Securing Peace

Securing Peace
Preventing conflict and building

peace: the UK’s role in
a changing world
The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group

October 2009
The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group (PSLG)
Members of the PSLG About the PSLG
(listed alphabetically): The NGO Peace and Security

British American Security
Liaison Group (PSLG) brings
Information Council (BASIC) together NGOs engaged in peace
g www.basicint.org and security issues. The group
Conciliation Resources (CR) works to establish mechanisms
www.c-r.org for policy dialogue on security-
Conscience TAXES FOR PEACE related topics between NGOs and
NOT WAR the British government that is of
www.conscienceonline.org.uk
practical benefit to both parties.
Gender Action on Peace and
Security (GAPS) The organisations that make up
www.gaps-uk.org the PSLG bring together
International Alert (IA) considerable knowledge and
www.international-alert.org experience from the peace and
Medact www.medact.org security sector of UK civil society.
Oxford Research Group (ORG) Their fields of interest and
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk
expertise span conflict prevention,
Peace Direct
conflict resolution, peacebuilding,
www.peacedirect.org
arms control and disarmament,
Quaker Peace and Social Witness
(QPSW) www.quaker.org.uk international security and
Responding to Conflict (RTC) governance. Their remits include
www.respond.org advocacy, research and
Saferworld campaigning.
www.saferworld.org.uk A policy summary based on this
The United Nations Association-UK report is available to download
(UNA-UK) www.una.org.uk
from: www.PSLG.info
ii Securing Peace - Preventing conflict and building peace: the UK’s role in a changing world
Contents Page
The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group ii

Introduction iv
Background v
1. Conflict prevention: from the periphery to the 1

mainstream
2. Empowering local capacity in post-conflict situations: 4

lessons from Afghanistan
3. Incentives, sanctions and conditionality in peacemaking 7
4. Delivering health care in unstable environments: 10

roles, capacities and consequences
5. The National Security Strategy: implementing an 13

integrated approach
6. Building community capacity to engage in early 16

recovery in conflict affected countries:
perspectives from peacebuilders from D.R. Congo
7. The EU’s approach to conflict prevention and 19

peacebuilding: current developments and
the role of member states
8. Building a spirit of cooperation for NPT 2010 22
The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group (PSLG) - November 2009 iii
Introduction
What is the UK government polices on peace and security Challenges were identified for policymakers
issues have developed significantly since 2000. and practitioners alike. Highly complex
added value
Greater attention is now given to the UK’s situations require extended attention, in-depth
of investment international role in preventing and resolving engagement and consistent investment of
in preventing violent conflict, with an acknowledgement economic and human resources. How can we
conflict and that military solutions alone are not build understanding of the nature of
building peace, appropriate or effective in the face of complex intractable conflicts? How should we deal
conflicts which can afflict whole regions. with the pressure to deliver short-term results
particularly
This report is based on a series of roundtable rather than invest in long-term solutions?
relative to
meetings held between 2007 and 2009, which Given the increasingly tight economic
defence examined aspects of these policies from both climate, how can national and international
expenditure? Whitehall and civil society perspectives. security best be achieved? What is the added
Issues raised included some of the trickiest in value of investment in preventing conflict and
peacebuilding – the relationship between building peace, particularly in relation to
locals and outsiders (whether multilateral defence expenditure?
agencies, national donors or international These are difficult but vital issues which will
NGOs – INGOs), how sanctions and continue to challenge governments in future,
conditionality can backfire, and the role of the whatever their policy agenda.
military in post-conflict reconstruction.
Roundtable participants included officials
from across the relevant government
departments, academics,
and members of think tanks
and NGOs. There were
disagreements on all the
issues discussed, though the
fault lines did not always fall
clearly or simply between
government and civil
society. Out of the interplay
between their very different
points of view, this report
highlights new insights and
approaches, which if
adopted, would make our
investment in this area
considerably more
productive.
US army soldiers question an Iraqi woman in Mosul 2008

Photo: U.S. Army / Pfc. Sarah De Boise
iv Securing Peace - Preventing conflict and building peace: the UK’s role in a changing world
Background
Since 2007, the NGO Peace and Security Other major events – in particular the Other
Liaison Group (PSLG)1 has sought to engage election of President Obama in November
major events
government officials, academics, members of 2008 and the economic crisis of 2008-09 –
think tanks and NGOs in discussions that look have created a further shift in perspectives.
– in particular
beyond the government’s headline policies on These filtered into the last few roundtable the election of
promoting peace and delivering security. The discussions, which reflected renewed hope in President
roundtable meetings posed the questions: the field of international policy, but also Obama in
concerns about the longer-term implications
• How do these policies work in practice? November 2008
of increasingly scarce public resources.
• Taken as a whole, how do they contribute to and the
a consistent approach towards building peace Since the series of meetings was completed
in June 2009, the NSS has been updated and
economic crisis
and preventing conflict?
DfID has launched a new white paper.5 Both of 2008-09 –
The meetings aimed to strengthen the UK
of these documents reflect concern about have created a
government’s conflict prevention and
global economic turmoil, increasing further shift in
peacebuilding capacity by facilitating thinking
marginalisation of the world’s poorest
on a more consistent approach to the perspectives.
communities, and the need to focus on fragile
formulation and implementation of policies
and failing states. The government has also
which promote peace and security. These
published its Roadmap to 2010 – the NPT
discussions2 over the course of two years
RevCon,6 reflecting the marked changes in the
reflect the way foreign and security policy has
climate of opinion on disarmament
developed and the changes in the political
internationally, as well as in the UK since
climate since the series began in autumn
Margaret Beckett’s June 2007 speech as
2007.3 In that time, many forward steps have
Foreign Secretary at the Carnegie Endowment
been taken and considerable efforts have been
in Washington DC.
made in key departments to create better
structures and strategies. When this series
began in September 2007, the Comprehensive
Notes and References
Spending Review was about to be launched,
including Public Service Agreement (PSA) 30 1 The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group (PSLG) brings together
(Reduce the impact of conflict through NGOs engaged in peace and security issues. See the box on page 8 for more
details, including a list of member organisations.
enhanced UK and international efforts), an
ambitious effort to move conflict prevention 2 All the meetings were held under the Chatham House Rule.
and peacebuilding toward the centre of policy. 3 For a summary of changes in foreign policy and the structures that support
it, see for example, British Foreign Policy Since 1997, House of Commons
Key policy developments in 2008 included the
research paper 08/56, 23 June 2008.
publication of the first National Security
4 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom:
Strategy (NSS) and the FCO’s revised strategy,
Security in an interdependent world, Cm 7291, March 2008; FCO, Better
in which to ‘prevent and resolve conflict’ was World Better Britain, February 2008.
one of four strategic policy goals.4 5 Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy of the UK Update 2009: Security
for the next generation, June 2009; DfID, Eliminating World Poverty:
Building our Common Future, Cm 7656, July 2009.
6 Cabinet Office, The Road to 2010: Addressing the nuclear question in the
twenty first century, July 2009.
The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group (PSLG) - November 2009 v
1. Conflict prevention:
from the periphery to the mainstream
The following summary is based on the The current focus on the division of labour
findings of a roundtable meeting convened within government along this spectrum is
on 20 September 2007 under the auspices of inadequate. It entails coordination, division of
PSLG and organised by International Alert roles and the avoidance of clashing priorities,
with the support of Conciliation Resources, but it cannot be strategic without agreement
Conscience and Medact. The government on objectives. Systems deal in compartments,
has taken a number of positive steps in and HMG has set compartments with different
regard to conflict issues but conflict languages, purposes and cultures. There is a
prevention and peacebuilding demand a new need for sharing at the edges, overlaps and
approach. This meeting explored ways of common terminology across government.
ensuring a common understanding within At a more fundamental level, there is a
and between government and NGOs of what misleading distinction made between ‘conflict
a new conflict prevention and peacebuilding prevention’ and ‘peacebuilding’. Conflict
Ministers approach might entail and how it can be prevention is commonly viewed as what may
tend to focus further prioritised within government. happen before conflict turns violent (i.e.
on high-profile upstream) and peacebuilding is conceived as
crises and on Divisions within government what may occur after the violent conflict has
ended (i.e. downstream). However, it is often
short-term There is currently no common vocabulary on unclear whether a violent conflict is genuinely
security and conflict prevention and peacebuilding across over or whether it may re-erupt (as happens
military government. Different departments’ priorities within five years in approximately 40 per cent
and internal concepts add to this divided of cases). This overlap between post-war and
solutions rather
institutional culture, which stems in part from inter-war periods means that peacebuilding is
than on conflict the division of labour that has developed itself conflict prevention.
prevention. among departments. On the whole, DfID This situation is further confused by
works upstream on development, with the inconsistent and even contradictory policies.
FCO joining if instability develops. The FCO From an NGO perspective, core ‘national
and MoD, on the other hand, attempt to deal security interests’, as perceived by government,
with the moment of crisis and the period of currently override conflict prevention
violent conflict. A little downstream from the concerns. Examples include the policies
crisis, it is possible that the FCO, MoD and pursued at the international level as part of the
DfID are all working at once, with the roles of ‘war on terror’, which have often undermined
the FCO and DfID diminishing as the work to address conflict at the local level.
peacebuilding process develops. This sequence Another example is the government’s aim to
is often seen as linear but, in fact, the process reduce arms flows and create a code of
is frequently circular because peace conduct, while at the same time backing arms
agreements so often break down. transfers to Saudi Arabia. Engagement at
ministerial level is an important issue here.
Ministers tend to focus on high-profile crises
and on short-term security and military
solutions rather than on conflict prevention.
The government machine may put the right
advice to ministers but, with political
pressures, the right decisions may not always
be reached.
1 Securing Peace - Preventing conflict and building peace: the UK’s role in a changing world
Government policy
frameworks
The new Conflict PSA has ambitious targets:
to reduce violent conflict; promote the
increased effectiveness of international
organisations; improve the government’s
coherence, showing impact on conflict across
all departments and activities; and use both
statistics and narrative to evaluate outcomes.
But demonstrating effectiveness is a challenge
and account has to be taken of Treasury
requirements. This is not something that is
currently happening.
Kenya community
The PSA seeks to avoid creating new An example is the Millennium Development policing training
mechanisms and committees – focusing Goal (MDG) target for children in school – in Photo: Saferworld
instead on better implementation. This will be Burundi there has been an increase in
a gradual process, but will mean a step change educational provision while exclusion
and realignment of resources. It envisages a continues for some communities. A focus on
shift towards early warning, early intervention outcomes rather than outputs demands better
and long range forecasting of potential strategic coordination of roles and
problems. This is ten to fifteen-year thinking, responsibilities. Fortunately, the government
which is not in the current political departments concerned recognise the need to
framework. The goals set will not be achieved adopt this perspective.
unless the government adopts a different Another challenge is to present these
approach and departments work together. This intangibles to the wider public in an accessible
did occur in the field in the Africa Conflict way. The MDGs did have an impact despite
Prevention Pool (DfID/FCO/MoD – now part their drawbacks – they captured the public
of the single Conflict Prevention Pool), but imagination and provided understandable
less so in Whitehall. targets, which do not currently exist for
conflict prevention.
Underlying issues in
peacebuilding New thinking
The government has taken a number of steps Conflict prevention and peacebuilding
in regard to conflict issues, but there is a large demand a new approach, which is difficult to
conceptual gap on how to deal with the achieve if it involves institutions, especially if it
communities and states involved in conflict. is happening without a pre-existing structure
As well as tangible deliverables such as arms to support it. It also requires that alternative
collection and work on the rule of law, the ways of thinking about the issues are more
other half of the equation entails addressing widely absorbed in government. Such thinking
the underlying, intangible issues – inequality, includes the following understandings:
exclusion and abuse. These ‘intangibles’ are Sound economic development leading to
not resolved by technical assistance alone. long-term growth in prosperity is widely
There is a need to ask how activities such as agreed to be one part of the basis for
health care and education address these sustainable peace. Yet the process of
underlying issues and to develop development itself often generates conflict.
methodological approaches to assess them. Thus when war-torn societies are urged to
push forward economic development they are
being asked to take risks.
The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group (PSLG) - November 2009 2
While Fully democratic systems appear to be more Conclusion
sound economic resistant to conflicts turning violent than other
political systems, but the process of Achieving and maintaining stability are not
development is democratisation is fraught with the danger of just short-term goals. A short-term approach
widely agreed to violent conflict. Thus when societies are urged risks creating only the trappings of peace, as
be a basis for to democratise themselves as well as to push has happened in Sierra Leone. Stability entails
economic development forward, they are more than dominating the security space.
sustainable
being asked to take further risks – and to do Experience in Afghanistan has led to an
peace, the acknowledgement that the military is a lesser
so when the institutions of governance are
process of likely to be particularly weak. part of the solution than was envisaged. The
development This indicates that attention must be paid to
political dimension now being discussed in
itself risks Whitehall is how to deal with a centralised
the quality, as well as the quantity, of aid: how
state with little or no power in provinces that
generating it is used, to what end and with what effect.
are largely dominated by war lords. The
conflict in The emphasis has to fall on helping to build
international nature of the forces involved
divided and the conditions that enable development, good
complicates the issue of how to engage with
governance, security and reconciliation to
war-torn move forward.
military, civilian and development issues
societies. outside the centre.
A suggested model rests on developing good
Addressing some of these issues will require
community relations through dialogue and
collective UK government approaches to
establishing different activities that build
international institutions and recognition at
community security. For example,
the political level of the need to work to
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
common objectives. The UK works with UN
Reintegration (DDR) programmes have to
and EU offices that often lack the will or
include strategies for developing infrastructure
capacity to address the long-term underlying
and moving the economy forward.
issues in peacebuilding. The UK must engage
Outsiders cannot make peace – the people
in efforts to improve the quality of thinking in
involved make peace between themselves. The
international organisations. However, the
key is the relationship between state and
focus should not just be on harmonisation, but
society and the need for strong civil society.
on creative thinking about alignment at a
Democratic, responsive and resilient states do
societal as well as a government level. At the
not get built primarily by strengthening the
same time it has to be understood that
capacity of government departments, but in
international organisations have a limited role
the relationship between state institutions and
when it comes to robust political pressure –
a strong civil society.
this is currently the role of member states.
Royal Navy Lt David

Joyce, responsible for
the UK element of the
Military Stabilisation
Support Team,
Helmand at work
speaking with local
Afghans
Photo: ISAF
2. Empowering local capacity in post-conflict
situations: lessons from Afghanistan
The following summary is based on the Local development capacity

findings of a roundtable meeting convened
on 20 February 2008 under the auspices of There are two models for peace agreements:
PSLG and organised by Oxford Research the first is donor-driven and devised at a
Group and Peace Direct. Local distance in foreign capitals. The second is a
empowerment is crucial to building post- domestically-driven and nationally-owned
conflict societies but donor countries often process. The Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan
concentrate their resources through was supposed to fall into the second category.
international agencies instead. This meeting However, the UN peace process was put
explored what would need to change for together very quickly, with little guidance
local capacity to be given a stronger role in available on how best to do it and with little
post-conflict situations. time made for local engagement, despite the
aim being greater inclusion.
In Afghanistan there has been a disconnect
The international approach between the UN agencies’ planning processes
Lasting reconstruction and peacebuilding in and the planning and financial structures of
post-conflict situations must be rooted in local the Afghan government. For example, the
decision-making and actions. Yet the way World Bank initially informed the Afghan
Local
post-conflict reconstruction is handled by government that, in order to keep inflation
down, it could not pay doctors or teachers empowerment
Western donors has often not taken sufficient
account of local capacity and privileges more than $50 a month. At the same time, UN has now become
international agencies in allocating resources. agencies were paying $800 for local drivers. widely accepted
This international approach is almost certainly The consequence was a drain of skilled as crucial to
not the most cost effective in the short term. Afghans to unskilled work in the vast network
building
More importantly, it does little to strengthen of donor organisations working in
Afghanistan, to the detriment of the domestic post-conflict
local capacity for the long term. Nonetheless,
there are clearly strong institutional and civil service. Despite some successes, donors societies.
political reasons why this international were therefore undermining local capacity
approach is adopted. building efforts.
Local empowerment has now become widely Research shows similar patterns in other
accepted as crucial to building post-conflict post-conflict situations where domestic actors
societies. The meaning of the term is are marginalised by technical assistance, and
understood, but there is less knowledge of how there is a mismatch between local and
to put it into practice. While there is now international systems. For example, while a
more funding available for work of this kind, a key to successful post-conflict reconstruction
number of factors conspire to make it less is an effective domestic construction sector, in
effective than it could be: lack of interest reality foreign firms and NGOs often get
domestically in the UK because the work is construction jobs that could be carried out by
long-term; skills shortages in conflict zones; domestic agents. There is a failure of donor
and a lack of knowledge of available donors. In systems to configure and mesh with domestic
addition, there is always pressure for rapid capacity. Technical assistance contracts are a
responses and instant results. particular problem as they actively discourage
foreign contractors from investing in local
capacity.
Local conflict These are harder to measure and produce less
obvious results, but they are crucial to
resolution capacity strengthen the social fabric of a country.
War and conflict have led to the breakdown of Community-based peacebuilding should be
social links and ties in Afghan society, integrated as a national programme – similar
weakening the traditional mechanisms for to a national solidarity programme.
conflict resolution. The result is proliferation Currently there is a lack of understanding of
of local conflicts and disputes that are not these processes, and a lack of interest on the
dealt with. Community-level conflicts add to part of the international community. On the
political instability – they affect the overall part of the Afghan government, there is a
security environment by driving a wedge failure to get information out to local people
between communities. Despite this, efforts with the result that the communications
remain limited at the local level and donor- strategies of the insurgent groups are more
driven at the wider political level. effective than those of the government.
Peacebuilding at the national political level is
necessary but not sufficient. There is a need
for bottom-up peacebuilding and support for Ways forward in local
local peacebuilding initiatives. There also capacity building
needs to be a better balance between social
Developing local capacity in development and
and physical infrastructure building.
conflict resolution presents a series of ways
Development currently emphasises physical
forward as well as obstacles for the UK
reconstruction rather than social building,
government and international community.
peacebuilding and relationship building.
Local peacebuilding: an Afghan NGO working with a local peace council

near Kabul Photo: Peace Direct
UK government The international community
Obstacles: Obstacles:
• FCO officials spend a relatively short time in • There is an international politics of intervention,
post in Afghanistan – between six months to with different vested interests and drivers
two years. They are not trained in the local (including counter-narcotics and counter-
languages – Dari or Pashto. There is a lack of terrorism), which can marginalise local actors.
high-level translators with an understanding • The militarisation of aid creates a blurred
of the culture and linguistic nuances. At large distinction between development workers and
formal meetings, documents are often the military on the ground, so that local people
produced in English and are therefore not often do not see the difference between them.
accessible to Afghan officials, let alone local
• Top-down approaches that focus on institutional
people.
processes emphasise structures rather than
• FCO staff members’ first obligation is to their citizens.
managers and to meet the targets expected of
• There is a fragmentation of donor effort and
them, not to adjust and adapt to their
lack of leadership and effective management of
surroundings and environment, meaning that
mechanisms for donating international aid.
they often gain little understanding of the
country they are working in.
Ways forward:
Ways forward: • Collective accountability.
• The UK government has made the positive • Countries should be open about their national
step of channelling 80 per cent of its assistance interests and clear about their priorities.
through the Afghan government, thereby • Build on the successes in public financial
strengthening the domestic administration. management (such as the Afghan Trust Fund)
The UK has an important role to play in by promoting local ownership, and extend the
persuading other donor countries to follow period over which aid funds flow though the
suit (currently 77 per cent of other donors system – if there is a longer window of time, it is
channel their development budgets outside possible to work through local mechanisms.
the Afghan government). However, most of • Work more with regional neighbours and those
this money only covers recurring costs – affected by the conflict, rather than relying solely
mainly salaries. Once these are covered little is on the international capabilities of major states.
left to carry out development projects. This • There should be a longer tenure for officials and
arrangement maintains the status quo but other international staff working in the country.
does not add anything extra.
• The UK should use its leverage with the World
• The UK should be supporting NGOs Bank as the largest donor to the IDA facility to
financially until the Afghan government can increase the Bank’s presence in fragile states.
take over the functions that NGOs are
• Rethink performance indicators, especially on
fulfilling. The UK government should also
the impact of technical assistance contracts.
make sure that the NGOs it supports can pass
There should also be more research on perverse
their capacity on to local people. It is crucial to
technical assistance mechanisms that undermine
build capacity at the local and national levels
domestic capacity.
as they are mutually reinforcing.
• For conflict-affected countries such as
• The UK’s Provincial Reconstruction Team
Afghanistan, there should be an international
(PRT) is the only one to have a civilian rather
conference table, which is open to all interested
than a military leader, which sets a different
parties to discuss key issues related to that
tone and emphasis, and can build better
conflict.
relationships. The UK needs to persuade other
countries to do the same.
3. Incentives, sanctions and
conditionality in peacemaking
The following summary is based on the There are three principal sets of incentives:
findings of a roundtable meeting convened (1) economic gains; (2) political legitimacy
on 31 March 2008 under the auspices of and recognition; and (3) guarantees and
PSLG and organised by Conciliation assurances. These can foster favourable
Resources in collaboration with conditions, encourage progress, generate
International Alert. Incentives, sanctions public support and aid implementation.
and conditionality are frequent features of However, the success of external incentives
government policy responses to countries depends on the capacity to encourage and
The experiencing violent conflict. This meeting amplify parties’ own motivations to make
measures explored the ways in which these measures peace with adversaries.
taken should can positively or negatively influence a peace In general, policies need to be attuned to the
strengthen process. factors driving conflict and what is likely to
societal modify its course and anticipate the effects of
support and Carrots and sticks policies on intra-party dynamics and decision-
making. The measures taken should
encourage more Incentives and sanctions – often applied strengthen societal support and encourage
inclusive and conditionally – are usually the primary means more inclusive and comprehensive processes.
comprehensive external actors use to respond to violent
processes. conflicts and encourage the parties involved to
engage in peace negotiations. There is a Competing priorities
spectrum of modes of influence from the most in government
coercive forms of sanctions to non-coercive
Peace negotiations are often launched on ‘our’
positive incentives to engage in negotiations.
timetable, but some moments are better than
Sanctions can be a catalyst for change, others for encouraging the parties to make
raising the costs of intransigence, deterring peace, and there are lots of intrinsic
negative behaviour and inducing parties to uncertainties. Humanitarian and human rights
Bush school talk. Though frequently applied, they are seen
programme in Central considerations are very important to the
African Republic to be of questionable effectiveness, with little government. Rather than terrorist proscription
supported by DfID evidence of impact and with the potential to versus peacebuilding, the greater tension is
allows children in have unintended and negative effects. Where
conflict zones to usually between the importance of stopping
resume their there are multiple agendas and contending the immediate humanitarian crises versus the
education priorities, they can result in strategy gridlock necessity for long-term peacebuilding. The
Photo: DfID /
and risk fuelling conflict. difficulty is the long-term nature of
Simon Davis
peacebuilding and the need to engage with
abusers, which may be in contradiction with,
for example, the rules of the International
Criminal Court.
It is very difficult for governments to get this
right. There is insufficient access to knowledge
and that knowledge is not well distributed
within government. Officials working on a
particular conflict are not necessarily those
who know about conflict in general.
Even if they are knowledgeable about a
Dilemmas for development
specific conflict there is a tendency to assume
and humanitarian agencies
that senior officials will have access to better
information.
There is also a tendency to overemphasise There are a number of dilemmas that have
the leverage of aid, particularly when it is on a difficult implications for development and
large scale. Instead, it might be useful to think humanitarian agencies:
about how smaller scale aid to activities that • Will external attempts to secure an immediate end
stimulate peace processes – such as civil to violent conflict on humanitarian grounds
society capacity building and advocacy jeopardise the achievement of a transformative
projects – are in effect incentivising peace, and peace for the longer term, based on a locally-
have the potential to be more effective than owned, locally-appropriate and locally-paced peace
using aid as a ‘stick’. process?
Sanctions and signalling are tied up with big • The provision of humanitarian aid in conflict
questions such as sovereignty and maintaining situations is inherently political, however much it
seeks to maintain impartiality and neutrality.
the international order. Multilateral
instruments are held in high regard – but they • There are associated risks in setting conditionalities:
are very slow and often not that nuanced. in particular, holding development and
reconstruction for ordinary people hostage to the
Handling the multilateral aspect is very
interests of the conflict parties who are likely to
difficult because of competing interests, often
have a different set of calculations.
not related to the specific conflict, and how
• Donors have an inherent bias towards engaging
conflict actors themselves respond to the
with national governments. Although there are
dynamics of international discussions. The
ways to work around governments to deliver aid,
conflict parties are often better at playing these
there is rarely space to engage in aid delivery with
politics than the international organisations. armed groups – especially those designated as
The UN reflects the views of member states ‘terrorists’ – even those who are most effectively
and their interests, even in the Peacebuilding placed to deliver basic services to people on the
Commission (PBC). The UN’s capacity to ground.
function depends on political will and • The OECD-DAC (Development Assistance
acceptance that the UN has a mandate to act. Committee) ‘Principles for Engaging in Fragile
As such, action depends on the interests of States’ may create some tensions for donors – for
UN members relative to the conflict actors. example, the logic that aid unpredictability feeds
This is complicated by different fault lines instability is difficult to square with the idea that
within the UN, including the question of aid conditionality can be used to respond to short-
resources. term lack of progress in a peace process.
It is important to recognise the real world of
government, international politics and policy DfID has put a lot of effort into developing a shared
alignments, and the complexity of conflict conflict analysis among donors, for example in Sri
must be acknowledged. Even the best designed Lanka, helping to challenge some of the assumptions
strategies are not guaranteed to have the about the role of aid in peace processes. DfID is
intended positive effect: there is a fine line, piloting ‘conflict audits’ to assess the degree to which
often in retrospect, between having a positive country programmes are integrating conflict
impact, ‘doing no harm’, or having a negative sensitivity into their policy work. This offers a
impact. For example, the UK government potentially useful avenue for considering how DfID’s
could appear to be incentivising ‘bad’ aid programmes and policies act to incentivise peace
behaviour through a history of increasing aid and disincentivise violence. Conflict analysis
to governments committing human rights approaches could place more emphasis on mapping
violations, such as Somalia and Rwanda. international aid actors in terms of the effect of their
aid policies in incentivising peace and
disincentivising violence.
The importance of perception Furthermore, the largest USAID recipients in
the 1960s and 1970s were disastrously
There is an ongoing gap between unrepresentative governments and there is a
understanding and action, and a great worry that the Cold War view of ‘aiding
complexity of motives in peace processes. friends’ has been reproduced by the ‘war on
Perception is of great importance and mistrust terror’ priorities.
can undermine a ‘rational approach’.
International participants in peace processes
often do not look from both ends of the Conclusion
telescope. They have a relatively complete There are several lessons that government and
analysis from the London end, but they often NGOs can learn in relation to policy-making
International do not have a sufficiently nuanced on incentives and sanctions in peacebuilding:
participants in appreciation of how protagonists will respond
• Thematic conflict advisers are one way to
peace processes to their interventions. Protagonists are also
bridge the gap between thematic and
operating in a wider societal environment, and
often do not practical decision-making.
this interaction influences, and is influenced
look from both by, responses to international interventions. It
• Competition between sound analysis and
political priorities creates an opportunity to
ends of the is also important that the parties understand
challenge governments on their decisions.
telescope. each others’ stories and responses to the use of
• Those who undertake thematic work often
incentives and sanctions. Local mediators can
have difficulties getting the information to
often play a crucial role in helping each side to
the right decision-makers. NGOs need to
interpret and understand the other party's understand how decision-making is carried
behaviour. out.
Aid donors can exaggerate the impact of • It is a mistake to see conflict prevention as a
what aid can do and sometimes this is separate policy as it is not carried out in
counter-productive (for example, the impact isolation.
of aid in war economies is actually quite
marginal).
Civilians displaced from LTTE-controlled by the Sri Lankan Army's military offensive January 2009
Photo: trokilinochchi
4. Delivering health care in unstable environments:
roles, capacities and consequences
The following summary is based on the In the Basra region of Iraq, UK armed forces
findings of a roundtable meeting convened worked with the Director General of Public
on 24 June 2008 under the auspices of PSLG Health to provide local services, and provided
and organised by Medact, in collaboration security for some senior health staff who were
with the London School of Hygiene and under threat. They also carried out Quick
Tropical Medicine and Merlin. Delivering Impact Projects involving infrastructure and
health care and supporting health systems utilities. In northern Afghanistan from 2002
are important aspects of humanitarian onwards healthcare was likewise supported by
activity in areas of violent conflict. This the UK armed forces.
meeting explored the relationships between QIPs have always been part of providing a
the military, humanitarian and health basic package of drugs, training staff,
workers and communities, with a particular reconstructing facilities and taking health care
focus on Quick Impact Projects. to unsafe areas. Considerations include the
type of QIPs being implemented, their
Quick Impact Projects rationale and how they link to longer term
strategies and meet community needs.
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) have replaced
There is
Depending on different contexts, QIPs
‘hearts and minds’ activities in the military involving health and health relationships can currently no
vocabulary. However, humanitarian best be defensible – for example, in Liberia and MoD or NATO
practice indicates that sustainability and long- Ethiopia QIPs were useful for a quick start to doctrine as to
term outcomes should be addressed even in fill gaps. It depends how they relate to wider how military
the acute stage of an emergency. It is often said Health Systems Strengthening (HSS). Tensions
that military involvement will ‘contaminate’
medical services
around the delivery of QIPs include whether
health care but the reality is more complex. If they are a quick response, whether they fill a relate to local
military actors are involved in local health gap, or whether they are primarily for force communities.
services it does not necessarily create protection (but hide behind the humanitarian
problems. In any case, the military does have a label).
role to play under International Humanitarian There is currently no MoD or NATO
Law (IHL): an injured civilian should receive doctrine as to how military medical services
the same treatment as injured military relate to local communities – it is the
personnel if brought to a military facility. The responsibility of local commanders. There is
military have always treated civilians in this some good practice, but the ways in which
way; what is being discussed now is a some QIPs and other practices have been
concerted and planned strategy to increase implemented have been unethical –
military involvement in health care. particularly on the part of the US. Health
In post-conflict situations of asymmetric professionals in the military operate on the
warfare, such as Iraq from 2004, non- same ethical basis as others and have ignored
adherence to IHL creates a security vacuum, the idea that they should not assist civilians.
making it difficult for NGOs to operate and However, the military is now under pressure
deliver health care. This leads to military to contribute to health care primarily because
involvement so as to allow NGOs to operate. it improves security.
At the NATO summit in Riga in November More effort should go into developing ways of
2006, the heads of state instructed the armed assessing effectiveness. It is important that
forces to develop their ideas on how health QIPs do not end up as white elephants – for
services fitted into what they did. However, example, providing equipment which cannot
assistance should be provided impartially work because there is no electricity supply.
according to need – so talk of ‘hearts and The FCO is trying to encourage benchmarks
minds’ changes the nature of the intervention. at the UN to measure effectiveness and
Health care was, in the past, a widely accepted possibly to judge the success of QIPs.
activity in humanitarian emergencies. The The interpretation of QIPs and how they
current problem is the blurring of relate to hearts and minds needs
humanitarian space because of political / consideration. The International Development
military objectives. Act specifies impartial humanitarian
objectives, but in the hearts and minds
Evaluating quick approach a military organisation living in a

village with its own medical support would
impact projects find it difficult not to offer assistance. DfID,
At what point does a QIP become something the MoD and the FCO have an implicit
else, become too entrenched? Are there agreement about QIPs. However, the exact
benchmarks that measure progress and make nature of QIPs is not explicitly understood
it possible to judge this? What role do QIPs between them or in the UK’s relationship with
have in restoring a level of trust and building others. There is also a wider lack of
for the longer term? Careful consideration of explicitness – discussions have begun within
the objectives and the resources entailed is NATO but quite a few nations have given no
needed, as well as how to link them to ongoing thought to it.
projects. It is necessary to measure the process
as well as the impact, and they are often
needed over a long period to ensure adequate
Health services
health care provision. However, they are more for the longer term
often seen as quick fix, and in this case they The implications of the international support
have a very limited role. given to the Afghan government meant some
In one view, the military’s efforts to evaluate organisations chose not to remain in the
this work have not been successful in this country, particularly because of the way the US
particular area, though they are good at positioned itself in relation to the Afghan state.
measuring progress in other areas. The move from providing acute to longer-term
services through strengthening health systems
needs strong community engagement, and is
not going to happen overnight – realistically it
could take three decades.
Of the three generic principles of neutrality,
impartiality and independence, neutrality is
often not practically possible. Often NGOs are
not seen as impartial. The concept of
participation is critical and any health
programme needs to support the national
strategy. In Congo and Liberia conditions were
slightly different as there was a policy vacuum
and it would have taken far too long to wait to
provide an effective and coordinated response.
Political drive is useful, as is engagement with
US Marine medic gives a brief health check to an Afghan child in 2006
Photo: MoD / John Smith the community.
For example, high profile input into the Restricted access to health care in a situation
central midwifery training facility in of increased trauma has meant higher death
Afghanistan also reflected community rates. People are fearful of making use of NGO
priorities. facilities, as they do not know who may be
Local participation and good community watching them. In the early days after the 2003
relations are the key factor for security, while invasion, a military role could have been
prioritising relations with the Ministry of effective. But now, events of the last five years
Health is also important. People make choices have influenced the way people see military
about which services to use and community involvement, creating distrust of the military.
perceptions of risk are not yet fully So where does this leave the Iraqi people?
understood. However unstable the situation is, They have unmet needs and they no longer
there is a need to provide quality services trust the different actors. One possibility
(over and above basic health needs) otherwise would be to reintroduce the old actors – the
people become disgruntled. Evidence on the UN agencies. While some in the UN are not as
relationship between health and state building innocent as one would like to expect, the UN
is anecdotal but there is an intuitive umbrella is still trusted to a certain extent.
recognition of the stabilising effect of There also needs to be trust in Iraqi NGOs
providing services and meeting people’s needs. from the international community, as there are
many examples of their effective work. In QIPs are
short, the humanitarian approach is tainted
Iraq: local perceptions but trust can be revived.
often of more
benefit to the
of different actors
international
After three wars and thirteen years of Trust and community community than
sanctions, the Iraqi health system is at a
massive disadvantage, and this neglect
engagement to local people.
resonates with Iraqi civilians. Sanctions Trust needs to be restored if the population is
removed their control over public services and to be helped. QIPs can sometimes restore
seriously damaged delivery. The static health confidence so that it is possible to operate,
budget under sanctions led to financial therefore encouraging NGOs and others.
corruption, a rise in black market activity and However, organisations can be targeted if
loss of health personnel through emigration. treatment is supplied in the ‘wrong’ facility.
Before this, Iraq’s health services were This is a practical problem – it would not, for
considered to be the best in the region. Iraqi example, be appropriate for the military to
health professionals are still taught best provide services to civilians returning to their
practice, but the medium in which to practice villages. People who return to their home areas
is no longer there. The public have lost their having been treated by the international
trust in the government and the public sector, military may be in danger because of this.
and also in the international community: they QIPs are often of more benefit to the
saw an opportunity to respond to their needs international community than to local people;
in 2003 wasted and feel let down. in situations of suspicion the ulterior motives
In the early days, before the bombing of UN for providing them can be clearly seen by the
headquarters, there was an optimistic feeling community.
about the way the UN was operating. Since UN peacekeeping forces, the UK military
then there has been a high degree of and NATO all need to consider what they do,
interference and difficulties created by faith- and where. UN peacekeepers are perceived
based political parties. Following the looting of differently to NATO or UK troops. All should
health facilities immediately after the invasion follow existing good practice guidelines, and if
there was an expectation that the NGO QIPs are undertaken, they should be part of an
community would help, when in fact they soon overall plan and direction.
withdrew due to increasing insecurity.
5. The National Security Strategy:
implementing an integrated approach
The following summary is based on the Implementation is a different sort of

findings of a roundtable meeting convened challenge. There is good, but not good
on 7 July 2008 under the auspices of PSLG enough, coordination between departments
and organised by the British American that have traditionally had security as their
Security Information Council (BASIC), concern, but not very good progress at
Oxford Research Group and Quaker Peace bringing in new actors – in government,
and Social Witness (QPSW) in collaboration public bodies, the private sector and the third
with the Royal United Services Institute sector.
(RUSI). The UK National Security Strategy The challenges are about how the system
is a serious attempt to integrate a wider view works and, more narrowly, how government
of security than previous Defence Reviews. works. The Ministerial Committee on
However, it is still a work in progress and National Security, International Relations and
this meeting explored the relevance of the Development (NSID) was set up in a
strategy to the broad security agenda. conscious effort to create a ‘broad chapeau’
committee, which thinks about these issues
Developing the National together (and through its specific

subcommittees). The final chapter of the NSS
Security Strategy sets down markers – a National Risk Register,
The UK National Security Strategy (NSS) new Parliamentary structures, a National
The NSS published by the Cabinet Office in March 2008 Security Forum and horizon scanning. There
is a powerful attempts to set a framework to take forward is also a commitment to an annual NSS review
example of the security issues across government to look at the progress on implementation
departments. It was an effort to shift the (with the first update published in June 2009).
growing
paradigm for the way government thinks These reviews will play into discussion on
recognition of future plans for resource allocation.
about security and to start a debate with the
complexity. public about what security is. There was an The Cabinet Office has taken on cross-
internal debate inside government on what Whitehall work with strong support from the
should be in, and what outside of, the NSS. FCO, working on what the Prime Minister has
There was no hard and fast rule, and no one described as ‘deliverables’, including:
definition was widely accepted. What was • How to respond to post-conflict situations
produced was the result of a set of deliberate
• How to respond to global economic shocks –
choices, one of which was that counter- especially establishing early warning
terrorism was not the defining criterion, but mechanisms
that the focus should be on identifying the
• How to improve environmental responses to
security challenges. climate change, including making the World
There was a recognition that there are Bank a bank for the environment as well as
different groups of challenges: some are as yet for development.
unknown quantities; others, such as
globalisation, climate change, poverty and
inequality, and resource competition, are well-
known but it is not yet entirely clear how they
might manifest themselves as security
concerns.
The culture needs to move beyond Missing the links
traditional processes. The Capability Reviews
The government does not acknowledge the link
carried out by the Cabinet Office implied
between its foreign policy and its counter-
departmental limitations on sharing. The
terrorism strategy, making joined-up long-term
alternatives are command and control, which
thinking very difficult. After 7/7, No 10’s line
would be easier, or a shared agenda and buy-
was that there was no link between foreign
in, which is more desirable but far more
policy and ‘home grown’ terrorism. This view
difficult to achieve.
does not convince British Muslims: they may
Public understanding of the issues condemn 7/7 entirely, but then they look at
surrounding the NSS is more limited than Iraq. The increased focus on counter-terrorism
hoped for. When officials were working with has also seen huge resources diverted to
the media on the NSS, journalists wanted the domestic counter-terrorism. The NSS fails to
story, not the analysis. Generating a debate is a address these links.
challenge, but the National Security Forum
Despite good strategies on the Chemical
will have a role in this.
Weapons Convention, for example, the
government’s strategy on nuclear weapons is
problematic. The NSS makes strong statements
Conflict prevention and
about proliferation but it is difficult to argue
national security that the UK is committed to non-proliferation
when it is not taking more serious steps towards
disarmament itself. If nuclear weapons are
The first draft of the proposed cross-
considered important to the UK’s security, it is Public
departmental conflict strategy was
circulating in August/September 2007 but
very difficult to argue for others not to seek to understanding
obtain them. of the issues
not much has happened with it since, though
it will be revisited. Conflict policy needs to The NSS addresses climate change and surrounding the
be mainstreamed beyond the ‘first rank’ of inequality as key issues, but does not make
NSS is more
countries (including Iraq, Afghanistan and sufficient links between the two. Climate
change and inequality, combined with global limited than
DRC). The decisions made regarding the
Conflict Prevention Pool and the communications mean that communities are hoped for.
Stabilisation Aid Fund are component parts increasingly aware of their own marginalisation,
of the NSS, at different levels and stages of but the NSS does not acknowledge this. If
implementation. But this is seen as a linked climate change is the greatest long-term threat
process, not a set of silos. to stability and survival, it needs to be treated as
such. In the short-term, we need to secure
DfID’s budget is not securitised but it can
access to energy supplies but in the long-term it
influence other areas, including security. For
makes much more sense to focus on energy
example, DfID’s strategy for Pakistan may be
conservation (in addition to renewables).
expected to have a beneficial impact on
security. The government does have some The NSS is a powerful example of the growing
country strategies on conflict prevention and recognition of complexity and the importance
security, but there are so many different of seeing the links in new ways. Some
funding streams that it is difficult to know important steps forward have been made
whether in totality the whole is greater or toward greater collaboration and a willingness
lesser than the sum of the parts. to understand that these are complex issues.
However, despite recognising the new security
challenges, the NSS still responds in outdated
terms. There is a further question of why some
issues were ‘securitised’ in the NSS and others
not? If, for example, the NSS was written now,
would economic issues receive far greater
attention?
The NSS Budgetary implications Rather than thinking about military responses,
does not take we need to focus on prevention and on
The NSS has budgetary implications, when strengthening other countries’ responses to it.
into account military expenditure still makes up the vast Climate change needs to be integrated into UK
possible threats majority of security spending. There is only foreign policy (as the ‘war on terror’ has been).
created by the one sentence on nuclear power in the NSS and That means strengthening the response at
hardly any mention of the two new aircraft home, but also promoting integrated responses
UK’s alliances.
carriers, which will have a huge impact on in relations with other countries.
procurement and defence policies in the
On Trident, expense should not be the key –
future. The ‘prevent’ strategy, especially
probably only a minimum deterrent is needed,
engagement with marginalised communities,
if at all. Dependence on the US keeps the UK
is grossly under-resourced.
hostage to US policy. This runs contrary to the
Spending on the military and on aid is whole point of a UK security policy. If the UK
currently overstretched because of competing is serious about the Non-Proliferation Treaty
priorities, but there is also confusion over (NPT), rather than making a 20 per cent
what the threats are – for example, are the reduction in the number of warheads, it
aircraft carriers capable of working should be making at least an 80 per cent
independently? If they’re not, then why not reduction and retaining no ballistic missiles.
work with the US, whose capabilities will
always be much greater? This is an example of
the way the political element in decisions The problem of alliances
about national security encourages short-term
The NSS fails to make sufficiently clear links
responses to long-term issues (the aircraft
between UK foreign policy and its security. It
carrier decision has long-term implications
asserts that the UK faces no state threats but
but is regarded as positive because of short-
does not take into account possible threats
term employment considerations).
created by the UK’s alliances, particularly with
In prioritising between interconnected the US and NATO. It is not set out publicly
issues, there needs to be consideration of why what these alliances are for, and what the
money is being spent. On climate change, if limits are to the UK’s loyalty. For example,
the consequences are as bad as even medium- although Russia poses no direct threat to the
range predictions in the Stern report suggest, UK, it does pose a threat to Georgia. Is the UK
US ballistic missiles,
then even the combined UK, US and prepared to send NATO forces to Georgia to
Huntsville Alabama, European armed forces could have zero ward off a Russian attack or to defend
2006 impact.
Photo: if winter ends Georgia’s claim to Abkhazia? If not, it could
render the UK’s security and defence strategy
useless. Likewise, how far does the alliance
with the US extend? What are the implications
for UK policy on Iran or Pakistan and
Afghanistan, when the impact of policy and
actions in one country undermines objectives
in another? There are difficulties in including
such issues in the NSS, but these are exactly
the kinds of questions an effective strategy
needs to address.
6. Building community capacity to engage
in early recovery in conflict-affected countries:
perspectives from peacebuilders from D.R. Congo
The following summary is based on the
findings of a roundtable meeting convened
on 13 February 2009 under the auspices of
PSLG and organised by Gender Action on
Peace and Security (GAPS) and
International Alert. Early recovery is a label
that covers a complex territory of early
efforts to establish peace and restore
systems. The aim is rapid recovery and an
exit from cycles of intractable crisis. This
meeting shifted the early recovery debate
away from state building by the
international community to focus on local
peacebuilders and locally-owned and
locally-driven early recovery processes.
Angry crowd in eastern
DRC disappointed at
The failure of early recovery Impunity and a lack of respect for the law government failure
to achieve peace
in the Democratic Republic make crime and violence commonplace. There
has also been a failure at almost every level to
Photo: Julien Harneis
of Congo (DRC) recognise sexual violence as a war crime,

There is growing consensus around the need particularly where violations involving the
to address identified gaps in international international community were committed
support for early recovery and post-conflict before the adoption of the national law against
stabilisation. The focus is not just on sexual violence.
peacebuilding but also on humanitarian actors Despite positive developments in the DRC’s
and services to the population. The challenges political process, the provinces of North and
discussed here are not special to post-conflict South Kivu still face ongoing insecurity and
situations; however, misjudgements can have a consequently ever-declining living standards
greater negative impact in such acute for their inhabitants. Despite massive levels of
situations. DRC is an example of the aid, there is little evidence of impact. As a
complexities around early recovery: armed result, there has been a failure to improve
conflict followed by a peace agreement but conditions despite the cessation of armed
subsequent government crisis and collapse. In conflict.
this case, the transition process has been Donors are impatient and international
highly flawed. initiatives often play out poorly on the ground.
Ethnic identity has been politicised and used The international community should be
by political leaders on local, provincial, mindful that changes of attitude and
national and even international levels to behaviour take time, and capacity building is a
achieve political legitimacy. The political and slow process. One upshot of the lack of local
military leadership has showed weakness in community/civil society participation in early
dealing with migration across borders and recovery, especially on part of women, is a
ensuring the safety of people and goods, and view of government as not responsive to their
has not dealt effectively with the issue of land needs. The international community is seen as
tenure and ownership. part of the problem rather than the solution.
There is a lot of focus on achieving peace
For eastern DRC, the end of the
agreements but there is less coherence on what
conflict and recovery presuppose
going beyond this stage requires. A focus
these steps:
purely on the Millennium Development Goals
Governance: Implement more effective (MDGs), the Paris Principles, aid effectiveness
planning linked to regional cooperation and technical solutions may not be the right
and decentralised structures with approach.
community participation. Reform the
What needs to happen for early recovery to
national army and improve management of
work and ensure security for the population,
and adherence to DDR programmes.
basic service delivery from the state, and
Economy: Support spontaneous recovery
support for national peacebuilding processes?
mechanisms (returning the displaced and
There is a need to look at how to approach
refugees and reviving productive activity to
development differently – for example, the
generate revenue). Implement planning in
participation with local communities to DAC principles for good international
identify sustainable livelihoods. Reinforce engagement in fragile states and situations go
control and transparency over the some way towards this.
exploitation and commercialisation of The UK government would like to see a
When local
natural resources. Create a climate of trust much clearer system of accountability, such as
engagement among investors while recognising DRC exists for the humanitarian and development
with sovereignty. areas, but currently not for this very complex
communities Community cohesion: Ensure that period that includes peacebuilding with
humanitarian operations establish stability peacekeeping and a humanitarian response.
is left out of the
within communities. Put early recovery DfID is currently struggling with the issue of
early recovery initiatives in place in communities with the whether engaging with communities is better
process, progress aim of reducing the threat of violence and
done by multilateral or bilateral agencies.
is not made and the scars of conflict.
Questions include:
the cycle of Human rights: Ensure transparency when
dealing with human rights and integrate • Are the capacities available?
violence may be women at all levels of the recovery process. • Who should be engaging?
compounded. • What is the entry point?
• What are the incentives?
DfID’s view of early recovery
The current aid model does not allow for
Peacebuilding dynamics are local, national,
these questions, and focuses on inputs rather
regional and international. There is a need to
than outputs. It is based on an international
link humanitarian, development, security and
system that is locked into relations with states,
political actors. However, expectations are
which are often part of the problem. The
huge and have to be managed. This raises
incentives for the international system and
important questions: how to support contested
DfID to engage with NGOs are low. Efforts to
peace processes and early efforts to create
lower DfID’s transaction costs while at the
peace; how to manage security and
same time engaging with local communities
development; how to support a peace process,
do not match up. These are very difficult
or peacebuilding, rather than undermine it?
trade-offs, but when local engagement is left
out of the process, not only is progress not
made, but the cycle of violence can be
compounded.
Transparency Recommendations
and accountability The international community should:
There are a number of approaches to • Seek to ensure that all stakeholders better
promoting transparency – freedom of understand the local context in which
information, citizen charters, aid transparency, recovery occurs; promote the widest possible
one-stop shops and user services – but so far levels of national and local engagement/
no coherent approach has emerged in an early ownership; and work to strengthen the
recovery setting. Transparency must start at operational synergies between humanitarian
and development assistance.
the local level. Donors and external
institutions can best help by encouraging • Build capacity at both at national and local
transparency in local institutions. The aim levels. The international community itself
needs expertise to do this.
should be to try and reinforce existing local
accountability – with a focus on improving • Better recognise and
utilise both national
local governance, reforming institutions and
and international
supporting local actors.
NGOs as equal
Community-driven reconstruction should partners to help
lead to community-driven accountability. provide reliable data
However, there is a problem in defining what on what national
civil society is and recognising local agents of capacity exists,
change – INGOs tend to look for local NGOs whether it is being
to relate to, but there may be other members utilised and how it
of civil society who could be engaged with. could be
However, the dynamics of bilateral / strengthened.
multilateral funding are problematic and Successful early
highly politicised. A further challenge is the recovery entails
restoring national as
problem of the local government being
well as local capacity
responsible more to the donor than to
in government and
community. Research suggests that local Militia members in
businesses, alongside
communities’ perception of international Sierra Leone being
longer-term physical reconstruction. demobilised
donors is that they do not really care what is Photo: Travlr
• Use its influence to promote greater
happening in the country. transparency and accountability for local
There is also a need to ‘disaggregate society’. populations.
It is easy to focus on vertical relations while • Initiate changes to funding streams to help
ignoring horizontal relations. When facilitate a smoother transition from
marginalisation and exclusion are at the centre humanitarian assistance to the early recovery
of the conflict, there is a temptation to deal and development phases. Currently there is
with elites even at local level as other groups too much donor focus on the emergency
are hard to reach. Therefore ‘local’ is not phase and service delivery.
necessarily always a positive thing. • Encourage the PBC to ensure that national
early recovery plans closely align local
capacity to the priorities of national actors.
• Highlight the gaps in local capacity –
especially the role of women. While
structures exist for emergency gender-based
violence service provision, large gaps remain
as donors frequently fail to recognise the
importance of longer-term engagement and
funding commitments to sexual violence
response and prevention.
7. The EU’s approach to conflict prevention
and peacebuilding: current developments
and the role of member states
The following summary is based on the The European Mediterranean Union (Euro-
findings of a roundtable meeting convened Med) is the least successful of its projects. The
on 6 May 2009 under the auspices of PSLG aim of spreading peace and prosperity beyond
and organised by Saferworld in cooperation the EU borders – starting with the Barcelona
with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Process in 1993 – has not worked. Euro-Med
Office (EPLO). The EU has a wide range of now covers 60 countries, but in at least half of
policies, strategies, processes and these there are no structures and no budgets
programmes in place to address conflict or programmes.
outside its borders – together these make up
the EU’s ‘conflict prevention and
In general, there is a lack of coherence in EU
peacebuilding architecture’. This meeting
actions:
explored developments in this architecture
and identified opportunities for Member • Its responsibilities are currently split
between Pillar 2 – Intergovernmental; and
States, particularly the UK, to improve the
Pillar 1 – Communities, which often operate
EU’s response to conflict.
separately and in parallel.
The EU • There are concerns about civilian capacity
has been most Peacebuilding and being absorbed into military capability.
successful in the European Union There are also tensions between the EU and
NATO and the EU and UN, and with the
peacebuilding The EU was created with the aim of governments of the countries where missions
developing a peaceful community. In the past are deployed.
close to home.
it has been seen mainly as a donor; now its • The EU needs to evaluate peacebuilding
In more distant more broadly by consulting more with civil
role is expanding into peacebuilding and
geographical conflict resolution. Europe is becoming a society. Evaluation tends to look at the
areas it is less serious player in thinking on how to address mission’s mandate rather than the context in
effective. all stages of conflict. the countries concerned, and lacks local
community feedback. The question arises –
The EU’s great success story is integration
who should EU peacebuilders be
and the wider neighbourhood policy. It has accountable to? To EU citizens or to the
been most successful in peacebuilding close to countries they are working in?
home. Among the 27 Member States there
• The Lisbon Treaty, if ratified, will provide an
have been quarrels but no wars between them External Action Service (EAS) to bring
since joining the EU. In more distant together staff from Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. It
geographical areas it is less effective – for will also create a high representative to
example, in Afghanistan where the EU is provide leadership. However, the treaty
struggling to build peace but not succeeding. commits to increasing military, but not
For the European neighbourhood the EU civilian, peacebuilding.
offers a blueprint and strong incentives.
Beyond the European neighbourhood, where
EU membership is not an incentive, the
situation is more complex, with competing
uncertainties.
The Role of the European The EU is clearly raising its peacebuilding
capability, but Member States, including the
Security and Defence Policy UK, are in a learning process in relation to
The European Security and Defence Policy conflict prevention and there are still
(ESDP) developed from the St Malo considerable gaps and problems, including:
declaration in 1998 and is one of the more • The nature of defence budgets, which still
dynamic aspects of EU architecture. There is focus on defence of territorial borders. Some
increasing demand for the EU to intervene Member States have not met their
internationally. However, until now, the ESDP commitments as certain defence ministries
has depended on US approval, especially in do not want to commit much money to
relation to NATO – it cannot be seen to be peacekeeping. In any case, the EU spends
having a negative effect on NATO members only €240 million for civilian peacebuilding
that are not in the EU. There is also a question out of €7 billion for EU external action.
over how to integrate EU and NATO • The EU is good as a civilian actor but
command capacity. recruiting skilled civilians and providing
good quality training is difficult. For
Several obstacles to the ESDP are being
example, civilians were deployed to the
removed. The new US administration is much
EULEX mission without training of any
more open to multilateral cooperation.
kind, let alone in conflict prevention.
Furthermore, France under President Sarkozy
• The time the EU
is now reintegrating into the EU and the
devotes to external
NATO command structure. Politicians are also
policy is considerably
realising that human security issues outside less than the time
the EU affect Member States too. individual Member
The ESDP has sent out over twenty missions, States devote to it.
both military and civilian, varying in size from Instead, the main
3,500 peacekeepers sent to Chad to ten people focus is still on
sent on a rule of law mission in Georgia. Most maintaining the
personnel are engaged in civilian tasks – rule peace between the
of law, policing capabilities, Security Sector increasing number of
members.
Reform (SSR), DDR, and mediation work.
Over 2,000 EU staff currently work for the • The ESDP is
EULEX mission in Kosovo, which is the EU’s dependent on lead
nations (for example,
largest experiment in state building.
France led the Chad
Nonetheless, the UN is still the peacekeeper
mission and the UK
and security provider of choice, though the
led the Somalia
EU can play a bridging role, as in the Artemis mission) and
mission to DRC. Beyond the European questions remain
neighbourhood the EU is only one of a over how to
number of international actors and not always multinationalise Soldier from EUFOR Chad / Central African
the most important. individual Republic based in north-east CAR, affected by
violence from Darfur and Chad, 2008
interventions.
Photo: Pierre Holtz for UNICEF / hdptcar.net
The key question is how to translate EU policy

and rhetoric into conflict prevention and
peacebuilding activities on the ground?
The Accession to the However, enlargement is not always an ideal
tool. If membership is being offered as an
capacity to European Union incentive, the relationship can be more
undertake problematic – for example, Georgia being
The stages of accession for EU candidate
systematic countries are designed to stimulate state offered EU membership instead of NATO
conflict building. The EU’s foreign affairs committee membership. The expectations of aspiring
prevention focuses on issues of integration. It has the members, such as Georgia, should be better
depends on power to oversee and regulate countries’ managed. When a state joins the EU, the
accession process and so can help promote impact of entering the EU market, for
political will example, can create a lot of poverty internally
stability in those countries.
from the top The EU works with these countries and as well as wealth. Furthermore, the
decision provides personnel to train police and judges conditionalities imposed by the EU on
makers. and monitor elections. Partnership and aspiring members, together with the control of
association agreements can be seen as opening immigration, sometimes make it appear
the door, providing progressively more money, effectively to be an unequal partnership.
staffing and involvement of the European
Parliament and other institutions – providing
a body of law, institution building and
Selling the European Union
personnel. When the UK government wants to
The door should be kept open to any state collaborate at the EU level – either in military
that wants to join the EU but the EU should or civilian roles – there are always objections
be united by common values, not just from Eurosceptics. UK citizens need to
geographical proximity. It is good for states to understand why being part of the EU is so
aspire to be members, as a very high level of important and how conflict prevention
cooperation is required before they are globally can affect the UK domestically. It
allowed to join. needs to be personalised: raising awareness of
the benefits for families in the UK.
Confronting organised crime is one possible
entry point to show the links to conflict and
terrorism. The role of civilian peacebuilders
also needs to be highlighted.
Selling the EU is difficult. Not many people
care about EU external policy, especially
conflict prevention and peacebuilding –
whereas humanitarian work creates a more
positive response. The capacity to undertake
systematic conflict prevention depends on
political will from the top decision makers. It
may take a longer period to build support for
EU action outside its borders, especially
further afield. This is, after all, a relatively new
role compared with the length of time the EU
has been in existence.
Award for Brig. Gen. Miller who led the European Command
Joint Assessment Team (EJAT) humanitarian assistance
mission in Georgia 2008 Photo: Herald Post
8. Building a spirit of cooperation for NPT 2010
The following summary is based on a

Reaching Zero
roundtable meeting convened on 2 June
2009 under the auspices of PSLG, and The Global Zero movement aims to reach zero nuclear weapons.
organised by BASIC, QPSW and Medact in However, even if the prospect of achieving this ultimate objective is
cooperation with the Acronym Institute for beyond current lifetimes, any progress made will be worthwhile,
Disarmament Diplomacy. A successful NPT though this will be complex and raises a number of issues, including:
Review Conference in 2010 would represent • Reduction is infinitely easier than elimination as it does not require
just one step towards the longer-term goal of a change in the strategic relationship between the US and Russia.
eliminating nuclear weapons. This meeting There is a need to reach global zero together to avoid other Nuclear
explored ways of achieving a spirit of Weapon States (NWS) gaining an advantage in weapons numbers.
cooperation ahead of the conference, • Security assurances will be required from the NWS for Japan, South
including how to align government and Korea and most of Western Europe, which do not possess nuclear
NGO perspectives. weapons but are dependent on US security assurances to defend
them against attack. The question is what will happen once the
nuclear umbrella disappears?
Eliminating nuclear weapons • Currently the US has an enormous advantage in conventional
Recent support for the goal of eliminating weapons. There is a danger that the end of nuclear weapons could
lead to a very serious conventional arms race as former NWS try to
nuclear weapons has been boosted by
close this gap.
President Obama’s initiative, but it did not
start there. Before that, there was bipartisan
growth of interest in nuclear disarmament – A welcome marriage of factors is providing
not just on the part of long-term supporters, new energy to efforts to eliminate nuclear
but also people who had previously been weapons. There are opportunities, not just on
strong defenders of the need for nuclear the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but on
weapons. related issues: for example, the establishment
There are several reasons for this: of a Conference on Disarmament (CD)
working group focussing on the Fissile
• The debate is now about multilateral – not
unilateral – disarmament. Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) after 12 years
of deadlock, and a new deal between the US
• The world has changed significantly since
and Russia on a START follow-up.
the Cold War – there is no serious possibility
of a world war breaking out, but regional There are also challenges, including the
conflicts are conceivable, making the case for recent test by North Korea and the problems
reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons over several years with Iran and Syria. The
more persuasive. challenges are often linked to wider global
• In Cold War times there were only five security issues – for example, the Israel-
nuclear weapons states (NWS), but now that Palestine conflict and the rise of China. These
there are more, and the discipline of states are difficult but surmountable issues that must
has reduced, the risk of the spread of fissile be addressed to maintain international peace
materials has increased. and security.
Policy-makers in Iran, Russia, China and
Pakistan have heard it all before and will not
necessarily be convinced by this ‘moment of
hope’. Why should they believe anything is
different this time round? One way to
overcome the notion that the current
optimism is just US propaganda would be to
find state champions – for example, South
Africa, Mexico, Argentina and Nigeria –
which would push this view within the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM).
NWS are stuck in the Cold War concept of
disarmament in which relinquishing nuclear
weapons is seen as giving up a form of
security. The debate needs to move beyond
this and frame the issue instead as 'eliminating
A Trident submarine
is escorted out to sea Disarmament is as much a political issue as a nuclear dangers'. In that way, nuclear weapons
from Barrow technical issue and progress must be built on are dealt with in terms of the dangers they
Photo: Bob Stroughton
the principles of collaboration, trust-building, pose to the countries that possess them as well
transparency and timing. The immediate steps as countries that do not. There is also a need
are to negotiate a follow-on treaty to START; to identify nuclear weapons as security
to ensure US Senate ratification of the problems, not security incentives, and
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty diminish the association of nuclear weapons
(CTBT); and to secure greater control over with power projection. This is a challenge for
fissile materials, including getting agreement the UK, where the arguments put forward on
on an FMCT. Trident are much the same as those of, for
example, Iran. This is not missed by the Non-
Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).
Building cooperation The aim must be to emerge from the 2010
Most countries see the common interest in a Review Conference (RevCon) with a more
world free of nuclear weapons. However, some robust NPT regime. Clear mechanisms for
governments still take an approach that puts enforcing verification need to be sold to other
national security first, above all other states, including the P5 (who need to develop
international priorities. Such an approach a more coherent approach). Work on
undermines progress. France is the least verification, such as has been put into place by
willing amongst the NWS to play a full part in a UK/Norway initiative can help to build
the disarmament debate. However, it is likely confidence, for example in verification of the
they will come on board when there is a clear Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
multilateral consensus, as they will not want to (CTBT). There is also work to be done with
be left outside the process. There is a the NAM, which showed itself fractured at the
perception, if not reality, that the UK takes the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), by
‘national security first’ approach too. reaching out to those states that want to see
There are challenges for the disarmament the NPT strong in all three pillars, such as
optimists. Possession of nuclear weapons is South Africa and Brazil.
often not about the weapons systems However, there are still huge differences
themselves but about identity, respect and between the NWS and some of the NNWS.
recognition.
Priorities for NWS and non-NAM NNWS The role of civil society
are:
organisations
• Identifying an evolutionary rather than a
revolutionary approach to disarmament and The relationship between government and
to the fuel cycle civil society organisations (CSOs) must be one
• Ensuring that the nuclear energy renaissance of partnership – not one between ‘dominant,
takes place securely. expert government’ and ‘non-expert’ CSOs
who need ‘to come on board' the government
agenda.
Whereas the three priorities for the NAM
NNWS are: Progress happens when sectors of civil
society and government come together to
• Building treaties
move forward on shared objectives.
• Unrestricted access to nuclear technologies Government and CSOs agree that they want
with little emphasis on non-proliferation
success at the 2010 RevCon, but disagree on
• A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle what success looks like. Part of the role of
East. CSOs is to also challenge the government. For
example, the UK is prepared to commit
A positive role for billions of pounds to Trident, which it regards
the UK government as indispensable for security, even though it

argues that Iran has no legitimate reason to
The British government approach is to want nuclear weapons. CSOs can try to Progress
produce a roadmap to 2010 and beyond for highlight such discrepancies in ways that allow happens when
the longer term. the government to see its own inconsistencies.
civil society and
There are some key challenges: CSOs can also say things to other
government
• The civil nuclear energy renaissance raises governments that the UK government cannot.
questions about the security of fissile The biggest challenges are entrenched come together to
material. positions – CSOs can help in terms of move forward
• There is a need to prevent proliferation and breaking down these positions and changing on shared
to ensure the NWS are genuinely committed the terms of the debate. objectives.
to disarmament.
• It is necessary to develop credible
multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel
Conclusion
cycle, in order to achieve the needs of those At the heart of the NPT are disarmament,
with a legitimate desire for nuclear power non-proliferation and access to nuclear energy.
without allowing proliferation. There needs to be a genuine attempt to see
different perspectives. There are systemic
The CD agreement to start work on the FMCT drivers that prevent movement towards a
is welcome but how can the UK use its interest world without nuclear weapons: there is
and expertise in this area to address the issue pessimism around outcomes and a
of stocks? And as the US moves to ratify the fundamental lack of trust – gamesmanship
CTBT, what role can the UK government play and the continued possession of nuclear
in promoting confidence in verification of this weapons by NWS contribute to undermining
treaty? The UK could play a ‘hub’ role in trust. We therefore need to build on the
facilitating constructive progress in these drivers that will encourage trust.
regards, and on the issue of verifying warhead
destruction in particular. However, this role
will be limited unless the government can
clearly explain the rationale behind its policy
of replacing Trident.
Securing Peace
Preventing c onflict a nd
building p eace: t he U K’s
role i n a c hanging w orld
This report addresses difficult but vital issues that
will continue to challenge governments in future,
whatever their policy agenda. With an increasingly
tight economic climate, how can national and
international security best be achieved? What is the
added value of investment in preventing conflict and
building peace, particularly in relation to defence
expenditure? How does climate change impact on
security policy?
Based on a series of roundtable meetings held between
2007 and 2009, the report examines aspects of peace and
security policies from both Whitehall and civil society
perspectives. Roundtable participants included officials
from across the relevant government departments,
academics, and members of think tanks and NGOs.
UK government polices on peace and security issues have
developed significantly since 2000. Greater attention is
now given to the UK’s international role in preventing and
resolving violent conflict, with an acknowledgement that
military solutions alone are not appropriate or effective in
the face of complex conflicts which can afflict whole
regions.
Challenges are identified for policymakers and
practitioners alike. Highly complex situations require
extended attention, in-depth engagement and consistent
investment of economic and human resources. How can
we build understanding of the nature of intractable
conflicts? How should we deal with the pressure to deliver
short term results rather than invest in long term solutions?
The NGO Peace and Security

Liaison Group
w w w. P S L G . i n f o

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Preventing conflict and building

The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group

Members of the PSLG About the PSLG

(listed alphabetically): The NGO Peace and Security

The NGO Peace and Security Liaison Group ii

1. Conflict prevention: from the periphery to the 1

2. Empowering local capacity in post-conflict situations: 4

3. Incentives, sanctions and conditionality in peacemaking 7

4. Delivering health care in unstable environments: 10

5. The National Security Strategy: implementing an 13

6. Building community capacity to engage in early 16

7. The EU’s approach to conflict prevention and 19

8. Building a spirit of cooperation for NPT 2010 22

US army soldiers question an Iraqi woman in Mosul 2008

Royal Navy Lt David

The following summary is based on the Local development capacity

Local peacebuilding: an Afghan NGO working with a local peace council

Evaluating quick approach a military organisation living in a

The following summary is based on the Implementation is a different sort of

Developing the National together (and through its specific

of Congo (DRC) recognise sexual violence as a war crime,

The key question is how to translate EU policy

The following summary is based on a

the UK government as indispensable for security, even though it

The NGO Peace and Security

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