Filed12/19/14Riverov.LakeCountyBd.

ofSupervisorsCA1/3

NOTTOBEPUBLISHEDINOFFICIALREPORTS
CaliforniaRulesofCourt,rule8.1115(a),prohibitscourtsandpartiesfromcitingorrelyingonopinionsnotcertifiedfor
publicationororderedpublished,exceptasspecifiedbyrule8.1115(b).Thisopinionhasnotbeencertifiedforpublication
ororderedpublishedforpurposesofrule8.1115.

INTHECOURTOFAPPEALOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA
FIRSTAPPELLATEDISTRICT
DIVISIONTHREE
FRANCISCORIVERO,
PlaintiffandAppellant,

A139216

v.

(LakeCounty
Super.Ct.No.CV411638)

LAKECOUNTYBOARDOF
SUPERVISORS,
DefendantandRespondent.

PlaintiffFranciscoRivero,thesheriffofLakeCounty(Riveroorsheriff),fileda
petitionforwritofmandatetocompeldefendantLakeCountyBoardofSupervisors
(countyorboardofsupervisors)toprovidehimwithindependentlegalcounselina
disputewiththedistrictattorney.Theimpetusoftherequestwasthedistrictattorneys
announcedintentiontodesignateRiveroasaBrady1officer,theconsequenceofwhich
wouldbethat,ifRiverowerecalledtotestifyinacriminaltrial,thedistrictattorney
wouldberequiredtodisclosetothedefensethatRiverohadpreviouslyprovidedfalse
informationinanofficialinvestigation.Thecourtgrantedthewritanddirectedthe
countytoprovideindependentlegalcounselforRiveropursuanttoGovernmentCode
section31000.6.2
1

Bradyv.Maryland(1963)373U.S.83.

AllfurtherstatutoryreferencesaretotheGovernmentCodeunlessotherwise
specified.
1

AfterthedistrictattorneychosetodesignateRiveroasaBradyofficer,thecounty
movedtoclarifyandlimitthecourtsrulingprovidingRiverowithindependentcounsel.
Thecourtgrantedthemotionandenteredanamendedjudgmentprovidingthatthe
countysobligationtoprovideRiverowithindependentcounselextendedonlyto
discussionsandnegotiationswiththedistrictattorneypriortothedeterminationtolist
RiveroasaBradyofficer.
Onappealfromtheamendedjudgment,Riveroarguesthatthetrialcourterredin
limitingthescopeofrepresentationaffordedtothesheriffundersection31000.6.We
agreewithRivero.Hisrighttoindependentcounselshouldhaveextendedtoalegal
challengetothedistrictattorneysdesignationofthesheriffasaBradyofficerwhile
Riveroservedassheriff.Wedirectthejudgmenttobemodifiedaccordingly.
FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
RiverowastheelectedsheriffofLakeCountyandassumedthatofficein
January2011.Roughlythreeyearsbeforebecomingsheriff,Riverowasinvolvedinan
ondutyshootingincidentwhileservingasadeputysheriff.Thesheriffsdepartmentand
thedistrictattorneyinvestigatedtheincidentbutfoundnowrongdoingbyRivero.
Inlate2011,nearlyayearafterRiveroassumedtheofficeofsheriff,thedistrict
attorneyannouncedthathehadreopenedtheinvestigationoftheshootingincident
involvingRivero.ThedistrictattorneybelievedRiverohadbeenuntruthfulinstatements
madeduringthecourseoftheinvestigationintothatincident.Thedistrictattorney
informedRiverooftheintentiontodeemhimaBradyofficer,inreferencetotheUnited
StatesSupremeCourtsdecisioninBradyv.Maryland,supra,373U.S.atpage87,in
whichthecourtheldthatdueprocessprinciplesrequireaprosecutortodiscloseevidence
favorabletotheaccuseduponrequest.IfRiveroweredesignatedasaBradyofficer,the
districtattorneywouldbeobligedtoinformanycriminaldefendantinacaseinwhich
Riveromighttestifythathewassubjecttoimpeachmentasawitnessbecauseofthe
districtattorneysfindingthatRiverohadprovidedfalseinformationinanofficial

investigation.ThedistrictattorneyaffordedRiverotheopportunitytoparticipateinan
informalhearinginwhichhewouldbegiventheopportunitytoopposethedistrict
attorneystentativedecisiontodeclarehimaBradyofficer.
BecauseRiverowasconcernedaboutthedetrimentalimpactthataBradyofficer
determinationwouldhaveonhisabilitytoperformhisdutiesassheriff,herequested
legalassistancefromcountycounselforLakeCounty.Countycounselrespondedthata
conflictofinterestpreventedthatofficefromrepresentingeitherofthepartiesina
disputebetweentwocountypublicofficers.Inamemorandumtotheboardof
supervisors,countycounselrecommendedthatRiverobeallowedtoretainoutside
counselatthecountysexpensetorepresenthiminthedispute.
Riverorequestedthattheboardofsupervisorsappointindependentcounselto
assisthimpursuanttosection31000.6.Despitecountycounselsrecommendationfor
appointmentofcounsel,theboardofsupervisorsdeniedRiverosrequest.
InMarch2012,RiverofiledapetitionforwritofmandatepursuanttoCodeof
CivilProceduresection1085seekingtocompelthecountytoappointindependent
counselforhim.Riverosubsequentlyfiledanamendedpetitionforwritofmandate.
Riveroprayedthatthecourtissueawritorderingtheboardofsupervisorstocomply
withitsstatutorydutytocontractwithandemploylegalcounseltoassist[Rivero]inthe
performanceofhisduties,towit,theissueoftheactionbytheDistrictAttorneyin
declaring[Rivero]tobeaBradyofficerand/ortheappealtotheDistrictAttorneyof
saidactionbytheDistrictAttorney.
Thetrialcourtgrantedthepetitionforwritofmandate.Initsrulinggrantingthe
petition,thecourtfoundthatRiverohadmethisburdenoneachoftherequisiteelements
undersection31000.6,subdivision(a).First,thecourtfoundthattherequestedlegal
representationwouldassistRiverointheperformanceofhisdutiesassheriff.A
determinationthatthesheriffisaBradyofficerwouldadverselyaffectthesheriffs
abilitytoparticipateincriminalinvestigationsinviewofthepossibilitythatthesheriff

couldbeimpeachedasawitnessattrial.Thecourtnoteditwasreasonablyforeseeable
thesheriffwouldbecomepersonallyinvolvedincriminalinvestigationsandmaybe
calledasatrialwitnessinaruralcountysuchasLakeCounty.Thecourtalsomadea
findingthatcountycounselhadaconflictofinterestprecludingcountycounselsoffice
fromrepresentingRivero.Theboardofsupervisorsdidnotdisputethataconflictexisted
butarguedthatcountycounselsofficecouldimplementanethicalwallallowingitto
representRivero.Thecourtrejectedtheboardofsupervisorscontention,findingthe
evidenceinsufficienttoconcludethatsuchanethicalwallcouldproperlybesetup.
Finally,thecourtfoundthatRiveromadeaclearrequestforoutsiderepresentation
pursuanttosection31000.6.
ThecourtconcludedinitswrittenrulingthatRiverowasentitledtoawritof
mandateorderingthecountytocontractwithandemploylegalcounselpursuantto
GovernmentCodeSection31000.6(a)toprovidelegalrepresentationandadviceto
petitionerRiveroinpetitionersdeliberationswith[thedistrictattorney]concerningthe
DistrictAttorneysproposeddesignationofpetitionerasaBradyofficerinfuture
criminalproceedingswhereinpetitionermaytestifyasawitness.Ajudgmentgranting
thewritofmandatewasenteredinNovember2012.Thejudgmentdirectstheissuanceof
aperemptorywritofmandaterequiringtheboardofsupervisorstoretainandpayfor
independentlegalcounselforPetitionerFranciscoRiveropursuanttoGovt.Code
31000.6.NeitherthecountynorRiveroappealedthejudgment.
InMarch2013,thecountyfiledamotionforclarificationofthetrialcourts
judgmentgrantingthewritofmandate.Thecountysoughttoclarifythatitsobligationto
provideoutsidecounseltoRiveroendedwhenthedistrictattorneydeterminedthat
RiverowasaBradyofficer.Thecountynotedthatthedistrictattorneyhadultimately
designatedRiveroasaBradyofficerfollowingdiscussionswithRiverosappointed
counsel.ThecountyfurthernotedthatRiverohadinitiatedlitigationagainstthedistrict
attorneychallengingthedetermination.Accordingtothecounty,Riverohadpublicly

expressedhisdesiretoappealtheBradyofficerdeterminationallthewaytothe
SupremeCourt,ifnecessary.CountycounselopinedthatRiverohadnolegalrightto
appealaBradyofficerdeterminationandclaimedthedistrictattorneyenjoyedabsolute
immunityinBradymatters.Thecountyurgedthecourttoclarifythescopeofwritrelief
affordedbythejudgmentbeforeRiverofiledmeritlesslawsuitsattaxpayerexpense.
InaMay2013order,thecourtgrantedthecountysmotionforclarification.The
courtconcludedthatsomeclarificationwasrequiredandframedtheissueaswhetherthe
legalrepresentationorderedbythecourtwaslimitedtothediscussionswiththeDistrict
AttorneyofthethenproposedBradylistingorwhethertheorderedrepresentation
extendedbeyondwhateverlistingdecisionwaseventuallymadebytheDistrict
Attorney.Thecourtnotedthatitswrittenrulinggrantingtherequestforindependent
counselwasclearandunambiguousastothelimitedscopeofrepresentation,although
thecourtacknowledgedthatthejudgmentgrantingthewritwasconsiderablybroaderin
scope.ThecourtfurtherstatedthatRiverospleadingscouldnotreasonablybeconstrued
toincludearequestforlegalrepresentationatanypointafterthedistrictattorneymade
itsBradyofficerdetermination.Thecourtdirectedtheissuanceofanamendedjudgment
clarifyingthatthecountysobligationtoprovideindependentcounselexistedonlyuntil
thedistrictattorneyhaddeterminedwhetherRiverowastobeidentifiedasaBrady
officer.AnamendedjudgmentfiledinMay2013providedinrelevantpartasfollows:
ThataperemptorywritofmandateissuecommandingLakeCountyBoardof
SupervisorstocontractwithandemployindependentcounselpursuanttoGovernment
Codesection31000.6torepresentpetitionerFranciscoRiveroinanydiscussionsand
negotiationswithDistrictAttorneyDonaldAndersonconcerningandoccurringpriorto
theDistrictAttorneysfinaldeterminationtoidentifyandlistpetitionerasaBrady
officer.Theorderedrepresentationshallnotextendtoanypostdetermination
representationorlitigation.
Riverofiledatimelyappealfromtheamendedjudgmentandwritofmandate.

DISCUSSION
InreviewingajudgmentonapetitionforwritofmandateunderCodeofCivil
Proceduresection1085,weapplythesubstantialevidencetestinassessingthecourts
factualfindingsbutexerciseindependentjudgmentonpurelylegalissuessuchasthe
interpretationofstatutes.(CityofOaklandv.OaklandPolice&FireRetirementSystem
(2014)224Cal.App.4th210,226.)
Ouranalysisbeginswiththepertinentstatute,section31000.6,whichsetsforth
thecircumstancesunderwhichacountymustprovideindependentcounseltoasheriffor
assessor.Subdivision(a)ofsection31000.6provides:Uponrequestoftheassessoror
thesheriffofthecounty,theboardofsupervisorsshallcontractwithandemploylegal
counseltoassisttheassessororthesheriffintheperformanceofhisorherdutiesinany
casewherethecountycounselorthedistrictattorneywouldhaveaconflictofinterestin
representingtheassessororthesheriff.Section31000.6,subdivision(a)imposesa
mandatorydutyontheboardofsupervisorstoretainindependentcounselfortheassessor
orthesheriffwhentheconditionsofthestatutearesatisfied.Thedutyariseswhen
(1)theassessororsheriffrequestsindependentcounsel,(2)theassessororsheriff
requireslegalcounseltoassistintheperformanceofhisorherduties,(3)county
counselorthedistrictattorneyhasaconflictofinterestinrepresentingthesheriffor
assessor,and(4)thecountyfailstodemonstratethatanethicalwallcanbecreatedto
resolvetheconflictandpermitcountycounselorthedistrictattorneytorepresentthe
sherifforassessor.(31000.6,subds.(a)&(c).)
Ifthereisnodisputeastowhetheraconflictexistsbuttheboardofsupervisors
refusestoprovideindependentcounseltothesherifforassessor,theproperlegalrecourse
fortheassessororsheriffistopursueatraditionalwritofmandateunderCodeofCivil
Proceduresection1085tocompeltheboardofsupervisorstoperformitsdutyunder
section31000.6,subdivision(a).(Strongv.SutterCountyBoardofSupervisors(2010)
188Cal.App.4th482,492(Strong).Section31000.6setsforthanexparteprocedurefor

resolvingwhetheraconflictexistand,ifso,whetheranethicalwallmaybecreatedto
resolvetheconflict.(See31000.6,subds.(b),(c),&(e);Strong,supra,
188Cal.App.4thatpp.491492.)Theexparteproceduredescribedinsection31000.6is
limitedtotheissuesofwhetheraconflictexistsand,ifso,whetheranethicalwallmaybe
createdtoresolvetheconflict.(Strong,supra,atpp.491492.)Here,becausetherewas
nodisputethatcountycounselhadaconflictofinterestthatpreventeditsofficefrom
representingRivero,thestatutoryexparteprocedurewasinapplicableandRivero
properlypursuedreliefbyfilingapetitionseekingatraditionalwritofmandate.
Thereisnodisputethatthecountyhadadutytoprovideindependentcounselto
RiveroorthatRiverowasentitledtoawritofmandate.Onappeal,thecountydoesnot
disputethatRiverorequestedtheappointmentofcounsel,thattherequestedlegal
representationwouldassistRiverointheperformanceofhisduties,thatcountycounsel
hadadisqualifyingconflict,orthattheconflictcouldnotberesolvedthroughthecreation
ofanethicalwall.Thesoleissueraisedonappealiswhetherthetrialcourterredin
limitingthescopeofrepresentationprovidedtoRiveropursuanttosection31000.6.
Riveroarguesthatoncethecourtmadefindingssupportingtheexistenceofaduty
toretainindependentcounsel,itcouldnotplacerestrictionsonthemannerinwhich
independentcounselcarriedoutitsrepresentationofthesheriff.Foritspart,thecounty
contendsthecourtisrequiredtoidentifytheboundariesofthepurposeforwhich
representationissought.
Riveroandthecountybothmakevalidpoints,buttheyarefocusingondifferent
aspectsofthescopeofrepresentation.Oneaspectofthescopeofrepresentationisthe
issueormatterforwhichindependentcounselmustbeprovided.Anotheraspectofthe
scopeofrepresentationisthemannerinwhichindependentcounselisallowedtopursue
theissueormatterthatisthesubjectofitsretention.
Plainly,thescopeofrepresentationundersection31000.6mustbelimitedtoa
particularissue,matter,ordispute.Section31000.6,subdivision(a)requirestheboardof

supervisorstoemploylegalcounselfortheassessororsheriffinanycasewherethe
requirementsofthestatutearemet.Necessarily,indecidingwhethertheboardof
supervisorshadadutytoemployindependentcounselforthe[sheriffor]assessorunder
subdivision(a)ofsection31000.6,thecourtwouldhavetodecidewhetherthepurpose
forwhichthe[sheriffor]assessorseeksindependentcounseliswithinthescopeofhis
duties,becausethedutyarisesonlywhenthatconditionissatisfied.(Strong,supra,
188Cal.App.4thatp.492,italicsadded.)Thepurposeforwhichindependentcounselis
soughtdefinesthescopeoftherepresentationi.e.,theissueormatterindependent
counselisauthorizedtopursue.
WeagreewithRiverothat,oncethecourthasmadethenecessaryfindings
supportingthecountysdutytoprovideindependentcounselfortheassessororsheriff,
thecourtgenerallycannotplacelimitationsonthemannerinwhichindependentcounsel
carriesoutitsrepresentation,excepttodefinetheissueormatterthatisthesubjectofthe
representation.3Theplainlanguageofsection31000.6,subdivision(a)imposesa
mandatorydutyupontheboardofsupervisorstoprovideindependentcounselforthe
assessororsheriffwithrespecttoadisputebearinguponthepublicofficials
performanceofhisorherofficialduties.Wediscernnothinginthelanguageofsection
31000.6thatauthorizestheboardofsupervisorsoracourttolimitlegaltacticsoractions
thatmightbereasonablypursuedbyindependentcounselwheretherequisitesofthe
statuteareotherwisesatisfied.(Cf.Strong,supra,188Cal.App.4thatp.486[plain
languageofsection31000.6limitscourtsauthoritytoact].)Aslongasthepredicatefor
3

Obviously,wedonotsuggestthatindependentcounselisfreetopursuefrivolous
ormeritlessactions.(Cf.31000.6,subd.(d)[sheriffsofficeorassessorsofficemust
payownlegalcostsandfeesincurredinactionfoundtobefrivolousorinbadfaith].)
Independentcounselmustnecessarilycomplywithethicalrulesandconductitselfin
accordancewithprofessionalnorms.Wealsonotethatthetrialcourtretainsjurisdiction
tooverseeandenforcetheexecutionofthejudgmentandwritofmandate.(SeeEstateof
Bonzi(2013)216Cal.App.4th1085,1103.)Consequently,thecountymayseekrelief
fromthecourtifindependentcounselpursuesactionsoutsidethescopeofthe
representation.
8

requiringthecountytoprovideindependentcounselremainsunchanged,thecourtcannot
placetemporalorotherlimitationsontherepresentationoftheassessororsheriff,suchas
limitingtheauthorityofcounseltopursueanappealortakeotherappropriatelegal
action.
Here,thepurposeforappointingindependentcounselwastochallengethedistrict
attorneysannouncedintentionandultimatedeterminationthatRiverowasaBrady
officer.ItisunquestionedthatthedesignationasaBradyofficerwouldbearuponthe
performanceofthesheriffaslongasRiveroremainsinthatoffice.Further,thedispute
thatgaverisetothedutytoprovideindependentcounseldidnotendwhenthedistrict
attorneydesignatedRiveroasaBradyofficer.UntilRiveroisnolongersherifforthat
decisionisfinaleitherbecauseRiverohaschosentoacceptitorbecausehehas
exhaustedallreasonableandappropriatelegalchallengestothedecisionthepredicate
findingssupportingthecountysdutytoprovideindependentcounseltoRiveroremain
unchanged.Consequently,itwaserrorforthetrialcourttorestrictRiverosrightto
independentcounseltotheperiodbeforethedistrictattorneymadeitsdeterminationto
listRiveroasaBradyofficer.Thelimitationimposedbythecourtdidmorethansimply
definethedisputeforwhichrepresentationwastobeprovided;itrestrictedthelegal
optionsavailabletoindependentcounselinrepresentingthesheriffinthatdispute. 4
4

WeemphasizethatthedisputeislimitedtothedesignationofRiveroasaBrady
officerduringhistermassheriff,includinganydirectlegalchallengestothat
designation.BecausetheBradyofficerdesignationisanissueuniquetoRiveroi.e.,it
bearsupontheperformanceofhisdutiesassheriffbutdoesnototherwiseaffectthe
sheriffsofficeortheperformanceofanyonewhomaysucceedRiveroassheriffthe
dutytoprovideindependentcounselextendsonlytotheperiodwhileRiveroisservingas
sheriff.Further,therepresentationdoesnotencompassanylitigationthatmayariseout
ofthedecisionbutdoesnotdirectlychallengethatdecision,suchasadefamationclaim
orotheractionseekingdamages.
Atoralargumentonappeal,Riveroscounselrepresentedthatthereisnolonger
anypendinglegalchallengetothedistrictattorneysdecisiontodesignateRiveroasa
Bradyofficer.Accordingtocounsel,thatlegalchallengecametoaconclusionataround
thesametimethetrialcourtissueditsamendedjudgmentinthiscase.Consequently,the
issuethatthisappealwilldecideiswhopaysfortheattorneyfeesandlegalcostsalready
9

ThecountysprimaryargumentonappealisthatRiverosoughtlimitedreliefin
thetrialcourtandcannotnowobtainreliefthathedidnotrequestbelow.Asweexplain,
wefindnomeritinthiscontention.

incurredbyRiveroinchallengingthedistrictattorneysdecision.Forpurposesof
clarification,althoughourdispositioncommandstheboardofsupervisorstoemploy
independentcounselforRivero,thatdirectiverelatesbacktothejudgmentoriginally
enteredbythetrialcourt.Therefore,thepracticaleffectofourdispositionistorequire
thecountytopayfortheattorneyfeesandcostspreviouslyincurredbyRiveroin
employingindependentcounseltochallengethedistrictattorneysBradyofficer
designation.
10

ThecountyclaimsRiveroaskedthecourtforrepresentationonlywithrespectto
thedeterminationbythedistrictattorneyconcerningtheBradyofficerdesignation.
WhileitiscertainlythecasethatRiveroemphasizedbeingrepresentedpriortothe
districtattorneysdetermination,itisnotthecasethathisrequestforreliefwaslimitedto
beingrepresentedduringthoseinformaldiscussionswiththedistrictattorney.Inhis
prayerforrelief,herequestedrepresentationwithrespecttotheissueoftheactionby
theDistrictAttorneyindeclaring[Rivero]tobeaBradyofficer....Riverosrequest
forreliefisbroadenoughtoencompassrepresentationinanylegalchallengetothe
districtattorneysaction.Further,baseduponourreadingoftherecord,Riverofocused
uponbeingrepresentedbycounselbeforethedistrictattorneymadehisdecisionbecause
itwascriticaltohaveinputintothatdecision.SimplybecauseRiverosoughttohave
representationbeforethedistrictattorneymadetheBradyofficerdecisiondoesnotimply
thatRiverohadnoneedforrepresentationafterthedecisionwasmade.

11

ThecountyalsoclaimsRiverowaivedanyrighttorepresentationafterthedistrict
attorneymadetheBradyofficerdeterminationbecausehepreparedajudgmentconsistent
withthetrialcourtsinitial,writtenrulinglimitingthescopeofhisrepresentation.We
disagree.TheoriginaljudgmentsimplyspecifiedthatRiverowasentitledtoindependent
counselpursuanttosection31000.6.Itdidnotevenspecifythepurposeforwhich
counselwastobeprovided.WhilethecourtswrittenrulingspecifiedthatRiverowould
beentitledtolegalrepresentationindeliberationswiththedistrictattorney,thatlanguage
wasnotincorporatedintothejudgmentand,inanyevent,didnotclearlyindicatethe
representationwouldterminatewhenthedistrictattorneyissuedafinaldecision.Itwas
onlyafterthecountysoughtclarificationthatthejudgmentwasamendedtospecifythe
purposeforwhichcounselwastobeprovided,includingalimitationthatthe
representationwouldnotextendtoanypostdeterminationrepresentationorlitigation.
Riverocannotbedeemedtohavewaivedhisrighttochallengethescopeoftheoriginal
judgmentwhenthetermsofthatjudgmentessentiallyplacednoboundariesontheextent
oftherepresentation.
DISPOSITION
Theamendedjudgmentandwritofmandateisreversed.Thetrialcourtisdirected
toenteranewanddifferentjudgmentprovidingthatRiveroisentitledtoaperemptory
writofmandatecommandingtheboardofsupervisorstocontractwithandemploy
independentcounselpursuanttosection31000.6torepresentRiveroduringhistenureas
sheriffinchallengingthedistrictattorneysannouncedintentionandfinaldecisionto
identifyandlistRiveroasaBradyofficer.Theamendedjudgmentandwritofmandate
shallspecifythatthecountysdutypursuanttosection31000.6extendstoreimbursing
Riveroforfeesandcostsincurredbyhiminemployingindependentcounselforthis
purposewhilehewasservingassheriff.Riveroshallrecoverhiscostsonappeal.

_________________________
12

McGuiness,P.J.
Weconcur:
_________________________
Pollak,J.
_________________________
Siggins,J.

13