Bureaucracy and Democracy

B. Guy Peters
University of Pittsburgh

Jon Pierre
University of Gothenberg

Bureaucracy and democracy are often considered antithetical properties of political systems. There is a
large scholarly and popular literature arguing that bureaucracies are major problems limiting the capacity
of democratic political systems to effectively respond to their citizens. In this panel we will be pursuing the
contrary argument that the public bureaucracy may be becoming the locus for democratic responsiveness in
many political systems.
The importance for bureaucracy for democracy in contemporary political systems arises in part from the
weaknesses of more conventional institutions of democracy. For example, participation in elections has
been falling rapidly in most democratic systems, and membership in political parties in also declining.
Parliaments have for some time been argued to be losing power to the executive, and within the executive
the collegiality of cabinet is eroding in favor of greater powers for the prime minister. Thus, the usual
instrumentalities of political democracy are, if not failing, certainly weakened.
Although we usually think about "bureaucracy" in the context of public administration, the system of
appointed officials, military and civil, in every state also has great political significance, not only in the
sense that officials exercise direct influence on the shaping of public policies but they also affect the
capacity of regimes to survive.
Maladministration not only leads to popular dissatisfaction with governments but it can provoke public
officials, led by military officers, to seize power and become a ruling elite. They may do this to abort
revolutionary movements and rebellions, or simply to replace a regime that cannot govern. Explanations
based on the ambitions of military officer's strike me as quite inadequate.
Good public administration reflects not only the ability of appointed officials to work effectively but also
the capacity of a country's political institutions to maintain effective control over its bureaucracy.
No matter how democratic the institutions of representative governance may be, they cannot survive for
long if they are not also able to exercise enough control over their appointed officials to assure the honest
and effective implementation of public policies -- at least to some degree! Without such controls,
bureaucrats left to them will easily indulge in corruption, abuse of power, laziness and inefficiency.
Conscientious and public spirited officials are numerous, but they easily succumb to counter-productive
practices tolerated or even encouraged by ambitious and aggressive colleagues who typically dominate
bureaucracies that are not effectively controlled by extra-bureaucratic political institutions.

Maladministration is much more than bureau pathology - all administrative systems suffer from difficulties
that antagonize and worry citizens and administrative reforms are able to correct many of them. By
contrast, maladministration involves the fundamental inability of appointed officials to perform the
functions normally expected of them.
When, over two centuries ago, the administrative functions of the federal government were minimal and
most public administration was, actually, carried out by state and local officials. Farmers, merchants, and
artisans working in the private sector were self-sufficient and able to manage most of their affairs without
governmental intervention.
Since then, however, the industrial revolution and the global interdependence brought into being by the
world-encircling conquests of modern empires have vastly increased the need for public administration in
every sphere of life. All constitutional democracies, if they are indeed to meet the needs of their citizens,
must provide a host of new public services.
The inherent complexity and interdependence of these functions requires the support of a large number of
talented and dedicated public servants. Their capacity and willingness to perform these functions cannot be
taken for granted: no bureaucracy can, in principle, be internally designed on democratic principles.
Rather, they need to become specialists with authority to act based on their competence and knowledge of
the technical problems involved in every domain of public policy, not by taking votes to see who agrees!
Put simply, good public administration requires the empowerment of appointed public officials -- they need
to be able to act quickly and efficiently in order to accomplish the missions assigned to them.
The more powerful officials become, however, the more difficult it becomes to hold them accountable for
their performance and the greater the need for effective institutions of representative government
(legislatures and courts of law as well as chief executives) that are able to direct and monitor public
bureaucracies.
The survival of constitutional democracy, therefore, hinges not only on the internal design and effectiveness
of the institutions of representative government but on their capacity to manage public bureaucracies. This
has always been true, but the emergence of modern technological, scientific, and industrial institutions and
problems on a global basis has raised the problems of bureaucratic control and management to new heights.
The need for such controls is most dramatically evident in the successor states created by the collapse of all
the modern empires, whether capitalist or communist in design. In these states, colonial bureaucracies have
been transformed into state bureaucracies in whom indigenous personnel replaced expatriates but
authoritarian practices and attitudes survived.

Those who wanted to democratize these polities faced the stupendous problems involved not only in
creating institutions of representative government but also in empowering them to exercise effective control
over the bureaucratic institutions which they inherited (or, in some cases, were able to create).
Understandably, they often failed and maladministration resulted. Indeed, it is fair to say that in many of
these countries anarchy resulted throughout much of the territory included within the nominal borders of the
new states. Not surprisingly, crime, banditry, and gangs emerged, often provoking both public officials and
political elites to resort to violence in futile fruitless efforts to restore or establish order.
Such efforts, however, in the absence of effective public administration, merely provoke more anger and
resistance to authority. Quite often political movements based on ethnic nationalism, religious
fundamentalism, or traditional clan and tribal structures, take shape in vain efforts to create islands of
security ("sovereignty") within the domain of anarchic states.
International agencies and national governments (including the U.S.) often responded to such situations by
sponsoring programs of technical assistance in public administration and military assistance. They felt
unable, however, to deal with the delicate and baffling problems involved in helping new institutions for
responsible representative governance become better established and more effective.
Instead, therefore, of improving public administration, in many cases these efforts contributed to
maladministration by enhancing the power of appointed officials (especially military officers) without
strengthening the institutions able to impose accountability upon them. In many cases, military officers
already dominated these regimes and, predictably bureaucratic domination augments the ability of
appointed officials to abuse their powers and deepen crises of maladministration.
In recent years, especially following the collapse of the communist empires, the United States and other
established democracies, in cooperation with a host of international organizations (both governmental and
non-governmental) have striven to promote democratization around the world.
Unfortunately, however, many of these efforts have focussed attention on some components of a democracy,
such as "free elections", without much attention to the fact that elections contribute to democracy only
when elected officials are able to use their powers, not only to represent popular preferences in the shaping
of public policies but also to manage public bureaucracies charged with their implementation.
Of course, there is a reciprocal relation between the structures of bureaucratic organization and the design
of representative institutions. Many colonial bureaucracies were organized according to the "mandarin"
principle first developed in ancient China, but subsequently borrowed by the British for use in their Indian
empire and, later, domesticated by creation of the Administrative Class in the government of England.

Parallel lines of development had brought mandarinates to power in most of the other modern empires, and
this mean that their successor states inherited administrative institutions staffed by mandarin-type
careerists.
A major exception can be found in the successor states of pre-modern empires, like the Spanish and
Portuguese. They inherited a kind of patronage-based bureaucracy in which officials, with no assurances of
tenure; banded together to protect their privileges and positions, forming what it can be referred to as a
"retainer bureaucracy."
Although initially less powerful than a mandarin bureaucracy, retainers who are able to retain their
perquisites for long periods of time can become formidably powerful, though often not very efficient as
administrators. Like the mandarins, however, they are often able, during severe political crises, to seize
power by means of a military led and become the ruling elite.
A truly great exception to these generalizations can be found in the U.S. The Congress, when enacting the
Pendleton Act in 1883, decided to follow the British example by creating career services to replace the
patronage/spoils system which had evolved before then.
However, the spoils principle was also retained by permitting succeeding chief executives to discharge
many incumbents and replace them by new "in-and-outer" (transient) appointees. Since transients have
neither the ability nor the will to conspire together to replace elected officials, this simple technique assured
the perpetuation of the American constitutional system even if maladministration prevailed.
However, some protection against maladministration was provided by creating the possibility of appointing
specialized career officials to occupy positions under the top echelon of in-and-outers. These officials,
moreover, would not be mandarins following the British example ~ rather, they would be functionaries
trained in specific fields of expertise that qualified them, at any age, to occupy specific
posts at all levels of government. The double effect of this design was both to enhance the administrative
expertise and capabilities of American officials and to reduce their ability to conspire with each other to
advance their common interests as bureaucrats or to join plots to overthrow the government.

There is a more positive case to be made for the linkage of bureaucracy and democracy. First, public
bureaucracies are major actors in making and implementing policy and therefore accountability has always
been a crucial form of democracy, but it becomes even more crucial when other aspects of democracy are
weakened. Further, the majority of contacts between the State and society occur through the public
bureaucracy, and these contacts are important for political inputs as well as simply for administration of
programs. This importance is especially evident given the development of a range of networked forms of
governing within particular policy areas. Programs such as "citizen engagement" and e-government often
are largely directed at, and managed by, the public bureaucracy, and provide opportunities for citizens to
have more immediate and personalized redress of grievances against government than would traditional

forms of accountability. Further, deliberative democracy may be more possible vis-a-vis bureaucracies
than with the manifestly political components of government, given that this form of decision-making would
not be seen as challenging conventional forms of representation.
Although we have made a case for some democratic elements in contemporary public administration, we
also need to think carefully about the type of democracy that these contacts between state and society
would produce. It would be a localized and sectorially-defined form of democracy, and might be even more
skewed toward the affluent, organized and articulate than are conventional forms of democracy.
To conclude, the design of a public bureaucracy and its capacity to administer public policies
effectively hinges on the capacity of representative institutions to maintain their authority and effective
control over appointed officials (military and civil).
When such control evaporates (or fails to evolve) because of the weakness of representative institutions
and/or the resulting maladministration of public policies, democratic government will almost surely
collapse.
Moreover, in the design of public bureaucracies, it is important to establish structures that will enhance the
power and authority of public officials enough to enable them to administer well but not so much as to
enable them to seize power when great crises severely test the capabilities of the institutions of
representative governance.
The design of contemporary constitutional democracies, therefore, must keep the structure and performance
of public bureaucracies in mind as an essential component of the whole system of governance

This proposed panel would investigate these issues in a variety of political and cultural settings coming
from Europe, North America and Asia. The panel should advance our understanding of the nature of
contemporary public administration, as well as contemporary democracy.

There is a constant and continuous collision between bureaucratic values and democratic values which
adversely affects development. In the light of this statement examine the role of bureaucracy in
development.
Democracy places people as the supreme authority of power. A democracy is one where decisions are based
on popular will. Most of the developing third world countries have adopted democracy as the nature of their
state.
Coincidentally, for all these developing third world countries which are striving to achieve rapid socioeconomic development, bureaucracy is the form of administrative system and it is the bedrock of
development.
Role of Bureaucracy in Development:

Administrative machinery is the basis of all government; it ensures that the policies of government
reach the intended beneficiaries.

It provides inputs to policy making and plays a major role in policy formulation.

It provides stability in society and ensures continuity in development

It acts as an instrument of change in social and economic development.

Conflicts b/w Bureaucracy and Development :

A democracy calls for decentralization and enhanced peoples participation. However, a

bureaucracy is highly centralized and decision making always emanates on its own.

Bureaucracy, in its strict adherence to rules, concentrates more on internal processes than the
results.

A country undergoing rapid economic change and development witnesses rapid and fundamental
changes. This poses a threat to the perceived supremacy of the bureaucracy which is highly change
resistant.

A working level bureaucrat has little or no opportunity to exercise individual judgment.

Over the years, various measures have been taken in India to overcome these conflicts and align
bureaucracy with development. Establishment of citizen charter, Lok Pal and Lok Ayukta, 73rd and 74th
amendment etc are some.
To overcome these conflicts, the following are needed.
1.

Result oriented bureaucracy instead of path oriented bureaucracy.

2.

Dynamic, flexible and ready to change

3.

Highly temporal oriented

4.

Infusion of professional management techniques.

5.

Creative, innovative and outward looking bureaucracy.

Thus, with the nature of the state radically changing and increasing private participation in service
providence, it is imperative that these underlying conflicts are resolved.
Madhusudan
ans : As per Weber bureaucracy helps in building democratic society. It provides the political stability, helps
in peaceful transition of power, provides necessary expertise in forming the policy meant for socio
economic development. There is difference in values inculcated by the democracy and bureaucracy. Such as
democracy believes in values such as equality, participation, universal adult franchise etc whereas
bureaucracy believes in specialisation, neutrality, impartiality, dehumanisation, justice, liberty etc.
But in developing country like India, bureaucracy is at loggerheads with the values of the
democracy. Bureaucracy believes in specialisation and hierarchy, which is necessary in carrying the
organisation goals in a efficient manner whereas democracy believes in peoples participation in
developmental activities. Bureaucracy is highly centralised in nature whereas democracy embarks upon the
idea of decentralisation to increase the effectiveness of the society.
Despite the difference in values imbibed by the two, there is an element of coherence when the
developmental objective is the concern. The reason being, bureaucracy works on impersonal rules hence
eliminating the idea of discrimination. In fact democratic society tries to eliminate the discrimination of any
kind in the society. Democracy promotes positive government. It is responsible to citizen demands and
bureaucracy with its adequate skills works towards this responsibility. Political executive makes sure
bureaucracy is held accountable for the prescribed developmental goals
Bureaucracy works on the principle of selection whereas democratic system works on the principle
of election. Earlier one focuses on the needs of the people and later on in representative of the voice of the
people. Both need to work in tandem to bring in development in the society. therefore despite the difference
both are compatible and are conducive to each other for the development of the society,