction is to engage in role distance. Here, the Tech employee suspends their
role-embracement in the process of performing behavioral displays. We have all seen individuals
suspect their formal role and organizational self.
When I teach, I may drop my teacher role at the
beginning or end of class, during transitions and
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that can be seen as a fatal flaw is now itself ritualized! This creates a potentially unstable balance
between role-distance and embracement that constantly calls into question the authenticity of experiences associated with the member role for persons targeted by normative control.
Presentation rituals are vehicles of enacting,
enforcing and reinforcing the sanctioned display of
member roles and are thus a mechanism mediating
normative demands and responses. The mediating
role of rituals is not simple though! They can juxtapose a variety of themes and stances: for example,
they can juxtapose ideology and common sense;
notions of obligation and choice; seriousness and
humor; affirmation and denial; internal and external viewpoints; participation and withdrawal.
Switching between embracement and distance
forms a web of normative pressures.
In the end, you have to wonder if a strong
organizational culture leaves room for individual
freedom of expression. What is real and prescribed here about your self? Even the contrived
self one that you accomplish by social skill and
by switching between embracement and distance
is something the organization prescribes and rewards. Think of all the managers who effectively
do this performance and dance. They are not that
unique! It is sort of like the rebellious kid. Sure
they rebel, but they rebel much like all the other
kids and are not that unique.
Not all members are invested equally in
Tech. Some members are marginal, like temps
and what Kunda calls wage 2 class earners. They
are not subject to same role demands and organizational ideology, so they are exempt to a degree because demands on their self are reduced. At same
time, it makes some of them feel left out and they
develop an estranged view.
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In sum, actors engage in two efforts at selfpreservation: (1) they attempt to control and stake
boundaries to their other selves by managing time
and separating work from non-work; (2) and they
seek to control their cognitive and affective responses at work when they are enacting their organizational self.
So lets sum up Kundas argument. According to Kunda, organizational cultures are a means
to normative control or an ideology. The ideology
is enacted and instilled in members via presentation rituals. These rituals are like layers of control
plied on. Lower status workers are under utilitarian control (they want pay!), but higher ranking
workers are under cultural and utilitarian control.
They sell their selves to the company! Now this
might be desirable or not. And most every true
member of an organization performs some roledistancing. In so doing, they free up other features
of their self independent of the company. But
even so, the higher one goes, the more roleembracement is needed and the distancing becomes part of a contrived self and an act.
But ask yourself something - is Kunda viewing organizational culture as a cup half empty
when maybe we can see it as a cup half full? If
I do not embrace my organizational self, then I
must be embracing another self in other spheres of
my life. For example, one might embrace being a
youth league soccer coach. Why is that organizational self more sacred? What if my organizational self at Stanford also serves some good? Is it
ok then? Or perhaps Kunda is saying any roleembracement has this quality of becoming more
and more of our virtual self? And that with any
role we fully embrace, we eventually assume a
self-referential perspective on it. But then this
process is merely descriptive of our being in an organizational world and how we manage our selves
more generally in todays society.
I do not have all the answers. I just know
Kunda hit on something profound. We want to create an integrated organizational culture and for employees to embrace it in many of the organizations
we hope to found and manage. And yet we have
this precarious relation with our self when participating in such an organization.
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Technology
(how solutions get decided)
Participants
Goals
(what probs to resolve)
Social Structure
Environment
Management Strategies
Organizational Culture
References
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic
Kunda, Gideon. 1992. Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Martin, Joanne. 1992. Cultures in Organizations:
Three Perspectives. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Martin, Joanne and Debra Meyerson. 1988. Organizational Cultures and the Denial, Channeling
and Acknowledgment of Ambiguity. Chapter 6
(pp. 93-125) in Managing Ambiguity and Change,
L. Pondy, R. Boland, and H. Thomas (Eds).
Martin, Joanne, Peter J. Frost, and Olivia A.
ONeill. 2004. Organizational Culture: Beyond
Struggles for Intellectual Dominance. To appear
in S. Clegg, C. Hardy, W. Nord, and T. Lawrence, (Eds.) Handbook of Organization Studies,
second edition, London: Sage Publications.
Van Maanen, John and Gideon Kunda. 1991.
"The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland." Pp. 5876 in Reframing Organizational Culture (eds. Peter Frost et al). Sage.
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7
Resource Dependency
Theory
Environment
Tech
Core
Firm
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Technical)
Social)
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Types of Resources
What does Stanford need to survive? Does it need students? Does it require a physical location, books, teachers, students, money, heating,
food? What can it live without? Is there demand for safety, healthy food,
expert teachers, and awards? For example, what is the greatest demand
of Stanford alumni it is sustaining high SAT scores, winning national
championships (prestige)? What resources are considered most and least
important?
On the other hand, does the availability, or supply of the resource
influence its value? Is the resource scarce? Do only some of the other
organizations have it? How concentrated is the resource? Are there alternatives to the resource? Can another kind of resource be substituted for
it? Who else has it? Lets consider Stanford again what does it offer
that is unique and that no other can provide? Discretion over a resource
also defines relations of resource dependence. Discretion is defined in
two ways: First, who controls the resource? Can the exchange partner dictate how you use the resource? Is the resource regulated by the government (changing districting to increase resource / student pool)? Is your
firm dependent on the supplier (materials and funds) or consumer (students / families)? Second, what controls dependencies? (laws) Are there
copyrights or contract licenses (curriculum)?
In sum, resource dependence varies from a variety of factors: there
are different types of resources, and they can vary in value due to their importance and availability. And then certain actors and institutions can control discretion over them. Now clearly, important and rare resources are
of greater value. Moreover, actors and institutions that have the greatest
discretion over them (and least amount of dependence) will be the most
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autonomous and capable for forging certain relations with other firms in the environment.
and, if necessary, proper exclusion. For example, many schools track and stream students. This classifies inputs (students) into
homogeneous ability groups so as to buffer
instruction from uncertainty (when you have
students of wide ability, your technology or
curriculum in this case is variably received
and has uncertain effects.
2. Second, firms can buffer their core tasks by
stockpiling. Organizations can collect and
hold raw materials or products, thereby controlling the rate at which inputs are inserted
into the technical core or outputs are released
to the environment. It is easy to imagine this
for raw materials like wood needed for furniture manufacturing. But another example of
this can be found in universities. A good portion of a universitys budget is dependent on
grants, but granting agencies can change the
amount of funding they make available, and
some years faculty fail to secure those funds
(so you have cycles of feast and famine!).
This is partly why universities are increasingly concerned with securing endowments
and gift funds. Universities with large endowments can stockpile funds and dip into
them during difficult times and maintain the
same number of students in their programs.
3. A third strategy entails leveling, or smoothing. Leveling is an attempt by the organization to reduce fluctuations in input or output.
Whereas stockpiling is a passive response,
leveling entails a more active attempt to
reach out into the environment so as to motivate suppliers of inputs or to stimulate demand for its outputs. Here, an example
might be a district (or even a university
again) advertising its strengths so that enrollments and housing values stay high. By creating demand, they sustain inputs in a recession.
4. A fourth maneuver entails forecasting If environmental fluctuations cannot be handled
by stockpiling or by leveling, organizations
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last concerns their salary. The school board approves 1-5, but not 6, since they regard the last
one to be a private demand cloaked in socially legitimate trappings.
The norm evoked here is one of informal expectations about trust and honesty. The managements job is to note where normative constraints
affect dependence relations, noting whether they
are beneficial, and if not, to seek ways to change
them via persuasion. And thats what happened
when the school board rejected the teachers 6th demand.
Unfortunately, normative coordination
does not always work, and free-riding and opportunism can burn an organization (e.g., one assumes that teachers will not strike during school
year, but that does not always happen). Hence, additional bridging efforts are typically sought.
A second pre-bridging tactic is to bargain.
Here the manager uses a family of tactics to ward
off impending dependence relations. The firms negotiate and exchange in an attempt to prevent the
resource relation from becoming imbalanced. We
saw this type of bargaining occur in the week on
coalitions, so we can gloss over it here.
More serious forms of bridging involve exchange, or the mutual giving up of autonomy for
an exchange of resources. Firms can do this
through contracting. There, the firm attempts to
reduce uncertainty by coordinating their future behavior in limited, specific ways. They define the
rules of inter-organizational contact and exchange.
Negotiated contracts are an excellent way to acquire greater certainty in environmental relations.
For example, it does not hurt to have routine negotiation with teacher unions about their contracts so
as to avoid strikes.
Another, form of exchange can arise via the
creation of interlocking directorates. Here, members of competing organizations are given a position within the central organization that oversees
them (e.g., a board of directors). By being on each
others boards, the firms trade away their sovereignty in exchange for some mutual support. By
giving external members a role, the organization
accomplishes the partial co-optation of an external
organizations interests as their own, but also gives
up some of its control. A focal organization may
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then become more effective in an environment because they have coopted external members that
might have control over resources central to its
functioning.
For example, I had a student write up a case on
Stanfords Committee of Undergraduate Education
when it was formed several years back (Pope
2006). The committee was trying to reform the undergraduate curriculum and it encountered a good
deal of resistance from the environment and stakeholders. In response, the committee was organized via a Noahs Ark model where they secured
representatives from all the environmental stakeholder organizations: 1 undergraduate from the student council, 1 graduate students from the student
council, etc. This opened up representation but
also co-opted their dissent in the process. The administration gave up some control for greater effectiveness in the environment of vocal stakeholders.
Another form of resource exchange can arise
in hierarchical contracts. These are contracts developed to manage dependencies via conditional
clauses evoking hierarchical mechanisms to handle disputes. It is a contract that preserves and defines the rights of parties in case some problem of
contingency arises. For example, it can be a
clause for subcontracts ensuring full pay if the subcontractor does not come through. These are more
complete and detailed exchanges or developed contracts.
A more extensive means of bridging with
other firms can entail the pooling of resources
across them. One means of accomplishing this is
to engage in a joint venture. Here, two or more organizations create a new organization in order to
pursue a common purpose. For example, two private schools pool their resources to create a daycare center to serve teachers and their children,
thereby reducing the uncertainty of teacher attrition / retention.
Firms can also enter strategic alliances as a
means of pooling resources. These are agreements
between two or more organizations to pursue joint
objectives through the coordination of activities or
sharing of resources. For example, Berkeley and
Stanford have a courtesy program where students
can take courses at one anothers university.
Producer
Supplier
Supplier
Now firms also can perform a complete pooling of resources or total absorption through
mergers. This can arise in several forms. First,
the firms can perform a vertical merger. Here, the
firm extends control over exchanges vital to its operation. Hence, a high school would merge with a
middle school, or a manufacturer / producer would
buy out a supplier to get control and to create certainty of supply. Firms can also perform horizontal mergers. They can accomplish this by taking
over their competition, thereby reducing uncertainty and increasing organizational power in their
exchange relations. An example of this would be
when one high school takes over another one so
that it can benefit from economies of scale and
pool resources. This actually arises sometimes in
rural areas of the United States where a township
high school is created as a merger of several
smaller rural high schools. Last, one can engage
in diversification. This is a Method for decreasing
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had tax exempt status, Chicago did not; Northwestern had a safe neighborhood, Chicago did not; Chicago had prestige and reputation, Northwestern
did not; Chicago was innovative, Northwestern
was not. Chicago was international, Northwestern
was local. Chicago was theoretical, Northwestern
was applied. Together, the two could benefit from
each others strengths and lose their weaknesses.
In addition, the merger has some financial
benefits. Merging would save each university
$1.7M in annual upkeep and better economies of
scale. And both institutions seemed to recognize
this, and the negotiation moved swimmingly along
until they broadened representation on Northwesterns review panel so as to begin vetting the
merger with larger constituents. Alumni and resistant groups were now included, and they saw
things as too rushed. When the two schools got
down to details, the merger began to unravel: Chicago wanted to keep its college and undergraduate
program, so that would still compete with Northwestern Universitys program; and neither wanted
to lose their medical school or education school.
The merger also fell apart because a key proponent on the Northwestern University board of
trustees died. Also, when the Northwestern University review panel expanded, damaging news
and gossip leaked into the press upsetting alumni.
The gossip was to the effect that the merger was
already decided, that it was a takeover, that it
was a last ditch effort by Hutchins to save his
failed presidency; that NW would lose its
identity, etc. The discourse was partisan and both
social support and public focus on the mutual gain
fell asunder.
So what can resource dependence theory tell
us about this case? Lets briefly review resource
dependence theory again. When does resource dependence theory apply? It has relevance to a case
when there are focal organizations interested in decreasing competition, increasing autonomy, increasing power, and (possibly) increasing efficiency. The main mode of organizing action is to
scan the environment for resource opportunities
and threats, attempt to strike favorable bargains so
as to minimize dependence and maximize auton-
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Case: Merger of
Northwestern
University and the
University of
Chicago.
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Goals
Social Structure
Management Strategies
Environment
Participants
changes in dependence)
Technology
Key Elements
Horizontal merger
Horizontal merger
Robert Hutchins
University of Chicago
Walter Scott
Northwestern University
Summary/Basic Argument -- The resource dependence perspective suggests that organizations seek to avoid dependence and uncertainty.
for Northwestern. Chicago was experiencing major economic woes that hurt all aspects of the university. However, these economic pressures were
supposedly greater for Northwestern than for Chicago.
In sum, simply identifying the organizational
elements and how they are characterized in the
case reveals how the two organizations differed.
They had very different social structures and
goals, and Chicago was slightly less financially dependent on the environment than NW.
Lets consider the different managerial concerns these two schools had. For Northwestern
there was much to be gained from the horizontal
merger, but also some to lose. There were certain
resources it wanted to retain. It wanted to retain
the tax break it got (a buffer) as part of its charter.
It was willing to lose its graduate programs if it
could retain its applied professional schools and
undergraduate program. In exchange it would get
an elite graduate program and international prestige. In addition, it would co-opt its regional competition for students, faculty, funding, etc.
Chicago on the other hand wanted the benefit of Northwesterns tax break. But it was not
very willing to lose its professional programs and
undergraduate college.
It wanted to keep its
school of education, medical school and college
Chicago was working for an edge! In some regards, Chicago saw the merger as an opportunity
to move its less desirable programs off-site (applied programs). Last, it saw this as a chance to
co-opt its competition and form a world-leading
super-university.
Resource dependence theory would approach
this case with a focus on the different levels of dependence. And it would cite those levels as a reason for Chicagos more aggressive approach and
the merger failure. It would note that Chicago
tried to change the rules of the merger toward a
more asymmetric contract and that Northwestern
saw this as a violation of normative coordination.
Other theories seem to help with the details of this
case. The internal workings of each schools deciding bodies are better characterized by coalition theory. There we can see how the build-up to a contract and merger required a good deal of political
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Summary or
Basic
Argument
Dominant
Pattern of
Inference
Management
Strategies
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social
Structure
Participants
Environment
Organizational Culture
Technology
(how solutions
get decided)
When does it
apply?
References
tion Books.
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8
Network Forms of
Organization
Social'Network'Perspec1ve'on'Organiza1ons
In this chapter, I will describe how organizations researchers look at social networks within
organizations. In addition, I will describe how
some theorists contend there is a network form of
organization that is distinct from hierarchical organizations and markets. So this week, I will relate two perspectives: a purely analytic one that describes networks within organizations, and a theoretical one concerning a prescribed form of interorganizational association that can result in better
outputs.
Lets start with the social network perspective. The social network perspective embraces the
notion of social embeddedness as related by Mark
Granovetter (1985). He argues that, on the one
hand, economics and market accounts of behavior
are under-socialized: actors behave as if their actions are unfettered by social contexts. On the
other hand, sociologists and institutional accounts
of behavior are over-socialized, and relate social
actions as socially deterministic and devoid of
choice. He posits the notion of embeddedness as a
middle ground, where social action is embedded in
transactional networks. This embedding applies
even to economic transactions in markets. It is
within those structures that we decide and act in
intentional ways.
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! Stage 2
! Stage 3
In this chapter, I will present to you some basic concepts used by social network scholars studying organizations (for review, see Kilduff and Tsai;
Borgatti). In so doing, I hope you come to see it
as a distinct empirical approach that you can possibly apply in the organizations you participate
within.
A network analyst typically asks and answers
a series of questions when they study a firm. First
they ask about the unit of analysis and the boundary of a network. They try to define what the network is and where it begins and ends. Many network analysts will focus on the individuals within
a firm and how they associate. However, it is not
always possible to study everyone in a firm. For
example, when studying schools, network analysts
may only study the teachers and students within a
classroom or school. As such, they recognize natural boundaries to the core work environment, but
they will forgo studying support staff, counselors
and parents. The same occurs when the analyst
studies a firm. They may focus only on managers
and employees who are in the building or a particular division, and they will ignore the clients, support staff, etc. In these cases of exclusion, the analyst is defining a nominal boundary to the organization, and it is important they consider whether that
boundary is sensible given the phenomena they
want to study. For example, a focus on teachers at
the exclusion of students may be an acceptable
boundary to define, if the concern is with how
managers exchange information on instruction and
pedagogy. If you think managers learn most of
their pedagogy from students telling them what
other teachers do, then it could be a problem for
your study and the conclusions you draw.
Analysts also look at larger units of analysis
like sets of firms and their relations. Here they
study a field of organizations and the transactions
they mutually recognize as most relevant to their
firms functioning. For example, in Powells 2005
paper in the American Journal of Sociology, he
looked at the field of biotechnology and included
in his sample universities, biotech companies,
banks, venture capital firms, and government granting agencies that were all co-partnering on patents,
sharing commerce relations, transferring experts,
and so on. As such, his work tries to capture the
boundary around an entire organizational field as
seen by those participants. That is often hard to
do, so many analysts will focus on one type of
firm and their core transactions and ignore others
for example, there have been ample studies of venture capital firms and their networks of copartnering on inventions.
Next the analysts ask (often implicitly)
what is the unit of time? When does the network
begin and end? At issue here is the temporal
boundary to the social structure in question. Most
confront the issue of temporal boundaries by considering which relationships are most important to
the organization. Are they transactions on a discussion forum; are they exchanges done each quarter
of the year; are they yearly contracts that have rela-
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Figure. Aggregations of classroom interactions by unit of time (Source: Bender-de Moll and McFarland)
tive permanence? And then they have to ask during which time period will they study the firm?
Will they look at exchanges occurring only in the
first week of a new technology being rolled out,
the span of a project (e.g., this whole course), or
over multiple years?
The unit of time issue matters since it has implications for how transactions aggregate into different patterns. Take the simple case of a classroom. If we look at interactions by the minute,
well see sequences of dyadic or pair-wise exchanges. If we look at interactions aggregated
over 5 minutes, we see the network structure
change from one activity (of say lecture) to another (of say groupwork). And if we aggregate all
transactions across 35 minutes, we start to see the
general interactions of the classroom as a central
tendency of association. Hence, your unit of time
presumes different notions of social structure
from the structure of momentary interactions, to
activities and practices, to social norms. As an analyst, you need to ask yourself if you are trying to
understand the structure of micro-routines, larger
tasks, or group norms, and from that you can decide the unit of time to adopt. Once a social network analyst has a sense of where and when important relations occur and when and where the network begins and ends, they can start to study the
quality of relations and analyze the network.
There are many kinds of transactions that occur within and between firms. A good analyst will
go to the heart of the matter. They will listen to
the clients concerns and seek out the most relevant types of transaction. These relations are typically observed behaviors or they are ones the subjects perceive. Observed relations can be identified in company records, observations and even
reports. Perceived relations are typically reported
by the subjects and require surveys or interviews.
Clearly, the focus on perceived relations implies
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Now lets impose the network of collaborations on these actors. In particular, lets look at
where coauthoring of publications happen. They
happen mostly in medicine, the hard sciences and
engineering.
Notably they collaborate more
within those fields than between them, but there is
a good deal of crossover. By contrast, social scientists and humanists mostly publish alone.
Now lets look at grant collaborations. Notice the network shifts and we get a second hub of
dense collaboration within engineering.
But
again, there is clear clustering and some inter-field
collaboration across engineering and medicine.
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Rawlings and I have studied how faculty productivity diffuses through collaboration networks (Rawlings and McFarland 2011). We found that a university improves its grant record by getting successful
grant-seekers to collaborate with novice grantseekers. Such collaborations improved application
rates, success rates, and the amounts awarded.
The diffusion of expertise was even greater when
these collaborations were repeated more than
once, thereby ensuring novices learned how to get
grants on their own and with others in the university. By contrast, persons who did not collaborate
struggled to win awards.
In other work, the conduit of influence is not
a strong tie, but a weak one. Granovetter has written some seminal work on social networks, and in
particular he has made a strong case for the importance and usefulness of weak ties (1974). In his
research on job seeking, he found that most people
learn about a job and acquire it through weak ties
and indirect ties (friends of friends) rather than
their close friends. He argues this occurs because
weak ties often bridge groups and bring more
unique information. Persons relying on strong ties
and cliques mostly found redundant information.
Hence, the person with weak ties was more able to
access knowledge about jobs.
Strong and weak ties are often characterized
as bonding and bridging forms of social capital
or types of association that bring social advantages. Strong ties and bonding capital generate social control and conformity as well as socialization
or diffusion, while weak ties and bridging capital
often extend a persons reach into pools of useful
information. Strong and weak ties imply the creation of certain network configurations and network
positions. Hence, I want to turn to positional effects next.
A common finding within organizations is
that persons occupying certain positions have an
advantage, like access to recognition and information, and this enables the occupant to be successful
in their career.
The same is said of interorganizational networks. Organizations assuming
prominent and brokerage positions tend to survive,
grow and have greater control and influence on the
field of organizations they are embedded in.
129
130
131
plish and engineer different structures of association? In my work on high school adolescent networks, we find they vary in macro-structure from
school to school and classroom to classroom.
Some of these settings entail hierarchical worlds
like the first image, and others are heavily segregated and clustered like the second. Nevertheless,
friendship networks are all shaped by the same
sorts of tie formation mechanisms homophily,
propinquity, reciprocity and hierarchicalization.
This raises a conundrum? If the same micromechanisms apply to every friendship network,
then how is it their patterns vary?
132
133
! Resource Dependence
"
! Network Organization
"
Broader context of
relationships
134
135
Key Factors
Hierarchy
Network
Market
Normative basis
Employment
relationship
Complementary
strengths
Contract property
rights
Means of
communication
Routines
Relational
Prices
Mode of conflict
resolution
Norms of reciprocity
Haggling resort to
courts
Degree of flexibility
Low
Medium
High
Amount of
commitment
Medium to high
Medium to high
Low
Tone of climate
Formal, Bureaucratic
Open-ended, mutual
benefits
Precision and/or
suspicion
Actor preferences
Dependent
Interdependent
Independent
Networked
Organizations:
Neither Hierarchy
nor Markets "
"
(Adapted from Powell 1990: 300)
had become possible because many organizations had become increasingly specialized and information technologies (phone, fax, email, teleconferencing, computing, etc.) made it feasible for them to coordinate delivery of services.
Woody Powell was one of the first to describe network organization
as an intermediary form between hierarchies and markets, and he elaborated its distinct logic of exchange (1990). You can find this paper in the
additional readings of the week. Powell argues that network organizations are neither market, nor hierarchy. They entail more enduring and
diffuse connections than markets but more reciprocal and egalitarian arrangements than hierarchies.
Lets look at an adapted table from Powells 1990 article where
these forms of organizing are compared. I have reordered and slightly edited the table for ease of presentation here. Powell goes through a variety
of organizational features and processes and contrasts them for each type.
For example, we all recall what a hierarchical form of organization is: it
is a centralized organizational chart with levels of reporting that winnow
down like a pyramid to the top. In these systems, the normative basis of
association is an employment relation (reporting); the means of communicating entail established routines; conflict is resolved by administrativeoversight; there is little flexibility in procedures; worker commitment to
the firm is medium to high; the tone of the climate is formal and bureaucratic and actor preferences are dependent on the firm and its centralized
actors.
136
137
"
"
"
"
138
ones that have fewer resources and work to become more efficient. Or they are agencies that
find themselves unable to perform the task required or they want to distance themselves from
the work they need performed. As such, the
agency coordinates the web of service providers or
they hire a coordinator.
Many US government agencies have adopted
the network form of organization. Government
agencies contract out more and more tasks to private companies (for and not-for-profit forms) in
the belief that competition among providers will
increase efficiency. Today, public agencies find
themselves working in a world of partnerships and
networks (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). They
form alliances that include mixtures of agencies,
large and small organizations, and so on. This sort
of network form of organization is seen as a viable
alternative to large-scale corporations and hierarchical public bureaucracies. Goldsmith and Eggers describe how government agencies hire contractors and they hire subcontractors in an effort to
provide a service. In those instances, the agency
integrates and coordinates the web. But in other
instances, the government agency either wants
more distance with the service, or they find a third
party provider can coordinate better. Here, there
forms a slightly different structure.
So government organizations find themselves working in a context of partnerships and alliances. In short, they are engaged in networks of
smaller and larger organizations that span public
and private sectors, and this is widely seen as an
alternative form of organizing in comparison to
large-scale corporations and public bureaucracies.
Many of you can probably relate a variety of
examples of network forms of organizing in your
respective industries and parts of the world. I will
give you a few examples. Goldsmith and Eggers
describe the Golden Gate National Recreation
Area (see image on prior page), and how it heavily
relies on partners to take care of the parks and
their services. Only 18% of park services rely on
forest service employees the rest relies on partners.
We can also consider the Iraq War as an example where firms like Bechtel and Halliburton
were contractors that coordinated a variety of services and worked on the reconstruction effort.
Now I do not know the details of this operation
and how it went. But in terms of network organization, it is an interesting case. One could arguably
believe that there was little local Iraqi trust for the
United States agencies. Is that why contracting
firms were used? And even then, was their much
trust to make the network form of organizing helpful? And again, I have to plead ignorance here,
but I think it interesting to ponder how the network form of organizing was applied and how it
performed in such a context.
A final example for the network form of organizing is the Manhattan Project (see image next
page). Here, over a dozen universities and a network of scientists, engineers, military agencies
and service providers were brought together to create an atomic bomb. To many, the project was
such a success that they now see it as a network
form they want to repeat in other areas of knowledge creation. So for example, I am often asked to
study interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary projects and centers that bring together a heterogeneous set of individuals and ask them to learn from
one another and create new ideas they never would
form if they stayed in their respective disciplinary
silos. The model of organizing is very much a network form. And many see it as a potentially powerful one for organizations engaged in todays
knowledge economy.
Why do network forms of organization like
this come about? In chapter 1 of their text, Goldsmith and Eggers relate a few reasons why governments use network organization, but we can extend it to firms more generally (2004). The first
reason is that a firm lacks the capacity to provide a
service and that it must rely on other firms. For
the government, this means the use of for profit
and non-profit firms as contracts and subcontracts.
The second reason is to provide more integrated
services. Outsourcing alone is not enough. It
merely creates 4 subcontractors and narrow channels to a service that would have existed via 4 government agencies anyway. Network organization
calls upon agencies and subcontractors to join-up
or partner horizontally and vertically so as to pro-
139
"
"
"
141
142
References
Bender-deMoll, Skye and McFarland, Daniel A.
(alphabetical listing). 2006. The Art and Science
of Dynamic Network Visualization. Journal of Social Structure, vol. 7, no. 2.
Borgatti, Stephen P. and P.C. Foster. 2003. A Network Paradigm in Organizational Research: A Review and Typology. Journal of Management
29(6):991-1013.
Cross, R., Liedtka, J. & Weiss, L. (2005). A Practical Guide To Social Networks. Harvard Business
Review 83(3), pp. 124-132.
Dahlander, Linus and Daniel A. McFarland. 2013.
Ties that Last: A Longitudinal Study of Tie Formation and Persistence. Administrative Science
Quarterly 58 (1)69110.
Davis, Gerald F. and Walter W. Powell. 1992.
Selection from Organization-Environment Relations (pp. 334-341). In Handbook of Industrial
and Organizational Psychology, Vol 3 (2nd ed.).
Eds. Marvin D. Dunnette and Leaetta M Hough.
Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists.
143
9
Neoinstitutional Theory
(Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Young_Afghan_girls_inside_the_classroom_of_Aliabad_School-2012.jpg;
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Newells_classroom.jpg/; http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Classroom_in_India.jpg;
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BMS_classrooms.jpg; http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ashs-learning-common-miro.jpg))
Neoinstitutional Theory
In this chapter, we will continue our discussion of organizations as open-systems whose survival depends on their relation with the environment. In particular, we will discuss one of the prevailing organizational theories stemming from sociology, called neoinstitutional theory. In oversimplified terms, one can think of neoinstitutional theory as arguing that an organizations survival depends on its fit with the cultural environment.
That is, a firms success depends on whether it
adopts structures that are deemed rational and legitimate in the external environment; that the firm
mirrors environmental beliefs about what a legitimate organization of that type should look like.
Neoinstitutional theory has always been one of the
harder theories for students to fully grasp, so I
have organized the chapter to be a little repetitive.
I will discuss many of the core concepts twice and
relate them in different ways so you get a better
sense for what this theory conveys.
Introduction to Neoinstitutional Theory
Neoinstitutional theory tries to explain institutional isomorphism, or how the same organizational forms develop, spread, and become legitimated in one sphere of activity after another. The
theory tries to explain how and why spheres of activity, like organizational fields of biotechnology
or education, are composed of organizations that
look more alike than they differ. Lets take the example of the organizational field of education:
why do most schools and classrooms look the
same? I recall talking with one of the founders of
neoinstitutional theory, John Meyer, and he recounted his travels all over the world visiting
schools and classrooms. He described how he had
visited typical American schools; poor subSaharan villages with classes taught outside in
these ground indentations without chairs and tables; how he had seen religious fundamentalist
schools in Saudi Arabia where boys and girls were
taught separately; and even wealthy Western
schools with computer tablets in every hand. In
spite of the different locations and cultural distances traversed, all had enough similarities that
one knew right away what kind of organization it
was, and what scripts were being referenced -they were all school classrooms!
In many regards, all these settings conform
to widely held institutional beliefs about what
schooling entails. These beliefs and conceptions
are cultural-cognitive controls, or deep social
structures in the environment. As Richard Scott
relates, they are sets of beliefs developed in social interaction, provide models, schema, and
guidelines for governing and guiding behavior in
social situations (Scott 2003:119).
Institutional controls are practiced in several
forms (Scott 1995:34-45). An explicit form of institutional control is practiced through regulations
or regulatory institutions. These constrain behavior through rules or laws and behavioral inducements like incentives and punishments. A second,
deeply ingrained institutional control is normative.
Normative controls guide what we should or
should not do, or how we should and should not
appear. In great part, these are informal rules and
guidelines, but they are just as influential on organizational behavior as laws and regulations. Last,
there are institutions that run very deep and these
are cognitive beliefs. Scott argues that compliance
with cognitive institutions occurs in many circumstances because other types of behavior are inconceivable. Cognitive beliefs are naturalized, taken
for granted ways of doing things, such as take for
granted routines and activities (Scott 1995:40-45).
In many instances, these institutions are layered on top of each other in reinforcing ways like
an onion. But in some instances they conflict and
segments in the environment adhere to one set
over another. As such, the cultural environment
can be varied. Organizations typically respond by
building that external complexity into their internal, formal structure, however.
I always find it easiest to distinguish the
three forms of institutions with the example of a
sport. I am going to take the game of soccer and
describe how these three institutional controls can
be layered so as to make the performance of soccer games relatively the same and recognizable.
145
Different contexts of
soccer activity "
(Sources: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:StateLibQld_1_194039_Shot_for_goal_duri
ng_a_soccer_match_in_Brisbane
%2C_ca._1937.jpg/; http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Uz_vs_Jap_2009-Free_kick_%28before
%29.JPG; http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Israel_v_Brazil_1.jpg/; http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Defense.gov_photo_essay_100503F-3745E-376.jpg)
What are the regulatory controls of soccer? Those are the rulebooks
and rules of soccer, as well as the referees acting as agents to enforce
them. Penalties are incurred for violating the rules in this case.
What about normative controls? The norms of soccer characterize
our notions of better and worse players, better and worse sportsmanship,
and so on. Norms lead players to act in certain styles within the tacit activities and routines they enact.
What is a cognitive or deeper form of institutional control? Cognitive institutions are taken-for-granted routines. For soccer, these entail
the activity of soccer itself. It is inconceivable that someone would approach the game of soccer using a different activity schema and roles of
say basketball. The enactment of a soccer game is taken for granted and
persons engage in it unquestionably. If they do not, everyone gets upset:
norms and regulations are violated. And we find this cognitive layer
when we go to different contexts of soccer play. Regardless of whether it
is a game in 1937, a playground game, or even one on a beach, all of
them share a family of resemblance in their routine such that we regard
them as soccer.
So multiple institutions can control behavior and render them into
scripted forms that are deemed legitimate and ideal. For any organization
their actions might be driven by taken for granted routines and activities,
norms and expectations of best practices and players, and explicit surface
regulations catching violations. John Meyer, Brian Rowan, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell were some of the first neoinstitutional theorists,
146
Now that you have an initial sense for neoinstitutional theory, let us contrast it with theories
discussed previously in the course. In particular, I
think it helps to compare neoinstitutional theory to
prior open system views and to prior cultural arguments since they are the most relevant. As you recall, resource dependence theory offers strategies
thought to be effective in exchange environments.
In contrast, neo-institutionalism offers strategies
thought to be effective in environments replete
with institutionalized beliefs about organizations
and their appearances. There is a shift here in how
firms view and respond to their environment: from
a logic of consequence (resource dependence theory) to a logic of appropriateness (neoinstitutional
theory). Neoinstitutional theory argues that organizations survive and succeed in their surrounding
environment by not only accomplishing economic
fitness and efficiency, but from accomplishing a
social and cultural fit with the environment.
You saw me remark in a past chapter about
Disney and its various theme parks. Disneys efforts actually reflect neoinstitutional arguments
about cultural fit to some extent. Disneyland in
the USA has a particular feel, a particular food
menu, and other features that are not easily
plopped down in another cultural context. In the
case of Euro-Disney, the company needed to take
into account the beliefs of the local environment,
and adjust its for-profit model and American
theme-park script to local views. The end result is
a different version and feel of the Disney theme
park: so less junk-food, less shopping mall and
main street appearances, and more old-world
charm.
Lets compare and contrast facets of resource
dependence theory with neoisntitutional theory so
you have a better sense of their differences. A lot
of the concepts I am going to introduce may seem
147
Unit of
Analysis
Change
Resource
dependence theory
and neoinstitutional
theory compared.
Resource Dependence
Organizations with resource
dependencies
Neoinstitutional
Organizational fields
Coordination of resources
Greater homogeneity of field
(greater interdependence and as rational myths spread
stability over time)
foreign at first, but do not worry, I will come back to them again in the
chapter so you get a richer understanding.
If we consider each theory, we can view them on a variety of dimensions (see table above). The first is their unit of analysis. Resource dependence theory is primarily focused on resource dependence relations
that an organization has with other firms. Neoinstitutional theory is concerned with entire organizational fields, or domains of activity where the
firms are aware of one another as relevant to that domain. Both theories
focus on the environment, but they target slightly different things in it: resource relations for one and cultural matching for the other. They see
change differently as well. Resource dependence theory argues there is a
movement toward greater coordination of resources, or greater interdependence and stability over time, while neoinstitutional theory sees a progression toward greater homogenization as legitimate classification
schemes spread. These changes are promulgated by different processes.
In resource dependence theory, the managers try to minimize their own
firms dependence on others while they increase the dependence others
have on them. By contrast, neoinstitutional theory generates change via
institutional isomorphism where each organizations effort to survive
and secure resources leads them to fall in line with external cultural pressures and rationalized myths on what a legitimate firm should look like or
what an ideal product should be.
Each theory also offers a distinctive view of an organizations structure: one that is characterized by dependence relations, and one whose for148
mal structures and classifications are radically decoupled from the technical core (this is the concept
of loose coupling, and we will discuss it at length
later). Last the theories espouse distinctive organizational needs. Resource dependence theory says
firms need resources and autonomy for survival;
neoinstitutional theory says firms need environmental legitimacy so as to secure resources and survive.
Theories from other chapters can also be contrasted with neoinstitutional theory. Research on
networks falls somewhere in between resource dependence theory and neoinstitutional theory, with
some scholars working to align network research
with neoinstitutionalism. The diffusion of particular formal structures, appearances, reforms and/or
practices through networks is a way these two literatures interrelate. However, cultural scripts,
norms, and ideas are not easy to locate in networks.
In some ways neoinstitutional theory
aligns with the notion of standard operating procedures and organizational culture, but neoinstitutional theory places much more emphasis on
taken-for-granted norms or ways of doing business instead of formalized rules and codebooks
for behavior. Moreover, neoinstitutional theory abstracts away from focal organizations to the field
level, taking organizational culture to a macro
level.
Features of neoinstitutionalism
Now that we have a general sense for neoinstitutional theory and how it compares to previous
theories in the course, we can begin to delve more
deeply into its core concepts. At this point in the
chapter, I will draw on a couple additional primary
sources. In particular, I want to discuss the basic
ideas presented in the 1977 piece by Meyer and
Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony", and the 1983
paper by Dimaggio and Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited. As we go along, Im going to draw out
examples on schools as an application since both
Meyer and Rowans 1978 paper and Mary Metz
1989 paper both do a terrific job of providing us
149
150
riage rites, where people adopt a range of appearances and go through a series of scripted actions
so they resemble husband and wife, or they transform into such an embodiment. When we say an
organization reflects ritual classifications we mean
it displays appearances so as to embody a ratified
organizational identity considered legitimate in the
environment. To maintain the ritual and the plausibility of legitimacy, the organization presumes a
chain of confidences and adopts an assortment of
face-saving efforts to preserve this myth.
Here are a few of the face-saving efforts
used to preserve these myths. The first is avoidance. Avoidance is maximized when units are segmented so interaction across units is minimized.
In this manner one unit cannot see into another
and question their contents. The second is discretion. Discretion is maximized when inspection is
minimized and participants are cloaked in professional, credentialed authority. By placing trust in
teachers, we give them discretion and let their profession act as rationalizing agents. Last is the assumption of integrity. Here, organizations often
engage in ritual performances and their appearances have integrity, and this sentiment allows
them to overlook problems and label them as
anomalies.
In education, there exist a sequence of confidences that are never fully inspected: The state has
confidence in the district; the district in school; the
school in the teacher; and the teacher deserves confidence due to their degree and the programs accreditation. The accrediting agency doesnt inspect the teaching and skill of the graduate, but
has confidence in the college administrators, faculty, and the courses offered. These people in turn
have confidence in the teachers training them to
label certain courses as history without carefully
inspecting them. So it is a system of confidences
(Meyer and Rowan 1978:207-8).
Loose coupling
The sequence of confidences is greatly sustained by a structural adaptation called loose coupling. Organizations may all come to look alike
151
152
153
Dimaggio and Powell describe multiple processes by which isomorphism arises. The first process is one they call competitive isomorphism. In
these instances, certain forms of organizing do not
survive because they are sub-optimal and because
decision makers learn appropriate responses and
adapt their organizations so they survive. Dimaggio and Powell suggest this occurs in fields where
open competition exists. We will discuss this form
more next week when we discuss population ecology as our final organizational theory in the
course.
The second form is institutional isomorphism. This is the core process within neoinstitutional theory: here organizations do not just compete for resources and customers but for political
power and institutional legitimacy. The concept of
institutional isomorphism is useful for understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade modern
organizational life (Ibid:150).
Powell and Dimaggio describe three forms
of institutional isomorphism:
1. Coercive forms of institutional isomorphism
most closely resemble those observed in dependence relations as discussed in resource
dependence theory. Here a dependent firm is
subject to political influence. This coercive
influence results from both informal and formal pressures exerted by other organizations
upon which a focal organization is dependent, and by societal cultural expectations
154
ronment by symbolic coding of their formal structure. As such, new universities adopt many of the
same subjects and departments that established universities have. In this manner, their formal structure fits ceremonial classifications, and the constructs are supported by a logic of confidence that
extends throughout society. The labels are assumed rational because rationalizing agents support them: e.g., confidence in elite universities and
their accreditation. Further buffering the core activities of the firms is the process of loose coupling, where the formal structures and codings of
the firm are distinct and unrelated to the actual
work activity. By segmenting them apart, the firm
exudes rational competence and cultural fit, but
does not allow them to be inspected with relation
to actual activity. This decoupling enables the
firm to run on trust and not have to confront the
potentially unsolvable issues of what works best
and why.
Firms also bridge in the environment, but here
it is mostly done through networks. Dimaggio and
Powell argue that these networks of association
lead to isomorphism via several routes. The first
entails political pressure as we learned about in resource dependence theory. The second entails mimetic behavior where firms look to exemplars and
peers so as to imitate what seems to work well or
is legitimate (i.e., trendy). Last, firms respond to
pressures of professional networks, like professional norms and standards on how to assess and
consider their firms performance. All of these
bridging efforts render the firm more institutionalized and legitimate in the cultural environment in
which it is found. And this in turn draws in social
resources and continues the firms survival.
Management and Critique of the Neoinstitutional Approach
In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus
more on management, discuss some cases of strategic manipulation of institutional environments,
and then critique the neoinstitutional approach.
155
ganizations can co-opt and manipulate institutional environments in an effort to improve bargaining power. This is often done by developing
symbolic linkages with sources of power so
many of the bridging efforts of isomorphism apply
here of coercion, mimesis, and norming.
In sum, the manager must find ways to align
the institutional environment, or to find ways to
help the organization wind its way through conflicting institutions in the environment. To do this,
they often conform and adjust their ritual classifications and outward appearances, and they buffer
their technical practice via decoupling. Or they
manipulate the situation by playing to the myths in
the environment. Therefore, managers can hire
planners and economists to waste time ratifying
plans already made; or hire human relations professionals to deflect blame from conflicts; etc. I
think we can go further in this regard and discuss
how marketing and advertising are used to receive
endorsements and support from the environment.
Later, I want to turn next to framing and framing
wars as a case for this.
Case Interlude: Framing Wars
Framing better captures strategic aspects of
cultural mirroring and fit since it is all about cultural alignment efforts. Recently, there were a series of scholarly and media articles concerning the
framing wars in politics (Lakoff 2011; Bai 2005)
and debates about intelligent design (Wilgoren
2005; Anonymous 2005). Both framing wars describe how organizations and their leaders manipulate narratives and meanings so as to better align
with the national consciousness or even segments
of the environment. The beauty of framing is that
it captures both aspects of this tension strategy
and cognition.
Back in 2004, we had a presidential election
between John Kerry and George Bush. They both
had stances on a variety of issues, but wanted to
legitimate themselves with voters and secure the
popular election. Bush won and linguistic experts
like George Lakoff argue that he won because his
strategists framed positions in a way that resonated
more with the voters (Lakoff 2011; Bai 2005). Or
156
Figure. Framing Wars in Politics and Religion (Kerry, Lakoff, Bush)" "
(Source - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_Kerry_headshot_with_US_flag.jpg/; http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pop%21Tech_2008__George_Lakoff.jpg/;http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GeorgeWBush.jpg/)
as we might say, the Republicans framed their positions in a way that resonated with deeply ingrained
rational myths. Lakoff makes it clear that the issue here is not about finding the right words
these conceptions or grand metaphors do not
just suddenly emerge, and the right words will not
suddenly change the national taken-for-granted understandings of the world around us. They must
resonate with beliefs and arguments many of us
hold.
As such Bush related he was against partialbirth abortion (not intact dilation extraction of a
fetus). Note how the label highlights the contradiction between birth and abortion. Bush also said
he was for exploring for energy, not oil drilling and fracking which are seen as potentially
damaging. He was also for tax relief, not tax
cuts for the rich which is seen as unfair. So by
reframing their policies in ways that make them
appeal to and resonate with deeply held beliefs
even if inaccurate -- seems to work. Now the
Democrats have gotten wise to this and have their
own set of framings like tax cuts for the rich,
Wallstreet Bailouts, etc.
commonly held rational myths serves to undermine the efforts of rational agents like professors,
universities, natural science fields and medical professionals. What I am trying to suggest is that we
can use rhetoric to manipulate opinions and to secure social resources from the environment we
just need to find interesting ways to appeal to rational myths!
ics mean that neoinstitutional theory mostly identifies weakness in other theories instead of revealing
direct evidence of its own claims. However, this is
easier in theory than in practice.
Demonstrating the diffusion of cognitive
scripts and conceptual frames (grand metaphors) is
much easier to do ex post and through proxies than
through ex ante prediction or the direct measurement of institutional variables. The theory has intuitive appeal and we can identify cases where diffusion and isomorphism occur, but it is hard to distinguish processes of normative and mimetic isomorphism and to identify the features being homogenized. Neoinstitutional theory is one of the
most vibrant theories of organization, however,
and many scholars are working hard at developing
it further empirically.
Case Challenges for Neoinstitutionalism?
There are certain trends in educational institutions that seem to counter neoinstitutional arguments. So lets consider them for a moment.
Critique+of+Neoins(tu(onal+Theory
158
works better? What kind of learning is more efficient and desirable? Yes there is a sense of this
but it is conveyed through the lens of a test.
Interestingly, the Bryk article discussed very
early in this quarter could be interpreted as strategic management based on recoupling. Changes in
the regulatory environment led to strategic responses like those described by Bryk and we saw
the system conform, but it was not clear it had become more efficient and successful than before.
Moreover, teachers felt deprofesionalized and their
motivation began to wane. So it is not clear
whether recoupling and centralization render organizations any less reliant on rationalized myths.
They just seem to focus them on certain standard
bearers more than others. Ambiguity and uncertainty remain and only one facet of the institutional environment (the currently dominant one) is
linked.
Massive Open Online Courses - MOOCs
Another conundrum for neoinstitutional theory is the creation of massive open online courses
(or MOOCs) and what they mean for the organization of universities. Could MOOCs threaten the
rationalized myths upon which the modern university is constructed? Does Coursera challenge the
common script and neoinstitutional conceptions of
organizational fields like education? How? Why
might MOOCs lack environmental legitimacy?
How do MOOCs challenge myths of schooling
and question the legitimacy of higher education institutions?
What will MOOCs do to community colleges, University of Phoenix, and to actual classroom experiences? What if superstar teachers can
effectively convey material and students learn it
almost as well as in person, but at a fraction of the
cost? What if Coursera and other platforms offer a
degree and it is just as effective and valued as an
actual credentialed, university degree?
What
might happen?
The whole societal apparatus
seeks credentials as standardized language by
which exchanges can be made across institutions.
With Coursera, success is not a scarce commodity!
People who cannot get into Stanford can potentially get the same credential and accomplish the
same course. Does it mean the credential is illegitimate? The market would be flooded with people
who have the same skills since Coursera has room
for far more people. As a result, they would give
employers little room to hire some and not others.
Who would do the janitorial work if everyone is
overqualified? Who would stand out as being able
to do complex tasks? What if the credential is associated with tons of variance? Is it less legitimate? MOOCs raise a lot of questions about legitimacy for one of our most central societal institutions and the rationalized myths it rests upon.
There has been much written about MOOCs
online, and there is much to be recommended.
However, one recent article seems to do a little
more research than most, and I can recommend it
to students in this course (Grossman 2013).
Rather than delve into this topic too deeply, I
would rather leave it to the forums of the class to
debate MOOCs and what they represent for neoinstitional understandings of organizatons.
159
160
161
Summary or
Basic
Argument
Environment
Dominant
Pattern of
Inference
Management
Strategies
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social
Structure
Participants
Technology
(how solutions
get decided)
When does it
apply?
Organizational Culture
Network Organization
Neoinstitutional Theory
Summary Table of Organizational Culture, Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), Network Organization, and Neoinstitutional Theory (NIT)
References
Anonymous. Intelligent Design Rears its Head.
The Economist, July 28, 2005.
Bai, Matt. The Framing Wars. New York Times
Magazine, July 17, 2005 (pp. 1-8).
Davis, Gerald F. and Walter W. Powell. 1992. A
selection from Organization-Environment Relations (pp. 342, 354-365). In Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol 3 (2nd
ed.). Eds. Marvin D. Dunnette and Leaetta M
Hough. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists.
162
10
Organizational Ecology
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Selection.svg
And then there are the main theorists we will focus on this week: Mike Hannan, John Freeman
and Glenn Carroll (Hannan and Freeman 1977,
1989; Carroll 1981, 1984). They take this metaphor and understanding of organizational populations to a new level in their construction of population ecology theory.
Population Ecology
Environmental Niche
Population ecology begins with several questions: Why are there so many kinds of organizations? What explains the diversity of organizations? Where do different organizational forms
come from? Notice these questions are the inverse
of neo-institutional theory, which asks, why are organizations so similar and stable?
Thus far, we have defined populations of organizations. Population ecology contends that the
environment can be partitioned into different kinds
of resource spaces where distinct populations of
firms can persist. They call these environmental
niches. Organizational ecologists describe two
types of environmental niches: fundamental and
In this chapter we continue our study of organizations as open systems whose survival and
success depends on their reaction to the environment. We introduce a 10th and final theory called
Population Ecology. There is a long history of
work that applies biological and natural selection
metaphors to organizations (Scott 2003:117; Davis
and Powell 1992:342-354), let alone to the study
of society.
Karl Weick (1979) is an organizations scholar
who described variation, selection, and retention
processes within human organizations and on an
organizational community level.
Arthur Stinchcombe talks of firm founding and
retention in epochs (1965).
Richard Nelson and Stanley Winter (1982) offer
an evolutionary account of how firms and industries change over time. They regard organizations as strings of SOPSs, which they view as
the genetic makeup of an organization, and then
firms experience random mutation and recombination in their tasks that lead some to outcompete and survive (i.e., selection and retention).
164
Figure. Example of
Fundamental and
Realized Niches ""
(Source - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:NAMAP.jpg)
165
Now some organizational forms suit the environment more than others and they survive. The
survivors are reliable and accountable (or favored
by selection). Population ecologists typically observe the selection of an organizational form as the
reproduction rate of an organizational form. Notably, organizational variation and selection does not
have to be optimal (e.g., the best mutation takes
off) nor Lamarckian (i.e., traits passed down from
predecessor organizations that enabled adaptation). The fit is more like that of satisficing described in chapter 2. An organizational form is selected, survives, ad spreads if its form fits (among
a variety that would work) and takes off.
Ultimately, some organizational forms are selected, reproduced and institutionalized as relatively permanent (e.g., Governments, schools,
franchises, etc). In biology we see these as animals that have a strong fit and reproduction rate
like Mallard Ducks, Starlings, and so on. Those
are birds that proliferate across the world.
Organizational ecologists identify retention
through a focus on the rates of organizational
founding and death. In the case of organizations,
we can observe this process of variation, selection
and retention in action when we consider the retail
industry in the United States. The environment
has greatly changed over the last 100 years. In the
1940s and 50s stores like Woolworth were com-
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Retention of
organizational forms
-- From Woolworth to
Wal-Mart to Amazon
(Source - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Woolworth-kassel.JPG; http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Walmart_exterior.jpg; http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amazon.comLogo.svg)
mon in the United States. These eventually gave way to another retail
firm, Walmart, and that spread and became common in the 1980s. Today, the environment continues to change, and a retailer like Amazon.com
has taken hold. In each era, the fundamental niche remains, but a new
form of organization rises, out-competes the others, gets selected, proliferates, and is retained.
Structural Inertia
So to this point, we have discussed populations, environmental
niches and processes of ecological change. Another key concept in organizational ecology concerns structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1977,
1977a; Hannan and Carroll 1995). Contrary to contingency theorists and
natural system views related earlier in the quarter, organizational ecologists contend organizations are inert, and at best slow to adapt and
change. There are a variety of pressures in place to make organizational
change difficult. Both internal and external constraints are at work: Internal constraints are things like investments in equipment, information limits, intra-organizational politics, and the institutionalization of organizational routines. All of these are sunk costs placed in internal technologies and social structures that make it hard to adapt them to new circumstances. External constraints are barriers to entry and exit, and legitimacy concerns. Inertia is often associated with organizational age since
many of these constraints build up over time, making it harder and harder
167
for a firm to adapt. Core organizational characteristics of mission, goals, forms of authority, core
technology, and market strategy are hardest to
change.
The implication of all this? Well, the greater
the inertia, the less an organization can adapt and
the more important environmental selection becomes. Instead of adapting, most firms die when
the environment changes. Therefore, the main dynamic of organizational change is the birth of new
organizations and the death of old ones. If you
want to change a niche, you need a new, better organizational form that can outcompete those firms
already present.
Population ecology studies the birth of new
organizational forms (diversification) and the
death of old ones. In this manner, it identifies the
core processes of population ecology. It asks, how
do prevailing social conditions determine what organizational forms are founded and their rate of
founding? It also asks the converse, how do social
conditions determine what organizational forms
die and their rate of death? I will cut to the conclusion a bit: in most instances, volatile times encourage the birth of new organizational forms, and this
frees resources for organizational founding.
A variety of sub-theories arise from organizational ecology to account for firm births and
deaths. One common theory in organizational ecology is called density dependence (Hannan and
Freeman 1989). The theory of density dependence argues that there is a curvilinear function
where social processes of legitimization found
firms and competition cull their numbers. In low
density or in a sparsely populated niche -, the
density dependence model predicts that the legitimization process will dominate to increase the organizational founding rate and decrease the mortality rate. At high levels of density or in a heavily
populated niche-, competition will dominate, leading to low founding rates and high mortality rates.
The inverted U curve here to my side shows
x=#foundings and y=population density. Legitimacy refers to the taken-for-grantedness of an organizational form: The more legitimate the form,
(1) the easier it is to acquire resources, and the (2)
mortality rate decreases. Competition refers to or-
ganizational forms that seek the same limited resources in a niche. When there are fewer resources to go around, competition grows intense,
so (1) the founding rate drops, (2) and the mortality rate increases. As such, competition is inversely related to population density.
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value. Changes in the core features of an organization, like its mission and values, are more problematic and therefore help explain organizational
death something population ecology is keen to
explain. In contrast, changes in short-run strategies and peripheral features are more consistent
with adaptive perspectives of organizations.
A third theory about firm survival and death is
called niche theory (Hannan and Freeman 1989).
Here the general idea is that different environmental conditions favor specialist and generalist
organizational forms. A specialist firm is one that
focuses on a particular technology and takes the
risk of maximizing their exploitation of an environment, fully realizing it could change. A generalist
firm is one that exploits multiple environments
(niches) at lower levels so it has greater security in
the face of environmental change.
For example, in the wine-industry, mass production firms like Gallo produce wines like burgundy, chablis, claret, madeira, port, rhine, sherry
and tokay, named from geographic regions. In
many instances, they generate jug wines or lower
quality versions of these wines at a much lower
cost. Generalist production accounts for the bulk
of wine sales. In contrast, a specialist firm in the
wine industry is a farm winery that produces varietal wines, named on the basis a specific grape, and
labeled with appellation of origin (Carroll and
Swaminathan 2000).
There are several theories on how niches favor specialists and generalists. One is called niche
width theory and it was posited by Hannan and
Freeman in 1977. Niche-width theory focuses on
2 aspects of environmental variability to explain
differential survival of specialists and generalists.
In my earlier discussion of ecological processes, I
described how populations of organizations can occupy the same niche (or the same domain of
unique environmental resources) and depend upon
identical environmental resources. If two populations of organizations occupy the same niche
while differing in some organizational characteristic, the population with the less fit environmental
characteristic will be eliminated. Generalist and
specialist organizations respond to environments
differently however. Generalist organizations
169
170
Figure. Stock
Correlations During
Normal and
Abnormal Market
Phases ""
"
"
(source - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Dynamics_of_US_stock_market_correlations.
jpg)
171
center of the market frees resources at the periphery that can be used by small specialist firms without engaging in direct competition with the generalists. Swaminthan has a paper on how this occurs
in wine (2001) and Carroll describes how it occurs
for beer (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000). As you
can imagine in both industries there are generalist
and specialist firms: for wine Robert Mondavi is a
generalist, and then farm wineries like the one up
the road here called Page Mill is a specialist.
And for beer, Anheiser Busch is a generalist and
our local beers, Anchor-Steam, Red Seal Ale, etc.,
are specialist micro-brews focused on varietals.
172
brew and farm-wine product so as to win over customers. For example, Robert Mondavi and Miller
Beer have developed wines and beers that challenge the quality of specialist wines and beers.
Such products have won critical acclaim, and this
has enabled generalist firms to operate in both generalist and specialist segments.
tion ecology explores the relationships of organizations to their environment from a selection perspective. Compared to the others, the population ecological view is more environmentally deterministic.
Management
Summary of Theory
In sum, population ecology concerns populations of organizations and it considers environmental features that drive firm birth and death.
Lets quickly summarize the main points. Organizational ecology assumes an open system perspective, which regards the environment as inseparable
from the birth and death of an organization.
For organizational ecologists, organizations
do not catch up with environmental change (internal adaptation is uncommon [is organizational
learning is a myth?!]), and the mechanism of organizational change is organizational selection
(birth and death). Much like Stinchcombe argued
in 1965, an organizations form is pretty constant,
and consistency is the result of the founders imprint, sunk costs in internal and external relations,
and the process of selection. If two populations of
organizations occupy the same niche while differing in some organizational characteristic, the organizations likely will not adapt very fast, and the
population with the less fit environmental characteristic will be eliminated.
The diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to the diversity of environments. In equilibrium, each environment has only one organizational form: the one that adapted to the demands of
the environment (this is the idea of a realized
niche). Each unit in the environment faces the
same environmental constraints, and hence, it has
to have the same organizational structure to survive. Isomorphism results from selection. Here,
the environment selects only those organizations
that fit the environment.
Resource dependency theory, contingency theory, and neoinstitutional theory are all about how
organizations adapt to their environment. Popula-
173
As with all the theories presented, organizational ecology has certain limitations and can
be critiqued. Perhaps the most common criticism
is that the population ecology perspective is so environmentally deterministic that there is a loss of
human agency (Baum 1996; Davis and Powell
1992; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Adaptation
and decision making are after-the-fact considerations for population ecology when the reality of
managers seems different.
Another critique is that the concept of population density assumes all organizational members
are equivalent. In terms of measuring competition, for example, not all organizations are equally
competitive. Some firms are huge and others are
small. Therefore the number is questionable in the
instantiation of competition.
In terms of density dependence, the term density refers to an absolute number. This could be
misleading since populations vary in size, so a density of 100 firms in a small population could be a
large number, while in a huge population 100
could be low. What might be more useful is a relative, normalized notion of density. An environment of that size is more dense than usual, may be
a better comparison.
Population ecology also neglects the role of
globalization and technology in linking different
populations. A variety of complications arise in
terms of niche definition with the advent of the
internet and telecommunications. How can the
size of a population or resource space be determined in this case? Is it fair to call Seattle financial firms a niche? Also, what happens when a
firm is a generalist in the local market but they are
a specialist in the global market because of different cultural definitions and tastes?
174
175
176
Dominant
Pattern of
Inference
Management
Strategies
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social
Structure
Environment
Technology
(how solutions
get decided)
Participants
Internal management of core doesnt really apply, but peripheral changes (shortrun strategy) are not inconsistent with theory. Instead, main effort is to be
competitively isomorphic in organizational niches. Organizations can succeed by
recognizing their fit with an environment what population you are in, what the
composition is, what change is occurring, and then whether is makes sense to
adopt a generalist or specialist orientation. Also consider own orgs history and if
your changes will evoke liability of newness. Also consider if your founding
entailed too much of an innovation so that you dont fit a niche (and will die).
Core structure of firm is harder to change inertia present making very stable,
hence selection, not adaptation decides organizational fate. Core structure consists
of SOPs, mission, goals, values, etc.
External selection in order to fit the environment and insure survival. Population
composition and niche density / carrying capacities determine selection.
Population Ecology
Summary or
Basic
Argument
Exists when the level of analysis is a field (not a focal actor) and the focus
is on conformity to cultural scripts and/or normative constraints on action.
Unlike organizational culture, social structure is based at least as much on
external environment as on internal dynamics.
Neoinstitutional Theory
When does it
apply?
Network Organization
Summary Table of Network Organization, and Neoinstitutional Theory (NIT), and Population Ecology
References
Hannan, M.T. and J. Freeman. 1989. Organizational Ecology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hannan, Michael T., and Glenn R. Carroll 1995.
An introduction to organizational ecology. In
Organizations in Industry. Oxford University
Press, pp. 17-31.
Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sydney. 1982. An
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Renzulli, Linda. 2005. "Organizational Environments and the Emergence of Charter Schools in
the United States." Sociology of Education 78: 126.
Swaminathan, Anand. 2001. Resource Partitioning and the Evolution of Specialist Organizations:
The Role of Location and Identity in the U.S.
Wine Industry. The Academy of Management
Journal 44, 6:1169-1185.
Weick, Karl.1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing (Topics in Social Psychology Series).
McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/
Languages; 2nd edition.
11
Summary of Theories
NM
EN
T)
EN
VIR
EN
VI
RO
ORGANIZATION)
ON
ME
NT
)
Social)Structures)
Technology)
Goals)
VI
EN
Par6cipants)
RO
T)
EN
NM
Figure. Features of an Organization
(adapted from Leavitt 1965: 1145; Scott 2003:18)
)
T
EN
M
N
O
R
I
V
N
E
Summary of Theories
If you consider this text for a moment, you
will realize that you have come a very long way.
You were introduced to something called organizations and their behavior. You were given a wide
array of cases to study from governmental organizations, lobbying groups, technology companies, classrooms, high schools, school districts, universities, reform movements, online educational
courses, multi-player online games, and national
policies.
179
180
181
Environment
Management Strategies
Social Structure
Action = Maximization of
means to ends.
Goals
(what probs to resolve)
Participants
NA
Actors in hierarchical
organizational positions. Cue
sequential routines that accomplish
task or solve problem by routines
available (supply issue).
Organizational positions
Coalitions enemy/friend
Players in positions
Coalitions /
Bureaucratic Politics (BP)
Organized Anarchies /
Garbage Can (GC)
182
Summary or
Basic
Argument
Dominant
Pattern of
Inference
Management
Strategies
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social
Structure
Participants
Environment
Organizational Culture
Technology
(how solutions
get decided)
When does it
apply?
183
Dominant
Pattern of
Inference
Management
Strategies
Goals
(what probs to
resolve)
Social
Structure
Environment
Technology
(how solutions
get decided)
Participants
Internal management of core doesnt really apply, but peripheral changes (shortrun strategy) are not inconsistent with theory. Instead, main effort is to be
competitively isomorphic in organizational niches. Organizations can succeed by
recognizing their fit with an environment what population you are in, what the
composition is, what change is occurring, and then whether is makes sense to
adopt a generalist or specialist orientation. Also consider own orgs history and if
your changes will evoke liability of newness. Also consider if your founding
entailed too much of an innovation so that you dont fit a niche (and will die).
Core structure of firm is harder to change inertia present making very stable,
hence selection, not adaptation decides organizational fate. Core structure consists
of SOPs, mission, goals, values, etc.
External selection in order to fit the environment and insure survival. Population
composition and niche density / carrying capacities determine selection.
Population Ecology
Summary or
Basic
Argument
Exists when the level of analysis is a field (not a focal actor) and the focus
is on conformity to cultural scripts and/or normative constraints on action.
Unlike organizational culture, social structure is based at least as much on
external environment as on internal dynamics.
Neoinstitutional Theory
When does it
apply?
Network Organization
Summary Table of Network Organization, and Neoinstitutional Theory (NIT), and Population Ecology