What Philosophy of Biology Is Not

Author(s): David L. Hull

Source: Synthese, Vol. 20, No. 2, Methodological Problems in Biology (Aug., 1969), pp. 157-184
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20114678 .
Accessed: 21/07/2014 16:45
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

DAVID

WHAT

L. HULL

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT*

Periodically
through the history of biology, biologists have tried to do
a philosopher has turned his attention
a little philosophy
and occasionally
to biology. In the past decade or so a body of literature has arisen which
might legitimately be called 'philosophy of biology'. The purpose of this
paper will be to review the contributions made to this literature by phi
losophers during the past 10 or 15 years. Earlier work will be discussed
if it has proven especially
influential. The contributions
made by
on
to
of
will
be
touched
the
biologists
biology
only briefly,
philosophy
both because the biological
literature is too vast to permit anything like
a fair summary in the confines of a short paper and because the strengths
only

and weaknesses
of this literature tend to be quite different from the efforts
In this paper, though it is sure to result in acrimony,
of philosophers.1
not
refrained from criticism. There is too great a discrepancy be
I have
tween what philosophers

under the guise of philosophy

could be or, in my opinion,

produce
of biology
comment.

and what

of biology
should be

philosophy
to pass over without
One striking feature of the remarks made by philosophers
about biology
For example, Mario Bunge in a
is how frequently they are misinformed.
in the construction
and assaying of
paper on the weight of simplicity
theories

scientific
What

asks the following

gave Darwin's

various

rivals,

of evolution

notably

theory
creationism

the vicious

logically
faulty
(remember
tained several false or at
individual",

"Acquired

of bacteria,
the theory,

porting
its explanatory

controlled

industrial
were

power

selection
through natural
Lamarckism?
Darwin's

circle

of

the "survival

of

the victory
theory was
the fittest");

observed

was

conditions

of antibiotic-resistant
(the development
in butterflies,
and a few other processes
sup
one century
after The Origin
of Species
appeared);
smaller
than that of its rivals
theories
(irrefutable

clearly
it had no inductive
the maximumpostfactum
basis
explanatory
power);
a bold
on the contrary,
invention
unobservables.
And,
containing
high-level
to condemn
sins were not enough
the theory, Darwin's
system was far more
of

its rivals.

its

in part
it con

melanism

have

than any

over

is good
least unproven
assertions
variation
for the
("Each
are inherited",
if favorable,
"Sexual
selection
characters,
it had not been tested by observation,
let alone by experiment

operates
universally");
on living species under
strains

and

question:

...2

Synthese 20 (1969) 157-184; ? D. ReidelPublishing Co., Dordrecht'-Holland

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

but was,
if these
complex

158

DAVID

L. HULL

of evolutionary
theory seem evenly divided on the question of
whether the survival of the fittest is false or tautological.
In spite of the
tiresome regularity with which this claim ismade, it has little foundation.
Critics

to G. G. Simpson and Ernst Mayr

from Darwin
Leading evolutionists
excellent explanations
of why this principle
have provided
is neither
nor
Fitness
in
viciously circular.3
tautological
evolutionary
theory is a
are fitter than
in a given environment
relative notion. Certain organisms
of those organisms which are nearer the
higher percentage
'fittest' end of the scale tend to survive than those at the other end. This

others. A

scale in turn is ordered

at least in part independently

of the actual sur
vival of these individuals. Of course, the claim that the fittest tend to
circular if fitness were determined
survive can be made viciously
only
or
means
a
of
actual
survival
into
'fitness'
by
tautology
by defining
in terms of actual
exclusively
in more
be
discussed
will
issue

do neither. (This
survival, but biologists
detail later in conjunction with Anthony
Darwin's
theory.)

attempt to reconstruct
that Darwin
Bunge contends

Flew's

false or at least unproven

or unproven, Darwin
are
false
Regardless
they
from the first that
held none of them. For instance, Darwin maintained
or atrophied organs are not
the variations which result in rudimentary
held

several

of whether

assertions.

good for the individual. Such organs were imperfect and useless.4 Darwin
some effect" but
did believe that "use and disuse seem to have produced
sufficient evidence to induce us to believe that muti
lations are ever inherited".5 Nor did Darwin believe that sexual selection

that there "is not

universally. He limited sexual selection just to animals with

separate sexes, and among them the struggle between the males for pos
session of the females occurred only in most cases. Further, not all differ

operated

ences between males

and females

of the same species were

due to sexual

selection.6
a
in butterflies was observed
says that industrial melanism
after The Origin of Species appeared, when actually two long
were published
by Tutt in 1890 (only 30 years after the
monographs
in British
and melanochroism
in
which
he
that
melanism
argued
Origin),
Bunge

century

of moisture
Lepidoptera were due to a combination
action of natural selection.7 And, although it might
point to a philosopher,
butterflies.

almost

and smoke under

the

seem an insignificant
all of the observations were on moths, not

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

159

Finally, Bunge asserts that the theory of evolution

through natural
selection had no inductive basis. One wonders what Bunge can mean by
30 years' labor in attempting
to support his
'inductive basis' if Darwin's
in the Origin provided
theory and all the data marshalled
basis. Only the first and last of the points raised by Bunge
of science, but his obvious
important to the philosophy

no inductive
are especially
in
disinterest

It is certain
theory is discouraging.
evolutionary
theory as a biological
that he would not treat quantum theory in such a cavalier fashion. The
differences between mesons and pions are important. The differences be
tween moths

apparently are not.

of what can happen when

and butterflies

a philosopher
does not
example
of the views which he criticizes is provided
sufficient understanding
by Peter Caws when he terms the interbreeding criterion of the biological
he recognizes
that the reason
definition of species 'artificial'. Although
of a class of living things is that they
for the similarity of the members
A

second

have

have a common
Even
draw,

in this case,
and some

together)
the same

have

he adds:

ancestry,
the borderlines
rather

been

used

artificial
for

species have at times

(such as the ability
or not a pair of
whether

between

criteria

judging

been very
to produce
individuals

difficult

to

offspring
belong

to

species.8

In the first place, ability to produce offspring together is not a criterion

for judging whether or not a pair of individuals belong to the same species.
between individuals of different species can and
Occasional
hybridization
mean that these individuals belong to the same
occur.
not
This does
does
species concept. 'Interbreed
species, nor does it invalidate the biological
as
of species applies to popu
in
the
definition
it
appears
ing'
biological
to
not
is
decide
and
used
which
classes or organisms
lations,
individuals,
(which taxa) are to count as species, not which individuals belong to the
same taxon. Membership
in a taxon is determined by phenotypic
charac
or not that taxon is to be considered
Whether
ters, mainly morphological.
a member of the species category is determined by various evolutionary
in particular interbreeding habits. (The taxon-category
dis
relationships,
in
which
Caws
finds
himself
will
tinction which underlies the confusion
be discussed

later.)
because of his failure

to understand
the role of the ability to
Perhaps
of species, Caws terms
in
definition
fertile
the
produce
offspring
biological
'artificial'. Numerous
this criterion
objections have been raised to the

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

160

DAVID

definition, most
biological
the criterion of potential

L. HULL

frequently

that it is too difficult

to decide when

to Mayr,
is fulfilled. According
interbreeding
are potentially
two populations
interbreeding whenever
they are prevented
isolation. If any isolating mechanism
from breeding only by geographical
are
is operative,
separate species.9 But even the most persistent
they
critics admit

that the mechanism

of interbreeding

to the evo

is central

If the ability
of sexually reproducing
organisms.
lutionary development
to produce fertile offspring is an artificial criterion in deciding what is to
count as evolutionary
units, one wonders what a natural criterion would
be like.10
have taken an interest in evolutionary
theory
philosophers
of the consequences which they see in it for man. A book entitled
is typical.11 Van
and Philosophy
Evolution
by Andrew G. van Meisen
Melsen's main thesis is that natural science deals only with the 'outside'
Numerous

because

of reality, but there is also an 'inside' to reality which the natural sciences
in man, who has direct access to
cannot touch. This 'inside' is manifest
a physical scientist might tell
the 'self, the primordial datum. Anything
us about man "is peripheral to this primordial datum". The existence of
this 'self is responsible for one of the gaps in the scale of nature, but there
are others. Just as there is an abyss between man and (other) animals,
Some authors of
there is an abyss between the living and the non-living.
a hiatus between

this bent also mention

reason Van Meisen
externally

down

observable

plays
structure

plants and animals, but for some

this gap. The increasing complexity
of
a
is paralleled
by
interiority
"growing

in man's
self-consciousness".
It is this 'interiority' that ne
culminating
of these different levels of being.
the recognition
cessitates
What can possibly be said in reply to claims such as these? Of course,
can be a
A biologist
and self-conscious.
human beings are conscious
without
mechanist-reductionist-neo-Darwinian
being a simple-minded
can also be aware of the epistemological
dis
Such biologists
behaviorist.
For example,
tinctions which give rise to these and similar utterances.
the ones in which we
G. G. Simpson
says that "our human universes,
our inner perceptions
as
on
our
much
really have
beings, depend at least
as on the external, physical facts".12 But the philosophers who emphasize
the distinction
with

the internal and the external world in connection

theory do so in order to assert that the existence of the

between

evolutionary
inner world
somehow

counts

against

the

sufficiency

of

evolutionary

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

161

theory. It is difficult if not impossible to discern why man's consciousness

and self-consciousness
theory
provide greater problems for evolutionary
than any other so-called 'emergent' characters. Until these authors make
their claims a good deal clearer, a biologist would be hard put to decide
whether

they conflict

with,

are extraneous

to or are consonant

with

modern

theory.
evolutionary
who wish to insulate the
is frequently the case with philosophers
finds evolutionary
'self from all inroads by science, Van Meisen
theory
of
as
a
Darwin's
Even
scientific
below par
today
theory.
explanation
in general
"The theory of evolution
evolution
lacks a solid foundation.
As

is, as we have seen, essentially based on 'belief rather than anything else."
and
views of G. G. Simpson
But he also discusses
the evolutionary
If
Teilhard de Chardin as if they were on an equal footing scientifically.
on
must
what
is
based
Teilhard's
the synthetic theory of evolution
belief,
theory be based on? What kind of proof is necessary before a scientific
the evidence
Is there no difference between
theory can be accepted?
and
Teilhard's
views?
adduced in support of modern evolutionary
theory
so
not
in
two
much
their
is
conclusions
theories
between
the
The difference
and arguments adduced by their authors to support
seems to have no conception of what a scientific theory is,
is, or how evidence can be brought to bear on a scientific

but in the evidence

them. Teilhard
what

evidence

view remains
problem. And finally we are reminded that "the Aristotelian
an
even
context
world
view".
of
in the
valid
evolutionary
extensive. It also follows
The literature of this genre is unfortunately
a surprisingly
theory is not

it is argued that evolutionary

rigid script. Characteristically
a
it
is
After
all,
theory'. Scientists are chas
'only
'proved'.
tized for being dogmatic and taking too much on faith rather than on the
than keeping an open mind on the matter, they plot to
evidence. Rather
stifle all contrary opinions. The utterances of Pius XII, on the other hand,

are in conformity with

is inevitably interjected

the best

scientific

into the discussion,

to those of the run-of-the-mill

are superior
all evolutionists

tradition.

Teilhard

de Chardin

either to show how his views

evolutionist

or in order to tar

with him for irresponsible speculation. W. R. Thompson

intel
latter tack, lamenting "the infatuation of Catholic
takes
the
(1966)
seems
to
it
But
he
overdo
lectuals for the Teilhardian
pseudoscience".13
a bit when he goes so far as to accuse Teilhard of perpetrating the Piltdown
albeit more conde
hoax. Medawar
(1967) concludes more cautiously

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

162

L. HULL

DAVID

that Teilhard "had about him that innocence which makes

it
scendingly
to
understand
the
of
the
skull
should
Piltdown
have
easy
why
forger
chosen [him] to be the discoverer of its canine teeth".14 Also character
istic of this body of literature is the view that, in the last analysis, Aristotle
concept of Nature provides a badly needed philo
right. Aristotle's
to
dimension
exists. Hence, Aristotle was right.
sophic
biology. DNA

was

One

feature

of efforts

such as those of Van Melsen's

to discover what

consequences
evolutionary
theory has for man is that evolutionary
theory
as a scientific theory plays no role whatsoever
in his exposition. All he
would have needed to know in order to develop his thesis is that man
from other animals and that living creatures developed from non
matter.
All the intricacy of evolutionary
the diffi
living
relationships,
culties with various mechanisms,
the recalcitrant
of
data, the wealth
are
over.
evidence
Whatever
of
supporting
passed
biology
philosophy
might be, this is not it.15
One exception among those philosophers
who are primarily interested
evolved

in evolutionary
for the nature
theory because of its possible consequences
In his book The Ascent of Life he goes to the
of man is T. A. Goudge.16
evo
trouble of providing a philosophically
oriented analysis of modern
lutionary theory. Since his views on evolutionary
theory are not especially
and depart in no important respect from those of the biolo
controversial
Haldane, Huxley, Mayr,
gists he cites in his preface (Carter, Dobzhansky,
one might wonder what point there could
M?ller,
Simpson, and Wright),
be in a philosopher
going over the same ground. This perplexity can be
whole approach to the
quickly be reading the book. Goudge's
a
is
from
different
that
of
scientist. He does not organize his expo
subject
sition according to various kinds of empirical phenomena
(e.g., kinds of
re
mechanism,
species,
isolating
hybridization,
genetic
populations,

dispelled

combination,
etc.) but according
be found among the phenomena

the peculiar nature of his

sequences,
of
evolution
and the systematic
aspects
made possible by certain evolutionary
laws and law-like
an
after
such
does
he turn his attention to the
Only
analysis
of evolutionary
theory for man.

structing particular
torical explanations,
explanations
statements).
implications

to the logically important differences to

aspects of recon
(e.g., the historical

phylogenetic
the causal

is very cautious
Goudge
the importance
but
lution,

in his assessment
he puts

of the place of man

is indicated

on the question

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in evo
by the

WHAT
title of his book. He

PHILOSOPHY
is interested

OF BIOLOGY
in the ascent

IS NOT

of life and whether

163
man

is at its forefront. Goudge

argues that in spite of retrogressive periods,
more diverse kinds of organisms are alive today than ever before and a
higher percentage of more recent organisms are biologically more efficient
organisms. As
in his adaptiveness.

earlier

than
flexible

is concerned,
he is extremely
far as man
He is a dominant
type and the dominant

species of mammal
primate. He is also "almost certainly the youngest
now on earth" and as such "there is a sense in which he is quite literally
the highest species".17 As cautious as these claims are, Goudge
goes too
far. There is no evidence to indicate that man is the youngest
species of
and, even if he were, he would hardly thereby become the highest
but hardly the highest
species. Perhaps the highest species of mammal,
his
is
in
Man
flexible
and so
very efficient,
adaptiveness,
species period.
on. So are cockroaches. Man is unique. So are cockroaches. Only when

mammal

features of man does

leaves the realm of such strictly biological
Goudge
claim for man begin to carry some weight. Only man has
the uniqueness
developed culture and has been able thereafter to pass on information by
more

than can other organisms. Hence, new possibilities

and
of man.
have opened up for the future development

direct means

new difficulties

has been said, I think, to show how unsuccessful

contemporary
the consequences
of biology for
have been in extracting
philosophers
analy
philosophy. What of the other side of the coin? Have philosophical
Enough

ses of biology

any clarity
provided any insights into biological phenomena,
themselves have been unable to provide, a deeper under
biologists
theories? When
have turned their
philosophers
standing of biological
attention to biology they have tended to limit themselves to a few issues and related topics. One thing is obvious
vitalism, teleology, reductionism,
have not been motivated
from this list. Philosophers
in their choice of

which

topics by any concern with issues currently of interest to biologists.

From the point of view of contemporary
biology, both vitalism and
are
stone
No
cold
dead.
better
teleology
proof can be found than that
to argue to the contrary.18 In support of
by recent attempts
ismade that living creatures are not just matter
vitalism the observation
but structured matter and that the world exhibits finality because regular
offered

ities exist. The major problem with this defense of vitalism and teleology
or mechanist
ever held any differently. Even though
is that no materialist
much of the heat generated by these controversies was due to misleading

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

164

DAVID

L. HULL

were entirely
that the disagreements
to these disagreements,
and central to all of
in
them is the role of 'principles' in science. For example, J. H. Randall
it is hard

formulations,
verbal. There

to believe

is substance

that Aristotle's
formal
his attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle
emphasizes
of understanding.19
and final causes are principles
They don't enter
do
the
don't
into
world
of
things.
They
anything.
Living creatures
causally
and can be understood
do what they do because of their organization
in terms of their organization.
finality is for there to be regularities
only

All

it takes for a world

to exhibit

and for the understanding

of these
a
in
these
which
sequences
stage
stipulating
by
regularities
can be thought of as 'final'. On this attenuated view only a totally chaotic
To be sure, Aristotle's
and un-Aristotelian.
world could be non-teleological
are
causes
but in too many
formal and final
principles of understanding,
be increased

explicitly has them doing things in the empirical world.

finds it difficult not to slip on occasion and have these
principles doing things; for instance, he has nous nousing nous.
and mechanists were certainly
The views expressed by early materialists
instances Aristotle

Randall

himself

is applicable
overly crude, but to the extent that contemporary
knowledge
to the various stages of these controversies,
the mechanist-materialists
were right. The only remaining
is even vaguely related to
issue which
these

theses

is the translation

of expression
of teleological modes
into
of the characteristics
the specification
of
are frequently described ideologically.
Both

and

nonteleological
language
those systems whose actions
of these tasks are proving a good
first expect.20
The

deal more

intricate

than one might

at

(and related topics) is more equivocal. At

on the history and philosophy
of biology sponsored
on Undergraduate
in the Biological Sciences,
Education

status of reductionism

a recent conference

by the Commission
the discussion
from

returned to the question

of
the floor repeatedly
some
sense
was
to
in
reducible
and
and
physics
chemistry
biology
what such a reduction entailed. Two things were made clear by these
mean very different things by
and philosophers
discussions
biologists
'reduction' and are worried by very different aspects of the problem.
There does seem to be at least one way in which the issues of interest to
whether

can be joined. During

the last 30 years,
both biologists and philosophers
a process has been under way in genetics which fulfills all the requirements
of what both scientists and philosophers
have in mind when they speak

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

of reduction. A biochemical
which

have

OF BIOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY

IS NOT

165

is being produced for phenomena

in terms of classical Mendelian

explanation

been

explained previously
to
have not been 'reducing' Mendelian
genetics. Geneticists
genetics
molecular
genetics in the sense of providing translation rules. The relation
too
is
ship
complex for that. For example, classical genetics speaks of
genetics there is no such
things like "the gene for albinism". In molecular
as
or
one
a
for
of
albinism.
several changes in the
the
gene
thing
Any
numerous
different loci can
inversions, etc.) at
genetic code (deletions,
is the molecular
result in the failure to produce pigments. What
version
statement

that in man

the gene for albinism is epistatic

Do all phenomena which were
produces pigmentation?
terms
in
of
recessive
epistasis receive the same kind
explained

of the Mendelian

to the gene which

previously
of explanation
dominant
phenomena

in molecular

Is the molecular
biology?
at all related to that for recessive

epistasis
are closely

for
explanation
These
epistasis?

in Mendelian

genetics. Do they receive

genetics? For any philosopher who
of reduction, a detailed investigation of the

related

inmolecular

comparable explanations
is interested in the question
inferential and definitional

relations

between

these two theories would

seem absolutely necessary, as careful an analysis as that which

have received.21
dynamics and statistical mechanics
outcome
of
of the
the dispute over reductionism,
Regardless

thermo

there is
of biology than whether or not biology
certainly more to the philosophy
can be reduced to chemistry and physics! During
the last decade or so,
to
center
of
been
forced
the
the
has
stage in the philosophy
briefly
biology
and prediction
in evo
and
in their
lutionary studies
by Hempel
Oppenheim
classic paper on the logic of explanation.22 After setting out four con
ditions of adequacy for scientific explanation,
they state that the same
as well. Although
formal analysis applies to scientific prediction
almost
of science because

of the relevance

of explanation

to a remark made

thesis has been subjected to ex

every aspect of the Hempel-Oppenheim
tensive criticism,
it is the symmetry thesis which has received the most
sustained attack. The significance of biology for this controversy
in the
of science is that biologists frequently set forth what they take
philosophy
to be explanations
of the evolutionary
of certain groups
development
when they readily admit that they could not have made much in the way
of any reasoned predictions
in the matter. As gratified as biologists
be for the attention that one of their theories had at last received

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

may
from

166

DAVID

L. HULL

first rate philosophers

ences was investigated

of science, the actual nature of evolutionary

infer
none too intensively. What biologists actually did
certain putative explanations
in producing
to
rapidly became peripheral
or
not these formulations were truly explanations.23
the issue of whether

Was Hempel

and Oppenheim's
introduction

The

analysis purely description,

explication or
of evolutionary
reconstructions
into a

legislation?
in the philosophy
of science points up even more strongly
controversy
a
the need for careful and detailed study of the logical structure of modern
evolutionary
theory and its relation to historical data.
Periodically

philosophers

have discussed
but

their

evolutionary
treatments have

theory and evo

to be
left much

reconstructions,
lutionary
desired. Abraham Kaplan considers evolutionary
theory a concatenated
theories like relativity theory, but he
theory in contrast to hierarchical
theories.24 A. G. N.
says little about the actual structure of concatenated
Flew on the other hand contends that there is a deductive core to Darwin's
in the Origin.25 Several attempts have been made
to specify
core
is. Flew cites Julian Huxley's
formu
precisely what this deductive
lation26 but finds it 'curiously slapdash'. His own formulation
is scarcely
better. He says, for instance:
argument

a priori, because
are empirical
the argument
itself proceeds
the premises
it can
are also empirical.
which
That
all tend to reproduce
yield conclusions
living organisms
at a geometrical
that the resources
to sustain
themselves
ratio of increase;
they need
life are limited;
and that while
each usually
after its kind sometimes
there
reproduces
are variations
which
in their turn usually
after their kind:
all these propo
reproduce

Though

sitions

are nonetheless

and empirical
for being manifestly
and incontestably
contingent
is a struggle
for existence;
and that through
this struggle
for existence
occurs:
are nonetheless
natural
selection
both of these propositions
equally
contingent
as a matter
and empirical
for the fact that it follows,
of logic a priori,
that
necessarily
wherever
the first three hold the second
two must
hold also.27
true. That

there

Everything which Flew says is true, important and needs saying, with
one exception. Neither
of his conclusions
follow deductively
from the
can
be deduced is that not all those
premises which he presents. All that
organisms

which

are born will

survive.

Flew

is aware

that he has not

presented a rigorous deduction. To do that "one would have to construct

to include explicitly every necessary
for all the crucial terms definitions
he himself does not attempt
such a rigorous
Though
assumption".28
he believes that such an endeavor would be "an exercise
reconstruction,
which might prove instructive".29 Anyone who undertakes
this exercise

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

167

instructive and a good deal more than an exercise.

is to identify
step which Flew takes toward such definitions
to
the
fittest.
He
observes
that if this
with
reproduce
being
surviving
is not made, the deductive argument which he has set out
identification
is no longer valid.
The question of whether certain basic principles of a scientific theory

will find that it is highly

The

only

are analytically
to evolutionary
actual

connected

survival,
in general must

that theory is neither new nor unique

to connect fitness analytically with
to evolutionary
fundamental
theory and to

within

theory, but
a distinction

in order

is the difference be
be ignored. This distinction
could happen, given the appropriate
laws, and what actually
does happen. For instance, given Newton's
laws, a planet must revolve
around a star in a conic section. Which of these possible paths the planet
science

tween what

and history of that

actually takes depends upon the particular make-up
between
star system. Similarly, biologists want to retain the distinction
which organisms do in point of fact survive and those which have the
- and
greatest likelihood of surviving
they define 'fitness' in terms of the
latter notion. Every organism which could survive, given the appropriate
im
laws, does not survive. 'Accidents' do happen and are frequently
in small populations.
The appropriate
in evolution,
portant
especially
and so on.
laws in this case are those of physiology,
ecology, embryology,
are
be true that in principle all macroscopic
phenomena
can
that
all
these
laws
be
laws and
organized
governed by deterministic
do not have these laws. The
into a deductive hierarchy, but biologists
laws which give substance to the claim that an organism which did not
It may well

exceedingly fit are currently not deducible from

are
and
formally independent of it. Until the day that
evolutionary
theory
can
of
all
the relevant parts of biology into one grand
biologists
organize
for
deductive hierarchy and know all the relevant antecedent conditions
survive was nevertheless

under study, not only are they entitled to

the evolutionary
phenomena
retain the distinction between what organisms actually survive and those
that are the fittest, they must.
Flew can be seen to vacillate on precisely this issue in his comments
the survival of the fittest.

concerning

survival

possible
to survive".
within

is to be construed

Sometimes

he says that "actual or

of fitness
condition

as the sufficient

he says that "actual survival to reproduce is itself

theory the sole and sufficient criterion for fitness to

Sometimes

Darwin's

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

168

DAVID

L. HULL

survive". Only from this latter assertion

is he entitled to conclude that
"it is as always the fittest who have survived, the fittest who do survive,
and the fittest who will survive".30
turned their attention
from evolutionary
to
reconstructions,
they have also found much
is it true, as Woodger
said many years ago, that
in the strict sense
is "a historical
explanation
phylogenetic
explanation
one
which could not be generalized
it would describe a
and
because
When

philosophers
to
evolutionary
theory
criticize. For example,

have

an evolutionary
succession" and
unique series of changes characterizing
of no inductive generalization
that we are "in possession
regarding the
of such high probability
and generality as
modus operandi of evolution
in an
will justify us in asserting with any confidence what happened
example"?31 The evolution of Hypohippus was a unique event,
but the occurrence of adaptive radiations,
the invasion of new ecological
on are not. Such phenomena
cases
so
of
and
evolution
niches,
convergent
historical

or not a particular species resulted from one

are generalizable. Whether
or more of these processes
is another story.32
in the space of a single paper to summarize
It is impossible, however,
all the various criticisms which have been made of evolutionary
theory
Rather I have chosen to discuss in detail the criticisms
by philosophers.
of a single philosopher, Marjorie Grene. I have chosen her work to discuss
for the simple reason that no criticisms of evolutionary
theory in the past
as much as those set out by Grene
decade or so have irritated biologists
Theories'.33 The
in her paper 'Two Evolutionary
throw some light, I think, on the shortcomings
In her paper Grene contrasts the evolutionary
Such an undertaking
and O. H. Schindewolf.34

reasons for this irritation

of biology.
of philosophy
theories of G. G. Simpson
is perfectly legitimate and

since Schindewolf's
proved instructive,
theory, unlike the
a
of
the paper
scientific
is
Teilhard,
theory. Although
musings
respectable
a
out
account
of
two
balanced
the
theories, it
fairly
begins by setting
gradually develops into a sustained attack on the orthodox neo-Darwinian
should

have

views of Simpson. But the synthetic theory has been criticized before.
Like all scientific theories it is under constant revision and re-examination,
and

in many

consider

instances

the severest

critics

are found

advocates of the theory. Why

appear so offensive?
attack on the synthetic theory is divided

themselves

among those who

then did Grene's par

ticular criticisms
Grene's

into two parts. First

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

169

the two
that, as far as the evidence is concerned,
on a par. She claims that Simpson and Schindewolf
if at all, about the 'facts'". The two theories merely

she tries to establish

are about

theories

seldom,
the data". Although
"provide alternative frameworks for understanding
for some details one point of view is preferable, for other details the other
point of view is preferable. Thus, "it seems to be purely a matter of choice
which we prefer. ... Perhaps what we need, then, is a more
inclusive
will
both
of
which
assimilate
sides
the
theory,
adequately
ambiguity".35
"disagree

to her own satisfaction

the equality of the two
establishing
to argue that
she proceeds
theories as far as the evidence is concerned,
more
is
than
of
that
Schindewolf's
theory
adequate
Simpson on epistemo
After

Simpson claims not to make use of types in an epistemo

refer to types, but
logically significant sense; that is, he may occasionally
he claims that in no instance does he suppose that natural kinds can or
logical grounds.

in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.36 The

is that
theory ismore adequate than Simpson's
a
of
admits
and
makes
them
his
he
types
part
theory, whereas Simpson
makes use of them surreptitiously,
though they are incompatible with his
is ade
theory. Grene does not claim that "Schindewolf's
type-theory

must

be defined

reason

that Schindewolf's

and so is at
quately explanatory. Only that it is not self-contradictory
- not
for asking philosophical
least a possible starting-point
for
questions
as
mean
to do."37
answers,
my critics suggested I
giving philosophical
is to be said of Grene's argument? In the first place, almost all
What
biologists
disagree with her assessment of the evidence. Taking the two
of the evidence supports the syn
theories on a whole, the vast majority
thetic theory, and it is in just those cases where Schindewolf departs most
radically from the synthetic theory that the evidence is most decidedly
belief that basi
against him.38 For example, Grene cites Schindewolf's
have a 'sudden origin'. There
cally new types or patterns of organization
were no feathered creatures. Then there were. The fossil evidence happens
on this issue, but given what we know of genetics and
it is unlikely that such macro-phenotypic
physiology,
changes resulting
from mutation
could occur in the space of a single generation
and the
results be viable - even once, let alone in the origin of every new type.
It does not help in the least to say that the gross phenotypic
changes were
not to be decisive

due

to micromutations

change

early
in the genetic make-up

in development.
The magnitude
is not at issue but the magnitude

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

of

the

of the

170

DAVID

L. HULL

one basic plan

to Schindewolf,
resulting phenotypic
change. According
of organization must be changed into another in the space of a single
find this unlikely.39
generation. Most biologists
Thus, with respect to the first part of Grene's argument, most biologists
is factually
in error, and it was these factual errors
think that Grene
which elicited much of the negative
response from biologists.40 Grene,
is not primarily
interested in these factual disputes but in her
however,
second point that Schindewolf's
theory is somehow
epistemologically
more adequate than Simpson's
theory. To be specific, Schindewolf
freely
admits certain concepts which Simpson pretends to do without, but intro
One of these concepts
is the concept of 'type'.
surreptitiously.
of
in a natural kind
notion
the
that
entails
type
Traditionally
membership
one
set of characters which are severally necessary and
is determined by
duces

jointly sufficient. If Grene intends to be referring to the essentialist notion

of type, then she could be making either of two claims
either the weak
claim that Simpson thinks he is not using an epistemologically
significant
concept of type when actually he does or the strong claim that not only
does he use such a type concept, but also he must.
is probably
On the first count, Grene
right. Even though Simpson,
and
other
evolutionists
have
that evolution
repeatedly emphasized
Mayr,
ary theory is incompatible with the essentialist
type concept, this point
in the midst of complex
of view is quite difficult to maintain
lines of
on
occasion. The strong
reasoning.41 Simpson may well have slipped
is a philosophic
position
it, she owes the reader some
of why this particular notion is a necessary element in any
explanation
In the article in question,
she provides none. In
adequate epistemology.
a later paper, she returns to this theme but this time she equates the
claim, however,
of long-standing,

concept
gestalt

is another matter.
but if Grene

of type with 'gestalt-idea'. But it is one of the key features of a

that one or more of the elements can be replaced or altered without
the gestalt,

affecting

in direct

type.42
It seems to be this confusion
arguing in her two evolutionary
the controversy. A later paper
matical

Essentialism

is to resurrect

version

objections,

since

opposition

to the traditional

notion

of

over exactly what Grene intended to be

theories paper that occasioned much of
in which

she criticized

Fisher's

of evolutionary
theory did not meet with
in this paper Grene explicitly states what

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

mathe

any strong
it is she is

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

171

to establish and provides careful arguments in support of her

attempting
thesis.43 In the original paper, biologists
read her to be claiming that a
to a highly confirmed
scientific
false
theory could be preferable
theory
some
because of
considerations.
preemptive
epistemological
They failed
these epistemological
considerations
could be or how they
To give Grene a run
considerations
of
truth.
outweigh
empirical
for her money, however, one might also suggest still another, more subtle
to see what

could

of the synthetic theory of evolution

be easy to understand why an essenti
alist would be anti-reductionist,
but given the synthetic theory of evo
see
is
to
it
difficult
these
lution,
why
biologists are equally opposed to the
of
reduction.44
possibility

possibility. The leading proponents

are also anti-reductionists.
It would

From what

has been said thus far, the reader might infer that philoso
have
little to contribute to biology. On the contrary, there are
very
phers
of
the scientific endeavor to which philosophers
could con
many aspects
tribute. My complaint
is that by and large they have not. A classic ex
have been in communication
with
ample of how ineffectual philosophers
is provided by the taxon-category
distinction.
J. H. Woodger
biologists
of
most
his
what
he
called
the
life
spent
"turning
Boole-Frege
doing
in biology". The differences between
indi
searchlight upon statements
viduals, classes, and classes of classes is one instance in which such an
effort could have resulted in considerable benefit for biology. The logical
was be
tools were available. The time was right. Just when Woodger
in mathematical
to
his work
logic, biologists were beginning
the
to
to
intensive
All
it
takes
re-examination.45
subject
species concept
appreciate how greatly the work of these biologists would have benefited
from having more than an intuitive grasp of the differences between de
ginning

fining the name of a particular species (a class) and defining the name of
the species category itself (a class of classes) is to read the literature of the
did provide just such an analysis in his book The
period. But Woodger
Axiomatic Method

in Biology.46

Unfortunately,

Woodger's

account went

unnoticed.
10 years later, when biologists did begin to point out the sig
Finally,
nificant differences between what they called taxa and categories,
the in
crease in clarity was substantial.
It would be pleasant to be able to say
a
that philosophers
in the recognition and dissemination
role
played
large
of this important

logical distinction,

but

such does not

seem to be the

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

172

DAVID

L. HULL

and termi
had to work out the appropriate distinctions
case. Biologists
were
same
At
this
time
themselves.
for
philosophers
producing
nology
involved whether
parallel accounts.471 have asked several of the biologists
they found these accounts helpful. They replied in the negative. What was
for this failure

the reason

Two

in communication?

factors

to

combined

of these philosophers
from having any significant impact
keep
on biology. In setting forth these factors, I do not mean to imply that all
some of the blame
parties were equally guilty in every respect or that
the work

I really am not so much interested

cannot be laid at the feet of biologists.
the causes for this failure in communi
in fixing blame as in discovering
cation.

tend to exhibit what can only be described as

First of all, philosophers
which biologists
find important.
disdain for the issues and distinctions
in his 1950 paper John R. Gregg argues that species are
For example,
classes,

not

an individual
and that the relation between
individuals,
not the
it belongs
is membership,
the species to which
relation.48 These issues were raised because two biologists had

organism

and

part-whole
advanced

independently

the notion
that species are as much concrete,
as
are
individual
organisms. On this score I think
things
spatiotemporal
in
his
is
but
arguments Gregg seems almost willfully blind
right,
Gregg
reasons
such an as
these
to the
biologists might have had for making
sertion. The point that they were trying to make was that species are not
of isolated individuals like the class of all things
just sets, just collections
in
of a species are interrelated
smaller than a breadbox. The members
significant ways, among which is spatiotemporal
biologically
questions of whether a class can be identified
proximity. The ontological
with itsmembers, whether the class of all cells that compose an organism
that organism, or
that compose
is identical to the class of all molecules
numerous

for that matter, whether the whole universe can be viewed as an organism
are irrelevant to the issues raised by these biologists. Gregg says that this
one which
is resolved by reference to
problem "is a pseudo-taxonomic
the semantic
evidence
slightest

structure

of language,

and upon which

distribution,
interbreeding
(geographical
If so, then Gregg
bearing whatsoever".49

problem.
The second
cation between

factor which

has contributed

these philosophers

no purely biological
relations, etc.) has the
has misidentified

to the failure

and biologists

the

of communi

is their method

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

of doing

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

173

of biological
statements
of science - the formal reconstruction
philosophy
a
There
is
continuum
with
in the notation of mathematical
respect
logic.
to the degree to which these 'formalists' utilize mathematical
logic. At
one end such notions are used just for clarity and consolidation
in the
are
of definitions. At the other end
those works in which the
presentation
is set-theoretical.
entire presentation
of doing philosophy
This method
obvious one is that few biologists

of biology has two drawbacks.

are familiar with the notation.

The
One

reason why Woodger's

work has had so little impact on biology
is that
cannot read most of his later work. But isn't this the fault of
biologists
Isn't it up to them to learn set-theory or symbolic logic so
biologists?
that they can reap the benefits of this large body of literature? The only
answer that I can honestly give to these questions is: No. Formalists
such
as Woodger
and Gregg have made some biologically
significant points in
their work, but few that could not have been made just as clearly without
extensive use of these notations. Perhaps the discovery of certain logical
was aided by the use of these techniques, but the results need
not have been communicated
in these same terms. Thetaxon-category
dis
distinctions

of mathematical
is a case in point. Too often the applications
or less common
more
to
in
the
that
biology give
impression
problems
logic
in
tiresome
when
have
ideas
been
exactitude
they could
expressed
place
more
a
more
sentences
in
of
few
have been conveyed
easily and
directly
tinction

plain English.
The second drawback

of the formalist method

not the method

the message.

which

becomes

occasioned

The

is that more

substantive

often

than

in biology

problem
as special, technical
is forgotten
The numerous papers which have been

the formalization

problems arise in the formalism.

written to solve what has been called Gregg's paradox provide
case in point. In his 1954 monograph,
set himself
Gregg
a set-theoretical

an excellent
the task of

hierarchy with
in
1952
had
attempted a
logic. (Woodger
similar reconstruction.50)
The problem is that biologists make use of in
In fact, the distri
in constructing
their classifications.
tensional notions

providing
in the confines

reconstruction

of the Linnaean

of extensional

of the organisms being classified is a primary

in constructing
Some biologists
classifications.
biological
As might be expected, Gregg's
argue that it is the only consideration.
a
reconstruction
gave rise to paradoxes. Thereafter,
purely extensional
bution

of the characters

consideration

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

174

DAVID

L. HULL

in which various devices were used to

long series of papers appeared
eliminate these paradoxes
introducing the notion
(or antinomies) without
of intensions.51 But why? Even if one or more of these devices work,
relevance

what
will

continue

characters
Linnean

will

this reconstruction

to make
among

their decisions

have for biology? Taxonomists

on the basis of the distribution
of
the
for reconstructing
All
will
remain.
the
effort
logic
the Linnaean hierarchy within the

specimens. The
in intensional or modal
their

hierarchy
expended in attempting
confines of extensional

to reconstruct
logic may

need

be first-rate

logic. It has little claim

to

of biology.
being philosophy
A second instance in which

could have been of some

philosophers
- what is a character?
to biologists
is afforded by the question
- one
This question has plagued genetics since the days of the one gene
character hypothesis. Closely associated with this problem is the question
- when are two instances of a character to be considered
of homology
instances of the same character and in what sense same? After the advent
service

of evolutionary
theory the answer has been that two characters are homo
logous if they are similar because of origin from a common ancestor. A
are homologous
or not two characters
in an
as to whether
decision
to
sense
and
recourse
to
evidence
all
available
evolutionary
requires
scientific theories, including evolutionary
theory. Because of
the intricacy of the inferences involved in such decisions and the frequent
more
paucity of evidence, some biologists have suggested that a different,
should be substituted
basic notion of homology
operational homology
for the notion of evolutionary
homology.
numerous

At

first, operational
homologies
served directly with no recourse

were
to

supposed to be something ob
inferences or scientific theories.

Gradually biologists have come to see that such units were quite ephemer
al and of little scientific use and have expanded the concept to permit
inferences on the basis of certain scientific theories, in fact, any scientific
interpretations are
theory. When evolutionary
theory except evolutionary
As
the result is evolutionary homologies.
put on operational homologies,
to clarify the ideas
the reader may have detected, the efforts of biologists
of character and homology have been excursions into pure epistemology.
the scope of a decade, they have relived the history of phenomen
and logical atomism. There is really no need for
alism, operationism,
biologists to remake all the old mistakes and to explore every blind alley.52

Within

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

175

Another
could have helped clarify the
place at which philosophers
over the problem
issues in a dispute between biologists
is the disagreement
of whether higher categories evolved first and then later diversified into
or whether
lower categories
species evolved first and then only later
and Schindewolf
incline toward the first
higher categories. Goldschmidt
view. Simpson and Mayr
subscribe to the latter view.53 The major diffi
is the logical crudity with which it is frequently
culty with this controversy
expressed. Both Marjorie Grene
versy at some length.54 Though

and T. A. Goudge
discuss this contro
they themselves do not make the fairly

straightforward
logical error at the bottom of the confusion, neither does
to
clarify the situation. The confusion lies primarily in the modes
anything
of Goldschmidt
of expression
and Schindewolf.
On neither view can
now
taxa
term
in use) evolve first and lower taxa such as
(the
higher
later. Perhaps Archaeopteryx
evolved in one fell swoop.
so
basic
its
is
novel
that
itmust be recognized as a
Perhaps
organization
new higher taxon regardless of any future developments.
Even so, a new
no
a
new
taxon
has
in
taxon.
evolved
lower
Given the
way
before
higher
species

principles
possible

evolve

of classification
for a new phylum

agreed upon by both sides, it is logically im

or family to evolve without
a new species

evolving simultaneously.55
The two sides are in disagreement,

but this is not it. Their disagreement

of fact and one matter of taxonomic
strategy. The
over the existence of large, abrupt changes in pheno
factual disagreement
typic make-up has been discussed previously. With respect to their differ
ences on taxonomic
want to
and Schindewolf
strategy, Goldschmidt

concerns

one matter

gaps,
entirely on the basis of overall similarity and phenotypic
regardless of the number and diversity of taxa which eventually exhibit
this type of organization. Novelty
alone guarantees a taxon a high cate
of princi
gory assignment.
Simpson and Mayr classify on a multiplicity
classify

some kind of balance in a classification while still re

ples. To maintain
a
to phylogeny,
of vertical
systematic
taining
relationship
principles
classification.
classification must be tempered with those of horizontal
numerous
included taxa is likely to be classified at a
level
than
its
degree of divergence alone might warrant.
higher category
no
of
of biology could possibly omit
review
the
Finally,
philosophy
in the philosophy
of
the two recent works devoted entirely to problems
- the Foundations
Felix
Mainx
Morton
Beckner's
and
biology
of Biology by

Thus

a taxon with

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

176

DAVID

L. HULL

The Biological Way of Thought. As might be expected from the fact that
to the International Encyclopedia
is a contribution
his monograph
of
Mainx
the verifiability criterion of meaning
emphasizes
Unified Science,
fulness and the unity of science. The errors and conceptual dangers which
he most frequently points out in biological works are attempts to pass off
claims as empirically meaningful
statements,
tautologies and metaphysical
for conceptual
and a tendency among biologists
realism. Both of these
tendencies are worth bringing to the attention of biologists,
but unfortu
treatment, he fails to reflect the increased sophistica
nately for Mainx's
tion of the positivist position which had occurred since its inception. For
instance he sees tautologies everywhere because he accepts a rather facile
notion of the relationship
between operations
used to test the applica
bility of a term and the definition

of that term. He

says in one place,

for

example:
If in the statement

"The

its

positive

the
light-requirement"
means
of the establishment
statement

ogous

Behavior

of

under

phototactic

reaction

concept
"light-requirement"
of the behavior
under the

the above

is proportional
of a Euglena
to
is only
defined
testably
by
stimulus
of light, this is a tautol

kind.56

of light is certainly neither logically nor

'testably defining' the concept 'light-require
is not tautologous. The same is true for most

the stimulus

the only way of

physically
ment'. Hence, the statement

of the examples which Mainx gives. Mainx would have done well to have
to the same series on the
earlier contribution
read Carl G. Hempel's
in empirical science.57 A careful read
of concept formation
of
this
earlier
ing
monograph
might also have suggested to him that the
basic distinction which pervades his book serves only to frustrate his
foundations

to provide an adequate explication

is between order-analytic
distinction

efforts
This

of the foundations

of biology.
express the

statements, which
of characters, and causal-analytic
statements, which express
as this distinction
a succession of states in time. As time-honored
is, it
coexistence

of the relationship
between con
just will not do as a characterization
in science. For example, Mainx
cept formation and theory construction
- the
three
in
different
the
recognizes
viewpoints
morphological,
biology
and the genetical. Although
he warns the reader that these
physiological
he
it sound as if a morpholo
three viewpoints
makes
overlap somewhat,
of
gist could analyze an organism into organs and tissues independently
of physiology,
descent. Further,
genetics or evolutionary

any knowledge

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

PHILOSOPHY

OF BIOLOGY

IS NOT

177

supposedly can then erect a classification by means of the

of these characters, and this classification
is equally neutral
co-variation
as far as scientific theories are concerned. Only afterwards can such
as the functions
these structures perform or
theoretical
considerations
a taxonomist

their evolutionary
derivation be brought into play. This is the impression
his exposition gives although he says that it must be "remembered
that
even in these elementary descriptive
statements the beginning of hypoth
esis construction must be recognized".58
Currently, biologists are carrying on an extensive debate over just these
issues.59 Must the sequence of events in an actual scientific study be the
same as those inMainx's
There are good
reconstruction?
epistemological
reasons
out,60

for maintaining
the morphological

that they cannot be. As Beckner has pointed

which are used to produce a
characteristics

are not purely morphological

characters.
supposedly neutral classification
The definition of 'kidney', for example, necessarily presupposes
know
a
of
with
visual
clues,
biologist might begin
ledge
physiology.
Perhaps
but what makes a structure a kidney is determined as much by its function
as by its structure. A similar story can be told for the evolutionary
deri
vation of a character, though the relevant evidence is more difficult to
obtain. The gills of a fish and the gills of a crayfish are not the same
even though they perform the same function, both because of
and because of their differing phylogenetic
their structural differences
are intercon
histories. These various aspects of scientific terminology
character

nected

in very complicated ways in the formation of concepts in science.

school of biologists
is presently arguing that all these different features
in biological
terminology must be disentangled,
especially any assump
tions about evolutionary
This task is, to say the least,
development.

One

ambitious.

overly simplistic treatment will help these

the
difficulties
which they are likely to encounter
biologists
appreciate
little.
The
is
different
with respect to Beckner's book.
very
story
quite
The attention which Beckner's explication of organismic biology con
Reading

Mainx's

tinues to receive from both biologists

and philosophers
is well-deserved.
has
been
re-issued
in paperback
recently
{The Biological Way of Thought
of
the
California
What
Beckner
says is important
by
University
Press.)
one
and expressed clearly
with only
major and pervasive exception. The
main purpose of Beckner's book is to show that biology is an autonomous
discipline with concepts and laws peculiar to itself. In general he tries to

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

178

DAVID

L. HULL

show that organization,

directiveness
and historicity play a more crucial
in biology
than in other sciences. Specifically, he attempts to show
that three classes of concepts - polytypic,
historical and functional con
- are
in one sense and fully unique in
cepts
characteristically
biological
role

theory in another. Beckner's explication of polytypic concepts

biological
affords a rare instance in which a philosopher
has actually contributed
a
to
of
the development
significantly
biologically
important notion, that
of polythetic definitions.61 Biologists had been using the notion for some
time and had discussed
it with varying degrees of clarity, but Beckner
also provided a general explication and a philosophical
justification for it.
The one glaring fault in Beckner's presentation
is his introduction
of
two technical terms, 'W-definition'
and 'E-definition', which he claims
to read Beckner's
will be helpful in his exposition. A biologist attempting
in the second chapter by a series of semi-formal
book is confronted
readers, if they go on at all, are tempted to skip this
as
it turns out, with no great loss. His brief discussions
of
chapter and,
are expanded
historical
and functional
in later
concepts
polytypic,
to them, and the notions of W- and E-defi
chapters devoted exclusively
nitions play almost no role in the ensuing pages. To be sure, Beckner
definitions.

Most

uses these technical terms in his subsequent discussions

but
periodically
to little consequence,
since in most cases a term cannot simply be W-de
fined or E-defined. Instead they can only be E-defined with "preestablished
criteria of adequacy for any W-definition",
and Beckner leaves the nature
of these criteria

At the risk of seeming totally

completely unexplicated.
to
the
formalist
method
of
of science, I must
opposed
doing philosophy
once
out
that
point
again the extensive logical machinery which Beckner
introduces serves to hinder rather than aid his exposition. Formalization
out problems
in the philosophy
of
may be an excellent way of working
science. It is not a very good way of communicating
the results of these
in spite of this flaw in presentation,
endeavors. However,
Beckner's book
remains

the single major

contribution

of a philosopher

to biology

in over

a decade.
In conclusion,
there are many things that philosophy
of biology might
A
be.
philosopher might uncover, explicate, and possibly solve problems
in biological
He might even go on to communi
theory and methodology.
cate

these results

biologists.

He might

to other philosophers,
to scientists, and especially
to
show what consequences
and
biological phenomena

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

OF BIOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY

IS NOT

179

or to show what
and for philosophy
even
other sciences and
consequences
philosophy have for biology. These
are some of the things which philosophers
of biology might do. With rare
theories

for other

have

sciences

of biology is not? It must be

to biology, nor biology to it.62

they have not. What philosophy

exception,
admitted that thus far it is not very relevant
REFERENCES
* This

paper will also appear in the Journal of theHistory of Biology 2 (1969), No.

1 Both

restrictions

stances

seemed

in the scope of
to demand
it. For

this paper
example,

have

been

Woodger

1.

ignored when
special circum
began his career as a biologist

and published most of his work prior to the time limits set for this paper, but he has
produced a body of work in the philosophy of biology too important not to include.
2 Mario

'The Weight

Bunge,

of

Simplicity

in

the Construction

and

Assaying

of

Scientific Theories', Philosophy of Science 28 (1961) 120-149.

3 G. G.

Yale University
The Meaning
Press, New Haven,
of Evolution,
1949;
Simpson,
Columbia
University
Press, New York,
Simpson,
of Animal Taxonomy,
Principles
Brace & World,
1961 ;G. G. Simpson,
This View of Life, Harcourt,
Inc., New York,
and Evolution,
Harvard
1963 ;Ernst Mayr,
Animal Species
University
Press, Cambridge,
that certain principles
in the synthetic
1963. In most
the assertion
instances
Mass.,
G.G.

are tautologous
stems from an extremely
superficial
understanding
theory of evolution
over the precise
nature
and an embarrassing
of
of evolutionary
uncertainty
theory
to the Neo
in Mathematical
For
Eden,
Murray
Challenges
tautologies.
example,
and M. M. Kaplan),
Darwinian
The
(ed. by P. S. Moorhead
Interpretation
of Evolution
Wistar

Institute

logical
Under

nature

of

the assumption
that the tauto
1967, began with
in evolutionary
controversial.
theory was hardly
to the position
Eden
retreated
several biologists
that
present,
vacuous.
such claims are supposedly
the wrong word. Rather

Press,
Philadelphia,
certain
concepts

the onslaught
of
was
'tautology'
perhaps
to the assertion
From here he retreated
did not

form

experiment
tautological
maintaining

that the basic principles

of evolutionary
theory
a crucial
a theory, and finally he concluded
that since one cannot provide
or not the synthetic
is false,
it is in some sense
to check whether
theory
as
was
or unfalsifiable.
in this discussion
cited
Karl
frequently
Popper
A Comment',
'The Concept
of Evolution:
the last position.
Flew,
Anthony

41 (1966) annihilates
40 (1965)
Evolution',
Philosophy
of the survival of the fittest must

Philosophy

Ethics,
University
4 Charles

Press, New

St. Martin's
of Toronto

similar allegations
'The Concept
of
by A. R. Manser,
argues later that the principle
18-34, though he himself
be made
into a tautology,
Anthony
Flew, Evolutionary
The Ascent
1967. See also T. A. Goudge,
York,
of Life,

1961.
Press, Toronto,
A Facsimile
the Origin
of Species:

Harvard
of the First Edition,
Charles Darwin,
The Descent
Mass.,
Press, Cambridge,
1966, pp. 450-456;
University
to Sex, 2 vols., Murray,
in Relation
And Selection
London,
1871, p. 92.
of Man,
5
Darwin,
472, 135.
Origin,
6
468, 89-90.
Darwin,
Origin,
7 J. W.
in British
'Melanism
and Melanochroism
Tutt,
Lepodoptera\
Entomologists'
Darwin,

On

Record 1(1890), 2 (1891).

8 Peter

Caws,

The Philosophy

of Science,

D.

Van Nostrand,

Inc., Princeton,

40-41.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1965, pp.

DAVID

180

L. HULL

91.
Animal Species,
on the species concept
is overwhelmingly
literature
biological
large. The best
can be found
discussions
of the pros and cons of the biological
definition
of 'species'
Ernst Mayr,
in Simpson,
and the Origin
Columbia
Systematics
of Species,
Principles;
'The Species
3
Evolution
1942); Ernst Mayr,
University
Press, New York,
Concept',
Mayr,
10 The

Ernst Mayr
American
for the
Association
(ed.), The Species Problem,
Science
Publication
Number
50, Washington,
1957; Ernst Mayr,
an Evolutionary
Factor',
of the American
Proceedings
Philosophical

(1949) 371-372;
Advancement

of

as

'Isolation

two philosophers
Animal
For
take
who
165-230;
Mayr,
Species.
see Morton
of the species
The
problem
seriously,
Beckner,
Columbia
Way
of Thought,
Press, New York,
University
1959, and Hugh
'Are Biological
34 (1967)
157-167.
Species Real?',
of Science
Philosophy

103
Society
the biological
Biological
Lehman,
11 Andrew

(1959)

aspects

Evolution
and Philosophy,
G. van Meisen,
Duquesne
Press,
University
New Paths
in Biology,
trans.:
1965. See also Adolf
1961 (English
Portman,
Pittsburgh,
& Row, New York,
1964) and Hans
Harper
Jonas, The Phenomenon
of Life: Toward
a Philosophical
& Row, New
1966.
York,
Biology,
Harper
12 G. G.
'The World
into Which
131 (1960) 966
Darwin
Led Us', Science
Simpson,
in Simpson,
This View, 3-25.
974; reprinted
13W. R.
'The Status of Species',
in Philosophical
Problems
in Biology
Thompson,
(ed.
E. Smith),
St. John's University
by Vincent
Press, New York,
1966, pp. 67-126.
14 P. B.
The Art of the Soluble,
& Company
Methuen
Medawar,
London,
Ltd.,
1967.
15 All of the above assertions
can be found expressed
in two volumes
edited
variously
E. Smith, Philosophy
St. John's University
by Vincent
of Biology,
Press, New York,
as well as in Pacific
Problems
Forum
1962, and Philosophical
of Biology,
Philosophy
6 (1968), No.
3, 1-99.
16
Ascent.
Goudge,
17
Ascent,
Goudge,
133, 134.
18 See the
cited number
Forum
o? Pacific
previously
(note 15), in which
Philosophy
that the vitalism-mechanism
several
cannot
be dis
argue
philosophers
controversy
as a dead
missed
issue. The major
in this number
is sufficiently
paper
by Hilde Hein
to such inanities
as "the
but in the others we are once again
innocuous,
subjected
human
less

than

the

intellect

violates

the

evolutionist's

laws

of

view,

the

the

of space and time",

that "no
irreversibility
a true and
of the creationist
approach
yields
that the fossil remains
of so-called missing
links

of life", and
satisfactory
philosophy
are actually
and other primates
between man
the unaltered
human
Manier
species. Edward
these papers.
19 J. H.
Randall,
other examples
'Life's

Aristotle,
in addition

Irreducible

Structure',
and principles

Columbia
to Randall
Science

the remains
had

of abnormal

the unenviable

task

individuals

of

of replying

to

1960. Numerous
Press, New York,
University
could be given. For example, Michael
Polanyi,
160 (1968)
1308-1312
levels
various
recognizes

to certain
which
levels and not to others,
but he
apply
the lower processes.
See also Marjorie
higher
principles
'harnessing'
The Knower
and the Known,
Basic Books,
1966. No biologist
Grene,
Inc., New York,
or of principles
would
of levels of organization
which
deny the existence
apply to these
can William
do things? What
E. Carlo,
'Mecha
levels, but how can these principles
A Reappraisal',
Forum
6 (1968) 57-68, mean
nism and Vitalism:
Pacific
Philosophy
of organization
also has these

when

he

man,

shapes

says

that
it, molds

is a principle
it, and organizes

"there

of organization
it into a man"?

which

takes

the matter

See also P. R. Durbin,

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

of a

Philoso

WHAT

OF BIOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY

IS NOT

181

McGraw-Hill
New York,
An Introduction,
Book
Company,
1968, and
phy of Science:
V. E. Smith, Science
and Philosophy,
1965.
Bruce, Milwaukee,
20 See
'Functional
in Biology',
Beckner,
Lehman,
Way, Hugh
Explanation
Biological
34 (1965)
J. V. Canfield,
in
1-19;
of Science
Philosophy
'Teleological
Explanation

Biology', British Journalfor thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1964) 285-295 ;J. V. Canfield

(ed.), Purpose
21 There
is a

in Nature,

discussions
(ed.),

Interrelations:

1966;

K.

in biology
The Biological

and Physical

Sciences,

to Reduction',
'Approaches
'Antireductionism
and

F. Schaffner,

137-147;

1966.
Inc., Englewood
Cliffs,
to the problem
devoted
of reduction.
Recent
can be found
R. T. Blackburn
in Grene,
Knower;

Prentice-Hall,
of literature

large body
of reduction

K.F.Schaffner,

Scott,

Philosophy
Molecular

Foresman,
of Science
Biology',

Chicago,
34 (1967)
Science
157

(1967) 644-647.

22 Carl G.
Hempel

and

Paul

'The Logic

Oppenheim,

of Explanation',

of

Philosophy

Science 15 (1948) 135-175.

23 Of

to the relevance
of explanation
in evolutionary
devoted
theory to
J. Scriven
in his 'Explanation
and Prediction
in Evo
thesis, Michael
130 (1959) 477-482,
is the most
with evolutionary
Science
concerned
lutionary Theory',
source for an example.
rather
than as a handy
See also
theory as a biological
theory,
the

all the papers

symmetry

J. Scriven,

Michael

Philosophy
sota Press,

of Science,

Prediction,
'Explanation,
vol. Ill (ed. by H. Feigl
1962,
between

Minneapolis,

metric

Parity
Principles,
in Induction:
Teleology',
Press,

Some

1963; Hugh

Middleton,

pp. 477-482;

Explanation
Current Issues

Lehman,

and

in the
inMinnesota
Studies
Laws',
and G. Maxwell),
of Minne
University
Adolf Gr?nbaum,
'Temporally
Asym
versus
and Predicton,
and Mechanism

(ed. by B. Baumrin),
Wesleyan
University
'On the Form
of Explanation
in Evolutionary

Biology', Theoria 32 (1966) 14-24.

24 Abraham
The Conduct
Chandler
San
of Inquiry,
Kaplan,
Publishing
Company,
1964.
Francisco,
25
'The Structure
of Darwinism',
in M. L. Johnson,
Michael
Aber
Anthony
Flew,
& G. E. Fogg, New
crombie
Books,
1959, pp. 25-44;
Penguin
Biology,
Baltimore,
Flew Evolutionary
Ethics.
26 Julian
The Process
Chatto
and Windus,
of Evolution,
London,
1953, p. 38.
Huxley,
27
28.
Flew,
'Structure',
28
28.
'Structure',
Flew,
29
29.
'Structure',
Flew,
30
Ethics,
Flew, Evolutionary
14, 36,14.
31 J. H.
& Kegan
1929 (2nd ed.: Routledge
Paul Ltd.,
Woodger,
Biological
Principles,
1948),
London,
32 For
differing

pp.

394,402.
on these views,

opinions

see W.

B. Gallie,

in History

'Explanation

and

the Genetic Sciences',Mind 64 (1955) 161-167; R. P. Gould, 'The Place of Historical

Statements in Biology', British Journalfor thePhilosophy of Science 8 (1957) 192-210;
T. A. Goudge,
'Causal Explanations
9 (1958) 194-202;
losophy of Science
Inference

of Function

from

in Natural
British
the Phi
Journal for
History',
'The
Beckner,
Way; M. J. S. Rudwick,
Biological
Structure
in Fossils',
British
Journal for the Philosophy
of

Science 15 (1964) 27-40.

33

Marjorie

Grene,

'Two Evolutionary

Theories',

British

Journal

for

the Philosophy

Science 9 (1958) 110-127, 185-193.

34

O. H.
Simpson, Meaning;
1950.
bart, Stuttgart,
35
'Two Evolutionary
Grene,

Schindewolf,
Theories',

Grundfragen

der Pal?ontologie,

185-186.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Schweizer

of

182
36 G. G.

Simpson,

DAVID

'Types

in Modem

'Two

Evolutionary

L. HULL

American

Taxonomy',

Journal

of Science

238

(1940) 413-431.

37

Marjorie

Grene,

Theories:

Reply',

British

Journal

for

the

or

that

Philosophy of Science 14 (1963) 152-153.

38 Of

all

not all biologists

course,
agree
to it. Almost
the data are favorable

with

all aspects

any biologist

of
will

the
have

theory
synthetic
some reservation

one or another
- H.
Graham

cited several
of the tenets of the synthetic
theory, and Grene
Paul G. 'Espinasse,
Ronald
Adolf
Cannon,
Portman,
Good,
fails to mention
is that these
and C. H. Waddington.
What Grene
Thompson,
of the synthetic
aspects
theory and with each other. It
disagree with different
case that a unified,
to the current orthodox
viable alternative
theory has been
as an
at "phylogeny
to looking
herself makes
reference
forth. Grene
passing

about
examples
W. R.
scientists
is not

the

brought

ontogeny
as expressing
a fundamental
the history
of groups
rhythm
still, in its
to the rhythm
to us, but analogous
of individual
unknown
intimacy,
development".
extinct by the various mechanisms
of the synthetic
Instead of species becoming
theory,
of living
itself out". Marjorie
'The Faith
of
"this pattern
Grene,
simply
played

writ

large,

Darwinism',
gists have

at

Encounter
investigated
the Species:

Cycles

of

(1966)
Natural

112-126.

The

13 (1959) 52, 55, reprinted

in Grene,
185-201.
Biolo
Knower,
most
Lawrence
this possibility,
S. Dillon,
'The Life
recently,
15
An Extension
of Current
Concepts',
Systematic
Zoology
to Darwin,
Journal
into the
idea even occurred
of Researches

Visited
the Voyage
and Geology
of the Countries
of H. M. S.
History
during
the World,
Round
2nd ed., revised, Murray,
1845. Unorthodox
views
London,
Beagle
the weight
to be against
of evidence
do get a hearing. Unfortunately,
has proved
this
to these
fact that most
unorthodox
view. The
after
biologists,
listening
particular
to label them dogmatic.
leads Grene
If refusal
to
views, remain unconvinced
are being dogmatic.
is dogmatism,
then these biologists
the weight
of evidence
go against
39
was a strong proponent
of macroevolution
Goldschmidt
Although
by macromu
were
that the two positions
of each other and said
independent
tation, he was aware

dissident

so explicitly:
the
"Continuing
out further whether

we must
in the foregoing
find
chapters,
so
is capable
of being changed
system
suddenly
a slow accumulation
of small steps, but as a

derived

line of argument
the development

that a new
emerge without
type may
of what we called a systematic
mutation.
consequence
out in complete
Such an analysis may
be carried
independence
we developed
which
the architecture
of
concerning
conceptions

from

the detailed

the germ

and
plasm
a single macroevolutionary
its changes.
It does not make
whether
any difference
step
a systematic
the chromosomal
is caused by a major
pattern,
change within
mutation,
or by a special kind of gene mutation
if such is imaginable.
with
effect,
generalized
is the single change which
affects
decisive
the entire reaction
of the
system
point
as opposed
to a slow accumulation
of small
simultaneously,
developing
organism
The Material
Yale
Uni
additive
Basis
of Evolution,
(R. B. Goldschmidt,
changes"
1940, p. 251).
versity Press, New Haven,
40 Walter
von Wahlert,
A Discussion',
J. Bock and Gerd
'Two Evolutionary
Theories:

The

British Journalfor thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1963) 140-146; Leigh Van Valen, 'On
Evolutionary Theories', British Journalfor thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1963) 146-152;
G.

S. Carter,

'Two

Evolutionary

Theories,

By

M.

Grene:

Further

Discussion',

British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science 14 (1963) 345-348; Marjorie Grene, 'Two
: Reply
Theories
Evolutionary
14 (1963) 349-351.
Science
One

to Dr.

the Philosophy
British
Journal for
of
Carter',
a philosophically
who attempted
oriented

philosopher

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

WHAT

Edward Manier,
criticism,
32 (1965),
phy of Science
'Discussion:
Mr. Manier's
reply', Philosophy
41 Ernst
Mayr,

OF BIOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY

'The Theory
of Evolution
was met with

244-252,

IS NOT

183

as Personal Knowledge',
Philoso
a harsh
rebuff, Marjorie
Grene,
as Personal
A Quasi
Knowledge:

of Evolution
Theory
33 (1966)
163-164.
of Science
and Evolution',
Harvard
Library Bulletin
'Agassiz, Darwin
This View
Animal
Species;
Simpson,
Principles;
Simpson,

165-194;
Mayr,
42
Grene,
Marjorie

in the Philosophy

'Positionality

of Helmuth

Plessner',

13 (1959)
of Life.
The Review

ofMetaphysics 20 (1966) 258.

43

'Statistics

Grene,

Marjorie

and

British

Selection',

Journal

the Philosophy

for

of

Science 12 (1961) 25-42.

44 This

was
out by certain
Lehman
and is bom
suggested
by Hugh
interpretation
comments
in Grene,
185.
Knower,
45 Theodosius
Genetics
and the Origin
Columbia
of Species,
Dobzhansky,
University
Press, New York,
1937; Mayr,
Systematics.
46 J. H.
in Biology,
The Axiomatic
Method
Press,
Woodger,
Cambridge
University
1937.
Cambridge,
47 John R.
The American
and Reality',
Naturalist
84
'Taxonomy,
Language
Gregg,

(1950) 419-435; John R. Gregg, The Language of Taxonomy, Columbia University

Press, New

1954;

York,

J. H. Woodger,

and Language,

Biology

Cambridge

University

1952; Beckner,
Press, Cambridge,
Way.
Biological
48
'Taxonomy'.
Gregg,
49
426.
'Taxonomy',
Gregg,
50
and Language.
Woodger,
Gregg,
Language;
Biology
51 A. F.
'Review of Gregg,
The Language
of Taxonomy',
Parker-Rhodes,
Philosophical
66 (1957)
'On Category
Review
in
A. Sklar,
in Taxonomy',
124-125;
Overlapping
Form
in Science
and F. T. C. Harris),
D. Reidel
and Strategy
(ed. by J. R. Gregg
'An Analysis
;Leigh Van Valen,
1964, pp. 395-401
Dordrecht,
in Gregg
and Harris,
C. J. Jardine,
402-415;
Form,
Concepts',
'The Structure
and Construction
and R. Sibson,
of Taxonomic
Hierarchies',
1 (1967)
Biosciences
John R. Gregg,
'Finite
Linnaean
173-179;

Publishing
Company,
of Some Taxonomic
N.

Jardine

Mathematical

Bulletin

of Mathematical
and P. H. A.

Structures',
52 Robert

R.

Freeman

and Company,

29 (1967)
191-200.
of Numerical
Principles
H. Colless,
1963; Donald

Biophysics
Sneath,

San

Francisco,
in Phenetic
Taxonomy',

W. H.
Taxonomy,
'An Examination

16 (1967)
6-27;
Systematic
Concepts
Zoology
16 (1967) 289-295;
'The Phylogenetic
Colless,
Systematic
Fallacy',
Zoology
British Journal for
the Philosophy
of Homology
in Biology',
'The Concept
a similar analysis
some years
18 (1968)
125-139. Woodger
had provided

of Certain
Donald

Sokal

H.

N.

Jardine,
of Science
'On Biological
Transformations',
earlier,
in Growth and Form Presented
Essays

inW.
to D'A.

E.

le Gros

W. Thompson,

Clark

and P. R. Medawar,

Clarendon

Press, Oxford,
an excellent
of
summary
though Woodger,
Biological
Principles,
provided
a few biologists
to argue that sense
in phenomenalism,
the problems
inherent
continue
data or the like are the fundamental
of science;
e.g., J. S. L. Gilmour,
subject matter
in The New Systematics
Oxford University
1940,
(ed. by Julian Huxley),
Press, Oxford,
1945. Even

pp. 461-474;

J. S. L. Gilmour

and

S. M. Walters,

'Philosophy

and

Classification',

Vistas inBotany 4 (1964) 1-22.

53 R. B.
Goldschmidt,

'Evolution

as Viewed

by One

Geneticist',

American

Scholar

40

(1952) 84-98; Goldschmidt, Material Basis; Schindewolf, Grundfragen; Simpson,

Meaning;
54
Grene,

Animal
Mayr,
Species.
'Two Evolutionary
Theories'

;Goudge,

Ascent.

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

184

DAVID L. HULL

55

are guilty of exactly

better
the same
two authors
who
should
know
Amazingly,
Foundations
of Chicago
Felix Mainx,
confusion:
of Biology,
Press, Chicago,
University
& Company,
in Authority,
W. W. Norton
Science
Inc., New
1955; Lancelot
Hogben,
1963.
York,
56
5.
Mainx,
Foundations,
57 Carl G.
Formation
in Empirical
Fundamentals
Uni
of Concept
Science,
Hempel,
1952.
Press, Chicago,
versity of Chicago
58
3.
Foundations,
Mainx,
59
'Numerical
Ernst Mayr,
Phenetics
Sokal and Sneath, Principles;
Science;
Hogben,
14 (1965) 73-97; Robert
R. Sokal,
J. H.
and Taxonomic
Theory',
Systematic
Zoology
F. J. Rohlf,
'Numerical
and P. H. A. Sneath,
Some
Points
of
Taxonomy:
Camin,
14 (1965)
237-243;
'Examination';
View',
Systematic
Colless,
Zoology
Colless,
'Fallacy'.
60
Beckner,
Biological
61 See
also, Woodger,
Critica
lution', Nuova

Way,

110-131.

J. H. Woodger,
and Evo
and Language;
Biology
'Taxonomy
3 (1961) 67-78;
J. H. Woodger,
and the Axiomatic
'Biology

Method', Annals of theNew York Academy of Science 96 (1962) 1093-1104; Douglas

Gasking,
Science.
62 I wish
commenting
the same,
This

paper

'Clusters',
to

Australasian

Review

of Psychology

38

(1960)

1-36;

Hogben,

and
Ernst Mayr,
Helen Heise,
and Hugh
Lehman
for reading
to Marjorie
this paper.
Grene
is owed
for doing
Special
appreciation
ideas were
criticized
in the paper.
several of her own
severely
though

thank
on

even
was

prepared

under

grant

GS-1971

of

the National

Science

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:45:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Foundation.