SELF LUMINOUSITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS BASED ON SRI

CITSUKHAS DISCUSSION IN TATTVA PRADIPIKA

Sri Citsukha was an eminent Advaitin scholar in the 13th Century A.D. His most
important works are: 1. Adhikaranamanjari: a brief summary of contents of the
adhikaranas in Sri Sankaras Brahmasutra Bhashya. 2. Abhiprayaprakasika: A
commentary on Sri Mandana Mishras Brahmasiddhi 3. Bhavaprakasika: a
commentary on Sri Sankaras Brahmasutrabhashya where he reconciles the
differences between the Vivarana and Bhamati Schools. 4. Bhavadipika: a famous
commentary on Sri Harshas Khandanakhandakhadya (sweetmeat of refutations).
5. Tattvaprakasika: a commentary on Sri Suresvaras Naishkarmaya Siddhi. 6.
Vivriti: a commentary on Sri Anandabodhas Nyayamakaranda. 7. Vivati: a
commentary on Sri Anandhabodhas Pramanamala. 8. Tatparyadipika: a
commentary on Sri Prakasataman Munis Panchapadika Vivarana. 9. Tattva
Pradipika: an original treatise the purpose of which is to defend Advaita and
criticize the viewpoints of its opponents. The first section of this work contains a
systematic discussion on self-luminosity of consciousness. We will be concerned
with this part of the book.

BACKGROUND
To understand the rigorous dialectical discourse of Sri Citsukha it is imperative to
have some knowledge of Nyaya logic. Inference or anumana in Nyaya is a
pramana, it leads to valid knowledge of some object based on another object
which acts as a sign or mark for the presence of the former object. The previous
knowledge of invariable concomitance between the sign and the signified and the
knowledge of their presence in a certain locus based on the above said relation
leads to anumana. To illustrate with the help of an example, someone notices
smoke on a mountain. Smoke reminds him of fire and also that he has noticed
their co-presence in a kitchen or a hearth and their co-absence in a lake and thus

he knows that smoke is invariably accompanied by fire. Based on this knowledge

of invariable concomitance (vyapti) between smoke and fire, the person believes
that the smoke on the mountain also must be accompanied by fire and he
concludes this must be the case. Here the Naiyayika is not saying that
psychologically we always go through this long process when we infer something
for a difference is made between inference for oneself and for another. When we
present our inferential knowledge we always do so in a syllogistic form and the
above description was of a way to convey ones inferential knowledge. The Nyaya
syllogism consists of five steps:
1. Theory (Pratijna): The Mountain possesses fire
2. Reason (hetu): because of smoke
3. Example (udharana): where there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen
4. Application (upanaya): This Mountain similarly possesses smoke which is
invariable concomitant with fire
5. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore the mountain possesses fire.
Here smoke is the hetu or the middle term, fire is the sadhya or the major term
and mountain is the paksha or the minor term. The instances which have the copresence of the smoke and fire is the sapaksha and where such a relation is not
found that is called the vipaksha.
It should be noted that all examples brought in an argument and counter
argument to support an empirical generalization must be acceptable to both the
parties.
There are three different types of inferences in Nyaya:
1. Kevalanvayi (only positive): when the hetu and the sadhya have only a sapaksha
but no vipaksha. For example: All that is knowable is nameable. The pot is
knowable and hence is nameable. Here knowable and nameable pervade the
whole world and hence there is no instance where their co-absence may be

found. (For Nyaya there is no instance where knowability and nameability are
absent).
2. Kevala Vyatireki (only negative): here the hetu and sadhya have no positive
instance of agreement in presence. An example will suffice here: no non-soul is
animate. All living beings are animate. Therefore all living beings have souls. Here
the hetu animate is said to be found only in living beings or beings possessing a
soul and nowhere else and hence no positive instance apart from the disputed
case can be found. Therefore the concomitance is established negatively,
between absence of possessing a soul and absence of animate-ness.
3. Anvaya Vyatireki (Agreement in presence and absence): Here the hetu and
sadhya are both positively and negatively related to each other like in the
mountain fire and smoke example.
Inference takes place always when there is pervasion or vyapti between two
objects which act as sign and the signified. However vyapti may be of different
types or degrees. When the relation between the hetu and the sadhya is in an
unfailing relation, here both the objects may act as the sign and signified for each
other. For example something is sinful because it is prohibited in the Vedas and
something is prohibited in the Vedas because it is sinful. Then there may be an
instance where only one object forms the sign for another but not vica verse. For
example one may infer fire on the basis of smoke but not vica verse as fire does
not pervade smoke like in a red hot iron ball. Thirdly two objects may be mutually
exclusive for example the class of cows and the class of horses, where the one is
the other is not and hence there is a relation of exclusion between them.
In Nyaya there are no fallacies but blockers or preventers. The so called fallacies
in Nyaya block the awareness or cognition of an inference to arise or they
themselves may be cognitions that oppose the awareness of inference to arise.
Mostly they are based on deviation between the hetu and the sadhya, either
there is some instance where the hetu is and sadhya is not or their relation may
be conditional. This brings us to the theory of upadhi. Upadhi is something that
pervades the sadhya but does not pervade the hetu and hence blocks an
inference. For example in the inference mountain has smoke because it has fire,

fuel is the upadhi, it pervades instances of smoke but not of fire for fire may be
present in a red hot iron ball.
Tarka is that which removes any doubt about the invariable concomitance
between two objects. It starts with an assumption based on the denial of vyapti
and shows how it leads to absurdities. For example: If the soul was not eternal,
then it may not experience the fruits of past life and hence it is eternal.
There are four kinds of absence in Nyaya: a) prior absence, this is the status of an
object when it is absent before its production b) posterior absence, this refers to
an object that has been destroyed c) absolute absence, this is absence of an
object in a locus in all three periods of time and d) mutual absence, this is absence
of identity between two objects. The entity negated is called the pratiyogin or
counterpositive of the negation, for example, when we say a pot is absent from
the floor, the pot is the pratiyogin or the counterpositive.
This is a very short account of a subject which needs volumes to be expressed in
but nevertheless it is sufficient for our current purposes.

DEFINITION OF SELF LUMINOUSITY AND ITS PROOF

Sri Citsukha considers eleven definitions of self-luminosity before accepting the

eleventh one and rejecting the previous ten. He defines self-luminosity as the
capability for empirical usage without being an object of awareness. Immediately
an objection is raised. Is the so called capacity an attribute of awareness or an
indicator (an accidental property)? Either way the definition would not apply to
pure consciousness for it would violate the tenets of Advaita as there is nothing
apart from pure consciousness which is non-dual. The definition may apply to
substratum-consciousness when due to avidya, consciousness is said to be the
substratum of the world but considered in itself, minus avidya must we then say
that consciousness is not self-luminous? Sri Citsukha replies that capacity here
has to be interpreted in a technical way. It means that this capacity never is a

counterpositive of an absolute absence in consciousness. Although in the nondual state there is no empirical usage of consciousness yet it is not absolutely
devoid of such a capacity. From the standpoint of avidya there shall always be in
consciousness the said fitness for empirical usage without being objectified. From
the absolute standpoint then we may say although the said fitness is not present,
it is not eternally absent too. This may still sound like consciousness possesses a
specific power or capacity. But this is not so for self-luminosity is the very nature
of consciousness although we express it in a subject-predicate form, as if
consciousness is the possessor of the property of self-luminosity, from the
standpoint of avidya. Sri Citsukha quotes Sri Padmapadas Panchapadika in his
support: Joy, experience of objects and eternity are the characteristics of Atman.
Although they are not different they appear to be different from pure
consciousness. The import of this whole discussion is that consciousness is such
that it illumines all objects but in itself it is self-revealed, it does not need
anything over and above itself to reveal itself unlike a material object. But when it
is not illuminating objects can we still say that it is self-luminous? Consider for a
moment we define fire as that which has the ability to burn. But it burns objects
only when they come in contact with it. But yet we may say that even when it is
not burning something it still has the capacity to burn and also that capacity to
burn is identical with fire or the very nature of fire. Same is the case here with
consciousness, by its very nature is self-luminous even when it is illuminating
other objects and also when all duality is absent. It should be noted here that
pure consciousness is self-luminous but not reflected consciousness or
consciousness delimited by mind or the vritti. When there is awareness, we know
that we know and we do not require another cognition to become aware of the
fact that we are aware but this is because Brahma-caitanya is self-luminous.
Panchadasi 8.4 says:
"The consciousness reflected in the vritti coincident with
the jar manifests simply the jar. The fact that the jar is known is manifested by
Brahma Caitanya." 8.16 says: "The statement 'this is a jar' is due to the favor of
reflection. The statement 'The jar is known' is due to the favor of Brahma
Caitanya (underlying consciousness)". Buddhi appears to be sentient and selfluminous because of pure consciousness. Pure consciousness illumines both the
object of knowledge and the knowledge that one knows the object and thus

reflected consciousness too is an object of consciousness. The definition calls

consciousness unknowable to exclude ordinary material objects like pot etc. from
the definition. They being the objects of empirical cognitions are not selfluminous. But if such is the case then how is it that we are able to talk about
consciousness? To talk about something and say it is unknown or unknowable is
self-contradictory. How again can the Upanishads inform us about Brahman? The
reply is that pure consciousness is not absolutely unknowable. We have an
immediate intuition of consciousness in a manner that is different from all
knowledge we may have of any other object. Even in perception our awareness of
the sense object is mediated by various processes of sense contact and removal
of avidya through the antahkarana vritti. Sense perception thus comes as the end
result of a long causal process to reveal the object to the subject. But the
intuition of consciousness does not lie anywhere at the end of a causal process,
our awareness of its presence is immediate in the full sense of the term. There is
no gap between consciousness and our consciousness of consciousness. This
knowledge is not caused in us, we just seem to have it all along. The only sense in
which consciousness is an object is that we can communicate about it though this
nowhere implies that consciousness then would indeed be captured by the mind
in which a sense object is. For whenever we think about consciousness we
conceptualize it and consciousness by its very nature lies beyond any
conceptualization. It transcends our thoughts for thoughts limit but consciousness
knows no limitations in which it is like space, all-pervading. Whenever
consciousness becomes associated with any cognitive process, any vritti, it
becomes reflected consciousness and not pure consciousness. We can
conceptualize about pure consciousness in order to communicate with it but any
such conceptualization is a superimposition on consciousness and hence we never
capture consciousness in it pure nature, though we never lose it too, for us to
capture it in our mind, later. Consciousness thus is speakable but not knowable.
Our speech about a jar is caused by our awareness of a jar but communicability of
consciousness depends only on its presence and not on a separate awareness
about it. Immediacy of consciousness is found in all our cognitive operations
whether it be thinking or perceiving or inferring, and we know it in a way we
know no other thing. We can think about it, perceive it, infer its presence, but

only remotely for when we think about it, it does not remain thought, when we
infer it, it does not remain the entity inferred. All these cognitive processes
depend on consciousness for their fulfillment but they cannot turn back on
consciousness to reveal it for it is self-revealed. Consequently we speak about
consciousness in negative terms, to say that it immediate is not to ascribe it a
positive property but to deny mediate-ness to it, to say that it is self-luminous is
to deny non-self-luminosity in it. The opponent conflates the difference between
unknowability and unknowability with capacity for communicability. Thus the
definition given is pure consciousness is capable of empirical usage though
unknowable. The capacity of empirical usage is contingent on there being the
domain of avidya yet consciousness is never absolutely bereft of it. To sum up,
Consciousness is a union of illumination and existence, illumination constitutes
its very being and nature. Hence the proof of consciousness in Advaita is
apodictic. To deny consciousness is self-contradictory and to affirm it is a
tautology, for consciousness is needed for the very act of denial or affirmation to
be.
The definition being given Sri Citsukha moves onto to prove pure
consciousness is self-luminous. The proof is presented syllogistically as follows:
Consciousness is self-luminous because it is consciousness (awareness) unlike a
jar.
This is an only negative inference. All the positive instances are included in the
paksha and hence the inference has to be understood as whatever is not
consciousness is not self-luminous and vica versa. Hence here the udharana or
example is negative, it exhibits the concomitance of absence of sadhya (thing to
be proved) where there is absence of hetu (reason). The opponent here brings
out the charge of sadhyaprassidhi on the Advaitin. In Nyaya there is the condition
for inference that there must be an invariable concomitance between the
probans (hetu) and the probandum (probandum). This invariable relation fails to
be materialized if either the probans or the probandum be an altogether
unknown fact, for a relation between two unknown facts or an unknown fact and
a known fact is inconceivable. If the probans are unknown it constitutes the

fallacy of sadhanaprassidhi and if the probandum is unknown it constitutes the

fallacy of sadhyaprassidhi. The above fallacies also occur even when either the
probans or the probandum are known existent facts but are qualified by unknown
or non-existent predicates. Here the advaitin is trying to prove that consciousness
is self-luminous in a manner defined above. But we cannot define things into
existence. The property of self-luminosity is completely unknown, what proof do
we have for it. The Advaitins retort by a counter syllogism, which runs as follows:
Knowability is a property and is thus subject to absolute negation in some
substrate.
In this way unknowability in a particular substrate is established, it implies the
presence of such a property as self-luminosity. Unknowability is one of the
characteristic marks of self-luminosity and is thus established by inference. Since
Knowability is subject to negation in some substrate, there may be some locus
which possesses unknowability. The opponent counters this by an inference: If
consciousness is not a content of awareness (unknowable), then it cannot be a
real entity. But it may be replied that consciousness does not need to be a
content of awareness to be real, it may be self-luminous. The other mark of selfluminosity viz. immediate apprehension is established through another inference
thus:
That object is immediately apprehended which if it were not would lead to such
undesirable consequences like infinite regress etc.
For Sri Citsukha self-luminosity of consciousness forms the very basis for any
activity, cognitive or conative. In apprehending an object we also apprehend our
apprehension of the object. If this was not the case and we needed another
awareness to become aware of the presence of awareness in us, then to be aware
of this awareness we would require another awareness and then a still another
one and so on ad infinitum. Consequently we may never know that we know and
we would ever be in doubt whether awareness has occurred in us or not. This
doubt would lead to a complete failure of our cognitive and conative systems. We
act not just on the basis of our knowledge of an object but also on the knowledge
that we know the object. If this feature is left out, we can never say or believe

that we have experience. We never have a doubt in the form: has the knowledge
of the pot arisen in me or not? We speak, think and act because of the light of
consciousness illuminates all. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that we are
immediately aware of our awareness of an object. To quote Sri Citsukha: If at the
time of cognizing a content, the experience were also not cognized, then in the
instant following the awareness of the content the person desiring knowledge of
this object will doubt his experience (have I had this awareness or not), or else
may have a contrary experience (I have had the awareness of non-existence of
this object), or have a directly opposite experience (I did not have that
experience). But when the individual is asked in the instant following his
experience he neither expresses doubt nor admits of a contrary experience nor of
one directly opposite, but he firmly says, I have seen this thing. Therefore it is
reasonable that consciousness being self-luminous produces practical activity
concerning the content. Considering the possibility of awareness being the
content of another awareness Sri Citsukha says: Just as the eye etc. are not selfluminous (but are illumined by something other than themselves), so too will
awareness be produced by an awareness which is other than itself and
consequently awareness will not be the cause of practical activity with respect to
an object. Furthermore since insentient objects are neither self-luminous nor
illumine each other, they cannot be luminous. On this model awareness too will
be non-luminous. And if awareness is non-luminous the entire world will remain
in darkness. This refutes the Nyaya theory of anuvyavasaya which says that
cognition is not self-apprehended but is cognized by another cognition. Just as the
existence of ordinary objects are established on the basis of our cognitions of
them similarly the existence of cognition is established by cognizing the same. To
defend this thesis Nyaya brings out an inference: Cognition is knowable because
it is an actual object like a jar. This would refute both the unknowability of
awareness and also their immediacy. Sri Citsukha retorts that for the inference to
succeed there will have to be an awareness of pervasion between Knowability
and being an actual object, but it may be asked is this awareness which is aware
of the said pervasion is itself self-illumined or not, if it is then the opponent would
have conceded the point to the proponent, if not then the inference would fail
since one is not aware of an awareness of the pervasion and if there is no

awareness of the pervasion then how will the inference succeed. The point is that
self-luminosity is the very basis for pramanas to work. The Advaitin by putting
forward a syllogism is not literally establishing self-luminosity of consciousness for
it is self-proved except ofcourse for its opponents, but for the Advaitin it is
nothing but a reinforcement of an intuition. The Pramanas have their very being;
owe their very function due to the self-luminosity of consciousness;
consciousness is the transcendental condition for the pramanas to be, for
otherwise the world would be nothing but darkness. This establishes the second
mark of self-luminosity and the fallacy of sadhya-prasiddhi is averted.
The opponent says that the Advaitins argument is something like this: A Jar is
self-luminous, because it is a jar. That, which is not like this, is not a jar. But as a
matter of fact a jar is illumined by sense-perception and hence we are directly
aware of the absence of self-luminosity in a jar and consequently the case is not
analogous.
The opponent now brings the charge of svarupasiddhi and ashrayasiddhi. The
former fallacy arises when the middle term is absent from the minor term (when
fire is inferred on a hill the middle term smoke has to be perceived on that hill)
and the latter arises when the minor term is unreal. The argument is that the
middle term, consciousness (which is not pure consciousness but apparently for
the opponent is empirical cognition or reflected consciousness), does not reside
in pure consciousness, hence the fallacy of svarupasiddhi, and pure consciousness
which is the minor term is single and homogenous with no plurality, consequently
it lacks a distinguishing mark that separates it from other things, but for the
Advaitins pure consciousness has no other. Because pure consciousness lacks a
distinguishing mark the minor term should be regarded as unreal or imaginary
and thus unfit to be the minor term of an inference. To the charge of
svarupasiddhi the Advaitin replies that from the absolute point of view pure
consciousness is unempirical but considering from the domain of avidya empirical
cognitions exist. In the above inference we take the middle term not as particular
cognitions but from a general point of view of being a cognition and hence
attributable to pure consciousness, the minor term. All particular cognitions,
because they are nothing but pure consciousness, possess the generic character

of being consciousness though from an empirical point of view we have to

consider its difference from the original consciousness. Pure consciousness
possessed of such a generality would contradict Advaita from an absolute
standpoint but not from an empirical standpoint. To the charge of ashrayasiddhi,
Sri Citsukha replies that we can take pure consciousness to be possessed of the
distinguishing mark of experience-ness or the property of being a cognition,
since again here as in the former objection we are making considerations from
the empirical point of view. But a distinguishing mark is class property which
resides in many different entities; experiences are varied for the opponent but for
the proponent there exists but the single pure consciousness. Thus there is no
validity of a class property like experience-ness. To this the immediate retort is
that just as moon-hood can be considered as an appropriate class property when
moon, though one is reflected in many different mediums, similarly one pure
consciousness is reflected in many internal organs which act as their upadhis or
limiting adjuncts, consequently from the empirical point of view the class
property of experience-ness is valid and hence the distinguishing mark of pure
consciousness as mere experience-ness, holds. Note here that moon-ness would
be a class property for the opponent too which in this case is Nyaya, the reason
this was necessary was because the middle term has to be acceptable to both the
disputing parties. The reader should here recollect the difference between
reflected consciousness and original consciousness made earlier. The two
objections considered above arised because the difference between the two was
obliterated even from an empirical standpoint, the opponent conflated absolute
and relative standpoints, a distinction central to the tenets of Advaita. Also there
was some ambiguity in the Advaitins middle term which needed to be removed.
The whole argument thus comes to this that pure consciousness is self-luminous
because it is of the nature of apprehension (which is not a particular experience
or cognition but a general mark of any particular cognition or experience), unlike
any entity which does not possess this distinguishing mark, which as it turns out
are all material objects or objects of pure consciousness, for anything different
from pure consciousness is a material object and hence insentient (even an
empirical cognition). This is a consideration purely from the empirical domain for
we dont make inferential arguments from a transcendental domain at all. Thus

Sri Padmapada says in his Panchapadika: When consciousness appears in

connection with other objects and manifests them it is called experience
(anubhava) and when it is by itself it is called the self or the Atman (pure selfrevealing consciousness). Consciousness reveals objects when they are illusorily
superimposed on it which happens in the realm of avidya.
Sri Citsukha next argues that the Self is self-luminous because it is of the nature of
awareness. We never doubt our own existence, to deny this is to contradict
oneself. The Self exists in all three states of waking, dream and deep sleep and is
immediately intuited. If the self would be nothing but a succession of mental
states or functions then in deep sleep when such mental states have ceased there
should be an end to the notion of the identity of the self and a man waking up
should have been different from the man who slept. Our notion of Self is derived
from the Atman though under the influence of avidya we regard ourselves as
psychophysical beings. Our sense of ego too is not essential to us for it is absent in
deep sleep. At such a time it is only because of the self-luminosity of the Atman
that acts as the substratum of our sense of individuality which otherwise would
have been lost. The identity of the self is because of the identity of the Self.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Tim Crane in his book The Mechanical Mind summarizes the current attitude of
philosophers towards consciousness, in the following manner: A creature is
phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like to be that creature; a
state of mind is phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like to be in
that state. The special way a state of mind is what constitutes what it is like to be
in that state, is likewise called the phenomenal character of the state. Sometimes
phenomenal consciousness is described in terms of qualia. Qualia are supposed to
be non-representational, non-intentional, yet phenomenally conscious properties
of states of mind. Believers in qualia say that the particular character of the
aroma of smelling coffee cannot be captured in terms of the way the smell
represents coffee; this would fail to capture the way it feels to smell coffee. Even

when you have described all the ways your experience of the smell of coffee
represents coffee, you will have left something out: that is the qualia of the
experience of smelling coffee, the intrinsic properties of the experience, which
are independent of the representation of coffee. Someone who believes in qualia
denies Brentanos thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional: certain
conscious properties of states of mind are not intentional at all. And these are
supposed to be the properties which are so hard to make sense of from a
naturalistic point of view. Hence the problem of consciousness is often called the
problem of qualia. But though it is not controversial that there is such a thing as
phenomenal consciousness, it is controversial that there are qualia. Some
philosophers deny that there are any qualia, and by this they do not mean that
there is no phenomenal consciousness. What they mean is that there is nothing
to phenomenal consciousness over and above the representational properties of
states of mind. In the case of visual perception, for example, these philosophers
known as intentionalists or representationalists say that when I perceive
something blue I am not aware of some intrinsic property of my state of mind, in
addition to the blueness which I perceive. To say that consciousness is
intentional means that consciousness is always about something or is always
directed to something other than itself. It cannot turn on itself and know itself
though it reveals the object towards which it is directed at. Consciousness thus is
always about something. Functionalists and representationalists reduce
consciousness to the functional organization of the brain. Consciousness is
nothing over and above the functions it may perform or the role it has in the
system. Directing behavior, forming judgments and ability to verbally report an
experience indicate the presence or the function of consciousness that it occupies
in a cognitive system. Many philosophers who take a non-reductive view of
consciousness also accept the functionalist picture of the mind. According to
David Chalmers, the leading proponent of non-reductive functionalism, there is an
organizational invariance between consciousness and a functionally organized
system. But what is that which counts as a functional system of a sort that is
invariable with consciousness? According to Chalmers: A Functional organization
is best understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction between various
parts of a system and perhaps between these parts and external inputs and
outputs. A functional organization is determined by specifying: a) a number of
abstract components b) for each component a number of different possible states
c) a system of dependency relations, specifying how the states of each
component depends on a previous state of all components and on inputs to the

system, and how outputs from the system depend on previous component
states A given functional organization can be realized by diverse physical
systems. For example the organization realized by the brain at the neural level
might in principle be realized by a physical system. A description of the brains
functional organization abstracts away from the physical nature of the parts
involved and from the way that causal connections are implemented. All that
counts is the existence of parts and the dependency relations between their
states. On this view even a computer may be said to have experiences in some
sense of the term. This may seem counter intuitive but there is no valid reason to
believe that consciousness is not present where there may be a physical system
that realizes the functional organization of the sort mentioned above. Afterall it
seems counterintuitive that even something like a brain could manifest
consciousness but actually it does. For a reductive functionalist consciousness can
be reduced to the functional organization or the physical system that realizes it
but for a non-reductive functionalist consciousness is different from the said
organized system though it may invariably be found in such systems. The relation
between the two may be governed by certain psychophysical laws. We may also
find a certain structure in consciousness which mirrors the structure of our
awareness. For example our visual field has a certain geometry. We perceive red
patches, yellow patches, objects with certain shapes and sizes etc. which are
cognitively represented in the mind. Anyone with the knowledge of the structure
of this representative awareness would also know that the same structure will be
found in our phenomenal consciousness. This is known as the principle of
structural coherence. Accordingly every experience has two sides to it,
psychological and phenomenal. The former is what we know about an experience
from a third person point of view, how a physical process of perception takes
place and how we have a direct access to this cognition and how it influences our
behavior. This would be the area of study for cognitive scientists. The other is
phenomenal, the way an experience seems to be to us. This is represents the first
person point of view. According to the principle of structural coherence whatever
structure our awareness (in the cognitive or psychological system) the same
structure would be mirrored in consciousness and vica versa.
For the advaitin consciousness is not intentional though it appears to be so due to
the mind which acts as a limiting adjunct for it. Qualia for the advaitin would be
reflected consciousness. The principle of structural coherence would be actually
the case of superimposition, where psychological qualities or qualities of the mind

are superimposed on consciousness. The question whether consciousness is

intentional or not is a matter of dispute even in Indian philosophy. Those systems
which are not eleminivatist about consciousness also believe that consciousness is
purely intentional in nature and hence is not self-aware. Nyaya for example as we
have seen above believes that the only way we know about the existence of
consciousness is through cognizing it through another cognition. Consciousness
cannot reveal the object and itself at the same time for which it would have to
turn back on itself simultaneously with revealing another object. However the
advaitin contends that this would be true if consciousness would have been just
like any other material object but as a matter of fact it is by its very nature
immediate and this immediacy itself informs us of its very existence. We do not
require consciousness to turn back on itself, for then we would have had no
immediate intuition of it. For Sri Ramanuja consciousness is self-luminous, it
reveals itself as well as its object. But even this view takes consciousness to be
primarily intentional for it is not possible on this view that consciousness could
reveal only itself but not an object, as it does according to the Advaitin in deep
sleep state. Consciousness always reveals its object to the subject along with
itself. But consciousness cannot be aware of its own presence, it is only the
subject that can be aware of consciousness. For the Vishistadvaitin there is no
contradiction in consciousness performing two functions at the same time, one of
revealing itself and the other of revealing its object as in the case of a lamp. Such
a notion of self-luminosity was criticized by Sri Citsukha while rejecting definition
5. The objection was that if awareness is regarded as the cause of awareness then
that would be in perfect consonance with the Nyaya theory of anuvyavasaya. If
however what is meant is that awareness in itself is cause of its own awareness,
then the whole proposition would be meaningless, like saying jar is the cause of
jar. Awareness cannot be the cause of its own awareness for then it will have to
precede it, but if it does then the theory of self-luminosity (in the
Vishishtadvaitins view) would be given up. For Sri Ramanuja empirical cognitions
are self-luminous while for the advaitin only pure consciousness is self-luminous,
if however empirical cognitions were regarded as self-luminous then they would
stand in no need to be revealed by pure consciousness. For the advaitin pure
consciousness which is immediately intuited cannot be an object of thought but
the cognitive representation would be a superimposition on consciousness and
hence would not capture pure consciousness as it is. Rather when we make pure
consciousness an object we do it through a mental mode which then becomes an
empirical cognition and not pure consciousness. It is in a very weak sense that we

call pure consciousness an object as has been explained above. We think of pure
consciousness not as pure consciousness but as an empirical cognition, which
however is an error. This is thus a counterexample to the principle of structural
coherence for there is no coherence between thought and consciousness. The
principle error of this theory lies in trying to link awareness (which term for
Chalmers means any cognition to which our mind can have a direct access and
which is capable to play some kind of a role in our behavior) with consciousness.
It also disregards the presence of consciousness in deep sleep, which absence is
inferred on the basis of absence of awareness. But if awareness (used in the
technical sense given above) is absent in deep sleep then how does the person
who wakes from deep sleep is able to report the absence of any knowledge
whatsoever during this period? The absence of awareness consequently stands in
need of being illuminated by consciousness. And according to the definition of
self-luminosity of consciousness, it is capable of being communicated. Since
awareness is absent in such a state, the verbal report of its absence can be
communicated due to the capacity of consciousness to be an object of empirical
usage. It may be contended that the non-existence of awareness is inferred on
the basis of non-recollection in the period of deep sleep. Here the minor term will
be the period of deep sleep, the probandum would be non-existence of
knowledge and the probans would be non-recollection. Recall that the valid
knowledge of paksha, sadhya and hetu are necessary for an inference. The
advaitin thus could argue that the minor term viz. period of deep sleep remains
unknown for no knowledge exists in such a state. The minor term being unknown,
one cannot know the presence of middle term in it and no concomitance of
middle and the major in the minor will be known. Moreover the middle term is
wavering for non-recollection is no proof for non-existence of something. Thus no
such inference is possible. For the advaitin then both qualia and the instance of
deep sleep can act as counter-examples to the reductive functionalist for
consciousness is proven to exist in itself and not as a function. Revelation for
consciousness is not a function but its very nature, if this was not so then one
would have never been immediately aware of consciousness in deep sleep where
there is a general absence of awarenesses and this itself is a fact that is revealed.
If consciousness would need to have been revealed by another of its kind then
consciousness would never have been immediately intuited in deep sleep for no
mediate cause of awareness exists in such a state. Consciousness exists even
when it is not performing any function. For a property dualist like David Chalmers,
for whom consciousness is a property distinct from material properties but

invariably attached to material properties exhibiting a functionalist system, the

advaitin can urge that there is an absence of such invariability and the cases of
their association are one of a metaphysical error and are not natural. On his
behalf it may be argued that we experience many things without our being
specifically aware of them. This is a case of unconscious perception. This may well
be from the standpoint of waking state but in deep sleep all experiences are
evidently absent unlike even in dream state where unconscious images come to
mind and are perceived. From the point of view of deep sleep there is no
cognition at all either in a strong sense or a weak sense. How would the subconscious or unconscious levels of mind be accounted for by the advaitin? For him
what Chalmers calls awareness would be vritti jnana or consciousness reflected
through a cognitive process. This is a specific state of mind. When however there
is no such cognitive process taking place that space we may regard as subconscious or unconscious levels of mind. These layers pertain to the mind and not
to consciousness which is ever self-revealed and which is present in all three
states of waking, dream and deep sleep. However the unconscious is not a
separate compartment of mind but only one of its aspects. Chalmers believes that
consciousness is a case against physicalism or materialism but not against
naturalism. One can consistently be a naturalist by renouncing materialism. He
can be a property dualist (one who holds that phenomenal properties are distinct
from material properties). However consciousness infact refutes a naturalistic
world view too for it transcends any limitations of physical laws that could predict
any occurrence in phenomenal domain by taking it as invariably related to the
psychological domain. This follows as a direct consequence of the failure of
structural coherence of awareness and consciousness. What then could be the
relation between consciousness and mind? The relation if there is a need for it to
be specified is one of superimposition. Consciousness and material entities (mind
included) are like light and darkness, opposite in nature to each other. There can
thus be no law-like regularities between the two of them and hence no possibility
of psychophysical laws grounding them. However there is a sense in which the
principle of structural coherence holds. It may hold between the mechanical or
psychological aspect of mind and reflected consciousness but not pure
consciousness. The problem is that the principle of structural coherence tells us
nothing about the nature of consciousness. But when the nature of consciousness
is determined to be self-luminous and free from subject-object duality, we can
correct the otherwise fallacious picture that the principle of structural coherence
presents to us about consciousness and also be aware of the limitations of the

theory. Chalmers was right when he took the phenomenal quality of any
experience and considered it as distinct from material properties. But he limited
the whole notion of consciousness to this phenomenal datum and failed to
investigate other aspects of consciousness. He indeed confesses that in his
current position little can be said about the nature of consciousness though he
believes whatever theory we may have, it should not be opposed to naturalism,
and for otherwise consciousness would not be a worthy object of scientific
investigation. However in Advaita consciousness forms the very basis of our
activities, cognitive and conative, without the light of consciousness shining the
whole world would be blind. Consequently its place in the scheme of things is
before anything else and consequently a naturalistic world view would not work
in its case since it does not give consciousness its rightful premier position.
According to Gilbert Ryle the Advaitin has misused language. He takes a picture of
consciousness as a lamp that illumines objects, however if we investigate the
cases where the term knowledge or consciousness is used we find nothing
apart from belief in some object or disposition to be believe that makes us adopt
some behavior towards that object. Following Wittgenstein he says that it is not
the function of philosophy to explain facts, which privilege belongs to science, but
philosophy needs just to observe facts, how they are used in a language speaking
community and enumerate them in order to remove any wrong views pertaining
to them. The purpose of philosophy is thus to cure us of the malady of misuse of
language. The theory that Ryle advocates is called the behavioristic theory of
mind. The problem with this theory is that we may be able to observe behavior in
someone and ascribe him a corresponding belief state, but we can never observe
our own behavior. Infact there is a joke regarding this theory. One day two
behaviorists met in a caf, the first one said to the other, you are feeling jovial,
how am I feeling? The Advaitin, however, tries to explain facts and not just
enumerate them. As we saw above self-luminosity is the very condition needed
for there to be any possible behavior or have a belief about an object. In our
everyday communication we may indeed use the words knowledge etc. to
indicate a belief or a disposition to behave in a particular manner towards that
object, but that does not invalidate the fact that such usage may itself have been
founded on the self-luminosity of consciousness. The term consciousness may be
used to inform us about a certain principle that grounds the ordinary practices of
human beings, the test of such a principle should be in its ability to explain facts
and only if some facts are left unexplained do we have a right to disavow the

theory. It true that sometimes philosophers suit facts to suit theories rather than
suit theories to suit facts, but this should not count as a case against positive
theory building rather it should be regarded as a sign of caution. It is also
important to note that the self-luminosity of consciousness is not a theoretical
construct but a principle discovered and understood and explicated by the
Advaitin. How the term consciousness, may be used is not relevant to the case at
hand, but what aspect of our world does it denote is the important thing to
understand. That is the function of philosophy unless we do not make it a
handmaid of science. The philosopher who denies this is akin to the plumber who
says to his client that there is no such thing as plumbing, just like a philosopher
who would tell you there is no such thing as philosophy!
REFERENCES

1. Tattva Pradipika of Sri Citsukha

2. The Mechanical Mind by Tim Crane
3. The Conscious Mind In search of a fundamental theory by David Chalmers
4. Panchadasi by Sri Vidyaranya Muni
5. The Concept Of Mind by Gilbert Ryle