Philosophy, Theology, and Politics

Supplements to The Journal of

Jewish Thought and Philosophy
edited by

Leora Batnitzky, Christian Wiese,

Elliot Wolfson

VOLUME 6

Philosophy, Theology, and Politics

A Reading of Benedict Spinozas
Tractatus theologico-politicus

by

Paul J. Bagley

LEIDEN BOSTON
2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bagley, Paul J.
Philosophy, theology, and politics : a reading of Benedict Spinozas Tractatus
theologico-politicus / By Paul Bagley.
p. cm. (Supplements to The Journal of Jewish thought and philosophy ; v. 6)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-16485-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Spinoza, Benedictus
de, 16321677. Tractatus theologico-politicus. 2. Judaism and philosophy.
3. Philosophy and religion. 4. Religion and politics. I. Title. II. Title: Reading
of Benedict Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus. III. Series.
B3985.Z7B34 2008
199.492dc22
2008005724

ISSN 1873-9008
ISBN 978 90 04 16485 7
Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,
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Fees are subject to change.
printed in the netherlands

For my parents
James Edward III and Lorraine Marie

CONTENTS
Foreword .....................................................................................
Acknowledgements .....................................................................

ix
xi

Introduction ................................................................................

Part One

Philosophy ................................................................

27

Part Two

Theology ..................................................................

81

Politics ...................................................................

143

Part Four Philosophy, Theology, and Politics ..........................

187

Epilogue

Spinoza: The New Moses ........................................

227

Selected Bibliography .................................................................

245

Index of Names ..........................................................................

251

Part Three

FOREWORD
The reading of Benedict Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus presented
in this book is based upon the standard edition of the Latin work
contained in Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg:
Universittsbuchhandlung, 1925). The Tractatus theologico-politicus is
located in the third volume of the Gebhardt edition, pages 3267.
The Tractatus theologico-politicus also will be referred to as the treatise
in this book. Quotations from the treatise in this book, or references to
passages from the treatise or other writings contained in the Gebhardt
edition of the Opera, will be cited in the footnotes by reference to the
volume number and the page number(s) where the passage(s) may be
found. In the footnotes, Tractatus theologico-politicus will be abbreviated
TTP and therefore a reference to the first page of the Preface to the
treatise would appear in the footnote as TTP 3: 5. Translations from
the Latin text into English have been made by the author.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book would not have been possible without the generous assistance
and support of numerous people and institutions. I am grateful to Loyola
College in Maryland for awarding me a senior faculty sabbatical leave
that facilitated my research and writing. I also especially am indebted
to the Program Officer, the President, and the Trustees of the Earhart
Foundation for the award of a fellowship research grant that permitted
me to focus exclusively on the completion of the manuscript for this
book over an extended period of time. I wish to recognize the teachers,
colleagues, and friends who have encouraged me in my work: Richard
Kennington; Gary B. Herbert; David Berman; Rev. Aidan Manning,
S.T.; Martin D. Yaffe; William Desmond; L.S. & P.; Douglas Den Uyl;
Vigen Guroian; Robert Miola; Gregory Cowart; Rev. Joseph Rossi, S.J.;
Rev. John Conley, S.J. I gratefully acknowledge and thank my children,
Katherine Sarah and Michael Hugh, for their patience with me and
Susan for her friendship and joy.

Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent,

vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret,
nulla supersitione tenerentur.
Prfatio, Tractatus theologico-politicus

INTRODUCTION

Benedict Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus1 is a complex book: it is

a whole that consists of parts. The Tractatus theologico-politicus also is a
complicated book: it is a whole the parts of which are interwoven in
an intricate way. In other words, Spinozas old book can be a difficult
read.
Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus contains a lengthy study of the
elemental features of Judeo-Christian revealed religion. Spinoza examines the nature of prophecy; the nature of the prophet; the nature of
the Hebrew vocation; the nature of natural law, divine law, human law,
and ceremonial law; the nature of miracles; the nature of Scriptural
interpretation; the nature of the Scriptural canon; the nature of piety
and the simplicity of Scripture; the nature of the apostolic mission; the
nature of faith; and the nature of the relationship between theology and
philosophy. But Spinoza also examines the foundational principles and
aims of republics or democratic political regimes; and in the course of
that examination his remarks frequently reflect what had been argued
or concluded about revealed theology or religion in the first fifteen
chapters of his book. In the final five chapters of the treatise, Spinoza

The title page of the TTP bears the publication date of 1670 and it lists the publisher as Henricus Knrath of Hamburg; the treatise was published anonymously. After
the initial printing of the TTP, three other impressions of the book were distributed
and each bore the 1670 publication date. During 1673 and 1674, four other printings
of the book appeared from Amsterdam or Leiden but only one of them was published
under the original title, Tractatus theologico-politicus: see Jacob Freudenthal, On the History
of Spinozism, Jewish Quarterly Review 8 (189596): 3031. According to Pierre Bayle
in his Dictionary article on Spinoza, from 1681 until the close of the 17th century the
TTP was translated two or three times into French under the titles, Trait des ceremonies
superstitieuses des Juifs, La clef du sanctuaire, and Rflexions curieuses dun esprit dsintress: see
An Historical and Critical Dictionary, 4 vols. (London, 1710) 4: 2789; and compare Ira O.
Wade, The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment, 2 vols. (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977) 1: 183. In Epistle 44 to Jarig Jelles, dated 17 February
1671, Spinoza requested that his correspondent intercede to prevent the publication of
a Dutch translation of the TTP. The entreaty of Jelles to those intending to publish
a Dutch translation of the TTP was honored and the publication of the treatise in
Dutch did not appear until 1693 after both Spinoza and Jelles had died.
1

introduction

explains the nature and constitution of a republic; the nature of a

democratic polity; the nature of the relationship between republics and
citizens; the nature of the Hebrew republic and the political lessons to
be derived from it; the nature of the relationship between religion and
the republic; and the nature of the liberties that are to be found in a
liberal republic. The reader of the treatise is notified that the various
examinations, discussions, and conclusions presented in the book serve
the purpose of demonstrating that the liberty of philosophizing may
be granted to all individuals in a republic without detriment to piety
or public peace; and, in fact, Spinoza proclaims that piety and public
peace actually are jeopardized wherever the liberty to philosophize is
curtailed.2
Spinozas treatise obviously is a book about theology and politics.
However, it is a book about theology and politics that is written by a
philosopher. More precisely, it is a theologico-political treatise written
by someone whose allegiance is to philosophy rather than either to
theology or to politics. Thus the treatise is a work of philosophy that
takes account of the functions of theology and politics in public life
from the philosophic point of view. In that respect, Spinozas book is
not unique. The complete title of the important seventeenth century
work by Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, indicates a similar interest to clarify
the relationship between theology or religion and politics in public life
from a philosophic perspective.3 But whereas Hobbes appears to maintain that there are patent divisions between the ecclesiastical and civil
realms or powers,4 Spinoza advances a different kind of relationship
between theology or religion and politics;5 and the theologico-political

2
TTP title page: Tractatus theologico-politicus continens Dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantum salve Pietate, & Republicae Pace posse concedi: sed
eandem nisi cum Pace Reipublicae, ipsaque Pietate tolli non posse; and compare 3: 7; 11; 179;
24043; 24647.
3
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (London: Thomas Crooke, 1651).
4
Compare chapters 1920 of the TTP with chapter 42 of Hobbes Leviathan.
5
The different kind of relationship is reflected in Spinozas conclusions about the
subordination of theology or religion to civil governance: e.g.: After that, I show that
those who hold supreme authority are the interpreters and appropriators not only
of civil but also sacred right (TTP 3: 11); and we conclude that nothing is more
prudent for a republic than that piety and Religion are comprehended only in the
exercise of Charity and Justice, and the right of the supreme powers, in respect of
the sacred as with the profane, is referred only to actions rather than to thoughts or
words (3: 247).

introduction

character of Spinozas treatise is one of the reasons why the treatise is

a book that is both complex and complicated.
The composition of a theologico-political treatise by a philosopher
might suggest that the author is attempting to offer a philosophic
analysis or a philosophic resolution of some kind of theologico-political question or problem. But the composition of a theologico-political
treatise by a philosopher also can signify that the author is attempting
to offer a theologico-political solution to some other sort of question or
problem.6 Spinoza plainly addresses the nature of theology as well as
the nature of politics in the treatise; and though he protests against the
occasions of collusion between theological and political powers7 it does
not seem to be the case that Spinoza analyzes or resolves any definitively
theologico-political question or problem as such in his book. Therefore
it is appropriate to study the alternative possibility and wonder whether
Spinozas theologico-political treatise involves the theologico-political
handling of some other sort of question or problem.8
The title of Spinozas book suggests that there can be some basis for
a relationship between theology and politics.9 The title suggests that
theology and politics can be combined perhaps insofar as they share
some common foundation; they can be integrated perhaps for the
sake of achieving some common goal; or they can intersect perhaps in
some common interest. In the most obvious sense, theology or politics
each has the express ambition of benefitting its charges. How theology
achieves that aim and how politics achieves that aim may prove to be
very different things. But if theology and politics do share a similar

The Latin word tractatus itself signifies a handling, treatment, working, or

management of something; and the word derives from the Latin verb tractare which
means to to haul, to tug, to drag, to take in hand, to handle, or to manage. A tractatus theologico-politicus thus may be understood to be a theologico-political
handling or management of something.
7
TTP 3: 7.
8
The most apparent question or problem addressed in the TTP would seem to be the
issue of the liberty of philosophizing. That question or problem surely has theological and political aspects to it inasmuch as theological doctrines or political policies can
determine what is permitted to be said publicly; and the full title to the TTP indicates
Spinozas awareness of the fact that philosophy is perceived suspiciously by religious
and political authorities. But the question or problem of philosophic liberty as such
may not be reducible to a theological, a political, or even a theologico-political matter.
Instead the difficulty may be more basic, as it pertains to human nature itself; and
therefore it must be understood as a natural or philosophic question or problem.
9
Chapters 1820 of the TTP examine the particulars of the relationship between
theology and politics in Libera Republica (TTP 3: 239).
6

introduction

goal then some form of integration of the two, or an accommodation

between the two, might yield a superior means to achieving the aim
of benefitting their combined charges than if each were to operate
independently of the other. An integration of theology and politics
which would yield theologico-political solutions to particular human
questions or problems can be witnessed in the example of a theocratic
regime.10 For in the theocratic regime the principal interests and aims
of an established religion and an established civil government basically would be indistinguishable. Love of God and Love of Country
would be identical. In a theocratic regime, the solutions to human
questions or problems would emanate uniformly from teachings that
were by definition theologico-political. The theocratic regime would
not differentiate between coreligionist and fellow citizen. Indeed in
the theocratic regime the terms of human theological salvation and the
terms of human political welfare would be interchangeable.
The theocratic regimes theologico-political solutions to human
questions or problems, such as the conduct of life and the governance
of affairs, presume that the tenets advanced by theology or religion
coincide with the principles advanced by civil government. Hence theological dogma and political policy would be as one in the theocratic
regime. Moreover, the integration of theology and politics would seem
to signal the prospect of an end to a variety of contentious disputes;
it would seem to prevent any number of causes of crime or sedition;
and it would seem to assure a regime that successfully could provide
for the security and benefit of its people, both in material terms and in
spiritual terms. Yet, Spinoza criticizes the Turkish regime for investing
politics and public life with so much theology or religion that prejudices
and superstitions, rather than sound reason, had become the criteria
for evaluating the tolerability of all discourse and judgment.11 In
another context, Spinoza defines the Hebrew kingdom as a theocratic
regime and he expressly disclaims any intention of resuscitating it.12
10
TTP 3: 4849; compare 3: 21011 where Spinoza notes that piety and patriotism
were considered to be identical in the Hebrew theocracy.
11
TTP 3: 67. The mention of the Turks by Spinoza probably was not arbitrary.
The Ottoman Empire held territory in the Balkans during the seventeenth century.
They attempted to besiege Vienna in 1663 and were driven from the gates of Vienna
a final time in 1683. In other words, the principles and conditions of the Turkish
theocratic regime were not an abstraction to Spinozas readers.
12
TTP 3: 206; 211. Although Spinoza states that it is not possible to restore the
Hebrew regime, nor would it be advisable to do so, he nevertheless acknowledges that it
had many things worthy of being noted at least and perhaps advisable to imitate.

introduction

A predicament then seems to present itself. If theologico-political solutions to human questions or human problems are illustrated best in the
cases of theocratic regimes yet Spinoza rebuffs the theocracies of the
Muslims and the Hebrews, what sort of theologico-political teaching
is it that will be propounded by Spinoza in his book? What question
or problem is it that he is handling in a theologico-political fashion?
Moreover, what, if any, theocratic dimension might be involved in the
theologico-political solution to the question or problem that is before
Spinoza in his theologico-political treatise?
It is plain that there is a theological teaching of the treatise; and it
equally is plain that there is a political teaching of the treatise. But it
is not at all plain that there is a philosophic teaching of the treatise.13
Whereas Spinozas book contains a chapter on prophets, a chapter
on the interpretation of Scripture, a chapter on the mission of the
apostles, a chapter on the foundations of a republic, and a chapter
on the liberty of thought and speech in a liberal republic, there is no
chapter on philosophers, no chapter on the reading of philosophic
books, no chapter on the task of philosophizing, and no chapter on the
foundations of philosophy. The only chapter of the treatise in which
the word Philosophy appears in the title is chapter fourteen; and
Spinozas declared purpose in that chapter is to elucidate the foundations of theology for the sake of demonstrating that they are entirely
separate from what is germane to philosophy. Though chapter fourteen
describes what theology is at some length, based upon Spinozas account
of it, the part of the chapter concerning philosophy concludes abruptly
with only the succinct assertions that philosophy simply is different
from theology; each has its own basis; and each has its own goal.14
However useful and important the conclusion about the separation of
philosophy from theology may be to the overarching purpose of the
book, and the reader is reminded at the beginning of chapter fourteen
that to separate faith from Philosophy has been the chief intention of
13
The title of the TTP explicitly states that securing the liberty of philosophizing is a principal ambition of the book. However it does not state that philosophy is
the subject of the book. It is important to discern whether the TTP simply is a book
about theology and politics written from the philosophic point of view or whether
the book contains a philosophic teaching in addition to its theological teaching and
its political teaching.
14
TTP 3: 179. The words philosophy, philosophize, and philosophical appear
only seven times in chapter 14, the only chapter of the TTP which explicitly mentions
the word Philosophy in its title. It also is noteworthy that the word philosopher
does not appear in chapter 14 of the TTP at all.

introduction

the whole work,15 it would not be misleading to say that no formal

or systematic account of philosophy is presented in the treatise.16 The
fact that philosophy seems to be present in the treatise only obliquely
contributes to the complicated complexity of Spinozas book. Still, if
theology and politics can be brought into some kind of relation with
each other then one might ask what connection does either, or both
together, bear to philosophy? It is necessary to raise the question about
the terms of the compatibility or the incompatibility among philosophy,
theology, and politics.
There is no evidence in the treatise that would permit one to conclude
that Spinoza pits philosophy and politics in opposition to each other in
his book. The treatise does not speak of politics in a deprecatory manner, an antagonistic manner, or an antithetical manner. To the contrary,
Spinoza asserts that the foundations and principles of the democratic
regime that he describes in his book are wholly consonant with nature
and with the natural right that is accorded to every individual.17 Since
philosophy seeks to provide an account of the natures of things and it
is concluded by Spinoza that the democratic polity agrees with human
nature then politics, in principle or in practice, need not be antagonistic
to philosophy.18 Rather it may be inferred that there is something about

TTP 3: 17374.
Within the treatise, the opinions, sentiments, and dictates founded on religious
prejudices or superstitions regularly are cast against the claims or perspectives that
might be advanced by appealing to reason alone. Nevertheless the contrasting of the
views attained by reason and the views that derive from superstition do not seem to
be sufficient to afford the reader of the TTP a grasp of what Spinoza maintains that
philosophy is. Indeed the less than conspicuous development of a position in the TTP
on what constitutes philosophy is probably a main reason why many scholars, including
Fokke Akkerman, Edwin M. Curley, Herman De Dijn, Errol E. Harris, H.G. Hubbeling, Alexandre Matheron, Lee C. Rice, Steven B. Smith, Andr Tosel, Yirmiyahu
Yovel, et al., regard the treatise as being at best only a kind of a nonphilosophic version
of the complete philosophic teaching of Spinoza that is presented only in the Ethica
ordine geometrico demonsrata (1677). The verdict of those scholars might receive some
support from Spinozas own claim in the Preface to the TTP that the chief things
raised in his book have been recognized more than enough by Philosophers; though
Spinoza still addresses the TTP directly to the the one who reads Philosophically (3:
12) and therefore the teaching of the treatise is intended for the reader who possesses
some philosophic acumen.
17
TTP 3: 19395; 245; and compare Tractatus politicus, chapter 2 4 and 1517; chapter 5
2 and 46; chapter 11 1.
18
TTP 3: 179: The object of Philosophy is nothing other than truth . . . The bases
of Philosophy are common notions and one is bound to endeavor to obtain them only
from nature itself ; and 3: 195: And thus I believe I have shown clearly enough the
basis of a democratic regime (imperium); I chose to advance it before all others because it
15
16

introduction

political life that agrees with human nature, especially the democratic
kind of political life that is propounded by Spinoza in the treatise.
Hence philosophy and politics appear to be compatible.
According to Spinoza, everything that we properly desire may be
referred to three chief things: (1) comprehending things through their
primary causes; (2) acquiring the habit of virtue and subduing the passions; and (3) living securely with a healthy body. Of the three proper
objects of desire, Spinoza asserts that the first and second objects may
be attained by the powers that are contained within human nature
itself. That is, knowledge and the acquisition of virtue depend solely
on the laws of human nature and [they] may be acquired solely
through our power. But the achievement of the third proper object
of desire, living securely and preserving the body, occurs principally
because of things external to us. Hence a cardinal source of our
security and preservation owes more to fortune than it does to human
planning or guidance. As a result, Spinoza concedes that the ignorant
and foolish may be just as happy or unhappy as the prudent and
vigilant. Nevertheless, in order to maximize the probability of realizing
the third proper object of desire, Spinoza advocates the formation
of societies with certain laws and he maintains that the task can be
aided greatly by human direction and human vigilance.19 Rather than
societies being arranged by fortune or chance it is better that they be
established and arranged by sensible and attentive human beings. In
other words, it is possible, desirable, and perhaps even necessary that
philosophy and politics act in concert with each other at least for the
sake of satisfying the third proper object of desire.
A similar consequence, however, may not be realized with respect
to the relationship between philosophy and theology. In point of fact,
the professed intention of Spinozas treatise is to demonstrate that
philosophy and theology have nothing in common; each rests solely
appears the most natural and agrees the most with the liberty that is conceded to each
by nature. In his excellent translation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Martin Yaffe
notes the difficulty of translating the Latin word imperium uniformly into English and so
he chooses to retain the Latin word throughout his translation of the TTP, see Spinozas
Theologico-Political Treatise (Newburyport, Massachusetts: The Focus Philosophical
Library, 2004) p. 256. The Latin word imperium may connote such diverse things as
authority, direction, command, right or power of command, sovereignty,
empire, dominion, government, jurisdiction, etc. I translate the Latin word
imperium with the English word regime for the reason that regime encompasses the
variety of meanings that are available in the Latin word imperium.
19
TTP 3: 4647.

10

introduction

on its own proper basis; the foundation of each disagrees with the
other; and neither is handmaid to the other.20 The disagreement
between philosophy and theology is introduced early to the reader of
the treatise through Spinozas critique of theology or religion and the
ways in superstition and prejudiced opinions had infected theological
or religious dogma and doctrine with the result that theology and
religion simply had become hostile to philosophy. Moreover, according to Spinoza, the bias that philosophy must be ancillary to theology
or religion is the chief impediment that prevents human beings from
philosophizing.21
Five years prior to the publication of the treatise, Spinoza sent a
letter to his friend and regular correspondent, Henry Oldenburg, who
recently had been appointed joint secretary of the Royal Society in
London. The epistle began with a response to Oldenburgs missive
which contained information about various scientific researches that
were being conducted or debated in England, as well as on the continent. Spinozas letter to Oldenburg also communicated a general view
he held about human nature and the defect of human ability, or the
simple human unwillingness, to understand the whole of nature in a
more coherent way. Spinoza then informed Oldenburg that he had
been composing a treatise on his interpretation of Scripture. He said
that three causes had induced him to write such a book. First, human
beings had been prevented from applying their minds to philosophy
because of the prejudices of the theologians and so Spinoza planned
to expose those prejudices in order to remove them from the minds
of the more sensible sort of person. Second, he wished to avert the
opinion that the vulgar had of [him] as being an atheist; that accusation, he said, must be averted as far as is possible. Third, Spinoza
proposed to secure the liberty of philosophizing and saying what we
think because those liberties typically were suppressed by the excessive
authority and petulance of the haranguers of the people.22

TTP 3: 10; 174; 17980.

TTP 3: 12: others would philosophize more liberally if this one thing did not
thwart them, they suppose that reason must be ancillary to Theology.
22
Spinoza, Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 2 vols., eds. J. van Vloten and J.P.N. Land (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 188283): 2:305. The letter does not appear in the 1677
publication of the Opera Posthuma. Instead, the letter from Spinoza to Oldenburg is
known from the correspondence between Oldenburg and Boyle in which Oldenburg
copied what was written to him by Spinoza. The letter now is listed as Epistle 30 in
the correspondence of Spinoza and its date of composition usually is agreed to be
20
21

introduction

11

By contrast to what may be inferred from the treatise about the

likelihood of a complementary relationship between philosophy and
politics, the epistle to Oldenburg in 1665 categorically establishes that
Spinozas views about theology, theologians and preachers, and theological prejudices were not only the stated causes that motivated him
to write the treatise but they also were the causes that would prevent a
complementary relationship between philosophy and theology. Perhaps
to be more accurate, it should be said that the complaint was directed
against what Spinoza regarded as the prevailing condition of theology
or religion. According to Spinoza, theology had become corrupted by
the vanity of the theologians and the preachers who sought less to serve
as teachers or guides than to establish themselves as objects of veneration. To that end, the theologians and the preachers had discovered
or introduced sacred mysteries in theology or religion that required
extraordinary means of interpretation or understanding which they
claimed that they alone possessed; they contaminated theological or
religious doctrines by accommodating them to the speculative theories of
Platonists or Aristotelians; and they were responsible for faith [having]
become nothing other than credulity and prejudice. With respect to
philosophy, the most detrimental feature of the prevailing theological or
religious tradition was its express contempt for reason as being corrupt
in itself; and Spinoza believed that theological or religious bigotry was
responsible for reducing rational human beings to brutes.23
Unlike the prospect of some collaboration between philosophy and
politics, one would be hard pressed to conceive of a situation in which
philosophy and theology could cooperate successfully given the intensity
of Spinozas complaints, both in Epistle 30 and in the Preface to the
treatise itself, about the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and
the negative impact of theology or religion on philosophy. If theology
or religion is a chief cause of human beings coming to despise reason
and if theology or religion is a chief cause of prohibiting human beings
from thinking liberally for themselves then it is difficult to imagine the
situation in which Spinoza could or would appeal to theology or religion to make any positive contribution to the teaching that he would
formulate in the treatise. Spinozas candid and critical assessments in

autumn 1665. In the context of the letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza is referring to the
theologians and the preachers as the haranguers of the people.
23
TTP 3: 89; 16768.

12

introduction

the treatise about the prevailing tradition of theology or religion should

invite the reader of the treatise to take pause and wonder why and how
Spinoza came to give his book the title that it has.
From what Spinoza says in the treatise, it would seem that there is
some sort of compatibility between philosophy and politics on a theoretical or a practical level. From what Spinoza says in the treatise about
theology, however, it would not seem possible at all that there could
be any sort of compatibility between philosophy and theology on any
level. The following conclusion then seems apt: philosophy and politics
are compatible; philosophy and theology are not compatible. But the
question yet remains open how or whether theology and politics are
compatible; and the title of Spinozas book certainly insinuates that
they are.
Despite compatibility between philosophy and politics, Spinozas
book does not bear the name Tractatus philosophico-politicus; and because
of the hostility of theology or religion toward philosophy the book
cannot bear the name Tractatus philosophico-theologicus. Instead the book
is called Tractatus theologico-politicus and there must a reason for choosing
that title rather than any other one.
In the treatise, Spinoza openly confronts the prevailing tradition of
theology or religion. He reproaches theology for having surrendered
itself to absurd secret mysteries, for having commingled idle philosophic
speculations with religious dogmas, and for having abdicated the use
of reason in favor of espousing blind prejudices. He declares that the
theologians and the preachers have sought eminence and advantage
for themselves in lieu of living and professing the message of the faith
that they pretend to serve. He asserts that they have corrupted religion
by promoting superstition and they have demanded that the faithful
adopt their pronouncements without question. The impudence of the
theologians and the preachers, he says, has led them and their followers
to denounce philosophy, liberty of thought, and any exercise of reason
that could lead to independence of thought or independence of judgment. However, the very condemnation of the prevailing condition of
theology or religion that is tendered by Spinoza also seems to leave
open the possibility that there may be some alternative to the prevailing
tradition of theology or religion. That is, if the prevailing condition is
corrupt then what alterative tradition was forfeited through the corruption? Spinoza himself alludes to it. In the midst of his pointed criticism
of the prevailing state of theological or religious affairs, Spinoza remarks
that it therefore is not astonishing that nothing remains of the ancient

introduction

13

Religion beyond its outward devotion [externum cultum] (by which the
vulgar are seen to flatter God more than to adore him).24 Without
defining the alternative tradition, Spinoza suggests that there can be
a condition of theology or a heritage of religion that does not suffer
from the corruptions inherent in the prevailing tradition of theology
or religion and perhaps it even may be possible to recover that more
basic, original, and uncorrupted condition of theology or religion.
Prior to the advent of theological arrogance, theological prejudice,
or theological corruption, Spinoza suggests that there was a Religio
antiqua though only the vestiges of it remain in the prevailing condition of theology or religion. If the current state of theology or religion
may be characterized as inherently hostile to philosophy and reason, is
it possible that once there was an expression of theology or religion that
was not hostile to philosophy? In perhaps one of its most interesting
respects, the argument of the treatise involves the attempt to reclaim a
supposedly uncorrupted tradition of theology or religion and reestablish
it as the valid and vital one. Moreover, that reclaimed tradition will
confirm that the basic, original, and uncorrupted theology or religion is
not at all hostile to philosophy or reason. On the contrary, the proper
interpretation and understanding of the matter will demonstrate that
the actual posture of theology or religion toward philosophy is one of
indifference.25
Spinoza argues in the treatise that the basic teaching of theology
is simple, uncomplicated, and easily comprehensible to anyone who
wishes to seek it.26 The source of that teaching is the Bible which
contains the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Scriptures.27 Thus
Spinozas account of theology or religion, that is, his attempt to arrive
at an understanding of the original message and meaning of the
Scriptures focuses on the Judeo-Christian tradition; and his reading,
understanding, and interpretation of that tradition was received with
nearly universal denunciation upon the publication and circulation of
the treatise.28 Because it was believed that so many of the claims of
the treatise would be recognized to be patently heterodox by readers
TTP 3: 8.
TTP 3: 10; 174; 17982; 188; 24547.
26
TTP 3: 16273.
27
TTP 3: 167.
28
Some of the edicts passed by the United Synods of The Netherlands against the
publication and distribution of the TTP have been reprinted in Jacob Freudenthals Die
Lebensgeschichte Spinozas: In Quellenschriften, Urkunden und nichtnamlichen Nachrichten (Leipzig,
24
25

14

introduction

who were committed to orthodox theological or religious views, some

early students of the treatise argued that the book was so transparently outrageous that its falsities and errors would be obvious and easily detected by any reader.29 In 1673, Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, a Swiss
Lutheran minister and military officer, issued a work in which he named
Spinoza as the author of the anonymously published Tractatus theologicopoliticus. Colonel Stouppe assailed Spinoza as a very wicked Jew and
no better Christian; furthermore he scolded the Dutch divines for
having failed to refute the vicious claims that were advanced in the
treatise.30 In response to Stouppes allegation, Jean Brun, a Dutch
minister, penned a denunciation of Spinozas book. He acknowledged
that there were many very pernicious doctrines contained in the treatise
but he dismissed Stouppes charge of a lack of zeal on the part of the
Dutch divines to produce refutations of the treatise by arguing that
the book had been published in Hamburg and so the matter was not
under the primary jurisdiction of the theologians or the preachers of
The United Provinces of the Netherlands.31 There is little doubt that
Spinozas book was unorthodox, provocative, and notorious. Even
Thomas Hobbes, no stranger to controversy and public admonishment

1899). The reception of the TTP also was detailed by Freudenthal in On the History
of Spinozism, The Jewish Quarterly Review 8 (189596).
29
For example, in Deism Examind and Confuted in Answer to a Book intitled Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus (London: Charles Brown, 1697), Mathias Earbury maintained
that it was not necessary to read past chapter 7 of the TTP to realize its errors and,
in fact, it probably was not necessary to read past its first two chapters. A number of
denunciations of the TTP appeared in 1674 and each of them condemned the book
as blasphemous and atheistic. But perhaps more intriguing than the refutations of
the book that can be found was the variety of opponents Spinoza had incited. They
included Jacob Veteler, a Remonstrant preacher; Regner van Mansvelt, a Professor of
Theology at Utrecht; Spitzelius, a Lutheran minister; Musaeus, a Professor of Theology
at Jena; Willem van Blyenbergh, a merchant and correspondent of Spinoza during
1665; and Lambert van Velthuysen, an Utrecht physician.
30
Jean-Baptitste Stouppe, La Religion des Hollandois reprsente en plusieurs lettres crites par
un Officier de larme du Roy un Pasteur & Professeur en Thologie de Berne (Cologne: Chez
Pierre Martineau, 1673) pp. 6567.
31
Jean Brun, La veritable Religion des Hollandois, avec une apologie pour la Religion des EtatsGenereaux contre le Libelle diffamatoire de Stouppe (Jena, 1675). Despite Bruns loyal defense
of the Dutch ministers against Stouppes allegation, it is of course more than a little
ironic that his defense partially relied upon the assumption that the TTP actually had
been printed in Hamburg as the title page of the book indicated. But a year prior to
the writing and publication of Bruns book a work already had appeared from Jena
confirming that Spinoza was a resident of The Netherlands and that the TTP actually
had been printed in Amsterdam and not Hamburg: see, Musaeus, Tractatus theologicopoliticus ad veritatis lumen examinatus ( Jena, 1674).

introduction

15

because of his own views, is reported to have expressed astonishment

upon reading the treatise.32
On his way to recovering the basic meaning and teaching of the
Scriptures, Spinoza proposes a variety of unconventional views. He
asserts that the natural knowledge that is attainable by all human
beings through the exercise of their own natural faculties is really
equivalent to prophecy, namely, that unique communication of sure
knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings; furthermore, the difference between the two kinds of knowledge really has
more to do with style than with substance.33 Spinoza also maintains that
although the Hebrew people claim a special providence and election
by God it actually is the case that they are no more blessed than any
other people; whatever advantages or prosperity the Hebrew people
may have enjoyed concerned only temporal or material issues which
had no bearing on salvation which is available to everyone equally.34
In a similar vein, Spinoza concludes that the natural light by itself is
competent to apprehend the divine law and, in fact, the Scriptures
fully endorse it doing so.35 He states that the customarily accepted
doctrine about the creation of the world only derives from a mistaken
assumption about the relationship between the power of nature and the
power of God; and he declares that belief in miracles actually leads
to Atheism.36 Spinoza further claims to demonstrate that an accurate
reading and interpretation of Scripture legitimately can be conducted
only after one methodically has assembled a history of Scripture;
the reading of Scripture and the conclusions reached about Scripture
must rely solely on the the natural light that is common to all; and
in the effort to interpret the meaning of Scripture one must eschew

32
When Spinozas Tractatus Theologico-Politicus first came out, Mr. Edmund Waller
sent it to my lord of Devonshire and desired him to send him word what Mr. Hobbes
said of it. Mr. H. told his lordship: Ne judicate ne judicemini. He told me he had outthrown him a bars length, for he durst not write so boldly in Andrew Clark, ed., Brief
Lives, chiefly of contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the years 1669 and 1696, 2 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898) 1:357.
33
TTP 3: 1516. With respect to human knowledge of things divine, Spinoza states
that there is nothing that impedes God from communicating in some other form [viz.,
revelation] what we know by the natural light.
34
TTP 3: 9; 4547; 57.
35
TTP 3: 10; 6869.
36
TTP 3: 81; 87.

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introduction

recourse to any interpretative authority that professes to implement a

light above nature.37
However provocative the treatises version of the meaning of the
Judeo-Christian tradition may be to orthodox readers, Spinozas critique
of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion underscores his sense
of the pragmatic advantage of adopting a minimalist attitude toward the
selection, adoption, and sanctioning of theological dogmas, doctrines,
or practices. That is, in satisfying the requirements of the method for
compiling a history of Scripture, one necessarily encounters various
inconsistencies and difficulties within or between the Hebrew Scriptures
and the Christian Scriptures and consequently questions about the
authorship, the intention, and the modes of communication employed
in the Scriptures are driven to the foreground of the treatise where they
come to receive a more critical and more focused attention. But the
means to resolving those questions can occasion even more problems.
For in the effort to adhere to the method of Scriptural interpretation
devised by Spinoza, one must learn or know all of the languages in
which the Scriptures originally were composed; one must catalogue the
contents of the whole of Scripture according to the subject matter of its
contents and one must make note of any passages that are obscure or
contradictory; one must supply a comprehensive biographical account
of each Scriptural author that includes the authors life, mores, education, intended audience, etc.; and finally one must give an account of
the fortune of each book, including evidence about who received the
book, how it was received, how it came to be accepted into the canon
of Scriptural books, etc.38 Beyond the daunting task of adhering to the
rules of the interpretive method, the textual difficulties encountered by
the readers of Scripture then often are so intricate and the prospect
of resolving them is so dim that Spinoza himself almost despairs of
settling many questions of Scriptural interpretation and thus he almost
fatally concludes that we ultimately are resigned to affirming that we
undoubtedly are ignorant of the true sense of the Scriptures in many
places or we divine it without certitude.39
TTP 3: 98102; 117.
TTP 3: 99101.
39
TTP 3: 111. The Latin verb hariolari means to foretell, to prophesy, or to
divine. But the word also pejoratively connotes to speak foolishly, to talk silly stuff,
or to talk nonsense. From an orthodox theological or religious perspective, divining
the significance of a Scriptural passage or statement need not be controversial. But
from Spinozas perspective, the use of a method for the interpretation of Scripture
37
38

introduction

17

If one recognizes that there are numerous difficulties that cannot

be resolved even by appealing to the methodical interpretation of
Scripture that is propounded by Spinoza in the treatise and if one
acknowledges the modest feasibility of resolving many of the problems
that will be encountered in the process of interpreting the Scriptures
then it becomes increasingly clear that it is preferable and more sensible
to adopt a minimalist approach to understanding or interpreting the
doctrines and meanings of Scripture rather than to become embroiled
in endless wrangling about the significances of difficult, obscure, or
corrupted passages of Scripture, a procedure which Spinoza believed
to be characteristic of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion.
If readers of the treatise were to embrace Spinozas position on Scriptural interpretation, as well as his account of the meaning of Scripture,
and if they were to acknowledge his warning about the insolubility
of numerous questions regarding the interpretation of Scripture then
readers of Spinozas teaching in the treatise would be inclined to accept
his simple or minimalist theology as being both reasonable and having
the advantage of avoiding or at least discouraging futile speculative
controversies and contentious disputes about irresolvable theological
or religious matters.
Spinozas version of the basic and authentic teaching of theology
or religion is simple and minimalist. His opponents however would
reject his theological teaching in the treatise for being simplistic and
minimizing. Spinoza reduces to seven the number of dogmas essential
to theology or religion; and he permits the faithful to apprehend the
dogmas in whatever manner prompts their piety most. Theology or
religion thus resides primarily in each individuals own heart or spirit
rather than in the edicts, the heritages, or the protocols stipulated by
the theologians, the preachers, the Pharisees or the Roman Pontiffs.40
The teaching of Scripture is found only in the Word of God and not in
some number of books.41 Consequently, any requirement that the faithful surrender interpretive authority to the theologians or the preachers
in questions of religious observance or conviction is eliminated. Instead
has the purpose of affording reliable explications of the meanings of Scripture and
hence the method would eliminate the need for any guesswork, divining, or talking nonsense about the significance of any Scriptural statement. Where there is no
final determination of the significance of a Scriptural passage, each individual is left
to judge the meaning of it for himself (TTP 3: 11; 11415; 17880).
40
TTP 3: 11617.
41
TTP 3: 1011; 15859; 172.

18

introduction

the resolution of matters affecting the interpretation of the meaning of

piety or faith is left to the adjudications of the individual consciences
of ordinary human beings; and, in consequence of that principle, the
verdict of the vulgus on such matters possesses the same theological
or religious legitimacy as the decrees of theological counsels or the
pronouncements of religious assemblies.
Spinozas account of the nature and foundation of theology or religion in the treatise purportedly represents that Religio antiqua which
had become unrecognizable after suffering so many perversions over
time. Conceived on the basis of Spinozas version of it, the teaching
and meaning of theology or religion essentially is easily comprehensible
by everyone; it is simple; it is uncontroversial; and it consists of but a
few dogmas and a few demands. Moreover, the account of theology or
religion offered by Spinoza in the treatise seems to go some long way
toward correcting those excesses of theology or religion that initially
had prompted him to compose the treatise.
In the first instance, the recovered version of theology or religion
proposed by Spinoza in the treatise demonstrates that the introduction of various prejudices and superstitions into theology or religion
is a result of the ambitions of the theologians and the preachers who
seek to achieve and maintain a certain authority and power over the
multitudes they influence. The debasement of theology or religion then
is a consequence of their vanity and arrogance. When the supposed
mysteries, secrets, or impenetrable lessons of the Scriptures have been
shown to be only manipulated opinions foisted on ordinary human
beings for the sake of the aggrandizement of the theologians and the
preachers then the faithful are afforded the preparation necessary to
reclaim the unadulterated teaching of Scripture. Moreover, at the same
time, Spinozas exposure of the corruptions of the basic teaching of
theology or religion means that the more sensible sort of person may
be encouraged to turn his mind to philosophizing since the ancient
Religion, or the basic teaching of theology, never would have dictated
hostility toward liberal and independent thinking. Quite the contrary,
the preeminent tenet of theology or religion unambiguously advocates
charity and justice toward every human being;42 and in accordance with
that tenet persecution and intolerance would be proscribed.

42

TTP 3: 1011; 17580; 18485.

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19

In the second place, though Spinozas version of theology or religion

conflicts with the prevailing tradition, his theological teaching in the
treatise is a theology nonetheless. Although the treatise may have been
rejected by orthodox readers and believers as a pernicious and heretical
book, strictly speaking, it is one thing to be a dissenter, an unorthodox
thinker, or even a polemical writer on theology or religion but it very
much is another thing simply to be an atheist. During the seventeenth
century, it frequently was the case that such a distinction may have
been observed in principle but only rarely was it applied in practice. If
someones theology or religion was perceived to oppose someone elses
theology or religion then either party could be accused by the opposing
party of having no theology or no religion at all. It is very clear that
Spinozas theology is not the theology of the received tradition. Nor
is Spinozas God in the treatise identical with the God of the received
tradition. But nowhere in the treatise does Spinoza expressly deny the
existence of God nor does he openly subvert the worth of theology
or its teaching.43 On the contrary, Spinoza concludes the explicitly
theological part of the treatise with the declaration that except that
we had the testimony of Scripture we would doubt the salvation (salus)
of almost everyone.44 One could submit then that Spinozas teaching
of theology, or his version of the recovered ancient Religion, that is
presented in the treatise serves to fulfill his professed aim of averting
the accusation of atheism as far as is possible.45

43
Spinoza never expressly contests or denies the existence of God in the TTP nor
does he do so in his other writings. However, the report of an Inquisition spy who
was traveling in The Netherlands in the late 1650s offers another perspective on the
matter. Fr. Toms Solano y Robles attended a meeting of the Collegiants, a group of
Dutch freethinkers, on 10 August 1659. Solan y Robles reported that Spinoza was
present at the meeting and the priest described Spinozas confession of his atheism in
this way: [E]staban contentos en tener el herror de el ateismo, porque sentian que
non havia Dios sino es filosofalmente (Como he declarado). The report is reprinted
and discussed in I.S. Rvahs Spinoza et le Dr. Juan de Prado (Paris: Mouton, 1959) pp.
3132; 64.
44
TTP 3: 188. The theological part of the TTP is contained in chapters 115.
45
The initial and early receptions of the TTP confirm that Spinozas teaching in
that book was considered heretical and atheistic by the majority of its readers. But
over time Spinoza has enjoyed a kind of rehabilitation which perhaps owes to the fact
that his successors have adopted his of method of Biblical criticism. In his assessment
of Spinozas teaching on theology or religion, one scholar has concluded that as a
whole his doctrine is a representation of that liberal moral type of Christianity: see
H.G. Hubbeling, Spinozas Methodology (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum Company,
1967) pp. 5859; and Hubbeling, Spinoza (Freiburg/Mnchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1978)
pp. 96110.

20

introduction

In the third place, according to Spinoza, the genuine teaching and

meaning of theology or religion indicates that human beings are free
to think, to judge, and to speak for themselves. Each may read and
interpret Scripture, for example, as his conscience and sentiment direct
him. The conclusions an individual reaches about the lessons of the
prophetic books, the significance of the histories of the Hebrew people,
the meaning of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, or the apostolic
instructions in the epistles may vary from one member of the faithful to
another so long as the interpretations and the understandings of such
things enhance ones piety. If ones understanding or interpretation of
Scripture leads to the performance of just and charitable acts then the
theology or faith or religion embraced by that individual is sound. If
ones acts are pious then the exact content of his interpretation and
understanding of the word of God is irrelevant. Whatever one believes
and whatever serves as the motive for ones faith are acceptable so long
as they confirm ones piety and therefore lead one to live justly and
charitably in obedience to God; for faith is to be gauged only by acts
and never by words.46 Thus liberty of thought, liberty of speech, and
the liberty to philosophize appear to be sanctioned by the teaching of
theology or religion itself.
The account of theology or religion propounded by Spinoza in the
treatise reflects the motives that prompted the composition of the book
which were listed by Spinoza in Epistle 30 to Henry Oldenburg. First,
Spinozas version of a more original and basic theology or religion
strips away the prejudicial or superstitious accretions to theology or
religion that had been introduced or compounded by the theologians
and the preachers over time in their attempts to extend their authority,
influence, and power over the people in their charge. Second, however
provocative the doctrines of the treatise were, Spinozas book does
express and defend a theological teaching; thus he affords himself some
line of defense against accusations that he is an atheist. In addition,
third, the version of theology or religion presented by Spinoza in the
treatise places a remarkable premium on liberty of thought, liberty of
judgment, and liberty of speech; only external behavior and action
matter in the determination of ones piety or faithfulness. Theology
itself, therefore, may be understood to encourage philosophizing in
a broad sense of the word (for example, when an individual strives to

46

TTP 3: 11; 17578; 182; 24347.

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21

interpret Scripture for himself ) and theologys emphasis on charity and

justice implies that tolerance of intellectual liberty, including the liberty
of philosophizing, is actually an element of piety or faithfulness.
Still, the version of theology or religion propounded by Spinoza in
the treatise continues to stand on a completely different foundation
from philosophy; its goal remains entirely separate from philosophy;
and accordingly it should not serve as a handmaid or complement to philosophy nor should philosophy serve as a handmaid or
complement to theology. Hence the teaching of theology or religion
presented by Spinoza in the treatise will not permit the title Tractatus
philosophico-theologicus; although a recovery of the basic sense of theology or religion, as it is explained in the treatise, does permit something
else. Spinozas account of theology or religion is no longer simply
identical with the prevailing tradition of theology or religion which
regards and treats philosophy with hostility. Instead, Spinozas teaching
in the treatise proposes a theology or religion which acknowledges the
legitimacy of liberty of thought and equal participation by all of the
faithful in understanding, interpreting, and implementing the Word of
God. Accordingly, Spinozas revised theology or religion essentially is
democratic and that novel characteristic makes it possible for Spinozas
theology to be compatible with Spinozas politics.
Spinoza says in the treatise that the democratic political regime is
the one most consonant with nature and natural right. The democratic political regime therefore is compatible with philosophy since
philosophy involves knowledge of nature and nature teaches liberty
and right.47 The prevailing theological tradition is impudent, authoritarian, illiberal, superstition-ridden, and corrupt. It opposes independent
inquiry and philosophical investigation though theology sometimes
will appeal to philosophic doctrines only if philosophy can be made
to serve the interests of the prevailing theological or religious tradition
as its handmaid. However, the version theology or religion presented
in the treatise contains a set of modifications to the received tradition
of theology or religion that make the recovered sense of the Religio
antiqua more responsive to Spinozas intentions in his book.
Philosophy and politics are consonant in respect of the democratic
regime. Both philosophy and politics converge in their relation to
nature. Philosophy and theology, however, are dissonant. The prevailing

47

TTP 3: 8; 17980; 241.

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introduction

theological tradition rebuffs nature and espouses the supranatural; and

even the version of theology or religion taught in the treatise remains
discordant with philosophy in certain important respects. For theology
of any kind and philosophy remain separate from each other in terms
of their foundations and in terms of their goals. Still, theology, be it
the version offered in the treatise or an uncorrected version of it, and
politics have opportunities to intersect insofar as they may be said to
share a common concern: each purports to offer what is indispensable
to the wellbeing of those under their respective charges. Each claims
to supply the indispensable instruction that is necessary for the proper
conduct of human life and the governance of human affairs. The
prevailing tradition of theology or religion which is impudent, authoritarian, prejudiced, and superstition-ridden may not easily be brought
to cooperate with a liberal democratic political regime. Where there
is intersection between the prevailing tradition of theology or religion
and politics the result often is confrontation rather than cooperation.
But the recovered sense of the ancient Religion and the corrected
theology that is taught by the treatise now conspicuously incorporate
a democratic trait. The newly retrieved sense of the basic teaching of
theology or religion authorizes subjective judgment; it encourages personal assent; it advocates private interpretation; and it defends liberty
of thought. Thus the reclaimed ancient Religion that is presented
in the treatise carries with it the prospect of fashioning a teaching that
can combine theology and politics through their common aim and their
common element which is the provision of an instruction for ordinary
human beings about how to conduct their lives and govern their affairs
peaceably. Spinozas old book is not a tractatus philosophicus nor is it a
tractatus theologicus nor is it a tractatus politicus although philosophy, theology, and politics each professes to furnish the teaching that is indispensable for the achievement of human happiness, human salvation,
or human welfare. Instead Spinoza writes a tractatus theologico-politicus
that professes to furnish a teaching that will establish the conditions
which are requisite for human salvation and human welfare. In other
words, Spinoza offers a ministerial theologico-political teaching under
the supervision of philosophy.
The first two proper objects of desire are knowledge and virtue. The
acquisition of both depends solely upon the laws and powers of human
nature. According to Spinoza, however, there are only a very few, if
compared to all of humankind, who acquire the habit of virtue led

introduction

23

by reason alone.48 Virtue implies knowledge; and knowledge is gained

through the exercise of reason which involves knowledge of nature and
knowledge of the causes of things. Though all human beings possess
the faculty of reason and all human beings desire happiness or salvation or welfare, the vast majority of human beings are incapable of
attaining knowledge and virtue through the exercise of reason because
they instead are drawn by their carnal instincts and desires rather than
by the dictates of reason.49 As a result, the satisfaction of the desire
that is sought by every individual is likely to elude the vast majority
of human beings. For the multitude succumbs to the influences of the
passions and the imaginative-affective life. They shun reason and turn
to fortune or superstition for the satisfaction of their desires.50 Hence
the majority of human beings, who inherently are passionate and who
are driven by the impulses of their emotions, look to external things
for their salvation or for their welfare rather than to the things that
are contained within human nature itself. They trust in chance more
than they trust in reason. In consideration of what human nature is,
philosophy cannot succeed in offering human beings the teaching or
providing them the conditions that will promote their attainment of
happiness. Passionate human beings, who are urged to action by the
immediate satisfaction of their interests and who regularly are oblivious
to the consequences of their conduct, abandon the dictates of reason,
avoid the demonstrations of reason, and ignore the exhortations of
reason. So we glimpse the very problem that is raised by Spinozas
old book. The problem concerns the fact of human nature: Human
beings are driven more by passion than they are guided by reason.51
Because of what human beings are, they will be moved to undertake
only that which conforms to their established opinions, experiences, or
expectations.52 They will be persuaded by what appeals most to their
senses, their passions, their sentiments, or their emotions and they will
contest, resent, dispute, or feel threatened by whatever is inconsistent
with their experiences or what they customarily anticipate concerning
such things. The problem raised by the treatise then is the natural or

48
49
50
51
52

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

188.
7375; 18992.
5.
18990.
7677.

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introduction

philosophic problem of human nature. That problem must be resolved

if human beings are to live together. More precisely, the natural or
philosophic problem must be resolved if rational human beings, or
those who are reasonable, are to live peaceably and securely among
the vast majority of human beings who behave only in accordance
with their passions. Inasmuch as it is based on reason and not on passion, passionate human beings will not be receptive to the teaching of
philosophy about knowledge, virtue, and human happiness. But if the
teaching of philosophy concerning human happiness will be dismissed
by passionate human beings then how will they manage to achieve the
third proper object of desire? What will persuade passionate human
beings to live in security and health with rational or reasonable
human beings, as well as with those other human beings who typically
also yield to their passions?
Theology and politics impart teachings that influence the courses of
human life and the conduct of human affairs. Moreover, the teachings
of theology and politics are designed to appeal to the experiences,
sentiments, opinions, and expectations of ordinary human beings.
Thus theology and politics already exercise control over some of the
principal avenues of access through which persuasive discourse can be
undertaken with nonphilosophers. If philosophy is to solve the natural
or philosophic problem effectively its solution must incorporate means
that are recognizable and credible to the majority of human beings.
Conjoining theology and politics under the supervision of philosophy
offers the greatest likelihood of propounding a teaching that will enable
human beings to satisfy the third proper object of desire; and the
theological and political teachings of the treatise are devised precisely
to facilitate the accomplishment of that task. For the political teaching
of the treatise is receptive to philosophys instruction on human happiness to the extent that the democratic regime advocated in the treatise,
which is designed to fosters human welfare, is consonant with Spinozas
account of human nature. Thus philosophy can inform the teaching
of politics in the treatise so that human security and health can be
realized; and, in addition, the version of the teaching of theology that
is presented in the treatise also is receptive to philosophy to the extent
that theology or religion no longer needs to approach philosophy with
hostility. That is, the teaching of theology or religion in the treatise
encourages the use of reason; the teaching of theology in the treatise
itself has been democratized; and so the teaching of theology in the

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25

treatise is tolerant of both politics and philosophy since each of them

also is concerned with human wellbeing.
The recovery of the basic teaching of theology or religion by philosophy in the treatise means that philosophy may appeal to the teaching of theology, as it appeals to the teaching of politics, in the service
of satisfying the third proper object of desire. Although philosophy,
theology, and politics are directed to human wellbeing, in accordance
with the understanding of human nature that each professes, it is only
philosophy that possesses the requisite knowledge and virtue to enable
human beings to realize their proper desires in an appropriate manner. Spinoza does not write a tractatus philosophicus because it would be
futile to do so; such a work would not be welcomed by the majority
of human beings nor would it be understood by those among them
whose lives are driven by passion. But because the theological teaching
of the treatise and the political teaching of the treatise can be joined
in their service of a shared objective, security and health, Spinoza
aptly can name his old book Tractatus theologico-politicus. In the treatise,
philosophy makes use of the familiar, appealing, and credible rhetoric
of theology and politics for the sake of moving the nonphilosophers
to adopt a kind of life that will bring them security, health, wellbeing,
peace, and prosperity but only if they are moved to act in ways that
initially appear to them to be contrary to their own selfish, immediate,
asocial interests.53

53
One might propose that Spinoza imitates Plato. That is, just as Socrates tames
Thrasymachus in the Republic (350d354b) so too Spinoza tames the theologians and
preachers in the TTP. Both Socrates and Spinoza wish to purge the content from the
doctrines of their opponents while simultaneously leaving the mode of communication
for their opponents doctrines intact. Just as Socrates empties Thrasymachus teaching
of its content but saves its form, namely, the rhetorical art, Spinoza purges theology or
religion of its harmful prejudices and superstitions so that he may continue to appeal to
theologys rhetorical prowess to move ordinary human beings toward sociability (TTP 3:
180; 188; compare Republic 398a400 and Leo Strauss, The City and Man [Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1964] pp. 8085); for human beings by nature
are inclined toward theology or religion (TTP 3: 57; and compare Republic 386a392a).
Platos justification for appealing to the rhetorical art of Thrasymachus, if not the
teaching of Thrasymachus, might be said to owe to the fact that human beings are
moved first, and perhaps most, more by music than they are moved by mathematics.
Spinoza is more straightforward about the matter in the TTP. According to Spinoza,
if one wishes to persuade or dissuade anyone about anything that is not self-evident
[per se notum non est] he must deduce the matter from what is accepted by his audience;
he will speak in accordance with their capacity for being moved; he will grant their
presumptions; he will rely on what they have experienced; and he will not resort to
lengthy proofs that involve long chains of reasoning or demonstration (TTP 3: 7677).

26

introduction

Taken together, the democratic political regime proposed by Spinoza

in the treatise and the democratic theology proposed by Spinoza in the
treatise are devised to make feasible the achievement of the third proper
object of desire. Theological salvation of the individual is the aim of
religious institutions; and the political welfare of the individual is the
aim of civic governments. Throughout the treatise, Spinoza uses the
same Latin word, salus, to connote both the theological condition of
salvation and the political condition of welfare.54 The problem or the
question raised by the treatise is the problem or the question of how
to solve the tension between human selfishness and human sociability.
Spinozas treatment or handling of that problem and his solution to
that problem is a theologico-political one. Notwithstanding his criticism of the Turkish and the Hebrew regimes, Spinozas answer to the
natural or philosophic problem involves the invention of a novel sort
of theocratic regime.

54

TTP 3: 6466; 15158; 16365; 16778; 188; 19298.

PART ONE

PHILOSOPHY

The Tractatus theologico-politicus does not contain a single chapter that

addresses philosophy exclusively. Whereas the title of chapter fourteen
of the treatise indicates that the chapter will define the foundations of
faith ( fidei fundamenta)1 and the title of chapter sixteen of the treatise
indicates that the chapter will define the foundations of a Republic
(de Reipublicae fundamentis),2 there is no title of any chapter in the treatise which suggests that the principal purpose of it is to define the
foundations of philosophy. Instead the philosophic teaching of the
treatise is scattered throughout the many chapters of the book. In other
words, the philosophic teaching of Spinozas old book is presented only
obliquely and it is appropriate to consider why he chose to proceed
in that manner.
The expressly stated aim of the treatise is to convince people that
the liberty of philosophizing can be conceded in a republic without
detriment to piety and without detriment to the public peace. But the
need for Spinoza to plea for a liberty of philosophizing in the treatise
also implies that a liberty to philosophize has not been achieved already.
The fact that Spinozas plea is necessary at all denotes the extent to
which there was an established environment in which philosophy was
neither free nor encouraged. From remarks made early in the Preface
to the treatise it easily can be concluded that Spinoza believed that
the prevailing tradition of theology or religion was largely responsible
for influencing and fostering an atmosphere of antagonism toward
philosophy.3 Yet, even without any theological or religious nurturing of
such an antagonism, a more basic fact of human nature explains why
there was not, or perhaps there never will be, a universal approval for
the liberty of philosophizing.

1
TTP 3: 173. Spinoza uses the words faith and theology interchangeably in
the TTP (3: 179).
2
TTP 3: 189.
3
TTP 3: 89.

30

part one

One claim asserted repeatedly in the treatise, which presumably

is reached in accordance with Spinozas philosophic teaching, is that
human beings typically conduct their lives by the urgings of their passions rather than by the direction of reason4 and consequently they
are not disposed to philosophy.5 Instead most human beings favor and
adopt whatever seems to conform to their immediate sentiments and
they embrace whatever appears to promise them the greatest likelihood of satisfying their desires.6 Lacking knowledge about the order
and operations of nature, which would assist them in acquiring what
they need or want, most human beings look for rarities, oddities, or
exceptions in their experiences of the world and they apprehend such
experiences as forebodings of whether their needs or desires will be
satisfied or frustrated. In other words, human beings are induced to
look to nonhuman or suprahuman things to provide them with the
means to their wellbeing. They look especially to external things
in order to satisfy the third proper object of desire, namely, security
and health.7
Perhaps somewhat ironically, then, human nature is prone by nature
to look away from nature and to look to something above or beyond
nature in order to satisfy the most natural human needs or desires. The
prevailing tradition of theology or religion, according to Spinoza, only
foments that perspective on human life and on the world. For theology or religion teaches that nonhuman or suprahuman agents, that
is, certain external things, are more useful, helpful, and successful
than human agents, and the capacities inherent to human nature, for
obtaining the objects of human need or human desire.8 Ignorant of the
order and operations of nature but natively prone to superstition, that
is, prone by nature to religious overawe, most human beings readily
accept the perspective advanced by theology or religion because they
do not know any alternative to it. Philosophy might offer that alternative. But theology or religion already professes to hold the knowledge
that is requisite to the proper conduct of life and the governance of
4
TTP 3: 57; 2930; 4344; 53; 5962; 7378; 8182; 98; 18081; 18892;
203205; 21719; 22628; 23940.
5
Spinozas identification of reason, or the use of reason, with philosophy (TTP 3:
180; 183; 188) implies that those who are led by the passions rather than by reason
are led away from philosophy rather than being led toward it.
6
TTP 3: 57; 18893.
7
TTP 3: 47.
8
TTP 3: 56; 89; 1516; 46; 8185; 186.

philosophy

31

human affairs, the knowledge that explains the order and operations of
the world, and the knowledge that will lead all human beings to their
ultimate wellbeing or salvation. Indeed, theology or religion claims to
possess such knowledge exclusively. Any endorsement of philosophizing,
therefore, would be taken to insinuate that theology or religion in fact
might not possess or supply what it is that human beings need to know
and to do in order to achieve their complete salus.9 Were philosophy
to be considered a legitimate alternative to theology or religion then
theology or religion would cede its authority and cease to enjoy its
privileged position among the people. To safeguard itself and its station,
theology or religion adopts an antagonistic posture toward philosophy;
theology or religion prevents human beings from turning their minds to
philosophy; and theology or religion induces ordinary human beings,
the nonphilosophers, to regard philosophy with suspicion, contempt,
or trepidation.10
The treatise seeks to demonstrate that philosophy can coexist peacefully with theology or religion and politics; and there is a significant
point made in Spinozas statement of the express aim of his book. He
maintains that allowing people the liberty to philosophize will not prove
to be an inconvenience either to piety or the public peace. The title
of the treatise, the summary of the chief aim of the treatise contained
in the Preface to the book, and the concluding sentiment found on the
last page of the treatise each repeat the promise that philosophy will
not be either a private or a public nuisance.11 However, the avowed
purpose of the treatise must be read against another declaration also
made by Spinoza early in his book.
In the Preface to the treatise, Spinoza states that the Dutch have
the rare happiness of living in a Republic where each is conceded
complete liberty of judging and revering God from his own native bent
[ex suo ingenio] and where nothing is held more estimable or agreeable

The ambiguity of the Latin word salus must be borne in mind throughout the
reading of the TTP. For in one context, the word simply may convey a sense of personal wellbeing which can be neutral to any theological or political considerations.
But in most contexts, Spinoza intends the word to bear the theological connotation
of religious salvation or the political connotation of civic welfare. The latter two
connotations bear a number of implications that can involve precepts or practices that
are either mutually inclusive of each other or mutually exclusive of each other.
10
TTP 3: 68.
11
TTP 3: 1; 7; 243; 247.
9

32

part one

than liberty.12 If the complete liberty of judging or the high estimation and approval of liberty were facts of the age, and the Dutch
circumstance in particular, then the stated ambition of Spinozas treatise
would be not only superfluous but also absurd. Why should Spinoza
seek to win a liberty that already existed and which already was said to
be enjoyed by every citizen? Spinozas assessment of the contemporary
situation in The Netherlands continues, however, and he notes that
religious and political prejudices as well as superstitions remain
the chief obstacles that prohibit the specific kind of liberty that he is
advocating. Indeed, the passage from the Preface about the Dutch situation makes it quite plain that the prevailing tradition of theology or
religion and the prevailing tradition of politics are susceptible to the very
sort of collusion that could reduce human beings, especially the most
vulnerable ones, namely, the passionate ones who constitute the majority of humankind, to a condition of servitude of thought. The not
so subtle warning against the undesirable consequences of collusion
between theology and politics should remind the reader of Spinozas
complaint against the Turkish regime wherein collusion between theology and politics had prevented liberal and open public discourse as well
as independent judgment. It also is worthwhile to note that Spinozas
complaint against the Turkish regime in fact appears at the top of the
same page of the Preface to the treatise where Spinoza comments on the
putatively salutary contemporary circumstances of The Netherlands.13
One implication that may be drawn from the proximity of the two
statements would be that the conditions in The Netherlands ran the
risk of becoming more similar rather than less similar to the conditions
associated with the Turkish regime. The reader should be struck by
an inconsistency. On the one hand, in the treatise Spinoza explicitly
pleads for a liberty of philosophizing. Yet, on the other hand, Spinoza
categorically asserts that liberty of judgment, liberty of worship, and a
seemingly widespread love of liberty already universally are approved
in The Netherlands. Because of the inconsistency between Spinozas
statements, it would seem fair for a reader of the treatise to infer that
the liberty imputed to The Netherlands by Spinoza is something that
may have been honored in speech but not really welcomed in deed.14
One ambition of the treatise is to correct that problem.
12
13
14

TTP 3: 7; 246.
TTP 3: 7.
TTP 3: 24446.

philosophy

33

As much as securing the liberty of philosophizing may be critical to

the overall design of Spinozas book, the elimination of the prejudices
and superstitions that foster servitude of thought appears to be the
necessary prerequisite to the announced aim of the treatise. There will
not be liberty until the threat of servitude is removed. The liberty of
philosophizing will depend upon a preliminary liberation of human
beings from the forces that hinder an individual from having the freedom to think as he wishes, and to say as he thinks.15 So long as fear,
ignorance, prejudice, and superstition dominate the human condition
it is improbable that even human beings endowed with reason will
be competent to protect themselves from being turned into brutes;16
and their brutishness only will contribute further to their subjugation
in theological, political, moral, and even intellectual terms. Therefore,
while the obvious ambition of the treatise concerns securing the liberty of philosophizing, the argument of the treatise in support of that
ambition involves the elimination of theological and political prejudices
together with an exposure of the superstitions that preclude freedom
of thought, independence of mind, and the liberty of philosophizing.
Still, the task of the supporting argument of the treatise never may
be realized fully; for human beings by nature are prone to superstition.17 Furthermore, there always will be a natural antipathy toward
philosophy by most human beings who are not philosophers since the
majority is driven by the urgings of passion rather than by the dictates
or conclusions of reason. It therefore is incumbent upon philosophy to
engage theology or politics in ways that advance liberty and the possibility of philosophizing while simultaneously remaining mindful of
the authority, function, and influence that theology and politics exercise
over the majority of human beings in their daily affairs.
Both the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing
tradition of politics invoke the opinions, sentiments, prejudices, and even
the superstitions that are endorsed by the majority of human beings.
They invoke the received views of things that are adopted by human
beings in order to affect the courses of their behaviors in an effort to
make it feasible for them to satisfy the third proper object of desire.
But in their attempts to make security and health attainable, theology or religion and politics frequently embrace inadequate or mistaken
15
16
17

TTP 3: 239.
TTP 3: 56; 8; 14; 8182; 9092; 167; 173; 18082.
TTP 3: 6.

34

part one

apprehensions of the world in order to facilitate the satisfaction of one

of the objects of desire that is most basic and natural to all human
beings. Holding out to human beings the prospect of the attainment
of the wellbeing that they seek, theology or religion and politics devise
and promulgate views about things that are contrary to what actually
transpires in the world. Still, theology or religion and politics affirm that
an individual can achieve what he most needs or desires so long as he
adheres to their approved doctrines. Because ordinary human beings
(vulgus) are impelled by their passions, possess little or no knowledge of
the order and operations of the world, and they naturally are prone to
superstition, theology and politics also inculcate vulgar conceptions of
the world; and based upon those conceptions they strive to persuade or
dissuade human beings about what is desirable, worthwhile, or acceptable in respect of achieving the third proper object of desire. But neither
theology nor politics is philosophy. That is, the doctrines of theology
or politics continue to be derived from basic human assumptions or
opinions about the world and they remain assumptions or opinions
which are nonphilosophical.
When philosophy attempts to instruct ordinary human beings, the
vulgar, the nonphilosophers, it proceeds in a different fashion. The philosophically devised teaching of theology in the treatise and the philosophically framed political teaching in the treatise are formulated in
ways which suggest an agreement between nature and both theology
and politics. Everyone seeks security and health. The achievement
of security and health will be made feasible for the nonphilosophers
by the introduction of a philosophical teaching about theology and
a philosophical teaching about politics. Philosophy will not supplant
theology or politics. Instead it will conserve some useful semblances
of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing tradition of politics which are familiar to the vast majority of
human beings and which generally are accepted by them. Still, the
basic opinions and notions on which theology or politics rest will be
retained only in the form that is deemed by philosophy to be most
effective for a philosophically devised version of theology and politics.
The theological and political teachings found in the treatise will be
unorthodox and controversial to the extent that they contest some
established orthodox tenets. But notwithstanding their heterodoxy, the
theological and political teachings propounded in the treatise also will
remain attractive to ordinary human beings for the reason that they
retain accepted elements of theology and politics while the teachings

philosophy

35

of the treatise also will recommend modifications to theology or politics

that will be advantageous to ordinary human beings.
Spinozas democratic theology and his democratic politics derive
from premises that are consistent with nature; for, according to Spinoza,
the democratic and the natural are in accord with one another.18
But in order to advance the democratic theology and the democratic
politics of the treatise certain basic principles of the prevailing traditions of theology and politics will have to be contested and shown to
be erroneous or mistaken to the readers of the treatise. A philosophic
analysis of the principles of the prevailing traditions of theology and
politics will enable attentive readers of the treatise to realize that the
prevailing traditions of theology and politics represent perversions of
nature inasmuch as the prevailing teachings on theology and politics
derive from a nondemocratic foundation. That is, the foundations and
principles of the prevailing tradition of theology and the prevailing
tradition of politics are monarchic in character. What initially appears
unorthodox, provocative, and controversial about Spinozas teaching in
the treatise yet may be seen by ordinary human beings to be attractive
and advantageous because Spinozas democratic theological and political
teachings in the treatise offer a means to satisfying what human beings
desire most; and his teachings also affirm what human beings hold most
dear. Spinozas teaching in the treatise offers hope rather than fear;
it offers liberty rather than servitude; and it offers the promise of the
satisfaction of individual desires in an ordered society.
If the teaching of philosophy were communicated directly in the
treatise, rather than obliquely, it would come into stark contrast with
the prevailing traditions of theology and politics. Or, contrary to the
stated interests of the treatise,19 philosophy just might show itself to be
quite inconvenient both to piety and to the public peace. Philosophy,
and its teaching, will be resented by the readers of the treatise until
Spinoza can persuade them that philosophy actually performs some
sort of useful service for them. If philosophy can be employed to supply the assistance that is needed to correct or eliminate the prejudices
and superstitions that had come to obscure the more original and basic
meaning of theology or religion then philosophy could be perceived
as beneficial to theology or religion and politics, as well as to the

18
19

TTP 3: 19395; 245.

TTP 3: 7; 12; 247.

36

part one

nonphilosophers. It is quite intentionally ironic, then, that much of the

work accomplished by way of the oblique introduction of philosophy
in the treatise actually can give the appearance of philosophy being
a kind of handmaid (ancilla)20 to theology or religion. To make the
liberty of philosophizing palatable to the nonphilosophers, Spinoza
must try to introduce philosophy as being a help rather than a hindrance
to human interests. Moreover, he credibly must submit that all human
beings are able to philosophize; and that they incidentally are doing
so when they think for themselves and say what they think.21 Teaching
philosophy indirectly in the treatise allows Spinoza to manage his task
of promoting the liberty of philosophizing by correcting the errors
and mistakes of theology and politics without simultaneously directly
exposing philosophy itself to jeopardy.
Part of the indirectness of Spinozas philosophic teaching in the
treatise can be illustrated by his attempt to imitate the formation of
a theocratic regime along Biblical lines. That is, Spinozas ambition
in the treatise is to institute a novel theocratic regime that procedurally mimics the theocratic regime instituted by Moses in the Hebrew
Scriptures. Like Moses, Spinoza holds that the way to human security,
health, and prosperity rests upon a particular understanding of revealed
religion that promotes justice, charity, and human wellbeing,22 but
which also happens to be salutary and necessary for the peace and
harmony of a republic.23 In terms of the Moses model of a theocracy,
the instruction for the attainment of security and health was written
on tablets of stone; in the terms of the Spinoza model of a theocracy
the way to human wellbeing is written in the hearts of faithful human
beings.24 In effect, Spinoza intends to replace the theocratic model of
the regime of the Hebrew people that is based upon the teachings of

20
TTP 3: 180. The Latin title of chapter 15 is Nec Theologiam Rationi, nec Rationem
Theologiae ancillari, ostenditur, & ratio, qua nobis S. Scripturae authoritatem persuademus. The
ironic sense of handmaid can be exhibited in the fact that notwithstanding Spinozas
assertions about the separation of theology from philosophy there is every indication
that theology increasingly is subordinated to reason or philosophy in the treatise. For
example, Spinoza lists three criteria by which a prophecy or revelation may be certified as valid but in the final analysis the validity of a prophecy or revelation will rest
on the reasonability of the doctrine or message that it imparts (compare TTP 3: 31
and 18587).
21
TTP 3: 1112; 239.
22
TTP 3: 11; 16465; 172; 17779.
23
TTP 3: 179.
24
TTP 3: 15859; 17576 and compare 6970; 161.

philosophy

37

Moses, the prophets, and the Pentateuch with a theocratic model of

a regime that is based upon the teachings of Christ, the apostles, and
the Gospels.25 Whereas the Moses model of a theocracy bore all the
hallmarks of monarchy, tribal heritage, and hierarchical authority; the
Spinoza model of a theocracy bears all the hallmarks of democracy,
individualism, and liberal egalitarianism. Moreover, Spinozas version
of theology and his purported recovery of a more original and basic
meaning of theology or religion prepares a justification for his model
for a theocratic regime in the following way. According to Spinoza,
prior to the monarchic theocracy of Moses, there was an initial moment
when the entire Hebrew people made a compact with God and each of
them individually retained the right of the regime absolutely since the
Hebrews transferred their right to no one else but all surrendered their
right equally as in a Democracy.26 However almost immediately after
that initial democratic moment at the founding of the Hebrew regime,
as Spinoza interprets the passages from Exodus and Deuteronomy
concerning the event, the Hebrew people were overwhelmed by their
fear of God and their fear of their own situation with respect to the
presence and power of God.27 The Hebrew people then immediately
demanded that Moses become the unique intermediary between them
and God. Or, the fear of the Hebrew people led them to opine that
their security and health best would be served if Moses alone were
to communicate with God on their behalf. By that contract with Moses,
says Spinoza, the Hebrew people resigned their rights to consult with
God individually and to interpret the decrees of God privately. Thus
the Mosaic theocracy was instituted.28
The theological teaching of the treatise purports to convey a recovered and uncorrupted theology or religion. That more basic form
of theology or religion, which is reflected in the earliest stage of the

25
On the crucial differences between Christ and Moses, see TTP 3: 2021 and
6465.
26
TTP 3: 206.
27
Exodus 19:8; 1821 and Deuteronomy 5:2232; 18: 1516. Spinozas account of
the passages emphasizes the fear that was experienced by the Hebrews. But another passage at Deut. 19:1625 also makes plain that God had forbidden the people to approach
the mountain and God set a boundary which if crossed would result in the death of
anyone who violated the boundary. The prohibition applied to human beings as well
as to animals. Fear of death is what prevented the Hebrew people from approaching
God. Moses did not suffer from the same fear that possessed the Hebrews and he was
exempted from observing the boundary that had been established by God.
28
TTP 3: 205207.

38

part one

relationship between God and the Hebrew people, as found in the

books of Exodus and Deuteronomy, happens to be a condition that
incorporates the same entitlements for the faithful that are advocated
by Spinoza under the terms of the teaching of theology presented by
him in the treatise. By contrast to the prevailing tradition of theology
or religion, which is monarchic and hierarchical in structure, Spinozas
version of the teaching of theology or religion is democratic in structure. The prevailing tradition of theology or religion emphasizes clerical authority, submissiveness, and conformity with approved traditions
of doctrine.29 But in Spinozas theological teaching each member of
the faithful once again is accorded the right to be a consulter and
interpreter of the word of God, the Divine Law, or the meaning
of faith and piety, just as the Hebrew people initially exercised those
rights, albeit if only for an instant.30 From the philosophic perspective,
the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing tradition of politics solve the human problem of selfishness and sociability
by recourse to ignorant opinions about the world, base superstitions,
inane prejudices, and autocratic schemes of life and worship. But the
philosophically inspired teaching of theology in the treatise together with
the political instruction of the treatise offer a solution to the problem
human nature and the problem of human sociability by recourse to
an account of nature which is novel. The account of nature offered by
Spinoza in the treatise emphasizes the democratic features of nature and
it recasts theology or religion and politics under the influence of that
account. Spinozas version of theology and his political instruction in
the treatise thus make it feasible for philosophers and nonphilosophers
to enjoy security and health together peaceably.
Although most human beings are not inclined to philosophy, it is
not a foregone conclusion of human nature that they therefore must
be opposed to it. Ordinary human beings could be drawn to become
unconcerned about philosophy or they could be induced to become
impartial to it if philosophy were perceived to pose no threat either to
the nonphilosophers or to their accustomed opinions, sentiments, or
beliefs. Spinozas democratized theology and his democratic politics go

TTP 3: 8; 10; 97; 11619; 13738; 14950; 159.

TTP 3: 205207 and compare 17879; 18788; also see chapters 7 and 13. Spinoza asserts that the liberty to think, even about religion, is always in ones possession.
He likens the liberty to a private and unassailable right (TTP 3: 117) or what might
be characterized as a natural right.
29
30

philosophy

39

some way toward representing philosophy in that light. Still, the view
that philosophy inherently threatens piety or the public peace is an
opinion formidably endorsed by the prevailing traditions of theology
and politics. As a result, animosity toward philosophy from either theology or politics typically occurs and Spinozas version of the teaching
of theology in the treatise is designed to counteract that outcome. The
account of theology or religion given in the treatise represents the prevailing received theological view about philosophy as a prejudice; and
Spinozas version of the teaching of theology in the treatise reflects
a doctrine of benign indifference on the part of theology or religion
toward philosophy. The recovered original and basic meaning of theology or religion can tolerate the existence and practice of philosophy
for the reasons that theology and philosophy have no commerce nor
affinity with each other; each has its own province and its own foundation; neither serves as the handmaid to the other; and faith itself is
shown to concede the highest liberty to philosophizing.31 Nevertheless,
Spinoza must persuade his readers that philosophy can be tolerated
and he must argue his case before an audience which naturally may
be unsympathetic to his claim but which demonstrably has been made
unsympathetic to his claim historically.
Given the aims of his book, Spinoza was required to introduce
his readers to philosophy; or, at least, he was required to present his
readers with a number of propositions that were of a philosophical
character or which were deducible from philosophy. But taking the
prevailing state of theology and politics into account, it was necessary
for Spinoza to communicate the teaching of philosophy in the treatise
only in an indirect way. To make it possible for there to be a liberty
of philosophizing philosophy has to confront the obstacles to philosophizing. Philosophy has to expose and then rebut those elements
of the prevailing traditions of theology or religion and politics that
prove most prohibitive of the liberty to philosophize. But philosophy
also has to undertake its task without alienating itself further from its
adversaries. Philosophy thus has to disclose enough of itself to combat
its theological and political opponents while simultaneously indicating
that philosophy in itself is not a lethal danger to those who oppose it
nor does philosophy corrupt those who are the followers of those who
are opposed to philosophy. In other words, if it is necessary to introduce

31

TTP 3: 17980.

40

part one

the readers of the treatise to philosophy, in order to achieve the stated

purposes of the book, yet human beings by nature are not attracted
to philosophy then it would be prudent to insinuate philosophy into
the treatise in such a way that the liberty of philosophizing can be
promoted while also shielding philosophy from an unreceptive and
unsympathetic audience.32 The unreceptive readers in that audience
include all those whom Spinoza criticizes in his book. His unreceptive
audience thus comprises a sizeable portion of humankind, namely, the
theologians, the preachers, their followers, passionate human beings, the
civic authorities, upstanding citizens, and almost all of those who can
be classified as nonphilosophers. Accordingly, Spinoza has to convey the
teaching of philosophy in the treatise warily and somewhat piecemeal
so as to safeguard himself and anyone else who might be sympathetic
to philosophy from being harassed by those who despised reason, those
who were convinced that philosophy was a source of impiety, those who
believed that philosophy must be subservient to theology, those who
perceived philosophy as a hazard to religion or to civic life, or those
who were anxious to classify philosophers as atheists, dissenters, or
turncoats. In other words, Spinoza had to introduce philosophy to his
readers indirectly because there are many in his audience who already
were quite convinced that philosophers or those who are attracted to
philosophy are the kind of persons who undoubtedly are menaces to
theology or religion, that is, they are persons who threaten piety, and
they are the kind of persons who are a danger to the political regime,
that is, they threaten the public peace. While advocating the liberty
of philosophizing, Spinoza tries to protect philosophy and the potential
philosophers from those who have concluded that philosophy ought to
be viewed with suspicion, disdain, or horror. Such a course of action
would be sensible. But serious consideration, however, also must be given
to the possibility that Spinoza decided to communicate the teaching

32
The almost immediate condemnations and refutations of the TTP by theologians,
preachers, and other philosophers, as well as the banning of the publication, distribution, and sale of the book, all would appear to confirm the view that if Spinoza were
trying to protect philosophy from its adversaries then it must be conceded that he failed
quite miserably. But two points may be offered to counter that conclusion. First, almost
every plea for reform or every demand for change initially is met with recriminations,
denunciations, or counterclaims. The reaction does not invalidate the worth of the
plea. Second, Spinozas teaching in the TTP generally was esteemed scandalous but
that fact does not mean that his teaching was understood in its entirety or that it was
understood correctly or even especially well.

philosophy

41

of philosophy in his book only indirectly for the sake of the security
and health of his audience.
Bearing in mind that the third proper object of desire is basic and
universal, the philosopher recognizes that human beings cling, and often
they cling tenaciously, to whatever they believe will provide them the
greatest likelihood of satisfying their desire for security, health, prosperity, and preservation. Most human beings presume that the prevailing
traditions of theology or religion and politics have proved to be, and
they will continue to prove to be, the most apt means to providing them
with security, health, preservation, and some degree of prosperity in
their lives. Therefore human beings will not abandon their theology
or their politics dispassionately; and theology or politics will attempt to
intimidate them with the loss of security and health if they forsake
theology or politics.33 Philosophy therefore concludes that it is unwise
to vitiate the opinions, convictions, sentiments, or hopes of ordinary
human beings without providing a satisfactory alterative to them.
Even while philosophy performs a useful service by exposing the
aspects of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion that had
come to corrupt and obscure the more benign elements of the ancient
Religion, it still would have been imperative for Spinoza to avoid being
seen to subvert certain pieties or civic principles too openly, though
philosophy itself actually might contest the merit, validity, or rectitude
of many of those pieties or principles.34 The philosopher thus expresses
himself guardedly in the presence of the nonphilosophers, especially
those theologians, preachers, orthodox believers, and ordinary human
beings or civic authorities, who are disinclined to suffer what philosophy
professes. Some of the disaffection toward philosophy exercised by the
nonphilosophers results from the ignorance, bias, intolerance, or antipathy that is endemic to human nature in cases where someone encounters
something novel, unconventional, or different from what he generally
expects to experience. But the superstitions and prejudices defended
by the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, together with any
political use or manipulation of those superstitions or prejudices, serve
only to compound whatever natural disaffection for philosophy any
individual already may possess.35
TTP 3: 89; 24243.
TTP 3: 74; 183; 24345.
35
One might recall the second motive for writing the TTP that Spinoza communicated to Oldenburg in 1665. According to Spinoza, it is necessary to avert the
accusation of atheism as far as it is possible to do so.
33
34

42

part one

Though the prevailing traditions of theology or religion and politics

may be wrong in numerous ways, the philosopher acknowledges a
responsibility not to eviscerate those traditions callously. He is mindful
of the authority, function, and influence exerted by the received traditions of theology or religion and politics on public life. Notwithstanding
their errors, therefore, the received teachings of theology or religion
and politics ought not to be dismissed heedlessly. However intellectually
suspect theology or religion may be from the perspective of philosophy
or however much theology or religion may rely on absurd premises and
tenets, Spinoza himself concedes that there is a fundamental worth
and utility of theology or religion. The simple fact is that theology or
religion is especially useful for inspiring, encouraging, or compelling
human beings to a certain kind of salutary conduct of their lives that
very well can promote the general security and health of all human
beings.36 Indeed Spinoza maintains that without the teaching and the
testimony of Scripture, which is the foundation of theology or religion,
we would doubt the salvation of almost everyone.37 Still, theology
or religion is not philosophy. Theology or religion is a teaching that
involves or invokes suprarational knowledge and supranatural events.38
Theology or religion makes its appeals to the base or ignorant dispositions of passionate human beings; and its emphasis upon elements of
the imaginative-affective life provokes animosity in the nonphilosophers
toward philosophy or whatever else seems to be contrary to the customarily embraced notions about theology or religion.39
Given the predicament of his setting, namely, the basic human
disinclination toward philosophy combined with the animosity of the
received tradition of theology or religion toward philosophy and the
likely civic complicity in theological or religious pronouncements against
philosophy, one could wonder why Spinoza would introduce philosophy
indirectly or directly in the treatise at all. Would it not have been better
to leave philosophy for the philosophers? Should he not have left the
teaching of philosophy for another book on another occasion for a different audience? To answer that question in the affirmative would demand
that one neglect an important discrimination enunciated by Spinoza
at the close of his Preface to the treatise. One would do a disservice
36
37
38
39

TTP 3: 179; 188.

TTP 3: 188. The Latin word translated into English as salvation is salus.
TTP 3: 56; 1516; 8186; 91; 153; 15556; 165; 168; 17478; 18485.
Spinoza asserts that theological hatred is the worst kind of hatred (TTP 3: 212).

philosophy

43

to the treatise, a disservice to its author, and a disservice to himself if

he were to fail to remember the intended addressee of Spinozas old
book. It must be recalled that the teaching of the treatise is specifically
intended for the one who reads Philosophically and Spinoza then
adds that the vulgar, therefore, and all who are vexed by like affects
with the vulgar I do not invite to read this [ book].40
Spinozas treatise is a book written for readers who might be or could
be disposed to philosophy. But it also is a book written for philosophical readers that can be read and will be read by many people who are
not disposed to philosophy, who may reject philosophy out of hand, or
who already may be convinced that philosophy indeed is detrimental
to piety and public peace. While Spinoza communicates with the one
who reads philosophically in the treatise, he nonetheless also is aware
that the nonphilosophers are reading his book as well.41 He knows that
TTP 3: 12. One who reads Philosophically is a literal way to render the Latin
words Philosophe lector. In the passage cited, Spinoza invites a certain kind of reader to
examine the treatise; he says that the main points of the TTP I believe are evident
enough to Philosophers; and he asks the vulgar and those who suffer from vulgar
passions not to read his book. Spinoza himself therefore acknowledges that the treatise is speaking simultaneously to a variety of audiences with different suppositions,
convictions, and intellectual interests or disinterests and abilities. It would be unsound
to think that the TTP can be read, and read well, without regard to the distinctions
announced by Spinoza himself.
41
A different formulation of the proposition was stated by Leo Strauss in How
to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1952): In the Treatise Spinoza addresses potential philosophers
of a certain kind while the vulgar are listening (p. 184). The essay first appeared in
Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 17 (1948): 69131. In another essay,
Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss enunciates a broader principle for the
kind of writing and reading that is required for certain kinds of old books: how can
a man perform the miracle of speaking in a publication to a minority, while being
silent to the majority of his readers? The fact that makes this literature possible can
be expressed in the axiom that thoughtless men are careless readers and only thoughtful men are careful readers (Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 25). In Epistle 30 to
Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza asserted that in the TTP he was attempting to assist the
more prudent sort of person. Perhaps that more prudent sort of person would be
the thoughtful and careful reader, the one who reads philosophically, or a potential
philosopher who could apprehend what Spinoza was conveying in the TTP while the
vulgar were induced to focus on other matters in the treatise that were of much less
interest to philosophers, e.g., they could lose themselves in speculative disputes about
theological issues (TTP 3: 18088). Even Strauss acknowledged that at one time he
himself had failed to attend sufficiently to the difference between the statements in
the TTP that were intended for the philosophic readers and the statements that were
intended for the nonphilosophers. In the Preface that he added to the English language
publication of Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft Untersuchung
zu Spinozas Theologisch-Politischem Traktat (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1930) [Spinozas
Critique of Religion, trans. E.M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken Books, 1965)], Strauss
40

44

part one

they are disinclined to accept what philosophy teaches yet he knows that
the nonphilosophical things which they have been taught and which
they believe are not entirely useless. The nonphilosophical doctrines
can impact the lives of the nonphilosophers in broadly positive ways.
Perhaps then Spinoza decided to present the philosophic teaching of
the treatise at one remove from the more conspicuous theological and
political teachings of his book as much for the sake of protecting the
nonphilosophers from certain of the doctrines that philosophy does
teach as it may have been for the sake of shielding philosophy from
the hostility of theology or politics.42
Spinozas old book raises a philosophic problem. The philosophic
problem concerns human nature and the prospects for human sociability.
The treatise provides a theologico-political solution to that philosophic
problem while philosophy itself largely is understated and operates
from the recesses of the book. If the declared intentions of Spinozas
book are to separate philosophy from theology and to secure the
liberty of philosophizing43 then it would seem that philosophy and the
teaching of philosophy should have been displayed more prominently in
the treatise and they should have been allotted more attention. But the
teaching of philosophy is not perspicuous in the treatise; and that fact
has occasioned different interpretations and explanations of Spinozas
old book among various scholars.
There are many scholars who argue that the purpose of the treatise
is to address a contemporary set of questions or problems that affected
The Netherlands at the close of the 1660s. Defenders of the republican
movement were pitted against the monarchists and their supporters.
The Calvinists also were contending with a variety of dissenting religious sects. Spinozas book takes sides in both of those conflicts. Thus
a significant portion of Spinoza scholars maintain that the treatise is
mainly a timely critique and treatment of the difficulties of its age.

made the following confession: I became ever more attentive to the manner in which
the heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their books. As a consequence of this, I
now read the Theologico-political Treatise differently than I read it when I was young. I
understood Spinoza too literally because I did not read him literally enough (p. 31).
42
Though the motive of protecting nonphilosophers from philosophy and the motive
of shielding philosophy from the nonphilosophers both could have influenced Spinozas
decision to write the TTP the way he did, the former is the more controversial and the
more neglected of the two motives. I have discussed my view on the matter in On
the Practice of Esotericism, Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992): 23147.
43
TTP 3: 7; 10; 17980; 188; 247.

philosophy

45

Therefore propounding the teaching of philosophy in such a book

would be neither Spinozas chief interest nor his principal concern. It
even could have proven to be counterproductive or a distraction for
him to have done so. On that view, then, the treatise is a problemsolving exercise. It was an attempt to offer a philosophic analysis of
the contemporary Dutch situation while simultaneously furnishing a
set of recommendations for resolving the crises that had occasioned
the immediate difficulties in The Netherlands. The recommendations
included a recovery of a putatively more original, basic, and benign
sense of the significance of theology, which would occasion a reorientation of attitudes about matters pertaining to worship, dogma, Scriptural
interpretation, as well as judgment and speech about theological or
religious issues, etc., together with the endorsement of a polity that
espoused principles of democratic liberalism. Consequently, whatever
philosophical position may have determined Spinozas recommendations
in the treatise, Spinoza scholars have come to conclude that the definitive statement of Spinozas philosophy is fully developed and presented
only in his magnum opus, the Ethica ordine Geometrico demonstrata.44 One
even might go farther. One could extend the thesis adopted by such
scholars and contend that there really was no teaching of philosophy
to be presented in the treatise because the doctrine propounded in
the Ethica had not been completed yet. If some basic facets of the
later systematic philosophic teaching can be discerned in the treatise,
their appearance in the earlier book can be explained by the fact that
composition of some parts of the Ethica already had begun in the early
1660s. Therefore whatever philosophy is detectable in the Tractatus
theologico-politicus is either an early and rudimentary form of Spinozas
final completed philosophic teaching; or it is only a partial and much
less thorough version of Spinozas complete philosophic teaching.45

44
In B.d.S. Opera Posthuma (Amstelodami, 1677). Part 4 of the Ethica contains
propositions that would align best with the view claiming that the TTP at most only
foreshadows the eventual systematic formulation of Spinozas teaching in the Ethica;
see, e.g., Propositions 3637 which concern political life.
45
Among those who have expressed the kind of perspective sketched here, one would
include Abb Antoine Sabatier de Castres, Apologie de Spinoza (Paris, 1766); A.E. Renthe,
Probatio quod B. de Spinoza graviter errans non fuerit atheus (Coethen, 1766); A.W. Rehberg,
Treatise on the Nature of Forces [trans. Anonymous] (Berlin, 1779); James Martineau, A
Study of Spinoza (London: Macmillan and Company, 1882); Frederick Pollock, Spinoza:
His Life and Philosophy (London: Duckworth and Co., 1899); Henry A. Wolfson, The
Philosophy of Spinoza, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1934); Alexandre Matheron, Le Christ et le salut des ignorants chez Spinoza (Paris: Aubier,

46

part one

In other words, at best and at most, the treatise may contain some
hints of the fully articulated philosophy of Spinoza that yet was to
come; and, at a glance, there may be much in the treatise and in the
history of Spinoza scholarship to support the plausibility of that sort
of conclusion which has been reached by many, if not to say most,
Spinoza scholars. However, their conclusion can be maintained only at
the expense of dismissing Spinozas explicit declaration in the Preface
to the treatise that his book is addressed to philosophic readers and the
nonphilosophers are asked to leave the book alone lest they become
annoying by interpreting it perversely.46
On the other hand, it can be concluded from the statements made
in the treatise itself that the teaching of philosophy occupies a covert
position in Spinozas book, or the philosophic teaching of the book is
communicated only indirectly, because philosophy not only is separate
from theology or religion but philosophy also fundamentally is at odds
with theology or religion.47 Insofar as theology or religion emphasizes
that its source or foundation rests on matters that surpass human grasp
(captum humanum superat) and insofar as it regularly affirms the occurrence of supranatural events, the teaching of theology and the teaching
of philosophy must be at odds with each other. The tension between
them owes to their very divergent regards for the status of reason and
its ability to provide an account of nature. The source of theology
or religion is revelation;48 and, according to the teaching of theology
or religion, revelation provides a valid knowledge of the world and a
valid teaching about the conduct of human life and the governance of
human affairs that is superior to the knowledge of the world and the

1971); E.E. Harris, Is There an Esoteric Doctrine in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus?

Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis 38 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978); Andr Tosel, Spinoza, ou
le crepuscule de la servitude: essai sur le Trait Thologico-politique (Paris: Aubier, 1984);
Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989); Edwin M. Curley, Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece, II: The
Theologico-Political Treatise as a Prolegomenon to the Ethics, Central Themes in Early Modern
Philosophy, ed. A.J. Cover and M. Floistad (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1990); Herman de Dijn, Knowledge, Anthropocentrism, and Salvation,
Studia Spinozana 9 (1993); Jacques Moutaux, Exotrisme et philosophie: Leo Strauss et
linterprtation du Trait thologico-politique, Spinoza au XX e Sicle, ed. Olivier Bloch (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1993); Lee C. Rice, Faith, Obedience, and Salvation in Spinoza, Lyceum 6 (1994); and Nancy K. Levene, Spinozas Revelation: Religion,
Democracy, and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
46
TTP 3: 12.
47
TTP 3: 16768; 17374; 18081.
48
TTP 3: 56; 15; 180.

philosophy

47

knowledge of human life that is reached by reason.49 For Spinoza, the

words theology and revelation are identical.50 So, if theology or revelation teaches what surpasses human grasp, what exceeds the limits
of the human intellect, or what happens in contradiction of the laws
and operations of nature then theology and philosophy must conflict
with one another; for philosophy and philosophizing are indistinguishable from the exercise of reason51 and, according to Spinoza, what is
contrary to nature is contrary to reason, and what is contrary to reason
is absurd.52 Thus, at the most fundamental level, the orientation of
theology or revelation toward the world and toward human life and
the orientation of philosophy or reason toward the world and toward
human life essentially are different from each other. If that constitutive
difference between them cannot be surmounted, but philosophy still
acknowledges the utility of theology to human conduct, then philosophy
is obligated to convey its teaching in a circumspect manner, or at least
it is obliged to communicate its teaching in a manner that pays heed
to the authority, function, and influence wielded by theology or religion
in everyday life. In an important respect, the problem encountered by
Spinoza in the treatise is similar to the one encountered by Socrates
in The Apology. How does one defend philosophy before a hostile audience or jury but simultaneously encourage others to philosophize?53
Or, from an even more troubling perspective, how does one defend
the defendant, namely, philosophy, without simultaneously exposing
it to further prosecution? Scholars who recognize the problem being
addressed by Spinoza in the treatise also recognize that there may be a
49
TTP 3: 1516; 2021; 28; 88; 95; 9899; 114; 15556; 16263; 168; 170; 18485;
188; 198200.
50
TTP 3: 184.
51
One source for the identification of philosophy with reason in the treatise is
located in the opening sentence of chapter 15 of the TTP. The title of the chapter sets
the words Theology and Reason as alternatives. The first sentence of the chapter
then substitutes the word Philosophy for Reason (TTP 3: 180) which confirms that
Spinoza recognizes the words as interchangeable. With respect to the suprarational
character of revelation, theology, or faith, see TTP 3: 1516; 2021; 28; 88; 95; 9899;
114; 15556; 16263; 168; 170; 18485; 188; 198200. In the Preface to the TTP,
Spinoza says that he found nothing in the things that Scripture expressly teaches which
did not agree with the intellect or which conflicted with it (TTP 3: 10; and compare
3: 68) but the seriousness of that statement must be reevaluated based upon Spinozas
own account of what philosophy and reason are and what they teach.
52
TTP 3: 91.
53
Socrates expressly warns his audience, the jury, about their need to discriminate
between speeches that are calculated to persuade but which are false and speeches
that are calculated to persuade which are true (Apology 17ad).

48

part one

serious and longstanding opposition between theology or religion and

philosophy that cannot easily be overcome. Indeed, the longstanding
opposition requires the use of certain literary devices that will enable
the philosopher to defend philosophy from its prosecutors and persecutors while also allowing the philosopher to convey his thinking to the
one who reads philosophically.54
54
During the twentieth century, Leo Strauss became the chief proponent of this
view in his essay, How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise, Persecution and the
Art of Writing, pp. 142201. Strauss proposed that in the TTP Spinoza communicated
the teaching of philosophy between the lines (pp. 17780). Strauss conclusion, and
his argument for it, continues to cause debate among Spinoza scholars and others
who contest Strauss reading of certain old books. However, Strauss was not the first
to conclude that Spinoza had introduced philosophy and its unconventional teachings
surreptitiously into the TTP. One also may consult Elmer E. Powells Spinoza and Religion
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trbner & Company, 1906). But Powells account, like
Strauss account, reflected a tradition of Spinoza interpretation that dates from the time
of the publication of the TTP. One early attack on the TTP sought to demonstrate that
Spinoza cleverly had attempted to conceal the genuine purpose of his book. According to Musaeus, a Professor of Theology at Jena, the author of the TTP had left no
mental faculty, no cunning, no art untried in order to conceal his [atheistic intention]
beneath a brilliant veil, see Tractatus theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen examinatus
( Jena, 1674) pp. 12. Johannes Bredenburg sought to expose the positions that Spinoza
attempted to conceal in the TTP in Joannis Bredenburgii enervatio tractatus theologico politici,
una cum demonstratione, geometrico ordine disposita Naturam non esse Deum, cujus effati contrario
praedictus tractatus unice innitur (Kiel, 1675). Christian Kortholt decried Spinozas use shifts
and equivocations in the TTP and he noted their harmful consequences for theology in
De tribus impostoribus magnis liber (Kiloni literis & sumptibus Joachimi Reumanni, 1680) pp.
7275, 9699, 14448. In Deism Examind and Confuted in Answer to a Book intitled Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus (London: Charles Brown, 1697), Mathias Earbury maintained that
most readers easily could recognize the heterodox character of the doctrine conveyed
in the TTP. But Earbury also went further. He argued that the author of the TTP
was guilty of deliberate ambiguity of expression (p. 14) and affected obscurity
(p. 119) in his writing. Still, by focusing on the implications of the discrepant statements
that he discovered in the TTP (pp. 99102, 119, 138, 178, et al.); Earbury concluded
that Spinoza concealed his own atheism by pretending to be a Deist (p. 180). In
Arguments to Prove the Being of God with Objections against it Answered, A Defense
of Natural and Revealed Religion: Being a Collection of Sermons Preached at the Lecture founded by
Sir Robert Boyle, Esq. 16911732, 3 vols. (London, 1739), John Hancock impugned Spinoza for using insinuation to undermine the Foundation not only of Revealed, but
natural Religion, and the Belief in the Being of God (2: 253). J. Roberts maintained
that Spinoza had dissembled his Principles . . . He plainly suspected his own constancy
and therefore we injure not his Memory if we suspect it too in The Christian Free-Thinker:
Or an Epistolary Discourse on Freedom of Thought (London, 1740) pp. 5860. Similar recent
cases about Spinoza and his manner of literary communication have been made by A.J.
Watt, Spinoza and the Use of Religious Language, The New Scholasticism 66 (Summer
1972) pp. 286, 29394, 307; and Efraim Shmueli, The Geometrical Method, Personal
Caution, and the Ideal of Tolerance, Spinoza: New Perspectives, eds. R.W. Shahan and J.I.
Biro (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978) p. 210. I have written on
the subject in Harris, Strauss, and Esotericism in Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus,
Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1996): 387413; Spinoza, the Status

philosophy

49

Because of the opposition between theology and philosophy, a philosopher can endeavor to manage the situation in one or another of
a variety of ways. Philosophy can ignore its opponent; it merely can
decide that theology or religion is an unavoidable nuisance and obstacle
that probably will continue to persist. But ignoring the opponent will be
insufficient for the purpose of lessening the opposition between theology or religion and philosophy since the philosophers decision would
have no effect on theology or religion. That is, if philosophy ignores
theology or religion there is no guarantee that theology or religion will
ignore philosophy in return. Another option is for philosophy simply
to destroy theology or religion and eliminate the opponent. Philosophy
thereby might secure itself to some degree; philosophy will have removed
a principal cause of the aversion to philosophy that is felt by many
human beings and which feeling was prompted by theology or religion.
But the attempt to eliminate theology or religion would only bring
philosophy into more disrepute than it already suffers. Furthermore,
the elimination of the prevailing prejudiced and superstition-ridden
theology or religion would do nothing to preclude the emergence of
another equally prejudiced and superstition-ridden theology or religion
to succeed the one that just has been eliminated. Even a more liberal
or putatively enlightened theology or religion might yet come to be
permeated by vulgar and obtuse views for the reason that all human
beings by nature are prone to superstition.55 In other words, theology
or religion just may be a fact of life and human nature that can be
neither ignored nor eliminated by philosophy.
Still, another option may be feasible for philosophy. The philosopher
can attempt to tame his opponent. The taming of theology or religion
involves neutralizing the opponents capacity to harm philosophy or to
hinder the liberty of philosophizing.56 The taming of theology or religion

of Prophecy, and Exoteric Teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Da Natureza ao

Sagrado: Homenage a Francisco Vieira Jordao, ed. Mrio de Carvalho (Porto: Fundaao
Eng. Antonio de Almeida, 1999); and Spinoza, Philosophic Communication, and the
Practice of Esotericism, Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize, ed., Paul J. Bagley
(Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
55
TTP 3: 6.
56
One example of the kind of taming of theology or religion that occurs in the
TTP is illustrated by Spinozas claim at the close of chapter 4 of the treatise that
Scripture commends the natural divine light (TTP 3: 68). The argument proposes
that revelation itself actually approves of reasons competence to apprehend the
divine law on its own. On the face of it, Spinozas claim suggests a kind of intersection or integration of revelation and reason. But (a) if revelation relates suprarational

50

part one

involves a modification of certain basic elements of the prevailing tradition together with a renovated assessment of which elements of that
tradition actually constitute the indispensable principles or tenets of
theology, religion, or faith.57 Furthermore, if philosophy succeeds in its
task and it manages to tame theology or religion, the natural human
inclination toward things theological or religious also continues to be
appeased. The disposition of nonphilosophic human beings to look
above or to look beyond nature for the satisfaction of their needs and
desires still is accommodated; and the positive effects of theology or
religion on human behavior still can be maintained. Consequently,
the taming of theology or religion is more possible, more desirable,
and more prudential than either of the alternatives of ignoring it or
eliminating it. However, the philosophic work of taming theology or
religion requires considerable subtlety. Philosophy has to put forward
a teaching of theology or religion that remains credible and which
allows theology or religion to continue to exert influence over the lives
of the faithful. However, the teaching of theology or religion that is
presented by philosophy also must prevent theology or religion from
exercising any authority over philosophy. To achieve the task of taming
theology or religion, philosophy must navigate a complicated path. It
has to establish the legitimacy of separating philosophy from theology
or religion. But philosophy must achieve the objective of neutralizing
theology or religion without subverting it entirely. Thus Spinozas teaching in the treatise involves a literary practice whereby he theologizes
overtly while he simultaneously philosophizes covertly.
Deciding neither to ignore nor to eliminate its opponent, philosophy
seeks to correct the prevailing tradition of theology or religion through
knowledge then surely it does not intersect with what is attainable through the use of
ordinary or natural knowledge alone, namely, what can be attained by reason; on the
contrary, revelation communicates sure knowledge of some matter that supersedes
reason. Moreover (b) it is hard to take seriously the claim that revelation approves what
reason concludes about the divine law. If that were the case then revelation would be
superfluous; reason would be sufficient. Spinoza tames theology or religion by making
an appeal to a particular reading of Scripture. On the basis of that reading, he can
curtail the authority of theology or religion to contest the competence of philosophy
or reason in grasping or interpreting the meaning of the divine law. Theology or religion is preserved and a certain respect for it is conceded. But the power and authority
associated with theology or revelation also has been mitigated.
57
Both Plato and Spinoza demand that the poetry about god(s) be submitted to a
certain hygienic supervision so as to assure that the right tales about god(s) are told. The
tales remain basically familiar but they omit whatever may tend to provoke controversy
or discord; compare TTP 3: 17780 and Republic 377b394b.

philosophy

51

an exposure of its missteps, its errors, and its corruptions. The ostensible
purpose of exposing the traditions mistakes is to occasion a return to
a more original and basic understanding of the sense of theology or
religion that retrieves and accentuates what are said to be the most
indispensable principles or tenets of faith. But if the teaching of theology or religion and the teaching of philosophy in fact collide with each
other then Spinoza cannot propose with seriousness that philosophic
readers of the treatise approve his version of the teaching of theology
or his version of the recovered ancient Religion. Philosophy must
propound a version of theology or religion for the nonphilosophers
that will incorporate the utility of the tamed theology or religion and
still permit it to fulfill its unique function in respect of the salvation
of almost everyone. As Spinoza himself states it, except that we have
Scripture or theology or revelation or religion or faith we would doubt
the salvation or wellbeing of nearly all human beings.58 The tamed
theology of the treatise is stripped of the most harmful elements of
the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, namely, useless superstitions and ignorant prejudices. But the remaining elements of the
tradition that the teaching of theology in the treatise retains continue
to be attractive to the passionate, nonphilosophic inclinations and
aspirations of ordinary human beings. Theology or religion remains
based on the Scriptures and from the outset they have been devised to
lay hold of the imaginations of those who read or hear them so as to
appeal to their passions, sentiments, prejudices, opinions, and experiences.59 But the one who reads philosophically, that is, the one to
whom the treatise is addressed, will be drawn in a different direction.
The one who reads philosophically will be pointed toward the covert
philosophizing or the indirect teaching of philosophy that is contained
within the treatise.
Lambert van Velthuysen was a contemporary of Benedict Spinoza.
He was educated at the University of Utrecht where he studied philosophy, theology, and medicine. Upon the completion his studies, he
remained in Utrecht and established himself as a physician. He also
continued to involve himself in scholarly pursuits and he embroiled
himself in debates about a few public controversies. During his time at
the university, van Velthuysen had become a disciple of the philosophic

58
59

TTP 3: 179 and 189.

TTP 3: 2835; 4344; 9091; 15354; 15761; 167; 17374; 18083.

52

part one

teaching of Ren Descartes and a supporter of the Collegiants. His

views therefore were regarded as liberal and unconventional. In 1655,
van Velthuysen published a tract in defense of the Copernican system
in which he maintained that the thesis concerning the motion of the
earth and the immobility of the sun did not entail a contradiction
of the Scriptures.60 The small book provoked a large dispute over
the relationship between science and Scripture that was seen to have
implications for theology, politics, and philosophy, broadly conceived.61
Van Velthuysen remained at odds with the Calvinist theologians and
preachers, as well as the Dutch authorities, until his death in 1685.
Van Velthuysen was a liberal, reform-minded, controversial, free
thinker. But he was not sympathetic to the doctrines contained in the
Tractatus theologico-politicus nor was he an ally of its author. Van Velthuysen
was opposed to the teaching of the treatise and he took pains to rebut
its claims. Though he was a fervent opponent of Spinozas teaching, it
also seems that he was a careful reader of Spinozas book. In a letter
to Jacob Oostens, dated 24 January 1671, van Velthuysen composed a
lengthy refutation of the treatise.62 He began his epistle to Oostens by
remarking that he did not know the nation or the occupation of the
anonymous author of the treatise but he acknowledged the intelligence
of the author of the book. Nevertheless, van Velthuysen argued that
the treatise sought to undermine revealed religion and he concluded
that the book endorsed atheism. He cited the treatises claims about
the necessity of Gods nature, the denial of miracles, the intellectual
inferiority of the prophets, and the role of the civil authority in respect
of public worship, among other propositions, as providing evidence
that the treatise actually undermines and excludes all worship and
60
Rienk Vermij, The Calvinist Astronomers: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the
Dutch Republic 15751750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van
Wetenschappen, 2002) p. 272; and Benedict Spinoza, The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1995) pp. 35 note
78 and 225 note 213.
61
The Calvinist Astronomers, pp. 27788.
62
The letter from van Velthuysen to Oostens was published as Epistle 48 in the Opera
posthuma ([Amstelodami] 1677) p. 553ff; in modern editions of the correspondence, the
letter appears as Epistle 42. In 1673, when he was at Utrecht to visit the Prince de
Cond, Spinoza met with van Velthuysen on a number of occasions, see The Letters,
p. 324 note 344. In the Autumn of 1675, Spinoza wrote to van Velthuysen and asked
him to provide the arguments that you believe that you can bring against my treatise.
Spinoza then praised van Velthuysen for his devotion to the truth and his exceptional
sincerity of mind (Epistle 69, The Letters, pp. 32324); the missive from Spinoza to van
Velthuysen in 1675 was not included in the publication of the Opera posthuma.

philosophy

53

religion. Still, more striking was how van Velthuysen concluded that
Spinoza had accomplished the task of subverting theology or religion
in the treatise. For van Velthuysen ended his letter to Oostens with the
accusation that Spinoza had endeavored to teach atheism in the treatise
by hidden and disguised arguments [tectis et fucatis argumentis].
The correspondence between van Velthuysen and Oostens was available to readers of Spinozas writings as early as 1677; the letter was
published among the contents of the Opera posthuma. The fact that van
Velthuysens missive appeared in the posthumously published collection
of Spinozas writings is a matter of more than passing interest. One
curious aspect of the letters inclusion in the volume is the fact that
van Velthuysens epistle was not written to Spinoza. Van Velthuysen
did not know who the author of the treatise was. Instead his critique
of the treatise was presented in a letter that he wrote to Jacob Oostens
who then passed the epistle to Spinoza, presumably because Oostens
thought that van Velthuysens refutation of some of the chief points
of the treatise was worthy of Spinozas attention. The presence of
the van Velthuysen epistle in the Opera posthuma at first seems justified
only inasmuch as it contains the criticisms of the treatise to which
Spinoza was responding in a letter that he wrote to Oostens.63 In fact,
Spinozas letter to Oostens begins with the acknowledgement that he
undertakes the correspondence out of obligation. That is, Spinoza
says to Oostens that there is no reason to answer [van Velthuysens]
letter other than to keep my promise [to you]. Still, the editors of
the Opera posthuma, who were intimate friends of Spinoza, chose to
include the van Velthuysen letter in the publication of that volume;
and the letters that were printed in the Opera posthuma were deemed
by the editors to be worthy of inclusion in the posthumous volume
for the reason that they contributed not a little to the elucidation of
his other works. Contained within the Opera posthuma were the works
entitled Ethica ordine Geometrico demonstrata, Politica, De emendatione intellectus,
Epistol & ad eas Responsiones, and Compendium grammatices lingu Hebr.
In the most obvious sense, the letters and responses contained within
the Opera posthuma well might serve to elucidate the other works found
in the posthumously published volume. But since multiple references

63
The letter appears as Epistle 49 in the Opera posthuma and as Epistle 43 in modern
editions of Spinozas correspondence.

54

part one

are made to the Tractatus theologico-politicus in the Preface to the Opera

posthuma, and van Velthuysens letter does refer to the treatise by name,64
one also justifiably may conclude that the treatise should be counted
among those other works which can be elucidated by the letters and
the responses to them. What van Velthuysens letter may be said to
contribute by way of elucidation to Spinozas other work would
be his contention that the author of the treatise communicated what
he seriously held to be true in that book by way of disguised and
hidden arguments. No other epistle in the extant correspondence of
Spinoza makes any similar allegation about the philosophers manner
of writing; and although van Velthuysen renounced both the disguised
and the undisguised teachings of the treatise, he also seems to have
recognized that Spinozas theologizing in the treatise was overt whereas
his philosophizing in the treatise was covert.
The most transparent function of philosophy in the treatise would
appear to be the service it performs in respect of correcting defects
in the prevailing tradition of theology or religion. Philosophy typically
appears in the treatise in the role of questioner and critic of theology or religion, the foundations of theology or religion, the doctrines
of theology or religion, or the oppressive character of theology or
religion. In the main, therefore, philosophy appears to fulfill only a
negative function in the treatise. It criticizes; it contests; it censures;
it counters. Its positive function seems to be limited to the fact that
it is able to expose the defects of the prevailing tradition of theology
or religion and then it suggests ways to repair them. Thus philosophy
in the treatise typically is seen as the source that corrects the errors
or the inventions that have corrupted theology or religion. So, in its
most conspicuous form, philosophy is experienced in the treatise as a
method65 that may be applied to emend the mistakes of theology or
religion. Philosophy is not represented as being hostile or antagonistic
to theology or religion per se. Philosophy is not represented as ignoring
or eliminating theology or religion. Instead, philosophy or reason in the
treatise ostensibly is presented as a useful tool. At its best, philosophy

64
The title of the treatise is cited incorrectly in van Velthuysens letter as Discursus
theologico-politicus. But Spinoza does not dissociate himself from the book being discussed
by van Velthuysen, nor does he disclaim his authorship of it, in the letter he writes
to Jacob Oostens. Of course, by 1673, Spinoza generally had been acknowledged to
be the author of the TTP.
65
The Latin word methodus means way of teaching or a way of proceeding.

philosophy

55

is a method that allows one to appreciate theology, Scripture, faith, or

religion more accurately.66 At its worst, philosophy is a tool for pruning the contaminations of theology or religion that have accrued over
time, and sometimes the tool cuts too deeply and too sharply for many
peoples comfort.67 However, beneath the surface representation of the
function of philosophy, there is a categorical teaching of philosophy
that is provided by Spinoza in the treatise.
At the close of his account of the foundations of faith in chapter
fourteen of the treatise, Spinoza enunciates his definition of philosophy:
The foundations of Philosophy are common notions and they must be
obtained from nature itself alone.68 Philosophy, for Spinoza, is identical with knowledge of nature; and it would not be misleading to say
that Spinozas philosophic teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus is
identical with what he characterizes as the teaching about that which
is in accordance with nature or what may be termed the teaching
of nature. Access to the teaching of nature comes through natural
or ordinary knowledge that has shared foundations which are common to all human beings;69 and though Spinoza does not formulate
an epistemology in the pages of the treatise, discrete statements in
his book guide the reader to understand that philosophy, nature, and
the exercise of reason are integrally related. Philosophy and reason
fundamentally are connected through their common objective, truth.
That is, the goal of Philosophy is nothing other than truth70 and
reason is the dominion of truth and wisdom.71 Moreover, the truth
that is attained by philosophy or reason is reached exclusively on the
basis of a universal history of Nature which alone is the foundation
of Philosophy;72 for what is contrary to nature is contrary to reason,
and what is contrary to reason is absurd.73
In the treatise, philosophy is the exercise of reason that endeavors to
provide an account of nature which includes both human nature and

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

910; 2930; 36; 43; 88; 97102; 114; 118; 167; 180; 183; 24647.
180.
179.
15.
179 and 187.
184.
185.
91.

56

part one

nonhuman nature.74 However, Spinozas view of philosophy is intrinsically problematical to theology since theology also claims to supply an
account of human nature and nonhuman nature that derives from a
very different and superior source. That is, Spinoza identifies theology
with revelation75 and he asserts that the foundations of theology are the
stories and the language that are obtained from Scripture and revelation alone.76 Yet theology or revelation communicates what surpasses
human grasp or what exceeds the limits of human understanding.77
Theology or revelation, therefore, imparts what is beyond, above, or
divergent from reason. Hence what theology or revelation communicates also may be contrary to reason. But what is contrary to reason,
on Spinozas view, is absurd and therefore also is refutable.78 Spinoza
is clear in his assertion that philosophy and theology are separate
from each other. The separation of the two means that neither should
interfere with the other.79 An accommodation between philosophy and
theology could be reached if each were to constrain itself within its
respective province and neither were to attempt to constrain the other.
But Spinozas statement about what is within the sphere of reason and
what surpasses human grasp makes any serious or genuine accommodation between philosophy and theology extremely unlikely. For if
philosophy concedes that theology does teach what surpasses human
grasp or what exceeds the limits of human understanding then philosophy also must concede without complaint that theology legitimately
can teach what is contrary to reason and hence absurd.
Because the domain of philosophy and reason is truth, it would seem
incumbent upon philosophy and reason to expose not only the errors or
mistakes that philosophy or reason has discerned in theology or religion

74
In the unfinished De intellectus emendatione, Spinoza defines the highest good of
human beings as the attainment of a nature that entails the knowledge of the union
that the mind has with the whole of Nature . . . To do so it first is necessary to understand
as much of Nature as suffices to acquire such a nature (Opera, ed. Gebhardt, 2: 9);
compare Republic 534 and Sophist 234e.
75
TTP 3: 184.
76
TTP 3: 179. In a set of passages in chapter 15 of the TTP, Spinoza establishes
that there is equivalence among the terms theology, faith, revelation, Scripture,
and piety by using the words interchangeably in relation to the unique doctrine that
human beings can be saved by obedience alone (3: 17985).
77
TTP 3: 1516; 2021; 28; 95; 9899; 114; 15556; 16263; 168; 170; 18485;
188; 198200.
78
TTP 3: 91.
79
TTP 3: 1011; 169; 18788.

philosophy

57

but more especially philosophy or reason should expose any absurdity

that was advanced by theology or religion. Such a practice however is
not always undertaken in the treatise. That is, with respect to certain
matters in the treatise, Spinoza does not openly contest questionable
theological principles or tenets. It immediately may not be clear why
philosophy or reason would let a theological absurdity stand without
contradicting or correcting it directly. Allowing a theological absurdity
to persist would seem permissible only if the absurdity somehow were
deemed to be expedient or salutary.80 Spinoza himself professes in the
treatise that the cardinal teaching of theology is useful and necessary
both to individual human wellbeing as well as to the wellbeing of a
republic.81 But he also acknowledges that faith (and hence theology
or revelation) only requires that its doctrines be pious; faith does not
require that its doctrines be true.82 The real tension between philosophy and theology in the treatise is reflected in the tension between the
teaching of nature or reason in the treatise, on the one hand, and the
teaching of what is above or beyond nature or reason in the treatise,
on the other hand. Indeed, a recognition of the elements involved in
that tension affords the reader, especially the one who reads philosophically, an avenue of access to understanding what transpires when
Spinoza theologizes overtly but philosophizes covertly. Cognizance of the
actual tension between philosophy and theology in the treatise prepares
thoughtful readers to detect when Spinoza is introducing his serious
philosophic thinking by way of hidden and disguised arguments. For
the moment, one example will suffice.
One form of the principal tension between the teaching of philosophy and the teaching of theology, that is, the tension between the
rational and the suprarational teachings in the treatise, is exhibited in
Spinozas claim about the central teaching of theology, revelation, or
faith. Spinozas statements about that doctrine and the consequences
80
Spinoza asserts that the fundamental dogma of Theology cannot be investigated
by the natural light or at least no one has been able to demonstrate the veracity of it
rationally or mathematically. Nevertheless, says Spinoza, the teaching of theology can
be embraced with moral certainty because of the authority of the prophets (TTP 3:
185). In other words, theologys essential doctrine cannot be proved to be true by the
exercise of reason but the doctrine can be adopted because of the moral reputation
of those who articulated it. Consequently, even an absurd doctrine can be advocated
and embraced if it happens to be morally salutary or if it promotes a certain sense
of human wellbeing.
81
TTP 3: 179 and 188.
82
TTP 3: 179.

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part one

of his statements about it help to elucidate the deeper meaning of his

book. According to Spinoza, the goal of Faith, as we have shown
abundantly, is nothing but obedience and piety.83 However, Spinoza
also says that we cannot perceive by the natural light that simple obedience is the way to salvation but only revelation teaches that it comes
from the singular grace of God, which we cannot attain by reason.84
Theology or faith, founded on revelation, teaches that obedience is the
necessary and sufficient condition for human salvation (salus). Reason or
philosophy cannot ascertain the veracity of theologys essential doctrine.
But reason or philosophy knows that whereas all human beings are able
to obey there are but very few human beings who acquire the habit of
virtue led by reason alone.85 Nevertheless because theologys teaching
of obedience is suprarational it then is a claim that is above or beyond
reason; and Spinoza explicitly rejects the legitimacy of all such claims.86
That is, in the treatise Spinoza concludes that those who hold that there
is some faculty that is above or beyond reason actually possess only a
fantasy that is far below reason.87 The pretense to possessing suprarational faculties or suprarational knowledge in fact is irrational.88 In
other words, it is not simply the case that readers of the treatise should
come to acknowledge that philosophy and theology are not subservient
to each other, that each stands on its own foundation, or that there is
no commerce nor affinity between them. Some readers of the treatise
also ought to recognize that philosophy and theology fundamentally
are opposed to each other. Theology posits what philosophy regards as
fantastic. Hence it is not only the case that philosophy is separate from
theology. Theology and philosophy teach different and opposite things.
For while philosophy is defined by its study of the teaching of nature,
theology is defined by its pronouncement of claims about what is above,
beyond, or contrary to nature and Spinoza regards such pronouncements as fantastic or absurd. On the decisive point concerning the
ultimate doctrine of philosophy and the ultimate doctrine of theology,
Spinoza insists that true human happiness and blessedness consist

83
84
85
86
87
88

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

180.
188.
185; 188.
13536.
80.
9798; 11213; 182.

philosophy

59

in wisdom and true knowledge.89 Since only philosophy or reason,

rather than theology, is dedicated to knowledge of the truth90 then it
must follow that philosophy rather than theology is most competent to
afford an account of human nature and an account of human happiness that will be sufficient to realize the three proper objects of desire
that constitute human wellbeing, namely: knowledge of things through
their primary causes; subduing the passions and acquiring the habit of
virtue; and living securely with a healthy body.91 Not only is theology
separate and different from philosophy but it also must be recognized as
inferior to philosophy; for only actions in accordance with the dictates
of reason are consonant with the wellbeing and true advantage of
human beings.92 Moreover, the knowledge that comes from philosophy
or reason is self-certifying by virtue of its own evidence but the knowledge attained and professed by theology, as it derives from revelation,
always requires extraneous certification.93 Whereas philosophy or reason
can stand on its own, theology or revelation cannot.
Very few human beings are capable of acquiring the habit of virtue through the exercise of reason alone. Therefore very few human
beings, left to their own devices, ever will achieve the second proper
object of desire. Those who achieve virtue will have done so because
of their knowledge of things, their knowledge of causes, and the
accounts they formulate about both human nature and nonhuman
nature. The important consequence of their satisfaction of the first
and second proper objects of desire is that they will be able to provide
for themselves a secure and healthy life.94 On the other hand, however,
the vast majority of human beings proceed differently. They possess a

89
TTP 3: 44. Following that declaration, Spinoza immediately adds that true happiness will not involve any sense of vainglory. Ones happiness will not be identical
with ones conviction that he is wiser than others or that others are less knowledgeable than he is. By contrast, one could note that the prevailing tradition of theology
or religion fosters vainglory among its members by demanding that they endorse one
interpretation of the meaning of Scripture as being superior to another interpretation
of the meaning of Scripture; or certain traditions of theology or religion cast one
religious sect as being more valid than another religious sect. Such practices in the
tradition of theology or religion only encourage the impudence of the theologians and
the preachers; and hence they encourage disdain for reason and philosophy among
ordinary human beings.
90
TTP 3: 172; 17880.
91
TTP 3: 46.
92
TTP 3: 69; 7374.
93
TTP 3: 30.
94
TTP 3: 73.

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part one

hope of attaining knowledge of things, acquiring virtue, or living in

security and health through their adherence to a set of suprarational
tenets. More precisely, their hope of satisfying the three proper objects
of desire is directly connected to their submission to theological or
religious dictates that promise them security and health if they profess
a particular creed and if they submit to a certain code of conduct in
their lives. Although reason or philosophy can provide human beings
with knowledge of causes, the acquisition of virtue, and a healthy,
secure life, most human beings are not inclined to philosophy nor are
they inclined to the exercise of reason that culminates in philosophy
or even in philosophizing. Instead most human beings look to what is
beyond or above reason and so they look to theology or religion and
revelation. For them the turn to suprarational dictates and the anticipation of supranatural events supersedes the turn to philosophy and
the exercise of reason that would bring them knowledge of nature,
knowledge of virtue, and the knowledge that is necessary for security
and health.95 For the vast majority of human beings, then, obedience to
a set of salutary doctrines may have to suffice if there is to be any hope
for human sociability; and perhaps obedience to salutary doctrines is
all that can be expected of them. Accordingly, the majority of human
beings will be encouraged to espouse teachings, opinions, or views that
conduce to sociability and general human wellbeing.96 To that end, some
form of theology or religion may be indispensable;97 and the version
of theology advocated by Spinoza in the treatise expressly recommends
obedience to a revealed law that demands the performance of acts of
justice and charity.98 In order to achieve a sustainable kind of security,
peace, and health, it is neither requisite nor possible to demand that all
human beings pursue knowledge of nature and knowledge of virtue.
Philosophy and philosophizing are not anticipated of all human beings.
Theology and obedience, on the other hand, can prove sufficient for
the task of making nonphilosophical human beings sociable since the
teaching of theology or faith or revelation is said to vouchsafe the salus
of nearly all humankind.99

95
TTP 3: 56; 1516; 29; 4345; 5859; 6870; 8185; 9598; 118; 17375;
17985.
96
TTP 3: 5859.
97
TTP 3: 7375.
98
TTP 3: 165; 17678; 188.
99
TTP 3: 188.

philosophy

61

The crucial subject of the treatise is human wellbeing and human

sociability. The crucial subject of the treatise then is the conduct of life
and the governance of human affairs. Philosophy recognizes that reason
is competent to afford the various sorts of knowledge that will enable
human beings to live well. That is, if the domain of philosophy and
reason is truth and if complete human happiness is achieved through
the attainment of true knowledge and wisdom then philosophy and
reason are the legitimate starting points for establishing the conditions
through which human beings can live well and thereby become happy.
The liberty to philosophize, the stated goal of the treatise, would seem
to be a prerequisite for the success of philosophy or reason in making
knowledge of nature, knowledge of virtue, and knowledge of secure
and healthy living possible. But philosophy or reason encounters a fundamental problem related to human nature. Human beings by nature
are not inclined toward philosophy. Instead they are inclined toward
superstition;100 and superstition, that is to say, religious overawe or
excessive fear of god(s), falls within the province of theology or religion. Thus human beings by nature are drawn more to theology or
religion than they are drawn to philosophy. Theology or religion can
exacerbate superstition or mitigate it but whichever course is taken
the fact remains that the prevailing tradition of theology or religion
is antagonistic to philosophy or reason and Spinoza contends that the
natural fact of superstition contributes to that antagonism.101 Indeed,
insofar as human nature is driven more by passion, instinct, or carnal
TTP 3: 6.
TTP 3: 57. Spinoza plainly suggests that the prevailing tradition and condition
of theology or religion is the matter under scrutiny in the treatise. In other words,
the theological or religious situation in The Netherlands or Europe in the seventeenth
century appears to be the focus of Spinozas attention. But his first example in the
treatise of a situation in which religion had gone awry is not a case from the contemporary Judeo-Christian heritage of seventeenth century Europe instead it is the
case of Alexander the Great, a pagan. Alexander succumbed to superstition when he
could not discern his fate in battle at the Gates of Susa and so he turned to augurs.
Spinozas choice of his first example to illustrate the tendency toward superstition in
human nature evinces that superstition and the problems it engenders are not unique
to Judeo-Christianity, the Hebrew Scriptures, the Christian Scriptures, or any particular
religion. On the contrary, superstition or the inclination toward superstition is a human
problem. The root of superstition is fear; and the passion fear is common to all human
beings (compare Leviathan [London, 1651] p. 2). If an inclination toward superstition, or
religious overawe, is natural to human beings then it also is the case that an inclination to theology or religion also is natural and common to human beings. Mastering
the passion of fear is a prerequisite for turning to reason rather than to revelation; and
subduing the passions is part of achieving the second proper object of desire.
100
101

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part one

urges, than it is governed by reason and insofar as human beings by

nature are drawn to superstition there is something about human nature
itself that disposes it to be resistant to the teaching and guidance of
philosophy or reason.102
Knowledge of what is by nature, and the truth about what is by
nature, are the proper objects of philosophy and philosophizing.103
Moreover, philosophy and philosophizing are identical with the exercise
of reason, or the exercise of the natural light, and the conclusions
that are established in accordance with philosophy or reason.104 Therefore the philosophic teaching of the treatise is contained in Spinozas
account of what reason concludes in respect of human nature and
nonhuman nature. The account of human nature in the treatise is most
fully articulated in chapter sixteen of the book. According to that teaching, human nature and nonhuman nature share a common foundation.
That is, it is the highest law of nature that each thing endeavors, to
whatever extent is in it, to persevere in its own state having regard for
none other but itself, and it follows to this that each individual has the
highest right, that is (as has been said), to existing and operating just
as it is naturally determined.105 An illustration of an individual thing
existing and operating just as it is naturally determined is given in
the case of greater and lesser fish in the water: fish by nature are
determined for swimming, the greater eating the lesser, thus fish have
the chief power of the water and the greater eat the lesser. For it is
certain that nature absolutely considered has the highest right to all of
which it is capable, that is, the right of nature itself extends as far as its
power itself extends.106 Spinoza is quite blunt about the relationship

TTP 3: 56; 1516; 73; 18991.

TTP 3: 95; 17980; 185.
104
TTP 3: 10; 95; 180; 183; 185; 187.
105
TTP 3: 189.
106
TTP 3: 189. Spinoza continues the proposition by explaining that the identification of right with power is justified on the view that the power of nature is the
power of God. That is, insofar as God has the highest right over all things and the
power/right of nature is the power/right of God then nature also must possess summum
ius over all things. Accordingly, natural power and divine power are the same and
knowledge of nature and its power would appear to be coincident with knowledge of
God and Gods power (TTP 3: 1516; 46; 60; 9596). Other consequences, however,
also accompany Spinozas claim. In his account of the identification of natural power
with natural right, Spinoza asserts that the universal power of the whole of nature
is nothing other than the same power of all individuals together hence it follows that
each individual has the highest right to all that it can do, or the right of the individual
extends as far as its determinate power extends (TTP 3: 189). Two curious implications
102
103

philosophy

63

between power and right. Natural right and natural power are identical. That which a thing can do it has a right to do; or natural right is
coextensive with determinate natural power.107 Spinoza, however, also
goes farther. The philosophic teaching of the treatise posits that nature,
considered in itself, involves a kind of moral neutrality. What human
beings consider to be ridiculous, absurd, or evil, in respect of what
they experience, derives only from human ignorance of the order and
coherence of the whole of nature. Human beings typically perceive
or conceive things only as discreet parts and consequently they fail to
appreciate the ultimate integrity of things as a whole. Human beings
gauge events and circumstances according to their own interests and
designs. Hence when natural power or natural right causes events
and consequences that do not conform to what a particular human
being or a group of human beings anticipates or desires then human
beings decry such events. What human beings call evil or good is not

follow from Spinozas proposition. First, if the power of nature is the power of God
but the power of nature also is nothing other than the same power of all individuals then the latter power also must be acknowledged to be identical with the power
of God. Or, individual power, natural power, and divine power are interchangeable
terms. Second, if the power of God is the power of nature and the power of
nature is the power of all individuals then God or nature must be understood to be
capable of acting against itself just as one individual can and does act against another
individual. That is, inasmuch as the highest law of nature is self-preservation and
each individual preserves itself without regard for any other thing but itself (TTP 3:
189) then self-preservation can involve the injury or the destruction of other individuals.
While such a consequence might be reconcilable with a broader philosophical view
of natures order and operation, that is, for example, things can come into being and
things can pass away, it is much more difficult to reconcile the consequence of mutual
injury or mutual destruction, as may be implied in Spinozas claims about power
and right, with any conventional sense of theology or religion. On the thesis that the
power of nature is the power of God is the power of all individuals one would
be compelled to acknowledge the logical implication that as individuals come into
being or individuals pass away so also the same thing must apply to divine coming into
being or passing away; such a tenet however is unacceptable to conventional theology
or religion. If Spinozas claims are interpreted to represent some attempt at a natural
theology one at least must recognize that such claims also are wholly subversive of
revealed theology; and the realization of the genuine tension between philosophy and
theology in the TTP cannot be obscured or neglected indefinitely.
107
Spinozas claim is reminiscent of the position advanced by Thomas Hobbes in
the first three paragraphs of chapter 14 of Leviathan (London, 1651) where he provides
definitions of The Right of Nature, Liberty, and A Law of Nature. Hobbes
asserts that The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation
of his Nature, that is to say, of his own Life, and consequently of doing anything
which, in his own Judgment and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means
thereunto (p. 64).

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determined in respect of the laws of all of nature taken together but

only in respect of the laws of our nature.108 Philosophically considered,
nature comprehended simply in itself adheres to the principle that each
individual thing always is existing and operating just as it is naturally
determined to do, regardless of what that existing and operating
might include or entail in respect of this or that or the other individual
thing, be it human or nonhuman. Moral blameworthiness and moral
praiseworthiness then must be acknowledged to be discriminations
made on the basis of dictates pronounced in accordance with human
nature.109 Nature in itself is neither good nor is it evil. Nature exists
and operates as it is determined to do consistent with the principles
and laws of nature. Therefore nature absolutely considered must
be recognized to be morally neutral.110 Still, the individual exercise of
natural right or natural power can be fraught with advantageous or
disadvantageous consequences and repercussions.
The lex summa naturae is that each individual endeavors to persevere
in its own state so far as it is able to do so. Each thing, by nature,
strives to continue to exist; and based on the highest law of nature
it is consistent with the teaching of philosophy regarding what is by
nature that the third proper object of desire is to live securely with a
healthy body.111 Though each individual is impelled by the highest law
of nature to preserve itself, the achievement of security and health can
be quite difficult. Unlike knowledge of nature and knowledge of the
causes of things or knowledge of virtue, each of which may be attained
through ones own nature and power, the means to achieving security
and healthy living principally are situated in external things.112 Having
resources readily available to satisfy ones basic needs or desires would
be an important component for fulfilling the highest law of nature and
to achieving a secure and healthy life. The absence of such resources,
however, would prevent individuals from fulfilling the highest law of
nature. Extrapolating from Spinozas example in the treatise about
aquatic life, it may be concluded that where there are no lesser fish,
it will be difficult for a greater fish to persevere in its own state; and
TTP 3: 191.
TTP 3: 191.
110
TTP 3: 5758; 18990. The moral neutrality of nature as a whole is echoed by
Friedrich Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, Section 13.
111
TTP 3: 46; and compare 47; 7374; 19192.
112
TTP 3: 47.
108
109

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65

where the water is impure neither greater fish nor lesser fish are
able to survive. Thus nature and the conditions of nature can facilitate
or impede what an individual achieves in respect of self-preservation
or in respect of achieving a secure and healthy life. The preservation
of both greater fish and lesser fish depends upon external things
and the same principle applies to human beings in terms of their preservation. Human nature will be a source that facilitates or impedes an
individuals fulfillment of the highest law of nature and the individuals
realization of the third proper object of desire.
By the right and plan of nature Spinoza says that he means nothing other than the rules of the nature of each individual according
to which we conceive each as naturally determined to existing and
operating in a certain manner. The ius et institutum naturae applies to
water, to lesser fish, to greater fish, and to every individual in nature.
Thus the ius et institutum naturae applies to human beings in the same way
that it applies to all of the other individuals of nature. The philosophic
teaching of the treatise does not establish nor does it acknowledge any
difference between human beings and the other individuals of nature
with respect to the fundamental principle or the basic practices implied
in the right and plan of nature, the highest law of nature, or the
identification of natural right with natural power. In terms of the law
that determines individuals to persevere in their own conditions and the
observance of that law by human beings, philosophy or the teaching of
nature admits no distinction between human beings who exercise reason
and human beings who are ignorant of true reason. Neither does the
philosophic teaching about human nature in the treatise discriminate
between rational or reasonable human beings, on the one hand, and
fools or madmen, on the other hand. Whatever any individual does, on
the basis of its own nature, it does with summum ius inasmuch as it is
existing and operating as it naturally is determined to do and it cannot do otherwise. Therefore, as long as human beings are considered
as living solely under the regime (imperium) of nature, anyone who does
not yet employ reason or anyone who does not yet possess the habit of
virtue lives solely under the influence of appetite with the same highest
right of nature as does the individual who conducts his life under the
guidance of reason. That is to say, just as the sensible human being
(sapiens) has the highest right to do all that reason dictates, namely, to
live in accordance with the laws of reason, so, too, an individual who
is ignorant of reason and who is wanton has the highest right to do

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all that is urged upon him by appetite, namely, to live in accordance

with the laws of appetite.113
The philosophic teaching of the treatise affirms that the life conducted
in accordance with reason and the life conducted in accordance with
appetite or passion are equally legitimate by nature. The summum ius of
existing and operating that is extended to the human being who conducts his life under the guidance of reason is the same summum ius that
equally is extended to the human being who conducts his life foolishly,
madly, or obsessively as he driven to do by his appetites or passions.
Since each natural individual endeavors to persevere in its own state, as
the lex summa naturae obliges it to do, inevitably there will be occasions
when exercises of the highest right to exist and to operate naturally
by the rational or sensible human being will conflict with exercises of
the highest right to exist and to operate naturally by the irrational
or foolish human being. By nature, then, it eventually will be the case
that rational human beings and irrational human beings will have
trouble endeavoring to persevere in their own respective states; and, as
a result, the prospect of their living securely with healthy bodies will be
imperiled, perhaps severely. For, in the attempt to preserve oneself and
113
TTP 3: 18990. Whereas most English translations of the TTP render the
Latin word sapiens as wise man, I have chosen to translate the Latin word sapiens by
the English words sensible human being. Sapiens derives from the Latin verb sapere
which means to taste or to have flavor. The word then also connotes something
having a taste or flavor. Subsequently, sapere came to mean to have a taste for a
thing, that is, to have taste or to have sense or discernment and so to be sensible.
I am not confident that in the TTP Spinoza intends any philosophically definitive
connotation for wisdom in the passage at issue. Rather, I think he aims at a more
general and commonsensical meaning for sapientia and/or sapiens. Spinozas remarks
in the TTP about the uniqueness of Solomon influence my decision. God is said to
have told Solomon that no one after him would be his equal in sapientia. Spinoza
says that such an expression only means that Solomons sapientia is of an extreme
kind; Gods remark does not mean that no one after Solomon would be wise. But
Solomons wisdom also consists chiefly in his prudence rather than his knowledge
of nature, for example, which is the province of philosophy. Solomon is prudens Rex
(3: 45). Thus Solomons distinction among human beings owes more to his possession
of practical wisdom ( prudentia) than to his possession of theoretical wisdom. In other
words, Solomons acclaimed wisdom is exhibited most in his political excellence as
a prudens Rex and a sensible individual rather than in his standing as a philosopher.
Indeed, although Spinoza explicitly praises Solomon for the fact that he surpassed all
others of his age in relying on the natural light, and his teaching plainly agrees
with everything that natural knowledge teaches about Ethics and true virtue, nevertheless Spinoza also explicitly says that Solomon ultimately cannot be considered to
be a philosopher (3: 41 and 68). Solomons sapientia and his condition as being sapiens
consist in the reasonability and sensibility that are evident in his teachings on theology and politics.

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67

to live securely with a healthy body, each individual, whether rational

or irrational, has the highest right to pursue and to obtain whatever
may be considered by the individual to be useful toward satisfying the
goals of self-preservation, security, or health. In other words, human
beings by nature are permitted to seek and to take whatever any one
of them deems to be useful and conducive to his wellbeing in terms of
self-preservation, security, or health; and every one of them may seek
and take whatever he deems useful to his wellbeing by any means that
are available to him. The Right and Plan of nature, under which all
are born and for the greater part live, prohibits nothing except what
no one desires or no one can do; it does not exclude struggles, hatred,
anger, ruses, nor absolutely any other thing that the appetite urges;
most notably, perhaps, the highest right of nature includes the use
of force if an individual estimates that it will be effective as a means
to any of the goals that he pursues.114
Life in accordance with the right and plan of nature entails that
each individual thing seeks to preserve itself and each individual thing
seeks to persevere in its own state through whatever means appear to it
to be the most useful or the most conducive to the goal of self-preservation. The means to self-preservation can be perceived very differently
by various individuals and those means can include treachery or force
or bodily injury to others and none of those means is proscribed by
nature. Therefore the lex summa naturae that impels all human beings
to endeavor to persevere in their own states is also the same lex summa
naturae that entitles them to exercise that ius naturae which in fact may
jeopardize the endeavor of any other individual human being to persevere in his own state. That is, each individual seeks its own preservation having regard for none other but itself and the natural right
of a human being is determined not by sound reason but by desire
and power.115 The influence of desire and power over human beings
induces them to yield to the urgings of their passions and to submit to
their carnal instincts. Passionate human beings, therefore, take little
regard for the future and they concern themselves only with their own
demands for the immediate satisfaction of their most urgent concerns
or needs.116 Moreover, their desires and needs tend to be idiosyncratic

114
115
116

TTP 3: 190.
TTP 3: 190.
TTP 3: 73; 19092.

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and inconstant. Impelled by the lex summa naturae to preserve himself,

an individual human being pursues what he perceives to be useful to
himself in terms of his own preservation. His pursuit of things contributing to his preservation, however, is determined chiefly by his own
sense of what supplies him with goods or what will allow him to avoid
evils. Yet the mode of discriminating among such goods and evils is
entirely subjective; for it is a universal law of human nature and it is
to be accounted among the eternal truths which no one can ignore
that every human being elects of two goods the one which he judges
to be the greater and of two evils the one which appears to be the
less. The accuracy of ones judgments about such matters, however,
is not assured. On the contrary, each individual will choose what he
seeks and he will determine what he does on the basis of the apparent usefulness of the objects before him, though there is no guarantee
at all that the matter necessarily is as he judges it. Notwithstanding
the susceptibility of human beings to err in respect of their judgments,
choices, or actions regarding the usefulness or uselessness of particular
things, it is a consequence of human nature that every individual will
regard as an enemy117 anyone who is considered to be an impediment
to the satisfaction of his interests, his needs, or his desires.118
The philosophic teaching of nature in the treatise exposes a serious
problem. The life conducted in accordance with passion is equally as

117
Spinozas reflection on the reason why human beings naturally may tend to
consider others as enemies is more subtle than the doctrine rendered by Thomas
Hobbes. In his account of the natural condition of human beings in chapter 13 of
Leviathan (Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning their Felicity, and
Misery), Hobbes characterizes pre-political life as a condition which is called war.
In the eighth paragraph of chapter 13, he states that the condition is such a war as
is of every man against every man; moreover, mere threats, suggestions, or suspicions
of violence are sufficient to constitute the condition of war (Leviathan [London, 1651]
p. 62). Thus Hobbes argues that war is a necessary consequence of the pre-political
condition of human beings. Spinoza does not seem to go so far. He makes clear that
there are imminent difficulties for human beings under the right and plan of nature
and the various but excessive exercises of natural right and natural power. But, unlike
Hobbes, Spinoza does not say flatly that nature is war.
118
TTP 3: 19092. Human beings pursue what they pursue on the basis of the
perceived usefulness or uselessness of the objects before them. The objects that appear
to conduce to someones wellbeing will be the objects that are sought by him; and the
objects that appear to be hindrances to his wellbeing will be avoided by him. What
human beings call useful, then, they also call good; and what they call useless, they also
call evil. The intimate relation between the concepts of utility and goodness, and the
subjective manner by which such things are determined, is demonstrated by Spinozas
account in the treatise of the making and keeping of pacts (3: 192; 196).

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69

legitimate by nature as the life conducted in accordance with reason.

Considered only under the regime of nature, or considered as existing
and operating only under the rubric of the highest law of nature,
the reasonable or sensible individual has no more right or power in
principle than does the unreasonable or insensible individual. Each one
is naturally determined to existing and operating in a certain manner. But the passionate or unreasonable individual, who judges and
chooses the objects of his desires and the means to his preservation on
the basis of the urgings of his appetites, typically opts for things that
actually may not promote his wellbeing at all. Moved by carnal instincts
or base impulses, and seeking immediate gratification of his longings,
the individual who responds only to the stimulations of his passions
and desires will neglect what is genuinely useful and advantageous to
his preservation, his security, his health, and his general wellbeing. The
passionate individual is determined to suffer such a fate because he
ignores or abandons reason and no one can doubt how much more
useful it is to live according to laws and the dependable dictates of
our reason which, as we have said, are directed only to what is of true
human usefulness.119
If every human being is impelled by the highest law of nature to
preserve himself but human beings are governed more by their passions
119
TTP 3: 191. The Latin sentence contains the phrase certa nostrae rationis dictamine.
The Latin adjective, certus, has an obvious English cognate in the word certain and
other English translations of the sentence render the Latin phrase in that manner.
For example, R.H.M. Elwes translates the phrase as assured dictates of reason (A
Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise [New York: Dover Publications, 1951;
originally published in London by G. Bell & Son, 1883] p. 202); Samuel Shirley uses
the words sure dictates of our reason (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [Leiden, New
York, Kbenhavn, Kln: E.J. Brill, 1989] p. 239); and Martin D. Yaffe translates the
words as the certain dictates of our reason (Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise
[Newburyport, Massachusetts: The Focus Philosophical Library, 2004] p. 181). In his
Glossary entry for the word certain, Yaffe also notes the ambiguity of the word
certus which would have been recognized by Spinoza. That is, he raises a question
about the epistemic standing of the word certus in the treatise. Yaffe wonders whether
the word univocally signifies something like sure-fire, something that involves irrevocable certitude, or whether the word also may allow the meaning of something
being well-established (p. 254). The Latin word certus also does mean resolved,
determined, fixed, settled, or purposed. With respect to moral matters, the
word signifies sure, unerring, faithful, and to be depended upon. I propose
that what Spinoza intends by the word certus is closest to the last alternative. I think that
in the TTP Spinozas teaching intends to emphasize the pragmatic dependability of
rational dictates rather than demand that readers of the TTP acknowledge a dictate
of reason as something that exhibits epistemic certitude. Hence I translate the Latin
word certus with the English word dependable.

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than they are governed by reason then it is difficult to conceive how the
choices, decisions, and actions of the vast majority of human beings
can be brought under the guidance of the dependable dictates of
reason that alone equips human beings with what is truly useful or
advantageous to them. The philosophic account of the ius et institutum
naturae formulated by Spinoza in the treatise discloses the obstacle that
human beings confront when they endeavor to persevere in their respective states or when they seek to achieve security and health. Human
beings, by nature, simply are drawn to whatever may be attractive to
any one of them. They are self-interested. Whatever anyone esteems
as useful to him he also esteems as a worthy object of desire since he
perceives it to contribute to his preservation and wellbeing. Accordingly,
he longs for it and he pursues it. Anyone who has the natural power to
acquire any object that he desires also has a natural right to acquire it.
One may deceive another, cheat another, steal from another, threaten
another, connive with another, and injure or kill another in order to
satisfy the desires or needs that one selfishly regards as indispensable to
his own preservation, security, health, or wellbeing. The natural condition of human beings then is fundamentally egocentric and isolated.120
But there is no guarantee that what each human being esteems and
pursues actually will satisfy his desires or allow him to achieve the end
he seeks because each individual typically judges, decides, chooses, or
acts in terms of what appears to each individual to be the most useful
or the most successful mode of attaining a greater good or of suffering
a lesser evil at any given instant. Mistaken perceptions, confused judgments, or erroneous opinions and the deeds that follow from them can
have dire consequences. It is quite possible that in the attempt to satisfy
the desire for preservation it will happen that evil rather than good
may befall individuals in the natural condition with the result that their
security, health, and wellbeing actually may be forfeited. In other words,
beyond the commonplace problems raised by human subjectivity and
human selfishness, the attempt by human beings to fulfill the lex summa
naturae through the exercise of the ius naturae that is intrinsic to the ius
et institutum naturae entails that life itself can be fraught with perils and

120
One may be reminded of Hobbes characterization of the life of man in the
state of nature as being solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Leviathan, chapter
13, paragraph 9 [London, 1651, p. 62]).

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71

achieving the third proper object of desire will be require more than
a little effort and skill.
Each natural individual exists and operates as it naturally is determined. Human nature is determined more by cupidity and power
than it is determined by sound reason. The prevalence of desire and
power over reason in life owes to the fact that human beings are born
ignorant of reason, its uses, and its advantages. Nevertheless it remains
possible to implement the faculty of reason. What is needed, perhaps,
is the establishment of a basic situation through which true reason
can be cultivated. For example, one could speculate that if the liberty
of philosophizing were granted to everyone then a greater number
of human beings would be introduced to the advantages of reason
and the advantages of living life in accordance with the advantageous
dictates that issue from reason. With the liberty to philosophize, more
human beings might come to appreciate the usefulness of the faculty
of reason and so they might consent to the use of it in respect of their
own interests or they even might elect to employ it themselves with more
frequency than they customarily do. But just establishing the liberty of
philosophizing probably is not enough; for even the general education
of human beings itself appears to present an obstacle to philosophizing.
That is, according to Spinoza, even in their rudimentary education and
training, most human beings develop habits and temperaments that
hinder them from developing reason fully and employing it to acquire
a true course of living and the habit of virtue.121
In the context of the claims of the treatise, Spinozas remarks about
education, training, and the prospects for the complete development
of reason among all human beings are significant. It is clear that the
theologians, for example, together with the educators in general, as well
as the people who are instructed by them, are educated human beings.
They have knowledge of various languages, arts, sciences, literatures,
histories, and so forth. But if Spinoza is correct that education and
training do not provide for a true course of living and the habit of
virtue then one must conclude that traditional education is unable to
convey what is needed in order to satisfy the second proper object of
desire. In other words, traditional education and training are inferior
to reason and philosophy which themselves enable human beings to
master the passions and acquire the habit of virtue. The defect of

121

TTP 3: 190.

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part one

the traditional education and training cited by Spinoza may owe to the
fact that traditional education and training toward acquiring a true
course of living and the habit of virtue already are corrupted by the
handmaiden thesis about the relationship between philosophy and
theology which is the chief impediment to any sort of philosophizing
in earnest by human beings.122 Under the influence of the prevailing
tradition of theology or religion, human beings are told that philosophy or reason or the natural light is inadequate to define or guide the
proper conduct of life or the governance of human affairs; and hence
human beings come to believe that philosophy is unable to teach a
true course of living and the habit of virtue. Traditional education and
training teach that philosophy or reason or the natural light cannot lead
human beings to security, health, or wellbeing. Instead it is maintained
that the correct path to human wellbeing is found in teachings that
relate something that is above or beyond reason and philosophy. Thus
human beings educated or trained in the traditional manner do not
possess or cultivate an unfettered reason. The faculty of reason that
they develop and employ is tainted by the biases of a theological or
religious tradition which itself may be rooted in a variety of contrarational and contranatural superstitions and prejudices that are opposed
to philosophy and which also are opposed by philosophy.
The issue that is raised and addressed by the philosophic teaching of the Tractatus theologico-politicus is the conduct of human life and
the governance of human affairs. The opening sentence of Spinozas
old book sets the problem that is to be solved by treatise: If human
beings were able to govern all their affairs with dependable counsel,
or if fortune always bore prosperity for them, in no way would they
be mastered by superstition.123 Human beings may conduct their lives
and govern their affairs in a variety of ways. But three particular kinds
of life are delineated by Spinoza. The question posed by the treatise
reduces to this: If human beings can conduct their lives and govern
their affairs with dependable counsel, and presumably they can prosper
and preserve themselves by doing so, why do they rely on fortune or
turn to superstition in the conduct of their lives and the governance of
their affairs? The answer to that question is not especially complicated.

TTP 3: 14.
TTP 3: 5: Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera
semper foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur.
122
123

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The turn to other recourses, to recourses other than reason, is connected with the basic facts of human nature. If human beings relied on
reason alone then they would enjoy a true course of living and they
would acquire the habit of virtue. But by nature human beings are
determined more by desire, passion, carnal instincts, and power than
they are determined by reason; and they also naturally are prone to
superstition.124 Yielding to passion and self-interest, human beings initially rely on fortune to influence their circumstances and they anticipate
that fortune will bestow on them whatever satisfies their needs, desires,
or concerns. But fortune does not always meet human expectations.
So human beings look to some other recourse that promises to meet
their expectations and alleviate their anxieties about their wellbeing
or their prosperity. Eventually human beings turn to superstition and
the tenets surrounding it in order to adopt a course of living that will
offer them the promise of the preservation, security, health, wellbeing,
or prosperity for which each individual human being longs.
Human beings judge, decide, choose, and act in selfish ways. They
opt for things on the basis of the apparent usefulness of those things
and in terms of which of the things appears to afford them greater
goods or which of the things will allow them to suffer lesser evils,
presuming that some evil must be endured. Human beings may try
to conduct their lives and govern their affairs on the basis of fortune
alone. In the past, perhaps, or even in the present, things that were
desired and sought were attained without the exercise of reason, without making any appeal to reason, and without expending any effort.
Fortune simply favors some human beings. But reliance on fortune as
a means to assuring ones own preservation and wellbeing can be risky;
for fortune involves external, unpredictable, and unexpected events that
follow from sets of causations or relations among things about which
the one who relies on fortune is entirely ignorant.125 Fortune may afford
an individual what he wants; it may not afford him what he wants; or
it even may afford more than he wants on any one occasion. If fortune
seems to afford what someone desires here and now it is likely that
the same person will expect fortune to give him what he desires or
seeks on a continual basis. But even if fortune proves to be stingy on
some occasion it is not necessarily the case that someone will seek an

124
125

TTP 3: 6; 81; 190.

TTP 3: 46.

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part one

alternative to it. Provided one does not suffer too greatly under the losses
that fortune may prompt, that is to say, so long as fortune does not
become oppressive, it is likely that one will continue to rely on fortune
in the conduct of his life and the governance of his affairs.
The difficulty of conducting ones life based on fortune is that fortune
is inconstant. If fortune always bore prosperity for men then life
would be comfortable, pleasant, and for the most part satisfying. But
human beings typically do not enjoy such a life. Instead fortune brings
both good fortune and bad fortune. Fortune does not favor everyone
equally and even those whom it appears to favor sometimes suffer debilitating reversals of fortune. Fortune does not always bear prosperity for
human beings; on the contrary, it is fickle. When fortune favors human
beings they consider themselves to abound in good sense indeed they
are overconfident, boastful, and haughty. But when fortune fails to
favor them they despair, they panic, and they beseech counsel from
anyone, nor is there anything to be heard that is so inept, absurd, or
vain, that they would not follow it.126 Human beings who rely on fortune fall prey to the vicissitudes of it and then they are subjected to the
throes of vacillating between the hopes that accompany their anticipations of good fortune and the fears that accompany their anticipations
of bad fortune. Every human being hopes for what is useful to his
preservation, his security, his health, his wellbeing, or his prosperity. But
every human being also fears that his hopes will be frustrated or that
his longings will go unrealized. To assuage the fear that ones hopes
will not be realized or to assuage the fear that ones wellbeing could
be compromised, passionate human beings abandon their reliance on
inconstant fortune and they take refuge in superstition and its tenets
which promise the fulfillment of ones needs and desires; or, failing
that, they embrace superstition and the tenets surrounding it because at
least they supply some explanation for why a particular need or desire
has gone unfulfilled. When fortune fails to deliver the things which
human beings hope to possess they turn to superstition and fear is the
motive for that turn.127 Common to both fortune and superstition is
the acknowledgement that the source for satisfying ones needs and
desires resides in a power that relies upon external, unpredictable, and
unexpected causes or events to effect human well being. The difference

126
127

TTP 3: 5.
TTP 3: 56.

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between fortune and superstition might be captured in the following way.

Reliance on fortune in the conduct of ones life and the governance of
ones affairs is reliance chiefly on external things without any doctrine
explaining them; reliance on fortune or luck includes recourse to dumb
luck. But reliance on superstition in the conduct of ones life and the
governance of ones affairs is reliance chiefly on external things that
includes a doctrine or a set of tenets which purports to give explanations
about why things happen the way they do as well as reasons for why
things happen to some human beings but not to other human beings.
Whereas the life of fortune involves submission to indiscriminate fate, the
life of superstition involves submission to the will of some divine agent(s)
whose function and power orders the world and delivers human beings
what is required for their preservation, wellbeing, and prosperity.128
The first sentence of the Preface to the treatise indicates that human
beings are led to superstition because fortune does not bring them the
prosperity which they seek. They turn from fortune to superstition
because they fear that they will not preserve themselves or prosper without the intervention of some nonhuman agent or force. Furthermore,
inasmuch as human beings are driven by passion more than they are
guided by reason, those who turn to superstition do so also because they
do not recognize dependable counsel as a worthwhile resource for the
proper conduct of their lives or the governance of their affairs.129 But
the life directed by dependable counsel ultimately ought to be preferred
by human beings since it is the very kind of life that actually can assure
human beings of the achievement of the third proper object of desire;
and no one can doubt how much more useful it is to live according
to laws and the dependable dictates of our reason which, as we have
said, are directed only to what is of true human usefulness.130 The fact
that human beings still turn to superstition owes to human nature itself.
But human nature is capable of improvement and the natural human
proclivity to superstition can be mitigated or modified. That is, the main
difference between the lives of rational or sensible human beings and
TTP 3: 57; 1516; 21; 2829; 8182.
With respect to the human interest in fortune, according to Spinoza, part of the
good sense or sapientia of Solomon is displayed in his teaching that all the goods of
fortune are empty for mortals and human beings have nothing more excellent than
the intellect (TTP 3: 41).
130
TTP 3: 191. On my translation of the Latin phrase certo consilio by the English
words with dependable counsel, see note 119 of this chapter where I explain my
choice of the word dependable in preference to the word certain.
128
129

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the lives of irrational or insensible human beings is witnessed in the

difference between the lives of human beings which are governed by
the power of reason and the lives of human beings that are governed
by the power of passion. Though the rational individual and the passionate individual legitimately live life as each naturally is determined
to do, that is, each lives his life in accordance with the power or right
that he possesses and exercises, namely, either the power of reason or
the power of passion, experience attests that there is no one who does
not long to be able to live securely without fear; however this can be
achieved least of all as long as each is allowed to do as he pleases and
reason is granted no more right than hatred and anger.131
The passion that inclines human beings to superstition, namely, fear,
can be countered by the passion that could incline human beings to
live securely without fear, or at least with a less pervasive fear. That
passion is hope; and making an appeal to a most basic natural passion
of every human being may be advantageous and useful for the purpose
of attaining the third proper object of desire if that appeal is executed
correctly. Philosophy or reason teaches that human beings are driven
more by passion than they are directed by reason. Philosophy or reason
teaches that the two most basic passions that motivate human choices,
decisions, or actions are fear and hope; and that fact regularly is taken
into account by those who attempt to influence human choices, decisions, or actions.132 Philosophy or reason also teaches that human beings
naturally are inclined toward superstition and the cause of superstition
is fear. However, from Spinozas perspective, the basic form of superstition has been compounded by the curators of superstition who use
superstition and the tenets surrounding it to perpetuate more fear.133
Nonetheless, an alternative to that scheme of things is possible. Although
superstition is engendered by fear, superstition also can be exploited
to advocate and promote hope; for human beings prefer to act on the
basis of hope for some good rather than fear of some evil.
In terms of the ius et institutum naturae, which is to say, in terms of
the philosophic teaching of the treatise, neither the life of reason
nor the life of passion is accorded any superior rank by nature. Each
individual endeavors to persevere in its condition and each individual

131
132
133

TTP 3: 191; and compare 5859.

TTP 3: 56; 5859; 74; 19193; 201202.
TTP 3: 68.

philosophy

77

uses the wherewithal at its disposal to attain that goal. Few individuals
rely on reason only. Most yield to passion only. Perhaps some individuals, to whom both the power of reason and the power of passion are
available, sometimes rely on reason and sometimes fall prey to passion
depending upon which alternative strikes them as being more useful
and successful in gaining the things or goods that promote security and
health or avoiding the things or evils that impede security and health.
Whether one follows reason or passion in the conduct of his life and
the governance of his affairs, the philosophic teaching of the treatise
makes plain that everyone longs to live securely without fear134 but
security is undermined wherever hatred, anger, lust, or deceit reign in
lieu of the laws and dependable dictates of reason which alone are
directed to what truly is useful for human beings. Reason or philosophy
may not succeed in convincing passionate human beings about the
advantages of attaining knowledge of the causes of things and acquiring
the habit of virtue. Thus the teaching of reason or philosophy may not
succeed in helping human beings to achieve the first and second proper
objects of desire. Still, reason or philosophy yet may aid and serve the
advantage of passionate human beings by informing those laws and
dependable dictates of reason that do forestall hatred, anger, lust, or
deceit and which thereby mitigate and moderate the fears that erode
human efforts to achieve security.
Whereas knowledge of nature, or knowledge of the causes of things,
and knowledge of virtue are attainable by human beings through their
own nature and power, the attainment of a secure and healthy life,
and hence the prospect for self-preservation, rests chiefly in external
things. Therefore fortune, in one form or another, always continues
to play a role in the ability of human beings to observe and fulfill the
lex summa naturae. The effects of fortune improve the human situation
or the effects of fortune worsen it. But when human beings encounter
fortune and then augment their experiences of it with convictions about
the reliability of portents, sacrifices, or invocations of extraordinary
powers or agents then those human beings live superstitious lives. When
human beings encounter fortune and augment their experiences of it
with a study of nature and knowledge of the causes of things then those
human beings start to conduct their lives sensibly and they govern their
affairs with dependable counsel. For all human beings, life initiates with

134

TTP 3: 191.

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part one

a fundamental reliance on fortune, or a reliance on external things,

and we all long to receive the favors of fortune.135 We commence our
lives as passionate, ignorant, and self-absorbed individuals. So, we rely
on whatever the external things make available to us for the satisfaction of our needs, desires, and interests. Whether it is from the motive
of hope or the motive of fear, human beings eventually try to bid the
external things to supply them with what they demand when they
seek it; and so human beings attempt to control the external things
and press them into the service of their longings. One way to exert
some form of control or influence over their condition is for human
beings to implore the powers or agents that are believed to be responsible for the workings of the external things to act on behalf of the
supplicants. But another way to exert some form of control over the
external things is to study them, come to knowledge of their causes
or relations, and to be mindful that the ultimate knowledge of the
order and operations of the whole is not possessed yet even by the most
diligent students of it.136 When it comes to achieving the most universal
and indispensable of the three proper objects of desire, namely, living
securely with a health body,137 success in the attainment of that object

TTP 3: 5; 47; 73; 191.

Spinoza warns readers of the TTP that an ultimate account of the whole, of
which human beings are but a part, has not been achieved yet (3: 47; 8182; 191). The
knowledge of nature that would afford human beings some control may be likened
to the knowledge of nature that can demonstrate the causes of things, account for the
particular actions of things, explain the various relations among things, and indicate
what things are possible and what things are impossible. I do not think that Spinoza
embraces the modern doctrine of power and dominion over the whole universe that
is announced by Francis Bacon in the Novum organum (Book 1, aphorism 129) or the
teaching of mastery of nature that is formulated by Ren Descartes in Discours de
la mthode, Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols., rev. ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin,
C.N.R.S., 196476) 6: 62. However, there may be some affinity between Spinozas
thinking and the mastery of fortune introduced by Machiavelli in Il principe (chapter
25). In the latter case, fortune is inescapable but prudent human agency can permit
human virt to arrange circumstances so as to influence or occasion the results that
one desires.
137
The attainment of the third proper object of desire may be characterized as
indispensable because it is possible to live, and perhaps even to live with some prosperity, without knowledge of the first causes of things and without acquiring the habit
of virtue which are achieved by the exercise of reason alone. If the attainment of all
three proper objects of desire were indispensable to human life then perhaps only the
philosophers would be able to preserve themselves. Since that obviously is not the case
then not all three proper of objects of desire can be characterized as indispensable for
human life. The attainment of security and health, however, are indispensable; for
no one can live, or at least no one can live long, without them.
135
136

philosophy

79

of desire remains connected with the gifts of fortune. But even in

acknowledging the fact that the achievement of security and health
owes much to fortune it also still is emphasized by Spinoza that human
direction and watchfulness can assist very much in the achievement
of that goal.138 Philosophy or reason can be advantageous both to the
philosophers and to the nonphilosophers by striving to assure that more
good fortune (that is, what truly is useful and advantageous to human
beings) than bad fortune (that is, what is useless and disadvantageous
to them) attends the general condition of humankind. Still, passionate
human beings are not disposed to the teaching of philosophy or reason nor are they disposed to the dictates of reason that constitute the
dependable counsel that would improve their lives. Instead passionate
human beings remain inclined toward superstitions of one kind or
another, whether the superstitions are dreadful or hopeful or whether
they are crude or sophisticated.
A dilemma presents itself. Every human being longs for security and
health. But how can that goal become realized if most human beings
live as their passions urge them to live and if few live as reason dictates?
To move passionate human beings toward security and health, that
is, to help them achieve the third proper object of desire, passionate
individuals must be drawn to conduct their lives and govern their affairs
in a reasonable or sensible manner. Teaching passionate human beings
in an exclusively philosophic manner will not succeed; the passionate
are incapable of apprehending the arguments and demonstrations that
philosophy or reason adduces for its doctrine. Instead passionate human
beings must be addressed, persuaded, moved, and drawn to a form of
reasonability or sensibility that is based upon what they already have
experienced, what they already accept, or what they already believe.
That is, if anyone wishes to persuade, or wishes to dissuade, human
beings of something that is not know in itself he will base his claims on
their experiences; he will rely on appeals to what his audience already
accepts or believes; he will accommodate his statements to their capacity to understand him; and he will be aware that he is addressing the
multitude, or the common people, rather than the ones who are the few
among humankind, namely, those who are capable of comprehending
rational or philosophic demonstrations.139 If philosophy or reason is to

138
139

TTP 3: 47.
TTP 3: 7677.

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part one

persuade passionate human beings to forsake their carnal instincts and

base impulses then the teaching of philosophy or reason must appeal
to what is common, experienced, accepted, or believed by the vast
majority of human beings. According to the philosophic teaching of
the treatise, all human beings by nature are inclined toward superstition or religious overawe. Thus theology or religion can be used as a
conduit for persuading human beings to adopt some types of conduct
and conviction that are advantageous to attaining security and health
while theology or religion also can be used for dissuading them from
adopting other types of conduct or conviction that are disadvantageous
for attaining security and health. Under the supervision of reason, the
philosopher will decide which parts of theology or religion are best
suited to that purpose.

PART TWO

THEOLOGY

Spinoza declares in chapter fifteen of the Tractatus theologico-politicus,

which is to say, he declares in the chapter of the book that concludes
the theological teaching of the treatise proper, that by Theology, in
short I understand revelation, to the extent that it indicates the goal to
which we have said Scripture aims (namely, the account and manner of
obeying or the true dogmas of piety and faith), that is, what properly
is called the Word of God which does not consist in a certain number
of books.1 Bringing to a close the argument that theology and philosophy are separate from each other and neither is subservient to the
other, the reader of the treatise is informed that theology is revelation;
revelation is communicated through the Scriptures; revelation imparts,
or it necessarily involves, a doctrine which advocates obedience; and
the doctrine which advocates obedience is the essential foundation of
piety or faith. Thus theology, revelation, Scripture, piety, and faith are
united and made identical through their unique common component:
a teaching about a particular manner of obedience. A similar statement
involving the identification of the same set of terms also appears at
the close of chapter fourteen of the treatise where the foundations of
faith are articulated.2 In the argument of chapter fourteen and in the
argument of chapter fifteen, one paramount claim is expressed: Human
salvation or wellbeing (salus) is achieved through obedience to God who
demands only that human beings act and live justly and charitably in
obedience to God.3 Faith itself is defined in the treatise as being nothing

1
TTP 3: 184. Spinoza also refers the reader to chapter 12 and what was established
there (3: 16264) in respect of the view that the Word of God does not consist of
a certain number of books; the subject matter of chapter 12 of the treatise is the
sacredness or the divinity of Scripture.
2
TTP 3: 17980. The goal of Philosophy is nothing other than truth: Faith however, as we abundantly show, is nothing but obedience and piety. The foundations of
Philosophy are common notions and they must be obtained from nature itself alone:
Faith on the other hand owes to the stories and the language that are obtained from
Scripture and revelation alone (3: 179).
3
TTP 3: 17680; and compare 165; 18788.

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part two

other than to feel about God such things that when they are ignored
obedience toward God is annulled and when this obedience is posited
such things necessarily are posited.4 Human obedience consists in the
observance of the Divine Law which teaches simply, unambiguously,
and without adulteration that the basis of Scripture or revelation or
faith or piety is nothing other than the instruction to love God above
all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.5 Indeed, if one is obedient
to the law that commands love of God and love of a neighbor then
ones faith or piety is established and his salvation is assured; for all
who yield obedience to God by this plan of living alone are saved,
however the rest who live under a regime of pleasure are lost.6 The
fundamental teaching of theology presented in the treatise promises
salvation to the obedient and it warns of perdition for those who pursue a plan of living that is devoted to pleasure and self-indulgence.
The doctrine characterized by Spinoza as representing the universal
faith or the fundamental premise of the whole of Scripture7 also is
a doctrine that cannot be investigated by the natural light, or at all
events there has been no one who has demonstrated it, and therefore
revelation was very necessary.8 Spinoza is confident that his version of
the account about the foundation and meaning of theology or religion
is accurate, authentic, and indispensable for a proper understanding by
the faithful of what faith really entails. Moreover, he maintains that his
version of the account about the foundation and meaning of theology
or religion is not presented with a view to introducing novelties but
with a view to correcting depravities that have infected both faith
(or piety) and the interpretation of Scripture (or revelation). Spinozas
account of theology or religion in the treatise purports to be a representative form of that more original and more basic Religio antiqua
which had existed prior to the corruption of theology or religion by
those prejudices, superstitions, and fantasies that various theologians,
preachers, or churches had introduced into dogma and worship over
time.9 The theological teaching of the treatise, therefore, recommends
itself as a correction of the flaws and distortions that have come to

4
5
6
7
8
9

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

175.
165; 168; 174; 17677.
175; and compare 178.
177.
185.
8.

theology

85

contaminate the way in which the foundation and meaning of faith,

theology, Scripture, piety, revelation, and the divine law appropriately
should be conceived.10
Spinozas account of the universal faith involves an interpretation,
as well as an evaluation, of the principal elements of revealed religion.
Spinoza defines what prophecy is; he describes the characteristics and
capacities of the prophet; he considers in what sense a people, for
example, the Hebrews, can regard itself as elected by God; he explains
the difference between the divine law and the ceremonial law; he discusses the phenomenon of miracles; and he formulates a method of
Scriptural interpretation that involves the construction of a historia
naturae by which the books of the Bible may be read, interpreted, and
understood.11 In the treatise Spinoza also proposes an account of the
apostolic mission and he explains the difference between the Hebrew
prophets and the Christian apostles. It cannot be said that the theological
teaching of the treatise is simply and entirely orthodox. Nevertheless
it can be said that Spinozas version of the teaching and meaning of
theology or religion retains many aspects of the theological or religious
tradition that could be recognized and approved by most readers of
the treatise who considered themselves faithful, even though Spinozas
version of the teaching of theology or religion restates those aspects
in a rather more liberal and unconventional form. For at the root of
both the orthodox theology or religion as well as Spinozas theological
teaching in the treatise is the tenet that there is an indispensable revealed
instruction which offers hope to human beings with regard to their ultimate wellbeing. The instruction is believed to convey the requisite terms
of a plan of living that will guarantee the salus of every human being
who adheres to the principles contained in the instruction. The mode
of communicating the indispensable instruction is particular revelation.
According to Spinoza, theology is revelation; and revelation(s) together
with histories constitute the largest part of the Scriptures.12 Revelation is
the constitutive term of both theology and Scripture; but, according to
Spinoza, revelation and its contents also happen to be accommodated
to the opinions of the Prophets and indeed they just surpass human

10
TTP 3: 811; 1516; 2729; 35; 42; 4748; 61; 6465; 7886; 96; 9799; 109113;
116118; 122; 128; 131; 141; 15860; 163; 16670; 17474; 18088.
11
TTP 3: 98.
12
TTP 3: 184; and compare 98.

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part two

grasp.13 If theology and Scripture are founded on revelation and what

is imparted by revelation communicates the indispensable instruction
for human salus then it is useful to understand what revelation is.
The first chapter of the treatise, De Prophetia, begins with this
definition: Prophecy or Revelation is sure14 knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings. A prophet, in addition, is he
who interprets the matters revealed by God to those who are unable
to have sure knowledge of the matters revealed by God yet who are
able to embrace the matters revealed simply by faith.15 If philosophy
draws a distinction between passionate human beings or irrational
human beings, on the one hand, and sensible human beings or rational
human beings, on the other hand, it also must be realized that theology
discriminates between those who are able to deliver sure knowledge
of what is revealed by God, namely, the prophets, and those who only
are able to receive sure knowledge of such matters and so they must
rely on faith alone in order to apprehend what is revealed. Whereas the
distinction observed by philosophy between human kinds owes to the
difference between those who choose to exercise reason and those who
do not choose to exercise reason, the discrimination between human
kinds observed by theology in the case of revelation owes simply to
Gods selection of some human beings to be prophets while the remainder of human beings are not accorded such a gift.16 Moreover, whereas
TTP 3: 99.
Here I have translated the Latin words certa cognitio by the English words sure
knowledge. In the preceding part of this book, I translated the Latin adjective certus
differently. I also explained there my reason for translating the Latin adjective certus
with the English word dependable rather than the word certain or the word
sure in respect to the phrases dependable dictates of reason and with dependable
counsel (see notes 119 and 130 to Part One of this book). However, I am confident
that in the opening sentence of chapter 1 of the treatise Spinozas design is to confirm
for his readers that Prophecy or Revelation conveys an unique sort of knowledge,
a sure knowledge; or, in the case of the opening sentence of chapter 1 of the TTP,
Spinoza does wish to assign an epistemic status to prophecy or revelation that he does
not mean to assign to the phrases dependable dictates of reason or dependable
counsel. Still, if for the sake of uniform consistency, I were to translate the sentence
as Prophecy or Revelation is dependable knowledge of some matter revealed by God
to human beings, I submit that dependable knowledge communicated by God to
human beings normally would be taken to imply that prophecy or revelation necessarily must be granted unique epistemic standing as an utterance that is irrefragably
certain or sure, that is, it is an utterance that is taken to be indisputably true
since it issues from God, a being to whom the attributes of omniscience and veracity
typically are assigned.
15
TTP 3: 15.
16
TTP 3: 17172.
13
14

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87

the difference between philosophers and nonphilosophers is established

on the basis of each individuals willingness or unwillingness to make
use of the faculty of reason, the gift of prophecy does not depend in
any way upon the native ability of the prophet who prophesies. That
is, prophecy or revelation is connected not with the work of a more
perfect mind but of a more vivid imagination.17
On page one of chapter one of the treatise, Spinoza explains the
significance of a prophet through reference to the Hebrew word, navi,
which he says means a speaker or interpreter. More precisely, for
the purposes of the argument of the treatise, prophet or navi means
interpreter of God.18 The first prophet named in the treatise by
Spinoza is Moses, whom he also calls the highest or greatest prophet
(summum Prophetum Mosem).19 In addition, of course, Moses was the chief
legislative prophet of the Hebrew people20 and the prophet who had
the unique distinction of having had God speak to him directly with
a true voice and having had God communicate with him face to
face.21 The initial propositions in chapter one of the treatise seem to
be in accord with orthodox positions that would be acceptable to the
readers of the treatise who would be accounted faithful. But Spinoza
then introduces an unconventional and controversial notion. He asserts
that the definition of prophecy that he has given also allows natural
knowledge to be called Prophecy. That is, although the possessor of
natural knowledge is not accorded the title, Prophet, still natural
knowledge and prophecy inherently are linked by the fact that both
derive from the same source and each expresses some knowledge of
God; for whatever we know by the natural light depends upon a
knowledge of God and his eternal decrees.22 Thus natural knowledge
and prophetic knowledge are assigned a kind of equivalence since each
may be said to involve some knowledge of God. But the equivalence
between the two sorts of knowledge ends at their common source of
derivation. For according to Spinoza, in respect of the certitude it
involves, natural knowledge does not cede to prophetic knowledge in
any way. Rather, in some critical respects, natural knowledge should
be considered superior to prophetic knowledge. For whereas prophetic
17
18
19
20
21
22

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

21; 2930; 3235; 42; 9799; 15253; 167; 173; 18081.

15.
153.
1719; 4445; 48; 163.
1719.
15.

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part two

knowledge imparts what surpasses human grasp or what exceeds

the limits of natural knowledge and therefore it always requires some
external certification for what it conveys, natural knowledge requires
no such external certification. Instead, natural knowledge contains its
own certification within itself.23 What natural knowledge apprehends
about God is the same thing that can be apprehended about God by
any human being who employs the natural light, which is to say that
it is the same thing that can be apprehended by any individual who
exercises reason. Yet what is attained by those natural faculties tends to
be dismissed by most human beings because natural knowledge rests on
foundations that are common to all human beings but for that reason
it is not so highly esteemed by the vulgar who always are gasping for
what is rare and alien to their nature and despising natural gifts. To
the extent that natural knowledge and prophetic knowledge intersect in
expressing some knowledge of God, it follows that natural knowledge
can be called Prophecy; but because the vulgar strain after rarities or
exceptions and they look to what they deem to be extraordinary, the
majority of human beings typically demand that natural knowledge,
which is common to all humans beings, be excluded when prophecy
is mentioned.24
As a speaker for God or as an interpreter of God, each prophet has
a power to convey what God dictates, demands, or desires; and the
prophets share a common trait in that the vivacity of their imaginations is more obvious than is the power of their intellects. Moreover,
Spinoza argues that the content of a prophets utterances regularly
were determined by the temperament and disposition of the prophet
himself. That is, prophets of a cheerful disposition conveyed cheerful
messages from God, such as victory in battle, the advent of peace, or
whatever moves human beings to joy; prophets who suffered from
sadness, however, revealed wars, torments, and every evil; thus the
prophecy or revelation communicated by the prophet was connected
directly to the personality of the prophet, the bodily disposition of the
prophet, and the opinions about various things that had been adopted
by each prophet.25 Because of the imaginative-affective foundation
of prophecy, the varying attitudes of the prophets, and the fact that

23
24
25

TTP 3: 1617; 30.

TTP 3: 15.
TTP 3: 32.

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89

revelations were framed in accommodation to the capacities and the

opinions of the prophets,26 Spinoza concludes in the treatise that this
Prophetic certitude was not mathematical but only moral.27 The
prophets were ignorant of speculative matters and they should
be looked to only in matters of charity and the practice of life.28 In
other words, prophecy or revelation amounts to nothing other than
that teaching of faith or piety that dictates obedience to God through
acts of justice and charity which reflect a love of God and a love of
neighbor by those who are faithful; hence we conclude therefore that
we are not bound to believe the Prophets in any thing other than the
aim and the substance of revelation; in what remains each is at liberty
to believe as he wishes.29
The phenomenon of prophecy or revelation involves the imaginative
faculty of human beings. Furthermore, if we look over the Sacred
books, we will see that all that was revealed by God to the Prophets was
revealed to them through words and figures, or through both modes,
namely, words and figures which were either real, in the sense that the
words or figures were true and outside the imagination of the Prophet
who heard or saw them, or they were imaginary no doubt because the
imaginations of the Prophet, even while awake, were disposed such that
he clearly seemed to himself to hear words or to see something.30 The
qualification that prophecies or revelations either actually happened or
they were such that someone was quite convinced that they actually
happened might cause some readers of the treatise to suspect the worth
of the nature and the content of what was prophesied or revealed
in the Scriptures by a prophet who characteristically exhibited lively
imaginative tendencies. Still, to forestall any suspicion about the merit
of prophetic claims, Spinoza asserts that each instance of prophecy or
revelation also was accompanied by three certifying criteria. Prophetic
certitude, which was only moral and involved neither mathematical
certitude nor speculative certitude, was founded on three things. 1.
The matter which was revealed was imagined very vividly as we are
accustomed to being affected by objects when awake. 2. A sign. 3.
Finally, and principally, [the prophets] have a spirit that was inclined

26
27
28
29
30

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

3236.
31.
4243; and compare 35; 8788.
42.
17.

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part two

solely toward the fair and the good.31 Satisfaction of the three criteria
would assure the faithful of the legitimacy of the prophecy or revelation
and Scripture itself warns the faithful to guard against succumbing to
the deceptions of false prophets.32 Nevertheless, a difficulty arises. In
respect of the three criteria to which one can appeal for the certification
of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation, readers of the prophecies or revelations contained in Scripture simply are not competent to
pass judgment on the first criterion. Readers of the Scriptures cannot
ascertain whether or not a prophecy or revelation in fact was imagined
very vividly. Perhaps those whom the prophets first addressed may have
enjoyed the possibility of assuring themselves of the vividness of a
prophets revelation because of his evident enthusiasm in proclaiming
the revelation, for example. But subsequent readers of the Scriptures
have no basis on which to assess the vividness of a prophets revelation and therefore the first criterion cannot be applied reliably as an
element in the certification of the authenticity of any prophecy or
revelation. Taking that fact into account, Spinozas theological teaching
in the treatise then proposes that the certification for the authenticity of
a prophecy or revelation must rest with the other two criteria: the sign
and the teaching. Yet Spinoza also notes that it is possible for someone
to work a true sign but also predict or teach falsely and Scripture
itself recommends that someone who commits such acts deserves to be
put to death. In the absence of a confirmation of the actual vividness
of the prophecy or revelation and because of the fact that true signs
can accompany false sayings or predictions, Spinoza concludes that
it follows that a true Prophet is distinguished from a false one by the
doctrine and the miracle together.33
Since one cannot vouchsafe the vivacity of the prophetic imaginings,
the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will have to be certified on
the basis of the teaching that is revealed and the sign or miracle that is
worked to confirm it.34 However, readers of the treatise will know that
chapter six of Spinozas book is dedicated to establishing the proposition that miracles cannot occur. On the contrary, in keeping with the
TTP 3: 31.
TTP 3: 186.
33
TTP 3: 186.
34
The identification of signs with miracles in the teaching of the TTP is
established by Spinozas use of the example of the sun standing still for Joshua to
illustrate an instance of a sign (3: 36) and his use of the same example later in the
TTP, in chapter 6, De Miraculis, to illustrate an instance of a miracle (3: 92).
31
32

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91

hypothesis that the power of nature is the power of God,35 the theological teaching of the treatise contends that miracles are absurd;36 nothing
can be learned or known about God from so-called miraculous events,
least of all do they establish the existence of God;37 and miracles themselves are nothing other than the anthropocentric misinterpretations of
the order and operations of nature that are rendered by human beings
who hold vulgar and ignorant opinions about the natures of things.38
Still, the theological teaching of the treatise acknowledges that the narratives of Scripture contain numerous references to miraculous events
and the prophets themselves embraced them. Spinoza resolves the
matter by concluding that although Scripture does teach that miracles
occur it is not the case that the Scriptures teach their occurrence as
lessons necessary to salvation; rather each is free to consider them as
he feels is better for himself for sustaining worship of God and religion
with a renewed spirit.39 In other words, attention to the miracles related
in Scripture serves the aim and object of piety and faith, or theology
and Scripture, only to the extent that interest in miracles can encourage or enable human beings to accept and follow the divine law more
wholeheartedly. If the belief that an event is miraculous serves as a
motive for human beings to accept a particular prophecy or revelation
as authentic and those human beings are moved to obey God by loving God above all things and loving their neighbors as themselves then
the belief in miracles by human beings is to be tolerated and such a
belief even may be considered salutary, despite the fact that the belief
in miracles is predicated upon an absurd conception of the order and
operations of nature.40
Readers of the Scriptures cannot adjudicate the vivacity of the
imaginative words or figures experienced by any prophet and so the
force of prophetic imagining cannot be used as a criterion for certifying whether a prophecy or revelation was authentic. Furthermore,
belief in miracles only results from mistaken views about the order
and operations of nature. The very name miracle, says Spinoza,
cannot be understood except in respect of human opinions and it
TTP
TTP
37
TTP
(3: 87).
38
TTP
39
TTP
40
TTP
35
36

3: 17; 2728; 4647; 5758; 81ff; 189.

3: 91.
3: 8386; Spinoza even asserts that belief in miracles leads to Atheism
3: 8182; 84; 8889; 9394.
3: 96.
3: 17680.

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part two

signifies nothing else than a work the natural cause of which we are
not able to explain by the example of some other accustomed thing.41
So-called miracles then are events which occur neither in ways that
are contrary to nature nor are they events that occur in ways that
are above nature; Spinoza considers each of those expressions to
imply the same thing, namely, a violation of the fixed and unchangeable order of nature, and he regards any such event as an absurdity.42
Readers and interpreters of the Scriptures therefore should not appeal
to miracles as corroboratory evidence of the authenticity of a prophecy
or revelation. At best and perhaps at most, references to miracles in
the Scriptures, in connection with a prophecy or a revelation, seem to
serve the purpose of inducing human beings to embrace a particular
lesson or doctrine more steadfastly. For example, at most and at best,
references in the Scriptures to the occurrence of miraculous events in
connection with prophetic warnings or revelatory promises might lead
an individual to obey the divine law with greater devotion in the hope
that his salus would be secured by doing so. But at worst, miracles can
be wrought by false prophets and so one might be led astray from the
authentic foundation and meaning of faith and piety. It therefore would
seem to be the case that the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation
will rest almost entirely on the doctrine that is imparted together with
the presumption that the prophet had a spirit that was inclined solely
toward the fair and the good. It is the content of the prophecy or
revelation, then, that supplies the certification for its authenticity.
Prophecy or Revelation is sure knowledge of some matter revealed
by God to human beings. A prophet, in addition, is he who interprets the
matters revealed by God to those who are unable to have sure knowledge
of the matters revealed by God yet who are able to embrace the matters revealed simply by faith. One may conjecture that each prophet
is convinced of the authenticity of his own prophecy or revelation. But
others must embrace the matters revealed simply by faith. Their faith
in the prophecy or revelation is said to be certified by the power of
the prophetic imagining, the sign or miracle that confirms it, and the
presumption of the prophets devotion to fairness and goodness. Since
one cannot make legitimate appeals to the first two criteria in order
to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or revelation, only the third

41
42

TTP 3: 8384.
TTP 3: 86; 91.

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criterion can serve to warrant ones embrace [of ] the matters revealed
simply by faith. The fairness and goodness of the prophet and the
extent to which the prophecy or revelation instructs human beings to
embrace fairness and goodness then are of paramount importance for
certifying the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation. But prophecy
or revelation still occurs through words or figures or a combination of
the two; and the production of those words or figures is either true
or it is imaginary. Consequently, the fairness and goodness of the
prophet or the prophetic utterance also could be either true or
imaginary. In the former instance, the words or figures actually were
experienced or they actually occurred just as the prophet heard or saw
them whereas, in the latter instance, words or figures were imagined
so vividly that the prophet was convinced that the words or figures
appeared just as he believed he had imagined them.43 However, if one
cannot determine the power of the imaginative faculty of a prophet to
whom imaginary revelations were made then one cannot determine
whether a prophecy or revelation that owes to the imaginative faculty
was sufficiently vivid to demand ones assent to it as being the sure
knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings; so ones
assent is given only on the basis that the prophet and the content of
the prophecy or revelation genuinely were fair and good. The process
for certification of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation involves
a serious problem. The process for the authentication of a prophecy
or revelation becomes self-vitiating.
The reader of the Scriptures has to embrace revelation by faith alone;
the validity of a revelation involves the power of the imaginative faculty
of the prophet, a corroborating sign, and the prophets devotion to fairness and goodness. One cannot appeal to the power of the imaginative
faculty of the prophet to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or
revelation since that power cannot be gauged adequately or accurately
by the reader of the Scriptures. Nor can one validly make an appeal to
some claim of a corroborating sign or miracle to certify the authenticity
of the prophecy or revelation since such occurrences in fact simply are
not possible. Hence, in order to certify the authenticity of a prophecy
or revelation, one can rely only on the character of the prophet and
the character of the doctrine that is professed by the prophet when
one accepts a prophecy or revelation as the sure knowledge of some

43

TTP 3: 17.

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matter revealed by God to human beings. But again prophecies or

revelations communicated to the prophets were either imaginary or
they were true and nothing from Scripture is more clearly manifested
than that God gave one Prophet more grace for prophesying than
another.44 The reader of the Scriptures, however, will find it difficult
to discover to which prophet more grace was given if one cannot
invoke two of the three criteria that are supposed to be employed to
certify the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation. One cannot say that
this prophet was more graced than that prophet on the basis of one
having had a more vivid imagination and worked greater miracles than
the other. Such statements cannot be made because such things simply
cannot be known. One can turn only to the character of the prophet
and the character of the prophets teaching. Prophecies or revelations
which suggest fairness and goodness should command the attention of
the faithful. Yet however much a prophecy or revelation might involve a
teaching that plainly indicates the fairness and goodness of the content
of the prophecy or revelation, why should the lessons of any prophet
whose prophecies or revelations are called imaginary45 or whose lessons are ostensibly corroborated by events that are called impossible or
absurd be adopted by any human being simply by faith? Of all those
persons in the Scriptures who are connected with prophecy or revelation
only two figures may be said to escape the dilemma that attaches to the
prophecies or revelations that are categorized as being imaginary in
kind. The two figures also are the principal disclosers of the law that
is the foundation of theology, piety, faith, and the Scriptures. The two
superior figures of the Scriptures are Moses and Christ.
Unlike all of the other figures mentioned in the treatise to whom
revelations were made, Moses and Christ are unique. Whereas the
prophecies or revelations of all the other prophets are categorized as
imaginary, the revelations of Moses and Christ are not and therefore
they may be understood to escape from the problems associated with
the process for the certification of a prophecy or revelation as being
authentic that applies to all of the other prophets in the Scriptures.
Spinoza says God spoke only to Moses with a true voice and God
communicated with Moses face to face; indeed the enunciation of
the Decalogue to Moses was the only occasion of the true voice of

44
45

TTP 3: 35.
TTP 3: 1720; 3034; 4243.

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God in all of the Scriptures.46 Moses is set apart from all of the other
prophets, whose prophecies or revelations are categorized by Spinoza as
imaginary, by the fact that his revelation alone incorporated the use of
a true voice. Thus the revelations or prophecies of Moses are accorded
an authority that exceeds the testimony of other prophets. Still, notwithstanding the superiority accorded to Moses, the uniqueness of his prophetic experience, and his enunciation of the sure knowledge contained
in the divinely revealed law that he imparted to the Hebrew people,
an even greater distinction is imputed to Christ. By contrast with all
of the others who may have received revelations from God, Christ is
exceptional for the reason that the communications between Christ and
God were undertaken mind to mind. The revelations to Christ neither
involved nor required any mediation through words or figures, as was
the case with all other prophets, including Moses; what was revealed to
Christ was not contained in the first foundations of our acquisition of
knowledge nor can it be deduced from them, his mind necessarily must
be more eminent and more excellent than the human one; no one else
achieved such perfection other than Christ; and so in this sense we
also are able to say that the Wisdom of God, that is, a Wisdom that
surpasses human nature, assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ
was the way of salvation (Christum viam salutis fuisse).47
Although Moses and Christ are said to be distinct among the persons
in the Scriptures to whom revelations were made, it also is the case that
Christs distinction supersedes the distinction imputed to Moses. Though
God employed a true voice and spoke with Moses face to face, a
mode of communication not used with any other prophet, the revelations to Moses still included sensory mediation: real words or real figures
which were external to Moses were employed in Gods communication
with him. No such mediation, however, was required by Christ who
communed with God mind to mind, who possessed a mind more

46
TTP 3: 17; 21. Spinoza argues that God used a true voice when enunciating the
Decalogue based on the fact that Exodus 24 asserts that the Jews heard God speaking
to Moses (3: 19). Thus the truth of the words or figures of the revelation at Mount
Sinai, rather than the imagination of them, was assured because of the claim that
the words or figures were external and presumably the words or figures also could be
heard or seen at least obliquely by other sentient human beings who accompanied
Moses when the Law was revealed.
47
TTP 3: 21.

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excellent than the human one; who assumed the Wisdom of God
in his own nature; and who therefore was the way of salvation.48
Moses and Christ are separated from all of the others to whom
prophecies or revelations were made. Yet there also are a number of
important disparities between Moses and Christ. A principal disparity
concerns the claim that God spoke to Moses face to face whereas God
communed with Christ mind to mind; and the implication of that
disparity extends further because of Spinozas claim about the character
of the law that each one of them revealed. The law revealed by Moses
was designated for the Hebrew people but the law revealed by Christ
was designated for the whole human race. In addition, Moses and
Christ are different in respect of the fact that Christ perceived what
was revealed truly and adequately as eternal truths whereas Moses
perceived what was revealed to him as precepts and ordinances and
as laws prescribed by God; accordingly Christ was not so much a
Prophet as the mouth of God (os Dei ).49 While due stature is given to
Moses and his teaching, it is clear that Spinoza intends to emphasize
the dissimilarity between the mode of revelation implemented in the
case of Moses and the mode of revelation implemented in the case
of Christ. The dissimilarity between the two modes, together with the
dissimilarity between their respective perceptions of what was revealed
to each of them, particular laws, on the one hand, and eternal truths,
on the other hand, as well as the respective audiences addressed by
each of them, the Hebrew people and the entire human race, sets the
teaching of Moses and the teaching of Christ apart from each other
but perhaps also they are at odds with each other.
Moses and Christ are unique among all of the others to whom
prophecies or revelations were given by God. Yet there can be no doubt
that the teaching of Christ must be acknowledged as the consummate
teaching of the Scriptures for the reasons that Christ alone perceived
48
In the sentence that immediately follows Spinozas acclamation of Christ as the
way of salvation, he warns his readers that he is not speaking of what some Churches
assert about Christ nor do I negate it; for I freely acknowledge that I do not grasp it.
The preeminence granted to Christ by Spinoza is in conformity with the Christian belief
that Christ is the Son of God. Indeed, Spinozas estimate that Christ had a more than
human mind, the Wisdom of God assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ
was the way of salvation, all tend toward the orthodox Christian position that Christ
is God incarnate. But Spinozas disclaimer concerning what some Churches assert
about Christ at least also suggests that one need not conclude that Spinoza subscribes
to the Christian view even though his other remarks might appear to affirm it.
49
TTP 3: 64.

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truly and adequately what was revealed as an eternal truth; Christ

alone possessed a mind more eminent and more excellent than the
human one; the Wisdom of God, that is, a Wisdom that surpasses
human nature, assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ was the
way of salvation; furthermore, Christ alone was the mouth of God.
The superiority accorded to Moses and Christ, compared to all of the
other prophets in Scripture, informs Spinozas teaching of theology in
the treatise. But, in addition, the differences between Moses and Christ
in respect of their modes of teaching, the content of their teachings, and
the audience each of them addressed also informs Spinozas teaching of
theology in the treatise. For the critical difference between the revealed
teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ influences the
theological teaching of the treatise with respect to prophecy, prophets,
the election of a nation, the divine law, the ceremonial law, miracles,
the interpretation of Scripture, the apostolic mission, the simplicity of
Scripture, the foundations of faith, and the separation of philosophy
from theology. In each of those aspects of the theological teaching of
the treatise, one can discern a tension between the Moses model of
comprehending theology or religion and the Christ model of comprehending theology or religion; and it is deference to the doctrine
revealed by Christ and Spinozas interpretation of its meaning and
orientation that decides the teaching of theology which is advocated
by Spinoza in the treatise.
One could describe the Moses model for comprehending theology, revelation, faith, piety, and the Scriptures in the following way.
With respect to prophecy and prophets,50 Moses occupies a place of
significance and uniqueness inasmuch as he was the instrument for
the revelation of the divine law to the Hebrew people. God spoke to
Moses face to face but to the other prophets God was revealed by
means of their imaginations alone. Furthermore, God was revealed
to each of the prophets in accordance with each ones established
dispositions, each ones adopted opinions, or each ones typical manner of apprehending things; and, in that important respect, Moses

50
Though prophecy and prophets are the subjects of two different chapters in
the TTP, Spinoza makes clear the intimate connection between the two by virtue of
the fact that prophecy, and what is revealed through it, is defined as being inextricably
linked with the temperaments, dispositions, and opinions that are held by each of the
prophets; none of the prophets, says Spinoza, was made more learned by prophecy
nor were his basic opinions altered by it (TTP 3: 2931).

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was not different from the other prophets. That is, Moses conceived
of God as a legislator or king and consequently God was revealed
to him, and Moses revealed God to the Hebrew people, as such a
being. In fact, on the basis of his own impression of what the nature
of God would involve, Moses revealed the very existence of God to
the Hebrew people as a law to be obeyed rather than as an eternal
truth to be acknowledged.51 Moreover, the introduction of the divine
law involved an extraordinary component. It was accompanied by a
terrifying event, the appearance of a burning fire that provoked fear
and violent trembling among the Hebrew people.52 In the broader
context of prophecy or revelation, then, one can understand why the
faithful particularly would look to uncommon modes or instances of
communication when they thought of the form of prophecy or revelation. God had spoken to Moses face to face with a true voice in
the midst of a burning fire that engendered awe among the Hebrew
people. Accordingly, the faithful would argue that it was appropriate to
dismiss the possibility of any merely natural knowledge being competent to disclose or relate anything worthwhile about God. Natural
knowledge somehow might fall under the broad rubric of prophecy, as
Spinoza explains the proposition in chapter one of the treatise, but it
could not be a real source of sure knowledge about God that would
be most prized and most sought by those who were true followers of
God. On the contrary, the faithful would be much more disposed to
receiving and responding to authoritarian prescriptive edicts, precepts,
or commands that emanated from a divine legislator-king who conveyed
his designs for the Hebrew people through prophets, or interpreters
of God, in ways that would seize the attention and imagination of
the chosen people. The communications from the prophets and the
interpretations of the prophecies or revelations that they made known
also would conform to an authoritarian, legalistic tradition that was
predicated upon dutifulness to the law.53 Indeed, the primacy of the law
was so central to Mosaic theology or faith that the need for a certifying
sign to authenticate a prophecy or revelation was excused in all cases
where a prophecy or revelation offered nothing novel or nothing that
exceeded or excluded the Law of Moses.54 Spinoza himself expresses
51
52
53
54

TTP 3: 6364; 207208; and see Exodus 20:16 and Deuteronomy 5:111.
Exodus 19: 1622 and Deuteronomy 5:15.
TTP 3: 9798; 15153.
TTP 3: 32.

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astonishment at the fact that even apocryphal books appear to have

been introduced into the canon of sacred literature only for the reason
that they were found to contain something in them that could be taken
to commend the Law of Moses.55 The law was the bond that united
the Hebrew people and it was the source of their identity.56 Through
adherence to the law enunciated by Moses, both the divine law and
subsequently the ceremonial laws, the Hebrew people believed that they
would achieve and enjoy continued salus. The Hebrews sense of their
election owed to their conviction that God had set them apart from
other human beings. God liberated them from their Egyptian captivity;
God had revealed the law to them alone in writing; and God promised
prosperity to them for their observance of the law.57 The faithfulness of
the Hebrews was acknowledged by God through the performance of
miracles, namely, the occurrence of unusual, special, or unanticipated
events, and when such occurrences tended to the advantage of the
Hebrew people the events were taken to be demonstrations of Gods
unique and providential care for the people he had elected above all
others. Because the miraculous events proved advantageous to them,
the Hebrew people perceived such things to be confirmations of their
conviction that belief in the prophetic testimonies and adherence to the
divine law, as well as the ceremonial laws, would assure the exercise of
Gods power on their behalf and to their advantage.58 Consequently, any
reading, study, or interpretation of the Scriptures would be undertaken
solely for the purpose of rehearsing and reinforcing the order of the
Moses model of theology or revelation: Human beings long for security
and prosperity; the phenomenon of prophecy or revelation establishes
that a suprahuman agent is willing to offer security and prosperity to
them;59 the suprahuman source makes itself and its design known to
human beings through prophets; the prophets reveal the plan of living
that must be adopted and obeyed by human beings if they are to live
securely and prosperously; the working of miracles by the suprahuman
agent provides the security and prosperity for which human beings
TTP 3: 14142.
TTP 3: 206.
57
TTP 3: 205207; and compare Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5.
58
TTP 3: 8182.
59
Spinoza indicates a connection between superstition and the natural human
inclination to have recourse to a suprahuman source for alleviating the difficulties of
the human condition. For example, human beings are inclined to seek the aid of any
numen in times of hope or fear (TTP 3: 6).
55
56

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long; and the security and prosperity that are attained by human beings
further confirm the belief of the faithful in the inextricable connection
and indubitable relation among prophecy or revelation, prophets, the
law, providence, and the authority of the Scriptures.60
The Christ model for comprehending theology, revelation, faith,
piety, and the Scriptures also affirms the inextricable connection and
indubitable relation among prophecy or revelation, prophets, the law,
providence, and the authority of the Scriptures. But it does so in a very
different fashion from the Moses model. Christ is exceptional among all
of those to whom prophecies or revelations were made for the reason
that Christ was of one mind with God.61 Thus prophecy or revelation in the case of Christ must be considered superior to every other
instance of prophecy or revelation that may be found in the Scriptures.
Christ did not require any use of the imaginative faculty nor was any
corporeal mediation needed in order for him to communicate with God.
Every other prophet, including Moses, required such mediation. Christ
alone is distinct from everyone else in the Scriptures because he was the
mouth of God and the Wisdom of God took on human nature in
Christ. For those reasons, Spinoza asserts that only Christ perceived
truly and adequately what was revealed by God. The revealed teaching
communicated by Christ involved the expression of an eternal truth
rather than a legislative precept that was to be followed in order either
to continue enjoying the advantages bestowed by God or to avoid the
terrors to be suffered as a consequence of transgressing the law.62 Unlike
the law revealed by Moses, a law dedicated to the promise of material
or bodily rewards and temporal happiness, the law revealed by Christ
offers the promise of a spiritual reward instead.63 Part of that reward
involves the acknowledgement and acceptance of the eternal truth that
the highest human good and blessedness consist in knowledge and love
of God; but furthermore knowledge of nature offers the possibility of
yielding an ever increasingly more perfect knowledge of God.64 In the
broader context of prophecy or revelation, then, natural knowledge
or the natural light may be considered prophetic or revelatory insofar
60
TTP 3: 9798; 56; 910; 15; 31; 44; 5860; 69; 8182; 97. Compare Strauss,
How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise, Persecution and the Art of Writing,
pp. 16566.
61
TTP 3: 21.
62
TTP 3: 41; 70.
63
TTP 3: 71.
64
TTP 3: 60; 1516.

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as natural knowledge offers knowledge of God to the extent that the

source of all knowledge is said to be God.65 But more to the point,
with respect to the divine law, or with respect to the plan of living
that will lead human beings to blessedness, Spinoza concludes that
the Scriptures commend the ability of the natural light to grasp
what one ought to pursue and what one ought to avoid in order to
achieve salus;66 still, the possessors of such natural knowledge are
not entitled to the name prophet for prophesying or revealing seems
to entail the promulgation of an instruction that human beings are
expected to obey.67 So whereas natural knowledge does not result in
the issuance of commands about nature, prophecy or revelation does
result in the issuance of commands about how to conduct ones life
and govern ones affairs in obedience to God. Despite the superiority
of the revealed teaching of Christ to the revealed teaching of Moses,
even Spinoza admits that Christ, who was not so much Prophet as
mouth of God and who perceived everything truly and adequately,
also articulated eternal truths as laws on some occasions. Christ
did so, Spinoza says, because of the nature, dispositions, and habits of
the people whom he addressed.68
If Christ sometimes enunciated his revealed teaching as a law, rather
than as an eternal truth, one may be led to wonder whether there
ultimately is a real tension or a real difference between the Moses
model of the revealed teaching of theology and the Christ model of
the revealed teaching of theology since the achievement of salus in
both cases is dependent upon an adherence to a certain plan of living.
Spinoza explains the difference between Moses and Christ, and their
respective revealed teachings in this way. Moses conceived of God as
a legislator and king, and so he issued edicts for the Hebrew people
to obey. Christ, however, did not conceive of God as a legislator or a
king. Instead, if Christ seems to have written laws in Gods name it
was done only because of the ignorance and the stubbornness of the
people.69 Christ did not believe that God was a king. Yet Christ did
TTP 3: 1517; 8187.
TTP 3: 10; 68.
67
TTP 3: 15152.
68
TTP 3: 6465. In chapter 7 of the TTP, De Interpretatione Scripturae, Spinoza notes
the importance of paying close attention to considerations of who has said things,
to whom, and at what time when reading, interpreting, or assessing the meanings of
the Scriptures (3: 103) and perhaps even other old books as well.
69
TTP 3: 64.
65
66

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recognize that the majority of people he addressed conceived of God

in such a manner, owing to the tradition and authority of the Moses
model of the revealed teaching of theology.70 Therefore, in order to
communicate to people his revealed teaching about the terms for their
salvation, in other words, for the purpose of giving expression to the
revealed teaching about the indispensable plan of living that would
yield security, prosperity, and salus for all human beings, Christ accommodated his discourse to the dispositions and opinions of his audience
and he communicated the lesson that he revealed to them as though it
were a law to be obeyed. But while the Law of Moses was directed
exclusively to the Hebrew people, the law of Christ was announced for
the entire human race and it was framed in such a way that all human
beings who heard the law were able to acknowledge it and embrace
it.71 Hence, while the law and the God of Moses were the law and
the God of the Hebrew people only, the law and the God of Christ
were the law and the God of all nations, or all of humankind. The
universality of Christs teaching also reflects the universalizability of it;
for since natural knowledge or the natural light makes knowledge of
God possible it follows that it is feasible for reason or the natural light
to apprehend the divine law, embrace it, and observe it.72 Still, most
human beings do not exercise reason nor do they rely on it as much
they might and so even Christ appears to have resorted to revealing
eternal truths in the form of laws on some occasions. If the natural
light, reason, or natural knowledge can offer knowledge of God then
it also can have access to the divine law and so it can comprehend
the eternal truth of the divine law, namely, that the highest good
and blessedness of a human being consist in knowledge and love of
God73 and love of God transforms one to practice love toward ones
neighbor.74 The real tension or the real difference between the revealed
teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ does not concern
the essential message of theology or revelation. The revealed teaching
of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ concerning theology or
revelation or the Scriptures or faith or piety both advocate nothing

70
Of course, one could go farther and contend that most religions conceive their
supreme being as a legislator-king.
71
TTP 3: 65.
72
TTP 3: 6869.
73
TTP 3: 6061.
74
TTP 3: 102; 165; 167; 16970; 17477.

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other than obedience to God which consists in love of God above all
things, love of neighbor, and the performance of acts of justice and
charity that spring from ones love of God.75 The real tension or difference between Moses and Christ then is that the former establishes
laws as a lawgiver whereas the latter proceeds as a teacher giving
instructions; for Christ did not wish to correct external actions as
much as to correct the spirit.76
The Christ model of the revealed teaching of theology involves a
correction to the Moses model of the revealed teaching of theology in
the following ways. Human beings long for security and prosperity; the
phenomenon of prophecy or revelation establishes that a suprahuman
agent is willing to offer security and prosperity to them; the suprahuman
source makes itself and its design known to human beings through the
revealed teaching professed by Christ, who reveals the plan of living
that must be adopted and obeyed by human beings if they are to live
securely, prosperously, and attain salvation. Furthermore, in Spinozas
account of the Christ model for comprehending the revealed teaching
of theology, interest in the working of miracles becomes insignificant
because the Wisdom of God has taken on human nature in Christ
and the divine teaching is said to be knowable by the natural light.
Therefore it is not an article of faith or piety that the faithful believe
that Christ actually worked miracles.77 The true plan of living that
guarantees the security, prosperity, and salvation for which each human
being longs is first revealed through Moses who teaches that God is
to be loved and obeyed. But Christ, who is the way of salvation,
reminds human beings of the fact that the fundamental premise of the
law, namely, obeying God by loving God and loving ones neighbor, is
indeed the sum of the divine law itself. Ceremonies, rituals, and institutions may serve to foster faith and piety in human beings. But ceremonies, rituals, and institutions are not requisite for human blessedness;78
TTP 3: 177.
TTP 3: 103.
77
TTP 3: 68 and 90; and compare 4344; 96; 15658; 163; 168.
78
Spinoza asserts that the ultimate significance of the Scriptures is identical with
their ability to move human beings to adopt a particular manner of living. He says that
if one reads the Scriptures but is unaffected by them, that is, if one does not change
his life, then it is as if he had read the Koran or the Fictitious fables of the Poets
(TTP 3: 79). Readers of the Bible would find reading the Koran a poor substitute
for learning the true plan of living. So too a reader of the Koran would find reading
the Bible a poor substitute for learning the true plan of living. But common to reading the Bible, reading the Koran, or even reading the fables of the Poets, perhaps
75
76

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in fact, they can have the potential to debase and corrode the essential
message of theology or revelation and therefore they are not mandatory
for faith or piety.79 According to Spinoza, the plan of living that makes
salus available to human beings and which enables human beings to
live securely and prosperously can be received with equal effectiveness
as an eternal truth or as a law which must be obeyed. The prophets
have given an instruction that simply is moral in character and their
prophecies or revelations are meant only to amplify the divine law as
it eventually was articulated by Christ. Because that law applies to all
of humankind there is no one nation or group that enjoys a privileged
place among others in respect of their receipt of the law, their comprehension of the law, or the advantages that accompany obedience to that
law. Furthermore, since the law is universal and eternal, there are no
incidents of miracles or cases of special providence, that is, there are
no contranatural events caused by a suprahuman agent, which would
afford security and prosperity for only one people to the exclusion of
the remainder of the human race.80 Instead the security and prosperity for which every human being longs is achieved through belief in
the divine law and faithful adherence to it. The Scriptures express the
divine law simply and unambiguously.81 Therefore wearisome contentious disputes about the interpretation of the Scriptures are pointless.82
The fundamental message of the Scriptures is easily intelligible and
it is directed to the whole human race. Moreover, the intention of
prophecy or revelation is only moral and thus one should not impute
any authority to Scripture, faith, theology, revelation, or piety in matters
pertaining to philosophic speculation, mathematical demonstration, or
the knowledge of nature.83 Each may judge for himself about the basic
meaning of theology, revelation, Scripture, faith, or piety because the
instruction is simple as well as universal; and, in addition, each may
judge for himself what messages, teachings, or instructions from the
narratives of the Scriptures best serve the purpose of enhancing his

the works of Homer or Virgil for instance, is the issue of the power that each of the
writings has to affect how human beings conceive of themselves and how they then
conduct their lives and govern their affairs.
79
TTP 3: 10; 6972; 76; 7980; 200.
80
TTP 3: 4748; 50; 5657.
81
TTP 3: 102; 165.
82
TTP 3: 104; 11617; 17880; 18485; 188.
83
TTP 3: 170.

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piety, that is, his obedience to God.84 The difference between the Moses
model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology and the
Christ model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology is
perhaps most clearly illustrated by the claim that all of the prophets
command whereas the apostles teach.85 The prophets issue edicts,
warnings, and threats; the apostles argue and persuade. Hence the
prophets are promulgators and enforcers of the divine law but the
apostles strive to inspire human beings to understand the divine law
and adopt it.
On the basis of the dissimilarities between the Moses model of understanding theology or revelation and the Christ model of understanding
theology or revelation, one may say that the delivery, implementation,
and observance of the fundamental teaching and meaning of the Scriptures may be distinguished in terms of what follows in accordance with
the prophetic mission, on the one hand, and what follows in accordance
with the apostolic mission, on the other hand. The prophetic mission
appears to be driven by an impulse to reign over those who adopt the
faith by compelling them to remain faithful while the apostolic mission seems to be driven by an intention to persuade and invite human
beings to be faithful.86 The prophetic mission is ordained for the Hebrew
people only; the apostolic mission is ordained for all of humankind. The
prophetic mission is autocratic and authoritarian; orthodox tenets are
established and issued; the observance of them is strictly determined;
and ones faith is gauged by ones unwavering adherence to the law.
The interpretation of theology or revelation or the Scriptures is a matter reserved for those who are sufficiently trained or for those who are
sufficiently gifted to undertake the task. However, it also often is claimed
that the Scriptures and the interpretation of them are fraught with mysteries that are beyond human comprehension or explication; but the
mysteries must be conceded nonetheless.87 The prophetic mission also
entails the working of miracles to certify the authenticity of a prophecy
or a revelation. But the credibility of miracles itself emanates only from
a vulgar and ignorant conception of the order and operations of nature
which absurdly posits the feasibility of contranatural events. What is
restrictive, exclusive, and conservative about the prophetic mission and
84
85
86
87

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

168; 179.
15154.
156.
9798; 104105; 109; 11113.

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its sense of theology or revelation becomes expansive, inclusive, and

liberal in the apostolic mission and its sense of theology or revelation,
at least as the apostolic mission is characterized by Spinoza. Based on
the descriptions of them in the treatise, a critical difference between the
two models of understanding the revealed teaching of theology is that
the Moses model or prophetic mission is portrayed as being explicitly
autocratic whereas the Christ model or apostolic mission is portrayed
as being implicitly democratic.
The Christ model of theology or revelation, together with its manifestation in the apostolic mission, proposes that there is one indispensable teaching communicated throughout the entirety of the Scriptures.
The revealed teaching involves a plan of living which assures those
who adhere to the plan that they will be saved. To love God above
all things and to love a neighbor as oneself is the plan of living that
guarantees ones ultimate security, health, prosperity and wellbeing. It
is the plan of living that will optimize the successful satisfaction of the
third proper object of desire that is pursued by every individual. Furthermore, though doctrine and dogma are important to faith, theology,
revelation, the Scriptures, and piety, in the final analysis it is only the
performance of acts of justice and charity practiced in obedience to
the divine law that evinces and affirms whether one is faithful. More
importantly, ones faith only can be evaluated properly on the basis
of ones piety, that is, ones obedience to God;88 and ones obedience
to God does not depend upon ones understanding of the doctrines
of faith to which one subscribes but instead ones obedience depends
only on whether the doctrines of faith to which one subscribes lead
an individual to be more obedient or they lead an individual to be
disobedient and stubborn.89
Spinozas theological teaching in the treatise is representative of
what may be characterized as a broadly Christian kind of faith. It
emphasizes the superiority of the revealed teaching of Christ over
the revealed teaching of Moses; though Spinoza maintains that the
essential instruction in each of the revealed teachings is the same.90
His theological teaching in the treatise advocates the legitimacy of
common sense or reasonableness in respect of the interpretation of

88
89
90

TTP 3: 16768; 175.

TTP 3: 17477; 180.
TTP 3: 163; 16566.

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Scripture, the framing and understanding of doctrines or dogmas, and

the performance and practice of faithful acts of justice and charity.91
The teaching of theology in the treatise conveys a doctrine with which
most Christians could find some basic general agreement, though
certain Christian sects obviously might object to particular aspects of
Spinozas account and description of theology. Still, Spinoza attempts
to blunt the significance and impact of possible disagreements with his
teaching of theology in the treatise to the extent that he defends the
view that each individual possesses a fundamental liberty of personal
interpretation and judgment about matters of theology, revelation,
Scripture, faith, or piety insofar as the inspiration for ones own faith
or piety ultimately is a private matter.92
The theological teaching of the treatise establishes that theology or
revelation or Scripture or faith or piety propounds one uniform lesson that is accessible, comprehensible, and practicable by all human
beings. Moreover, the indispensable lesson has been revealed. In other
words, the revealed lesson involves the communication of the sure
knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings.93 The
matter was communicated both to Moses, the lawgiver of the Hebrew
people, and to Christ, who was sent to instruct the entire human race.
The doctrine or lesson which is the foundation of theology, revelation,
Scripture, faith, or piety is uniform and it is commended throughout
the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Scriptures. The doctrine is
the Divine Law and it encourages all who encounter it to love God
above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself. However vexing
the interpretation of the Scriptures may be, whether the vexation owes
to the absence of a thorough Hebrew grammar or the textual corruptions that may have occurred to the sacred books over time,94 Spinoza

TTP 3: 11617; 17374; 17879.

TTP 3: 11617; 17374; 17881.
93
TTP 3: 15.
94
TTP 3: 105107. In chapter 7 of the TTP, Spinozas complaints about the difficulties of interpreting Scriptural passages are directed principally against passages
from the Hebrew Scriptures. At one point, Spinoza almost despairs of being able to
resolve many of the textual problems at all (3: 11112). But one should not conclude
that Spinozas criticisms are reserved for the Hebrew Scriptures alone. On the contrary, at the close of chapter 10 of the TTP, Spinoza demurs from addressing any
questions about the Christian Scriptures on the grounds that he does not possess an
adequate knowledge of Greek, the original Hebrew texts have been lost, and others
who are more competent than he already have undertaken the task (3: 15051). But in
chapter 7, Spinoza already contended that what is said apropos the Old Testament
91
92

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assures the reader of the treatise that the the foundation of the whole
of religion, namely, obedience to the instruction to love God and to
love ones neighbor, cannot have been adulterated or written by an
errant scribe because if the Scriptures had taught any other doctrine
then it necessarily would have had to teach the remainder in another
manner and the whole fabric falls to ruin.95
The teaching of theology or revelation or Scripture or faith or piety
is one. Furthermore, it is a doctrine that cannot be investigated by
the natural light, or at all events there has been no one who has demonstrated it, and therefore revelation was very necessary.96 In other
words, according to Spinoza, the revealed teaching about love of God,
love of ones neighbor, and obedience to Gods command to love
ones neighbor by living justly and charitably, is a lesson that cannot be
demonstrated by reason or the natural light but it nevertheless remains
a doctrine to which our judgment may assent because we at least
may embrace what already has been revealed with moral certainty and
what was revealed by the prophets is to be accorded moral certainty,
as already was shown in Chapter 2 of this Treatise.97
The theological teaching of the treatise proposes that there is a
divine law that has been revealed through the Scriptures. The principal
advocates and promulgators of the divine law are said to have been
Moses and Christ; though Christs instruction should be regarded as
superior to the instruction of Moses since the Wisdom of God took
on human nature in Christ, Christ was the way of salvation, and
Christ was sent to teach the entire human race.98 The theological
teaching of the treatise posits that the reading, understanding, and
interpretation of theology, revelation, or the Scriptures basically are
private and personal matters. The public matter of how one reads,
understands, and interprets theology, revelation, or the Scriptures is
exhibited in ones living a life that is conspicuously just and charitable
and doing so in obedience to Gods command to love ones neighbor.
Ones faith or piety therefore is demonstrated by ones actions rather
than by ones convictions and, according to Spinoza, it follows that
also implicitly applies to the New inasmuch as the authors of both testaments were
Hebrews and so their mode of expression even in the New Testament basically also
was Hebraic (3: 100).
95
TTP 3: 165.
96
TTP 3: 185.
97
TTP 3: 185.
98
TTP 3: 21; 6465.

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nothing can pertain to the catholic or universal faith which is able to

give controversy among decent human beings.99 Spinozas individual,
liberal, and minimalist theology prepares a reduction in sectarian quarreling about a variety of issues to the extent that theology or revelation
or the Scriptures or faith or piety is concluded to impart only moral
certitude. No legitimate claim can be made by theologians, preachers,
or the faithful that theology or revelation portends any mathematical
or speculative certitude. Consequently, theological disputes that bear
on theoretical matters simply become irrelevant; and any attempt by
theology or religion to pretend to possess an authority or influence over
such matters or indeed anything other than a consideration of moral
issues must be taken as impertinence. The theological teaching of the
treatise thus seeks to forestall the prejudices of the theologians and
their excessive authority and petulance by establishing that the liberty
of individual judgment is a fundamental concession demanded not only
by Spinozas teaching in the treatise but by Scripture itself as well.100
After contesting long held prejudices and reclaiming uncontaminated
beliefs, Spinozas teaching of theology in the treatise purports to reflect
a doctrine that is more consistent with and approximate to that uncorrupted, untarnished, unprejudiced Religio antiqua, the demise of which
had been lamented in the Preface to his book.101
The theological teaching advanced in the treatise obviously is
Christian in character. It also obviously is liberal in attitude. But the
theological teaching of the treatise is not indeterminate. According to
Spinoza, theology or faith concerns nothing other than piety and obedience;102 and faith is defined as thinking or feeling those things about
God such that when one thinks them or feels them ones obedience to
God is necessitated but when one ignores those things ones obedience

TTP 3: 177.
TTP 3: 11617; 17879.
101
Spinoza ostensibly recovers a more basic sense of theology or religion that accords
with his sense of what had been sacrificed or corrupted in theology or religion by the
various churches over time. Spinoza thus affords the reader a recovered sense of the
ancient Religion. But one should not miss the irony. That is, the recovery of the more
pristine ancient Religion is achieved only at the expense of the scathing critique of
the prejudices of an ancient people, namely, the Hebrews, that is executed by Spinoza
(3: 8; 81; 180; 222). In other words, on the one hand, the term ancient connotes
venerable but, on the other hand, the term ancient in the treatise also is used to
signify rude and obsolete; see Leo Strauss, How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political
Treatise, Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 194.
102
TTP 3: 179.
99

100

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to God is neglected.103 In other words, theology or faith is the sum of

a set of revealed tenets that induces human beings to obey God and to
live piously. Moreover, the sum of the revealed set of tenets is identical
with what are defined as the essential and indispensable seven dogmas
of the universal faith which are articulated in chapter fourteen of
the treatise. The dogmas are essential to the universal faith inasmuch
as there are no others more than these; and they are indispensable
because if one were not to believe or to think or to feel such things
about God then ones obedience to God, and hence the prospect of
ones salvation, would be removed.104
The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith are expressed
by Spinoza in the following way. (1) God, a supreme being, who is
supremely just and merciful and who is the exemplar of the true life,
exists. One who is ignorant or does not believe that God exists cannot
obey God or know God as a judge. (2) God is one; no one can doubt
that the supreme devotion, admiration, and love of God requires it;
for devotion, admiration, and love only arise from one being excellent
above all the rest. (3) God is present everywhere, or all lies open to
God. If it were believed that a thing could be concealed from God
then it could be doubted that God directs all things with fairness and
justice, or one could ignore Gods fairness and justice. (4) God holds
supreme right and dominion over all things. Everything God does is
done at Gods good pleasure and singular grace; all absolutely must
obey him, he obeys no one. (5) The Worship of God and obedience to
him consist solely in Justice and Charity or love toward ones neighbor.
(6) Only all who obey God by this plan of living are saved; the rest
who live under the regime of pleasure are lost. If human beings did
not believe this firmly there would be no cause why they would choose
to obey God rather than pleasure. (7) Finally, God remits the sins of
the penitent: There is no one who does not sin; if therefore this were
not established all would despair of salvation and there would not be
any reason to believe God is merciful. Whoever firmly believes this,
namely, God directs all things from his mercy and grace, remits the
sins of human beings, and for this reason is incited to love God more

103
104

TTP 3: 175.
TTP 3: 175; 17778.

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111

greatly, he really renews Christ in himself according to the Spirit, and

Christ is in him.105
The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith generally
are consonant with a recognizably Christian sense of the meaning
of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety. But Spinozas
interpretation of the basic character of that Christian teaching still
also reflects his own liberal design. For example, the third dogma of
the universal faith affirms the omnipresence of God. If one were to
doubt Gods omnipresence, Spinoza says, or if one were to suppose that
something could be concealed from God then one could doubt or ignore
Gods equity and justice. In other words, if one doubted or ignored the
omnipresence of God then one could suppose that some violation of
the divine law could occur which would escape Gods notice; and, as a
result, Gods justice and/or Gods mercy would be diminished or people
could come to question Gods justice and/or mercy.106 The dogma that
God is omnipresent and God is just and merciful must be believed. If
the dogma is not believed then one cannot be obedient to God; and
if one is not obedient to God then one is not faithful; one cannot live
or act piously; and consequently ones very salvation is at risk. Still, the
liberal bent of Spinozas theology is confirmed by his claim that belief
in the omnipresence of God does not require that one affirm the actual
omnipresence of God or that one affirm the potential omnipresence of
God. Rather, what each individual affirms about Gods omnipresence
will be determined in accordance with each ones own opinion about the
matter. Moreover, whichever opinion one adopts about Gods omnipresence is irrelevant with respect to affecting that individuals faithfulness.
For although belief in Gods omnipresence is required for obedience to
God and hence it is required for ones salvation, belief in God as being
potentially omnipresent or being actually omnipresent is a matter
of personal opinion. The only issue of note is whether one or the other
particular opinion better serves the enhancement of ones piety, that
is to say, ones obedience to God.107 It equally is a matter of private
opinion and private judgment whether one believes that God, as the

TTP 3: 17778.
A different interpretation of Spinozas point would be that if one doubted Gods
justice and/or mercy then one could opt for a life of pleasure rather than a life of
obedience to God; and, furthermore, one could do so without compunction because
divine reward and punishment would not be assured.
107
TTP 3: 178.
105
106

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exemplar of the true life, is perceived to be fire, Spirit, light, thought,

etc.; and it also is a matter of private opinion or private judgment
whether one holds that God prescribes laws as a prince or whether
God simply teaches eternal truths. The decisive issue concerns only
the question of whether what one believes encourages an individual
to be obedient or whether what one believes encourages an individual
to be, or to become, disobedient.108 One must believe in Gods unity,
Gods mercy, Gods grace, and the remission of sins by God. One also
must believe that God exercises dominion over all things and that God
obeys nothing whereas everything obeys God. One must believe that
obedience to God consists solely in love of neighbor, which is demonstrated by acts of justice and charity; and one must believe that only
those who live in such obedience to God are saved while all others are
lost. Finally, one must believe that even the disobedient yet may have
their sins remitted by God and consequently everyone may live in the
hope that his disobedience will be forgiven and his salvation retrieved
if he comes to obey God fully. Whatever anyone personally holds with
respect to the specific nature of Gods attributes, namely, Gods unity,
Gods mercy, Gods grace, Gods dominion over all things, Gods omnipresence, or Gods forgiveness of sins, is a matter of personal conviction that has bearing on the worth or the sincerity of an individuals
faith only to the extent that ones convictions encourage or discourage
his obedience to God. Scholastic debates and disagreements between
individuals, churches, or institutions about the actual omnipresence
of God versus the potential omnipresence of God, for example, at
best are irrelevant to the practice of piety or faith. But at worst, such
debates or controversies can have the harmful consequence of confusing the faithful to the extent that the controversies can sow doubt in
the minds of the faithful about what is necessary to be believed for the
purpose of being obedient to God and attaining salvation as distinct
from what concerns are left to the preference and judgment of each
pious or faithful person. The worth of ones faith or theology or piety,
that is, ones belief in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal
faith, is not something to be ascertained by the reasons one adduces to
substantiate his conviction; rather the issue of ones faith or theology
or piety is to be determined only on the basis of the individuals performance of acts of justice and charity, namely, his acts of love toward

108

TTP 3: 178.

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his neighbor as they are undertaken in obedience to God.109 Whatever

view one may adopt about the particular characteristics of any one
of the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith, faithfulness
itself only requires that one acknowledge and embrace the basic seven
fundamental dogmas; for if any one of the dogmas is removed then
obedience also is removed110 and should obedience to God be removed
then ones salvation will be put in jeopardy.
According to the theological teaching of the treatise, belief in the
seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith is the necessary precondition for the performance of just and charitable actions in obedience to God. By the performance of such acts in obedience to God,
individual salvation will be achieved. In contradistinction to their actions,
individuals are permitted considerable latitude in the ways they understand the particular features of any one of the fundamental dogmas
so long as their interpretations of them do not instigate behaviors that
prompt disobedience to God. The theological teaching of the treatise
thus curiously represents a kind of liberal orthodoxy. But the liberal
orthodoxy of the theological teaching of the treatise also includes a
rather extreme principle, namely, the fact of someones faith or piety
is established only on the basis of that persons performance of just
and charitable acts. Regardless of what an individuals particular beliefs
may be, if his actions exhibit justice and charity then that person is
accounted faithful or pious; whereas if another persons beliefs conform
to traditional and approved theological tenets but his actions vitiate
justice and charity then he is faithless and impious.111 The performance
of just and charitable actions in obedience to God serves the definitive
function of confirming the validity of the foundation and meaning of
revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety. That is, if human
beings live justly and charitably then the teaching of revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety is substantiated. Thus it also is clear
that the dogmas of the universal faith are dedicated to the aims of
influencing human action, directing human behavior, and framing the
terms for cooperative human living. To put the matter in terms of the
proper objects of desire, the teaching of theology offers a plan of
living that promises its followers secure and healthy life. It is a plan

109
110
111

TTP 3: 17879.
TTP 3: 178; and compare 175.
TTP 3: 17577.

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of living that leads toward human salus; and Spinoza assures the reader
of the treatise that the lesson of prophecy or revelation, and hence
the lesson of theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety, expresses moral
certitude even though it may not be competent to impart mathematical
or speculative certitude. How an individual conducts his life and how
an individual governs his affairs are the sole means for assessing that
persons faithfulness or piety; and an individuals faithfulness or piety,
that is, his obedience to God, is made practicable only because one
believes each of the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith.
Disputations concerning the complicated significances of Scriptural
passages, or scholastic controversies about the merits of one tradition
of theological doctrine over another, or conflicts about ceremonies and
religious practices have no bearing on the authenticity of an individuals
faith or piety. On the contrary, despite the fact that there may be differences of opinion among believers about specific aspects of the dogmas
of faith, only one criterion ever may be invoked to determine whether
an individual is faithful or pious: namely, if the works are good he
still is faithful [since] faith without works is dead.112 Indeed, Spinozas
theological teaching in the treatise goes so far as to assert a curious
and extreme principle: faith does not require true so much as pious
dogmas, that is, such as move the spirit to obedience though there are
many among them that do not have a shadow of truth.113
The theological teaching of the treatise affirms that human salvation
depends upon obedience to God; and obedience to God depends upon
ones belief in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith.
The dogmas themselves need not be true; they only need to be pious
or they only need to be such as to promote piety in human beings.
That is, the dogmas only need to advocate and encourage obedience
to God. Whatever one may think of Spinozas liberal orthodoxy, there
is something odd in his remark about the relation between piety and
truth. If we assume the premise of the treatise that theology and philosophy in fact are separate from each other, and neither is handmaid
to the other, then perhaps it may be said with some legitimacy that the
piety of a dogma is far more important than the truth of it since the
dogmas of faith are revealed dogmas and what is revealed customarily
surpasses human grasp and hence is it beyond rational demonstration.

112
113

TTP 3: 175.
TTP 3: 176.

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Or, because the revealed dogmas are held to convey only moral certitudes then they should not be expected to convey mathematical certitudes. In that sense, the piety of the dogma is more significant than the
truth of it because the piety of the dogma involves a kind of empirical
verification that the truth of the dogma does not. For example, we
are able to see the faithful acting piously by their performance of works
of justice and charity; in other words, we are able to see the faithful
acting lovingly toward their neighbors. On the other hand, however, we
are not able to see the faithful embracing the actual omnipresence of
God rather than the potential omnipresence of God; nor are we able
to see the faithful believing the unity of God, the mercy and grace of
God, the ability of God to remit sins, etc. The reader of the treatise,
perhaps especially the one who reads philosophically to whom the
book is addressed,114 might be perplexed by Spinozas assertion that
the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith only need to be pious
rather than true.115 But Spinoza seems to make some attempt to alleviate concern about the unconventional character of his declaration
by the fact that he strongly recommends the teaching of revelation,
theology, the Scriptures, piety, or faith for the reason that the essential
lesson of Scripture has been transmitted uniformly, without error or
corruption;116 and he states that one may accept the testimony of the
prophets and the apostles who reliably bear witness to the authenticity
of theologys lesson.117
The distinctive teaching of theology is the teaching of obedience
to God. The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith are the
TTP 3: 12.
TTP 3: 179. Spinozas liberal orthodox Christianity possesses other features that
also might strike one who reads philosophically as being rather curious in character.
For example, with respect to the performance of ceremonies, Spinoza argues that
the Hebrew regime employed various ceremonies for the sake of establishing greater
social coherence and identity but the ceremonies in fact did not have any bearing on
the blessedness of the Hebrew people. Christian ceremonies also are said to have
no bearing on blessedness; even Baptism and the Lords Supper are said to have no
blessedness or any Sanctity in them (3: 76). During the 17th century, the controversy
with the Anabaptists was significant and so was the controversy over the Eucharist
and the issue of transubstantiation. If Spinozas teaching of theology in the treatise is
accepted then his position on ceremonies effectively neutralizes disputes about those
matters. Also, with a view to the ability of the natural light to apprehend the divine
law, Spinoza affirms that our natural faculties have that competence and so it is not
necessary to accept the divine law on the basis of ones conviction in the passion
and resurrection of the carnal Christ (3: 68).
116
TTP 3: 16566.
117
TTP 3: 163; 174; 18688.
114
115

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propositions that are necessary to be believed in order for one to obey

God and thus to live faithfully or piously. Only the faithful or pious or
obedient are saved and they are saved precisely because of the plan
of living that they have adopted.118 The plan of living emphasizes the
performance of acts of justice and charity by the faithful and as a
result theological deeds now become more decisive to faith or piety
than are theological thoughts or theological words. Furthermore,
knowledge of the nature of God is not a requirement for faith or piety
or obedience; only conviction in the fundamental dogmas of faith is
required. Accordingly, Spinoza discriminates between knowledge of
God, on the one hand, and obedience to God, on the other hand. The
discrimination is consistent with Spinozas claim that an intellectual
or accurate knowledge of God is not a gift common to all of the
faithful as is obedience;119 that is, no one is able to be commanded
to be sensible any more than to live or to be. Men, women, children,
and everyone equally are able to obey by command, but not to be
sensible.120 Nonetheless, the tension between knowledge of God and
obedience to God illustrates a deeper tension that runs throughout the
teaching of the treatise. Spinoza asserts that true human blessedness
and happiness consist solely in the knowledge and love of God.121 But
he also observes that the happiness and tranquility achieved by any
individual owe more to ones own nature and internal virtue than
they owe to fortune, that is, the external aid of God.122
A question should come to mind for the one who reads philosophically. If true blessedness and happiness derive from knowledge and
love of God then why is it the case that the very basis and teaching
of theology only involves a doctrine of obedience to God rather than
a teaching that also places some premium on knowledge of God? Or,
what do knowledge of God and obedience to God have to do with
each other?123 The question partially is resolved by Spinozas assertion
that no one can be commanded to be sensible, or knowledgeable, any

TTP 3: 17778.
TTP 3: 168.
120
TTP 3: 170. I continue to translate the Latin verb, sapere, as to have sense or
discernment or to be sensible. My reason for choosing to translate the word in that
way may be found in note 113 in Part One of this book.
121
TTP 3: 4445; 6061.
122
TTP 3: 68.
123
Compare Strauss, How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise, Persecution
and the Art of Writing, p. 170.
118
119

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more than he can be commanded to live and to be. If one is to live

well and achieve happiness then he must develop the faculties and
characteristics that enable him to accomplish those aims. Knowledge
of the primary causes of things and the acquisition of the habit of
virtue are indispensable to living well; and the treatise teaches that
knowledge of the causes of things and the acquisition of the habit of
virtue are contained entirely within human nature itself and therefore
the realization of them depends upon human power alone, or on the
laws of human nature alone.124 Hence it is possible for human beings
to live well, satisfy the third proper object of desire, and attain happiness by increasing their natural knowledge and conducting their lives
and governing their affairs in accordance with the dictates of reason.125
However, for those who fail to employ their own rational power in the
purpose of living well and attaining happiness there is an alternative.
All can be commanded to obey and by adopting a plan of living that
has been laid down for them they can live in a manner that conduces
to the security and health that each of them desires. Still, not all will
achieve sensibility and not all will gain knowledge; nor can they be
commanded to do so. Every human being will seek to discover and
adopt a plan of living that enhances the prospect of his own security
and health. But due to lack of knowledge of the causes of things, lack
of an interest to acquire the habit of virtue by oneself, and lack of
effort to exert reason as a power of human nature, the vast majority of
human beings will not look inward but instead they will look outward
for a means to achieving the third proper object of desire. Most human
beings then regularly will look to fortune, that is, the external aid of
God. More precisely, they will turn to a phenomenon like prophecy
or revelation to instruct and guide them with respect to the conduct
of their lives and the governance of their affairs in their attempts to
achieve security and health.126 In other words, security and health for
most human beings is more a matter of obedience to an established
plan of living than a matter of knowing the best plan of living.
TTP 3: 46.
TTP 3: 1516; 6061; 18992.
126
Spinozas mention of the fact that Alexander the Great turned to superstition
confirms the natural human proclivity toward recourse to augurs, prophets, and
miraculous events, in times of distress, confusion, or anxiety. Even Alexander, who
would have studied prudence and reasonability under the tutelage of Aristotle, was not
exempt from the urgings of his passions that led him to seek security and health in the
dictates of soothsayers (TTP 3: 6) or in the aftermath of extraordinary acts (3: 96).
124
125

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Insofar as piety and faith derive from revealed teachings but knowledge of the causes of things and virtue derive from human nature,
one could distinguish between the kind of life that involves obedience
to God, which is engendered by revelation, and the kind of life that
involves knowledge and love of God, which arises from human
power alone and the laws of human nature. Furthermore, inasmuch
as nonphilosophers are more prone to follow their passions and to look
chiefly to fortune in order to conduct their lives, govern their affairs, and
satisfy their desires, whereas the philosophers follow reason and look to
knowledge of nature and knowledge of the causes of things in order
to conduct their lives, govern their affairs, and satisfy their desires, one
may question whether the philosopher is able to live piously at all.127
Moreover, if natural knowledge and prophecy or revelation are
equivalent,128 it is unclear why the former will lead to knowledge of God
but the latter only can lead to obedience to God. Indeed, according to
the teaching of the treatise, the teaching of revelation or theology or
the Scriptures or faith or piety does not even require that the doctrines
which promote obedience to God even be true. The only doctrines
that are required by the universal faith are ones that sufficiently lead
human beings to obey God by living justly and charitably; and human
beings adopt that plan of living only because it has been revealed to
them. They do not adopt the revealed plan of living because it emanates
from natural knowledge or reason; for no one knows by nature that
he owes any obedience to God, nor indeed does he attain it by reason,
but someone is able to adopt it only on account of revelation confirmed
by signs.129 Consequently, the appeal of theology or revelation, and
with it the prospect of inducing human beings to obey God, is tied
to the appeal of revelation confirmed by signs. Yet in terms of the

127
The question of the relationship between piety and philosophy, of course, is the
theme of Platos Euthyphro, as well as being a critical element of The Apology of Socrates.
In the case of Socrates, the tension between the philosopher and the city is reflected
in the tension between reason and piety. A similar tension seems to be present in the
TTP. One illustration of the tension and Spinozas attempt to repair it appears in his
intent to demonstrate in the TTP that philosophy, and the liberty of philosophizing,
need not be detrimental to piety and the public peace.
128
TTP 3: 1516.
129
TTP 3: 198. Philosophy and reason have truth as their common object and philosophy is founded upon common notions that are sought on the basis of nature alone
(3: 17980; compare 183 and 188). Accordingly, if one cannot know by nature that
he owes any obedience to God then it also follows that one cannot know the doctrine
of obedience to God on the basis of philosophy or reason.

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teaching of the treatise, the phrase revelation confirmed by signs is

very problematical in two significant respects.
The first and more obvious problem attaches to the notion of signs.
Spinoza asserts in chapter two of the treatise that the process for the
certification of the authenticity of prophetic certitude always was
based on three criteria: (1) the revealed matters were imagined very
vividly; (2) there was a sign; and (3) the prophets spirit was inclined
toward fairness and goodness.130 Indeed, the theological teaching of
the treatise also affirms that the apostles confirmed their sayings by
signs [for] signs absolutely were required for converting the peoples to
religion and confirming them in it.131 But in the course of the teaching of the treatise, Spinoza identifies signs with miracles, that is,
the sun standing still for Joshua is called a sign in chapter two of the
treatise132 and the same event illustrates a miracle in chapter six of the
book.133 But, according to Spinoza, miracles are absurd.134 If revealed
teachings require or involve signs or miracles to validate the teachings
then there would appear to be serious grounds for questioning the
authority or the credibility of any doctrine that must be accompanied
by an absurdity, that is to say, a miracle or a sign, in order to certify
the revealed teaching. Still, the obvious problem of confirmation by
signs is eased somewhat by Spinozas version of the corrected criteria
for establishing prophetic certitude.
In chapter fifteen of the treatise, after a lengthy analysis of the
prevailing tradition of theology or religion, Spinoza insists that the
authority of the Bible depends upon the authority of the Prophets [and]
the authority and certitude of the Prophets consist of (1) a distinct and
vivid imagination, (2) a Sign, and (3) finally, and chiefly, a spirit inclined
to the fair and the good.135 Spinoza repeats the criteria for the certification of the authenticity of prophetic certitude that were named in
chapter two of the treatise. But Spinozas appraisal of the possibility
of certifying the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation based upon
those criteria alters considerably in chapter fifteen. That is, after his
investigation of theology and his critique of the prevailing tradition

130
131
132
133
134
135

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

31.
153.
3536.
84.
86.
18586.

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of theology or religion, Spinoza is prompted to reassess how readers

of the Scriptures should employ those three criteria. With respect to
the vividness of a prophets imagination, Spinoza concludes that only
a prophet could validate the vivacity of such a faculty and therefore
the certitude of the prophecy or revelation must be based upon the
other two criteria. Spinoza then says that appeals to signs also are
problematical because even Moses warns the people about being duped
by false prophets who yet can give true signs.136 Therefore the only
remaining criterion by which to determine prophetic certitude is the
disposition of the prophet toward fairness and goodness together with
the teaching that the prophet offers, namely, a teaching that advocates,
encourages, commands, or conduces to a plan of living that requires
acts of justice and charity in obedience to God.137 So the authority,
certitude, and perhaps most importantly the credibility of prophecy
or revelation is confirmed simply on the basis of the character of the
prophet and the character of the prophets teaching, both of which
must evince a fundamental disposition in favor of fairness and goodness.138 Based on that standard, however, it could be argued that any
reasonable or sensible teaching that promoted fairness and goodness, as
all reasonable or sensible teachings should do, also could be regarded
as a prophetic or revealed teaching and thus it could be said to possess
prophetic certitude.139 In fact, Spinoza proposes that human laws or
human plans of living only have a different focus than the divine law
unless they have been confirmed by revelation.140 In other words, then,
reasonable or sensible human laws can pass for divine laws to the degree
that they indisputably satisfy the determinative criterion for prophetic
certitude: They are laws made by fair and good human beings that
aim at promoting fairness and goodness among human beings. After
all, natural knowledge and prophecy or revelation have been made
equivalent by Spinoza; and the preference for revealed teachings over
the teachings of natural knowledge appears to derive simply from the
extraordinary character of the former versus the ordinary character
of the latter. A case in point is Spinozas claim about the testimony of
the apostles. For he observes that although the religion preached by

136
137
138
139
140

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

186.
18687.
79.
5961.
61.

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the apostles might not be accounted reasonable, since their preaching

revolved around the history of Christ and the peculiar claims made
about it,141 nevertheless the sum of their teaching could be approved by
reason because it consisted entirely of moral lessons.142 Still, the present issue is the matter of revealed teachings being confirmed by signs.
Spinozas teaching in the treatise holds that the presence of a sign or
the occurrence of some astonishing event together with the enunciation
of a teaching or a law only would enhance the likelihood that vulgar
and intellectually deficient human beings would embrace the teaching
or law that was enunciated. For example, Spinoza suggests that Moses
recognized the necessity of performing signs or miracles in order to
convince the Hebrew people to remain steadfast in their covenant with
God. That is, after Moses noted the obstinate mind and spirit of his
nation, he clearly saw that he could not complete the matter he had
begun without great miracles and Gods singular external aid.143
The second less obvious but more dramatic problem with the phrase
revelation confirmed by signs concerns the question of the veracity of revelation itself. Spinoza asserts that prophecy or revelation is
sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings.144
He then says that because the source of natural knowledge and the
source of prophecy or revelation is the same, namely, God, it follows
that natural knowledge actually is a kind of prophecy, though natural
knowledge is not accorded that designation. The two most important
persons in the Scriptures to transmit sure knowledge of some matter
revealed by God to human beings are Moses and Christ. However
Spinoza assigns superiority to the teaching of Christ on the basis of the
differences between the characteristic features of the revealed teaching
of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ. For example, Moses is
distinct from all of the other prophets because God spoke with Moses
face to face. But Christ surpasses Moses for the reason that Christ

141
One should recall Spinozas confession that he does not understand certain
things put forth about Christ by certain churches (TTP 3: 21) as well as his claim that
one may accept the revealed teaching of Christ without being required to accept the
passion and resurrection of the carnal Christ (3: 68).
142
TTP 3: 156.
143
TTP 3: 53. Because Spinoza identifies the external aid of God with fortune
(3: 46), the claim that is made about Moses by Spinoza insinuates that Moses understood
just how much fortune, or apparently some kind of extraordinary good luck, would
be needed so as to keep the Hebrew people orderly and united.
144
TTP 3: 15.

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communed with God mind to mind. The revealed teaching of Moses

was delivered only to the Hebrew people. But the revealed teaching of
Christ was intended for the entire human race. Moses pronounced laws
on Gods behalf whereas Christ enunciated eternal truths. Those basic
differences between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed
teaching of Christ permit Spinoza to cast the teaching of Christ as
more universal, more accurate, and more adequate than the teaching
of Moses. In one sense, the espousal of the teaching of Christ over
the teaching of Moses would seem to be an obvious consequence of
Spinozas liberal orthodoxy. That is, prior to the institutionalization
of it, the revealed teaching of Christ is not as stylized, ritualized, or
formalized as the revealed teaching of Moses and the religion of the
Hebrew people. Nor does the revealed teaching of Christ inherently
demand the hierarchical systems of interpretation, adjudication, or
social relations that are endemic to the revealed teaching of Moses.
Furthermore, Christ does not abrogate the law of Moses;145 Christs
purpose is to extend it. Christ was sent to teach all human beings to
adopt a universal love of neighbor rather than remain bound by the
more constrictive love of ones own neighbor, namely, ones fellow
Hebrews, which had been taught by Moses.146 Still, the endorsement
of the revealed teaching of Christ in lieu of the revealed teaching of
Moses also introduces an inconspicuous but serious implication about
the very nature of prophecy or revelation itself.
According to Spinoza, Moses taught that God was a legislator, a
king who sits in judgment, a ruler who dispenses justice, mercy, etc.;
but Christ, who was the mouth of God, perceived revealed matters
truly and adequately and imparted them as eternal truths rather
than as laws.147 On the surface of his argument, Spinoza distinguishes
between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching
of Christ in terms of their universalizability, their accuracy, their
adequacy, as well as their mode of communication. But he also goes
farther. What Moses taught about God and the divine nature proceeded
from revelation or from a foundation of what was revealed to him.148
Therefore what Moses taught from revelation or from a foundation
of what was revealed to him must be presumed to have expressed a
145
146
147
148

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

71.
233; and compare 64.
6465.
64.

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sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings

since that is what is implied by prophecy or revelation. Yet Spinoza
also concludes that the revealed teaching of Moses expresses a false
conception of the divine nature. That is, the writing of laws in Gods
name, even when undertaken by prophets, is an exercise that counters
and corrupts an adequate perception of the truth about the matter,
namely, that Gods decrees are not laws but instead they are eternal
truths. The reason for framing revealed teachings as laws rather than
expressing revealed teachings as eternal truths, says Spinoza, is that
the vulgar are able or willing to comprehend God only in such a fashion. Accordingly, Spinoza says that we conclude therefore that God
is described as a legislator or a prince, and called just, merciful, etc.,
from nothing other than the grasp of the vulgar and from a defect of
their understanding; and God really acts solely from the necessity of
his own nature and perfection, and all of his decrees are eternal truths
and involve necessity.149 In addition, Spinoza contends that describing God as ruler, legislator, or king and imputing to God justice or
compassion simply are anthropomorphisms that are completely alien
to the divine nature.150
The theological teaching that is advanced in the treatise in accordance with Spinozas liberal orthodoxy occasions a conflict that should
be noted by one who reads philosophically. Moses teaches from
revelation or from a foundation of what was revealed to him that
God is a legislator and king, a ruler who dispenses justice and mercy.
Christ, however, does not portray God in such a manner. He does not
present God as legislator-king but speaks of God in terms that are
familiar to his audience and their experiences. Christ typically spoke
more clearly than the Prophets but it is conceded by Spinoza that he
still taught revealed things obscurely because he conveyed the revealed
matters through parables.151 Spinoza explains the difference between
the mode in which Moses portrays God and the mode in which Christ
portrays God by noting that the Mosaic portrayal of God is rooted in
a conception of the deity that was embraced by those he addressed but
their conception also derived from a defect of their understanding.
The principle at issue, however, is rather more controversial than

149
150
151

TTP 3: 65.
TTP 3: 64; 17172.
TTP 3: 65.

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any simple suggestion that Moses or Christ employed concessions or

accommodations of vulgar views in their revealed teachings. Moses says
that God is a king who legislates; Spinoza says that such a conclusion
about God is vulgar, intellectually defective, and fundamentally false.
Hence the theological position of Moses is contradicted explicitly by the
philosophical position of Spinoza; and perhaps it also is contradicted
implicitly by the theological position of Christ, at least as that teaching
is interpreted and represented by Spinoza in the treatise.
An astute reader of the treatise might detect the following predicament. At first glance, Spinozas advocacy of the revealed teaching of
Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses appears orthodox to the
majority of the readers of the treatise who subscribe to one Christian
affiliation or another. But the superiority of the revealed teaching of
Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses can be maintained only at
the expense of exposing the vulgar and intellectually flawed character
of the revealed teaching of Moses. In other words, the merit of the
revealed teaching of Christ is affirmed because of its contrast with the
shortcomings of the revealed teaching of Moses; and Spinoza states
that the same vulgar conception of the deity and the same defect of
understanding that is attributable to the revealed teaching of Moses
also applies to Adam, the Israelites, and all of the Prophets who wrote
laws in Gods name.152 In effect, therefore, the revealed teaching of
Moses and the entire prophetic mission that is based upon that teaching
are erroneous. But if the revealed teachings of Moses and the prophets
are erroneous then it cannot be said with seriousness or confidence that
prophecy or revelation is sure knowledge of some matter revealed by
God to human beings.
If the revealed teaching of Moses expresses a vulgar and intellectually defective depiction of God and the divine nature then there is
at least one cardinal instance in the Scriptures which demonstrates
that prophecy or revelation does not impart sure knowledge. But if
prophecy or revelation fails to impart sure knowledge on any one occasion, but especially on an occasion as significant as the revelation of the
Law of Moses, then the claim that prophecy or revelation exclusively
conveys sure knowledge simply is undermined. If what is conveyed
through revelation can be vulgar and erroneous, as it is in the case of
the revealed teaching of Moses, then what exempts any other instance

152

TTP 3: 63.

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of prophecy or revelation, including the revealed teaching of Christ,

from imparting similar vulgar, intellectually defective, erroneous, or false
doctrines? According to Spinoza, even Christ on occasion appears to
have expressed his teaching as a law instead of communicating it as an
eternal truth. Christ did so, Spinoza claims, because of the ignorance
and stubbornness of the people; but Spinoza also remarks that in
legislating on such occasions Christ acted the part of God.153 The
latter remark suggests that whatever may have been the actual perception of revealed matters by Christ, it is clear that Christ was aware of
the generally received view of God as a legislator-king and so he also
was aware of the efficacy of introducing a plan of living that would
bring salus to human beings in the form of a divinely issued law or
command. While the vulgar are able to obey God, they are not able to
understand or know God; though the vulgar often confuse their obedience to God for a display of their knowledge of God. The vulgar think
or feel that God is a king who legislates, judges, punishes or rewards,
shows mercy, and dispenses justice. Those views about the nature of
the deity themselves obligate human beings to obey the sort of divine
being who possesses such characteristics. Still, the vulgars knowledge
of God involves a circular argument; for the knowledge of the divine
nature that compels obedience issues from a command in the revealed
teaching of Moses rather than from some exercise of the intellect. The
fact of the matter is that all are able to obey but not all are able or
willing to know or to understand. The majority of human beings, the
nonphilosophers, need a plan of living. But the plan of living that will
promote their security and health must be proposed for them since they
are unable or unwilling to utilize their own power and the laws of their
own nature in order to acquire the habit of virtue. Thus Moses, almost
always, but also Christ, on certain crucial occasions, gives expression to
a revealed teaching as a law and consequently each imparts a revealed
theology of salus that is predicated upon obedience to God. Both Moses
and Christ teach obedience to God; and both Moses and Christ teach
that obedience to God is evinced through acts of love toward ones
neighbor. An important difference between their teachings, however, is
that Moses sought to effect compliance with the law through external
compulsion which focused on bodily advantages or disadvantages154

153
154

TTP 3: 65.
TTP 3: 70; 7374.

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whereas Christ sought to effect compliance with the law through an

internal correction or reform of the spirit of each individual.155
The authority and certitude of the Scriptures, and hence revelation,
theology, faith, and piety, are identical with the authority and certitude
of prophecy or revelation. The authority and certitude of prophecy
or revelation, however, rest upon the satisfaction of three criteria; and
two of the three criteria must be abandoned. One cannot know the
vividness of the imagination of the prophet nor can one appeal to
a confirming sign in order to establish the certitude of a prophecy
or revelation. All that remains by way of establishing the certitude
of the revealed teaching is a determination of whether the doctrine
revealed and the one who revealed it are inclined toward the fair and
the good. But representing the fair and representing the good
does not entail that the revealed teaching be true; it only is required
that the revealed teaching be pious. That is, the teaching must induce
human beings to obey God.156 According to Spinoza, obedience to God
depends upon ones conviction in the seven fundamental dogmas of the
universal faith. But one also is at liberty to decide the exact manner
in which he apprehends those dogmas. Again, one must believe that
God is omnipresent. But it is nothing to faith whether one believes
that God is omnipresent essentially or potentially; nor is it anything to
faith if one obeys God based on ones free will or whether one obeys
God based on the necessity of the divine decree; nor is it anything to
faith if one believes that the reward of the good and the punishment
of the evil is natural or supranatural.157 In other words, one is not
required to have a precise knowledge about the attributes of God in
order to live in obedience to God and thus be saved. All such claims
conform to Spinozas teaching of a liberal orthodox theology. But
Spinoza also tells the reader of the treatise that whoever says that it
is not a necessity to understand the attributes of God but only simply
to believe them without demonstration certainly is jesting.158
On the one hand, Spinoza emphatically declares that one must believe
the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith and one enjoys
considerable personal discretion in precisely how one understands those
dogmas. But on the other hand, Spinoza equally emphatically declares
155
156
157
158

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

103; and compare 65.

168; 17576; 180.
178.
170.

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that whoever says that one must believe that there are particular attributes of God without affording a demonstration of them is someone
who certainly is jesting. What is the reader of the treatise to conclude?
More to the point, what should the one who reads philosophically
conclude about Spinozas odd or discrepant statements?159 At the very
least, a philosophical reader of the treatise can be assured of this consequence. If theology is revelation160 and the teaching of revelation is
the teaching of obedience to God161 and obedience to God is achieved
only through conviction in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith162 then one must acknowledge that on the basis of Spinozas
arguments in the treatise, that is to say, his philosophical argument or
philosophical teaching in the treatise, it is necessary to conclude that
however much the fundamental dogmas of faith may assure piety
they also continue to teach vulgar, intellectually defective, and erroneous characterizations of the deity and Spinoza already explicitly has
renounced those vulgar depictions of the deity previously in his book.163
The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith require the faithful
or pious to regard God as highly just and merciful; to regard God as
a judge; to regard God as directing all things through his fairness
and justice; to regard God as having supreme right and dominion
over everything; and to think of God as forgiving and as directing
all things by his mercy and his grace.164 However, Spinoza himself
159
At this juncture it could be tempting to rehearse the history of the debate over
the question about the sincerity of Spinozas theological teaching in the TTP. That is,
one could address the question of whether the TTP contains both an exoteric teaching
that is designed for nonphilosophers and an esoteric teaching that is designed for the
potential philosopher or for one who reads philosophically. It is not my intention to
resolve that issue here in its entirety. I have defended the proposition that exoteric/
esoteric literature is possible in On the Practice of Esotericism, Journal of the History
of Ideas 53 (1992); and I have demonstrated Spinozas use of such literature in Harris,
Strauss, and Esotericism in Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus, Interpretation: A Journal
of Political Philosophy 23 (1996) and in Spinoza, Philosophic Communication, and the
Practice of Esotericism in Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize, ed. Paul J. Bagley
(Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
160
TTP 3: 184.
161
TTP 3: 185.
162
TTP 3: 175 and 178.
163
TTP 3: 6265. This is but one instance where Spinoza demands that his reader
pay close and careful attention to statements made in the book that are inconsistent
with each other directly or that are inconsistent with each other indirectly or by implication. In the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith, Spinoza is encouraging
inattentive readers to accept what Spinoza himself philosophically rejects as vulgar,
defective, and erroneous.
164
TTP 3: 17778.

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rejects each of those characterizations of the deity for the reasons that
they are erroneous and anthropomorphic. Hence to be faithful or pious
in the manner demanded by the theological teaching of the treatise is
to forsake any accurate understanding of the deity and to embrace a
vulgar, intellectually defective, and anthropomorphic apprehension of
the nature of God. The theological teaching of the treatise therefore
endorses and advocates as the foundational doctrine and lesson of
revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, and piety a teaching that
Spinoza himself contests and dismisses as vulgar and mistaken. Still,
Spinozas theological teaching may prove to be palatable to most of
his readers inasmuch as it is more liberal and it is not as superstitionridden as he says the traditional teaching of theology or religion had
become.165 Nevertheless, the one who reads philosophically will have
noted the fact that the theological teaching of the treatise demands
that the faithful or pious, or all those who long to count themselves as
faithful or pious for the sake of achieving salus, adopt a set of tenets
which the author of the treatise deems to be patently untrue. But if
that is the case then what purpose does the theological teaching of the
treatise serve? The answer to that question is complex.
The theological teaching of the treatise conforms to Spinozas definition of theology in this sense. Theology is revelation and Spinoza holds
that revelation teaches obedience to God. Furthermore, theology or
revelation teaches obedience to God through love of God and love of
ones neighbor and those kinds of love are displayed in acts of justice
and charity. Spinoza says that the teaching of revelation or theology
or the Scriptures or faith or piety always has been uniform. Obedience
to God, love of God, love of neighbor, and the performance of acts
of justice and charity are the essential components of the revealed
teachings of the sacred books as well as the foundational elements
of the revealed teachings of Moses and Christ.166 With respect to the
165
TTP 3: 89. In place of the traditional teachings of theology or religion which
emphasize senses of prophecy, prophets, law, miracles, and the interpretation of sacred
books that reflect an extreme kind of superstitious orientation, Spinozas versions of
those elements of revealed theology, as they are presented in the TTP, may be said
to promulgate a sort of enlightened superstition rather than a merely crude one. I
have treated the issue in Spinoza, Biblical Criticism, and the Enlightenment, Modern
Enlightenment and the Rule of Reason, ed., John McCarthy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1998).
166
TTP 3: 16566. Spinozas claim that the Hebrews hatred of other Nations
preserves them considerably (3: 56) and his conclusion that hatred of other nations
was identical with piety for the Hebrew people (3: 215) intimate that there may be a

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basic elements of faith, the theological teaching of the treatise then

is conventional albeit with a liberal bent. But what is said about the
differences between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed
teaching of Christ points the careful reader of the treatise to a significant and different consideration. Notwithstanding his endorsement of
the revealed teaching of Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses,
Spinoza states that it also happens to be the case that human beings
can arrive at the revealed teaching of Christ in a way that they cannot arrive at the revealed teaching of Moses. The revealed teaching
of Moses was communicated by God directly to Moses alone and so
he became the sole prophet or interpreter of God; all of the others who embraced the Hebrew religion subsequently submitted to the
revelations, prophecies, dictates, and guidance of Moses.167 By contrast, however, when Christ communicated his revealed teaching as an
eternal truth rather than as a law it was possible for human beings to
apprehend the teaching by the natural light inasmuch as the sum
of it contained moral lessons.168 Spinoza therefore maintains that
natural knowledge or the natural light is more than competent
to apprehend the natural divine law;169 and human nature is sufficiently equipped to devise a plan of living consonant with the nature
of things such that it can provide security and health for an individual
as well as for other human beings.170 But if that conclusion is correct
then the revealed teaching of Christ would seem to be superfluous.
If natural knowledge or the natural light can know the natural
divine law as an eternal truth, for example, then there is no need to
rely on the revealed teaching of Christ in order for human beings to
achieve salus. The revealed teaching of Christ would be redundant,
and even dispensable, on Spinozas view about what natural knowledge

legitimate and serious question about the uniformity of the Scriptures teaching about
love of a neighbor. Spinoza himself acknowledges the discrepancy between the
revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ in chapter 19 of the
TTP where he draws the readers attention to the passage from Matthew 5:43: it has
been said to you love your neighbor and hate your enemy (TTP 3: 233).
167
TTP 3: 4445; 205209.
168
TTP 3: 156; 65.
169
Chapter 4 of the treatise bears the title, De Lege Divina. However, a few pages
into the chapter Spinoza refers to the divine law as the natural divine law (TTP
3: 6168). In effect, Spinoza blurs any profound distinction between the revealed
divine law and the universal laws of nature (3: 57). The shift made by Spinoza is
most unorthodox.
170
TTP 3: 5961.

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or the natural light can attain. Hence one simply could set aside the
teaching of Christ, to say nothing of the revealed teaching of Moses.
One could set aside those revealed teachings except for one persistent
fact: Still it is impossible for carnal human beings to understand this
[namely, that the highest good can be attained by reason] since it seems
vain to him who has an extremely barren knowledge of God and also
he finds nothing in this highest good that he can caress, eat, or finally
have affect his flesh, which delights him the most, because [the highest
good] consists solely in speculation and it is purely in the mind.171 In
other words, the revealed teaching of Christ, the apostles, Moses, and
the prophets might be expendable if it were not for the fact that human
nature is disinclined to exercise the natural light and seek a knowledge
of nature, human nature is not inclined to acquire the habit of virtue
through the use of reason, and human nature is not inclined to achieve
salus through native powers of the intellect. Instead, human beings
are inclined to function in accordance with their fleshy instincts and
what the appetite urges.172 Therefore the revealed teaching of Christ,
like the revealed teaching of Moses, is indispensable so long as human
beings remain driven more by passion than by reason, or for so long
as there are more nonphilosophers than philosophers.
The revealed teaching of Christ is situated between two orientations. On the one hand, Christ reveals eternal truths but, on the other
hand, Christ pronounces laws. When Christ reveals eternal truths, the
truths equally can be apprehended by the natural light and so revelation becomes redundant. But when Christ pronounces laws it seems
that he is the mouth of God and he acts the part of God which
suggests that unique revelations or pronouncements from Christ are
necessary for inculcating the appropriate plan of living that will make
human salus possible. The revealed teaching of Christ is bifurcated.
In one respect, it is a teaching that can be attained by reason left to
its own devices. In the other respect, the revealed teaching of Christ
imitates the revealed teaching of Moses in terms of enunciating the
indispensable instruction that leads to human salus as a law that is to
be followed. Christs imitation of Moses and his indebtedness to the
mode of the revealed teaching of Moses is illustrated in the gospels.
On the decisive occasion in the New Testament when Christ is asked

171
172

TTP 3: 61.
TTP 3: 73; 18990.

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by the Pharisees about the greatest commandment in the Law, Christ

affirms the revealed teaching of Moses, that is, he confirms the Law
of Moses and he emphasizes obedience to the divinely dictated command to love God above all and to love ones neighbor as oneself 173
as constituting the essence of the divine law. Christ does not present
that teaching, the cardinal instruction of the New Testament, as an
eternal truth. On the contrary, he explains his own teaching as a
commandment that places him in continuity within the context and
on the foundation of the revealed teaching of Moses.
Spinozas account of the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed
teaching of Christ has this consequence. What Christ may be said to
teach in contradistinction to the teaching of Moses is something that
also can be learned or known by virtue of natural knowledge or the
natural light. But what Christ teaches in concert with the teaching of
Moses is something that cannot be obtained through the exercise of
natural knowledge, reason, or the natural light. What Christ and Moses
both teach is the doctrine of obedience to God; and that doctrine is
conveyed and known only through revelation, theology, the Scriptures,
faith, or piety.174 What Christ offers beyond the revealed teaching of
Moses is an appreciation of the natural divine law as an eternal
truth. But that aspect of the matter equally is accessible to reason or the
natural light and therefore those who live in accordance with reason or
the natural light are under no obligation to appeal to revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety in order to apprehend the natural
divine law nor do they have any interest to do so. But what Christ
offers by way of imitation of the revealed teaching of Moses, namely,
when Christ enunciates laws, is the continuity of a theological tradition
which inculcates a plan of living that depends upon obedience to divine
commands and a vulgar perception of the nature of the deity.
At first glance, one might infer that Spinoza proposes in the treatise
that the teaching of revelation and the teaching of the natural light
converge and meet each other. That is, both revelation and natural
knowledge are said to emanate from the same source, namely, God,
and therefore the teaching of revelation and the teaching of the natural
light eventually and ultimately intersect. But what revelation imparts
and what the natural light concludes actually are mutually exclusive of

173
174

Matthew 22:3440; Mark 12:2834; and Luke 10:2528.

TTP 3: 170; 175; 17980; 185.

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each other in the most important respect. Both revelation and reason
or the natural light can teach love of God. Only revelation teaches
obedience to God whereas only reason or the natural light teaches
knowledge of God. Knowledge of God and obedience to God are
not the same thing. Indeed the revealed teaching of obedience to God
is predicated upon a set of dogmas that Spinoza himself describes as
vulgar, intellectually defective, and anthropomorphic. The dogmas
are pious, or at least they are deemed to be the sort of tenets that will
induce human beings to obey God but the pious dogmas do not have
to be true. So long as one is ignorant of the falsity of a dogma and
remains obedient to God, his piety is assured; though Spinoza also suggests that one who becomes aware that a dogma is false necessarily
will become rebellious.175 Thus ignorance of the falsity of a dogma
conduces to piety but awareness of the falsity of a dogma will lead to
impiety, that is, it will lead to an inability to embrace the fundamental
dogmas of the universal faith. Disbelief in any one of those dogmas,
or awareness of the falsity of any one of those dogmas, means that
one cannot be pious in the sense defined by Spinoza in the theological teaching of the treatise. That is, disbelief in any of the dogmas
or awareness of the falsity of any one of the dogmas of the universal
faith is sufficient to preclude an individual from living piously, which is
to say, disbelief in any of the dogmas of the universal faith precludes
an individuals obedience to God. Nonetheless, Spinoza also maintains
that we nevertheless can embrace by our judgment what already has
been revealed with at least a moral certitude since the certitude of the
prophetic testimonies concerns only moral matters.176 The combined
worth of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety and the
pious fundamental dogmas of the universal faith is contained in the
fact that all are able to embrace them and thus all are able to adopt a
plan of living based upon obedience which is salutary. But knowledge
of the first causes of things,177 acquisition of the habit of virtue, and
knowledge of a true plan of living, which owe to our power alone or

TTP 3: 176.
TTP 3: 185.
177
TTP 3: 46. The first of the three proper objects of desire is to know things
through their first causes [res per primas suas causas intelligere]. If God is the cause of
all things as Spinoza affirms, that is, if God is the first cause (3: 60; 8485), then it is
curious that Spinoza defines the first proper object of desire as involving the knowledge
of the first causes of things which suggests more than one first cause.
175
176

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to the laws of human nature alone, are not objectives that are achieved
equally by all human beings.
Theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety offers a rhetorically powerful, imaginatively appealing, and passionately compelling
teaching that can be embraced by the vast majority of human beings.
The doctrine of theology or revelation posits that human salus can be
obtained by obeying God through loving God and performing just and
charitable deeds toward ones neighbor. An individual does not require
a speculative or mathematical knowledge of God or the doctrines and
dogmas of theology or faith in order to be faithful or pious; an individual only needs to believe certain things about God that will make
mandatory obedience to God by that individual inevitable. Moreover,
the theological teaching of the treatise proposes that even if one fails
to live a life dedicated to obeying God, through the performance of
acts of justice and charity toward ones neighbor, it still is possible
for him to enjoy the remission of his sins, that is, the remission of
his disobedience, if he repents and is delivered by Gods mercy and
grace. Still, no particular fundamental dogma of theology, revelation,
Scripture, piety, or faith needs to be true; it only needs to be pious.178
178
A significant example will help illustrate the matter. In chapter 7 of the treatise,
Spinoza examines the difficulty of determining the meaning, rather than the truth, of
any Scriptural statement. He then illustrates the difficulty by raising the question of
how one is to understand the assertion of Moses that God is fire and the assertion
of Moses that God is jealous. Spinoza maintains that each assertion individually is
perfectly clear in its meaning. But in respect of their relation to one another he says
that the two statements are very obscure (TTP 3: 100). In chapter 2 of the treatise,
Spinoza remarked that God was revealed in accordance with each prophets opinions
and preconceptions about the divine nature. Consequently, it was revealed to Moses
and he taught nothing other than that [God] was merciful, benign, and extremely
jealous, as is evident from many places in the Pentateuch. Finally, he believed and he
taught that this being differed so much from all other beings that the image of nothing visible could express it nor could it be seen (3: 38). The claim that God is fire
and the claim that God is jealous are assimilated by Spinoza through reference to
a declaration by Moses found at Deuteronomy 4:24. The passage there helps Spinoza
to explain that the name fire also pertains to anger and jealousy (See Job 31:12), so
the statements of Moses are easily reconciled, and thus we legitimately conclude that
the two statements God is fire and God is jealous to be one and the same in meaning (3:
101). In chapter 7 of the treatise, Spinozas interest in the two propositions is limited
to their meaning only. But later in the treatise a very different verdict is reached with
regard to the utterances of Moses. In chapter 15 of the TTP, Spinoza argues that
there are numerous places in Scripture which speak in accordance with the received
opinions of the prophets or the received opinions of the vulgar, teach falsely, and involve
contradictions (3: 18086). Among the examples cited are the statements of Moses that
God is fire and God is jealous. Rebutting the proposition of Alpakhar that one
passage contradicts another only by implication but not directly, Spinoza declares that

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The most basic dogma of the universal faith only needs to establish with some credibility that God demands obedience from human
beings; God demands that human beings treat their fellows with justice
and charity; and God promises the forgiveness of sins, together with
the prospect of redemption, if one repents and becomes obedient to
God. That set of claims can offer a compelling inducement for human

the statements of Moses involve a direct contradiction. That is, Moses directly affirms
that God is fire (see Deut. 4:24) and he directly denies that God holds any likeness with
visible things (Deut. 4:12) [3: 183]. The direct contradiction attributed to Moses in
chapter 15 of the treatise involves the same statements Spinoza previously treated and
reconciled in chapter 7 of the book. In the earlier treatment of the statements, Spinoza
assigned a reason for the Mosaic claim that God is jealous. According to Spinoza,
the claim itself is contrary to reason and hence it is absurd. But however repugnant
the doctrine of a jealous God may be to reason, Spinoza says that one plainly must
conclude that Moses believed it himself or at least he wished to teach it (3: 101).
Because Spinoza says that the statements God is fire and God is jealous are the
same in meaning, one may resolve the direct contradiction between the statements
of Moses about Gods appearance as fire and Gods inability to be seen in a similar
fashion to the way the statements were reconciled in chapter 7. That is, it may be
postulated that Moses himself believed that God was fire or at least he wished to
teach it. From his explanation of the statements made by Moses, one may infer that
Spinoza imputes to Moses the practice of teaching exoterically. That is, since the revelation of the Decalogue at Exodus 19:1718 attests that God descended on Sinai as
fire when the tablets were conferred to Moses, the continued affirmation of the claim
at Deuteronomy 4:11 that God is fire focuses the attention of the Hebrew audience on the uniqueness of that event. Indeed, Deuteronomy 4 concerns the fidelity
of the Hebrew people to God. It is a reminiscence of the past glories of the Hebrew
people, their historic mission, and the promise of their future greatness. By rehearsing
the doctrine of Gods jealousy and the doctrine of Gods appearance as fire, as the
passages from Deuteronomy recount, Moses is reminding the Hebrew people of the
unique status of their election, their receipt of the Law, and Gods demand for obedience and loyalty from them. Moses is proposing that continued adherence to the plan
of living which he established will assure the Hebrew people of future acts of divine
providence. What Moses teaches, in respect of Gods jealousy or Gods appearance as
fire, may not be trueand Spinoza asserts that the statements plainly are contrary
to reason (3: 183)but the teaching of Moses certainly was pious in the sense that
it prompted the Hebrew people to recommit their obedience to God. In addition to
the surface argument about Gods jealousy and Gods bearing a likeness with visible
things, Spinoza exposes the self-contradiction of Moses which indicates another facet
of the vulgar and intellectually defective character of Scriptural statements and
the theology or faith that is based upon them. The exposure of the self-contradiction
indicates that the Scriptures profess irrational things. For one who reads philosophically, the exposure of the irrationality of certain Scriptural claims, e.g., God is fire
or God is jealous, should raise a crucial question: Which passages or doctrines of
the Scriptures, if any, were ones that the speaker or writer of it really believed and
which were the ones that the speaker of writer simply wished to teach? Spinozas
use of hidden and disguised arguments, as Lambert van Velthuysen called them, to
expose the irrationality of theological claims is intended to serve as a prompt for the
philosophical reader of the TTP.

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beings to embrace the teaching of theology, revelation, the Scriptures,

faith, or piety. The ambition of the foundational teaching of theology
is not to withstand demands for rational verification of its dogma or
doctrines. Instead, the purpose of the teaching of theology is to move
human beings to behaviors that increasingly will promote their security
and health, that is, their salus. Spinozas turn to theology or revelation
to present the teaching of obedience is dictated by the fact that the
teaching of obedience cannot be established by reason. That is, no
one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God, nor indeed
does he attain it by reason, but someone is able to adopt it only on
account of revelation confirmed by signs.179 Although the teaching of
obedience to God is not a product of reason, it nevertheless is a teaching that is quite effective for influencing human action and behavior; it
evidently is salutary; and it is persuasive to most human beings. Indeed,
for that very reason, the utility and necessity of Sacred Scripture or
revelation has been very great.180
Spinoza says in the treatise that if anyone wishes to persuade or dissuade anyone of anything that is not self-evident then he must argue
his case by making concessions to the views of his audience and he
must try to convince them of his position by deducing his claims from
what is familiar to them; accordingly, he must demonstrate his claims
by appealing to their experiences or he must appeal to their use of reason.181 But the goal of persuading or dissuading people about a specific
matter regularly confronts a basic problem of human nature. That is,
the sort of reasoning that may be required in order to demonstrate a
point through the use of reason typically is too demanding for most
human beings who eschew reason in favor of their passions and their
immediate concerns.182 The kind of intellectual aptitude required for
comprehending a thing by means of a rational demonstration of it is
rare among human beings. Accordingly, Spinoza concludes that human
beings prefer to be taught by experience rather than by rational
proofs or demonstrations which presume abilities not possessed by the
179
TTP 3: 198. Spinoza only asserts that no one knows by nature that he owes any
obedience to God. But one who reads philosophically also might infer that if nature
or reason does not teach obedience to a being who has dominion over everything
(3: 177) it is unlikely that nature or reason can teach that one human being should or
must obey another human being who is his equal unless he can be made to do so.
180
TTP 3: 188.
181
TTP 3: 7677.
182
TTP 3: 73; 18993.

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majority of them.183 Obedience to God is not known by nature and so

it cannot be discovered, known, demonstrated, or proved to be true by
the exercise of reason.184 Accordingly, since philosophy is reason and
philosophy aims at knowledge of the truth about the causes or natures
of things based upon common notions derived from nature alone185
the teaching of obedience to God, and perhaps the teaching of obedience simply, must be introduced by some other means. Those means
are found in the revealed teaching of theology communicated through
the Scriptures. But, more to the point, the Scriptures communicate the
teaching of obedience in a manner that is especially alluring to the
majority of human beings whose lives are conducted in accordance
with their appetites and urgings. Persuading such individuals to adopt
a plan of living that will lead to their security and health cannot be
undertaken successfully by appeals to the reasonability or the sensibility of the plan or through the provision of rational proofs about it.
Persuading passionate human beings to adopt a sensible plan of living
will have to involve making concessions to their presumptions about
things, accommodating ones teaching to their received opinions, and
appealing to their experiences. Passionate human beings will not be
moved by rational demonstrations but they will be moved by accounts
that conform to their inclinations and their way of perceiving themselves, others, and the world. To that end, Scripture proves to be most
helpful; for histories and revelations compose the greatest part of it
and the histories principally contain miracles.186 The narratives of the
Scriptures relate the accomplishments of those who have adopted
the plan of living that is articulated in the teaching of theology and
the narratives also relate the failures of those who have rejected that
plan of living or who have deviated from it. Moreover, the narratives in
the Scriptures which contain the working of miracles forcefully illustrate
Gods willingness to provide for those who obey the revealed teaching
that is communicated through the Scriptures. The narratives of the
Scriptures recount the blessings to be enjoyed by those who adhere to
the plan of living that is formulated by the revealed teaching of theology and, since every individual seeks what he perceives to be to his own
advantage or what he perceives to be of use to himself, the narratives
183
184
185
186

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

77.
185.
179.
98.

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137

of the Scriptures are especially appealing because they affirm that acts
of divine providence are performed in order to bestow good fortune
or the greater of two goods upon faithful human beings.187 Hence,
whereas reason may not be effective at persuading human beings to
adopt a plan of living that will help them to achieve the basic objects
of their desires, namely, security and health, it may be the case that
the impressive narratives of Scripture and their accounts of marvelous wonders will fare better in persuading human beings to embrace a
plan of living that will offer them what they need most.188 Even those
who live in accordance with reason, those who pursue knowledge of
nature, and those who follow the natural light are aware of the influence exerted by some stories on human dispositions as well as human
actions; and philosophers will know that nonphilosophical tales are
more likely to move or persuade nonphilosophers than rational arguments and proofs.189

TTP 3: 56; 44; 5356; 8182; 19192.

At issue is the question of rhetoric or the telling of tales. Spinoza notes that
people may not sit still for long chains of deductions (3: 77); they are more moved
and better moved by compelling stories. The educational process undertaken in Platos
Republic also initiates with a musical education of the soul; for human beings are
first moved more by music than by mathematical propositions. For the sake of the
nonphilosophers, Spinoza will rely on his interpretation of the histories or powerful
stories of the Scriptures in order to move the readers of the TTP to embrace his version of the teaching of theology just as Plato relies on his revision of the authorized
poetry of the Athenians to move his interlocutors in the Republic (386aff ) to consider
the teaching he advances for them.
189
In the course of the teaching of the treatise, Spinoza offers a commentary on the
intent of an author as well as a commentary on telling tales, each of which gives
an indication of Spinozas regard for certain sorts of writing, including the contents
of the Scriptures. With respect to the intent of an author, Spinoza states in chapter
7 of the TTP that it is possible to read similar histories in different books (3: 110)
but the judgment that a reader will make about each history or story will depend
upon the opinion that the reader has about the author. In the context of chapter 7,
Spinozas point is that it is necessary to know something about the life, upbringing,
and disposition of the Scriptural authors in order to ascertain the meanings of their
writings (3: 109). To illustrate the matter, Spinoza cites the case of a literary figure
that flies through the air and butchers people. The example, Spinoza says, can be
found in an account of Orlando Furioso, an account of Perseus by Ovid, and accounts
of Samson and Elijah in the Books of Judges and Kings (3: 110). Acquaintance with
the life and disposition of the author of each story informs the reader about how to
interpret it. That is, familiarity with the author of the Orlando Furioso story informs
the reader that the tale is intended to entertain; familiarity with Ovid informs the
reader of the Perseus story that the tale has a political intention; and familiarity with
the author(s) of the books of Judges and Kings informs the reader that the tales about
Samson and Elijah have sacred intentions. We are able to draw those conclusions about
the respective stories, Spinoza says, because of the opinions we have of their writers
187
188

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According to Spinoza, faith in the histories found in the Scriptures cannot yield knowledge of God.190 Nevertheless, the reading of
the histories and an acquaintance with the basic features of them is
highly necessary for the vulgar who are not intellectually competent to
grasp things clearly and distinctly.191 What the narratives of Scripture
affirm and repeat is that God exists; God sustains and directs all things;
and God cares for human beings.192 Without belief in the existence
of God, the direction of God, or the care of God for human beings,
it would be difficult for human beings to obey God and embrace the
revealed plan of living that assures them of their salvation. Indeed,
if one were to reject the existence of God there would no reason for
one to obey God rather than pleasure193 and for that reason Spinoza
asserts that disbelief or lack of confidence in the narratives of Scripture
is impious.194 That is to say, disbelief in the narratives of Scripture
will prevent human beings from obeying God and following a plan of
living that will assure their salus.
(3: 110). In other words, although the substance of various stories basically can be the
same, the purpose the story serves will be different depending upon the intent of the
author who wrote it. The same story can serve the purpose of amusement, political
instruction, or the inculcation of some theological view; and, with respect to telling
tales, Spinoza also emphasizes in chapter 5 of the TTP that there are important
consequences that accompany the telling of a tale. That is, Spinoza asserts that the
reading of the Scriptures is of worth only insofar as it affects how one lives: If one
were to have faith in everything he were to read in the Sacred Scriptures but not attend
to the doctrine that it intends to teach [viz., obedience to God] nor correct his life, for
him it would be just as if he read the Koran, the Fictitious fables of the Poets, or the
common Chronicles with the attention the vulgar usually do (3: 79). In the end, the
intent of the author and the tale that is told merge in the realization of a particular
consequence for the behavior of the reader. If one reads and believes the Scriptures
but does not alter and improve his life by having read them then it is as if he had read
some profane or common book. But there also seems to be another equally plausible
implication. If the consequence of reading the tale is decisive, i.e., if reading it makes
one live better, then could it not be said that reading the Koran, poetical fables, or
common chronicles could be just as effective as reading Sacred Scripture in exhorting
human beings to live in some desired way? The Koran presents a revealed teaching
that provides an instruction concerning the conduct of ones life. The superiority of
the Scriptures over the Koran, the fable, or the chronicle seems to be decided by the
fact that the opinion the reader has of the author and the tale is determinative
of how the story is received and understood; and for Spinozas audience the moral
authority and force of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures enjoy preeminence over
other books.
190
TTP 3: 61.
191
TTP 3: 78.
192
TTP 3: 77.
193
TTP 3: 178.
194
TTP 3: 78.

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Throughout the theological part of the Tractatus theologico-politicus,

namely, chapters one through fifteen of that book, the reader has been
advised of the difficulties and the dangers associated with the prevailing
theological tradition. The tradition has urged human beings to accept
the authority of certain schemes of Scriptural interpretation over others and it has denigrated the use of reason or the natural light.195 The
theological tradition has attempted to subsume philosophy within theology or it has sought to reduce philosophy or reason to the status of a
tool in the service of theology or religion.196 The theological tradition
has demanded that the faithful and the unfaithful alike accept a view
of nature that permits the possibility of miracles or events that occur
in contradiction of the laws of nature.197 The tradition of theology or
religion emphasizes the performance of ceremonies as manifestations
of an individuals faith or piety and it has insisted upon an individuals
belief in a number of stipulated tenets as proof of his faith rather than
focusing upon his actions and behavior.198 The theological tradition
has made pronouncements on speculative matters instead of confining
itself to making recommendations about moral matters. Each of those
troublesome elements of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion
has been exposed and contested by Spinoza; and in lieu of what the
theological tradition proclaims Spinoza offers an alternative version of
that theological teaching.
Spinozas teaching of theology in the treatise remains in line with
the cardinal features of the theological tradition. Spinozas theological
teaching emphasizes that God exists; God is meant to be worshipped; the
worship of God consists of obedience to God; obedience to God only
involves acts of justice and charity toward ones neighbor; all who adopt
the revealed plan of living are saved and all who oppose it or ignore it
are lost. But by contrast to the tradition of the theology, in Spinozas
teaching of theology one only needs to believe that God exists; one
does need to know any of the particulars concerning Gods existence
nor does one even need to believe various features about what may
be imputed to the existence of God. One should read and familiarize
oneself with the narratives of the Scriptures. But one should absorb only
those aspects of the Scriptures that prompt firmer belief in God such
195
196
197
198

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

9799.
18089.
8197; 15158.
6980; 16768; 175.

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that they occasion a more fervent obedience to God. One should look
to the testimonies of the prophets, the chroniclers, the apostles, and the
authors of the gospels for the moral lessons that may be gleaned from
their writings; but one should not invoke the words of the Scriptures
to solve speculative or philosophical questions. One should be moved
by the Scriptural accounts of formidable historical events, and even
the mention of the unusual occurrences that accompanied them, only
insofar as those accounts may enhance ones faith but one should not
take the accounts literally; on the contrary, one must regard miraculous
events simply as instances of causally unexplained good fortune which
have befallen people.199 Finally, whatever theology or revelation or the
Scriptures or faith or piety seem to impart, each individual is permitted
to take from it what is most consonant with his own sense of matters
and what will contribute most to his obedience to God for the sake of
his own salvation. It is not important that the doctrines or the dogmas
of theology be true; it only is important that the doctrines or dogmas
encourage one to live piously. Insofar as the piety of the foundation,
meaning, teaching, and dogmas of theology is more crucial than the
truth of those things, Spinoza can conclude the theological teaching
of the treatise with a seemingly unqualified endorsement of theology;
or at least an unqualified endorsement of the theological teaching that
is propounded by him in the treatise. But perhaps the reason given
by Spinoza for his endorsement of theology is more interesting than
the endorsement itself. For Spinoza reminds the reader at the close of
chapter fifteen of the treatise that the utility and necessity of Sacred
199
A connection exists, I think, between miracles, as events for which the natural
causes are unknown (TTP 3: 8384) and fortune, as the occurrence of unexpected
events which advantageously favor someone (3: 46). The same event can be called a
miracle or an episode of fortune depending upon ones suppositions about nature.
That is, the one event that occurs unexpectedly and for which no causal account can
be given will be called a miracle by the person who believes that God contravenes
the order and operations of nature in order to display his power and providence for
one group of human beings rather than another group of human beings (3: 8182; 84).
But that same event that occurs unexpectedly and for which no causal account can be
given will be called fortune by two other kinds of person. The first kind of person
is the one who sees the order and operations of nature as determined and inviolable;
for him nature simply is acting in a way that he did not anticipate but still it is acting
in accordance with the laws of nature. For the second kind of person, nature is an
unknown and so he regards all events as matters of chance; the difference between good
fortune and bad fortune is the same as the difference between what satisfies the person
and what does not satisfy him. Fortune, for Spinoza, is defined as an occurrence that
as yet is the causally unexplained external aid of God but the same description also
equally applies to a miracle (compare 3: 46 and 96).

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Scripture or revelation is very great. But the utility and necessity of

theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety is very great because
we cannot perceive by the natural light that simple obedience is the
way of salus hence the teaching of theology, revelation, the Scriptures,
faith, or piety has been a very great consolation to mortals.200
In the context of Spinozas statement about the utility and necessity
of the teaching of revelation, and the fact that it brings consolation to
mortals, it seems plain that the Latin word, salus, should be translated
by the English word salvation. Nonetheless it is well to remember
the ambiguous character of the Latin word which can mean either
religious salvation or it simply can mean general wellbeing. In
respect of the theological teaching of the treatise, obedience to God
is the way to theological or religious salvation. But perhaps obedience
also is required for the sake of ones own wellbeing together with the
wellbeing of others in a social or political setting. What is significant
in Spinozas statement about the utility and necessity of Scripture
is the declaration that we cannot perceive by the natural light that
simple obedience is the way of salus, be it theological salus or perhaps even social or political salus. Only revelation or theology makes
such a doctrine available; though among the theological dogmas and
doctrines there may be very many that do not contain so much as
a shadow of truth201 and there are many things said in Scripture or
revelation which only Philosophy and reason and not Scripture teach
to be false.202
In the final analysis, it may be the case that philosophy, reason, or the
natural light is unable to teach in truth that simple obedience is the
way of salus in theological, social, or political terms. But philosophy,
reason, or the natural light will espouse theologys teaching of obedience for the reason that the doctrine is salutary for vulgar and passionate human beings who constitute the vast majority of humankind.
Indeed, Spinoza discloses the social or political implications of the
theological teaching of obedience at the close of chapter fourteen of
the treatise when he states that I leave everyone to judge how salutary
and necessary this Doctrine is in a republic so that human beings live
peacefully and in harmony.203 In other words, because the life of
200
201
202
203

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

188.
176.
183.
179.

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passion is equally as legitimate as the life of reason, in accordance

with the teaching of nature, philosophy or reason or the natural light
may endorse the theological teaching of obedience as a way to salus on
the basis of it being a necessary and useful pious tale even though it
may not be a true tale. Theology teaches the doctrine that philosophy
does not teach and perhaps philosophy cannot teach on its own. The
realization of that fact, however, is attained only when the one who
reads philosophically recognizes that Spinoza has theologized overtly
but he also has philosophized covertly.

PART THREE

POLITICS

Chapter fourteen of the Tractatus theologico-politicus is dedicated to an

examination of the foundations of faith. No chapter of the treatise by
name is dedicated to an examination of the foundations of philosophy;
and no chapter of the treatise by name is dedicated to an examination
of the foundations of politics. The adjective politicus (political) conspicuously appears in the title of Spinozas book. But there is no formal
or definitive treatment of politics or the political in the treatise.1
The Latin word politia, which means the administration of the state,
appears once in Spinozas book;2 and later in the treatise, in the context
of his examination of the foundations of a Republic, Spinoza refers
the reader to the significance of what previously had been said about
politia in chapter five of the treatise.3
In that chapter of the treatise which concerns the institution of ceremonies, Spinoza discusses the utility and necessity of society together
with the reasons for its formation.4 He says that we see that those who
live rudely without politia make a miserable and almost brutish life.5
Then, when discussing again the need for human association in the
context of his account of the foundations of a Republic in chapter
sixteen of the treatise, Spinoza reiterates his verdict that human beings
live miserably, they fail to afford one another mutual assistance, and
they neglect the cultivation of reason in those circumstances which

1
The Latin word Politica appears once in the TTP. Citing the teaching of Solomon,
Spinoza says that knowledge of God contains true Ethics and Politics (TTP 3: 67).
2
TTP 3: 73.
3
TTP 3: 191.
4
TTP 3: 7375. One should recall Spinozas remark at the close of chapter 14
of the TTP about the salutary effects of theologys teaching of obedience and the
performance of works of justice and charity with respect to peace and harmony in a
Republic (3: 179). Spinoza also distinguishes the teaching of Sacred Scripture, theology,
or faith for its utility and necessity in leading human beings to salus (3: 188). It is at
least interesting that the double criteria of utility and necessity are applied almost
exclusively to politics and theology in the TTP.
5
TTP 3: 73.

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are devoid of any sort of society.6 Though Spinoza offers no formal,

separate treatment of politics or the political per se in the treatise, his account of the political things is contained in his teaching on
the foundation, formation, definition, and purpose of a society or a
republic. Therefore the political teaching of the treatise is transmitted
through Spinozas accounts of a society, a republic, or the regime
(imperium).7
The first extended remarks about society appear in chapter five of
the treatise. The focus of that chapter is the ceremonial observances
or laws of the Hebrew people that are described in the Scriptures
and the stories that are related to them. But Spinoza also declares his
intention in that chapter to demonstrate the universal foundations of
society together with his account of how the ceremonial observances
or laws of the Hebrew people were instituted for the purpose of fostering only [their] temporal bodily happiness and the tranquility of
[their] regime.8 Spinozas description of the universal foundations
of societies provides the basis for his formulation of an account about
the natural inclination of individuals toward a life in society with other
individuals. The utility and necessity of society, says Spinoza, is connected with the natural human drive toward self-preservation. That is,
society is useful and necessary because it promotes mutual security from
enemies and it easily abbreviates many things, such as labor; indeed,
if there were not cooperation among human beings they would lack
the time and the skill to sustain and conserve themselves, for not all
equally are apt for all things and no one alone would be able to provide for himself what he requires most.9 The formation of a society
principally is intended to assure the sustenance and conservation of
the members of that society. A society seeks to achieve the sustenance
and conservation of its members by overcoming the deficiencies that

TTP 3: 191.
TTP 3: 193200. In footnote 18 to the Introduction of this book, I explained my
reason for translating imperium as regime.
8
TTP 3: 69. The overarching point of Spinozas argument is that the divine law
is universal in character and the Hebrew ceremonial laws simply were customs or
traditions observed by the Hebrew people as a particular nation. The ceremonial laws
were not required for salvation (TTP 3: 7880; and compare 48).
9
TTP 3: 73. The natural inclination toward society, as described by Spinoza,
has an ancient pedigree. That is, both Plato (Republic 369ad) and Aristotle (Politics
1252a241253a18) acknowledge that an awareness of the basic human insufficiency
to live well on ones own, that is, the fact of human need, is what initially compels
human beings to enter into social or political arrangements with one another.
6
7

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are experienced by single, and perhaps isolated, individuals trying to

provide for themselves on their own. What society introduces to the
human situation are conveniences that make life possible as well as
comfortable. A society offers its members mutual defense, facilitation
of the use of various crafts or skills, the establishment of a division of
labor, and, quite importantly, the promotion and the development of
the arts and the sciences which Spinoza maintains are indispensable
for the perfection of human nature and its blessedness.10
The formation of society is useful, necessary, and advantageous.
What human beings can attain and accomplish in association with
other human beings exceeds what any one human being might attain
by himself alone. An individuals awareness of his own insufficiency to
satisfy his chief needs on his own is what disposes him toward a life in
association with others. Still, despite the impetus of individual human
beings to participate in society for the sake of their own conservation,11
the basic features of human nature can interfere with a societys success
in achieving the essential goals of social or political life, namely, the sustenance and conservation of the members of the society. For inasmuch
as human beings live miserably and brutishly without politia, it must
be inferred that their initial existences are conditioned by an asocial or
unsocial manner of living prior to their entrance into society. Indeed,
if human beings are considered only under the regime of nature then
one must acknowledge that the natural right of each individual, that
is, the fundamental condition of each individual, is determined not
by sound reason but by desire and power.12 Furthermore, by nature,
each human being exclusively pursues what he esteems to be to his own
advantage, interest, or pleasure13 and so the practicability of human
10
TTP 3: 73. The one who reads philosophically might note that in the chapter
preceding the discussion of the ceremonial law and the formation of society Spinoza
plainly had said knowledge and love of God were the conditions requisite for achieving blessedness (3: 44; 50; 60; 62). In the passage from chapter 5, however, human
blessedness seems to be attainable through the satisfaction of certain quite mundane
and wholly nontheological needs, desires, or goals.
11
One will recall that the lex summa naturae is that each individual endeavors to persevere in its state so far as it is able to do so (TTP 3: 189). Therefore, if society serves
the goal of the lex summa naturae then societies, republics, or regimes dedicated to the
goal of self-preservation are wholly consonant with Spinozas teaching of nature. But
it also must be concluded that just as the natural state is prior to religion both in
nature and in time (3: 198) so too the natural state is prior to politics.
12
TTP 3: 190.
13
TTP 3: 19093. Spinozas account of that which is by nature, or the philosophic teaching of the TTP, obviously is crucial to Spinozas account of political life

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social or political arrangements contains an inherent impediment. Each

individual seeks only his own interest or advantage and he seeks it to
the neglect, or even the possible injury, of others.14 But if society is to
succeed in achieving the sustenance and conservation of each of its
members then the members cannot be allowed to follow the urgings of
their passions in the pursuits of their pleasures.15 Properly functioning
societies require a means to counter the impetuses of those passions that
lead human beings to neglect others or do injury to them. According
to Spinoza, if human beings were to be constituted by nature so that
they sought nothing except what true reason indicates then society
would have no need for laws; to the contrary, it would be absolutely
sufficient to teach true moral lessons and human beings would respond
to them freely and they would do what is truly useful.16 But because
human beings by nature are driven more by passion than by reason it
is not enough to inculcate true moral doctrines and to wish that human
beings will embrace what true reason teaches. Human nature is constituted very differently. Each seeks what is useful to him but he does
so not on the basis of the sound dictates of reason; rather each seeks
what is useful to him on the basis of what he determines to be most
satisfying to his appetites and his lusts at any given moment.17 According to Spinoza, therefore, no society can subsist without a regime,
force, and consequently laws that moderate and restrain human lust
and unbridled impetuses.18
The problem of human nature is that human beings can conduct
their lives and govern their affairs in accordance with the dictates
of reason or they can conduct their lives and govern their affairs in

inasmuch as political life emerges from a natural inclination and political life serves as
a correction to natural insufficiencies, as well as natural deficiencies. In explaining the
political teaching of the treatise it will be necessary to recall certain features of the
philosophic teaching of the treatise.
14
TTP 3: 189.
15
The absolute primacy of the human desire to pursue pleasure is presupposed
even in the sixth dogma of the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith. That
is, the sixth dogma states that only those who obey God by performing acts of justice
and charity are saved; all others, who live under the regime of pleasure are lost.
The dogma continues by asserting that if human beings did not believe in salvation
through works then there would be no reason why they would obey God rather than
follow their pleasures (TTP 3: 177). Spinoza posits a basic tension between a life of
obedience to law and a life dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure alone.
16
TTP 3: 73.
17
TTP 3: 73; 19192.
18
TTP 3: 7374.

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accordance with the urgings of their passions and their appetites.

By nature, either manner of living is completely legitimate; for each
individual simply is conducting himself as he naturally is determined
to do.19 Nevertheless, whereas reasonable or sensible individuals are
competent to conduct themselves in a manner whereby they achieve
what is truly useful to them, those who conduct themselves according
to their impulses, lusts, and the urgings of their passions often do not
achieve what is truly useful to them and furthermore they even can
obstruct other human beings from obtaining what is truly useful to
them. Passionate individuals typically lack reasonable or sensible selfcontrol. They pursue the objects of their longing with force, ruses, and
any means at their disposal which they perceive to be suitable to the
satisfaction of their desires or their interests. The facts of human nature
therefore constitute the problem of human nature itself.20 What is the
prospect of peaceful and harmonious living, or what is the prospect
of satisfying the third proper object of desire, namely, achieving security
and health, if anyone, especially passionate human beings, may do or
pursue anything that any one of them perceives to be pleasurable in
any manner that he chooses to obtain it? According to Spinoza, the
remedy for the problem of human nature involves a solution to it that
requires taking human nature itself into account. That is, because it
is a universal law of human nature that each individual pursues the
greater of two goods and avoids the greater of two evils, it may be
possible to persuade or entice passionate human beings to enter into a
social or political arrangement with others which will allow all members
of the society to enjoy the advantages of a life that will afford mutual
security and defense, the division of labor, the development of the arts
and the sciences, and the advancement of reasonability or sensibility,
in the context of convenient and comfortable living.21 If reasonable or
sensible human beings by nature already acknowledge the advantage
and worth of conducting themselves reasonably or sensibly, it only is
required that passionate individuals be drawn to adopt a reasonable or
sensible plan of living. Still, passionate human beings must be made

TTP 3: 18990.
Compare Hilail Gildin, Spinoza and the Political Problem, Spinoza: A Collection
of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre
Dame Press, 1973).
21
TTP 3: 73 and compare 4648; 19091; also see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
(London, 1651) p. 62.
19
20

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to see why such a plan of living satisfies their own selfish, appetitive
interests. In principle, that task appears to be achievable if one can
move passionate individuals to perceive and embrace social or political
life as a greater good and to regard continuing in their natural conditions as a lesser good, or perhaps even a greater evil. If passionate
individuals can be moved to that way of perceiving social or political
life then only one other task remains. The viability of any society or
a republic, says Spinoza, depends upon the elimination of the natural
right to act deceitfully.22
Each individual per ius et institutum naturae may do as he pleases in
order to achieve what he believes to be conducive to his own interests,
desires, or hopes. Each individual, therefore, may deceive others in
order to obtain the things for which he longs. One can profess oaths,
one can negotiate terms of agreement for an exchange of goods, or
one can promise to perform a service or function for another individual but then violate the oath, forsake the agreement, or renounce
the promise, if the individual comes to conclude that honoring his
word to someone else amounts to a lesser good or a greater evil.23
For the force and validity of any oath, any agreement, any promise,
or any kind of pact whatsoever depends entirely upon the perceived
utility of it. If the pact is perceived as useful by the individuals who
enter into it then the pact will be honored as binding but if the pact
comes to be regarded as useless by any individual who has entered
into it then the pact does not need to be honored at all.24 One way
to forestall the breaking of promises and prevent the natural tendency
to violate a pact when it comes to be regarded as having no use or
advantage to one of the parties to the pact is to construct a social or
political arrangement in which each participant transfers his private
right to the collective right of the society or the regime. Under such a
condition, what initially might be construed by individuals entering such
a regime as a greater evil, namely, the sacrifice of ones unlimited
natural right to acts as one pleases, could be presented persuasively
as being the realization of a greater good inasmuch as all of the
other members of the political society also will lose right or power

22
23
24

TTP 3: 192.
TTP 3: 19192.
TTP 3: 192.

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individually but each also will gain right or power collectively.25 The
mode by which passionate human beings are converted from being
asocial or unsocial individuals to becoming social individuals can be
rather simple and basic. Taking into account the fundamental dispositions of human nature toward what is regarded as good, passionate
human beings must be promised the hope of a greater good for their
participation in society and their cooperation with other individuals or
they must be threatened with the fear of a greater evil if they do not
participate in society and cooperate with other individuals. The name
of the society to which human beings, even passionate ones, can be
drawn in a collaborative endeavor to preserve and sustain themselves
is a democracy; it is established on the basis of a pact which binds
every member of the polity to abide by the terms of the pact and
to keep the promises that he makes to others; and more than just
providing for the wellbeing of its citizens, the political regime called
a democracy serves the express ambition of following the dictates of
reason and more particularly the democratic regime aims to avoid the
absurd things of the appetite.26 The democratic regime, therefore, is
the political arrangement that is most consonant with human nature
and it is optimal for maximizing the satisfaction of the third proper
object of desire, namely, security and health.27
For those who may be interested in the advantages of political life, or
for those who already are inclined toward it, the avoidance or elimination of absurd things in favor of reasonable or sensible things would
seem to be an attractive feature of a society, a republic, or a regime.
Indeed, Spinoza affirms that it is a fact of human nature that there is

25
Spinozas manner of discriminating between goods and evils is based upon
the criterion of utility (TTP 3: 19091; 196). As a result, however, what is useful and
hence good to one person may be considered useless and hence evil to another
person. A possible exception to the egoistical and subjective measure of useful and
useless things is the fact that every individual has the essential endeavor to persevere
in its state. Hence, a common motive for individual human beings to enter into social
or political association is the promise of sustenance and conservation which such
associations make feasible. As each citizen surrenders his right to do as he personally
pleases, it also is the case that every other member of the polity has surrendered his
right to do as he pleases and while each ones individual right to act impulsively
is lost it also is the case that each individuals collective right to be protected from
the impulsive, the deceitful, and the injurious acts of foreigners or fellow citizens has
been gained.
26
TTP 3: 194.
27
TTP 3: 19395; 245.

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no one who does not wish to live securely without fear but that condition is exceedingly difficult to achieve where each individual is permitted
to do as each one pleases and reason has no more right than hatred
or anger.28 It would be natural then for citizens or potential citizens
to presume that a polity would endeavor to curb the absurd things,
namely, the longings, urges, impulses, actions, or behaviors, of passionate human nature. But in the course of the treatise Spinoza has not
spoken of absurd longings, urges, or impulses; nor has he spoken of
absurd actions or behaviors. Spinoza is prevented from making such
declarations on philosophical grounds. For by the right and plan of
nature whatever an individual does in accordance with its own nature,
whether what he does follows from the dictates of reason or whether
what he does follows from the urgings of the passions, it is perfectly
legitimate for the individual to do as he does because by nature there
are no absurd longings or absurd actions. Rather what individual
human beings consider ridiculous, absurd, or evil owes only to the
fact that human beings, for the most part, remain ignorant of the order
and coherence of nature.29 From the perspective of philosophy, the
absurd is what is contrary to nature; and what is contrary to nature
also is contrary to reason.30 No longing, urging, passion, action, or
behavior is contrary to nature; if it were contrary to nature then it
also would be impossible.31 In the teaching of the treatise, the only matter that explicitly is designated absurd is the miracle;32 and by virtue
of that designation it may be inferred that there can be circumstances
in which the teaching of theology and the teaching of politics may not
be consonant with one another. For example, the dependence of the
prevailing tradition of theology or religion on miracles or signs as
certifications of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will cause
traditional orthodox theology or religion to come into conflict with the
political teaching of the treatise which advocates a democratic regime
that avoids absurd things. But the version of theology that is defended

TTP 3: 191.
TTP 3: 191.
30
TTP 3: 91.
31
TTP 3: 8687.
32
TTP 3: 86. One will recall that earlier in the treatise Spinoza had denounced
superstition, which often is a basis for theology or religion, as having turned rational
beings into beasts (3: 8). In the end, superstition, theology, and religion are connected
through a basic tendency of each toward unreasonable or insensible predilections that
ought to be resisted by a regime that is dedicated to fostering the development, the
exercise, and the advancement of reason.
28
29

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in the theological teaching of the treatise, which denies the possibility

of miracles because of their absurdity, is entirely consonant with the
political teaching of the treatise. For, according to the political teaching
of the treatise, society, the republic, or especially the democratic regime
has an interest, an obligation, or a responsibility not to command
very absurd things and its goal and foundation is to avoid absurd
things and to constrain human beings within the limits of reason.33
As a result, from the perspective of philosophy, a society, a republic,
or a democratic regime cannot embrace a theology or a religion which
patently avows absurd things.
How does politics or the political, that is, a society, a republic, or
a regime, dedicated to the security, health, and wellbeing (salus) of its
citizens relate to theology or religion, when the goal of the Republic is
not to make human beings from rational beings into beasts or machines
but instead its goal is to enable the minds and bodies of human beings
to function safely while encouraging them to use reason freely without
confronting hatred, anger, or deceit?34 In the Preface to the treatise,
Spinoza explicitly states that various religious prejudices are responsible
for turning human beings from rational beings into beasts.35 But if
the goal of the Republic is to prevent rational human beings from
being made into beasts and religious prejudices cause human beings
to be made into beasts, or to be made less than human, then there
may be a basic and ineluctable tension between politics and theology
just as there is a basic and ineluctable tension between philosophy and
theology. However, perhaps philosophy can mediate the tension between
politics and theology on the basis of an appeal to the teaching of theology that is advocated by Spinoza in the treatise. That is, philosophy
can mediate the tension between politics and theology in the same way
that philosophy mediated the tension between the prevailing tradition
of theology or religion and philosophy itself. Philosophy accomplished
that task by contending that the authentic meaning of theology actually
takes a position of indifference with respect to philosophy and implicitly the revealed teaching of Christ is indifferent to politics since both
philosophy and politics can be separated completely from theology.
The goal and purpose of a republic is to institute and promulgate a
plan of living that will make it possible for human beings to satisfy the

33
34
35

TTP 3: 194.
TTP 3: 24041.
TTP 3: 8.

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third proper object of desire.36 The plan of living will involve the enactment of laws which serve the defense of life as well as the republic37
and the laws will be framed so as to encourage citizens to do their duty
not from fear but from a hope for some good which they desire.38
But given the proclivities of human nature, it will be a delicate chore
to inspire human beings to forsake unlimited exercises of natural right
and to conform to laws that serve the interests of the individual as well
as the welfare of the political society as a whole. For human beings by
nature are driven more by passion than by reason. They also naturally
are inclined toward superstition and hence they are inclined to believe
absurd things, follow rash impulses, suffer from credulity, and adopt
unreasonable opinions and behaviors rather than live in accordance
with reasonable or sensible designs. In one very significant sense, the
teaching of the treatise has as a goal the correction of the prevailing
conditions surrounding human nature by offering an alternative to the
life that is conducted in accordance with the passions or superstitious
urgings and opinions; though the alternative to the life of passion is
not the life of the philosopher. Instead it is the life of the reasonable
or sensible human being who lives in accordance with the dictates of
reason whether they issue from his own nature or whether they have
been issued to him by those reliable human beings who are reasonable
or sensible and who also have the authority to devise a plan of living
for all of those who inhabit a democratic political regime. Politics can
avoid the absurd things and it can safeguard the wellbeing of citizens
and the republic because of its ability to offer a plan a living that is
reasonable or sensible. Indeed, the very necessity of providing such a
plan is reflected in the opening sentence of the treatise. Bearing in mind
the natural proclivity of human beings toward that which is passionate,
superstitious, or nonrational, the overarching goal of the treatise is to
propose a teaching that will persuade both reasonable and passionate
individuals of the advantages of democratic political life.
The Preface to the treatise commences with an unqualified and
universal declaration: If human beings were able to govern all their
affairs with dependable counsel, or if fortune always bore prosperity for

36
37
38

TTP 3: 4647; 7374; 19092; 24041.

TTP 3: 59.
TTP 3: 73; 19295.

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them, in no way would they be mastered by superstition.39 The opening sentence of the Preface delineates three distinct manners whereby
an individual may conduct his life and govern his affairs. An individual
may proceed in his thinking, choosing, or acting on the basis of some
kind of sure or reliable deliberation, that is, a dependable counsel.40
An individual may rely on fortunes favor. Or an individual may live
under the sway of superstition. It is evident from the Preface to the
treatise, and even from the first sentence of it, that Spinoza regards the
conduct of ones life or the governance of ones affairs by a reliance
upon superstition as a plan of living that is to be avoided. Superstition
is an extreme recourse for the individual who cannot achieve the satisfaction of his interests or his desires by any other means than wishing
for extraordinary interventions by suprahuman agents on his behalf.
Indeed, superstition is embraced only as a result of the combined facts
that someone lacks a dependable counsel for the conduct of his life and

39
Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper
foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur (TTP 3: 5). The opening sentence of the Preface to
the TTP may be translated in a variety of ways. For example, the noun res principally
means thing but it also signifies a matter or affair or circumstance. Regere may
be translated to guide, to conduct, to direct, to keep straight, to rule, to
manage, to control, to govern, or to have sway or supremacy over someone or
something. But the verb also means to keep from going wrong. Given the purpose
of the argument of the Preface to the TTP, the latter sense of the verb is most apt.
That is, in the first sentence there is an appeal to some kind of certum consilium as
an alternative to forestall what can go wrong when individuals naturally are driven
to embrace fortune or superstition as a guiding principle in the conduct of their lives
or the governance of their affairs.
Alternative English translations of the opening sentence of the Preface may be found
in A Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951
[originally published London: G. Bell & Son, 1883]): Men would never be superstitious,
if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favored
by fortune (p. 3); Tractatus theologico-politicus, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden, New York,
Kbenhavn, Kln: E.J. Brill Publishers, 1989): If men were able to exercise complete
control over all of their circumstances, or if continuous good fortune were always their
lot, they would never be prey to superstition (p. 49); A Spinoza Reader, trans. Edwin
Curley (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994): If men could manage all their affairs by a certain plan, or if fortune were always favorable to them, they
would never be in the grip of superstition (p. 6); and Theologico-Political Treatise, trans.
Martin Yaffe (Newburyport, Massachusetts: Focus Publishing, 2004): If human beings
could regulate all their affairs with certain counsel, or if fortune were always favorable
to them, they would not be bound by any superstition (p. xv).
40
The Latin word certus means resolved, determined, fixed, settled, or purposed. With respect to moral matters, the word signifies sure, unerring, faithful,
and to be depended upon. I submit that what Spinoza intends by the word certus is
closest to the last alternative and therefore I translate the Latin phrase certo consilio
by the English words by dependable counsel or with dependable counsel.

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the governance of his affairs and fortune does not always bring that
individual the prosperity for which he longs. Accordingly, there are three
distinct ways in which one can conduct his life and govern his affairs;
or, Spinoza proposes that there are three basic plans of living. One
can employ dependable counsel; one can rely on fortune; or one can
turn to superstition. It may be possible that some combination of those
alternatives, or a combination of degrees of each of the alternatives,
might be attempted for the conduct of ones life and the governance
of ones affairs. But the opening sentence of the Preface insinuates that
the three plans of living are reciprocally exclusive of one another and,
indeed, the remainder of the Preface to the treatise demonstrates how
and why human beings ruinously succumb to superstition as a mode
for conducting their lives and governing their affairs. Little is said in
the treatise about fortune. But, perhaps even more curiously, Spinoza is
virtually silent about what dependable counsel is or what it involves.
Yet if dependable counsel is the reliable plan of living that is advocated
by Spinoza in the treatise then it is necessary to determine precisely
what certum consilium means.
The first sentence of the Preface to the treatise is the answer to a
question that has not been asked expressly. The question is: Why do
human beings become superstitious? The question is raised because of
the prominence of the phenomenon of superstition and the philosophic
proposition of the treatise that human beings by nature are inclined
toward it.41 However, the question also is raised because superstition
constitutes a plan of living that is adopted by a great many human
beings who live and act under the influence of various traditions of
theology or religion. The actual turn toward superstition appears to
be prompted by a combination of three factors. Human beings often
are driven into difficulties where their own counsel or deliberation fails
them; nevertheless they still long inordinately for the uncertain goods
of fortune; consequently, fluctuating miserably between hope and fear,
they become most prone to believing any thing whatever; the cause
which encourages, conserves, and gives rise to superstition therefore is
fear.42 Spinozas argument reduces to this: Human beings are desirous
beings who seek the satisfaction of their own desires.43 But human
TTP 3: 6.
TTP 3: 56.
43
TTP 3: 18990. The principal desire and endeavor of any individual thing is
to conserve itself; and although the human impetus to conservation of oneself may
41
42

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beings also are aware that on some occasions they will fail to realize
the satisfaction of their desires. Thus an individuals wish or hope that
the fulfillment of his desire will be realized also often is cast against the
same individuals fear that his wish or hope will not be realized. When
the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs by means of
dependable counsel yields success, one conceives himself to abound
in good sense and he shuns any who wish to give him counsel; but
when adversity befalls them, such individuals beseech counsel from
anyone, nor is there anything to be heard that is so inept, absurd, or
vain, that they would not follow it.44
An individual may attempt to employ his own counsel or even follow
the counsel of another for the purpose of satisfying his desires. Regardless of whether that individual succeeds or fails in his attempts to satisfy
his desires, Spinoza notes that such an individual will continue to seek
the goods of fortune. Thus it may be inferred that individuals tend
to presume that they will satisfy their desires for various goods either
through fortune itself or through their own agency and planning. Yet
a difficulty persists inasmuch as the goods sought from fortune are not
assured; and human agency itself also may prove to be ineffective at
obtaining what an individual wants or needs. Superstition, therefore,
can appear to be as worthy an option as any other one when individuals are confronted with having to choose the plan of living that they
will adopt based on their perception of which plan will be the most
successful in satisfying their desires and which plan will permit them to
conduct their lives and govern their affairs with some advantage.
In the conduct of ones life and the governance of ones affairs, the
turn to superstition shares a common element with the turn to fortune.
Human beings hope, indeed they expect, that their desires will be satisfied. When the objects of their desires are easily obtained, without much

be universal, the means to it and the demands of it are quite idiosyncratic. A similar
characterization of the matter is found in chapters 13 and 14 of Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan. Hobbes defines conatus, or the endeavor of a thing to persevere in its state, as
a principle of physical motion in De Corpore, chapter 15, article 2; but he also defines
conatus as a principle of psychic motion in Elements of Law, chapter 7, paragraph 2.
The term conatus does not appear in the TTP. But in Part 3 of the Ethica ordine Geometrico
demonstrata, Spinoza defines the endeavor [conatus] of a thing to persevere in its own
being as the actual essence of a thing (Propositions 67).
44
TTP 3: 5. I have translated the Latin word sapientia as good sense rather than
wisdom which is the word used in the translations of the TTP by Elwes (p. 3), Shirley
(p. 49), Curley (p. 6), and Yaffe (p. xv). My reason for translating the Latin word sapientia
as sensibility or good sense was explained in note 113 to Part One of this book.

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of their own agency or much of their own planning, then they conclude
that fortune favors them. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that
fortune would not or should not favor them again. Reliance on fortune
is effortless. One simply anticipates that desirable things will happen to
him. In chapter three of the treatise, Spinoza provides a definition of
fortune in the context of his account of the Election of the Hebrews:
by fortune I understand nothing other than the direction of God to the
extent that he directs human affairs through external and unexpected
causes; and Spinozas definition of fortune occurs within his account
of the ways through which an individual human being achieves conservation in [his] being.45 Relying on fortune is one way whereby the
direction of human affairs may be accomplished by an individual.
But in addition to fortune, which involves unexpected and hence
unpredictable causes and events, Spinoza maintains that an individual
may direct his affairs through his own efforts or through some kind of
external assistance.46 Yet experience confirms, sometimes painfully, that
our hopes and desires often are either frustrated or forsaken when we
rely on fortune or even on our own dependable counsel.
In the sense that is most crucial to the teaching of the treatise, the
decisive question of Spinozas book concerns which plan of living
human beings adopt for the conduct of their lives and the governance
of their affairs. What options are available to human beings? And in
which directions are they usually drawn? The answer to the decisive
question of what plan of living human beings adopt influences the sort
of society or regime that human beings establish and it also determines
how the third proper object of desire will be achieved. Reliance upon
fortune is the easiest of the options for a plan of living inasmuch as it
requires the least effort, or no effort at all, on the part of human beings.

45
TTP 3: 46. The precise form of Spinozas claim is threefold. (1) Where perseverance in being is achieved through ones own nature and power then, strictly speaking,
it is achieved through the internal aid of God since the power of Nature is the
power of God and the power of human nature is an expression of the more comprehensive power of nature itself. (2) Where things useful to perseverance in being
owe to causes external to human beings then such things express the external aid of
God. (3) Where perseverance in being owes to unanticipated external causes then
fortune is said to be at work. However, to those ignorant of the order and operations
of nature, the external aid of God is likely to be confused with fortune; and
that confusion only tends to confirm for most passionate or vulgar human beings the
authority and validity of certain teachings propounded by the prevailing tradition of
theology or religion about things like miracles.
46
TTP 3: 46.

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Still, fortune is fickle. When fortune fails to deliver the goods that one
anticipates, he turns to superstition. Fearful that he will not acquire
what he seeks, desires, or needs, or fearful that he will suffer what he
opposes, an individuals fear drives him to find a solution to his predicament through an appeal to god(s) or some divine agent(s). Consistent
with his belief in supranatural causes and agencies, an individual then
regards unusual and unexpected events as portents of things that will
bring him prosperity or distress.47 But recourse to superstition as a plan
of living also is related to ones understanding and experience of the
world. Ignorant of the order and operations of nature, superstitious
individuals impute the satisfaction of their desires to forces, causes, or
beings that are willful in their provision of the goods that individuals
seek, desire, or need. What fortune does not yield and what planning
does not provide will impel human beings to plead or sacrifice and
promise service, worship, or obedience to whichever numen they deem
to be responsible for providing the things for which they long. As a
consequence, human beings are willing to yield to any delirium, fantasy, or extravagance, in the hope that they may obtain what they seek.
Such fear, says Spinoza, makes human beings insane; furthermore,
those individuals will castigate human good sense as vain and they will
call reason blind.48 The choice of a plan of living that is based upon
superstition presumes an ignorance of nature and an abdication of
reason, as well as the implicit consequence that one must embrace any
number of absurd things. The superstitious life, as Spinoza defines
it, and the political life, as Spinoza defines it, do not intersect.49
TTP 3: 5.
TTP 3: 5. The obvious English translation of the Latin verb insanire is to be
insane. But the Latin verb also means to be of unsound, unhealthy mind, to be
without reason, to be senseless, or to be mad. The turn to superstition thus
must be recognized as an abandonment of reason, albeit sometimes only a temporary
one. Spinoza suggests that one can vacillate between reliance upon superstition and
reliance upon some sort of dependable counsel as is demonstrated by the example
of Alexander the Great. When suffering from the terror of the unknown outcome
of battle at the Gates of Susa, Curtius reports that Alexander turned to soothsayers
for predictions about the result of the conflict. After Darius was defeated, Alexander
abandoned such interests. However, [Alexander] was led back to superstition again,
says Curtius, when his situation was unsettled (3: 6).
49
If superstition and the plan of living that derives from superstition involve belief
in absurd things, e.g., miracles, but the goal of politics is to avoid absurd things and
promote reasonability then the superstitious life and the political life cannot converge.
Obviously the Turkish theocracy and the Hebrew theocracy exemplify instances where
superstition, as understood by Spinoza, and politics were integrated. But Spinoza
eschews both of those regimes. In lieu of those kinds of theocracy, Spinoza will introduce
47

48

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From the opening line and the first page of Spinozas Preface to
the treatise it may be inferred that human beings embrace superstition
largely because fortune and dependable counsel fail them when
they try to acquire what they believe will serve their conservation and
their interests. Here it should not be inferred that an individuals dashed
hope over the loss of one desired object, for example, or his unfulfilled
desire to attain what he seeks, would of necessity drive an individual to
espouse superstition as the only basis for the conduct of his life and the
governance of his affairs. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore a simple fact.
The fear of the failure to satisfy desires is what impels an individual to
turn to superstition as a source of hope; and the fear that causes him
to turn to superstition owes to his uncertainty about there being any
reliable alterative means for satisfying his desires or conducting his life
and governing his affairs prosperously. In other words, in the attempt
to obtain what he seeks, desires, or needs, an individual human being
will embrace whatever plan of living he perceives to be most conducive
to the attainment of his ends. The attainment of the end, therefore,
effectively justifies the means.50 Or, the perceived likelihood that some
means will enable an individual to achieve his ends or to secure the
objects of his desires is what justifies an individuals choice of his plan
of living.
Fortune and superstition are quite similar in one significant respect.
The turn to fortune and the turn to superstition involve an ultimate
dependence upon external and unexpected causes. Neither fortune
nor superstition involves an individuals reliance upon his own power
to conserve himself; and neither implies an individuals employment
of the power of external causes for the sake of his own conservation.51
According to Spinoza, the satisfaction of the third proper object of
desire, namely, the achievement of security and health, will require and
depend upon external things, that is, security and health will require
a theocratic regime that involves a mitigated superstition or an enlightened superstition
which restrains the excesses of the prevailing traditions of theology or religion.
50
TTP 3: 190.
51
TTP 3: 46. The passage from the TTP identifies an individuals own power within
himself as the internal aid of God and it designates an individual human beings
use of the power of external causes as the external aid of God. The external aid
of God may be said to be different from fortune or superstition for the reason that
the latter two are said to involve unexpected or unpredictable causes whereas the
external aid of God simply involves the regular order and operations of nature
which can be comprehended by human beings and used by them to facilitate their
own conservation.

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and depend upon fortune; but Spinoza also insists that human
direction and vigilance are of great assistance.52 Consequently, if an
individual chooses to trust either fortune or superstition as appropriate
means for the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs, the
choice of either fortune or superstition implies that the individual has
forsaken his own agency and surrendered his conservation to external,
unpredictable influences or forces. Still, if fortune always were to afford
prosperity to human beings then they never would fall prey to superstition. But human beings never would fall prey to superstition nor would
they ever rely on the vacillations of fortune if they could govern all their
affairs with dependable counsel,53 that is, if they had a plan of living
that generally assured them of maintaining their security and health
and which offered them the greatest hope of living prosperously.
Whereas Spinoza defines fortune in the treatise and gives an account
of the causes of superstition in his book, he is almost silent about
what certum consilium is. The word consilium appears nineteen times in
the treatise and it is used preponderantly in connection with passages
quoted from the Scriptures, both the Old Testament and the New
Testament. For example, Spinoza refers to the breath or spirit of God
as expressing Spiritus sapientiae, counsel or fortitude.54 In another
passage in the treatise, he notes the difficulties associated with interpreting the histories conveyed in the Scriptures and he argues that
an individuals understanding of those histories cannot be made to
depend, for instance, on the reader actually having heard the quarrels of Isaac or the counsels of Achitophel given to Absalom;55 and
Saul went to the Prophet Samuel on his servants counsel in order
to learn where to find his lost animals.56 It further is reported that the
Apostle Paul maintained that he gives counsel by Gods grace; and
Spinoza observes that the apostles choices of their places to preach
were taken on their own counsel.57
If dependable counsel is the worthy alternative to fortune or superstition as a plan of living it yet remains unclear what that kind of counsel
involves or requires. Still, based upon the passages from the Scriptures

52
53
54
55
56
57

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

47.
5.
22.
78.
89; 131.
151.

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quoted by Spinoza, or Spinozas own use of the word, it is plain that

consilium in the treatise is used to signify advice or consideration,
some manner of consultation, or even ones determination as it
affects his plans or purposes of action. Accordingly, then, governing
all ones affairs certo consilio would mean that one would conduct himself with determination, due consideration, requisite consultation, or a
deliberated plan and purpose of action. Hence life in accordance with
dependable counsel would seem to be a worthy choice as a plan
of living. Indeed, if human beings were able to govern all of their
affairs in such a fashion then surely there would be no need for anyone
to rely on fortune or to succumb to superstition in order to satisfy his
interests, desires, or needs. But counsel and dependable counsel
are not defined for the reader of the treatise. Rather the reader seems
obliged to infer what dependable counsel means on the basis of what
Spinoza says about counsel in general; and Spinozas citation of one
instance from the New Testament of the use of counsel demonstrates
that consilium in and of itself can be problematical. That is, Spinoza
says that a rift between the apostles Paul and Barnabas resulted from
Paul acting on his own counsel.
In the treatise, the apostles are distinguished from the prophets
because of their capacity to teach whereas the prophets are said
to have possessed the ability to prophesy and command. According to
Spinoza, the capacity to teach granted each apostle the authority to
choose the method of teaching or preaching that he would employ.
Furthermore, unlike the prophets who were ordained to prophesy to
particular people in specific places, the apostles were permitted to teach
or preach wherever each thought it best to do so. On one occasion
the Apostle Paul on his own counsel chose where he would take his
ministry; however, Spinoza observes that Pauls decision about where
to preach led to a disagreement with Barnabas who was accompanying
him.58 Having gone to Antioch together, Paul recommended that he,
Barnabas, and the others with them return to places where they had
been preaching to see how the converted were faring. But Barnabas
opted to continue his mission by going to other places. A disagreement
ensued over whether the two apostles should proceed to new locations
or return to old ones. They went in different directions. The subsequent

58
TTP 3: 15155. The account of the matter is related at Acts of the Apostles
15:3640.

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passage from Scripture testifies that both Paul and Barnabas proceeded
in their respective missions with success. Still, Pauls reliance on his own
counsel and the action he undertook pursuant to it must be deemed
the cause of some disturbance, aggravation, or conflict with his colleague, Barnabas. In other words, Pauls consilium was not such that it
guaranteed the satisfaction of his interests, aims, or desires. Pauls own
counsel moved him to travel in one direction but it did not move or
persuade Barnabas to accompany Paul. As advice, due consideration,
determined purpose, or deliberated plan of action, Pauls specific plan
of living and his consequent action illustrate that counsel or ones
own counsel may not always yield what one intends. Paul wanted
Barnabas to return with him to the places where they had taught or
preached together. Barnabas, however, presumably on his own counsel,
chose not to do so and went his own way to Cyprus with John Mark
while Paul and Silas traveled to Syria and Cilicia. There is no indication in the passages from Scripture, or from Spinozas assessment of
them, that the failure of Pauls own counsel to secure the object of
his interest led him to embrace fortune or surrender to superstition as
plans of living. Nevertheless, the failure of consilium in Pauls governance of his affairs with Barnabas could invite one to opine that Paul
actually did no better by his own counsel than he might have done
had he turned to fortune or superstition to attain his aim. With respect
to achieving success in the governance of ones affairs, fortune and
superstition are problematical. Neither supplies constant relief. But
neither is it clear that ones own counsel or dependable counsel
provides a consistently worthy alternative to fortune or superstition as a
plan of living. Very little is said in the treatise about certum consilium.
However, in addition to the opening sentence of the Preface, there is
only one other occurrence of the phrase certo consilio in the treatise.
The words appear in chapter nine of the treatise.
Chapters eight through ten of the treatise contain Spinozas examination of how the various books of the Bible have come to be arranged
and received. In chapter nine of the treatise, Spinoza devotes special
attention to the first five books of the Scriptures and the matter of
Ezras responsibility for the final version of the Pentateuch, as well as
the marginalia that accompany those writings. A question arises about
whether some textual defects in the Pentateuch were accidental or
contrived. According to Spinoza, one learned tradition holds that the
readings did not happen by chance. On the contrary, obvious mistakes
in the text were left uncorrected so that later students of the books

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could conclude that such flaws were made with dependable counsel
by the first Writers, in order that they signify something by them.59
Spinozas reference to that learned tradition is in connection with the
spelling of the Hebrew word for girl in the Pentateuch. Spinoza
asserts that the word is incorrectly spelled on all occasions in the texts
of the five books except one; but adjacent to the misspelled word is the
correct spelling of the word in the marginalia. At issue is the question
why the erroneous spelling in the texts was allowed to persist when
the correct spelling was present in the marginalia. Spinoza explains
that competing readings of the texts were allowed to stand in order to
avoid the replacement of the correct sense of the text by an incorrect
one. The general conclusion proposed by Spinoza is that the Scriptures
have suffered a variety of impositions over time and therefore their history, sources, authors, and compositions present myriad difficulties for
interpreters.60 Indeed, in many cases, it simply is impossible to recover
the original meanings of the texts at all.61 Still, the present purpose is
to learn what the phrase certo consilio means and one useful inference
may be drawn from what Spinoza says about dependable counsel with
regard to the first Writers of the Scriptures. What is said to have been
done by dependable counsel (certo consilio) is set against what might
have happened in the Scriptures by chance (casu). Spinoza therefore
uses the terms dependable counsel and chance as antonymous to
each other. Since he also maintains in the treatise that words have a
fixed meaning through their use alone62 the reader of the treatise may
conclude that what happens in accordance with dependable counsel

TTP 3: 137: Igitur cum hae lectiones casu non contigerint, nec tam clara vitia correxerint, hinc
concludunt, haec certo consilio a primis Scriptoribus facta fuisse, ut iis aliquid significarent.
60
Spinoza does not believe the claim advanced by the one interpretive tradition
about the first Writers of the Scriptures; he does not believe that there are profound
mysteries hidden in them (TTP 3: 13536; 167). Nor does Spinoza recite what factors or reasons might have prompted the first Writers to take the course of action
that is imputed to them by some interpreters of the sacred books. Still, rather than
explain the episode as being something that just happened by chance, Spinoza says
that dependable counsel was the cause. However antithetical it may have been to a
chance event, the practice imputed to the first Writers failed to accomplish what
the interpreters claimed it was designed to achieve. Instead of signifying something
specific by the intentional flaws, the first Writers appear only to have occasioned more
confusion about the sacred books. Acting with dependable counsel moved them to
leave textual errors uncorrected and subsequently the errors were compounded further
over time by the misinterpretations of others (3: 13741).
61
TTP 3: 13637; and compare 109111.
62
TTP 3: 160.
59

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is contrary to what happens by chance; and by implication it further

may be inferred that dependable counsel is the opposite of those
things that are related to chance, namely, fortune and superstition
which rely on external, unexpected, or unpredictable causes.63
A philosophic proposition of the treatise is that an appropriate and
effective plan of living is indispensable to the achievement of the third
proper object of desire. All human beings seek security and health.
But not all human beings pursue security and health in the same
manner. Still, if human beings were able to govern all their affairs
with dependable counsel, or if fortune always favored them, then they
would never succumb to superstition. In other words, if human beings
had dependable counsel at their disposal they could formulate a plan
of living that enabled them to establish the conditions through which
they would satisfy their needs, realize their desires, and live advantageously. That is, they could establish a society, institute a regime, and
inculcate a plan of living that could be adopted by all human beings
who choose to enter into the kind of political arrangement that offers
them the hope of a greater good. The plan of living afforded by the
dependable counsel of the democratic political regime is preferable to
the alternative plans of living because they rely almost entirely upon
chance elements and the alternative plans of living operate without
the intercession of human direction and vigilance.64 In other words,
because fortune owes to chance it is unreliable as a plan of living for
the reason that it is occasioned by unexpected, that is to say, unpredictable, causes or events. Thus reliance upon fortune is a precarious
way to conduct ones life and govern ones affairs. In addition, recourse
to superstition as a plan of living also ought to be shunned because
superstition owes to a kind of panicked longing for goods that leaves
an individual subjugated and ignorant. Furthermore, succumbing to
superstition demands a credulity that can be extended to almost any
extreme and succumbing to superstition implies the abdication of
reason on the part of the superstitious individual.65 Hence superstition
cannot be a sane way to conduct ones life or to govern ones affairs.
Still, it even appears that dependable counsel does not assure one
on every occasion that he will accomplish the result that he desires.

63
64
65

TTP 3: 4647.
TTP 3: 47.
TTP 3: 5; 2930.

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So, a perplexity remains. On what basis can Spinoza maintain that

human beings never would fall prey to superstition if they could govern
all their affairs with dependable counsel?
What advantage or incentive is there to the governance of ones
affairs, or the conduct of ones life, certo consilio? If human beings are
driven more by passion than by reason, why would they embrace
dependable counsel rather than the ostentatious promises of superstitious observances or the facile reception of goods from fortune? The
initial attractiveness of dependable counsel may be said to derive
less from what it is, for there is no definition of it in the treatise, than
from what it is not. Human beings, by nature, succeed or fail and
rise or fall in the throes of hope and fear.66 Dependable counsel
would seem to avoid the foolish hope prompted by turning to fortune
while it also evades the desperate fear that is inherent in the turn to
superstition. Perhaps it just is common sense that suggests the worth
that may be assigned to dependable counsel. That is, Spinoza commences the argument of the treatise with an appeal to something that
he nowhere defines in the book; and that fact is at odds with his more
detailed comments about what fortune and superstition mean, involve,
or entail. Spinoza would appear to believe that there is some general
notion of what certum consilium means such that he can assume that his
readers will be aware of its worth or at least they will be familiar with
its significance. Yet if dependable counsel is not defined in any formal
way in the treatise, to what in general is Spinoza appealing when he
declares that human beings never would be mastered by superstition
if they could govern all their affairs with dependable counsel? The
answer may be inferred from Spinozas account of human nature.
By the right and plan of nature, each individual thing endeavors to
persevere in its state without consideration of any other thing but itself
as it is naturally determined to exist and to operate.67 Human beings
by nature are disposed to a life of passion or to a life of reason but
they are determined to the former more than they are determined to
the latter. Because the life of passion is more determinative of human
nature than is the life of reason, it becomes clearer why fortune and
superstition become the typical recourses embraced by human beings
as plans of living for the conduct of their lives and the governance of

66
67

TTP 3: 56.
TTP 3: 189.

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their affairs. Passionate or insensible individuals seek any advantage in

order that they may be conserved and they implore relief from any
disadvantage in order that they may be conserved. Neglecting reason,
passionate or insensible human beings credulously seize whatever may
suggest itself as a source that promises them the satisfaction of their
desires or they credulously seize whatever suggests itself as a remedy
for their predicaments. Yet even sensible human beings are liable to
commit blunders in judgment or make errant choices in their endeavors to persevere in their states. Regardless of whether one executes
his endeavors according to the dictates of reason or he executes his
endeavors according to the urgings of the passions, it is a universal
law of human nature that no one neglects what he judges to be good
except in the hope of a greater good or from the fear of a greater
evil.68 In the endeavor to persevere in his state, an individual always
will be drawn toward what he regards as the lesser of two evils or the
greater of two goods; and Spinoza acknowledges that ones judgment
on such matters is entirely idiosyncratic. That is, an individuals choice
will be made on the basis of what appears to him to be greater or
less rather than on the basis of what actually is the case. The turn to
superstition or the turn to fortune or the turn to dependable counsel
in the conservation of oneself, the conduct of ones life, or the governance of ones affairs involves an inherently subjective choice. The
reasonable or sensible individual will gauge his options for action in
respect of what appears to him to be greater or less, in respect of
goods or evils, apropos his immediate circumstance and in the context
of his present or his future hopes and fears; and the individual who
surrenders to fortune or superstition evaluates the greater of two goods
and lesser of two evils in respect of his immediate circumstances
and in the context of his present or future hopes and fears. In terms
of the governance of ones affairs, then, the choice of dependable
counsel is an appeal to reasonability or sensibility over and against a
temptation to succumb to the unreasonable or insensible options for
the conduct of an individuals life or the governance of ones affairs
that characteristically accompany the life conducted in accordance
with fortune or superstition. Furthermore, the opening sentence of the
treatise suggests Spinozas belief that just as the turn to fortune and
the turn to superstition are natural options for human beings so too

68

TTP 3: 19192.

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recourse to dependable counsel also is available as a natural option

to every human being.
Each individual possesses a native disposition to rely on his own
counsel. Each individual by nature selects what he perceives to be
conducive to his owns interests, desires, needs, and the conservation of
his state. Each individual also assesses the relative merits of things only
with respect to himself and his own situation. In other words, whether
counsel is informed by the dictates of sound reason or it is informed
by the urgings of the appetites, an individual takes his own counsel just
as he naturally is determined to do. If that counsel were dependable
then no one ever would fall prey to the vicissitudes and consequences
of fortune or superstition. Nevertheless, taking ones own counsel, be
it dependable or not, fundamentally reflects Spinozas awareness of
the universality of natural egoism. For Spinoza acknowledges that in
adhering to the lex summa naturae each individual attempts to conduct
his life and govern his affairs on the basis of his own experience, his
own judgment, his own perspective, his own habits, or his own learning. In fact, Spinozas position is reminiscent of the one enunciated by
a philosopher about whom Spinoza wrote.69 The opening proposition
of Ren Descartes Discours de la Mthode (1637) acknowledges the universality of natural egoism:70 Good sense [bon sens] is the best shared
thing in the world, because each thinks it to be so well provided, that
the very same ones who are the most difficult to satisfy in any other
thing have no habit at all of desiring more of it than they have.71 In
69
Benedictus de Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I. et II.
(Amstelodami, 1663).
70
Richard Kennington, Descartes Discourse on Method, and Descartes and the
Mastery of Nature in On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Pamela
Kraus and Frank Hunt (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington
Books, 2004).
71
Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols., rev. ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin, C.N.R.S.,
196476) 6: 12. Acknowledgement of the universality of natural egoism also is found
in the works of other prominent early modern philosophers, for example Thomas
Hobbes: For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all
men in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps
make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of ones own wisdom, which almost
all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but
themselves and a few others whom, by fame or for concurring with themselves, they
approve (Leviathan [London, 1651], pp. 6061 and a similar claim also appears in
chapter 5, pp. 1819); and John Locke: [The natural condition of man is a] State also
of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another (The Second Treatise of Government, section 4). Lockes account of natural
equality follows his declaration in the same passage about the principal feature of

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other words, human beings generally regard themselves as possessors

of sufficient competence to manage themselves, their interests, and
their lives. It may not be amiss to suggest that Spinozas dependable
counsel is comparable to Descartes good sense. That is, both philosophers concede the basically subjective character of each individuals
habit of judgment. Moreover, both philosophers recognize that painful
or disadvantageous consequences can ensue from ones reliance upon
subjective judgment and consequently there will be need for some correction of it. In the Discours, Descartes asserts that there is much more
truth in the reasoning that each makes touching the matters that are
important to him, and the consequences of which he must suffer soon
after if he has judged badly, than in the reasoning of a man made in
his study touching on speculations that produce no effect.72 In other
words, an individuals good sense principally involves ones assessment
of the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs in terms of
their immediate or remote consequences for him. Experience bears
witness to whether ones judgment was useful and successful or not;
and, according to Descartes, that personal experience of the matter is
superior to the idle speculations of those who avoid experience. In a
similar fashion, Spinoza affirms in the treatise that it is a universal law
of human nature that each individual evaluates his condition, chooses
his course, and acts with a view to what appears to be most desirable
or useful to him as he perceives the matter at that time. Furthermore,
if an individual believes that he has judged or chosen badly, Spinoza
confirms that a person may change his mind, alter his course of action,
or even renege on his commitments whenever he reconsiders his own
counsel and believes that the result of his initial choice or action would
be useless or disadvantageous to himself.73
When good sense or dependable counsel yields what we desire,
we are satisfied with ourselves, proud, and confident.74 But neither

what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of Perfect Freedom to order
their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and Persons, as they think fit, within
the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will
of any Man. The equal power and jurisdiction of which Locke speaks also is the
equal power of each man to say what is right for him. The primacy of subjective
bias in ones conceptions and judgments also is recognized by Francis Bacon in Novum
Organum, Book 1, Aphorism, 49.
72
Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 910.
73
TTP 3: 192.
74
TTP 3: 56; Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 12.

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bon sens nor certum consilium is infallible. Spinoza admits that sometimes
human beings are driven into difficulties such that their own counsel
fails them;75 and Descartes concedes that an individuals good sense
can cause him to suffer from the consequences of his judgments and
therefore bon sens is not flawless. However, Descartes does propose a
remedy. After conceding at the close of the first paragraph of part one
of the Discours that an individual will be satisfied with himself when he
successfully exercises good sense, Descartes reminds the reader of his
book that it is not enough to have a good mind [esprit] the chief thing
is to apply it well.76 Human beings can seek the satisfaction of their
interests, desires, and needs through the simple reasoning of a man
of good sense or they may employ something more perfect, namely,
a pure and solid reason as though it were had from birth;77 and to
possess the latter, superior, optimized sort of good sense, an individual
only needs to apply the rules of the method for rightly conducting
reason and seeking truth in the sciences which are articulated in part
two of the Discours de la Mthode.78 In other words, Descartes supplies
the reader of his book with a standard against which the exercise of
ones own reason or the application of ones own good sense may
be measured. In a broadly similar vein, Spinoza acknowledges that the
proper exercise of dependable counsel might well involve the conduct
of ones life and the governance of ones affairs not just on the basis of
what ones own simple, selfish counsel might exhort (something akin to
Descartes simple reasoning) but he also might judge, choose, and act
in accordance with what reason dictates (something more akin, though
not identical, to Descartes methodical pure and solid reason). No
one can doubt, says Spinoza, how much more useful it is for human
beings to live in accordance with laws and the dependable dictates of
reason.79 But to what rational dictates would the individual who follows dependable counsel adhere or defer? If ones own judgments are
subjective and often erroneous, what corrective standard can be invoked
to improve them? Descartes gives a solution to that problem by advocating the use of a method for the right conduct of reason, which
involves avoiding rash and precipitate judgment as well as reasoning

75
76
77
78
79

TTP 3: 5; and compare the example of the Apostle Paul.

Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 2.
Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 1213.
Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 1719.
TTP 3: 191.

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clearly and distinctly.80 If one employs and applies the method for
the right conduct of reason then it is proposed that each individual
will achieve the satisfaction of his interests, his desires, or his needs.
Moreover, the satisfaction of them will be certain.81 Spinoza offers no
such method in the treatise. Although Spinoza does seem to imply that
even on the basis of egoistical experience there is some merit in relying
upon common sense. Thus, Spinozas alternative to the method of
Descartes in the Discours is the dutiful citizens reasonable or sensible
cognizance of the advantages to be enjoyed by him when conducting
his life and governing all his affairs in accordance with the dictates of
reason that are established by the regime in which he lives. That is,
political life advantageously can affect an individuals security, health,
and prosperity in ways that are evident even to the most egoistical
human beings.
It is evident that any individuals own counsel may not always be
sound. On the contrary, the counsel of each human being is subjective;
it typically derives from passion rather than from reason; and therefore
an individuals native endeavor to persevere in his being ironically may
become the very cause for frustrating that ambition; or it even can
contribute to his own demise. Therefore dependable counsel would
be superior, more desirable, and more efficacious in securing each
individuals ultimate goal, namely, self-preservation, security, and health,
when the dependable counsel issues from the collective counsel of the
political authority, or the highest power, reflected in the democratic
political regime that serves the interests of its citizens, requires the ceding of some rights or powers by each of the citizens, and guarantees
adherence to the laws of the regime through force, if necessary.82
Ceding individual, unlimited right or power to some external authority would appear to be counterintuitive to human beings whose lives
are governed more by passion than by reason. But Spinoza assures
the reader of the treatise that yielding individual right or power, even
when it is done by passionate individuals, is a task that may be undertaken easily inasmuch as the sacrifice of such rights or powers in
fact represents a lesser evil than the basic human condition in which

Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 18.

Part of the promise of the method enunciated in the Discours is that it will afford
the practitioners of it a mathematical certitude. In the TTP, Spinoza only appears
interested in advocating or arriving at moral certitude.
82
TTP 3: 19294.
80
81

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every individual retains unlimited right or power to act as each pleases;

furthermore, adherence to the reasonable or sensible dictates of the
regime carries with it the promise of that for which every individual
longs most, namely, preservation, security, health, and peace.83 In order
to obtain the indispensable and highly desirable goods that are promised by the democratic political regime, a citizen must submit to the
dictates of the regime even where they may affect the most personal
matters; and to illustrate his point, Spinoza offers the example of a
regimes authority over public religious worship. For the sake of the
peace and preservation of the republic, Spinoza declares that citizens must adhere to what the supreme power dictates about public
religious worship since it is certain that dutifulness in respect to ones
country is the chief thing that one can fulfill.84 The sort of certum
consilium that Spinoza recommends and defends in the treatise then is
not the private, selfish counsel of the individual human being that can
be influenced by various lusts or passions. Instead, Spinoza advocates
the dependable counsel which issues from the supreme authority or
power of a democratic political regime that is dedicated not only to
the welfare of its citizens but which also serves the express ambition of
following the sound dictates of reason and avoiding absurd things.
Indeed, the identification of dependable counsel with the reasonable
or sensible dictates issued by a democratic political regime is substantiated by Spinozas consideration of how the counsel of an individual
must be relegated to the counsel of the regime.
In chapter seventeen of the treatise, Spinoza reflects upon the practical implications of a difficulty that had been noted in the previous
chapter of his book. In his account of human nature in chapter sixteen
of the treatise, it was asserted that every individual per ius et institutum
naturae endeavors to persevere in his own state by whatever means it
may consider useful to itself. According to Spinoza, such means do not
exclude struggles, hatred, anger, or ruses.85 Thus, in the pursuit of
his own preservation and interests, an individual human beings own
counsel may lead him into situations that occasion faction and cause
harm both for himself as well as for the society in which he resides.
Accordingly, Spinoza asserts that the individual must conform to the

83
84
85

TTP 3: 194 195; 202203.

TTP 3: 232.
TTP 3: 190.

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dictates of the democratic political regime since the regimes purpose is

to foster the conditions for securing the preservation and health of all
of its citizens. Furthermore, Spinoza categorically states that a citizens
conformity to the dictates of the regime does not imply an enslavement
of the individual. On the contrary, inasmuch as the dictates of the
democratic political regime inherently encourage the better ambitions of
its citizens, and the citizens choose to be members of that regime, then
those ambitions are most likely to be realized when citizens embrace
the rational dictates of the supreme power. That is, it is in the nature
of a democratic government to avoid absurd desires and to constrain
men under the limits of reason, as much as it can be done, so that they
may live concordantly and peacefully; if that foundation were removed
the whole fabric easily goes to ruin.86 In other words, obedience is the
foundation of any political regime. To demonstrate the conclusion that
conformity to the dictates of the democratic political regime is consonant with an individuals own interests and counsel, Spinoza asserts in
chapter seventeen of the treatise that even if a man does something by
his own counsel ( proprio consilio) it cannot be concluded that he does it
exclusive of the dictates of the regime. Given the terms and conditions
of Spinozas democratic political regime, the action of an individual
that is performed in conformity with the dictates of the regime implies
that he acts from the right of the regime and not by his own right
whether the motive for his act be fear, hope, love, or reverence.87 The
action of the citizen and the dictates of the regime become as one.
Perhaps more importantly, however, Spinoza also holds that even an
individuals own good counsel must submit to the counsel and dictates
of the democratic political regime even though there may be occasions
when the counsel of an individual is more useful or advantageous than
the counsel of the regime.
In chapter sixteen of the treatise, Spinoza defines the crime of
treason as being the endeavor of a subject or a citizen to seize the
right of supreme power himself or to transfer it to someone else.
Spinoza then offers an example of a treasonous act. He proposes the
scenario of an individual who quits his station in battle and attacks an
enemy without his commanders knowledge or approval of the assault.
The consequence of the individuals action is a victory in the military

86
87

TTP 3: 192; 24142.

TTP 3: 202.

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engagement with the result that the position of the city involved in the
conflict also happens to be strengthened and improved. But despite the
advantage gained by the regime from the individuals action, Spinoza
maintains that the fellow who violated his oath to the commander
deserves condemnation as a traitor for the reason that he usurped
the commanders authority and power. Whatever may have been the
citizens reason for doing so, and Spinoza affirms that the individual
acted with good counsel (bono consilio) and he acknowledges that there
was a successful, useful, and advantageous outcome for the city from the
assault, any individual who acts on is own counsel and undermines the
right of the supreme power, or the power(s) assigned to its representatives, is a traitor to the regime.88 According to the political teaching of
the treatise, even the good counsel of a citizen may be considered
detrimental to the regime because the preservation of the Republic
is the highest good and only the regime can provide the conditions
through which security, health, prosperity, and peace, are made available for all of its citizens.89
The example of treason in the political teaching of the treatise
establishes that an individuals endeavor to persevere in his own state
requires that he submit to the dictates or the dependable counsel of
the regime in which he lives regardless of any advantage or utility that
might be obtained from his reliance on his own bonum or certum consilium.
For the sake of sociability, peace, and as much health and security as
may be extended to individuals by a polity, it is both necessary and
useful that citizens adhere to the reasonable or sensible dictates of the
democratic political regime. Citizens should adhere to the dependable
counsel of the supreme authority or power if they hope to conserve
themselves and sustain a social and political condition that makes
their self-preservation practicable. Where an individuals own good
counsel or his own dependable counsel does not come into conflict
with the dispositions and dictates of the regime then the individual is
free to feel or to think or to speak or to act as he wishes; for the goal
of the Republic really is liberty.90 Still, the goal of the Republic is
unachievable if every individual simply does as he pleases and the goal
of the Republic is unachievable where reason has no greater standing

88
89
90

TTP 3: 197.
TTP 3: 192.
TTP 3: 241.

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than passions such as hatred or anger with respect to the conduct of

life and the governance of human affairs. Accordingly, the philosophic
reader of the treatise is confronted with two stark alternatives.91 On
the one hand, if all human beings were constituted so as to do nothing
but what true reason indicates then there would be no need of laws;
rather, it would be sufficient to teach true moral lessons to human
beings and the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs
would conform to standards of reasonability or sensibility. But, on the
other hand, human beings are not so constituted by nature. Instead
they abandon reason and follow their lusts and impulses. Therefore,
in order for a society or a republic to exist and to operate successfully
on behalf of its citizens it is necessary for the regime to enact laws
that will constrain the lusts and impetuous behaviors of human beings;
moreover, the regime must be willing and able to employ force to bring
citizens into conformity with the law.92
Because human beings are driven more by passion than by reason
it is necessary that passionate human beings be moved to abide by the
reasonable or sensible dictates of the regime; for passionate human
beings typically are not disposed to adhere to the dictates of others.
Instead they regard the reasonable or sensible dictates of others to be
opposite to their own interests, desires, or needs. Therefore human
beings must be made to become law-abiding. Yet there may be no
incentive for them to do so. For any pact between or among human
beings has force only on the basis of its utility;93 and if an individual
human being does not regard the social pact which obliges him to be
law-abiding as useful to himself then he will not observe the terms or
the conditions of the pact into which he has entered. Furthermore, if
the utility of every pact is determined subjectively by each individual

91
Based on the teaching provided by Spinoza in the TTP, it may be said that any
reader of the book will recognize that there is some need for law. However, given the
idiosyncratic character of human assessments about matters of personal interest and
personal utility, it is likely that any reader of the TTP will recognize that laws are necessary mostly for other human beings rather than for themselves. But the philosophic
reader of the TTP will acknowledge something else. The philosophic reader of the
treatise will know that by nature passion is as legitimate as reason in the conduct of
life and the governance of human affairs and therefore unreasonable human beings
will require greater inducements to adopt reasonable or sensible behaviors. In other
words, it may be necessary to have recourse to unreasonable inducements to move
vulgar or passionate human beings to become law-abiding citizens.
92
TTP 3: 7374; 191 94.
93
TTP 3: 192.

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then there is no guarantee that all of the members of a democratic

political regime will remain mutually faithful to the pact simultaneously.
Unless one can convince passionate human beings of the need for law,
the need for becoming law-abiding, and the advantageous utility of
obeying the law, there can be little confidence that the polity will succeed in accomplishing its cardinal aims. The polity or regime will not
be able to cultivate preservation, security, health, or prosperity nor will
the polity or regime be able to help its citizens realize the advantages
of liberty. The task for the founder of a regime is to determine the
best conduit for moving human beings toward political life and causing
them to perceive life in association with others as useful and advantageous to them. In other words, the task is to persuade human beings,
especially passionate human beings, about the utility of the law, the
advantages of being law-abiding, and the necessity or desirability of
participating in political life.
Chapter four of the treatise is entitled, De Lege Divina. However,
that chapter commences with a definition of the meaning and nature
of law. According to Spinoza, the name law taken absolutely signifies that according to which each individual, whether all or some of
one same species, acts by a fixed and determinate plan.94 But law
also may be distinguished in respect of what occurs by the necessity
of nature and what depends on that which is agreeable by human
beings. With respect to the former kind of law, Spinoza cites as an
example of a law from the necessity of nature a universal law of
bodies according to which bodies impinging on smaller bodies lose as
much of their motion as they communicate to other bodies; and with
respect to the latter kind of law, Spinoza cites as an example of a law
that depends upon that which is agreeable to human beings a law
that involves the yielding of some right they have by nature, either
voluntarily or by compulsion, whereby human beings confine themselves
to a certain plan of living.95 The plan of living to which they adhere
aims to provide the conditions through which human beings can adopt
a manner of living more safely and conveniently.96
With respect to law taken absolutely, Spinoza concedes that
everything is determined from universal laws of nature to existing and

94
95
96

TTP 3: 57.
TTP 3: 58.
TTP 3: 57.

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operating by a fixed and determinate plan; nevertheless it correctly

may be said that some laws depend upon that which is agreeable
to human beings for two reasons. First, inasmuch as human nature
constitutes part of the power of nature, what proceeds from human
agreement is part of what emanates from nature through the power
of human nature as it is expressed by human beings. Second, though
human agreements owe to the power of human nature, it also must
be realized that human beings largely are ignorant of the order and
operations of nature, and so they are ignorant of the concatenation
of causes among the various things in nature. Therefore, according
to Spinoza, for the advantage of life, it is better, I rather should say,
it is necessary, to consider things as possible.97
The account of law given in the treatise leads the reader to the conclusion that law, properly conceived, is the fixed and determinate plan
that is inherent to nature itself and which applies to all of the things
that are included within nature. All that is within nature functions in
accordance with the universal laws of nature. Still, one may draw
a distinction between laws that are natural and necessary and laws
that are human. Laws about bodies are natural and necessary. Laws
about bodies apply to human bodies just as they apply to nonhuman
bodies. Accordingly, there are functions of human bodies that may be
characterized as adhering to the necessary laws of nature. For example,
Spinoza cites the faculty of memory as a human function that proceeds
in accordance with necessary laws of nature. An association of images
or impressions with other like images or impressions is a natural and
necessary element of the faculty of memory: So when a human being
recollects one thing he recollects at the same time another similar thing
or something he perceived at the same time with it.98 But it also is
the case that laws which issue from human agreement can involve
principles that conform to necessary laws of nature. For example, the
lex summa naturae that dictates the self-preservation of the individual
could be represented in the framing of a reasonable or sensible plan of
living that would propose to assure the achievement of the third proper
object of desire. In that instance, human power representing the power
of nature can be conceived as devising laws for the conduct of life and
the governance of affairs that are the most reasonable or sensible for

97
98

TTP 3: 58.
TTP 3: 58.

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the purpose of achieving preservation, security, health, and peace. But

the laws or codes of conduct that are devised by human beings through
the use of reason possess a peculiar feature that differentiates them
from necessary laws of nature. Human laws are predicated upon the
assumption that things in nature are possible or contingent rather than
necessary. The human laws concern the possible as that which may
exist or that which may be done.99 Consequently, though human
laws derive from human nature and hence they ultimately derive from
the power of nature itself, human laws typically do not give adequate
expression to the actual nature of things; for the actual nature of things
is such that natural individuals are bound only by the rules of the
nature of each individual which imply both the natural impetus of a
thing to existing and operating in a fixed and determinate manner
as well as the identification of the right of nature with the right of
power.100 Insofar as human deliberation, human choice, and human
agency emanate from the power of nature, the framing of human laws
through the faculty of reason is natural. But one also cannot ignore the
fact that human laws and even divine laws at best are an approximation of what is most adequately understood and expressed through a
philosophic account of the necessary laws of nature. In a sense, the
difference among the kinds of laws delineated by Spinoza, that is,
necessary laws of nature, on the one hand, and human laws or divine
laws, on the other hand, may be said to be reflected in the difference
between the revealed teaching of Christ and the revealed teaching of
Moses. For whereas Christ perceived things truly and adequately and
taught them as eternal truths, Moses perceived things inadequately
and translated his perceptions of those things into laws which would
bring advantages to those who adhered to them and disadvantages to
those who failed to adhere to the laws.101 Thus the name law, says
Spinoza, seems applied to natural things by transference and commonly nothing else is understood by law than a mandate that human
beings either are able to execute or neglect; and for that reason, it
seems Law is defined more particularly: namely, it is a plan of living
which a human being prescribes for himself or for others toward some

99
The Latin word, possibilis, involves the sense of contingency expressed in those
two phrases.
100
TTP 3: 189; and compare 5758 and 8184.
101
TTP 3: 6365; and compare 21; 2829; 4144.

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aim.102 Moreover, because the majority of human beings are inept at

apprehending the true goal of the laws and because they live on
the basis of anything but reason, Spinoza contends that in order to
constrain everyone equally, legislators have constituted another aim,
quite different from that which necessarily follows from the nature of
law, namely, promising the maintainers of the laws what the vulgar
love most and threatening those who violate the laws with what they
fear most; and so [legislators] have endeavored to curb the vulgar as a
horse by the rein, as much as it can be done.103
Spinozas account of law indicates that in the most basic and correct
sense of the word, law is defined as that in accordance with which an
individual acts by one and the same fixed and determinate plan. Laws
governing the motions of bodies illustrate what it is to be a necessary
law of nature. Natural necessary law is that without which an individual
thing would not function in the fixed and determinate manner that
empowers it to exist and operate in a natural and determinate way. In
the primary sense, then, law concerns that which cannot be otherwise
than it is. But since the necessary laws of nature involve the expressions of the power of nature itself, the laws or powers of human nature
also are such that particular laws can be enacted by human beings to
regulate the conduct of human life or the governance of human affairs;
though it must be acknowledged that the human laws do not give an
adequate expression to the actual nature of things.104 Instead, human
laws typically include, or they even may require, an accommodation
of vulgar sentiments and opinions about the nature things. More precisely, human laws appear to be especially effective for the majority of
human beings when the laws powerfully affect the passions of human
beings in terms of what they love, what they fear, or that for which
they hope. Human law therefore attempts to exhort unreasonable or
insensible human beings to become law-abiding through an appeal to
their elemental hopes and fears; and if the human laws are ratified by
revelation then their authority and their ability to influence the majority
of human beings only is enhanced.105

102
103
104
105

TTP 3: 58.
TTP 3: 5859.
TTP 3: 57.
Compare TTP 3: 61 and 205207.

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Most human beings do not grasp the true aim of laws.106 For them
to do so would require that passionate human beings, unreasonable
human beings, insensible human beings, or the vulgar exercise the faculty of reason in ways that they habitually eschew. Therefore legislators
establish another aim for law. They use law to entice human beings to
adopt a plan of living that promises them what they desire most. The
true aim of law, however, is to curb the vulgar appetites and impulses
of passionate, unreasonable, or insensible human beings. An accurate
apprehension of the true aim of laws presupposes that a human
being possesses the reasonableness and the capacity to seek nothing
other than what true reason indicates as being useful or advantageous
to him. Reasonable or sensible human beings recognize that simple
moral lessons are sufficient to instruct reasonable or sensible human
beings about how to conduct their lives and how to govern their affairs
prosperously. But the majority of human beings are neither reasonable
nor sensible. Consequently, virtue, which is contained within human
nature and principally depends upon human power alone,107 is quite
rare in any age among all human beings.108 The majority of human
beings therefore must be persuaded or coerced to apply standards of
reasonableness or sensibility to the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs by being curbed. The guiding or true aim of
human law, as defined by Spinoza, is the attempt to curb the passionate,
impulsive, and lustful behaviors of human beings. The law succeeds in
that aim when the multitude are induced to become law-abiding citizens
of a democratic political regime, or human beings who adhere to the
dictates of the dependable counsel of the democratic political regime,
because it promises them what they admire and love most or because
it threatens them with what they detest and hate most. Human law
will not succeed if it announces its true aim. Human law will not
succeed if it announces that its purpose is to curb the vulgar impulses
and appetites that are shared by the majority of human beings. Still,
human laws must not oppress; they should persuade. Quoting Seneca,
Spinoza reminds the reader of the treatise, and perhaps especially the
one who reads philosophically, of the need for moderate regimes109

106
107
108
109

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

5859.
46.
102.
74.

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such as the democratic political regime that is advocated by Spinoza

in the treatise.110
After considering law in terms of necessary laws of nature and
human laws, Spinoza treats the subject matter proper of chapter four
of the treatise, De Lege Divina. The difference between a human law
and a divine law is explained by reference to the object of each kind
of law. That is to say, both human law and divine law express a plan
of living. But the object of the plan of living reflected in human law
serves in protecting life and the republic whereas the object of the
plan of living reflected in divine law looks solely to the highest good,
that is, knowledge and love of God.111 Human law and divine law
are said to be distinguishable from each other for the reason that each
has a different object. Human law seeks to protect life and to protect
the political institution that is designed to preserve life, namely, the
democratic republic. Divine law, on the other hand, concerns knowledge and love of God. The claim about the divine law, the object
of the divine law, and knowledge of God involves a perspective that
emphasizes the difference between the life of reason and the life of
passion. That is, since the perfection of the understanding is the highest thing that human beings can attain, the highest good of human
beings consists in the perfection of the intellect. Furthermore, because
nothing can be or be conceived without God, the more we know
about nature the more we know about God; and the more we know
about God the greater is the perfection of the intellect.112 Hence the
divine law aims at the highest good of human beings insofar as the
highest good of human beings consists in the perfection of the intellect and the perfection of the intellect ostensibly includes knowledge
and love of God.113 Yet the highest good of human beings predictably
is neglected by the vast majority of human beings inasmuch as it is
impossible for carnal human beings to understand such things; they
regard claims about the highest good as vain because they possess
only a meager knowledge of God and they can find nothing tangible
and satisfying in pursuing a knowledge and love of God that requires
TTP 3: 19394.
TTP 3: 59.
112
TTP 3: 5960.
113
TTP 3: 6061. Notwithstanding Spinozas assertion, it also must be recalled that
Spinoza maintains that knowledge of nature or knowledge of the primary causes of
things is achievable on the basis of human power alone or it is achievable from the
laws of human nature alone (TTP 3: 46; and compare 10; 1516; 5960).
110
111

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the use of the intellect alone.114 Hence the highest good of human
beings remains largely unattained by most human beings for the reason
that they fail to employ the faculties of human nature that make such
knowledge possible. Still, because many things may be referred to God,
especially things in the superlative degree,115 it also is the case that a
plan of living may attain the status of a divine law where the human
law aims at what is highest, or superlative, and if it has been ratified
by revelation [for] in this sense, the Law of Moses can be called the
Law of God, or the divine Law.116 In other words, the plan of living
contained in the Law of Moses is regarded as divine law to the extent
that it inculcates and fosters one half of the highest good of human
beings, namely, love of God.
Knowledge of the necessary laws of nature, knowledge of things
through their primary causes, and acquisition of the habit of virtue are
aims that may be achieved through the exercise of the human intellect
alone. The achievement of those goals depends principally on human
power or the laws of human nature.117 Accordingly, the highest good
attainable by human beings is something that can be realized through
human agency and effort.118 Moreover, the highest good attainable by
human beings is such that it is its own reward and failure to attain
the highest good is evinced in the life of those who suffer slavery of
the flesh, or an unsteady and vacillating spirit.119 The vulgar do not
pursue the highest good because it demands the exercise of the intellect
and because it requires speculation and a clear mind whereas the
passionate multitudes pursue only what they are able to touch, eat, or
have affect their bodies.120 Nonetheless, the majority of human beings
who are driven by their passions, who neglect reason, and who behave
insensibly must be prompted to develop the habit of virtue if they are
to preserve themselves and prosper; or, more to the point, they must

TTP 3: 61.
TTP 3: 3841.
116
TTP 3: 61.
117
TTP 3: 46.
118
TTP 3:229. At the close of chapter 5 of the TTP, Spinoza recounts the views
expressed by Rabbi Joseph, son of Shem Tov. According to Rabbi Joseph, the ethical teaching of Aristotle omitted nothing concerning true Ethics. But the teaching
of the Greek philosopher was incapable of contributing to ones salus for the reason
that Aristotles teaching was derived from reason alone and it therefore could not be
embraced as a lesson revealed prophetically (TTP 3: 80 and compare 3: 79).
119
TTP 3: 62.
120
TTP 3: 61.
114
115

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be pushed toward living virtuously if others are to preserve themselves

and prosper. The inducement to virtue and living well, however, will
not come from the teaching of moral lessons that convince the intellect. Instead, the inducement to virtue and living well will come from
those means which are more attractive or compelling to passionate,
unreasonable, or insensible human beings. The majority of human
beings can be moved by law. They can be moved by the law to constrain their excessive and harmful behaviors; and they can be moved
by the law to develop behaviors which discourage them from acting
neglectfully of others. The majority of human beings will be moved
to embrace law because it will promise them what they love most or it
will threaten them with what they fear most or desire least. The laws
will have as their purposes the protection of life and the republic;
and both purposes contribute to the fulfillment of the third proper
object of desire inasmuch as laws constitute a plan of living that is
dedicated to security and health. Furthermore, there is no reason to
believe that the human laws need to be incompatible with the Law of
God or the divine Law.121 As is evident from the example of the Law
of Moses, it is plausible that human laws which are consistent with
revelation or human laws sanctioned by revelation may supply human
beings with an element of the highest good which includes a teaching about the love of God. That is, although divine law and human
law involve histories and narratives that are not capable of affording
human beings adequate knowledge of God,122 divine laws and human
laws nonetheless can inspire a love of God which fosters obedience to
God and the hope of salus.123

121
The possible compatibility of human law with divine law is illustrated in Spinozas
claims about the reasonableness that ultimately should be reflected in each kind of law.
That is, Spinoza goes so far as to assert that the Hebrew people during their enslavement were obligated to follow even the Egyptian laws if those laws did not conflict
with the natural divine law (TTP 3: 72).
122
TTP 3: 6162; 7677; and compare 16870.
123
TTP 3: 165; 168; 17580. Spinozas account of the various kinds of law in
chapter 4 of the TTP is reminiscent of Platos account of law in Minos which commences with the question: What is law? (313a). The focus of the dialogue is political
law but in order to establish the significance of political law Socrates contrasts it with
two other definitions of law. At one extreme, law is defined as things customarily
accepted (313b) or what also may be characterized as the official opinion [doxa] of
the city (313c). At the other extreme, law is an art which implies knowledge of what
is (314b; 317d). Between those extremes, political law is defined as the wish to be
the discovery of what is (315a). According to Socrates, the official opinion of the
city can incorporate divine elements (318c). The scheme of law in Minos involves

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On the basis of their nature and inclinations, the vast majority of

human beings can be persuaded to adhere to human laws or the dependable counsels of the democratic political regime because they promise
them what they love most or because they threaten them with what
they fear most. Reasonable or sensible legislators will realize what
moves the vast majority of human beings most efficiently. They will be
aware that passionate, unreasonable, or insensible human beings are
not moved by the articulation of a long series of arguments, nor are
they moved by sets of rational demonstrations, nor are they moved by
the presentation of deductive proofs. Rather passionate human beings
are moved by the telling of the appropriate sorts of compelling and
persuasive tales or stories. Passionate human beings are moved to be
virtuous, sociable, dutiful, and law-abiding as a consequence of the
persuasive power of compelling narratives. The tales or stories are ones
that appeal to the imaginations and the experiences of passionate human
beings; they are tales or stories that reflect commonly received opinions, sentiments, or habits already received by the majority of human
beings; and the tales or stories will have the authority to influence the
desires, hopes, and fears of the multitude.124 The kind of tale or story
or narrative that can be invoked for the purpose of moving the vulgar
to political life is named in the teaching of the treatise. According to
Spinoza, the Scriptures contain the sorts of tales, stories, or narratives
that are revealed first for the use of an entire nation and in the end
revealed to the whole human race; accordingly, the teaching of the
Scriptures has been accommodated greatly to the grasp of the plebs

three distinctions which I propose correspond approximately to Spinozas division of

laws in the TTP. Knowledge of what is corresponds to necessary laws of nature;
the official opinion of the city or things customarily accepted, insofar as they
may include divine elements, correspond to divine law; and the wish to be the
discovery of what is corresponds to human law. Human law occupies a middle
position between two extremes. Or, while philosophy is concerned with knowledge of
what is and necessary laws of nature and theology is concerned with the official
opinion of the city and things customarily accepted, which can include divine
elements, politics seeks to be the discovery of what is for the reason that it is less
than philosophy but more than theology. That is, it is less than knowledge of what is
but it seeks to be more than merely an official opinion of the city which can include
more than one superstitious belief or absurd premise. Though politics can be informed
by philosophy or theology, at its best politics aims to be the discovery of what is for
an audience that remains comprised principally of nonphilosophers.
124
TTP 3: 7677.

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185

and it is confirmed by experience alone.125 In other words, the teaching of the Scriptures is capable of moving and persuading the majority
of human beings to adopt a plan of living that is sensible and which
contributes to their security and health. Moreover, the teaching of the
Scriptures which is the teaching of revelation, theology, faith, or piety
is one that demands obedience to law; it cultivates virtue and sociability
by encouraging love of a neighbor; and it offers the promise of salus to
all human beings in both theological and political terms.126

125
126

TTP 3: 118.
TTP 3: 6971.

PART FOUR

PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND POLITICS

The philosophical teaching of the treatise is the teaching of nature.

The theological teaching of the treatise is the teaching of piety and
obedience. The political teaching of the treatise is the teaching of
the protection of life and the protection of the republic. But it is not
immediately obvious how the three teachings of the Tractatus theologicopoliticus are related to each other nor is the connection among them
entirely clear. Hence it is not immediately evident why the teaching of
the treatise is distinctively theologico-political.1
Chapters one through fifteen of the treatise are devoted to subject
matters that are preponderantly theological in kind and only chapters
sixteen through twenty of the book treat subject matters that are political
in kind; although two of those last five chapters of the treatise examine
the Republic of the Hebrews, that is, those two chapters contain a
discussion of various aspects of the relationship between theology and
politics in the Hebrew theocracy.2 Nevertheless, the political intention
of Spinozas book is exhibited in the subtitle to the treatise as well as
in Spinozas declaration in the Preface to his book that the principle
to be demonstrated is that liberty, especially liberty of thought, liberty
of speech, and the liberty of philosophizing can be granted without
detriment to piety or the public peace; and, indeed, such freedoms

1
A sense of the separation of the theological teaching of the treatise from the
political teaching of the TTP is reflected in the title of the anonymously published
first complete English translation of Spinozas book, A treatise partly theological and partly
political, containing some few discourses, etc. (London, 1689). Prior to the 1689 publication
of the treatise in English, Charles Blount had incorporated an English translation
of chapter 6 of the TTP (De Miraculis) into his own anonymously published book,
Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature (London, 1683). Familiarity in England with
Spinozas teachings in the TTP is confirmed by the fact that the interpolation by Blount
of chapter 6 of the TTP into his own book was denounced quickly by Thomas Browne
in his work, Miracles, Works Above and Contrary to Nature (London: Samuel Smith, 1683).
Some of the ideas expressed in Part Four of this book initially were introduced in
my essay, On the Unity of Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus, Jewish Political Studies
Review 7 (5755/1995): 107143.
2
TTP 3: 201 and 221.

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cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and grave harm

to the Republic.3
The connection between the theological and political parts of the
treatise is introduced by Spinozas remark in the Preface to the treatise
that the conclusions he reaches concerning the liberty of thought and
the liberty of speech in a democratic political regime derive from his
examination of the Scriptures.4 In addition, at the beginning of the
political part of the book, Spinoza states that he will consider the practical consequences in optima Republica of his conclusion that philosophy
must be separated from theology, the position which he asserted at the
close of the theological part of his book.5 On the surface appearance
of matters, then, it would seem that chapters sixteen through twenty of
the treatise represent an adjunct discussion of the manner whereby the
civil liberties of a democratic political regime can be seen to parallel
the kind of theological and philosophic liberties that were advanced in
chapters one through fifteen of the book. Based on that perspective,
one would infer that the aim of the treatise is to separate philosophy
from theology so that liberty of thought and liberty of speech, as well
as the liberty of philosophizing, could be instituted under a political
regime whose chief purpose is to secure and advance the liberty of its
citizens;6 and the achievement of that aim is central to the teaching
of the treatise. However, the readers awareness of the significance of
that aim also must be supplemented by the readers realization that
Spinozas old book also serves a more basic intention. The teaching of
philosophy, the teaching of theology, and the teaching of politics in the
treatise are united more deeply through their relation to a problem that
is endemic to human nature; and the teaching of the treatise concerns
the respective abilities or inabilities of philosophy, theology, and politics
to solve that problem. That is, since the vast majority of human beings
do not acquire the habit of virtue by the exercise of their own faculties
of intellect, it is necessary to motivate the vulgar to become sociable
and virtuous by some means other than an appeal to their reasonability
3
The subtitle to the TTP describes the book as containing a number of dissertations, wherein it is shown that liberty to philosophize not only can be granted without
injury to Piety and the Peace of the Republic, but that the Peace of the Republic and
Piety are endangered by the suppression of this liberty (compare TTP 3: 7 and 11).
4
TTP 3: 11.
5
TTP 3: 189.
6
TTP 3: 241.

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191

or sensibility. If passionate human beings are to become sociable and

virtuous, it is necessary to convince them of the advantages and the
utility of political life through means that are more familiar and persuasive to them. Consequently, the teaching of the treatise requires
philosophy to press theology into the service of politics. Or, to state
the issue causally, Spinoza conceives the theological teaching that he
presents in the treatise for the purpose of contributing to the solution
of a natural or philosophic problem by a political means; and for that
reason Spinozas teaching in the treatise necessarily is theologico-political:
Spinoza presents a theologico-political handling of the natural or
philosophic problem.
A principal aim of the treatise is to defend the liberty of philosophizing.7 Such liberty can be achieved only by permitting everyone in
a democratic political regime to think as he pleases and to say what
he thinks.8 As the opening passages from the Preface to the treatise
make clear, a chief impediment to liberty of thought and liberty of
speech is theological or religious prejudice which grows out of the
natural human inclination toward superstitious beliefs which also leads
human beings to despise the use of reason in itself or to condemn it as
a source of impiety.9 Thus theology or religion inherently is indisposed
to accept any claim by philosophy that philosophy or reason is capable
of providing a plan of living for human beings that would prove to be
sufficient for their attainment of salus. Theology or religion presumes
that the plan of living that it prescribes is the sole plan of living that
is suitable for the conduct of human life or the governance of human
affairs. Moreover, because human beings are led more by passion
than by reason it will happen that the majority of human beings will
be drawn to the kind of instruction that theology or religion offers to
them, namely, an instruction communicated though dramatic narratives which appeal to the opinions, sentiments, biases, and experiences
of the world that are common to human beings who are not inclined
toward philosophy. Furthermore, according to Spinoza, human beings
naturally are prone to credulity and they live superstitiously especially
at those times when they cannot govern all their affairs with some
kind of dependable counsel or when they feel that fortune has failed
7
8
9

TTP 3: title page; 7; 11; 24647.

TTP 3: 10; 11; 117; 241; 243; 24647.
TTP 3: 57; 910.

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to favor them in accordance with their wishes or hopes.10 In such circumstances, human beings take refuge in the teachings of theology or
religion. The doctrines and dogmas of theology or religion promise
individuals the satisfaction of their hopes and desires, as well as the
alleviation of their miseries, if the individuals adhere to a prescribed
plan of living that has been approved by theology or religion. More
particularly, because they are ignorant of the order and operations of
nature, the vast majority of human beings come to adopt the theological
or religious prejudice about the existence of a supranatural agent that
is concerned with human wellbeing and the agents existence is said to
be most manifest when the familiar courses of nature seem to be interrupted or contravened with an accompanying event that proves to be
satisfying for those human beings who gain some advantage from the
putative display of divine providence.11 Anyone who would seek to
explain the unaccustomed event or the good fortune that follows from
it by an account that involves natural causation rather than miraculous
agencies is perceived by the vulgar to be an opponent of the existence
and the power of God; and hence such individuals are charged with
discrediting belief in the existence of the supranatural agent that most
human beings regard as the source of human fortunes and misfortunes.12
The alternative to the plan of living that is determined by a reliance
on superstition and chance events is the one that is despised by prejudiced and vulgar human beings. The alternative to the plan of living
that is based upon superstition or fortune is the life of reason or the
philosophic life13 which relies neither upon absurdities nor luck.
Notwithstanding the liberating of the teaching of theology or religion from its corruptions and the liberalizing of its doctrines in the
TTP 3: 5.
TTP 3: 8184.
12
TTP 3: 8182; and compare 30.
13
The degradation of reason by those who succumb to religious prejudice and
superstition is a pronounced theme of the Preface to the TTP: [W]e see that it is
especially those who greedily long for uncertain things who are the readiest victims
of superstition of every kind, and it is especially when they are helpless and in danger that they implore Gods help with prayers and womanish tears. They call reason
blind . . . and they call human sensibility vain, while the delusions of the imagination,
dreams, and other childish absurdities they take to be the oracles of God. Indeed,
they think that God, spurning the sensible (imo Deum sapientes aversari) has written his
decrees not in mans mind but in the entrails of beasts, or that by divine inspiration
and instigation these decrees are foretold by fools, madmen, or birds. Fear makes
human beings be insane (3: 5).
10
11

philosophy, theology, and politics

193

version of theology or religion that is presented in the treatise, which

is achieved through critiques of prophecy, prophets, the Hebrew election, the status of ceremonial laws, belief in miracles, and the traditions of Scriptural interpretation, Spinozas teaching in the Tractatus
theologico-politicus serves another more important philosophic purpose.
The ultimate ambition of the teaching of the treatise is to provide a
solution to the natural or philosophic problem.14 The ultimate ambition of the treatise is to solve the problem of human nature. The issue
raised by Spinozas book is the problem concerning the conduct of
human life and the governance of human affairs. Or, to state the issue
differently, Spinozas purpose in the treatise is to solve the question of
how human beings can live together in peace and security given the
facts of human nature and the predominant tendencies and inclinations
of passionate human beings. In other words, the treatise proposes to
solve the question of how human beings can come to achieve the third
proper object of desire by propounding a plan of living that will make
preservation, security, health, and prosperity, or what generally may be
termed human salus, possible.
There are three proper objects of desire: the desire to know things
through their primary causes; the desire to live well or to live virtuously;
and the desire to live in security and health.15 Yet before the attainment
of knowledge and the acquisition of virtue are feasible, it is necessary
for human beings to live in security, health, and peace. The pursuit of
knowledge, the cultivation of virtue, and the establishment of the liberty
to think, to speak, and to act will not be practicable if human beings
live in a bestial, rude, asocial way.16 Liberty and the opportunity to live
well are unattainable without society or political life; and no one can
doubt that it is much more useful for human beings to embrace life
in political association with other human beings.17 However, a consequence of human nature is that human thoughts, speeches, and actions
can occasion conflict among human beings. The peace and security
advocated by Spinoza in the treatise therefore require that constraints
be instituted which will prevent the harmful human inclinations toward
license without simultaneously eliminating human liberty or human

14
15
16
17

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

179.
46.
73; 19091.
191.

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right. For the immediate purposes of the surface argument of the treatise, Spinoza focuses on the threats to the liberty of thought, speech,
and action that are posed by the prevailing tradition of theology or
religion in the Dutch situation of the late 1660s. He seeks to expand
liberty while remaining mindful of the dangers of license. But in fact
Spinozas teaching in the treatise reflects his awareness of the perennial
tension that persists between those whose lives are led according to their
passions and those who lives are led in accordance with reason.18
The first mention of the tension between the life of passion and the
life of reason occurs early in the theological part of the treatise. In
the discussion of the ceremonial law and the Hebrew regime, Spinoza
seeks to demonstrate that the particular rituals observed by the Hebrew
people were ordained for them only in respect to the temporal happiness of the body and the tranquility of the regime, and therefore
they could have been of use only while their regime was standing.19
Spinozas conclusion about the Hebrew imperium enables him to confirm
his narrow view of the condition of the Hebrew election, the condition
of the Hebrew regime, and implicitly the condition of the Hebrew
religion. But it also permits him the opportunity to introduce his teaching about the constitution of human societies by making an argument
from universal foundations.20 Spinoza says that the formation of a
society is necessary and useful to human beings because it provides for

18
That the treatise concerns the deeper question about the claim that is laid upon
human life by passion and superstition as distinct from the claim that is laid upon human
life by reason is indicated by a remark made by Spinoza in the Preface to the TTP.
Even though Spinoza says we have the rare good fortune to live in a Republic where
liberty of judgment is fully granted to the individual citizen and he may worship God
as he pleases, and where nothing is esteemed dearer and more precious than liberty,
nevertheless he also claims that he is undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task
in demonstrating that not only can [the liberty to philosophize] be granted without
endangering piety and the peace of the Republic, but also that the peace of the Republic
and piety depend upon this liberty (3: 7). If nothing truly were esteemed dearer and
more precious than liberty then Spinoza would have no need to defend the liberty
of philosophizing in the TTP. Instead, however, he recognizes that the natural liberty
to philosophize was in jeopardy because of the restrictions upon the civil liberties of
thought and speech that were being advanced by the more zealous anti-republican
alliances between sectarian religious forces and monarchists in The Netherlands during the 1660s. Still, the immediate historical situation only mirrors the more natural
and basic problem inherent in the tension between the life of passion and the life of
reason, as well as the dire consequences of that tension for the prospect of achieving
the third proper object of desire.
19
TTP 3: 69.
20
TTP 3: 73.

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195

mutual security and the division of labor. Indeed, human beings would
lack both the skill and the time to support and conserve themselves to
the greatest extent possible if they did not afford each other mutual
assistance. Moreover, life in society brings with it developments in the
arts and sciences which also are indispensable for the perfection of
human nature and its blessedness; for one sees that those who live
in a barbarous way with no civilizing influences lead a wretched and
almost brutish existence.21 While human societies are founded for the
purposes of overcoming human insufficiencies, promoting human convenience, and establishing the terms for mutual aid and security among
their members, the satisfaction of needs, desires, and interests in social
life is contingent upon the observance of certain codes of behavior by
the citizens who inhabit any particular society or political regime. For
instance, as the Hebrew imperium enacted ritual ceremonies to enhance
loyalty and conformity to the Hebrew political regime or the Hebrew
plan of living, every political society, according to Spinoza, requires
laws to regulate the behavior of its citizens in respect of the conduct
of their lives and the governance of their affairs. The justification of
the need for laws is conveyed through Spinozas account of human
nature that is propounded in his discussion of ceremonial laws. Spinozas
contention is that ceremonial laws, rituals, observances, etc., are not
required by the natural divine law;22 nor do ceremonial laws have
any bearing on the blessedness or the virtue of human beings.23 Rather
the ceremonial laws, rituals, and observances that were formulated by
the Hebrew regime for its people served the purpose of maintaining
order and discipline among the people as well as order and discipline
within the regime itself. Laws which constrain certain behaviors are
needed because human beings naturally seek their own advantage to
the neglect of others.24 Furthermore, human beings typically pursue
their own advantages on the basis of their passions, lusts, or immoderate

21
TTP 3: 73. One might compare the similarity between Spinozas account of
the origins of political association based upon mutual security and the division of
labor with Platos account of the origins of the city of natural necessity at Republic
369b3ff. On the disadvantages of life outside political society, compare Spinozas
remarks with the view offered by Thomas Hobbes in chapter 13 of Leviathan, where
life in the state of nature is described as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short
(London: 1651), p. 62.
22
TTP 3: 62.
23
TTP 3: 6971; 76.
24
TTP 3: 189.

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impulses instead of on the basis of the dictates of sound reason or on

the basis of a reliance on some sort of dependable counsel:25 Hence
no society can subsist for long without government and coercion, and
consequently without laws to control and restrain the lusts of human
beings and their unbridled urges.26
In the broader context of the discussion of human life in society and
the need for laws to prevent human beings from pursuing base interests,
Spinozas explanation of the Hebrew imperium and the intentions of its
ceremonial laws indicates the crucial natural difference between those
who live solely from willfulness and who are carried away by the affects
of the spirit, namely, the passionate human beings, and those whose
lives are conducted from the sound dictates of reason, namely, the
reasonable or sensible human beings.27 If all human beings lived according to the sound dictates of reason then there would be no need for
laws that compelled or curtailed certain behaviors since each individual
would be acting in his own interest and to his own true advantage.
However, the fact that the majority of human beings are passionate
rather than reasonable or rational leads Spinoza to conclude that in
order to maintain itself every society requires government, coercion, and
the enforcement of laws that place restrictions upon the behaviors of
human beings.28 Without laws, the threat of coercion and punishment
for those who violate or ignore the laws, and the enforcement of the
laws, there would be nothing to curb the impulses of the majority of
human beings, who generally follow their fleshy instincts rather than
rise to the use of reason. If unchecked impulses were to prevail, society
and the advantages it can provide would be vitiated. The third proper
object of desire is security and health; and the aim of society, as is
evident from Spinozas claims about the Hebrew regime, is to afford
the members of the society temporal and bodily advantages. Thus,
inasmuch as they provide for the division of labor, establish mutual
defense, and foster the development of the arts and sciences, societies
naturally tend to promote the satisfaction of the third proper object of
desire and hence the best kind of societies29 can serve as the means to
TTP 3: 190.
TTP 3: 7374; 19192.
27
TTP 3: 73; and compare 44, 68, and 80.
28
TTP 3: 7374; 19192.
29
Spinozas examination of the foundations of a Republic commences with a
consideration of how far liberties may extend in optima Republica (TTP 3: 189). The
best Republic also is called a Democracy (3: 193).
25
26

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197

achieving one of the most basic human desires. Yet the success of any
society or regime in achieving its aims turns on the dispositions of its
members and their willingness to embrace political life and the terms
or the conditions that accompany it.
According to the philosophic teaching of the treatise, the right and
plan of nature is nothing other than the rules that determine the nature
of any individual thing to act and to exist in a certain way: Fish swim;
and big fish eat little fish because it is their nature to do so. Whatever
any individual thing does by its own nature and through its own power
it has the highest right to do because the right of the individual is
coextensive with its determinate power.30 The identification of natural right with natural power extends to every individual in nature and
therefore the identification of natural right with natural power extends
to all aspects of human nature as well. In other words, a human being
who is not yet acquainted with reason or has not yet acquired a virtuous disposition lives under the control of appetite alone with as much
right as he who conducts his life under the rule of reason. Or, just as
the reasonable or sensible human being has the highest right to do all
that reason dictates, that is, he may live in accordance with the laws
of reason, so too a human being who is ignorant and wanton has the
highest right to do all that is urged on him by his appetites, that is, he
may live according to the laws of appetite.31 Furthermore, since it is
the highest law of nature that each thing endeavors to persist in its state,
as far as it is able to do so, taking no account of any other thing but
itself, it follows that each individual has the highest right to exist and
to operate as it is naturally determined. In the exercise of rights or
powers by any individual there is no distinction made between human
beings who have discovered the advantages of the use of reason and
human beings to whom true reason is unknown or between fools,
madmen, and the sane.32 Whatever any individual thing does by the
laws of its own nature, it does with the highest right inasmuch as it
acts as it is determined to do by nature.
The philosophic teaching of the treatise which is the teaching of
nature and which contains an account of the ius et institutum naturae
exposes the root of the natural or philosophic problem. That is, the

30
31
32

TTP 3: 189.
TTP 3: 18990.
TTP 3: 190.

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natural right of every human being is determined not by sound reason,

but by his desire and his power. The natural or philosophic problem
addressed by the teaching of the treatise is the problem of human
nature itself. Because human beings by nature are bound to preserve
themselves, they will choose whatever they perceive to be the most
convenient means to the satisfaction of their desire for self-preservation.
But functioning without the use of sound reason, it is typical that passionate human beings will be guided by their appetites alone. Thus
whatever any human being believes to be to his advantage, whether
he is under the guidance of sound reason or under the sway of passion,
he may seek and get it for himself by the highest natural right through
any means he can, be it force or deceit or entreaty and consequently
he may regard as an enemy anyone who tries to hinder him from
obtaining what he wants.33
In and of itself, the right and plan of nature prohibits nothing
except only those things that no one desires and no one can do; it
does not condemn struggles or hatred or anger or ruses or anything
at all that is urged by appetite, passion, impulse, or lust. Most striking
in Spinozas account of the teaching of nature is his deduction that
the life of passion is equally as legitimate as the life of reason per ius et
institutum naturae. Hence the imaginative-affective life or the impulsive or
impetuous or even the violent life is no less justified by nature than is
the tranquil and self-possessed life. Every individual will pursue whatever
he perceives to be to his own advantage or his own interest and each
individual will pursue what he perceives to be to his advantage or his
interest regardless of the consequences that his actions may have for
others. The natural or philosophic problem, which is to say, the problem of human nature, turns on the issue of rational, reasonable, or
sensible human beings living peacefully and securely among a majority
of human beings who live passionately and who regard as enemies
anyone who is perceived to impede them from satisfying their desires,
impulses, or lusts however excessive or self-indulgent those urgings may
be. Indeed, by the highest right of nature, passionate human beings
may employ any means at their disposal to achieve the things they seek
and only that which no one desires or no one can do is excluded from
anyones right or anyones power.

33

TTP 3: 190.

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199

Inasmuch as most human beings are governed by carnal instincts

and emotions rather than by dictates of sound reason, the fundamental native endeavor of any individual human being toward self-preservation implicitly is jeopardized by any other individuals adherence to
the lex summa naturae or any other individuals exercise of natural right
since natural right is limited only by an individuals power. No one is
prevented by nature from wresting from others by force whatever he
perceives to be to his advantage; and even those who ignore reason
for the sake of the passions are as much at risk from others who live
according to the passions as are those who conduct themselves temperately according to the dictates of reason.34
In order to avoid the dangers inherent to the natural human condition and facilitate the satisfaction of the third proper object of desire,
some remedy must be contrived that allows human beings to exercise
their natural rights and natural powers within the bounds of some
restrictions that can be set upon their excessive actions and behaviors.
Laws must be instituted for human beings that prescribe limits to how
they may act in the pursuit of their interests; and human beings must
be brought to comply with those laws. One efficient way to achieve that
goal is the construction of a political society that will frame laws to serve
the advantage of the populace. But, in addition, the regime then must
threaten punishment for those who violate the laws and promise rewards
for those who abide by them.35 If human beings can be persuaded to
enter into political life with other human beings then their adherence
to laws can occasion specific advantages for them. For in addition to
curtailing the harmful exercises of natural right and natural power
by human beings which can be destructive of others, participation in

34
In accordance with the philosophic teaching of the treatise, that is, the teaching
of nature, the life of passion and the life of reason are equally natural and equally
legitimate. Still, the conclusion that the life of reason is superior to the life of passion
is supported by Spinozas identification of living in accordance with the dictates of
sound reason and living in accordance with ones true advantage (TTP 3: 7374).
Moreover, if a human beings true happiness demands knowledge of the truth
(3: 44) and only philosophy or reason is devoted to truth (3: 179) then the life of reason must be superior to the life of passion and the various ways that the passionate
life can express itself, including the acceptance of various forms of religious prejudice
and superstition. Common to both the passionate life and the superstitious life are the
emotions of anger, hatred, and deceit (3: 6; and compare 190); and Spinoza plainly
affirms that superstition itself originates from the most powerful kinds of affect and
not from reason (3: 6).
35
TTP 3: 74; and compare 5859.

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political life safeguards mutual security, it increases the conveniences of

life through a division of labor, and it provides the conditions through
which the improvement of human life can be advanced insofar as the
beneficence of the arts and sciences can become more developed and
refined within the framework of a political society. Thus an obvious
practical solution to the natural or philosophic problem of human
nature would seem to be a political one.
Human life, as determined by the right and plan of nature, has the
ironic effect of making human life itself precarious. Since the natural
right of every individual typically is determined more by desire and
power than by reason there is no positive guarantee that the highest
law of nature, which obliges each individual to preserve itself, actually
conduces to the preservation or the protection of any individual at all.
On the contrary, the fact that any human being has summum ius to live
according to his appetites already implies that all human beings could
act injuriously toward each other if they believed it to be advantageous
to do so. Still, Spinoza insists that no one can doubt that it is far
more salutary to live in accordance with laws and the sound dictates
of reason that genuinely are intended for the true advantage of human
beings.36 Each individual seeks to conduct his life and govern his affairs
free from anxiety, struggles, hatred, anger, and ruses but that condition cannot be realized as long as every individual is permitted to
do as he pleases and reason can claim no more right than hatred or
anger. To forestall anxiety, struggles, hatred, anger, and ruses, together
with the disadvantageous consequences of them, human beings must
be moved to unite into one body, agree that the unrestricted right
naturally possessed by each individual be put into common ownership,
and make the most stringent pledges to be guided in all matters only
by the dictates of reason. [ They must] keep appetite in check in so
far as it tends to anothers hurt, [they must] do to no one what they
would not want done to themselves, and [they must] uphold anothers
right as they would their own.37
In a somewhat ironic fashion, the philosophic teaching of the treatise
itself introduces the mode whereby human beings can foreswear the
unrestricted exercise of their natural right or natural power and live in
compliance with laws in a political regime. The natural mode which

36
37

TTP 3: 191; 7375.

TTP 3: 191.

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201

permits individuals the use of any extreme to secure their interests or

satisfy their desires is the same mode that permits human beings to
embrace political life and an adherence to established laws that constrain
those very behaviors. That is, the universal law of human nature
which compels self-preservation also entails that no one rejects what
he judges to be good except through the hope of a greater good or the
fear of a greater evil, and no one endures any evil except to avoid a
greater evil or to gain a greater good.38 Because self-preservation of
the individual is the lex summa naturae and political societies are designed
to protect human beings from injury as well as improve their lives, it
is obvious that human beings could be moved, persuaded, or lured to
enter political life in the hope of achieving a greater good or avoiding a greater evil by doing so. Relinquishing ones entitlement to the
exercise of certain rights or powers would be perceived as a lesser evil
that a human being could endure for the sake of attaining a greater
good in the form of gaining protection from injury by other human
beings; and that kind of protection is the stated ambition of human
law for human law is a plan of living that is designed to protect
life and to protect the republic.39 Still, the manner of discriminating
between or among various goods and evils is an entirely idiosyncratic
matter. According to Spinoza, it is a principle of human nature that
everyone will choose of two goods that which he judges to be the
greater and of two evils that which seems to him to be the lesser. I say
expressly that which in his belief is the greater or lesser. I do not say
that the facts necessarily correspond with his judgment. This law is so
firmly inscribed in human nature that it should be placed among the
eternal truths which no one is able to ignore.40
Human nature is such that ones perception of what does or what
does not conduce to his advantage or his interest is neither constant nor
consistent. Even the advantages promised to an individual for participation in political life may not be sufficient to induce a human being to
remain compliant with the law, to conform to the political culture, or
to constrain all of the injurious behaviors to which he may be inclined.
Indeed, because of the primacy of natural egoism, Spinoza concludes
that an agreement has no force except by reason of its utility, without
TTP 3: 19192.
TTP 3: 59.
40
TTP 3: 192. The Latin word firmiter is italicized in the original 1670 publication of the TTP.
38
39

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which the agreement is annulled and held void.41 Consequently, the

maintenance and stability of any political regime ultimately depend
upon the estimation of the utility of the regime to its citizens. If any
citizen ceases to regard the regime as being of use to him then, in
accordance with the philosophic teaching of the treatise, that individual
is no longer bound by the terms of his allegiance to the regime. In
that crucial respect, however, the right of nature that can draw human
beings to participate in political society (namely, when human beings
choose political life as a greater good based on its utility to them) is
the same right which can undermine a political regime (namely, when
human beings regard continuing in political life as a greater evil
because of its lack of utility to them). Thus the political solution to the
natural or philosophic problem of how to assure a secure and peaceful life for both rational human beings and passionate human beings
contains an inherent deficiency.
Within his account of the universal law of human nature that
inclines human beings to choose in favor of the greater of two goods
or the lesser of two evils, Spinoza introduces a claim which reveals
the chief limitation to an exclusively political solution to the natural
or philosophic problem. From the universal law of human nature it
necessarily follows that no one is going to promise in all good faith to
give up his unrestricted right, and in general no one is going to keep
any promises whatsoever, except through fear of a greater evil or hope
of a greater good.42 Since an individuals natural right is determined
by the individuals power alone, the philosophic teaching of the treatise
acknowledges that one can act deceitfully in dealing with an assailant, for example, and promise that individual whatever he demands
though the victim has no genuine intention to honor his promise if he
can avoid fulfilling it. In adhering to the highest law of nature which
obliges every human being to preserve himself, it is a perfectly licit
exercise of natural right and natural power to act deceitfully whenever
an individual believes that necessity or utility calls for it. Hence it is
a consequence of human nature that agreements are made, and they
are made valid, only because of the perceived utility of an agreement
or pact among the parties who assent to it; and that fact, Spinoza
says, deserves special attention when establishing a political regime.

41
42

TTP 3: 192.
TTP 3: 192; and compare 5859.

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203

That is, if all human beings easily could be induced to follow reason
alone and to recognize the supreme utility and the necessity of the
Republics existence then they would foreswear deceit entirely. Because
of their desire to secure this highest good, namely, the preservation of
the Republic, all human beings would abide by their agreements or
pacts with others in complete good faith and they would regard their
most important civic function to be keeping their word since honesty
is the strongest shield of the Republic. However, the majority of
human beings are not readily induced to be guided by reason; for
each of them is drawn by his own pleasure, and the mind frequently is
so occupied by avarice, glory, envy, hatred, etc., that no place remains
for reason. Therefore although human beings may make promises by
certain signs of simple spirit, and pledge themselves to keep faith, no
one can be assured of anothers faith unless something else attends the
promise; for everyone by the right of nature is able to act deceitfully
and no one is bound to stand by a promise except in the hope of a
greater good or the fear of a greater evil.43
Human beings can be enticed to enter into political associations
because of the assistances or conveniences that a regime is able to
offer to them. Human beings can be enticed to live in political societies
because they promise a greater good to them. But human beings will
abide by the promises they make in political life principally because
of the threat of the supreme penalty universally feared by all.44 It is
the fear of some punishment or it is hope for some reward to which
Spinoza alludes when he asserts that one cannot depend on anothers
pledge of faith unless something else attends the promise. For many
human beings, the threat of punishmentbe it severe or mildmay
be enough to prompt them to adhere to established laws, fulfill the
terms of their agreements or pacts with others, and to participate
fully and advantageously in political life. But daily experience plainly
confirms that even threats of the severest punishments do not curb all
injurious behaviors or excessive acts by human beings. Those human
beings who are guided only by their carnal instincts regularly ignore
laws, violate their agreements or pacts with others, and frequently they
escape any reprisal for their injurious or excessive behaviors. If human

TTP 3: 19293.
TTP 3: 193. The supreme penalty universally feared by all obviously would be
death since death is the antithesis of self-preservation.
43
44

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beings can act viciously toward others with impunity, even within the
precincts of political life, then the hope of human beings for secure,
healthy, and prosperous lives becomes compromised. Where greater
goods or lesser evils are decided principally on the basis of their
utility to individuals who are driven by their own selfish desires and
power then there is only a scant possibility that carnal human beings
will comply with established laws or that they will fulfill all of the terms
of their obligations to other human beings in political life. Accordingly,
an exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem
is undercut by the implications of what Spinoza himself calls a law
so firmly inscribed in human nature that it should be placed among the
eternal truths which no one is able to ignore, namely, no one ever
completely forswears the right to act deceitfully.45
With respect to the formation of a political society or regime, the
philosophic account in the treatise of the right of nature and natural
power exposes the friction that occurs between a human beings interest
to satisfy his own desires and the regimes interest to have individual
human beings restrain themselves for the sake of the welfare of the
political community as a whole. But that friction is compounded by
another element of Spinozas account of human nature; for the philosophic teaching of the treatise establishes that the phenomenon of
obedience cannot be known from nature and therefore the legitimacy of
it cannot be established by philosophy or reason.46 In other words, the
very thing that is required in order for human beings to enter political
life and to comply with the laws established there, namely obedience,
is something that the philosophic teaching of the treatise, which is
to say, the teaching of nature, does not provide. Consequently, some
alternative nonphilosophic means must be employed to introduce the
doctrine of obedience that is necessary to support any political solution
to the natural or philosophic problem; and to that end, Spinoza resorts
to the teaching of theology.
After describing the founding of a democratic political regime, Spinoza defines various matters which pertain to political life including
justice, injustice, civil right and wrong, who is an ally and who is an
enemy, etc.47 According to Spinoza, the perpetrator of the crime of

45
46
47

TTP 3: 19293.
TTP 3: 86; and compare 9899.
TTP 3: 19599.

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205

treason, for example, is the one who for whatever reason endeavors to
seize the right of the highest power even if the regime were assured of
gaining some advantage from that individuals action.48 The matter of
treason, which in the example cited results from an action based upon an
individuals appeal to his own good counsel, recalls Spinozas account
of the right of nature and natural power in terms of the interests of
the individual and the interests of the regime. At issue in the crime
of treason is the question of the relationship between the right and
sovereignty of the regime over and against the right and sovereignty
of the individual.49 However, the return to a consideration of right and
power in the context of the political discussion of the act of treason
incorporates a reflection on the obligations of individuals to the terms
of divine right and the teaching of theology that are presented in the
treatise. That is, Spinoza wonders whether an individual human being
who lives entirely by appetite alone, even though he has the highest
natural right to do so, is not in clear contradiction of the revealed
divine right which demands that everyone equally is required by Gods
command to love his neighbor and avoid doing injury to others since
the command applies to everyone whether he uses reason or not.50 In
the example, Spinoza asserts that the regime gains from the endeavor
of the individual who is said to have acted treasonously; and there is no
evident sense that the action involved some failure of the individual to
love his neighbor or that any injury to his neighbors, that is, his fellow
citizens, was involved. On the contrary, his actions secure the advantage
of the regime and therefore his action served the advantage and welfare
of his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, using the example of a crime of
treason as a conduit, Spinoza asks the more penetrating question about
whether the right or power of nature is superior to the right or power
of the revealed divine law. The answer to the question is that the claim
about a contradiction between the right of nature and divine right can
be resolved easily; for if we attend only to the natural state, we easily
are able to respond that it is prior to religion in nature and in time. No
one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God. Indeed, this
knowledge cannot be attained by any process of reasoning. One adopts
the teaching of obedience only on account of revelation confirmed

48
49
50

TTP 3: 19798.
Compare the discussion of treason on pp. 17375 of this book.
TTP 3: 197.

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by signs. Therefore prior to the revelation of the divine law and the
teaching of obedience to God no one can be bound by a divine right
which he is not able to know.51 According to the philosophic teaching
of the treatise, the life of passion is as legitimate as the life of reason.
In the context of the natural state, each individual human being
may do as he pleases, that is, each individual may do as his right or
power permit, whether he is led by his appetites, impulses, and lusts
or whether he is led by the sound dictates of reason that derive from
his own deliberations. In the political state, however, promulgated
laws established by the dependable counsel of the supreme power of
the regime establish limits to ones behaviors in respect of the conduct
of ones life and the governance of ones affairs; and in the theological state the revelation of the divine law is the promulgation of the
terms of divine right and the limits it sets upon human behavior with
respect to the conduct of human life and the governance of human
affairs. Nature, however, prescribes no restraints upon human behavior.
Whatever limits to action or behavior one experiences in nature follow
from an individual human beings own exercise reason and his sensible
perception of what accrues to his true advantage.
With respect to the crime of treason, Spinozas account is rather
conventional. Where political societies have been formed, the sovereignty
and right of the regime is to be acknowledged above the sovereignty
and right of the individual and his interests. Private right must yield
to public right and those individuals who prefer to pursue the former
rather than submit to the latter can be punished to the maximum
degree. But Spinoza also raises another question that introduces a
very different set of considerations. In the absence of political regimes
with established and promulgated laws, that is to say, in the natural
state, is it not the case that human beings still are bound to restrain
their injurious tendencies and behaviors in accordance with the divine
law and the divine right which obliges everyone to love his neighbor?
Spinozas reply to the question is that human beings are not bound
by any such obligation if they are conceived in accordance with their
natural condition alone; for the state of nature is prior to religion both
in nature and in time. Consequently, for Spinoza, the origin of religion
is identical with the origin of a civil state. That is, the establishment of
political life and the establishment of theological or religious life each

51

TTP 3: 198; and compare 165.

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207

involve the surrender or transference of certain natural rights or powers

from individual human beings to the supreme legislative power, whether
the legislative power is the polity or God.52 Through his treatment of
the political phenomenon of treason, Spinoza establishes the political
requirement of personal submission to public authority. Private right
must yield to public right for the sake of the stability and the prosperity
of the regime and its citizens. But, through his treatment of treason,
Spinoza also establishes that human obedience is introduced and initiated only through a revealed teaching. The philosophic teaching of the
treatise therefore establishes that political right is related toif not to
say dependent upontheological or divine right.
The natural right or power of human beings is determined solely by
the laws of nature. By nature, no one is obligated to comply with laws
or decrees of either human or divine origin. Rather each individual
human being can conduct his life and govern his affairs as each ones
right or power determines him to live, namely, according to the right or
power of the passions or according to the right or power of reason. In
the natural condition, then, each individual human being is completely
at liberty to follow passion or reason and each one is completely at
liberty to live as his right or power allows him to live. Still, the exercise
of individual liberty can be perilous to the other human beings with
whom the individual lives and the exercise of individual liberty also
can be perilous to the individual himself. Political law and right or
theological law and right establish limits to human action or behavior
by placing restrictions upon the exercises of natural right or power by
individual human beings. Thus political law and right or theological law
and right possess the authority and the influence to minimize injurious
human behaviors and to foster human wellbeing because of their ability
to promise rewards and dispense punishments on the basis of human
observance of the law. Furthermore, politics and theology share the
same basis of origin. Both political law and right and theological law and
right are inaugurated and become binding only after the adoption of a
pact among human beings through which individuals expressly resign
their unlimited exercise of natural rights and powers and transfer certain
of those rights and powers to a commonly acknowledged authority.
Indeed, it is only through an express act of resignation of those rights
and powers, together with the adoption of an agreement to enter into

52

TTP 3: 198.

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a pact to live in a certain way with other individual human beings, that
the phenomenon of obedience comes into existence at all. For just as
no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God prior to
an express covenant with God, surely no one knows by nature that he
owes any obedience to his fellow human beings, that is, to others who
are his equals, prior to his pledging his faith to adhere to the laws,
rights, responsibilities, obligations, and adjudications of the supreme
power or the acknowledged authorities.53 Thus obedience, either to
God or to other human beings, derives from an artificial contractual
construct rather than a natural fact and that realization returns us to
the core of the natural or philosophic problem.
In accordance with the ius et institutum naturae, human beings legitimately can seek to preserve themselves and pursue their interests either
through a life of passion or through a life of reason. The reasonable
or sensible human being acts for his true advantage whereas the
passionate human being acts as he is drawn by his own pleasure.54
The pursuits of pleasure that are connected with base interests, like the
carnal instincts and emotions, produce greed, ambition, envy, anger,
and other causes of strife. Human beings can protect themselves against
the perilous consequences of the carnal, emotive, or passionate life by
agreeing to live with other human beings in a peaceable and secure
manner. Entrance into a pact with other individual human beings and
forming a political society would seem to be an attractive alternative
to conducting ones life and governing ones affairs in an environment
where uncurbed passions, desires, impulses, urgings, or lusts carry every
bit as much sway and legitimacy as reason does. But one significant
and problematic feature of human nature persists. By natural right and
natural power human beings may enter into pacts with other human
beings and then break those pacts arbitrarily. In order for a political
society to offer the hope of a providing a greater good to its citizens,
individual human beings must be made to be obedient since they are
not obedient by nature. However, it also is a fact that the natural tendencies of the vast majority of human beings are insufficient, if not to
say simply opposed, to adopting the habit of obedience.
The rational or the reasonable or the sensible human being who
understands what conduces to his true advantage conducts his life

53
54

TTP 3: 199.
TTP 3: 19093; 7374.

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209

and governs his affairs by the dictates of sound reason or by his reliance upon some dependable counsel (certum consilium) in both the natural
condition and in the political condition. Furthermore, human actions
that are rationally self-determined do not involve acting at the bidding of another and therefore such actions do not involve any kind
of obedience.55 The fact that the rational and self-determined life does
not entail obedience helps to explain Spinozas conclusion that no
one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God; moreover,
knowledge of obedience cannot be attained by any process of reasoning.
Instead, the phenomenon of obedience must be inaugurated through
the suprarational and supranatural means of revelation confirmed
by signs.56
Passionate human beings reject the dictates of sound reason, as well
as the pronouncements issued by the dependable counsel of the political regime, because such dictates or pronouncements are contrary to
what the appetites of passionate human beings esteem. The individual
who conducts his life or governs his affairs on the basis of his passions
desires, impulses, or lusts, will comply with rational, reasonable, or
sensible decrees only if he is made to do so. Whereas the reasonable
human being can live peaceably without obedience to law, the security
of all human beings is put in doubt if the passionate human being is not
made to be obedient. Yet if nature and reason do not and cannot teach
obedience, what hope is there for moderating the behaviors of passionate human beings? Even those who conduct their lives and govern their
affairs in accordance with passion rather than with reason also seek to
55
TTP 3: 74: Denique quoniam obedientia in eo consistit, quod aliquis mandata ex sola
imperantis authoritate exequatur. Rational self-determination excludes the phenomenon
of obedience inasmuch as no one can be said to obey himself.
56
TTP 3: 198. The need for a compelling medium to justify human obedience to
law is obvious given Spinozas account of human nature. But the questionability of that
medium from a philosophic perspective also is warranted because of the basis for the
foundation of the doctrine. That is, the doctrine of obedience is apprehended only on
the basis of revelation confirmed by signs. For Spinoza, however, that statement means
that the doctrine of obedience is known only through a phenomenon that presumes the
possibility of miracles and Spinoza rejects the possibility of miracles as absurd. Thus
Spinoza disingenuously affirms the possibility of miracles for the sake of establishing
the doctrine of obedience on grounds that appeal to prejudiced or superstitious human
beings for whom only what is extraordinary and seemingly contranatural is sufficient
to command their attention. In effect, then, for the purpose of compelling passionate
human beings to become peaceful and moderate in their behaviors, Spinoza appeals
to the very prejudices and superstitions that they embrace, even if the prejudices and
superstitions have been mitigated by the liberated and liberating principles of the
theological teaching of the treatise.

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preserve themselves in accordance with the lex summa naturae. They do

not conduct their lives or govern their affairs with dependable counsel
nor do they adopt the dictates of reason. Instead they turn to fortune
to favor them. Naturally prone to superstition, human beings who are
driven by passion refuse to solve the problems of life by resorting to
the exercise of reason; they consider reason to be blind and they take
human sensibility as vain with respect to obtaining what they desire.
Nevertheless, the superstitious inclinations of passionate human beings
that disincline them from adopting the rational or the reasonable or
the sensible solutions to human predicaments still can be exploited so
as to induce passionate human beings to live moderately; for passionate individuals will yield to suprarational and supranatural lessons or
instructions that promise them a greatest good if they adhere to the
precepts of the suprarational instruction.
The natural or philosophic problem of human nature, that is, the
problem of passionate human beings and rational or reasonable human
beings living together in peace and security with one another cannot
be solved naturally, which is to say, philosophically, because by nature
the life of passion is as legitimate as the life of reason. Furthermore,
philosophy or reason cannot demonstrate that a life of obedience is a
true life because the genuinely rational life is self-determining. Nor can
the natural or philosophic problem be solved by exclusively political
means. For the political solution to the natural or philosophic problem
still requires obedience to laws and obedience to laws is predicated upon
the commitment of individual human beings to abide by the promises they make or the faith they pledge to live, to act, and to behave
within certain prescribed constraints. But each individual human being
evaluates his interests, choices, and actions only by the light of his own
idiosyncratic gauge of what constitutes a greater or a lesser good
or evil in respect of his own unique situation; and no individual ever
completely surrenders the natural right to act deceitfully if he believes
that violating his pledge of faith will accrue to his interest or to his
advantage. Thus a wholly political solution to the natural or philosophic
problem cannot eliminate a basic and legitimate exercise of natural
right or natural power which itself is corrosive of political life.
The democratic regime advocated by Spinoza permits human beings
to make use of their natural rights, natural powers, and natural liberties
as far as is reasonably practicable within the tolerable limits prescribed
by the laws of the political regime. The political solution to the natural
or philosophic problem still demands obedience to laws but political

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211

obedience frequently is secured through modes of coercion or fear57

rather than from a sense of devotion and dutifulness to the regime.58
One cannot rely on the natural appetites or emotions of human beings
to guarantee their obedience to the laws of the regime; and one certainly cannot appeal to the use of reason in order to demonstrate from
a philosophic perspective that a life of obedience is a superior kind of
life. What recourse is there then that will prepare human beings to be
obedient to salutary laws and to constrain their passionate impulses and
behaviors? What recourse is there to prevent passionate human beings
from believing that promises or pledges of faith are made to be broken
and retribution for their violations of the terms of their pacts with others or for their injurious behaviors against others can be avoided? The
answer to the predicament posed by the problem of human nature is
located in the theological teaching of the treatise.
According to Spinoza, the sole, the specific, and the authentic teaching of theology is obedience to God through adherence to the command
to love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.59 An
individual obeys the divine law, and exhibits his piety, through the
performance of acts of justice and charity toward those with whom he
lives. The love of neighbor doctrine that is the basis of the teaching of theology in the treatise implies reciprocal treatment between or
among human beings. The love of neighbor doctrine implies that
individual human beings will avoid injuring other individuals on the
basis of the empirically valid premise, that is to say, on the basis of
the commonsensical opinion, that no individual human being wishes
or hopes that he himself will be injured by any other individual human
being. Moreover, the divinely revealed doctrine of love of neighbor
encompasses the same terms that are expressly conveyed in Spinozas
description of the fundamental principles that are essential to the
establishment of a democratic political regime. That is, each member
of the democratic political regime is bound to keep [his] appetite in
check insofar as it would tend to anothers hurt; each member of the
democratic political regime is to do to no one what he would not want
done to himself ; and each member of the democratic political regime

57
58
59

TTP 3: 5859; 7374; 19293; 202203.

TTP 3: 74.
TTP 3: 165.

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is to uphold anothers right as he would his own.60 In other words,

conducting ones life and governing ones affairs in accordance with
the terms of political life in a democratic political regime, that is, a life
in optima Republica, are tantamount to satisfying the essential conditions
for a life of piety in accordance with the teaching of theology in the
treatise which requires obedience to God through observance of the
divine law. Whereas the demand for compliance with the sound dictates
of reason found in the dependable counsel of a democratic political
regime may not be sufficient to move passionate human beings to obey
the laws that constrain their harmful desires, impulses, and lusts, the
divinely revealed doctrine of obedience to God and its condition that
the saved are those who perform acts of justice and charity because of
love of a neighbor is more likely to inspire obedience to law in human
beings because by nature they are prone to embrace superstitious things
and the divinely revealed doctrine of obedience is professed to be a
suprarational teaching that is confirmed by signs.61
The nexus between political obedience and theological obedience
is evident in their common element. Political obedience and theological obedience each hinge upon the pledging of faith or the keeping
of promises by individuals. Therefore eliminating deceit or fraud and
bearing public right before private convenience is the task and the
labor.62 If one adheres to the divine law it follows that one should and
one will avoid deceit or fraud in his engagements with other human
beings. But if one adheres to the human laws of the democratic political regime it is not at all apparent that all individual human beings will
eschew ruses or fraud since no ever completely forswears the right to
act deceitfully. Nevertheless, Spinoza resolves the troubling defect in the
political solution to the problem of human nature by appealing to the
teaching of theology. That is, the philosophic teaching of the treatise
explicitly asserts that members of the democratic political regime are
obliged to vouchsafe their promise of obedience to the polity, even where
the determinations of the political regime concern religion, because
God bids that the faith, or the promise of obedience, that is given to

60
TTP 3: 191; compare 3: 7071; 8485; and 17780 which express the specific
practical implications of the divine law for human behavior and action in everyday
situations.
61
TTP 3: 198.
62
TTP 3: 203; and compare 74; 204; 21112.

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213

the political regime be altogether kept.63 In other words, the political

requirement of obedience is prepared, introduced, and given credibility
by the divinely revealed theological teaching of obedience.
In the political solution to the natural or philosophic problem, human
beings are persuaded to keep faith or abide by their promises when
making agreements with other human beings because their pledges
of faith will be monitored by the regime and ones adherence to the
terms of any agreement or promise will be attended by something
else. In the political context, that something else is an individual
human beings fear of punishment or his hope of reward. However,
the dispensing of punishments and rewards by political regimes is neither wholly equitable nor is it entirely reliable; for the punishments or
rewards of the regime may be inconstant. On the other hand, however,
the prospect of divine punishment or reward is more perfect. What the
theological teaching of the treatise brings to the solution of the natural
or philosophic problem is the divinely revealed doctrine of obedience
to law, a teaching which cannot be established by reason, together with
the something else that attends the demand for obedience and
compels ones adherence to it, namely, the threat of divine punishment
(perdition) and the promise of divine reward (salvation). Philosophy is
able and willing to appeal to the teaching of theology for the purpose
of contributing to the solution of the natural or philosophic problem
for two reasons. First, it is not required that the fundamental teaching
of theology be true; it only is necessary that the fundamental teaching
of theology be such that it inspires piety, which is to say, it inspires
obedience to God.64 Obedience to God then permits obedience to other
legitimate authorities, such as the political authority or the supreme
power, of the democratic political regime. In addition, philosophy can
resort to the teaching of theology to contribute to the political solution
to the natural or philosophic problem without being disingenuous for the
reason that the teaching of theology does not involve any philosophic
claim to truth, that is, the teaching of theology is moral and not mathematical.65 Second, the moral instruction of the teaching of theology
contributes to the political solution to natural or philosophic problem
because of its rhetorical influence, authority, and power. Philosophy can

63
64
65

TTP 3: 199200.
TTP 3: 16772.
TTP 3: 30; 32; 179; 18586.

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resort to the teaching of theology to introduce the concept of human

obedience to law or external authority for the reason that the mode
of the teaching of theology is especially persuasive to the vast majority
of human beings who are superstitious, ruled by their passions, prone
to credulity, and led more by their imaginative-affective instincts than
they are led by reason. Indeed, Spinoza himself professes that faith
in the histories from the Scriptures, whatever their deficiencies may
be, can be read with utility for the reason of civil life66 because the
study of such histories indicates the mores and conditions of human
beings which enables the reader to live among them more cautiously
and to adapt his actions and life to their native dispositions as much as
reason permits him to do so.67
The introduction of obedience to laws through the teaching of theology, together with the upholding of promises that it implies, exceeds
any merely political resolution of the natural or philosophic problem
in two decisive ways. First, among the seven fundamental dogmas of
the universal faith that are enunciated in the treatise by Spinoza
as representing the authentic teaching and meaning of theology, the
third dogma of faith asserts that human beings must acknowledge the
omnipresence of God: God is present everywhere or all is open to
him. If it were believed that a thing could be concealed from God then
it could be doubted that God directs all things with justice and goodness, or the fairness of his Justice whereby he directs all things could
be doubted or else it could be ignored.68 Whereas the authorities of
a political regime may fail to monitor and punish the breaking of laws
or the breaking of civic or commercial agreements between or among
human beings, belief in Gods omnipresence implies that no deceit or
fraud or injury between or among human beings can go undetected by
God and therefore no harmful act ultimately can elude the tribunal of
divine justice. Human justice, to the contrary, typically is far less effective or thorough. Second, because obedience to God consists solely in
justice and charity, or love toward a neighbor, and only those who obey
God are saved,69 as the fifth and sixth dogmas of the universal faith
assert, it follows that obedience to the established laws of the democratic

66
67
68
69

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

61.
62.
177.
17778.

philosophy, theology, and politics

215

political regime and the keeping of faith in the pledges or promises

one makes to other human beings not only are politically salutary but
they also satisfy the conditions that are established in order for human
beings to attain theological or religious salvation. In principle, therefore,
the terms of human justice and divine justice become virtually identical;
and, in practice, the meting out of divine justice is said by Spinoza to
be witnessed in the rule of just individuals on earth.70
The limitation of an exclusively political solution to the natural or
philosophic problem owes to its inability to preclude the natural right or
the natural power of human beings to act deceitfully. Hence the success
of any exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem
is identical with the political regimes ability or inability to make passionate human beings submit to the law because of their fear of punishment
for any failure to live in compliance with it. The exclusively political
solution to the natural or philosophic problem, then, largely depends
upon the threat of coercion or repression by the political regime. But,
according to Spinoza, regimes that operate on the basis of coercion,
repression, or trepidation are repugnant to human nature; for human
nature will not submit to simple compulsion, and, as Seneca had it, no
one continues in a violent regime for long, moderate ones endure.71
Without recourse to some other motive than coercion for constraining
the licentious tendencies of human beings and inducing them to obey
the salutary laws of political life, there only would be politically repressive regimes. But political regimes of that kind exacerbate, rather than
mitigate, the natural or philosophic problem by causing more occasions for conflict and fear among human beings rather than fostering
the conditions that reduce conflict and fear among them. The use of
theology or religion in the service of a political solution to the natural
or philosophic problem can help to avoid such difficulties when the
suprarational revealed teaching of love of a neighbor and respect
for others is the foundation of an individual human beings convictions
and actions. The authority of theology or religion to influence human
behavior and action on the basis of a doctrine of love for ones fellow
human beings or fellow citizens, rather than on the basis of a fear

70
TTP 3: 22829 and 231. According to Spinoza, it is a responsibility of a good
republic to set conditions so that it cannot be expedient for evil human beings to
be evil (3: 104).
71
TTP 3: 74.

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of them, is a teaching that philosophy can press into the service of a

politically framed solution to the natural or philosophic problem. Furthermore, the theological teaching presented by Spinoza in the treatise
is intended to be universal as well as nonsectarian. The theological
teaching of the treatise, which is predicated upon the revealed teaching
of Christ, is a teaching that is designed to be expressed to the whole
human race. It is not a teaching that is dedicated to one nation nor is
it a teaching that is designed for one people. As a result, the revealed
teaching of Christ hypothetically can circumvent the kind of political
or theological wrangling and strife in which passionate human beings
frequently engage because of their theological or religious sentiments,
opinions, or passions. Still, it is plain that Spinozas theological teaching
in the treatise is designed especially to have its impact on passionate
and superstitious human beings.72 What prompts Spinoza to employ
a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem is
foreshadowed perhaps in an acknowledgment expressed by him in the
Preface to his book. Spinoza deferentially quotes the observation of the
ancient Roman historian, Curtius, that nothing rules the multitude
more effectively than superstition.73
The natural or philosophic problem is the problem of human
nature. Human beings are driven more by desire and power than they
are led by reason. In pursuing their desires or interests and exercising
their power, human beings act to the neglect of other human beings.
Moreover, in acting for their own interests exclusively, human beings
determine their choices of what to pursue and what to avoid solely
on the basis of the perceived utility of the object that is before each
individual; and human beings discriminate between what they regard
as good and what they regard as evil in a like manner, that is, a human
being generally judges, chooses, and acts on the basis of his own private

72
At first glance, my claim may seem strange. The TTP is written and published in
Latin which would seem to prevent the reading of the book by singularly passionate
and superstitious human beings, that is, the language in which the book was written
and published would seem to prevent a reading of it by vulgar human beings. Yet
one must remember that at the close of the Preface to the TTP Spinoza explicitly says
that he asks the vulgar and those who suffer like affects as the vulgar not to read
his book (3: 12). Thus Spinoza recognized that there would be Latin readers, that is
to say educated people, who nevertheless embraced vulgar passions and superstitions.
I have described such readers as the learned vulgar in Spinoza, Biblical Criticism,
and the Enlightenment, Modern Enlightenment and the Rule of Reason, ed. John McCarthy
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998).
73
TTP 3: 6.

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217

and idiosyncratic standard without reference or regard to the desires,

interests, or needs of others.74 The natural or philosophic problem,
which is to say the human problem, is the problem of love of self.75
TTP 3: 18990.
The basis for any polity is the individual. But individuals are not born into isolation they are born into families and thus they are parts of a whole (cf. Aristotle, Politics
1253a2040). The family is bound together by the bonds of blood and need. Families
become bound to other families where the recognition of human need increases or
human insufficiency becomes more apparent to the individuals involved. Individuals
join with individuals from other families, marry, and blood ties are extended. Thus
the first polity, even if it is based only on necessity and the recognition of the natural
insufficiency of the self or a single family, is a tribe connected by blood ties and the
basic inclination, need, or desire to procreate and to preserve life. The first polity then
is the consequence of a shift from the most basic and native love of self to a familial or
tribal love of ones own. For the Hebrew people, for example, their regime or theocracy
was constituted by Hebrew blood and the Hebrew claim of election by God. However,
Spinozas critique of the Hebrew theocracy in the TTP undermines both the Hebrew
claim to a unique election as well as the Hebrew claim about the need, advantage, or
superiority of establishing the polity on the basis of blood ties alone. The deficiency
of the Hebrew theocratic solution to the natural or philosophic problem of self-love is
evident in the fact that its scope is unhelpfully narrow. Christianity, on the other hand,
is more universal and better equipped to be universalized. Or, a liberal Christian liberal
democracy is a more suitable alternative than the restoration of the Hebrew theocracy
for the purpose of solving the natural or philosophic problem that is addressed in the
TTP. But Spinozas theologico-political teaching in the treatise then also would seem
to entail this consequence. The political teaching of the treatise emphasizes the division of labor and mutual security as the critical features of political life that serve to
overcome natural human insufficiency. Thus the polity principally is directed toward
fulfilling the needs of the body only. Yet the three legitimate objects of desire mentioned
in the TTP include: knowledge of things through their primary causes; acquisition of
the habit of virtue; and secure and healthy life. The first two objects of desire may be
satisfied by an individual human being on the basis of his own effort whereas the third
object of desire cannot be satisfied by oneself. Virtue, therefore, on Spinozas account
of it, is a private matter that is attainable by human beings who possess knowledge of
the causes of things. Virtue is not a public or political responsibility. Protection of life
and protection of the Republic are the principal public or political responsibilities.
By contrast, Aristotle says in the Politics that if man does not have virtue he is the
most savage and unholy of animals and the most full of gluttony and lust. But justice
is the bond of human beings in cities, for the administration of justice, which is the
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society (1253a3540).
Spinozas justice, it would seem, involves only what is required to set the conditions for
a secure and healthy life. Thus Spinozas polity focuses on bodily preservation rather
than the development of philosophic virtue or philosophic justice. Although philosophy
and philosophizing will be safeguarded in the democratic political regime advocated
by the teaching of the TTP, and so the possibility of the philosophic pursuit of virtue
will be implied, Spinozas political teaching in the treatise and his theological teaching
in the treatise are dedicated more to the restraint of lusts and urgeswhich also were
noted by Aristotlethan either teaching is dedicated to a concentrated promotion of
the habit of virtue. The theological teaching of the treatise and the political teaching
of the treatise consist of more or less salutary opinions which foster religious pieties as
well as civic pieties. Accordingly, Spinoza, like Plato, makes theological or political law
74
75

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If a human being is to achieve the third proper object of desire, he

must be made to constrain his impulses and urges which tend only
toward his own self-preservation as well as his own self-satisfaction and
he must be moved to perceive the advantage and utility of satisfying
his own designs and interests in collaboration with other human beings
who also are satisfying their own designs and interests; for what every
individual ultimately seeks is preservation, security, health, prosperity,
and some sense of tranquility. Somewhat ironically, then, native selfishness is the shared component that every individual possesses in common
with every other individual and because of that fact love of self can
be modified and transformed into love of ones own or love of ones
polity. Individual human beings must be persuaded that native love of
self can be maximized and enhanced best only through participation
in a political life which is dedicated to defending and increasing the
security and health of every one of its citizens.
According to Spinoza, the democratic political regime is the polity
that is most consonant with human nature and the protection of natural
right;76 it is the regime most dedicated to human liberty;77 and it is the
regime that can institute the best plan of living that will safeguard the
preservation, security, health, prosperity, and tranquility of every one
of its members for the reason that it is the regime that emphasizes
defending anothers right as ones own.78 The democratic political
regime, as defined by Spinoza, and the universal religion, as defined by
Spinoza, share an important common focus. By the terms of Spinozas
definitions of each of them, both politics and theology serve the purpose
of encouraging human beings to live tranquilly, securely, and in health

the wish to be the discovery of what is (Minos 315a); even though the law or wish
often must incorporate and accommodate persuasive official opinions of the city which
yet may not be worthy opinions (Minos 313a314e). For Spinoza, knowledge and
virtue are achieved on the basis of the realization of a philosophic account of what is:
Nature observes an order that functions in accordance with its own determinate plan.
What philosophy teaches the polity to be and to do is to seek to represent a wish
to discover what is while acknowledging that what is may oppose what passionate
human beings desire, expect, or hope. In lieu of simply indiscriminately communicating a knowledge of what is to all human beings, philosophy influences the polity to
teach its citizens what the knower of what is recommends as powerful, convincing,
but also tolerable tales that serve to induce human beings to embrace political life as a
greater good rather than being simply a lesser evil by the fact of their obedience
to the dependable counsel of the democratic political regime.
76
TTP 3: 193 and 245.
77
TTP 3: 24041.
78
TTP 3: 191.

philosophy, theology, and politics

219

by overcoming their natural inclinations to act neglectfully of others;

they both encourage human beings to abide by their pledges of faith to
each other; and they both encourage human beings to be obedient as a
matter of duty or devotion rather than as a matter of fear. Philosophy
cannot teach that love of self is a false plan of living. On the other
hand, however, theology and politics can communicate the doctrines of
love of a neighbor or love of a fellow citizen because neither theology nor politics is bound by the same standards of reason and truth
which bind philosophy. Theology professes doctrines and matters that
are said to exceed human grasp79 and reason or philosophy is not
able to certify the validity of the fundamental dogma of theology;80 and
politics, by implication of its function in issuing human laws, offers a set
of opinions about things based upon a sense of their being contingent
rather than based upon a sense of affirming the actual knowledge of
those things which would enable human beings to conceive of them as
being contained within the natural, necessary, and eternal order81 of
the Whole. In other words, neither theology nor politics is philosophy;
and neither theology nor politics is sufficient on its own to discover the
true plan of living82 that will permit every individual human being the
possibility of achieving the security and health for which each human
being longs. But because it is knowledgeable about what it by nature,
philosophy can press theology and politics into the service of a solution
79
TTP 3: 1516; 2021; 28; 30; 8384; 95; 9899; 114; 15556; 16263; 168; 170;
18485; 188; 198200.
80
TTP 3: 185.
81
TTP 3: 5759; 8183.
82
TTP 3: 41; 58; 5960; 69; 80; 190; 24041. According to Spinoza, the means
for acquiring the habit of virtue are contained within human nature itself and they
owe to human power alone or they depend upon the laws of human nature alone
(3: 46). However, Spinoza also says that the divinity of the Scriptures has to be
established on the basis of whether it teaches true virtue (3: 99). Scripture derives
from revelation and revelation communicates what surpasses human grasp or what is
insinuated to represent some kind of suprarational knowledge which is beyond human
power and what exceeds the laws of human nature. If both reason and revelation
each can teach true virtue one might be led to wonder whether one of them simply
is redundant or whether one of them does not teach it as well or as completely as the
other. Spinoza does say that nothing impedes God from communicating the same
things to human beings in a manner other than what we know by the natural light
(3: 16). On that view, the paths of reason and revelation might seem to intersect ultimately and propose an identical teaching. But, in point of fact, reason and revelation
conflict on the decisive issue of obedience. For no one knows by nature, and hence
no one can know from reason, that he owes obedience to God; obedience to God is
established only on the basis of revelation confirmed by signs. Hence the paths of
reason and revelation diverge rather than converge.

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to the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness. Philosophy

can devise a persuasive and compelling tale to move passionate human
beings to recognize that in order to satisfy their desires and interests it
is necessary for them to be obedient to laws which constrain their selfish and injurious impulses and behaviors. The success of philosophys
teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, which is to say, the success
of the tale told by philosophy, rests upon its ability to combine those
elements of the teaching of theology and those elements of the teaching of politics that prove most attractive and most persuasive to the
vast majority of human beings. Philosophy is competent to devise such
a tale because philosophy concerns itself with knowledge of nature,
both human nature and nonhuman nature, and that knowledge is
indispensable for telling the right kind of tale since the tale must be
accommodated to the natural predilections of human beings while it
also attempts to neutralize human inclinations toward extreme forms
of selfishness, prejudice, and superstition.
Spinozas theologico-political teaching in the treatise offers a solution
to the natural or philosophic problem of human nature by proposing
the identification of political welfare (salus) with theological or religious
salvation (salus) through a unique interpretation of the meaning of
theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety.83 What the teaching
of theology in the treatise contributes to the solution of the natural
or philosophic problem is a dramatic and awe-inspiring warrant for
obedience to laws that neither philosophy nor politics can supply. All
human beings absolutely are able to obey but there is only a minority
of human beings who acquire the habit of virtue led by reason alone;
hence without the testimony of the Scriptures we would doubt the
salvation of nearly all human beings.84 The teaching of theology in
the treatise supplies a justification for human obedience to law which is
extraordinary in character; and even though the natural light cannot
affirm that simple obedience is the way of salvation, Spinoza still
concedes that theologys teaching of obedience has brought a very
great solace to mortals.85 Not only has the teaching of theology given
human beings solace with respect to the possibility of their attainment
of some kind of ultimate wellbeing but Spinoza further encourages

83
84
85

TTP 3: 179 and 188.

TTP 3: 188.
TTP 3: 188.

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221

his reader to think how salutary and necessary this Teaching is in a

republic in order for human beings to live peacefully and harmoniously;
the inescapable merit of the doctrine, Spinoza says, is something that
everyone can judge for himself.86 The importance of the teaching of
theologyand its unique emphasis on obedience and the need to live
justly and charitably by not neglecting ones neighboris acknowledged
by Spinoza in his conclusion that even in the natural condition an
individual is bound by the revealed right from the same motive that
he is bound to live by the dictates of sound reason, namely, that it is
useful and necessary to his salus, one is permitted to neglect it only at
his own peril.87
Philosophy or reason has for its object the teaching of nature. On the
basis of that teaching, reason concludes that philosophy and politics,
taken separately or taken together, are insufficient to solve the natural
or philosophic problem of human selfishness. To curb selfishness law
is required.88 But the curbing of selfishness through adherence to laws
presumes the fact of obedience. According to Spinozas teaching in
the treatise, only theology teaches that obedience to laws which constrain injurious human behaviors and which compel human beings to
observe their duties to others is the necessary and sufficient condition
for achieving human salvation. But, in addition, the teaching of theology in the treatise also prepares the achievement of human political
welfare. That is, inasmuch as the theological teaching of the treatise
emphasizes almost exclusively the doctrine of obedience to God or
obedience to established authority as the means to human salus, together
with the demand that human beings treat one another with care and
respect by performing acts of justice and charity, it becomes increasingly
clear that the theological teaching of the treatise is devised for the sake
of the political instruction of that book. For neither philosophy nor
reason teaches that obedience is natural; and politics can offer only a
fragile inducement to obedience, namely, the persistent threat of civic
punishment or the regular promise of civic reward. If violators of
the law are not regularly punished or if adherents to the law are not
regularly rewarded then the advantage and utility of political life is

TTP 3: 179.
TTP 3: 19899.
88
The word law conveys a sense of binding or constraining human behavior. But
it also is the case that laws are what serve as the bond, or the principle of binding
together, that distinguishes one political regime from another.
86
87

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subverted. Theologys teaching, on the other hand, contains a suprahuman command to obedience and it offers enticements for obedience
that neither philosophy nor politics can deliver. That is, the form and
content of the teaching of theology are persuasive or moving to the
imaginative-affective faculties of the vast majority of human beings in
three important respects: theologys teaching of obedience is suprarational and supranatural in character; adherence to theologys teaching
promises a presumably eternal reward and blessing for compliance
with the divine law but it also threatens a presumably eternal perdition for resistance to it; and theologys teaching holds out the hope for
what passionate and superstitious human beings desire most, namely,
wellbeing now and in an afterlife at the behest of a provident deity. It
is no mere coincidence that the theological teaching propounded by
Spinoza in the treatise happens to supply precisely what philosophy and
politics cannot supply individually or together for the sake of solving
the natural or philosophic problem, namely, a compelling justification
for human obedience to law. But that does not mean that what the
teaching of theology in the treatise advances is true.89 On the contrary,
philosophy and reason know that the teaching of obedience to another
cannot be known or learned from nature. But philosophy and reason
also know that human beings naturally are inclined toward superstition
and only a powerful, persuasive, suprarational and supranatural doctrine
of obedience will suffice to transform human behaviors and actions
so as to correct the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness, even if that doctrine must involve certain superstitious and absurd

89
One example will suffice. The third dogma of the universal faith asserts that
God directs all things by the fairness of his Justice (TTP 3: 177). The third dogma
establishes the omnipresence of God which entails that nothing can escape Gods notice
or nothing can be hidden from God and therefore divine justice is absolute. In other
words, conviction in the theological doctrine of Gods omnipresence is necessary if
human beings are to be moved to obedience either because of their hope for a divine
reward or because of their fear of a divine punishment. But Spinoza also maintains
in the treatise that God acts and directs everything from the necessity of his own
nature and perfection and hence the imputation of justice to God owes only to a
vulgar conception of the divine nature based upon a defect of the intellect (3: 65).
A number of contradictions or inconsistencies can be discovered in the pages of the
TTP. But Spinozas own ultimate verdict regarding how to resolve the discrepancies
appears to be given in his conclusion that the Scriptures expressly affirm many things
that are said in accordance with the opinions of the Prophets and the vulgar and
which only reason and Philosophy, but not Scripture, teach to be false (3: 183; and
compare 10013).

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elements.90 Without recourse to the theological teaching of obedience

in the treatise, the prospect for achieving political obedience and realizing the third proper object of desire would be reduced.
The reconciliation of the lives of passionate human beings and
rational human beings in security, health, liberty, and tranquility can
be achieved only through a philosophic teaching which presses the
teaching of theology into the service of politics. For that reason, the
teaching of Spinozas treatise necessarily must be theologico-political; and
that conclusion is confirmed by Spinozas use of a phrase that appears
only twice in the pages of the treatise. The words of the phrase appear
once in the context of the theological teaching of the treatise and once
in the context of the political teaching of the treatise.
In the theological teaching of the treatise, Spinoza asserts that the
foundation of the Scriptures itself is unambiguous and uniform.
The sum of it is to love God above all things and to love a neighbor
as oneself. That doctrine is said to be so essential to the message and
meaning of the Scriptures that if any other doctrine than love of God
and neighbor were taught by Scripture then the whole teaching of
Scripture would have had to have been revised and consequently the
teaching of the Scriptures would be completely different from what has
come to be received and there would have to be some other account
of the essential teaching and meaning of theology, revelation, the
Scriptures, faith, and piety. Furthermore, if the foundational doctrine
of the Scriptures were removed or revised then tota fabrica ruit:91 the
whole fabric or edifice would go to ruin. In other words, the philosophic
version of the teaching of theology that is presented in the treatise by
Spinoza asserts that if the Scriptures ever proposed any other teaching
than the divine law which commands obedience to God through love
of neighbor then the whole fabrica would come to ruin in one fall.92
In the political teaching of the treatise, Spinoza asserts that in a
democratic political regime it is necessary for individuals to transfer
their natural rights and natural powers to the supreme authority of
the regime and once having done so they must submit to the dictates
of the established authorities. Such a course of action may be taken
without fear by individuals because the democratic regime has as one
90
91
92

ruit.

TTP 3: 67.
TTP 3: 165.
TTP 3: 165: hoc totius religionis fundamentum est, quo sublato tota fabrica uno lapsu

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of its chief purposes the avoiding of absurd things. Accordingly, every

citizen of the regime may comply with the commands of the supreme
authority, that is, each citizen can obey the dependable counsel of the
regime and follow its sound dictates of reason, because if the regime
were dedicated to anything other than harmony and peace among its
citizens then the whole fabrica of the democratic political regime easily
would come to ruin.93
The teaching of theology in the treatise and the teaching of politics
in the treatise are united by the fact that each is a fabrica. Each is
a skillful production or a building; each, in other words, is the
product of an art. The art or craft or skill, namely, the sophia, which
weaves the fabric of the theological teaching of the treatise together
with the political teaching of the treatise is the art or craft or skill that
relies on the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of causes of
things, as well as the knowledge of virtue. It is philosophy that weaves
a theologico-political fabric in the teaching of the treatise because
philosophy itself cannot defend the life of obedience yet philosophy
or reason also acknowledges that only the life of obedience can make
passionate human beings curtail a complete love of self and constrain
their behaviors within tolerable limits. The natural or philosophic truth
of the treatise is that no one knows by nature that obedience is owed
to anyone nor can he attain such knowledge by reason94 whether that
obedience be to God or to other human beings or to political authorities and institutions. However, the promulgation of that philosophic
truth could undermine the possibility of human beings living together
in security, health, tranquility, and liberty. In other words, the telling
of that philosophic truth could undermine the possibility of human
beings achieving the third proper object of desire. Therefore, instead
of advocating the philosophic teaching or the teaching of nature in
the treatise, Spinoza resorts to the salutary opinion that is conveyed
by the teaching of theology in the treatise. Obedience is made known
only through revelation confirmed by signs; the teaching of theology
has been of very great utility and necessity to political regimes; and
the teaching of theology, because of its introduction of obedience and

93
TTP 3: 194: quod fundamentum si tollatur, facile tota fabrica ruet; and compare 3: 228.
The Latin word fabrica signifies the workshop of an artisan, the skill or profession of an artisan, as well as any skillful production, fabric, or building. But
the word also can mean a crafty device or stratagem.
94
TTP 3: 198.

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225

its emphasis upon obedience through works of justice and charity, has
brought great solace to mortals.95
To solve the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness,
Spinoza devises a theological teaching that advances obedience to laws
of either divine or human origin;96 he makes the terms of theological
salus identical to the terms of political salus;97 and he makes the terms of
divine justice coincident with human justice.98 To assure the prospect of
preservation, security, health, prosperity, liberty, and tranquility, within
the democratic political regime, as well as the prevention of sectarian
strife, Spinoza goes so far in the treatise as to dictate that there must
be a subordination of religion to civil governance and he justifies that
conclusion on the basis of the philosophic, theological, and political
teachings in the treatise. That is, because the theological teaching of
the treatise asserts that God is the God of all nations,99 and therefore
God has no special kingdom or care over any particular nation, it then
follows in the political teaching of the treatise that public worship and
the exercise of piety must be accommodated to the peace and utility
of the Republic.100 Spinoza further asserts that it is established both
from experience and from reason that divine right depends solely
on the dictate of the highest powers; and since the welfare of the
people is to be the highest law [salutem populi summam esse legem] it is
the function of the highest powers [of the regime] to determine by
which plan each must practice piety to a neighbor, that is, by which
plan each is bound to obey God.101 Accordingly, it is appropriate to
conclude that the teaching of theology in the treatise is indispensable
for introducing the notions of piety and obedience but it remains
for the teaching of politics in the treatise to determine the precise
manner by which piety and obedience will be practiced or exhibited
in the democratic political regime.
The theologico-political teaching of Spinozas old book is a fabrica
devised by a philosopher for the sake of solving the perennial natural
or philosophic problem of human selfishness or human unsociability.
What the treatise proposes then is the framework for a modern liberal
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:

179 and 188.

59; and compare 232.
17475; 17778; 191.
198200.
54.
22829; and compare 236.
232; and compare 19798; 226; 233.

226

part four

democratic theocracy. The exemplar for Spinozas practice of the art

of constructing a theologico-political teaching for the sake of solving
the natural or philosophic problem through the institution of a plan
of living conducted within a theologico-political regime is none other
than Moses, the founder of the Hebrew theocratic regime.

EPILOGUE

SPINOZA: THE NEW MOSES

In the Preface to the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Spinoza criticizes

oppressive and illiberal political regimes for inculcating theological
or religious prejudices and superstitions among their populaces and
conjoining theological and political convictions. Spinoza complains
about the theocratic regime of the Turks which eschews sound reason
and leaves no room for individuals to doubt anything dictated by the
regime.1 It further may be concluded from the teaching of the treatise
that Spinoza opposes the theocratic regime of the Hebrew people, or
at least he is opposed to various fundamental elements of it. Still, in
his reflections upon the nature and origin of the Hebrew theocratic
regime and its history, Spinoza asserts that while no can imitate it now,
nor would it be advisable to do so, nevertheless there are many things
about that regime which are worthy of being noted and which even
are advisable to imitate.2 The issue for the reader of the treatise, and
perhaps especially for the one who reads philosophically, would seem
to be this: Among the features of the Hebrew theocratic regime that
are worthy of being noted, which features of that regime also are
advisable to imitate and which features of that regime may be notable
but not advisable to imitate? Or, what instruction does the model of
the ancient Hebrew theocratic regime provide for the author of a book
that advances the integration of a modern liberal democratic political
regime with a modern liberal teaching of theology?
The kind of theocratic regime mentioned by Spinoza in the Preface
to the treatise is objectionable specifically for the reason that it refuses to
permit liberty of thought and liberty of speech. The kind of theocratic
regime mentioned in the Preface to the treatise opposes the liberty of
philosophizing. However, there is a suggestion in the treatise that there
may have been a more generous disposition toward theological or religious debate and dissent in the Hebrew theocratic regime than in the

1
2

TTP 3: 67.
TTP 3: 221.

230

epilogue

theologico-political regime of the Turks. For example, the more generous disposition within the Hebrew circumstance is intimated by the fact
that Spinoza himself acknowledges that there were various traditions
of Scriptural or religious interpretation among faithful Hebrews; and
although Spinoza contests most of the conclusions reached by both the
orthodox and the dissenting traditions it yet must be recognized that
differing interpretive traditions existed and there was some tolerance
of them among the faithful adherents to the Jewish religion.3 Still,
authority over the determination of the meaning of the Scriptures
or the meaning of theology or religion and the implications of it to
daily life ultimately resided with the appropriate councils that were
appointed or approved to decide such matters, even from the time of
Moses.4 The theocratic situation of the Hebrews thus may be seen to
have been superior to the theocratic situation of the Turks in at least
that one significant respect: theological or religious debate, perhaps
even a rationally informed debate, was allowed. But despite that advantage of permitting scholarly disputes about Scriptural interpretation,
the basic features of the Hebrew theocratic regime also consisted of
objectionable elements such as the required performance of ritual or
ceremonial observances which, according to Spinoza, added nothing to
human blessedness5 and which, in the end, may have made the people
effeminate;6 as well as the exceptional belief of the Hebrew people that
their theocratic regime was founded by God for the sake of the Hebrew
people alone to the exclusion of all the other nations.7
The attractiveness of the Hebrew theocratic regime as a model for
Spinozas teaching in the treatise, and the extent to which it is imitable
in some respects, rests on the fact that it was the kind of theocratic
regime that expressly was able to moderate spirits and contain those
who were ruling as well as those who were ruled so that they were not
rebellious on the one hand nor were they Tyrants on the other hand.8
Spinoza turns to the Hebrew theocratic regime as an instructive model

TTP 3: 97100; 18086. An example of such a debate in the Hebrew tradition

is cited by Spinoza in chapter 15 of the TTP. He notes the disagreement between
Maimonides and Jehuda Alpakhar over the role and place of reason in Scriptural
interpretation (3: 181).
4
TTP 3: 21112; 21718; 22122.
5
TTP 3: 6971.
6
TTP 3: 57; 21617.
7
TTP 3: 4445; 7980; 207; 21415.
8
TTP 3: 212.
3

spinoza: the new moses

231

because it is an example of one particular kind of theologico-political

solution to the natural or philosophic problem which enjoyed success
for an extended period of time. Under the leadership of Moses,9 the
Hebrew people were established as a nation and their nation prospered
because in their regime piety and patriotism were taken to be identical10
since the Hebrews were not bound by any right unless it were revealed
to them by God and therefore in the Hebrew theocratic regime civil
right and Religion which, as we have shown, consisted solely in obedience to God, were one and the same.11 Furthermore, despite the unique
role of Moses as the prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew people,12
the Hebrew theocratic regime eventually also incorporated a distribution of functions and authority that prevented the concentration of all
of the right or all of the power in one individual or in one group of
individuals.13 There were separate functions and responsibilities assigned
to the administrators, the judges, and the military commanders. But
all of the princes of the Hebrew theocratic regime together with all of
the citizens of the theocracy were associated by the bond of religion
alone and every member of the regime acted not for his own interest,
desire, or glory but every individual acted for God and the preservation
of the regime.14 Indeed, the Hebrew theocracy is esteemed singular
by Spinoza for the reasons that its most solid feature was the loyalty
of the citizens to the regime which was based no doubt on account
of its utility which is the force and life of all human actions; and in
particular, the utility of the Hebrew theocratic regime was evident in
its protection of the right to private property and its aversion to poverty.15 With respect to property and poverty, Spinoza notes that the very

9
It is worth observing that Spinozas treatment of Moses is ambiguous. For example,
in the teaching of the treatise, the definition of prophecy and the very function of
the prophet are illustrated through the example of Moses (TTP 3: 15). The appeal to
Moses as the model for prophecy and the function of the prophet in the treatise also
seems to rest on the premise that Moses actually did everything that is imputed to
him in the first five books of the Scriptures; and the authority and stature of Moses
seem linked to the presumption of the Mosaic authorship of the first five books of
the Scriptures. But Spinozas final word is that it is clearer than light at midday that
the Pentateuch was not written by Moses (3: 122). Thus Spinoza elevates Moses but
he also subverts him in the treatise.
10
TTP 3: 208; 21415.
11
TTP 3: 206.
12
TTP 3: 207; 20811.
13
TTP 3: 222.
14
TTP 3: 21216.
15
TTP 3: 21516; and compare 69, 195.

232

epilogue

constitution of the Hebrew theocratic regime was such that poverty

would be intolerable since charity toward a neighbor, that is, toward
a fellow citizen, had to be cultivated as the highest piety in order for
God their King to be propitious to them.16 Thus two foundational
principles of the Hebrew theocratic regime, namely, the right to private property and the commitment to charity toward a neighbor and
charity among the regimes citizens, aimed to assure the health of
the people; and the dedication of the military forces to victory for God
and the theocratic regime meant that the security of the people also
would be safeguarded.17 The Hebrew theocratic regime then represents
a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem of
human selfishness or unsociability by making the third proper object
of desire attainable by human beings through their obedience to Gods
command to love a neighbor as oneself which was the foundation of
both piety and patriotism in the Hebrew theocracy. Indeed the fact that
all right or power in the theocracy was understood to proceed from
God meant that obedience to the rule of the regime was tantamount
to obedience to the rule of God.
What is advisable to imitate in the Hebrew theocratic regime is
its emphasis upon an inextricable connection between obedience to
God and obedience to the regime. The love of God which commands
obedience to God through love of a neighbor in acts of justice and
charity is extended to the political regime in terms of respect for the
rights of private property; respect for the rights of others in terms of
defending anothers right as ones own; respect for the rights of others in terms of keeping ones pledges of faith; and respect for others
in terms of constraining the appetites or impulses that lead one to do
harm to another.18 The Hebrew theocratic regime, during the period
of its success, ably afforded preservation, security, health, and prosperity to its citizens because the theological salus of the individual and the
political salus of the individual were understood to be indistinguishable.
Moses was able to inculcate the identification of theological salus and
political salus because he greatly had won over the judgment of his
people, not by fraud but by divine virtue, so that he was believed to
be divine and to speak by divine inspiration;19 Moses also further
16
17
18
19

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

216.
4849.
16566.
239.

spinoza: the new moses

233

submitted that there were beings who (without doubt by the order
and command of God) carried the weight of the role of God, that
is, beings to whom God gave authority, right, and power to direct
nations and to provide and to care for them.20 In other words, Moses
himself taught the Hebrew people that God could anoint beings to
carry the weight of the role of God, though Spinoza also says that
Moses never defined the nature or the creation of such beings, and
therefore it can be doubted whether Moses himself actually believed
that beings who carried the weight of the role of God were uniquely
created by God.21 On Spinozas view, Moses endorsed the proposition,
at least rhetorically, that God can institute a plan of living for a nation
by acting or speaking through an intermediary. Moses, of course, also
was the intermediary to whom the Hebrew people turned to interpret
and to promulgate the utterances of God when the Decalogue and
the terms of the covenant between God and the Hebrew people were
revealed.22 Hence although it may be said that God was the author
of the Hebrew theocratic regime, it also must be said that Moses was
the first to proclaim the laws or the plan of living of that the Hebrew
people would adopt for their security, health, or salus and so Moses
rather than God launched the Hebrew theocratic regime.
Spinoza claims that Moses excelled others in divine virtue; Moses
was able to persuade the people that he possessed it by demonstrating
it to the people; and therefore he easily could retain his rule over the
regime.23 The ease with which Moses was able to establish himself as
TTP 3: 38.
TTP 3: 39. Spinozas assertion is curious. On the one hand, the assertion suggests that God creates vice-regents to rule on earth. The assertion suggests that Moses
endorsed a divine right of kingship which would be consistent with the function of
Moses within the Hebrew theocracy. But on the other hand, Spinoza says that it can be
doubted whether Moses himself actually believed such a thing. A reader of the TTP,
perhaps especially one who reads philosophically, would recall Spinozas account
of the declarations by Moses that God is fire and God is jealous. According to
Spinoza, both claims are absurd; and Spinoza concludes that either Moses believed
such things or at least he wished to teach them (see note 178 in Part Two of this
book). Since Spinoza says it can be doubted whether Moses actually believed that
God creates beings to carry the weight of the role of God perhaps Moses simply
wished to teach such a doctrine even though he himself did not believe it. The phrase
carried the weight of the role of God in Latin is quae vicem Dei gerebant. A similar
phrase also appears in the treatise in reference to the teaching of Christ where Spinoza
holds that when Christ ordained laws, in that respect, he played the role of God [in
re vicem Dei gessit] (3: 65).
22
TTP 3: 206207.
23
TTP 3: 75.
20
21

234

epilogue

the principal prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew people may have

owed to the fact that upon their exodus from Egypt the Hebrews were
untutored, ignorant, contumacious, and they were no longer bound by
any law, any principle of social organization, or any plan of living to
guide them.24 The excellence of Moses gave him a stature that distinguished him from his fellow Hebrews and thus by the divine virtue in
which he was strong, he established jurisdictions and commanded the
people and because of this, therefore, Moses by virtue and by divine
order introduced religion into the Republic so that the people would
do their duty from devotion rather than from fear.25
Spinozas statements about Moses and his function in respect of the
constitution of the Hebrew theocratic regime appear conventional. But
upon a closer inspection of the statements one finds the insinuation
of something unconventional. It is said that Moses possessed divine
virtue; and therefore it is to be inferred that his possession of that
divine virtue enabled him to institute the Hebrew theocratic regime.
However, Spinoza also notes that Moses was strong, or able, or
indeed skilled, in divine virtue and that is a curious claim. If someone
were to possess divine virtue it would seem that such a possession
would be a gift from God rather than something at which a human
being himself could excel or be strong or able; that is, it would not
seem to be the case that divine virtue would be something at which
a human being could become skilled or proficient. Moreover, the
philosophic teaching of the treatise maintains that the acquisition of
virtue, which is coincident with knowledge of things and their causes,
is a consequence of the laws of human nature and so the acquisition of virtue depends chiefly on human power alone.26 According
to Spinoza, it is only natural knowledge which teaches Ethics and
true virtue after we have acquired knowledge of things and tasted the
excellence of knowledge.27 It is not entirely clear then what divine

TTP 3: 205206; and compare 4041; 48; 64; 7576; 203.

TTP 3: 75.
26
TTP 3: 46.
27
TTP 3: 68. The Latin word scientia means knowledge. That is, scientia means a
knowing or a being skilled in anything. But that sense of scientia is broader than
most modern significations of the word. I think that Spinoza is contrasting knowledge of nature or knowledge of the causes of things with superstition, prejudice,
ignorance, or opinions about things. Whereas the former term includes the first proper
object of desire which depends only on the power of human nature and is contained
24
25

spinoza: the new moses

235

virtue signifies. But even if it derives from God as a gift it also seems
that divine virtue is something at which a human being, like Moses,
can become proficient; or it is something at which a human being can
excel, based on the exercise of ones own native human powers.
Spinozas claim that Moses by virtue and by divine order introduced
religion into the Republic involves a subtle but interesting contradiction
that reflects the problem of the difference between divine virtue and
the kind of virtue that is attainable by human beings in accordance
with their own intrinsic powers. According to Spinoza, virtue is acquired
by the power of human nature itself; no other power is required for
the acquisition of virtue. The power of human nature or the law of
human nature that makes the acquisition of virtue possible is contained
in the exercise of reason or the application of the laws and dictates of
reason by human beings.28 For the human being who conducts his life,
governs his affairs, adheres to a plan of living, or simply practices the
life that is directed by reason, the need to follow orders is superfluous
since the life of reason already pursues what truly is advantageous to
human beings.29 Therefore if Moses instituted the Hebrew theocratic
regime by virtue then his founding of the regime together with his
introduction of religion into it would be more a consequence of his
being a reasonable or sensible man than it would be a consequence
of his having submitted to an order issued from another source. In
other words, there may be a question about whether the introduction
of religion into the Hebrew theocratic regime by Moses followed from
his possession of a divine virtue or whether it followed from the fact
of his possession of a different kind of virtue which may have been
excellent but also quite human.
Spinoza speaks in the treatise about the status and function of
Moses in respect of the establishment and the framing of the Hebrew
theocratic regime. After the Hebrew people initially had transferred
their right to God at Mount Sinai, Spinoza says that they were in a
condition similar to a democracy; that is, everyone who had engaged
in the pact with God was equal. But when the Hebrew people went
to meet with God to learn what would be commanded of them, they

within the laws of human nature, the latter terms are symptoms of the prevailing
tradition of theology or religion.
28
TTP 3: 80.
29
TTP 3: 74.

236

epilogue

became terrified by Gods voice and they beseeched Moses to serve as

their intermediary with God. Thus a new pact was entered with Moses
by the Hebrew people which replaced the pact initially undertaken
between God and the whole of the Hebrew people.30 The choice of
turning to Moses as their leader and as their interpreter of God was a
plain one for the Hebrew people if only for the reason that Moses had
led them from their captivity in Egypt into a new realm where they
might be reconstituted as a free and unified nation. Moreover, it was
Moses who had interceded on behalf of the Hebrew people with the
king of Egypt to seek their liberation and it was at the intercession of
Moses that the Red Sea was parted by Gods power, an extraordinary
event which permitted both the exodus of the Hebrew people from
Egypt as well as the destruction of a considerable part of the Egyptian army that was in pursuit of them during their flight. Moses was
the savior of the Hebrew people; he had advocated their cause before
the king of Egypt; he had worked a great miracle on their behalf; he
communicated directly with God; and accordingly he was the evident
choice to serve as the prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew people.
Thus Moses assumed the role of a monarch but more importantly, as
Spinoza expressly states it, Moses had the role of God in respect to
the Hebrew people.31
Among the imitable features of the Hebrew theocratic regime were
its particular emphasis upon loyalty to the regime in terms of love of
ones own country and love of ones own fellow citizens rather than
love of self; its particular emphasis upon the preservation of the security
and the health of the regimes citizens through the regimes attention
to the rights to private property together with the regimes intolerance
of poverty; and its particular emphasis upon the extent to which piety
and patriotism were made to be identical so that in obeying God one
was understood to be obeying the regime and in obeying the regime
one was understood to be obeying God. What further is notable and
perhaps even imitable about the Hebrew theocratic regime is the virtue
or power of the one who launched the regime, Moses, who recognized certain basic features of human nature, namely, selfishness and

TTP 3: 206207; and see Exodus 1920.

TTP 3: 207: qui solus apud Hebraeos vicem Dei, hoc est, majestatem habuit. One will
recall that Moses himself had advocated and defended the view that there could be
something or someone divinely anointed for carrying the weight of the role of God
to direct nations and to provide and to care for them (3: 38).
30
31

spinoza: the new moses

237

stubbornness, which would have to be overcome or corrected if preservation, security, health, prosperity, and the stability of the regime were
to be achieved. His acknowledgement of those basic features of human
nature influenced how Moses determined the modes by which he would
devise a plan of living for the conduct of the lives and the governance
of the affairs of the Hebrew people. The virtue or excellence of Moses
impressed the Hebrew people. But perhaps Moses was most impressive
to them because of their belief in his ability to work miracles on their
behalf and thereby his ability to assure the providence of God for
the elected Hebrew people. Such demonstrations of providence only
would confirm the preeminence of Moses over the Hebrew people; and
Spinoza asserts that the received perception of the ability of Moses to
work miracles enhanced his claim to possess divine right, it suggested
his possession of a peculiarly divine virtue, and it enhanced his rule
over the Hebrew people and their regime.32 In particular, Spinoza cites
the significance for the Hebrew people of the liberating miracle of the
parting of the Red Sea. That feat was taken by the Hebrew people as
a demonstration of the power of Moses to call upon God to perform
acts of beneficence for them and the power of Moses to invoke the
power of God led the Hebrew people to perceive the virtue of Moses
as being a uniquely divine virtue.33 Indeed, Spinoza says quite plainly
that because Moses knew something about human nature, and because
he experienced that nature in the Hebrew people, Moses resolved
that he would not be able to complete what he had begun with the
Hebrew people through the institution of their regime without very
great miracles and he further realized that without the invocation of
the special external aid of God it would be difficult to convince the
Hebrew people that God wanted them to be conserved.34 Recognizing
the native selfishness and the native stubbornness within human nature
itself, and not just the particular selfishness and stubbornness in the
disposition of the Hebrew people,35 Moses determined that extraordinary means would be required to convince the Hebrew people of the
utility and advantages of adopting a plan of living that would provide
for their security, their health, and their salus. In effect, of course, the
successful functioning of the regime instituted by Moses also would
32
33
34
35

TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP

3:
3:
3:
3:

205208.
75.
53.
217.

238

epilogue

facilitate the attainment of the third proper object of desire. But Spinoza
also acknowledges that there was suspicion among the Hebrews about
the divinity of the virtue possessed by Moses;36 and Spinoza indicates
to the one who reads philosophically that what appeared to most of
the Hebrew people as divine virtue may have been more akin to an
adroit form of political virtue.
At the close of chapter six of the treatise, De Miraculis, Spinoza
quotes a passage from Antiquitates Judaicae by Flavius Josephus which
relates the parting of the Pamphylian Sea by the deity for the sake of
Alexander the Great so as to aid the Greeks and destroy the Persians.37
Josephus suggests that the event occurred because of the will of God
and therefore he concludes: Let no one, in truth, disbelieve in the
word of the miracle. Spinoza, however, relies on the passage from
Josephus to serve another purpose. Spinozas interest is to corroborate
his own conclusion that although the Scriptures may teach that there
are miraculous events, and perhaps many prophets professed that
unusual events were miracles, it ought to be understood that belief in
those events as being miracles is irrelevant to faith or piety inasmuch
as belief in such events as being miraculous is not really necessary for
salvation. Belief in miracles or disbelief in miracles, says Spinoza, has
no bearing on faith, piety, or salvation.38 That is, even if the parting
of the Pamphylian Sea were perceived by human beings to be a miracle
the event itself could have had nothing to do with the salvation of
the Greeks since the Greeks were heathens. Belief in the parting the
Pamphylian Sea as a miracle wrought by the power of God to spare
the Greeks from the Persians or belief in the parting of the Red Sea
as a miracle to spare the Hebrews from the Egyptians has nothing to
do with the salvation of any human being since neither faith nor
piety is predicated upon a belief in miraculous events. Still, for the
one who reads philosophically, the similarity between the situation
of the Hebrew exodus and the Egyptian pursuit in the context of the
parting of the Red Sea and the situation of the Greek retreat and the
Persian pursuit in the context of the parting of the Pamphylian Sea
is quite striking;39 and in chapter seventeen of the treatise Spinoza

36
TTP 3: 239. Spinoza states that jealousy was the motive for the suspicions
raised against Moses.
37
TTP 3: 96; and compare Antiquitates Judaicae 2. 34748.
38
TTP 3: 8889.
39
Spinoza cites the story of the Greeks and the Persians from the Antiquitates Judaicae
of Josephus to indicate that many people are susceptible to belief in miracles. One

spinoza: the new moses

239

weaves an argument which obliquely draws more attention to other

similarities between Alexander and Moses.40 In one place, Spinoza
affirms that Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jove and
it appears to have been done on the basis of counsel and not out of
pride.41 Moses, of course, achieved that stature himself insofar as he
had the role of God with the Hebrew people; and, according to
Spinoza, if one person is to hold a regime he is to have something
above common human nature or at least he must endeavor with the
greatest strength to persuade the vulgar of it.42 For a former member
of the royal house of Egypt and the heir apparent to that throne,43 it
may not have been a staggering feat for Moses to convince a simple,
enslaved, and unlearned Hebrew people that his own virtue or power
bore all of the hallmarks of a kind of divine virtue.44
By having attained the role of God with the Hebrew people, it
is easy to imagine how effectively Moses could rule over the Hebrew
theocratic regime. Deriving his right to rule from God, the authority
facet of citing the Josephus account could be that it demonstrates that if there indeed
are miracles then miracles are not reserved for one nation and so they cannot be used
as evidence of one nation being favored more by God than any other nation. But it
also happens to be the case that Spinoza confesses his own disbelief in the miraculous
nature of the parting of the Red Sea and he attributes the parting of the Red Sea to
natural causes (3: 9091).
40
TTP 3: 204213. It is worth noting that in his account of the characterization
of the nature of God by Moses, Spinoza says that Moses believed God has his home
in the heavens, which opinion was very usual among the Heathens (3: 39) and so
Spinoza suggests that the revealed teaching of Moses possesses features common to
other religious traditions.
41
TTP 3: 204. By contrasting counsel with pride in Alexanders ambition,
Spinoza suggests that the motive for Alexanders ambition was a kind of political
prudence.
42
TTP 3: 74; and compare 46.
43
Exodus 2:915. The Book of Exodus provides only a scant account of the life of
Moses prior to his own departure from Egypt, his life in Midian, and his subsequent
return to Egypt. But in Antiquitates Judaicae, Josephus is more elaborate. He explains that
Moses was acknowledged to possess superior abilities to his peers as well as to those
who were senior to him in the Egyptian court; he was of great physical size; and he
was educated with care (2. 22838). In fact, Moses defended and saved the Egyptians
by defeating the Ethiopians. But there was envy toward Moses and fear of him among
the Egyptians who thought that Moses would use his station to liberate and elevate the
Hebrews; so there were plots concocted to assassinate Moses both before and after the
Ethiopian campaign (2. 23858). Spinoza quotes from the Antiquitates of Josephus five
times in the TTP; it therefore is very likely that Spinoza was familiar with Josephus
account of the early political and military training of Moses at the court of the king
of Egypt. It is worth recalling that during their exodus from Egypt some portion of the
Hebrew population was armed for battle and hence the exodus was both a religious
and a military undertaking (Exodus 13:18).
44
TTP 3: 4041; 7475.

240

epilogue

of Moses was enhanced; although Spinoza also notes that there

were cases in which the envy of the Hebrew people toward Moses
threatened his authority.45 Nonetheless, according to Spinoza, divine
revelation long ago taught Moses what was required to maintain the
regime: the keeping of faith is what is most necessary, whether it be
keeping faith with others in agreements, keeping faith in executing
commands, or keeping faith with the dictates and directions of the
regime.46 Part of that great task was achieved because of fact that the
Hebrew theocratic regime demanded that keeping faith with God be
identical to keeping faith with ones fellow citizens as well as keeping
faith with the regime. On the basis of the identification of piety with
patriotism in the Hebrew theocratic regime, Moses was able to effect
a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem of
human selfishness or unsociability; for obedience to the divine law that
regulated human action or behavior and obedience to human law, or
the laws of the regime, that regulated human action or behavior were
understood to be identical to each other. Spinoza himself makes this
clear in the terms of his account of the laws of God and the laws of
the regime in the Hebrew theocracy.47
According to Spinoza, the sum of the divine law is to love God above
all things and to love a neighbor as oneself. That divinely revealed
cardinal teaching of the Scriptures is the foundation of theology and
piety; the teaching has been transmitted without error; the teaching
is unambiguous and unadulterated; and if that teaching ever were
altered or removed in any way then the very notion of what theology
or religion or faith or piety is would have to be revised completely.48
Spinoza also asserts that the Scriptures affirm that God exists; God is
provident; God is omnipotent; God blesses the pious but punishes the
impious; and God grants salvation by his grace alone.49 Furthermore,
from the foundation of theology, that is to say, on the basis of the
divinely revealed teaching of the Scriptures, the divine law also must
include the following precepts namely to defend justice, to be of help

TTP 3: 21819.
TTP 3: 203204.
47
TTP 3: 21516.
48
TTP 3: 165; and compare 168; 17475; 17780; 187.
49
TTP 3: 165. In a number of other passages, however, Spinoza says that philosophy
teaches something very different from those claims or those claims are the product of
vulgar prejudices and a defect of the intellect; compare TTP 3: 6365; 175; 183.
45
46

spinoza: the new moses

241

to the helpless, to murder no one, to covet nothing of another, etc.50

Such are some of the particular practical implications of the divine
law to love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.
In other words, those precepts are necessary consequences of the sum
of the teaching of theology, revelation, faith, the Scriptures, or piety.
But, in addition, those precepts also are the laws which are stipulated
quite clearly in the Decalogue divinely revealed to the Hebrew people
by Moses at Mount Sinai.51 Yet in the chapter concerning the election
of the Hebrew people by God as a chosen nation, Spinoza contends
that the laws of the Hebrew regime were instituted solely for the purpose of fostering the material and temporal welfare of the citizens of
the Hebrew theocracy and therefore they had nothing to do with the
achievement of blessedness by those who observed those laws. That is,
according to Spinoza, Moses does not teach the Jews not to kill or to
steal as a teacher or a Prophet but he commands them as a legislator
or prince; for he does not establish the lesson by reason but he adds a
penalty to the order which can and must vary in accordance with the
disposition of each nation, as experience sufficiently teaches. Thus also
the order not to commit adultery has regard only to the utility of the
republic and the regime.52 In effect, Spinoza contends that at least the
fifth through the tenth commandments, which constitute the practical
implications of the sum of the divine law, are decidedly political in
nature rather than being theological or religious in nature. In other
words, then, the divinely revealed Law of Moses which affirmed the
existence of God, issued the demand for obedience to God, and held out
the prospect of reward and salvation for compliance with the law or the
prospect of punishment and perdition for opposing the law, is a set of
commands and warnings that are devised for the sake of establishing a
plan of living that will provide for the preservation, security, health, and
prosperity of the Hebrew people who otherwise were lawless, ignorant,
and stubborn. The eminence of Moses enabled him to have himself
regarded as being someone who was above common human nature
and therefore he was considered to be someone who could serve as an
intermediary between God and the Hebrew people. But, in fact, on
Spinozas view, Moses was a man of some estimable virtue or power

50
51
52

TTP 3: 165.
Exodus 20:118 and Deuteronomy 5:123.
TTP 3: 70.

242

epilogue

who recognized something about the basic features of human nature

and used that knowledge to accommodate his political instruction to
the basic dispositions, superstitions, and prejudices of those whom he
governed. Thus Moses assumed the role of God and became the
unique prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew theocratic regime.53
In suggesting that Moses devised a theologico-political solution to the
natural or philosophic problem, Spinoza is not proposing that Moses
was a philosopher. On the contrary, Spinoza explicitly states that Moses
taught an abject Hebrew people a plan of living only as a Legislator
and not as a Philosopher.54 Still, the virtue or excellence of Moses
is affirmed by the successes of the Hebrew theocratic regime that he
instituted, the basis on which he built it, and his recognition of the utility of combining theology and politics to correct the human problem
of selfishness or unsociability. Those features of the Hebrew theocratic
regime are the ones that Spinoza regards as worthy of being noted
and which he promotes as being advisable to imitate.
The Hebrew theocratic regime cannot be resurrected because in order
to do so a new pact would have to be made between God and a people.
Spinoza doubts whether such a situation as the one experienced by the
Hebrew people upon their exodus from Egypt ever could be repeated.
But there also is another critical difference from the circumstance that
occasioned the institution of the Hebrew theocratic regime. That is,
according to Spinoza, an express compact with God by a people, or
even by the whole human race, is no longer necessary because God
has revealed through the Apostles that Gods pact is no longer written
with ink and on stone tablets but on the contrary with the spirit of
God on the heart.55 Hence there is no need for introducing a new
53
In his Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, Machiavelli observes that there has
never been any sagacious lawgiver who did not resort to divine authority and he states
that such a practice was undertaken by Lycurgus and Solon (Discorsi I, 11). Previously
in the Discorsi, Machiavelli had linked Moses, Lycurgus, and Solon as founders of
monarchies and republics who had instituted laws for the general good by keeping
authority exclusively for themselves (I, 6). In Il principe, Machiavelli connects Moses with
the founders of other great regimes, namely, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus. In that
context, Machiavelli remarks the success that is enjoyed by those leaders of regimes
who have had recourse to force or threats of force; Machiavelli also explicitly speaks
of armed prophets (chapter 6): compare Exodus 13:18. Spinoza may have known of
Machiavellis views since he possessed a copy of the Testina edition of the Tutte le opere
di Niccol Machiavelli (Geneva, 1550); see, Jacob Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas:
In Quellenschriften, Urkunden und nichtnamlichen Nachrichten (Leipzig, 1899) p. 161.
54
TTP 3: 4041.
55
TTP 3: 221.

spinoza: the new moses

243

theology or a new religion. Instead, Spinoza turns to the existing teaching of theology or religion, which is to say that Spinoza invokes his
own version of an interpretation of the revealed teaching of Christ, to
serve the purpose of grounding the belief in the existence of God, the
belief in the need for obedience to established laws and to established
authorities, the belief in the remission of sins, the belief in salvation
for loving a neighbor as well as the belief in perdition for neglecting a
neighbor, and belief that faith and piety have little to do with theological disputes and everything to do with the performance of the acts of
justice and charity which are encouraged, approved, and monitored by
the appropriate authorities in a democratic political regime. By making
theological salus and political salus identical in the teaching of treatise,
Spinoza imitates the model of the Mosaic Hebrew theocratic regime.
By making piety and patriotism indistinguishable in a liberal democratic
regime which espouses a liberal Christian theology, Spinoza introduces
a theologico-political solution to the natural or human problem of
human selfishness or unsociability that imitates the basic features of
the formula employed by Moses in establishing the Hebrew theocracy.
Perhaps it may be said that Spinoza was a New Moses56 who has
instituted a new theocracy predicated upon the natural or philosophic
knowledge of the importance of satisfying the third proper object of
56
It is clear from the teaching of the treatise that the virtue of Moses, whether
it was divine or simply political, distinguished him from other human beings. Spinoza
remarks in the treatise that anyone who would hold a regime has to have something
above common human nature, or at least he must endeavor to convince the vulgar
that he possesses such a nature. The virtue of Moses accomplished that aim and it
permitted him to hold the regime. Spinozas imitation of Moses does not extend to
his own attempt to hold a regime. Spinoza advocates a liberal democratic regime. But
it still can be said that Spinoza possesses something above common human nature
by the fact that he dramatically and convincingly alters the received conceptions of
theology and politics in the 17th century and beyond that time. As Moses liberated the
Hebrew people from their captivity in Egypt, Spinoza aims to liberate his contemporaries
and his successors from the kind of theological or political captivity that follows from
ignorance, prejudice, or superstition. The theologico-political plan of living instituted
by Moses involves an autocratic regime because of the obstinacy of human nature; the
theologico-political plan of living instituted by Spinoza involves a democratic regime
also because of the obstinacy of human nature. In both plans, however, there is the
presumption that the wellbeing of the individual is best secured and maintained where
the wellbeing of the regime is assured. Moses assumed that human selfishness was too
great an obstacle to political stability and so his laws, according to Spinoza, made the
people effeminate (TTP 3: 57). Spinoza, on the hand, assumes that human selfishness
can be harnessed to advance the interests of both the regime and its citizens so as to
secure the wellbeing of both (3: 19395). Rather than curtailing selfishness, Spinoza
seeks to establish the conditions for a more orderly and productive exercise of it.

244

epilogue

desire. Because of his knowledge of human nature and the causes of

things, his appreciation of the usefulness of theology or religion for
public life, and his formulation of a means for inducing human beings
to obedience, Spinoza propounds a theologico-political teaching in
the treatise that promises preservation, security, health, prosperity, and
salus to human beings who adhere to the dependable counsel or the
sensible and reasonable dictates of a liberal, democratic, and loosely
Christian theocratic regime.

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