Allies and Enemies

in the war on Terror

Hoover Institution Working Group on Military History

Realism about Allies

WHAT THE U.S. CAN EXPECT FROM MIDDLE EASTERN PARTNERS
FREDERICK W. KAGAN

Military History

A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY ON ALLIES AND ENEMIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR

America has come a long way since the days when George Washington warned
againstentangling alliances. Americans have instead come to see alliances and
coalitions as essential to their willingness and ability to act on the international stage.
Truly unilateral operationssuch as the campaign against the Taliban in 20012
have been anomalies for decades. Foreign policy debates more often turn on whether
agivencoalition is large and active enough.
The current debate about American strategy toward ISIS is no exception. Britain,
Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates,
and other states have all contributed combat aircraft, supplies, money, basing, or some
combination. Yet Americans are still debating whether these partners are bearing their
share of the burden, in the case of our western allies, and whether they are really
committed in the case of the Arab states and Turkey. Americans seem to want to know
that our teammates are as committed as we are, fully share our interests and objectives,
and are contributing at least all they can (and we are generally very hazy about how
much they actually can commit).
This search for equal commitment, perfect interest alignment, and maximum
contributions is, in fact, unrealistic. Perfect interest alignment is almost unattainable
in the real world. We come closest to achieving it with our partners in the Englishspeaking world, who generally share our values to a very high degree and are most
likelyto see a threat to one as a threat to all. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
(still-)United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have all moved quickly to join our
effortsagainst ISIS and demonstrated their willingness to put their pilots and even
soldiers in harms way. As usual, they have asked very little of the U.S. in return.
Americans must be very careful not to take for granted this crucially-important group
ofloyal and like-minded states.
Other NATO allies have also stepped up to greater or lesser degrees, although they
tend to define their interests somewhat differently. NATO itself creates a strong and
natural pull to cooperation with the U.S., but continental European states often see
their interests and even values as more divergent from ours than our English-speaking
partners do. When we work through the diplomatic, bureaucratic, and international

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legal challenges that preoccupy European states that still seek in this war-torn age
to livea post-war and even post-history life, however, we can generally obtain such
supportas their extremely limited defense budgets permit.
Finding true interest-alignment with Arab states is inherently much harder, however.
Whereas Europeans generally feel a relative affinity toward the U.S. and American
values, peoples in post-colonial regions have tended to channel colonial resentment
into an anti-imperialist resistance to American predominance. U.S. (and European)
support for Israel fed that narrative and gave another cause for resentment for many
decades, although the intensity of that particular concern has been fading among
many Arab states and peoples for some time. Muslim populations look at the powerful
and very Christian and secular West with both longing and trepidation. Arab states,
generally quasi-democratic at best and with their own views of human rights and the
appropriate relationships between ruler and ruled, worry that the U.S. and the West will
impose its own ideas about these things upon them, as we sometimes have tried to do.
The chief source of tension between Arab states and the West, however, remains the
eternal tension between regional and extra-regional actors: they know that we can
walk away, and we know that they cant. The episodic nature of Americas engagement
with the Middle East has, in fact, persuaded most people in the region that we will
periodically walk away, leaving them to face on their own challenges we had been
trying to face together. Regional states therefore do what such states have always
done:they hedge. They avoid committing all of their forces to joint efforts with the
U.S.and they retain contacts and even sometimes alliances with Americas opponents
inthe region and the world.
Americans tend to find this behavior puzzling and even treacherous. ISIS is a threat
to all states in the region. Surely they all recognize that. Surely they should be
putting forth all of their effort against ISIS whether we support them or not. How
could they possibly tolerate their own people helping ISIS or groups that we find
almost equally hateful and threatening? This line of thinking often leads to a partlyemotional response: Well, if they wont fight (and when they even actually help) our
common enemies, then what can we do? Perhaps if we just walked away, they would
realize thatthey have no choice but to do what we want them to do. And our policy
sometimesthen turns into an effort to cajole, bluff, and persuade local partners to
behave as we would wish, even at the cost of developing and implementing strategies
toaccomplish what we need.

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The main trouble with this line of reasoning is that it tends to bury a clear-eyed
understanding of Americas interests and security requirements in the region under a
weight of injured resentment at the perfidy of our so-called allies. It presupposes that
our engagement in the region primarily subserves the interests of partners who just
wont really commit even to defending their own interests. It ends up unwittingly
ignoring the fact that Americas actions in the Middle East, as anywhere in the world,
are meant primarily to ensure the security and well-being of Americans, and that
perfidious or weak partners create obstacles to U.S. policy rather than reasons to
abandon our interests.
Recognizing the grander and natural divergences of interest and perception between
the U.S. and its regional would-be allies lets us focus better on the particulars of each
potential partner. We can then make realistic estimates of the likelihood that any
individual state will work well with us and pursue interests that are as congruent with
ours as possible. We can also identify those states that just dont see the world as we
doand will never make strong partners. We can then stop wasting time in courting
them and spending emotional energy in being frustrated when they are not helpful.

Saudi Arabia
The Kingdom is easily the most frustrating of all U.S. allies in the Middle East. It
dominates the global oil market, making enormous profits from the West and holding
the stability of the global economy in its hand. A pseudo-theocracy, its royal family
relies on support from extremist Wahhabi clerics to justify its right to rule the holy
sites of Mecca and Medina. Saudi kings have recognized the threat posed to them
by al Qaeda, itself an offshoot of Wahhabi theology, but have not stopped their own
relatives from giving large donations to the terrorist group. The Kingdom maintains a
moderately-sized military equipped with expensive American weapons systems manned
by U.S.-trained pilots and officers. But it almost never contributes military power to
regional fights, preferring instead to buy the services of Americans and others with
cash. Saudi Arabia generally manages to stay just close enough to U.S. policy to remain
aperpetual aggravation without becoming an acute source of anger.
We should not expect to see a dramatic change in Saudi behavior any time soon.
The ties between the House of Saud and the Wahhabis go back to the foundation
of thedynasty centuries ago and are unlikely to be broken in the near future. The
monarchy has been teetering on the brink of a succession crisis for many years now,
with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz trying to outlive yet another incredibly-aged
would-be successor. When not worried about the succession itself, Saudi rulers fear

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the rise of Iran, which poses a double threat. Persian nationalism draws forth fears
ofIranian regional hegemony and traditional Saudi mistrust of Shia.
Saudis tend to see the region through this Arab-Persian, Sunni-Shia prism, which
Americans find alien. The Kingdom sees itself beset on all sides by Iranian-backed
adventurismthe Shia government in Iraq, now supported by Iranian-controlled
militias whose activities are coordinated directly by the commander of Irans
QodsForce, Major General Qassem Soleimani; the al Houthi movement in Yemen,
which is also tied to Iran and holds territory on the Saudi border; the Assad regime in
Syria,whose forces are now thoroughly commingled with Iranians and their regional
proxies; the Shia protest movement/insurgency in Bahrain, which the Saudis believe
(with only partial accuracy) to be an Iranian incursion on to the Peninsula itself; and
Saudi Arabias own Shia population, concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province,
which the Saudis believe the Iranians are constantly trying to infiltrate and stir up.
The Saudis have made it very clear that they view U.S. policy in the region with deep
suspicion on current, realpolitik grounds. They fear the possibility of an Iranian
nuclear arsenal almost as much as the Israelis do, worrying that nuclear weapons would
enable Tehran to expand its regional efforts to collapse the Saudi regime and establish
Persian-Shia hegemony. They regard the U.S. effort to obtain a nuclear deal with Iran
as dangerous, foolish, and a betrayal. They have also observed American support for the
Shia sectarian rule of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Malikiwhom KingAbdullah
personally despised and refused to meetand have interpreted U.S. passivity in Syria
as de facto support for Tehrans puppet, Assad. Saudi behavior now is thus heavily
conditioned by the worry that the U.S. is throwing in its lot with the Persians and the
Shia and preparing to abandon its alliances with the Sunni Arab states. That concern,
combined with long-standing family and political dysfunction, succession distractions,
and other social problems, is likely to keep the Kingdom ambivalent at best about
supporting American efforts in the region for some time. The Saudis, nevertheless,have
nowhere else to turn. When the U.S. seeks to act energetically in the region against
Iranian interests and, to a lesser extent, against al Qaeda, the Saudis will probably
continue to be reluctant but meaningful partners.

Qatar
The tiny state of Qatar has long been the most irritating of all the Gulf States. It hosts
the most important U.S. airbase in the region at Doha, but it also hosts (and funds)
alJazeera, the media conglomerate that has spent many years spewing anti-U.S. hatred

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throughout the Arab world. Worse still, Qatar actively supports al Qaeda-affiliated
groups and individuals. It also periodically sides with Iran against the U.S. Qatar has
a lot of money that could, in theory, help support opposition groups in Syria and
elsewhere. In reality, though, the U.S. would do better to see Qatar as an adversary
to be contained rather than a potential partner to be wooed, despite the presence of
our airbase there. Just getting the Qataris to stop doing bad things in the Middle East
wouldbe a major step forward.
Qatari motivations stem from personal relationships among Gulfi royal families, but
even more from the fact that Qatar is a tiny, powerless country with too much cash for
its own good. It shares a critical gas field with Iran, making decent relations with Tehran
an economic necessity. It feels a natural, if foolish, resentment of Saudi domination of
the Peninsula and a desire to poke the Kingdom in the eye whenever possible. It relies
on the American presence to deter adventurism by its much more powerful neighbors,
but resents the Western dependency thereby created. And it both sympathizes with and
fears Islamist extremism, which it prefers to buy off rather than confront.
Given this conglomeration of mutually-antagonistic interests, policies, and emotions,
the U.S. should focus on getting only two things out of Qatar. The airbase in Doha
is important, and we should try not to jeopardize italthough we cannot allow it to
hold our entire policy hostage if the worst comes to the worst. And we should try much
harder to get the Qataris to reduce their support for al Qaeda and like-minded groups.
We should be prepared to sanction individual Qataris, block their travel, and work with
our European partners to exclude them from their favorite universities and vacation
homes. We should focus threat finance efforts on identifying the worst offenders and
blocking or seizing their finances. We should not ask or expect anything else from
Qatar, and we should not accept any help with funding oppositionists in Syria in place
of efforts to stop the much larger funding going to our enemies. Qatar is not an enemy,
but it is unlikely ever to be a real ally.

Turkey
Turkey, on the other hand, actually is an ally, at least legally, although it is sometimes
hard to remember that fact. Ankaras refusal to allow the U.S. to use its territory during
the 2003 invasion of Iraq seriously complicated that effort. President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has oscillated between coddling Assad, threatening and confronting him, and
falling into limp passivity. Turkey has courted improved relations with Iran, primarily
for economic reasons, and moved generally away from the U.S. and the West.

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Yet Turkeys realpolitik interests remain pretty closely aligned with ours. Al Qaeda and
especially ISIS is a serious threat to Turkey. The collapse of Syria has been a major source
of problems, which the more recent collapse of Iraq are exacerbating. Turkish cozying up
to Tehran does not mean that Ankara is any more enthusiastic about an Iranian nuclear
arsenal than we are. And for all the anti-Western rhetoric that Erdogan and his allies
spew, Turkey still looks primarily to Europe as a stepping-stone to an improved economy
and higher position in the world.
Erdogan himself is a major part of the problem in Turkeys relationship with the West.
Autocratic by temperament, he represents and leads an anti-secular backlash against the
modern Turkey created by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk as the Ottoman Empire collapsed.
The backlash itself should not be surprising. Atatrk secularized Turkey rapidly, boldly,
and uncompromisingly. He helped build a secular Turkish military that maintained
thecountrys secularization in part through periodic coups.
It is extremely unfortunate that the rise of Erdogans brand of Ottoman-Islamism should
have occurred at this moment in history, however, and that he himself should have
proven an adroit manipulator of the Turkish political scene. He has established himself
as a dominant figure now with his recent election to the presidency. More importantly,
he appears to have neutered the Turkish military through a determined quasi-judicial
purge. The Turkish military would normally have been a powerful force driving toward
a muscular response to the rise of violent Islamist groups and Iranian proxies on
Turkeys southern border, but Erdogan has deprived it of its power.
He has not been able to establish himself as strongly in its place, however. His heavyhandedness caused internal unrest that forced him to turn inward, while empowering
an opposition that seemed able to agree on only two things: dislike of Erdogan and
a desire not to become embroiled in Syria. The refugee crisis that engulfed southern
Turkey could have been a spur to action but became instead a weapon in Turkeys
domestic political fight. The opposition managed to deflect Erdogan from taking a
strong line on Syria without being able to prevent his coronation.
Erdogan has crowned himself, nevertheless, and Turkeys unrest has fallen relatively
quiet, at least for now. His recent action to gain formal assent for a more forward policy
in Syria may represent a turning of the tide and the resurgence of Turkish activity in
the Levant. Such a turn would be welcome insofar as it leads Erdogan to allow the U.S.
to operate freely from Turkish territory. But the ham-fistedness with which Erdogan
kindled unrest in his own country can also alienate Arabs and Kurds who view his
neo-Ottoman imperialism with mistrust. The U.S. can and should expect more help

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from Turkey, but should not make the mistake of imagining that Erdogan is likely to
bean effective surrogate leading efforts against ISIS, still less against Iran.
One could examine the other regional states in equal or greater detail without changing
the overall picture very much. Jordan is desperately poor, internally riven, weak, and
fearful. The Emirates are wealthy, relatively strong, relatively unified and stable, but far
away and focused on Iran and other more immediate concerns. Kuwait is mired in its
own internal tensions, fearful of Iraqi unrest and Iranian adventurism, and unlikely to
engage materially outside its borders. Egypt is large, potentially powerful, but distant,
challenged with its own al Qaeda problems, and on a knifes edge between precarious
stability and chaos. Different American policies might cause these states to be somewhat
more or somewhat less helpful, but the delta will be relatively small.
The notion, never stated but always implied, that there is some large, latent power in
the Arab-Turkish world that could be mobilized to take the lead in solving the problems
in Iraq and the Levant is a fantasy. The region is fragile, unstable, riven with internal
tensions and conflicts, and torn among many competing crises. That statement of the
obvious is somehow not penetrating the U.S. policy discussion about what to expect
from regional partners. The Middle East is a net consumer of stability and will be for a
long time to come. The only real choices facing the U.S. and the West are whether to
try to supply some stability or risk widespread regional collapse. Chasing the mirage of
cajoling regional states into solving the regions problems will get us nowhere.

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Working Group on the Role of Military History

inContemporary Conflict

About the Author

FREDERICK W. KAGAN
Frederick W. Kagan, author of the
2007 report Choosing Victory: A
Plan for Success in Iraq, is one of
the intellectual architects of the
successful surge strategy in Iraq.
He is the Christopher DeMuth
Chair and Director, Critical Threats
Project at the American Enterprise
Institute and a former professor of
military history at the US Military
Academy at West Point. His books
range from Lessons for a Long War
(AEI Press, 2010), coauthored with
Thomas Donnelly, to The End of
the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe,
18011805 (Da Capo, 2006).

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

434 Galvez Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
650-723-1754

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The Working Group on the Role of Military History in

Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past
military operations can influence contemporary public
policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful
study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern
war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of
technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more
in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary
wars, one that explains how particular military successes
and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes
misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context
ofthe present.
The core membership of this working group includes David
Berkey, Peter Berkowitz, Max Boot,Josiah Bunting III, Angelo
M.Codevilla, Thomas Donnelly, Admiral James O. Ellis Jr.,
ColonelJoseph Felter, Victor Davis Hanson (chair), Josef Joffe,
Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Edward N. Luttwak,
Peter Mansoor, General Jim Mattis, Walter Russell Mead, Mark
Moyar, Williamson Murray, Ralph Peters, Andrew Roberts,
Admiral Gary Roughead, Kori Schake, Kiron K. Skinner, Barry
Strauss, Bruce Thornton, Bing West, Miles Maochun Yu, and
Amy Zegart.
For more information about this Hoover Institution Working Group
visit us online at www.hoover.org/research-topic/military.

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