Sei sulla pagina 1di 2

September 27, 2014

An Unaffordable Game
Neorealists on both sides have yet again constrained India-China relations within the old rules of the game.

eorealists continue to call the tune in the highest policy


circles, think tanks and the media in India and China.
They found their moment when Chinese President
Xi Jinping came calling on 17-19 September. The visit brought
into full play power games by the two sides thereby denying the
potential for a growing partnership between the two countries.
There are mixed images from President Xi Jinpings visit. There
was the colourful reception in Ahmedabad which conveyed
warmth and hospitality. But there were also the pictures of the
face-off between the Chinese and Indian personnel in Chumar in
Ladakh in the disputed zone of the Line of Actual Control (LAC),
both sides carrying banners claiming that it was their territory.
A similar incident took place in April 2013 in Depsang on the eve
of the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and there was the case
of stapled visas for residents of Jammu and Kashmir or earlier
Chinese pronouncements of their claim to Arunachal Pradesh.
The Chumar development was raised by Prime Minister Narendra
Modi in Ahmedabad following which the Chinese personnel
withdrew, but only to return the day after Xi departed for
Beijing. Clearly, the Working Mechanism for Consultation and
Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, which came into
being following an agreement signed during Prime Minister
Manmohan Singhs visit to China in October 2013, is not functioning, otherwise the Chumar incident would not have happened.
The Indian prime ministers emphatic statement that without
peace on the border there can be no peace in India-China relations
and the statement by President Xi that China was determined to
arrive at a settlement of the boundary dispute at the earliest and
putting it in the joint statement as a strategic objective were the
most important takeaways from the visit. But there was no clear
indication that the two heads of state had agreed on a new process
to achieve this objective. Modi and Xi reaffirmed the utility of the
Special Representative mechanism which was put in place after Atal
Behari Vajpayees visit to China in 2003. Incidentally, the Modi government is yet to name Indias Special Representative for the talks.
Despite 17 rounds of talks over the years between the two
Special Representatives, there has not been much progress. The
approach that had been laid out jointly by Rajiv Gandhi and
Deng Xiaoping way back in 1988 that while the boundary talks
should be pursued for a settlement, India-China relations on all
fronts should develop has had its major achievements in the
past quarter century and has now run its course.

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

september 27, 2014

vol xlix no 39

Perhaps a time has come to address the boundary issue more


directly. Prime Minister Modis demand to clarify the LAC to
prevent incidents like Chumar and Depsang may actually be the
clue to delimit and identify the actual line by mutual discussions and settle the boundary dispute once and for all. Congress
President Sonia Gandhis statement to Xi that Indias China policy
represented a national consensus is indeed a good baseline for
the Modi government to make solid moves towards a boundary
settlement while enforcing an agreed method to maintain
peace on the LAC.
The neorealist moves of placing checks and balances on
bilateral relations worked in full force during the Xi visit limiting
the possibilities of cooperation not only in economic and cultural
areas but also on regional and global issues. Chinese investment
of $20 billion in infrastructure-building, particularly in railways,
was announced but there was no target set for an increase of the
trade volume such as reaching $200 billion in 2020, i e, doubling
the 2015 target that was set by Chinas Premier Zhu Rongji in 2002.
There was no common view on how to address the trade
imbalance against India except the hope that the Chinese investment would promote manufacturing for export. No doubt, the
13 agreements signed by the two countries during the bilateral
discussion had many important initiatives among them, such as
cooperation on civil nuclear energy and space, and, thankfully,
opening a new motorable road via Sikkims Nathula Pass to
Kailash Mansarovar.
But there were clear retreats during the Chinese presidents
visit on regional cooperation. Modi chose to ignore Xi Jinpings
dream project of the Southern and Maritime Silk routes, all of
which would pass through India something that both Maldives
and Sri Lanka, which Xi visited before coming to India, welcomed.
China has already announced its support for Indias full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which
surprisingly did not find mention in the joint statement.
Equally surprising, the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and
Myanmar) Economic Corridor got only a passing mention. It
should be noted that unlike the SCO, the BCIM an alphabetical
order signifying equal status of all the four countries has been
designed collectively to mutual advantage. To regard it as a Chinese
manoeuvre to get access to the Indian market is the height of
neorealist obsession. Instead of developing four-country cooperation to promote local peoples participation and development,
7

EDITORIALS

and BCIM as an opportunity to address the alienation of the people


of north-east India, the Government of Indias security advisers
are pushing the country in the opposite direction.
Prime Minister Modi has been fascinated by Chinas reforms
and its focus on economic development and may therefore wish
for a positive turn in India-China relations. But if he too falls

into the neorealist trap and makes India a part of balancing


coalitions in Asia and the world, then the early promise of his
foreign policy of making peace and understanding in the neighbourhood as the focus of his world outlook will make little
headway. India and China cannot afford to play another round
of a power game that will only hurt both of them.

september 27, 2014

vol xlix no 39

EPW

Economic & Political Weekly

Potrebbero piacerti anche