Pagei

Texts

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SUNYSERIESINPHILOSOPHY
GEORGER.LUCAS,JR.,EDITOR

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Texts
OntologicalStatus,Identity,Author,Audience
JorgeJ.E.Gracia
STATEUNIVERSITYOFNEWYORKPRESS

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Publishedby
StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany
1996StateUniversityofNewYork
Allrightsreserved
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Nopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermission.Nopartofthisbookmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemor
transmittedinanyformorbyanymeansincludingelectronic,electrostatic,magnetictape,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwisewithouttheprior
permissioninwritingofthepublisher.
Forinformation,addressStateUniversityofNewYorkPress,
StateUniversityPlaza,Albany,N.Y.12246
ProductionbyM.R.Mulholland
MarketingbyNancyFarrell
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Gracia,JorgeJ.E.
Texts:ontologicalstatus,identity,author,audience/Jorge
J.E.Gracia
p.cm.(SUNYseriesinphilosophy)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindexes.
ISBN0791429016(alk.paper).ISBN0791429024(pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Criticism(Philosophy)2.Meaning(Philosophy)
3.Hermeneutics.4.Theory(Philosophy)I.Title.II.Series.
B809.3.G731996
121'.68dc20
959554
CIP
10987654321

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ToLeonila
Hewhowritestherebyexposeshimselftocriticismbyeveryone,
andappearsbeforethetribunalofthewholeworldandeveryage.
JohnofSalisbury,Metalogicon

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Contents
Preface

ix

Introduction

I.TheLogicofTexts

II.Outline

1.OntologicalStatus
I.AreTextsIndividualorUniversal?

10

A.IndividualityandUniversalityofECTs

12

B.IndividualityandUniversalityofMeanings

14

C.IndividualityandUniversalityofTexts

16

II.IndividuationofTexts

17

III.AreTextsPhysicalorNonPhysical?

18

A.PhysicalTexts

19

B.MentalTexts

23

IV.RelationofTextstoMeaningsandECTs

26

V.AreTextsSubstancesorFeatures?

29

VI.AreTextsAggregatesorNonaggregates?

34

VII.ExistenceandLocationofTexts

35

VIII.HistoricityofTexts

40

IX.Conclusion

41

2.Identity
I.Sameness

45
47

A.AchronicSamenessofTexts

52

B.SynchronicSamenessofTexts

68

C.DiachronicSamenessofTexts

68

II.Difference

80

III.IdentificationandReidentificationofTexts

81

IV.Conclusion

85

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3.Author
I.IdentityoftheAuthor

93

A.HistoricalAuthor

93

B.PseudoHistoricalAuthor

97

C.CompositeAuthor

101

D.InterpretativeAuthor

102

II.FunctionoftheAuthor

104

A.FunctionoftheHistoricalAuthor

105

B.FunctionoftheCompositeAuthor

114

C.FunctionofthePseudoHistoricalAuthor

115

D.FunctionoftheInterpretativeAuthor

116

III.NeedforanAuthor

117

A.NeedfortheHistoricalauthor

119

B.NeedforthePseudoHistoricalAuthor

126

C.NeedfortheCompositeAuthor

128

D.NeedfortheInterpretativeAuthor

128

IV.RepressiveCharacteroftheAuthor

129

V.SubjectivityoftheAuthor

134

VI.Conclusion

138

4.Audience

91

141

I.IdentityoftheAudience

142

A.TypesofAudience

142

B.CompositionoftheAudience

148

II.FunctionoftheAudience

154

III.NeedforanAudience

158

IV.CharacteroftheAudience

161

A.SubversiveCharacter

161

B.RepressiveCharacter

165

V.SubjectivityoftheAudience

166

VI.Conclusion

168

Conclusion

171

Notes

173

SelectBibliography

191

IndexofAuthors

205

IndexofSubjects

209

Pageix

Preface
Textsandtextualityhavebecomethesourceofconsiderableinterestinrecentyears,notonlyinliterarycirclesbutalsoamongphilosophers.Textshavealwaysbeena
focusofphilosophicalattentiontosomeextent,becausephilosophersareconcernedwithphilosophicalviewsandtheseviewsareexpressedintexts.Recently,
however,philosophershavebecomeinterestedintextsnotonlyfortheviewstheyexpressbutalsoforwhattheyare.Apartfromthemoretraditionalepistemological
issuesinvolvedintheunderstandingandinterpretationoftexts,questionshavebeenraisedconcerningtheirontologicalstatusandidentity,andtheirrelationstoauthors
andaudiences.Theliteratureonthesetopicsisalreadylargeandcontinuestogrowatasteadypace,butsofarnoattempthasbeenmadetoexploresomeofthese
questionsinthecontextofatheorythataimstoprovideacoherentandcomprehensiveapproachtothem.Asaresult,onefrequentlyfindsstatementsintheliterature
thatappearshockingbecausetheycontradictlongheldbeliefsandmuchcommonsense.Myaiminthisbookistotakesomestepstoremedythissituationby
consideringthequestionsoftextualitytogether,aspartofaninterrelatedsetofissues,ratherthaninisolationfromoneanother.
ThequestionsIexaminearecloselyrelatedto,butdonotoverlapwith,theonesraisedinATheoryofTextuality(1995).Thediscussionisdividedintofourchapters,
whichareprecededbyanintroductionashortconclusionisaddedattheend.Theintroductionaimstogiveasampleoftheissuesdiscussedinthebookand
summarizesomeoftheconclusionsreachedinthelogicalpartofthetheory,presentedintheearliervolume,thatarepertinentfortheunderstandingoftheissues
discussedhere.Thefirstchapterprovidesanontologicalcharacterizationoftextsconsistentwiththeconceptionoftextsdefendedintheaforementionedstudy.The
secondchapterturnstothequestionofidentityitexplorestheissuesinvolvedintheidentityofvarioustextsandcloseswithadiscussionoftheepistemictopicsof
identificationandreidentification.Thethirdandfourthchapterstakeupmattersthathavetodowiththeauthorandtheaudience,theiridentities,functions,andrelations
totexts.Apartfromthebriefconclusion,aselectbibliographyandindexesofauthorsandsubjectsclosethestudy.Thebibliographyrecordsthesourcescitedaswell
asothermaterialsconsulted.Pertinentbackgroundsourceshavenotgenerallybeennoted,butIreferthereadertothebibliographyofATheoryofTextuality,which
containsamorecompletelistofthem.

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InthepreparationofthisbookIhaveusedthefollowingpreviouslypublishedmaterials:"TextsandTheirInterpretation,"ReviewofMetaphysics43(1990):495
542"TextsandTheirInterpretation,"inPhilosophyandItsHistory:IssuesinPhilosophicalHistoriography(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1992),
pp.177222"CanThereBeTextsWithoutHistoricalAuthors?"AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly31,no.3(1994):24553"CanThereBeTextsWithout
Audiences?TheIdentityandFunctionofAudiences,"ReviewofMetaphysics47(1994):71134''AuthorandRepression,"ContemporaryPhilosophy16,no.4
(1995):2329and"TextualIdentity,"Sorites2(1995):5775.Iamgratefultotheeditorsofthejournalsmentioned,JudeDougherty,NicholasRescher,Peter
Redpath,andLorenzoPeaandtothedirectoroftheStateUniversityofNewYorkPress,WilliamEastman,fortheirpermissiontousethematerialsinquestion.
Noneofthematerialsborrowedappearwithoutsubstantialmodificationsandelaboration.
Ishouldalsoliketoacknowledgemygratitudetothosewhoreadthewholemanuscriptorpartsofitandgavemethebenefitoftheircriticismsandsuggestions.
AmongtheseIwouldliketomentioninparticularDavidGreetham,EdwardPols,IgnazioAngelelli,GeorgeLucas,JamesBunn,andBruceReichenbach,aswellas
MichaelGorman,JeremyFantl,WilliamIrwin,KennethShockley,YishaiyaAbosch,andDanielBarwick.Asmyresearchassistantsatvarioustimesduringthe
preparationofthisbook,thelastsixhelpedmewithresearch,proofreading,andthecriticalanalysisoftheideaspresented.IamalsogratefultoKennethSchmitz,Paul
Eisenberg,andRegaWood.Thefirsttwoweremycriticsatasessiondevotedtomybook,PhilosophyandItsHistory,atthe1994EasternDivisionmeetingsofthe
AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,andraisedquestionsthatmademetakeasecondlookatsomeoftheviewsIpresentinthisbook.Thelastwaspresentatthe
sessionandraisedinterestingquestionsconcerningmyconceptionofthepseudohistoricalauthor.ToallIoweadebtthatcannotbeeasilyrepaid.

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Introduction
Aretextsindividual,universal,orboth?ItisnotdifficulttoconcludethatmycatChichiorthepenwithwhichIamwritingthesewordsisindividual.Andthereisno
difficultyinconcludingthatcatandpen,bycontrast,areuniversal.Butwhatdowemakeoftexts?Unliketheexamplesofindividualsanduniversalscited,textsappear
tosharesomeofthecharacteristicsassociatedwithindividualsandsomeofthecharacteristicsassociatedwithuniversals.Ontheonehand,textsarehistoricalentities,
producedatacertaintimebyanauthorwithinadeterminatesetofcircumstancesandthuswouldappeartobe,likeallotherhistoricalentities,individual.Yet,onthe
otherhand,theyseemtobecapablenotonlyofinstantiationbutalsoofmultipleinstantiationindeed,oftenthereappeartobemanyinstancesofthesametext.
ConsiderthetextofDonQuixote.Ontheonehand,thetextofDonQuixoteisahistoricalentity,publishedintheearlyseventeenthcenturybyCervantes,withina
determinatesetofcircumstances,andthusitwouldappeartobe,likeallsimilarhistoricalentities,individual.Ontheotherhand,thetextofDonQuixoteseemstobe
capablenotonlyofinstantiationbutalsoofmultipleinstantiationastheseveralcopiesofitinthelibraryandtheoneIhaveinmyofficeindicate.
TheexampleofDonQuixoteleadsusintoanotherissue,thequestionofidentity.SeveralvolumesinthelibraryoftheUniversityatBuffalobearthetitleDonQuixote
whoseauthorisidentifiedasCervantes.Thesevolumeshaveimportantdifferencesamongthem:Theyoccupydifferentspatiotemporallocationstheyareprintedin
differenttypescripts,onpapersofdifferentconsistencies,withvaryingnumbersofwordsperpage,andsoon.But,inspiteofthesedifferences,weregardthese
volumesascopiesofthesametext,andindeed,usersofthelibraryhavenotroubleidentifyingthemassuch.Sowemayask:Whatmakesthemthesame?Indeed,we
mayposethemoregeneralquestion:Whatmakestextsthesame?
Onepossibleanswerpointsinthedirectionoftheauthor.Butthisanswerraisesproblemsofitsown,foritisnotclearthatalltextsrequireintentionandconsciousness.
CouldnottheproverbialmonkeytypeacopyofHamlet?Thisexampleseemsfarfetched,butitwouldnotbeasoddorunlikelyforamonkeyatrandomtopresskeys
inatypewriterandproduceanexpressionlike"Fire!"or"Excuseme!"Andyet,ourintuitiontellsusthattextsrequireintentionandconsciousnessoftheirmeaningon
thepartofthosewhoproducethem.Atextisintendedtosaysomething.Themonkeyhasnosuchintention,however,

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whenitpressesthekeysofthetypewriter,evenifoneweretoconcedeithassomekindofintention.Andthesamecouldbesaidaboutthepurportedtextsproduced
bycomputersortheexpressionsutteredbyparrots.Butifthisisso,thentextsdonotrequireauthors.
Asimilarquestionariseswithrespecttoaudiences.Somerecentphilosophersandliterarycriticshavechallengedthelongheldviewthattextswithoutaudiencesare
nottexts.Theclaimthattextsdonotrequireaudiencesisbasedonvariousgrounds,butperhapsthemostimpressivearethestatementsofcertainauthorsthemselves
whosaytheydonothaveaudiencesinmindwhentheycomposetexts.Practitionersofthenouveauroman,forexample,believethatforawritertheaimistowrite,
andwhethertheauthorisreadornotisactuallyunimportant.Fromthispointofviewanaudienceisneithernecessarynorimportantfortheauthor,andifthisisso,
thenitsconsiderationcouldbeneithernecessarynorimportantfortheexistenceorunderstandingofatext.Stillitseemstobesomethinginthenatureoftextstohave
audiencesbecausetheyareintendedtobeunderstoodbysomeone.Howcanthisintuitionbereconciledwiththeviewofthoseauthorswhorejecttheideathatthey
haveanyoneinmindwhentheyproduceatext?
Thesefourquestionsshouldsufficetoillustratetheproblemsthatwillbediscussedinthisbook.Theseproblemsarisebecausewethinkabouttextsinwhatappearto
becontradictoryways.Wethinkofthemasuniversalbutalsoasindividual,asonebutalsoasmany,andashavingandnothavingauthorsandaudiences.
Philosophershavelittletolerance,atleastintheory,forinconsistencyithasalwaysbeentheirtasktobringorderintotheconceptualframeworksweuse,to
understandthewhyandhow,andtoeliminatecontradictionswheneverpossible.Hencethechallengetextsposeforthem.Butthereismore,fortextsaretheverystuff
outofwhichphilosophyismade.Somemaywanttothinkoftextsasinstrumentsofphilosophyandothersasessentialtophilosophy,butregardlessoftheviewone
adoptsitisclearthatphilosophyasweknowitcannotproceedindependentoftexts.Ifthisisso,itwouldappearwise,andperhapsevennecessary,forphilosophers
toaddressthephilosophicalquestionswehaveraisedinconnectionwithtexts.
ThisiswhatIhavetriedtodobothinATheoryofTextualityandinthisvolume.IntheformerIhavetakenupprimarilylogicalandepistemologicalquestions,and
hereIturntoontology,identity,authors,andaudiences.Insteadofthepiecemealapproachcharacteristicofmuchcontemporaryphilosophy,Iproceedbypresenting
anoverallviewoftextuality,foritismybeliefthatonecannothopetosolvethevariegatedproblemsthatariseconcerningtextsunlessonelooksatthelargerpicture.
ThisapproachisunpopulartodaybutIdonotseehowanyothercanyieldthekindofunderstandingoftextualityphilosophersseek.Ofcourse,therearedangersin
suchaprocedure,buttheyareworthtaking,forevenifthetheorypresentedhereturnsouttobeinadequate,the

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processofworkingthroughitwillhaveproducedabetterunderstandingoftheissuesthetheoryseekstosolve.Toguardagainstthedangersonemustkeepinmind
thenondogmaticandheuristicaimoftheories.Theviewpresentedhereismeantasaconceptualframeworkwhosefunctionistomakesenseofourexperience,notto
besuperimposedonit.
ThepositionsIdefendinthisbookareintendedtostandbythemselves,buttheybecomefullyintelligibleonlywhenthelogicalgroundsonwhichtheyrestaretaken
intoaccount.Hereisasummaryofthepertinentgrounds.1
I.TheLogicofTexts
TheconceptionoftextsIadoptisexpressedbythedefinitionoftextsasgroupsofentities,usedassigns,thatareselected,arranged,andintendedbyanauthorina
certaincontexttoconveysomespecificmeaningtoanaudience.Thisdefinitionmakesclearthattextsarecomplexentitiesandthereforecomposedofotherentities.It
alsomakesclearthattextsincludesuchthingsasexpressions,sentences,paragraphs,andbooks.DonQuixoteisatext,butsoare'2+2=4'and'Fire!'.
Textsarecomposedofsigns.Thesentence,'Thecatisonthemat,'forexample,iscomposedofthesigns'The,''cat,''is,'andsoon.Butsignsarethemselves
constitutedbyentitiesthatareusedtoconveymeaning.Becausetheseentitiesconstitutesignsandsignscomposetexts,theseentitiescanalsobesaidtoconstitute
texts.Thus,thesentence,'Thecatisonthemat,'iscomposedofthesigns'The,''cat,'andsoonandconstitutedbythemarksonthepagethatalsoconstitutethesigns
ofwhichthesentenceiscomposed.
Itisimportanttodistinguishtheentitiesthatconstitutetexts(ECTs),thesignsthatcomposetexts,andthetextsthemselvesaswellastherelationbetweentextsand
signs,ontheonehand,andtheentitiesthatconstitutethem,ontheother.Textsarecomposedofsignsbuttextsandsignsareconstitutedbyentitiesthatareusedas
signstoconveymeaning.Thusthedistinctionbetweentextsandsigns,ontheonehand,andtheentitiesthatconstitutethem,ontheother,isthatthelatter,considered
merelyastheentitiestheyare,havenomeaning,whereastheformerarerelatedtoameaninganauthororuserintendstoconveythroughthem.Thedistinction
betweentextsandsignsrestsonthefactthatatextisalwayscomposedofmorethanonesignandthemeaningofatextisatleastinparttheresultofthemeaningof
thesignsofwhichitiscomposed.Signsbycontrastmaybecomposedofothersignsbuttheirmeaningisnottheresulteveninpartofthemeaningofthesignsofwhich
theyarecomposed.2
Theentitiesthatconstitutetextshavemeaningonlyiftheyareusedassignswhichinturncomposetextstheyhavenomeaningwhenconsideredinthemselves,but
theyacquiremeaningwhentheyareusedortakenassigns.Signsarethoseentitiesinsofarastheyareendowedwithmeaning.Themarks

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onthepagethatconstitutethesentence,'Thecatisonthemat,'havemeaningonlyiftheyareusedasortakentobesigns.
Textualmeaningitselfisconceivedaswhatisunderstoodwhenatextisunderstoodandthusasrelatedbothtotextsandtotheactofunderstanding.Thissomewhat
neutralconceptionofmeaningallowsthemeaningoftextstovaryitcanaccommodatethethreemostpopularviewsofmeaningwhileavoidingtheirdifficulties.These
viewsarethereferential,ideational,andfunctional.Itaccommodatesthefirstbecausetextualmeaningcanbeconceivedasthethingsorstatesofaffairsthatwe
understandwhenweunderstandatextthesecondbecausetextualmeaningcanbeconceivedastheideasexpressedbyatextandthethirdbecausetextualmeaning
canbetakenasthatinvirtueofwhichatextcarriesoutcertainfunctions.
Thattheprimaryfunctionoftextsistoconveymeaningdoesnotentailitistheironlyfunction.Textsmayandoftendootherthingsthanproduceunderstanding,butto
dothoseotherthingstheymustalsoproduceunderstanding.Theproductionofunderstandingisanecessaryconditionforanyotherfunctionatextmayhave,evenif
thatotherfunctionisprimaryintheintentionoftheauthororuser.
Thedefinitionoftextsmakesclearanotherimportantpointabouttextsnamely,thattextsalwayspresupposeanintention.Theuseofatextmakesnosenseunlessthis
principleisaccepted.Butintentionshouldnotbeconfusedwithfullawarenessofwhatisintendedorwithfullawarenessoftheintention.Onemaynothavefull
awarenessofthemeaningofatextandyethavetheintentiontocommunicateit.Andonemaynothavefullawarenessoftheintentiontoconveymeaningandyet
intendtodoso.
Animportantcorollaryofthedefinitionoftextsisthattextsareconventionalentities.Theirconventionalityreferstotherelationoftheirmeaningtotheentitiesthat
constitutethem,forthereisnonaturalsemanticconnectionbetweenthemeaningofthesignsthatcomposeatextandthoseentitiesorbetweenthemeaningofatext
andthoseentities.Theconnectionistheresultofaconventionestablishedbythosewhousetheentitiesthatconstitutetextsassignsandcomponentsoftexts.Signs
arenevernaturalinthesenseofhavinganaturalconnectiontoameaning.Thisconventionalcharacterappliesalsotothesemanticsignificanceofthearrangementof
thosesignsandtheroleofcontext.
Contextisanythingthat,notbeingpartofatext,canaffectthemeaningofthetext.Somecontextsmaydependtoagreatextentonthetypeoftextinquestion,
whereasothersdonot.Theimportanceofcontextcanbegatheredfromthefactthattextsareintendedbyauthorsforcertainaudiences,andthuspresupposea
languageandsoon.Itisalsoclearfromthefactthatmosttextsareellipticaland,therefore,meanttobecompletedbyadditionsthatarenotpartofthemandcanbe
suppliedonlybyanaudienceinadeterminatecontext.Thedependenceoftextsoncontextdoesnotentailthattheyareequallydependent

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oncontextorthattheydependoncontextinexactlythesameway.Differenttextswilldependoncontextindifferentwaysandindifferentdegrees.
OneofthemostsignificantresultsofthedefinitionoftextsIproposeisthatitnarrowsdownthecategoryoftextualityconsiderably,rulingoutallsortsofthingsthat
havebeenproposedastextsbyrecenthermeneuticists,literarycritics,andphilosophersoflanguage.Textsconstituteanarrowcategoryofentitiesthathaveavery
particularuse,toconveymeaning,andthataresubjecttostrictconditionsrelatedtoauthorship,audiences,andcontexts.Atthesametime,theconceptionoftextsI
proposeallowscompletefreedomwithrespecttothechoiceofentitiesusedassignstomakeuptexts.Indeed,theconfusionbetweenthetwonamely,between
textsandtheentitiesthatconstitutethemisatleastinpartresponsibleformistakenlyextendingthecategoryoftextstoentitiesthatinfactarenottexts.
Thedefinitionalsomakespossiblethedistinctionbetweenthecategoryoftextsandothercategoriessometimesconfusedwithit,suchasthecategoriesoflanguage,
artifact,artobject,andwork.Mosttextsarecomposedofsignsthatbelongtonaturallanguagesandthosesignsarearrangedaccordingtotherulesofthenatural
languagestowhichtheybelong,buttextsarenotlanguages.Textsarenotcomposedofrules,whereaslanguagesareinpartcomposedofrules.Textshaveaconcrete
structure,whereaslanguagesdonot.Textsarehistoricallydetermined,whereaslivinglanguagesareconstantlychanging.Textslogicallypresupposelanguages,
whereaslanguagesdonotlogicallypresupposetexts.Textshaveparticularpurposes,whereaslanguages,exceptforartificialones,donot.Mosttextshaveidentifiable
authors,whereasthatisnotsowithnaturallanguages.Finally,textshaveaudiences,whereaslanguagesdonot.
Theconfusionoftextswithlanguagesmayleadtotheconclusionthattexts,likemostlanguages,areflexible,havenoverystrictidentityconditions,andare
independentofauthorsandaudiences.Thefactis,however,thattextsarelessflexiblethanlanguages,havingconcretestructuresandgenerallyidentifiableauthorsand
audiences.Itisamistaketoconclude,then,thattextslackdefinitionanddetermination.Thisisoneofthereasonswhyitisimportanttounderstandthedistinction
betweentextsandlanguage.Note,ofcourse,thatthedistinctionbetweentextsandlanguagedoesnotimplythattextsarenotsemanticallyflexibleandarenot
dependentontheirauthorsandaudiencesinvariouswaysitimpliesonlythat,iftheyareso,itisnotbecausetheyarelanguagesorlikelanguages.
Textsshouldnotbeconfusedwithartifactseither.Theconfusionoftextsandartifactsisalsounderstandable,fortextsarealwaysartifactualandthereforesharewith
artifactssomefundamentalfeatures.Artifactsareentitiesthateitheraretheproductofintentionalactivityanddesignor,notbeingtheproductofintentionalactivityand
design,haveundergonesomechangeortheircontexthasundergonesomechange.Thischange,ineithercase,hastobethe

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resultofintentionalactivityanddesignandtheartifactualentitymustbeconsideredinthecontextwherethechangehasoccurredratherthanapartfromit.
Somethingsimilaroccurswiththecategoryofartobject.Althoughsomeartobjectsmaybetexts,notallartobjectsaretextsandnotalltextsareartobjects.For
somethingtobeanartobjectitmustbeanartifactanditmustbecapableofproducinganartisticexperience.Thefirstconditiontiesartobjectsandtextsfor,likeart
objects,alltextsareartifacts.Butnotalltextsarecapableofproducinganartisticexperience.Theconditionsforobjectstobecapableofproducinganartistic
experiencearetwo:Theymustberegardedasartifactsandascapableofproducinganaestheticexperience.Thustheconditionsofbeinganartobjectincludebeing
anartifact,beingregardedasanartifact,andbeingregardedascapableofproducinganaestheticexperience.Artobjectsarenotrequiredtobecomposedofsigns,
andeveniftheiraimweretoconveymeaning,theirprimaryfunctionhastodowiththeproductionofanartisticexperience.Texts,bycontrast,neednotnecessarilybe
regardedascapableofproducinganartisticexperienceeveniftheysharetheconditionsofartifactualitywithartobjects.Nordoesitmakeadifferencethattheyalso
sharehavingauthorsandaudiences.
Finally,textsshouldnotbeconfusedwithworks.Worksarethemeaningsofcertaintexts.Notalltextshavemeaningsthatqualifyasworksworksarethemeanings
ofthosetextsthatacultureregardsasworksbecausetheyfulfillcertaincriteriadevelopedbytheculture.Thisentailsthatnogeneralrulesapplytowhatconstitutesa
workforalltimesandplaces.Itisnotlength,thedegreeofeffortthatittakestoproduceatext,orthefactthatitmaybeopentomanyandconflictinginterpretations
thatdetermineswhichtextshavecorrespondingworks.Thenotionofworkisculturallyconditionedanddeterminedbythefunctionsparticularculturesattachto
certaintexts.
Theintroductionofthenotionofculturalfunctionleadsnaturallytotheconsiderationofvarioustypesoftextsdependingonthefunctionstheyhave.Thenotionof
functionplaysanimportantrolenotonlyinthedeterminationofwhetheratext'smeaningconstitutesawork,butalsointhecontextoftextualunderstandingand
interpretation.
Functionmaybeunderstoodinvariousways,twoofwhicharepertinenthere.Thefirstisthenotionoflinguisticfunction.Textsarelinguisticincharacterandtherefore
derivesomeoftheirfunctionsfromthisfact.Likelanguage,theycanbeusedtoinform,direct,express,evaluate,andperform.Lessfundamental,butnoless
important,however,aretheculturalfunctionsatextmayhavethatdonotderivefromitslinguisticnature.Theydependonvariousculturalphenomenaandhowthey
affecttheusestowhichtextsareput.Thustextsmaybeclassifiedaslegal,literary,philosophical,scientific,religious,political,historical,pedagogical,confessional,
entertaining,inspirational,mnemonic,andsoon.Noneofthevariousfunctionsidentifiedistoberegardedasexclusionary.

Page7

Textsmayfulfillvariousfunctionsatdifferenttimesandatthesametime,dependingonawidevarietyoffactors.Norarethesefunctionsjointlyexhaustive,because
theydependonmanyfactorsthatmaychangeaccordingtothediversityofcircumstances.
Textsmayalsobeclassifiedmodallyintoactual,intended,orideal.Theactualtextisthetextthatexistsoutsidethemindofaninterpreter.Itiseitherthehistoricaltext,
thecontemporarytext,ortheintermediarytext.Thehistoricaltextisthetextthehistoricalauthoractuallyproduced,whetherwehaveitornot.Thecontemporarytext
isthetextavailabletousintheoriginallanguageinwhichitwasproducedsometimes,whenthehistoricaltexthassurvivedintact,thecontemporarytextisthesameas
thehistoricaltext.Theintermediarytextisatextwedonotactuallyhaveandisnotthehistoricaltextbutnonethelessexistedatsometimeandfunctionedatthattime
asacontemporarytextofanaudience.Theintendedtextissupposedtobethetexttheauthorofthetextintendedtoproducebutdidnotproduce,althouthIhave
arguedthatthisunderstandingofanintendedtextmakesnosense.Theintendedtextcanbenomorethanavaguesetofideasandintentionsconcerningatextandits
meaning.Finally,theidealtextisthetextaninterpreterthinksthehistoricalauthorshouldhaveproduced.
II.Outline
TofacilitatethediscussionoftheissuesIraiseconcerningtextsinthisbookIhavedividedthemintofourdifferentclusters,dealingrespectivelywithontologicalstatus,
identity,author,andaudience.Eachclusterisdiscussedwithinaseparatechapter.
Ontologyseekstodevelopamapoftheworldaccordingtosomefundamentalcategories.Asubstanceaccidentontology,forexample,willtellusthattheworldis
composedofsubstancesandaccidentsandwillseektoexplaintherelationsbetweenthetwo.Butanontologythatrejectssubstancewilltrytodescriberealityinother
terms.Also,ontologywilltrytoaccountforandexplaintherelationsamongthemostfundamentalattributesofbeing,suchasunity,identity,similarity,andsoon.
Ifontologyisageneralinvestigationofthestatedsort,anontologicalcharacterizationinvolveslocatingwhatisunderinvestigationinageneralcategorialmap.One
mightask,forexample,whetherthethinginquestionisasubstanceorafeature.Inturn,onemightaskwhatasubstanceisandwhatitsrelationistofeatures.To
defineahumanbeingasafeatherlessbipedisnotpartofontology,butitispartofontologytodeterminewhetherhumanbeingsaresubstancesorbundlesoffeatures.
Textsposemostofthefundamentalquestionsthatonemayraiseinontologicalinvestigations.Onemayask,forexample,whethertheyare

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substancesorfeaturesandwhatisthebasisoftheiridentity,amongotherthings.Ihave,however,decidedtofocustheontologicalinvestigationoftextsaroundthe
followingcategories:universality,individuality,physicality,aggregatecharacter,substantiality,existence,andlocation.Ialsodiscussthehistoricityoftexts.
Adifferentissuehastodowithidentity.Ihaveframedthisissueintermsofsamenessanddifference.Simplyput,thequestionhastodowiththedeterminationofthe
necessaryandsufficientconditionsofthesamenessanddifferenceoftexts.BecauseIarguethattextscanbeuniversalandindividual,andbecausesamenessand
differenceareconditionedbytemporality,thequestionisdividedaccordingly.Hence,Idiscusstheconditionsoftheachronic(apartfromtime),synchronic(intime),
anddiachronic(throughtime)samenessofbothuniversalandindividualtexts.Theconclusionsreachedintheanalysisarethenbrieflyapplied,mutatismutandis,to
difference.
Twootherissuesareraisedinthechapteronidentity.Theyareepistemicissuesandhavetodowiththeidentificationandreidentificationoftexts.Identificationmeans
theprocesswherebyaknowerisabletopickoutsomethinginsuchawaythattheknowercandistinguishitfromotherthings.Reidentificationhastodowith
identificationattwoormoretimes.
Adifferentsetofquestionsinvolvestheauthorandaudienceofatext.WithrespecttotheauthorIexplorequestionsofidentity,function,need,repressivecharacter,
andsubjectivity.Fourtypesofauthorsarediscussed:historical,pseudohistorical,composite,andinterpretative.
Considerationoftheaudienceraisesseveralissuesofphilosophicalinterest.Ibeginwiththequestionofidentityandfollowwithdiscussionsoffunction,need,
subversiveandrepressivecharacter,andsubjectivity.Aswiththeauthor,theaudiencemaybeclassifiedinvariousways.Idiscussfiveofthesewaysexplicitly:author
asaudience,intendedaudience,contemporaneousaudience,intermediaryaudience,andcontemporaryaudience.
Withthegeneraldirectionindicatedbythesepreliminariesinmind,wecannowturntothemoresubstantiveanddetailedpartofthebook.Ibeginwithontological
status.

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1
OntologicalStatus
Ontologyisthebranchofphilosophythatstudiesbeingandseekstoestablishitsmostgeneralcategories.Theapplicationofthesecategoriestosomethingisthe
determinationofitsontologicalstatus.Philosophershavesoughttoidentifymanyofthesecategories.Aristotle,forexample,identifiedtenofthem,andother
philosophershavebeenaddingtoorsubtractingcategoriesfromthoseteneversince.1 Forourpurposes,however,Ibelieveitwillbemostprofitableifweexamine
fourpairsofcategories:individualuniversal,physicalnonphysical,substancefeature,andaggregatenonaggregate.Ihavechosenthesebecausetheyareveryoften
usedinphilosophyandbecauseatleastsomeofthemhavebeenappliedtotexts.2 Thedeterminationoftheontologicalstatusoftexts,aswillbeundertakenhere,will
involveaninquiryintothesuitabilityofapplyingthesecategoriestothem.NotethatbyusingthesecategoriesIdonotmeantoendorsethem.Therearestrong
disagreementsamongphilosophersabouttheviabilityofthesecategories,andtherefore,Icannotsettlethesemattersinthecourseofaninvestigationdevotedto
somethingelse.
Themostgeneralontologicalcategoriesoftheonesmentionedareindividualityanduniversality,andforthisreason,ontologicalstatusisusuallytakenintherecent
literaturetorefertothesecategories.Here,however,wewillgobeyondquestionsofindividualityanduniversalityanddiscussalsoquestionsofphysicality,
substantiality,andaggregatecharacter.Inaddition,becauseontologyisconcernedwithbeing,wewillraisequestionsofexistence,location,andhistoricity.
Atextisagroupofentities,usedassigns,thatareselected,arranged,andintendedbyanauthortoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudienceinacertaincontext.This
entailsthattextsareartifacts,productsofaconventionallyestablishedrelationbetweencertainentitiesandmeaninginacontext.Textsamounttotheentitiesofwhich
theyareconstituted(ECTs)consideredashavingameaningthatanauthorintendstoconveythroughthem.Themainimplicationofthisconclusionfortheontologyof
textsisthattextsaretheentitiesofwhichtheyareconstitutedconsideredastheystandinrelationtothemeaningand,therefore,theirstatusisthesameasthestatusof
thoseentitieswithanaddedrelationtomeaning.3 TextsareneithertheECTsconsidered

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apartfrommeaning,meaningconsideredapartfromECTs,therelationbetweenECTsandmeaning,orthecontextinwhichtherelationbetweenECTsandmeaningis
established.
Thereisnothingoddinthisview,asisclearfromthefollowingexample.Considerastonethatisusedasapaperweight.Itisobviousthatontologicallythestoneand
thepaperweightdifferonlyintheiruse,whichisestablishedbyarelationofthestonetotheuser.Bothhaveacertainweightandcolor,andsoon.Thedifference
betweenthemarisesbecausethestonemaybeconsideredasitisinitselfapartfromtherelationsitmayhavetoauserwhoputsitdowntoholdpaper,whereasthe
paperweightisthestoneconsideredasusedbysomeonetoweighdownpaper.Inthesameway,atextisontologicallytheentitiesofwhichitisconstituted(ECTs)
exceptthat,consideredasatext,theECTshavearelationtomeaningmissingwhentheyareconsideredmerelyastheentitiestheyareapartfromthatmeaning.The
marksonapagethatconstituteatextconsideredbythemselves,apartfrommeaning,arenotatextbutmerelymarksonapage.
Onecouldarguethatthefundamentalquestioninvolvedinthedeterminationoftheontologicalstatusoftextsconcernsthedeterminationofthestatusoftheentitiesthat
constitutethem.Butthisisnotquiteright,formeaningsareintrinsicallyrelatedtotexts.Hence,wemustinvestigatetheontologicalstatusofmeaningandthesortof
relationECTshavetoitifwearetoclaimtohaveprovidedasatisfactoryontologicalcharacterizationoftexts.
I.AreTextsIndividualorUniversal?
Forourdiscussionoftexts,twopertinentquestionscanberaisedconcerningtheirindividualityanduniversality.Thefirsthastodowithwhethertextsareindividualor
universal.Thesecondneedstobeaskedonlyif,intheanswertothefirst,weconcludethatthereareindividualtextsitseekstoidentifythenecessaryandsufficient
conditionsoftheindividualityoftexts.
Somethingisindividualifandonlyifitisanoninstantiableinstanceofaninstantiable,whereasuniversalsarecapableofbeinginstantiated,thatis,theyareinstantiables.
4 ''Peter,"forexample,isindividualbecauseheisaninstanceofhumanbeingbutnotitselfinstantiable."Peter"isanoninstantiableinstance.Bycontrast,"humanbeing"
isuniversalbecauseitcanbeinstantiated,indeeditisinstantiatedinPeter,Mary,andsoon.Thesamecouldbesaidabout"thiswhitecolor"(anoninstantiable
instance)and"thecolorwhite"(aninstantiable).
Thefirstquestionthatwehavetoaddressconcerningtheindividualityanduniversalityoftexts,then,iswhethertheyarenoninstantiableinstancesorarecapableof
instantiation.Ifthefirst,thentheyaretoberegardedasindividualifthesecond,thentheyareuniversal.

Page11

ThedistinctionbetweenindividualanduniversaltextsisequivalenttoPeirce'sdistinctionbetweenatokenandatype.5 Termsandexpressionsfunctionastypesifthey
canbeplacedbothbeforeandafterthecopulainatrueidentitysentencesuchas'AisA.'Inthiscase'A'standsforthetype,andthesentencemeansthattheuniversal
Aisthesameasitself.Termsandexpressionsfunctionastokensinturnwhentheyfailtomeetthatcondition.Intheexampleprovided,itwouldbefalsethatAisthe
sameasAbecausetheindividualAatthebeginningofthesentenceisnotthesameindividualattheend.Thenotionsoftokenandtypearesubcategoriesofthe
notionsofindividualanduniversal.Atokenisanindividualsignortextatypeisauniversalsignortext.Atextisatypebecauseitisthesortoftextofwhichtoken
textsareinstances,andatextisatokenbecauseitisanoninstantiableinstanceofatypeoftext.Tokensoccuronlyonce,butseveraltokensmaybelongtothesame
type.Thenotionsoftokenandtypedonotapply,then,toobjectsexceptincaseswherethoseobjectsaresemanticallysignificant.Bycontrast,thecategoriesof
individualanduniversalapplytoallsortsofobjects.Tospeakoftokenorindividualtextsandoftypeoruniversaltextsamountstothesamething.
Individualsshouldnotbeexclusivelyidentifiedwithsubstances,noruniversalswithfeatures,eventhoughthesecategoriesarefrequentlyexchangedinphilosophical
discourse.6 Theyareconfusedbecausesubstancesarethemostobviousexamplesofindividualsfoundinourexperience.Features,however,canbeandoftenhave
beenconsideredtobeindividualinthehistoryofphilosophy.7
UsingastandardAristoteliandistinction,asubstanceiswhatcanneitherbepredicableofnorpresentinsomethingelse.8 "Predicabilityof"and"beingabletobe
presentinsomethingelse"are,then,thecriteriathatdistinguishbetweenasubstanceanditsfeatures.Bycontrast,thedistinctionbetweenindividualanduniversalhas
todowithnoninstantiabilityandinstantiability,andbothofthesecategoriesmaybeappliedtosubstances:anexampleofindividualsubstanceisthecatChichi,an
exampleofuniversalsubstanceiscat.Likewise,althoughtheblackcolorofChichi'scoatisafeature,onecouldspeakofinstancesofthatblackcolor(theindividual
blackcolorofChichi'scoat)aswellastheinstantiableblackcolor(theuniversalblackcolorofChichi'scoat)ofwhichtheindividualblackcolorofChichi'scoatisan
instance.
Theissueoftheindividualityoruniversalityoftextsneedstoberaisedbecauseonthesurfaceitisnotclearwhethertextsareindividualoruniversal.Unlikethe
examplesofuniversalsandindividualsgivenearlier,textsseemtohavesomeofthefeaturesassociatedwithindividualsandsomeofthefeaturescharacteristicof
universals.9 Ontheonehand,textsarehistorical,theresultsoftheactionsofanindividualauthorworkingwithinadeterminatesetofcircumstancesatacertaintime
andthuswouldseemtobe,likeotherhistoricalentities,individual.Ontheotherhand,textsappeartobecapablenotonlyof

Page12

instantiationbutofmultipleinstantiation.ConsidertheexampleofthetextofDonQuixote.Thistextisahistoricalentity,publishedbetween1605and1615by
Cervantes,andthusitwouldseemtobe,likeotherhistoricalentities,individual.However,thetextofDonQuixoteappearsalsotobecapablenotonlyofinstantiation
butofmultipleinstantiation,becausethereareseveralcopiesofitinthelibraryandelsewhere.
Inthesensethattheyappearonthesurfacetobebothindividualanduniversal,textsareverymuchlikeartobjects.10Forartobjectsseemtobeindividualandatthe
sametimesubjectnotjusttoinstantiationbuteventomultipleinstantiation.TheoriginalofPicasso'sGuernica,forexample,isinamuseuminSpain,butthereare
reproductionsofitinvariousplaces,includingoneinmyofficewhereIkeepapostcardsentbyoneofmydaughtersfromSpain.Insofarassomeofthese
reproductionsmaybeindistinguishablefromtheoriginal,couldwenotsaythattheyareinstancesofthatoriginaland,therefore,thatPicasso'sGuernicaisinstantiable
andthereforeuniversal?AndyettheoriginalofGuernicaisahistoricalartifactthatexistsonlyinoneplaceatatimeandhasallthemarksnormallyassociatedwith
individuals.
Thecasewithtextsisevenmorepuzzling,becausetheoriginalprintingofatextandsubsequentprintingsofitappear,forallintentsandpurposes,tobe
indistinguishableasfarasthetextitselfisconcerned.11Thatis,althoughonemaywanttosaythatthisorthatprintingisdifferent,thetextoftheprintingsisregardedas
thesame.So,aretextsuniversalorindividual?
Myresponsetothisquestionisthatthecontroversyconcerningwhethertextsareindividualoruniversalistheresultofaconfusion.Differentpersonsanswerthe
questionoftheindividualityoruniversalityoftextsdifferently,dependingonwhattheyconsiderthetexttobe.Textsarecomplexandarecomposedofentities(ECTs)
thatareusedtoconveymeaning.However,asshallbecomeclearinChapter2,noteveryonethinksoftextsinthisway.SomeidentifytextswiththeirECTswhereas
othersidentifythemwiththeirmeaning.Thisgivesrisetodifferentviewsconcerningwhethertextsareindividualoruniversal,becauseitisnotobviouslytruethatboth
ECTsandmeaningcanbeindividualanduniversalor,ifso,whethertheyarealwaysbothindividualoruniversal.Myclaimisthat,onceitisclearwhatatextis,the
difficultiesconcerningtheindividualityanduniversalityoftextscanbesettled.12IneedtobeginwiththeindividualityanduniversalityofECTS.
A.IndividualityandUniversalityofECTs
ECTscanbeuniversalorindividual.Anythingwhatevercanfunctionasanentitythat,togetherwithotherentities,isusedasasigntoconveymeaning.Iassume,
moreover,thatthecategoriesofindividualityanduniversalityarejointlyexhaustiveandmutuallyexclusive,sothateverysinglethingiseitherindividualoruniversal,but
notboth.ECTscanbeofvarioussorts.Forexample,

Page13

therecanbephysicalandmentalECTs.Butthisshouldnotconfuseusabouttheindividualityoruniversalityoftheentitiesinquestion.Norshouldthemeaningofatext
beconfusedwiththeuniversalsofitsECTs.TheuniversalphysicalECTsarethoseofwhichtherecanbephysical(e.g.,writtenorspoken)noninstantiableinstances
andtheuniversalmentalECTsarethoseofwhichtherecanbemental(e.g.,imagined)noninstantiableinstances.TheuniversalECTs,however,arenotthemeaning
thattheindividualECTsaresupposedtoconveywhenusedastextsbutratheratypeofthephysicalormentalindividualsinquestion.Thiscanbeillustratedwiththe
followingtexts:
1.

2+2=4

2.

2+2=4

3.

Twoandtwomakefour.

4.

Twoplustwoequalsfour.

5.

Dosydossoncuatro.

Intexts15wehavefivesetsofindividualECTstowhichcorrespondonlyfoursetsofuniversalECTs(since1and2arethesameintype).13TheECTsoftexts15
instantiatefourdifferentuniversals:oneconsistingofmathematicalsymbols(1and2),twoofEnglishwords(3and4),andoneofSpanishwords(5).Andthesame
couldbesaidforthecorrespondingoralormentalECTsofthecorrespondingoralormentaltexts.TheoralECTswouldconsistofthesoundsweutterwhenwesay
thetexts,andthementalECTswouldbetheimageswehaveinourmindswhenweimaginethetexts.Thereis,therefore,nosingleuniversalsetofthephysicalor
mentalECTsconsideredassuch,evenwhentheymayhavethesamemeaning.
ItshouldbeobviousfromwhathasbeensaidthattheclassificationofECTsintouniversalandindividualhasnothingtodowiththestandardlogicalclassificationof
propositionsintouniversalandsingular.Considerthefollowingpropositions:
6.

AllSisP.

7.

AllSisP.

8.

SomeSisP.

9.

SomeSisP.

Accordingtothestandardlogicalclassification,6and7areuniversaland8and9aresingular.Butaccordingtoourclassification,theECTsof69areallindividual.
However,texts6and7areinstancesofthesameinstantiable,theuniversal"AllSisP,"andthesamecanbesaidabout8and9,whichareinstancesoftheuniversal
"SomeSisP."Thus,in69wehavefourindividualsetsofECTsthatareinstancesofonlytwouniversalsetsofECTs.

Page14

Inshort,theECTsthatconstitutetextscanbeindividualoruniversal,butwhatofmeanings?Wemustexaminetheindividualityanduniversalityofmeaningsbeforewe
cansettletheissueoftheindividualityoruniversalityoftexts.
B.IndividualityandUniversalityofMeanings
Meaningisanecessaryconditionoftextualitybuttextsarenottobeidentifiedwiththeirmeaning.Themeaningofatextiswhatweunderstandwhenweunderstand
thetext.Thus,forexample,themeaningof'2+2=4'isthattwoandtwomakefour.This,however,doesnottelluswhethermeaningsareindividualoruniversal.
TheontologicalstatusofmeaningisoneofthemostdisputedissuesinphilosophyandthusitwouldbepresumptuoustotrytosettleitintheshortspaceIcangiveitin
abookontexts.Nonetheless,somethingmustbesaidaboutitsothatthetheoryoftextualityIamexpoundingmaynotbeleftincomplete,butwhatIsayshouldbe
takenonlyasatentativeproposal.
Onewaytomakesomeheadwayinansweringthequestionofwhethertextualmeaningsareindividualoruniversalistolookatsomeexamples.Ofcourse,meaningis
notrestrictedtotexts.Words,forexample,havemeaningsand,accordingtotheunderstandingofmeaningIhaveproposed,themeaningof'white,'iswhite.Buthere
Iamconcernedonlywithtextualmeaning.Letusbeginbyconsideringthefollowingtexts:
10.

Catsaremammals.

11.

ThecatChichiisamammal.

12.

Archangelsareimmaterial.

13.

ThearchangelGabrielisimmaterial.

14.

Mentalimagescanbequitevivid.

15.

ThementalimageJorgehasisquitevivid.

Now,themeaningsof1015areasfollows:
10m.

Catsaremammals.

11m.

ThecatChichiisamammal.

12m.

Archangelsareimmaterial.

13m.

ThearchangelGabrielisimmaterial.

14m.

Mentalimagescanbequitevivid.

15m.

ThementalimageJorgehasisquitevivid.

Aconsiderationofmeanings10m15mleadsnecessarilytotheconclusionthatmeaningscanbeuniversalorindividual.Meanings10m,12m,and14mareuniversal
insofarastheydonotconcernanyoneindividualcat,archangel,

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ormentalimagebuteverycat,archangel,andmentalimage.Bycontrast,meanings11m,13m,and15mareindividualinsofarastheyconcernonlyanindividualcat,an
individualarchangel,andanindividualmentalimage.Themeaningsof11,13,and15havetodowiththenoninstantiableinstances"Chichi,""ArchangelGabriel,"and
''thementalimageJorgehas."Inshort,theseexamplesindicatethatthemeaningsoftextscanbeuniversalorindividual.
Onemayquestionthisconclusioninseveralways.Forexample,onemaywanttoarguethatitappearsstrangetosaythatmeaningsareuniversalorindividual.
Moreover,iftheyareso,whycouldtheynotalsohavethefeaturesweordinarilyattributetothings.Whycouldmeaningsnotbewhiteorblue,sweetorbitter,for
example?
Ibelievethisobjectionisbasedonthesurfacegrammaroflanguage.Myviewoftextualmeaningisthatitiswhatweunderstandwhenweunderstandatext.Thusthe
meaningof'2+2=4'isthattwoplustwoequalfour,andthemeaningof'Thewallsofmyofficearepaintedwhite'isthatthewallsofmyofficearepaintedwhite.In
thefirstIunderstandsomethinguniversal,inthesecondIunderstandsomethingindividual.Indeed,thosephilosopherswhounderstandpropositionsasthemeaningof
certainsentenceswouldwanttosaythatbythefirstIunderstandauniversalpropositionandbythesecondanindividual(orsingular)one.Andthosephilosophers
whoidentifymeaningswithstatesofaffairswouldwanttosaythatbythefirstIunderstandauniversalstateofaffairsandbythesecondanindividualone.Butthen,
shouldonenotalsosayconcerningthesecondthatIunderstandsomethingwhite?
Theanswertothisquestionisaffirmativetothisextent,thatwhatIunderstandisthatthewalliswhite.Thosewhoacceptaprepositionalviewofmeaningwouldwant
toaddthatIunderstandapropositionthatdescribesawhitewall.ThosewhofavorstatesofaffairswouldwanttosaythatIunderstandthestateofaffairsofawall
beingwhite.Andsoon.Butitisamistaketospeakofmeaningsashavingfeatureslikecolorbecauseindividualityanduniversalityarenotonthesameontological
levelascolor.
Iprefernottogetinvolvedinquestionsthataskwhethertextualmeaningsarepropositions,stateofaffairs,referents,uses,orthemanyotherthingsphilosophers
identifywithmeaning,formylimitedpurposesdonotrequireit.Itissufficienttoshowthattextualmeaningscanbeindividualoruniversal.
Anotherobjectiontowhathasbeensaidconcerningtheontologicalstatusoftextualmeaningistopointoutthatthecharacterizationgivenprovidesonlyaclassification
ofparticulartextualmeaningsbutdoesnottellusmuchabouttextualmeaningitself.Ismeaning,consideredinitselfandthusapartfromparticulartextualmeanings,
universalorindividual?
Theanswertothisobjectionisthatthementionedcategoriesdonotapplytotextualmeaningquatextualmeaningtheyapplyonlytothisorthattextualmeaning.To
trytoapplythemtotextualmeaningquatextualmeaning

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wouldbeliketryingtoapplyextensionalcategoriestointensionsorviceversa.Letmeillustratethepointbyreferringtothemeaningofsigns.Onemaywanttoargue
therearesomesignswhosemeaningsaresimplytheextensionsoftheterms(Socratesfor'Socrates')andthereareothersignswhosemeaningsaretheintensionsof
theterms(humanbeingfor'humanbeing').Ifthisisso,thenitisnotalwayspossibletoapplythesamecategoriesandprocedurestoboth.Forinstance,itwouldmake
nosensetoaskforadefinitionbygenusanddifferentiaofSocrates,asitwouldofhumanbeing,becauseSocratesisnotaspeciesthatcanbedefinedinthatway.
Likewise,itwouldnotdotoasksomeonetopointtohumanbeing,forthemostthatonecoulddowouldbetopointtoahumanbeing.
Thissameprinciplecanbeappliedtothemeaningoftexts,fornoteverymeaningisofthesamesort.Theexamplesprovidedearlierindicatethatsomemeaningsare
universalandothersindividual,regardlessofwhatultimatelyonetakesmeaningstobepropositions,statesofaffairs,andsoforth.Forthisreason,themostwecan
sayabouttextualmeaningquatextualmeaningisthatitisneutralwithrespecttothesecategories,notinthesensethatitcanbeneitherofthembutinthesensethatit
canbeboth,dependingontheparticularmeaninginquestion.Inthissensewemightcomparetextualmeaningtocloth,forjustasclothcanbedyeddifferentcolors
andthuscannotbesaidtohaveofitselfaparticularcolorbutcantakeonanycolor,sotextualmeaningcanbeofdifferentsortsandthuscannotinitselfbeidentified
withoneofthemtotheexclusionofothers.Ifitwereinthenatureoftextualmeaningtobeonetotheexclusionoftheothers,thenitcouldneverbetheothers.Say
thatitwereinthenatureoftextualmeaningtobeuniversal,thenitcouldnotbeindividual(singularsentenceswouldbemeaninglessorhaveuniversalmeanings).
Textualmeaning,quatextualmeaning,mustbeneutralwithrespecttothesecategoriesinorderthatparticularmeaningsfitintothem.
C.IndividualityandUniversalityofTexts
HavingexplainedhowtheECTsandmeaningsoftextscanbeindividualanduniversal,wemaynowaddresstheoriginalquestionraisedconcerningtheindividuality
anduniversalityoftexts.Intheexamplementioned,isthetextofDonQuixoteindividualoruniversal?
TheanswerdependsonwhatonetakestobethetextofDonQuixote.First,ifonetakesthetextofDonQuixotetobetheECTs,thentheanswerwilldependon
whetheroneisreferringtoanindividualsetofECTstheonesprintedonthecopyofDonQuixoteIown,forexampleortotheuniversalofwhichtheindividual
setcontainedinthebookIownisaninstance.Second,ifonetakesthetextofDonQuixotetobethemeaningtheECTs,whenusedassigns,areintendedtoconvey,
thentheanswerwilldependontheindividualityoruniversalityofthemeaningofthetext.Becausethetextisaboutanindividual

Page17

fictionalcharacter,onemightbetemptedtoconcludethatthemeaningofDonQuixoteisindividual.ButthefactisthatDonQuixotecontainsmanysentencesand
evenparagraphsthatmeannothingindividual.Forexample,DonQuixote'smusingsaboutlife.SoitisanoversimplificationtoclassifythemeaningofDonQuixoteas
individual.Third,ifonetakesthetexttobetheECTs,whethertheindividualortheuniversalset,insofarastheyareusedtoconveymeaning,whethersuchmeaningis
individualoruniversal,thentheansweriscomplexforitwilldependontheontologicalstatusoftheECTsandthemeaning,andthesestatusmaynotbethesame.In
thecaseofthetextofDonQuixote,wemaybereferringtoasetofuniversalECTs,whereasthemeaningmaybemixed,forexample.
Toavoidthecomplicationsresultingfromthethirdalternative,onemayfollowtheprocedureofcharacterizingtextsaccordingtothecharacteroftheirECTs.The
advantageofadoptingthisprocedureisnotonlythatitavoidscomplications,butthatitisreasonable,forECTsarethefoundationoftextsinthattextsarethoseECTs
usedassignstoconveymeaning.Thisbecomesobviouswhenoneexaminestherelationoftexts,theirECTs,andmeaning,asIshalldoinSectionIVlater.
II.IndividuationofTexts
Becausetextscanbeindividual,thequestioncomesupastowhatcausestheirindividuality.Thisiswhatisgenerallyreferredtoas"theproblemoftheindividuation"of
texts.Thesolutiontothisproblemisnodifferentfromthesolutiontotheproblemofindividuationofotherentities.Nothingissoidiosyncraticabouttextsthatitmakes
theirprincipleofindividuationdifferentfromthatofotherentities.AndbecauseIhavediscussedthisproblemelsewhereatlength,Iwillsimplypresentmypositionin
abbreviatedform.BeforeIdothat,however,IshouldmakeclearthatIdistinguishbetweentheproblemofindividuationproperlyspeakingandtheproblemof
individualdiscernibility.Theproblemofindividuationdoesnotconcernthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofourknowledgeofindividualsassuchthatisthe
epistemicproblemofdiscernibilitybutratherthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheindividualityofindividuals:themetaphysicalaccountofindividuation.14I
discusstheproblemofdiscernibilityundertwoheadings:identificationandreidentification,inChapter2.
Thattextscanbeindividualmeansthattheycanbenoninstantiableinstances.Andtoaskforthesourceor"principle"oftheindividualityofindividualtextsistoaskfor
thenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheirindividuality.Whatweareseeking,then,arethoseconditionsthatasawholeareresponsiblefortheindividualityofa
text,thatis,theconditionsunderwhichaninstantiabletextbecomesanoninstantiableinstance.

Page18

ElsewhereIhavedefendedtheviewthatthereisonlyonenecessaryandsufficientconditionofindividuality:existence.15Ifthisviewisappliedtotexts,itturnsoutthat
anytextthatexistsisindividualandonlyindividualtextsexist.Butexistence,ifthisviewistowork,mustnotbeconsideredtobeafeature,forifitwereafeatureit
wouldinturnrequireindividuation.Now,nothingthatexistscanexistwithoutfeatures,sofeaturesofsomekindoranotherarealsorequiredforindividuation.For
somethingtobeindividualitisnecessarythatitbesomekindofthing.Thereisnotextwithoutfeatures.Butthosefeatures,althoughnecessaryforatext'sexistence
andthusindirectlyforitsindividuality,arenotsufficientconditionsofitsindividuality.Onlyexistenceisbothanecessaryandsufficientconditionoftheindividualityof
texts,becauseexistenceimpliesfeaturesbutnotviceversa.
Thisviewhasbothgeneralandspecificadvantages.Itsgeneraladvantagesarethatitavoidstheproblemsthatplagueotherviews.Theexistentialviewofindividuation
doesnothavetoworryaboutthelogicalpossibilityoftwothingshavingexactlythesamefeatures,forexistenceisconsiderednottobeafeatureitdoesnothaveto
worryabouttheprincipleofindividuationbeingaccidentalandextrinsic,forexistenceisfundamentallytiedtothingsevenifnot,strictlyspeaking,essentialtothemand
itdoesnotneedtobeconcernedwiththedecharacterizednatureoftheprincipleofindividuation,foralthoughexistenceisnotsupposedtobeafeature,itisamatter
ofexperiencetoeveryone.
III.AreTextsPhysicalorNonphysical?
Toanswerthisquestionwemustmakecleartwothings.First,thecategoryofnonphysicalisnotequivalenttothecategoryofmental.Iunderstandthecategoriesof
physicalandmentalinsuchawaythattheyaremutuallyexclusivebutnotjointlyexhaustive.IfXissomethingphysical,itcannotbesomethingmental,butnot
everythingiseitherphysicalormental.Theremaybe,forexample,nonmentalnonphysicalentities,suchasGod,angels,andthelike.AlthoughIamnotpreparedto
arguefortheexistenceornonexistenceoftheseentitieshere,Iwanttoleaveopenthepossibilityoftheirexistencebecausemanyphilosophershavearguedforit.
Consideringourlimitedpurposes,however,thereisnoneedforustoconsidernonmentalnonphysicalcategories.Textsmustbeconstitutedbyepistemically
accessibleentities,anditisnoteasytoarguefortheepistemicaccessibilityofnonphysicalnonmentalentities.Iftherearesuchentitiesandtheyareepistemically
accessible,thenitisaltogetherpossible,otherthingsbeingequal,thattherebenonmentalnonphysicaltexts.
Second,wemustrememberthattextsareECTsusedtoconveymeaningandthereforearenotidenticalwithECTsormeaning.Forthisreason,primafacieitwould
appearbesttobeginourdiscussionbyaskingseparatelywhether

Page19

ECTsandmeaningcanbephysicalornonphysicalandifthelatter,mentalornonmental.But,inordinarydiscourse,conclusionsaboutthephysicalornonphysical
characteroftextsseemtobederivedexclusivelyfromthephysicalornonphysicalcharacteroftheirECTs.Whenonespeaksofanoraltext,forexample,onerefers
tospokenECTs.So,uponreflectionandtosimplifymattersIwilladdressthequestionofthephysicalormentalcharacteroftextsintermsofthephysicalormental
characteroftheECTs.16
A.PhysicalTexts
PhysicaltextsaretextswhoseECTsarephysical.17Textsconstitutedbypebblesarrangedincertainwaysonabeach,bylinesandfiguresdrawnonapieceofpaper,
orbypixelsonacomputerscreenarephysicalbecausetheentitiesthatconstitutethem,thatis,thepebbles,lines,figures,andpixels,arephysical.Indeed,our
ordinaryparadigmsoftextsarephysical,andofphysicaltextsitiswrittenandoraltextsthatwehaveinmindwhenwethinkabouttextsatall.
Onewayinwhichphysicaltextsmaybeclassifiedisaccordingtothesenseswithwhichwehaveaccesstothem.Inthisway,physicaltextscanbesaidtobevisual,
auditory,tactile,gustatory,andolfatory,dependingonwhetherweperceivethemthroughsight,hearing,touch,taste,orsmell.18Fromthefactthattextsmustbe
epistemicallyaccessible,itfollowsthatphysicalentitiesnotsubjecttoperceptionthroughatleastonesense(e.g.,matter)cannotconstitutetexts.Thisisthereasonwhy
physicaltextscanbeexhaustivelyclassifiedaccordingtothesensesthroughwhichweperceivethem.
Themostobviouscaseofavisualtextiswriting,buttextscanalsobecomposedofnonscriptdesigns,figures,pictures,andsoon.Norisitnecessarythattheessential
factorinavisualtextbeshape.Colorcouldverywell,andinfactdoes,functioninsomeinstancesasconveyorofmeaning.Forexample,redisoftenusedinEastAsia
tomeanhappiness.
Alessfrequentlyacknowledgedtypeofvisualtextconsistsofphysicalactions.Thedeaf,ofcourse,arequiteusedtothinkingaboutactionsparticularlythe
movementsofhandandfaceastexts,formanyofthesignstheyusetocommunicatewhentheydonotusewrittensignsareactionsofthissort.Buttherestofus
tendtoignorethistypeoftext.
Allthisappearsfairlystraightforward,andsomethingsimilarcouldbesaidaboutauditorytexts.Justastherecanbewrittentextsliketheonesmentioned,socanthere
beoraltexts.19Inthiscase,insteadofthewrittenmarksonapieceofpaperorotherwritingmaterial,therewouldbecertainsoundsutteredbyaspeakerormadein
someotherwaybyasubject.Considerthewrittentext'2+2=4.'WhenIreadaloudthistext,Iproduceanauditorytext.ThesoundImakewhenIreadthetextis
infactthesoundcounterpartofthewrittentext,butisnottobeidentifiedwiththewrittentext.Thesoundsthatapersonutters

Page20

inspeechormakeswhentransmittingthroughtelegraphindicateatypeoftextthatisauditory.
Anothertypeoftextthatfunctionsinourculturebutweseldomtakeintoaccountisthetactiletext.Itistheblindwhomostfrequentlyusethissortofphysicaltext.
Noneofthetypesofphysicaltextsmentionedisparticularlycontroversial.Whenwecometothepossibilityofgustatoryandolfatorytexts,however,mattersare
different,foratleastinourculturenocompositionsoftastesorsmellsseemtohavebeenusedastexts.Itistruethatinsomesensewespeakofsomesmellsand
tastesassignsofthisorthat.Butevenifweweretotakethatuseof'sign'toimplythatthetasteorsmellinquestionhasameaningconventionallyassignedtoit,that
wouldnotbesufficienttocallitatext.
Generally,whenwespeakoftastesandsmellsassigns,wearethinkingofthemascausallyrelatedtosomethingelseratherthanassignsproperlyspeaking.Thus,for
example,asourtasteinwineisasignthewinehasspoiled.Butthesearenotthesortsofsignsthatmakeuptexts,becausetheyarenotconventionallyattachedto
theirmeaning.Ofcourse,therearecasesinwhichacertainsmellisclearlyaconventionalsign.Takethefoulsmellthatisaddedtonaturalgassothatitcanbeeasily
andquicklyrecognized.Thissmelliscertainlyusedasasignofthepresenceofgas,butthissortofcaseisnotverycommonandappliesonlytosignsandnottotexts.
Atleasttworeasonsmaybegivenwhytastesandsmellsarenotusedastexts.ThefirstisareasonthatgoesbacktoAugustine.20Henotedthattasteandsmellare
privateinthesensethattheexperienceofasmelloratasteinvolvesthedestructionofthatwhichhasbeensmelledortastedand,therefore,precludesitsbeingsmelled
ortastedbyanyoneelseindeed,strictlyspeakingitwouldprecludetherepetitionofthesameexperiencebyeventhepersonwhoexperiencedthetasteorsmellinthe
firstplace.Itistrue,ofcourse,thatifIsmellbreadbeingbaked,thisdoesnotentailthatthebreadhasbeendestroyedandIcannotsmellitagain.MostlikelyIwill
continuetosmellituntilI,orsomeoneelse,haseatenitallandtheroomwherethebreadwasbakinghasbeenaired.ThepointmadebyAugustine,however,isthat
theindividualparticlesofthebreadIhavesmelledcannotbesmelledagain,becausetheprocessofsmellingimpliestheirmodificationbyourolfatoryorgans.I
continuetosmellthebreadbecausenewparticlesofthebreadarriveatmynostrils,notbecauseIcanhaverepeatedcontactwiththesameindividualparticles.And
thesamecouldbesaidabouttasteandfood.
Theproblemwiththisargumentisthatsoundsmaybecharacterizedtoacertainextentinthesameway.Onecouldargue,forexample,thatjustasbreadisdestroyed
whenitissmelledortastedandcannotbesmelledortastedagain,soasoundwavecannotbeheardagainbythesamepersonoranyoneelse.Onemayarguethat,
justasthebread,whichhaspartsthatcantastealike,thewave

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haspartsthatareheardalike.Norcanitbearguedthatsounds,unlikefood,canberecordedandthuspreserved.Therecordingofasoundisnomorethanthe
preparationofadevicethatcausesasoundofthesametypeastheindividualsoundbeingrecorded,notthepreservationoftheindividualsound.Inthissoundisno
differentfrombread,becauseagoodrecipewillensurethatthesametypeofbreadcanbeproduced.However,onedifferencehassomerelevanceinthecaseof
taste.Intastingafoodonemayconsumeallofit.Icandrinkallthewinethereis,forexample,butIcannothearallthesoundthereis.Ifthereissound,itcanbeheard
byeveryonewhohastherightauralequipment.Andthisdoesnotapplytosmells.
Inshort,theredoseemtobedifferencesinthewayinwhichsoundsandtastesfunctionthatcouldjustifyanexplanationofwhytastesarenotusedastextswhereas
soundsare.Butthedifferencesarenotsogreatthattheexplanationcanbeconsideredsatisfactory.Moreover,thedifferencesbetweensmellsandsoundsareeven
lesscompelling.Forthisreasonwemustlookfortheexplanationelsewhere.
Asecondreasonwhytastesandsmellshavenotbeenusedastextsisthattheytendtobebothsimpleandvague,lackingthecomplexitythatwouldberequiredof
themiftheyweretoserveastextsandtheprecisionnecessarytoservetheirfunctionunambiguously.HowcouldaCiceronianperiod,forexample,beproducedin
taste?PerhapsIambeingparochialhere,displayingindirectlythelackofsophisticationintheareaoftastesandsmellsthatpervadescontemporarysocietyinNorth
America.Allthesame,IdonotthinkthateventheFrenchortheChinese,peopleshighlyskilledintheartofcooking,havecomeupwithtextscomposedoftastesand
smells,andleastofallwithtextshavingthesortofcomplexityandprecisionofwhichCicerowascapableinwritingandspeaking.Logically,however,suchpossibility
mustbeadmitted.Onecouldthinkofasocietythat,owingtoextraordinarytechnicaladvances,wouldbeabletocontrolthehomogeneity,composition,and
consistencyofgasessothattheproductionofspecificsmellscouldbeproducedatwillandthusbeusedtocommunicatecomplexmeanings.Andthesamecouldbe
imaginedconcerningtaste.Itiscertainlypossibletocombinetastesandsmellsandtoarrangetheminsuchwaysthatmeaningwouldbeconveyedaslongasonewere
awareofthemeaningofthetastesandsmellsinquestion.
Althoughwetendtoseparatetextsbelongingtodifferenttypesay,writtenandoralthisseparationisbynomeansnecessary.Insomeculturesoraltextsareused
regularlytogetherwithvisualtexts.ThatthisisnotasfrequentinEnglishspeakingculturesismerelyanaccidentofhistory.InMediterraneancultures,forexample,itis
customarytoaccompanycertainwordsandexpressionswithparticularmovementsofthebodytoconveyspecificmeanings.

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Eachofthetypesofphysicaltextswehaveexaminedcouldbefurthersubdividedaccordingtothevariousphysicalfeaturestheyhave.Forexample,theycouldbe
classifiedbycolor,size,texture,andsoon.Butthesesubclassificationsdonotreadilyraiseintriguingphilosophicalissuesandthereforeneednotconcernushere.Two
subclassesoftexts,however,displayaninterestingrelation,whichneedstobetakenintoaccounttoclarifycertainproblemsthatcomeupwithrespecttotexts.Oneis
asubclassofvisualtexts,namely,writtentexts,andtheotherisasubclassofauditorytexts,thatis,oraltexts.21Theimportantfactforusaboutthesesubclassesof
textsisthattheyarefrequentlyrelatedassignsofeachother.22Writtentextsarefrequentlyintendedasvisualsignsoforaltexts.23Indeed,whensomeonedictates
andsomeoneelsewrites,whatisbeingwrittenisacceptedasasignofwhatisbeingsaid.Thereverserelationisalsotrue,moreover,fororaltextsareoftenintended
assignsofwrittentexts.WhenIreadaloudatext,Iampresentinganoralsignofthewrittentext.
Theoriginofthispeculiarrelationisthefactthatwritingseemstohavedevelopedasacodificationofspeech.24Forthisreason,writtensignsoftenfunctionassignsof
oraltexts.Naturally,thecharacterofthisrelationallowsnotonlytheuseofwrittentextsassignsoforaltexts,butalsomakespossiblethereverserelationinwhich
oraltextsareusedassignsofwrittentexts.
Thepeculiarrelationbetweenwrittenandoraltextsraisestwointerestingquestions.Thefirstconcernsidentityandmaybeformulatedasfollows:Cananoraltextand
awrittentextbethesametext,particularlywhenonefunctionsasasignoftheotherandbothhavethesamemeaning?BecauseIdevoteChapter2toquestionsof
identity,Ishallpostponediscussionofthisquestionuntilthatchapter.
Thesecondquestionisasfollows:Canawrittentextbeconsideredtobeameaningofanoraltext,andviceversa,whenbothtextsalsohavesomeothercommon
meaning?ConsiderboththeoraltextIutterwhenIreadaloudthewrittentext'Nosmokingispermittedhere'andthewrittentextmentioned.Boththeoralandwritten
textsmeanthatnosmokingisallowedhere,butitisalsothecasethattheoraltextmaymeanthewrittentextthatis,whatisunderstoodbytheoraltextisthewritten
text.Indeed,theoraltextmaypromptsomeonetothinkaboutthewrittentextandthewrittentextmaypromptsomeonetothinkabouttheoraltext,becausethatis
whattheyunderstandbythem.Itlooks,then,asif,inadditiontothecommonmeaningthatthetextshave,theyalsomeaneachother.
Ifthedifficultyunderconsiderationisnotwithsignsandtextsbeingsignsofsignsandtexts,butwiththefactthatthosesignsandtextshavetwodifferentmeanings,that
shouldnotbeconsideredveryserious.For,inthefirstplace,everysignandeverytexthasatleasttwomeanings.Oneisitselfandtheotheriswhateverothermeaning
ithas.Thuscatmeansboththesign'cat'and"cat."25

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AndNosmokingispermittedmeansboththetext'Nosmokingispermitted'and"Nosmokingispermitted."
Thefactthatsignsandtextsappeartohavedifferentmeaningsandevenfunctionsposesnoseriousdifficultyforunderstanding,foringeneralthecontextmakesclear
whichmeaningisinvolved.WhenIproducetheoraltextcorrespondingtothewrittentext'Nosmokingispermitted'andIamdictatingtoaclass,thestudentswill
writeontheirnotebooksthewrittentextmeantbytheoraltextwithoutgivingmuchthoughttoanyothermeaningoftheoraltext.Butifsomeoneissmokinginthe
classroomand,addressingthatperson,Isay"Nosmokingispermitted,"herreactionisquitedifferent.Mostlikelyshewillputouthercigaretteormakeanasty
remark,ratherthanwritedownonapieceofpaperthewrittentextthatcorrespondstotheoraltextIutter.Indeed,ifshedidthelast,wewouldthinkshewas
confused.Thus,neitherhavingmorethanonemeaningnorhavingthespecialrelationthatwrittenandoraltextshaveposesanyseriousdifficultiesforthenotionofa
physicaltext.26
B.MentalTexts
Incontrastwiththephysicalcharacteroftheentitiesthatconstitutephysicaltexts,theentitiesthatconstitutementaltextsaremental.Amentaltextisnotcomposedof
physicalentitiesbutofmentalphenomena.Thementaltextisconstitutedbyimagesorthoughtsthatsomeone,sayapsychologistinterestedinthenatureofmental
phenomena,investigatesorthinksaboutwhilecarryingonresearch.Considerthefollowingwrittentext,'2+2=4,'andfurtherconsidertheimageIcanformofthat
writtentextafterIclosemyeyesandimagineit.TheimageIformofthetextafterIclosemyeyesisamentaltext,andtheimageIformwhen,afteraninterruption,I
againthinkaboutit,isalsoamentaltext.Perhapsthedistinctionbetweenthementalandthephysicaltextcanbeillustratedbynotingthatthetwotextscannotshareall
features.Forexample,afeatureofthephysicaltext,'2+2=4,'isthatitiscapableofbeingvisuallyperceived,butthecorrespondingmentaltextlacksthiscapability
Icanusemyeyestoseethefirst,butIcannotdosoforthesecond.27
Thequestionthatarisesatthispointiswhetheradistinctioncanbemadebetweenmentaltexts,ontheonehand,andwhatsubjectsthinkaboutwhentheyaresaidto
understandtexts,ontheother.Thisquestionarisesbecauseitseemsdifficulttodistinguishbetweenamentaltextandthemeaningthetextconveys,forthemeaningof
atextdoesnotprimafacieappeartobesomethingphysical,whichseemstoimplyinturnthatitmustbesomethingmentalandidenticalwiththementaltext.The
questionisimportantbecause,ifthereisnodifferencebetweenamentaltextandthemeaningthetextissupposedtoconvey,then,fortheretobesomedifference
betweenatextanditsmeaning,thetextmustalwaysbephysical,andthiscontradictsmuchofwhathasbeensaidbefore.

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Thefollowingobservationsshouldhelpclarifythismatter.Thesamethingthatissaidconcerningwrittentextsvisvistheirmeaningmaybesaidalsoaboutmental
textsandtheirmeaning.Forexample,letussupposethatamentaltextisconstitutedbyamentalimageofthewrittentext'2+2=4.'Wecanthinkofthemeaningof
thementaltextwithoutthinkingaboutthementalimagethatconstitutesthetext.Andyet,tothinkofthetextwouldseemtorequirethinkingbothaboutthemental
imageanditsmeaning,becausethetextisinfactthatimageconsideredasconveyorofthemeaning.NotethatIamnotarguingthatallmentaltextshaveasECTs
imagesofwrittentexts.Theycouldcertainlybeconstitutedbyimagesoforaltexts,forexample.Indeed,theymaynotbeconstitutedbyimagesatall,althoughabout
thatIamnotatallsure.Butthatisaquestionthatdoesnotdirectlyconcernushere.Thepertinentpointsarethat,first,amentaltextisdifferentfromaphysicaltext
(whetherwrittenorspokenorwhateverelse),andsecond,thementaltextisnotthesamethingasthemeaningofamentaltext,justasthephysicaltextisnotthesame
thingasthemeaningofthephysicaltext.
Themeaningofatextconsistsofwhatweunderstandwhenweunderstandthetext,sothatitmayturnoutthatthemeaningsofmentalandphysicaltextsarethesame,
evenifthetextsarenotthesame.Thus,forexample,themeaningofthewrittentext'Thecatisblack,'oftheoraltext'Thecatisblack,'andofthementaltext(the
image)'Thecatisblack'arethesame,namely,thatthecatisblack,eventhoughthetextsaredifferentbecausetheirECTsaredifferent.Thefirstisavisualobjectthe
secondisanauditoryobjectandthethirdisanimaginaryobject.Fromthiswesee,then,thatthedistinctionbetweenthemeaningofaphysicaltextandthetextalso
appliestomentaltexts.
Nextwemightraisethequestionofthekindandorderofprioritybetweenphysicalandmentaltexts.Ontheonehand,itwouldseemthat,ifmentaltextscanbe
constitutedbyimagesandimagesarementalreproductionsoftheobjectsweperceive,thenthephysicaltexthaspriorityoverthementaltextinsofarasanimageofan
objectpresupposestheobject.Realistshavebeenharpingonthispointformanyyears.Ontheotherhand,itlooksasifsomeauthorscomposetextsintheirminds
beforetheycommitthemtowriting,thusshowingthatthementaltexthaspriorityoverthephysicalone.Indeed,theexampleofMozart,whoseemstohavecomposed
andcarriedthescoreofhismusicalworksinhismindforvaryingperiodsoftimebeforewritingthemdown,maybecitedtosupportthisintuition.
Bothofthesepositionsarepartlyrightandpartlywrong.Itistruethat,atleastforthoseofuswhodonotacceptinnateideasofanysort,whateverisfoundinthe
mindistheresultofexperience.Themindhaspowersofcombiningandseparating,sothatwhatisinitdoesnothavetobeanexactreplicaofwhathasbeen
perceived.Onecanholdthat,indeed,thementaltext,provideditisconstitutedbyimages,isinfactderivativeandsecondaryinthesensethat

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thoseimagesortheircomponentsaretraceabletoperception.Nevertheless,becausethemindmodifieswhatitperceivesinvariousways,thereisnorequirementthat
amentaltextbeanexactreplicaofaphysicaltext.Authorsmayuseimagesthatarenotderivedfromwrittentexts,say,tomakeupmentaltexts.Inthatcase,the
mentaltextisnotderivativeorsecondaryitisnotthementalreproductionofaphysicaltext,butanoriginaltext.Indeed,iftheauthorthengoesontoreproduce
physicallythementaltext,thephysicaltextisderivedfromthemental.
Stillsomeonemaywishtoarguethatevenwhenauthorsproduceoriginalwrittenororaltexts,theydonothavepriorimagesofwhatthetextsaregoingtolooklike
beforetheyactuallyproducethem.Thus,whileIamwritingthesewords,Imaynotbethinkingofthephysicalshapeofthesewordsandtheircomponents.PerhapsI
thinkoftheirsoundsbeforeIwritethem.ButwhenIspeak,producingaphysicalsoundtext,itdoesnotseemthatIproducementalimagesofthosesoundsbeforeI
actuallyproducethem.So,canitbearguedthatthementaltextprecedesthephysicaltext?
Ibelieveonecanarguethatinsomecasesthementaltextdoesprecedethephysicaltext.Thereisnoreasonwhyonecannotholdthatsomeauthorsdocomposenot
onlyshorttextsbutthetextsoflongandcomplexworksinthemind,whichtheycommittomemorybeforetheyreproducethemphysically.Thismayhavebeensoin
thecaseofMozart.Isay''may"becauseitisaltogetherpossibletoarguethatMozartandotherslikehimdonothaveintheirmindsthetextbutratheran
understandingofthework.Thatistosay,theymayhaveintheirmindsanunderstandingofthemeaningwhichthetextissupposedtoexpressratherthanthegroupof
signstheyaregoingtousetoconveythatmeaning.Whetherthisisthecaseornot,however,Istillwishtomaintainthatatleastinsomecasesamentaltextnotjust
anunderstandingofitsmeaningcouldprecedethephysicaltext,andIbasethisconclusiononexperience.Wecan,ifwewish,pictureinourmindsthesignsweare
goingtousetoconveyacertainmeaningtoanaudiencebeforeweproducethemextramentally,eventhoughweseldom,orperhapsnever,asamatterofordinary
practice,doso.
Ontheotherhand,caseslikethatofMozartareunusual.Mostauthorsoftextsdonotseemtothinkofatextfirstandthenproduceitwhetherorally,visually,or
otherwise.Theprocessesofphysicalproductionandmentalcompositiondonotseemtobeseparate.Ourmindworksverymuchlikeacomputerwhereacertain
eventsay,pressureonakeybringsaboutanothereventsay,theappearanceofaletteronascreen.Justasinacomputer,wherethepressureisnotanimageof
theletter,soinourexperience,whatevercausesthesoundstocomeoutofourmouthsorthehandandfingertomoveinacertainwayisnotanimageofthosesounds
producedbythemouthorthatshapeformedbythehand.

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Twofurtherquestionsmayariseinconnectionwithmentaltexts.Thefirstasksforthatwhichdistinguishesamentaltextfromaphysicalonebeyondthedistinctions
alreadypointedout.Iftherecanbementalreproductionsofphysicaltextsandsomephysicaltextsarecopiesofmentaltexts,thegeneralquestionofwhatsetsthe
mentalapartfromthephysical,andnotjustthespecificquestionofwhatsetsmentaltextsandphysicaltextsapart,becomesimportant.Thisisaninteresting
philosophicalquestion,butonethatisnotuniquetotextsandthereforeneednotbetakenuphere,althoughthewayoneanswersitwillaffectwhathasbeensaidhere
aboutphysicalandmentaltexts.Theimpossibilityofansweringitinpassing,however,forcesmetoleavethematterasis.28
ThesecondquestionaskshowthetextsIhaveclassifiedasmentalcanbeconsideredtextswhentextsmustbeintendedtoconveymeaningtoanaudienceandmental
textsareaccessibleonlytotheirauthors.Thisquestionmaybeansweredinavarietyofways.Forexample,itmaybepointedoutthatmanymentaltextsaremerely
trialrunsforphysicalandperceptibleones,whichsometimesgetproducedandsometimesnot.Also,itisoftenthecasethatauthorstalkmentallytothemselves
indeedtheydosophysicallyaswellinanefforttocoordinatetheirthoughts,formulatetheirviews,orpreservetheirviewsintheirmemorywiththeintentionoflater
usingthemtocommunicatewithothersatapropitioustime.Moreover,asweshallsee,thefunctionofauthorincludesthatofaudience,soitshouldnotbesurprisingto
findthattherearetextswhichhavenoaudiencebuttheauthor,thuseliminatingdifficultiesarisingfromthatquarteragainstthenotionofamentaltext.
IV.RelationofTextstoMeaningsandECTs
Themeaningofeachofthenoninstantiableinstancesofaninstantiabletextandthemeaningoftheinstantiabletext,thatis,themeaningofeachoftheindividualtexts
thatfallunderauniversaltextandthemeaningoftheuniversaltextunderwhichtheyfall,arethesame.29Considertwotextscitedearlier:
1.
2.

2+2=4
2+2=4

Itwouldmakenosensetosaythatthemeaningsof1and2arenotthesameorthatthemeaningof1,orof2,isdifferentfromthemeaningoftheuniversaltextof
which1and2areinstances.Naturally,tosaythat1and2areinstancesofthesameuniversalrequiresthattheconditionsoftheiridentitybespecified,whichis
preciselywhatwillbedoneinthenextchapter.Forthemoment,however,Ishallassumethatindeed1and2areinstancesofthesameuniversaltext.Thepointthatis
pertinenthereissimplythatinstancesofthesameuniversaltexthavethesamemeaningasthattext.

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Atextisagroupofentities(ECTs)consideredinrelationtoaspecificmeaning.30Therelationinvolvedisnotnaturalbecauseitistheresultofintentionanddesign
norisitrealinthesensethattheremaybesomethingintheECTsorthemeaningtowhichtherelationrefersotherthanthefeaturesoftheECTsandtheirmeaning.
Indeed,neithertheECTsnorthemeaningundergochangeasaresultofthetransformationoftheECTsintoatext.WhatchangesistheusetowhichthoseECTsare
putorareintendedtobeput,andthatistheresultofthewaytheyareconceivednamely,asbearersofthemeaning.ThereisnoindicationintheECTsoftheir
functionasbearersofmeaningwhentheyaretakenbythemselves,becausetheconnectionbetweenthemandthemeaningexistsonlyinthemindofthosewhouseor
intendtousethemtoconveymeaning.TherelationbetweenECTsandtheirmeaning,then,ispurelymental,eveniftheECTsthemselvesmaynotbe.
TheECTsoftexts1and2earlierarephysical,buttherelationbetweentheECTsof1,forexample,andthemeaningof1isapurelymentalaffairresultingfroman
author'sintentiontousetheECTsof1toconveythemeaningof1.Doesthisentailthattextsarealwaysmental?No,theyarenotalwaysmentalinsofarastheyhave
theontologicalstatusoftheentitiesthatconstitutethem,andthatstatusmaynotbemental,eveniftheyalwayshaveanaddedmentalrelationtoacertainmeaning.The
waythisrelationisaddedtotheECTsmaybegatheredfromthefollowingtwoillustrations.Considerthecaseinwhichanauthorusesphysical,writtenECTsto
conveysomeuniversalmeaning:
A=anindividualauthor
'2+2=4'=individualECTs
"2+2=4"=universalECTs
*twoandtwomakefour*=universalmeaning
+actsofunderstandingofA+=individualacts
A'sfunctionasauthoristotie*twoandtwomakefour*to"2+2=4,"butAdoesthisonlybytying*twoandtwomakefour*to'2+2=4,'throughthe+actsof
understandingofA+.Neither"2+2=4"nor*twoandtwomakefour*canbesaidtoexistortobeinanyplace.Thefirstbecauseitisatypetextandthesecond
becauseitisauniversalmeaning.Itdoesnotmakesensetosaythateitheronequauniversalisinamind,beitA'smindorthemindofGod,assomehavebelieved.If
theywereinmindstheywouldbeindividualandthereforecouldnotbeinanyothermindatthesametime,althoughweknowtheyare,becausetwoormorepersons
canthinkofthesameuniversalatthesametime.Andthesamecouldbesaidaboutexistence.Itmakesnosensetosaythatuniversals,whethermeaningsortexts,
existordonotexistforsimilarreasons.Itis,therefore,amistaketotrytofindaplaceandamodeofexistenceforuniversalmeanings.*Twoandtwomakefour*
doesnotexistanywherebecause

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neitherexistencenornonexistenceappliestoit.(Moreontheexistenceandnonexistenceoftextslater.)
NowconsiderthecaseinwhichanauthorusesphysicalwrittenECTstoconveysomeindividualmeaning:
A'=anindividualauthor
'TheimageJorgehasofMininaisquitevivid'=individualECTs
"TheimageJorgehasofMininaisquitevivid"=universalECTs
[TheimageJorgehasofMininaisquitevivid]=individualmeaning+actsofunderstandingofA'+=individualacts
Inthiscase,asinthepreviousone,theauthorA'connectsthemeaning[TheimageJorgehasofMininaisquitevivid]to"TheimageJorgehasofMininaisquitevivid"
through'TheimageJorgehasofMininaisquitevivid.'Thedifferenceisthatthemeaninginquestionisindividual.Therefore,whatA'understandsissomething
individualratherthansomethinguniversal.Whatwehaveisaphysicaltypetextwithanindividualmeaningthatistheresultofamentalandconventionalrelation
establishedbyanauthor(onthebasisofsocialprecedents,andsoon)betweentheindividualECTsofthetextandanindividualmeaning.
Whathasbeensaidaboutauthorsalsoappliestoanyaudienceofthetextanauthorhascomposed.Justasanauthorthinksoftheuniversalmeaningthroughthe
individualactsofunderstandingintheauthor'smind,soanymemberoftheaudiencewithaccesstotheindividualECTsmayalsounderstandtheuniversalmeaningofa
text.
Anindividualtext,then,isanoninstantiableinstanceofauniversaltextandconstitutedbyindividualECTsthatarethemselvesnoninstantiableinstancesofuniversal
ECTs.Moreover,itisintendedbyitsauthortoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudiencethatis,tocauseanunderstandingonthepartoftheaudience.Theuniversal
text,bycontrast,isconstitutedbyuniversalECTs,butitsmeaningisthesameasthatoftheindividualtext.
Becausetextsareartifactsanddependonconvention,however,wecannotsaythatcertainuniversalECTsaretiedtomeaningsnaturallyorindependentlyofa
subject'sintentionanddesign.Butsubjectshaveaccesstouniversalsonlythroughindividuals.Itfollows,then,thatuniversaltextsinasensedependonindividualtexts
forinindividualtexts,individualECTsareinfacttiedtomeaningthroughtheintentionanddesignofanauthor.
Textshaveapeculiarstatus.UniversaltextsareconstitutedbyuniversalECTsandassuch,asweshallseelater,areneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocation,but
theirmeaningscanbeuniversalorindividual.Individualtexts,ontheotherhand,areconstitutedbyindividualECTsalthoughtheirmeanings,aswithuniversaltexts,can
beuniversal.Thusneitheruniversalnorindividual

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textscanbeconsideredpurelyuniversalorindividualinallcases.Strictlyspeaking,theyhaveadividedsortofontologicalstatusandlocationdependingonthe
ontologicalstatusandlocationoftheirECTsandmeanings.Themostconvenientwaytodescribethem,however,asIdidbefore,istogiveprioritytotheentitiesthat
constitutethem(ECTs)andthustoidentifytheontologicalstatusandlocationofthetextwiththeontologicalstatusandlocationofthoseentities.Fortextsarethose
entitieswithanaddedmentalrelationtoaspecificmeaning.Iftheentitiesarephysical,thetexthasaphysicallocationiftheyaremental,thetexthasamentallocation
andiftheyareuniversal,thetextisneutralwithrespecttolocation.
V.AreTextsSubstancesorFeatures?
Themostcontroversialontologicalissueswithrespecttotextshavetodowiththeirindividualityoruniversalityandphysicalormentalcharacter,butnoconsensushas
beenreachedonseveralotherissuesaswell.Twoaboutwhichsomethingshouldbesaidinpassingarethequestionsofthesubstantialityandaggregatecharacterof
texts.Thefirstinvolvesdeterminingwhethertextsaresubstances,features,orboth,consideredeitherseparatelyorincombination.
Beforeonecandeterminethestatusoftextswithrespecttothesecategories,however,somethingneedstobesaidaboutthecategoriesthemselves.Thedefinitionof
thesecategoriesisbynomeanseasy.Indeed,itposessomanyproblemsthatmanyphilosophershaveoptedforrejectingaltogetherthenotionsofsubstanceand
feature.Idonotwishtogetboggeddownhereinadiscussionofsubstancesandfeaturesorinadefenseofthesubstancefeaturedistinction.Rather,Iproposeto
arguethat,wereonetoacceptthisdistinctioninthewayIshallexplainitpresently,certainconclusionswouldfollowconcerningtexts.
FollowingtheprocedureIadoptedinpassingearlier,IproposetounderstandasubstanceinthetraditionalAristoteliansenseinwhichsomethingisasubstance
provideditisneitherpredicableofnorpresentinsomethingelse.31AndIproposetounderstandafeatureasanythingthatiseitherpredicableoforpresentin
somethingelse.Peter,mycatChichi,andthedeskonwhichIamwritingthesewordsaresubstances,butthecolorofPeter'seyes,Chichi'stemperament,andthe
shapeofthedeskarenotrather,theyarefeaturesofthosesubstances.Thedeterminingfactoronwhethersomethingisorisnotasubstanceisnotbasedonwhether
itcanhavefeaturesbutonwhetheritisorisnotafeature.Featurescanhavefeaturesasacolormayhaveaparticularintensityoratemperamentmayhaveacertain
characterbutthatdoesnotmakethemsubstances,fortheyarestillpredicableoforpresentinsomethingelse.Themisunderstandingofthisfactleadstofrequent
confusionsindiscussionsofsubstantiality.

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Theunderstandingoffeaturepresentedhereisverybroad.ItincludeswhatAristoteliansrefertoasgenericandspecificcharacteristicssuchas"animal"and"human,"
specificdifferencessuchas"rational,"propertiessuchasthe"capacitytolaugh,"accidentssuchas''white"and"threefeetlong,"andparts,suchasafinger.32Within
accidentswouldbeincludednotonlyqualitiessuchas"white"andquantitiessuchas"threefeetlong"butalsorelationssuchas"fatherhood,"timessuchas"three
o'clock,"actionssuchas"movingthehands,"andsoon.Allofthesecanbesaidinsomesenseofotherthings,eveniftheydonotintrinsicallycharacterizethem.I
understandthisnotionsobroadlyforthesakeofconvenienceandbrevity.Idonotmeantoruleoutthepossibility,forexample,thatsuchthingsasrelationsmaybe
whatarecalledincontemporaryphilosophy,monadicproperties.TheexactontologicalstatusofrelationsandthelikeisnotthetopicofthisbookandthusIintendto
leavesuchquestionsopen.
Havingunderstoodsubstancesandfeaturesinthestatedway,wemayreturntothequestionofwhethertextsaresubstances,features,both,oracombinationofboth.
FromtheunderstandingoftextsadoptedintheIntroduction,itwouldappearprimafaciethattheycouldbeboth.Thereasonisthattheentitiesusedasthesignsof
whichatextisconstitutedcanbeanything.Yet,whenonelooksatthesituationmorecarefully,textscannotbesubstancesexclusivelyifbythatonemeansthatthey
arecomposedofsubstances,whetherofoneormorethanone,consideredapartfromtheirfeatures.33Tworeasonsmaybegivenforthis.Thefirstisthatsubstances
arealwayscharacterizedthatis,theyalwayshavefeatures.PeterisamanandshortChichiisablackcat.Thisis,ofcourse,thewayAristotle,thescholastics,and
manycontemporaryauthorsunderstandsubstance.Butthoseauthorswhoconceivesubstanceasdecharacterizedassomeearlymodernphilosophersdidandsome
proponentsofbareparticularsdointhiscenturywouldnotbeimpressedbythisreason.
Thesecondreasonisthattextsmustalwaysbecomposedofmorethanonesignandthusasinglesubstancewithoutfeatureswouldlackthecomplexityrequiredof
texts.Hence,evenifoneweretoconceivesubstancesasdecharacterized,asinglesuchsubstancecouldnotfunctionasatextIshallconsiderthecaseofseveral
decharacterizedsubstanceslater.
Asubstancecanbeatextonlywhenthefeaturesofthesubstancefunctionassignsthat,takentogetherinthearrangementinwhichtheyappearinthesubstance,are
usedtoconveyacertainmeaningbyanauthortoanaudience.Forexample,considerthecaseofapersonPwhowantstocommunicateamessagetoanotherperson
P&primeatsomefuturetimewhentheywouldnothavedirectaccesstoeachother.Andsupposefurthermorethattheonlywaytheycouldcommunicatewouldbe
throughathirdpersonP"whoissupposedtobekeptinthedarkastothemeaningofthemessageheisconveying.Undertheseconditions,itwouldbepossibleforP
tosendsomeobjectasagifttoP'bymeansof

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P"inwhichtheobjectanditsfeaturesfunctionasatext.PandP'mightagree,forexample,thatifPsendsabrownwalletitmeansthatP'istodepositthemoneyP
hasentrustedtoP'inthebank.Ifthewalletisblack,however,themoneyistobegiventoacertaincharity.Ontheotherhand,ifinsteadofawallet,Psendsapurse,
thatmeansthatP'istokeepforhimselfthemoneythatbelongstoP,andsoon.Inthesecases,theobjectanditsfeatureswouldactasatext.Moreover,becausethe
objectisneitherpredicablenorpartofsomethingelse,thetextwouldbethesubstanceconsideredtogetherwithitsfeatures.
Still,thereisanotherpossibilitythatmaybeexplored.Letussupposethat,insteadofonesubstance,wehaveseveralsubstancesthatfunctionassignstoexpressa
specificmeaningandthatthetextiscomposedonlyofthesubstancesconsideredapartfromtheirfeatures.Doesthismakesense?No,becauseforthesubstancesin
questiontofunctionassignsthatexpressthecomplexmeaningofthetexttheyneedtohaveeithercertainarrangement,orcertaindistinguishingfeatures,orboth.
Consider,forexample,thecaseofthreebilliardballsthattogetherareusedasatextwhosemeaningis"XisY."Ifthebilliardballsaresimilarinalldiscernible
features,wecouldnotpossiblyusethemtosaythatXisY,forwecouldnotknowwhichoftheballsfunctionsas"X,"whichas''Y,"andwhichas"is."Weneedto
haverecourseto,say,theircolortheblackballfunctionsas"X,"thewhiteballas"is,"andtheredballas"Y"ortheirarrangementthefirstballfunctionsas"X,"
thesecondballas"is,"andthethirdballas"Y."Butbothcolorandarrangement,orwhateverelsewemayusetodistinguishtheballs,areconsideredfeaturesinthe
ontologyweareusing.Theresultisthat,evenincasesoftextscomposedofmultiplesubstances,wehavenopurelysubstantialtexts.Theconclusionofallthisisthat
therecanbenotextscomposedonlyofsubstances,evenseveralsubstances,consideredapartfromtheirfeatures.
Notethatitwouldnotdotosayagainstthisargumentthatitconfusesontologyandepistemologybecauseitgivesasareasonagainstthenotionofatextcomposedof
substancesconsideredapartfromtheirfeaturesthatthesubstancesinquestioncannotbediscerned.Wehaveacceptedthattextsareepistemicentitiesinthesense
thattheymustbesubjecttoacquaintance.Hence,ifthisobjectionistobeeffective,itwouldbenecessaryfirsttodoawaywiththeepistemicrequirement.
Iftextscannotbecomposedexclusivelyofsubstancesconsideredapartfromtheirfeatures,however,wemayask:Cantheybecomposedoffeaturesandnothingbut
features,thatis,cantextsbecomposedexclusivelyofsignsthatarepredicableoforpresentinotherthings?Inoneoftheexamplesgivenearlier,woulditbepossible
forPtosendamessagetoP&primesolelyonthebasisofsomefeaturesofanobjectratherthanontheobjectconsideredtogetherwithitsfeatures?Itseems
possible.Indeed,PandP&primemighthaveagreedthatP

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wouldsendanobjectasagiftandagreedbeforehandthatthecolorandshapesdisplayedonthesurfaceoftheobjectwouldbetheconveyorofP'smessage.Ifthe
colorisredandtheshapesarestars,Pistodepositacertainamountofmoneyinthebankifthecolorisblackandtheshapesarestars,heistogivetheamountof
moneytocharityandsoon.Inthesecases,notthesubstancebutsomefeaturesofit,namely,thecolorsandshapesonitssurface,constitutesthetext.
Mosttextswithwhichweareacquaintedappeartobeofthefeaturevariety.Forexample,theverytextIamputtingdownonpaperatthismomentappearstobe
relatedtothepaperasafeatureorsetoffeaturesofit,foritiscomposedofblackmarksthatcharacterizethepaperinacertainway.
Theviewthattextscanbefeaturesandthatmostofthetextswithwhichweareacquaintedarefeaturesandnothingbutfeatures,doesfacesomedifficultiesthatneed
tobeaddressed,however.Forexample,itisnotquiteclearthattheblackmarkstowhichIreferredasatextarefeaturesofthepaper.Inthefirstplace,themarksdo
notseemtobeapartofthepaperinthewayahandisapartofahumanbeingorasideisapartofatriangle.Moreover,themarksdonotseemtocharacterizethe
paperinthewaycolordoes.Forthemarkscanbeconsideredtobedriedpatchesofinkstucktothepaperinthewayapieceofgumisstucktotheundersideofa
chair,andsotheywouldappeartobe,likethegum,substancesratherthanfeatures.
Thefirstpartofthisobjectionisquitesensible.Theblackmarksonthesheetofpaperthatconstitutethetextinquestionarenotpartsofthepaperinthewaythe
lowerhalfofthesheetofpaperisapartofthesheetorthemoleculesthatmakeupthesheetofpaperarepartsofit.Butthesecondpartoftheobjectionisnottobe
grantedsoeasily,forthemarks,unlikethepieceofgum,maybeconsideredtobefeaturesofthepaperinsofarastheyaredependentuponitbothlogicallyand
ontologically.Logically,thenotionofamarkisrelatedtothenotionofsomethingelseonwhichitisamarkontologically,marksdonotexistindependentlyofthe
thingstheymark.Whetherwhattheymarkisasheetofpaperornotisirrelevantwhatispertinentisthatmarkshavenoindependentexistenceapartfromotherthings.
Thisispreciselywhatitmeanstobeafeatureratherthanasubstanceasagreeduponhere,andwhatdistinguishesmarksfrompiecesofgumandothersubstances.
Still,onemaywanttocounterarguethatthemarksaremadeupofink,whichinturnismadeupofmoleculesthatareneitherpartsofthesheetofpapernor
characterizeit.Inthatcaseitwouldseemthatthetextmadeupofinkmarksisnotafeatureofthepaperafterall,butratheracollectionofsubstances(molecules)
arrangedinacertainwayonthesurfaceofthepaper(anothersubstance),inthewaythatagroupofpebbles,forexample,restsonabeach.
Thiscounterargumentmaybeansweredbydrawingadistinctionbetweenatextthatconsistsofmarksonapageandatextcomposedofthemolecules

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thatmakeupink.Thetextconsistingofmarksisafeaturebecausemarksarefeaturesanddependentonotherthingsfortheirexistence.However,whenonespeaks
ofatextascomposedofthemoleculesthatmakeupinkarrangedinacertainway,oneisnotspeakingaboutmarks,butaboutinkanditsparts.Inthatcaseitistrue
thatthetextisnotafeature,butratheranaggregatesubstancethatis,anaggregateofmolecules.Indeed,evenifundernormalconditionsthearrangementofsuch
moleculescouldnotbemaintained,onecouldalwaysfreezeinkandcarveatextoutofit.Frozenliquidscancertainlymakeuptexts,andsuchtextswouldhavetobe
consideredsubstantialwintercarnivalsarefulloftextscomposedofblocksoffrozenwater.Butmarksonasheetofpapercanbenothingbutfeaturesofthesheetin
questionregardlessofwhatthemarksaremadeof.
Iamnotarguingthatonethingisbothasubstanceandafeatureofasubstance.Iamarguingthatthetextswearespeakingofineachofthecasesdescribedis
differentand,therefore,canhavedifferentontologicalstatus.Amark,quamark,isafeature,whereasink,quaink,isasubstancecomposedofmolecules.The
complicationarisesbecausethemarksinquestionareproducedbyinkandinkisasubstance,whichraisesthequestionofwhethersubstancescanfunctionasfeatures
ofothersubstances.Astheexamplediscussedillustrates,theycannotfunctionasfeatures,buttheycancausefeatures.Inkproducesamarkonthesheetofpaper,
butthatmark,consideredquamark,isnolongerink,althoughitisproducedbyink.Hence,itcanbesaidwithoutcontradictionthatthemarkisafeatureofthepaper
whereasinkisnot.Nordoesitmakeanydifferencethatwespeakof"inkmarks,"forinsuchcaseswhatismeantispreciselythatthemarksareproducedbyink.The
situationisnotverydifferentfromtheonethatexistsbetweenanobjectandtheshadowitcasts.Theobjectisnottheshadow,butnonethelessitisthecauseofthe
shadow.
Fromallthiswemayconcludethattextscanbecomposedexclusivelyoffeaturesorcanbecomposedofsubstancesandtheirfeaturesbuttheycannotbecomposed
exclusivelyofsubstancesconsideredapartfromtheirfeatures.Becauseinthediscussionofthesupposedsubstantialityoftextsexamplesofsubstancefeaturetexts
wereprovided,thereisnoneedtodwellanyfurtherinthiscategory.
TheviewIhavepresentedhereisbynomeanswidelyaccepted.Althoughnotmuchattentionhasbeengiventotheontologyoftextsincontemporarycircles,the
prevalenttendencythesedaysistoconceivetextsasformsofaction.34ThebackgroundofthispositionistobefoundintheusestowhichAustin'sworkhasbeen
put.Austin'sdiscussionofspeechactshasledsometotheviewthattextsareinfactactsandnothingbutacts,althoughitisnotalwaysclearwhichoftheactstowhich
Austinreferred(locutionary,illocutionary,orperlocutionary)theyhaveinmind.35

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Thispositionrestsonaconfusionbetweentheactthatproducesatextandthetextitself.ThatIengageintheactofwritingorspeakingtoproduceawrittenor
spokentextdoesnotwarrantidentifyingtheactinquestionwiththeresultingtext.36Nordoesitmakesensetoidentifythelocutionaryactofutteringatextwiththe
textitselfthatis,withthesoundsbeinguttered.Thecasewiththesignlanguageusedbythedeafisdifferent,becauseinthatlanguagesomesignsconsistpreciselyin
theactofmovingthefingers,thehand,andotherpartsofthebodyincertainways.Andsomethingsimilarcouldbesaidaboutsocalledbodylanguage.Ofcourse,
someofthesignsofthesignlanguageusedbythedeafandthebodylanguageusedbymostculturesarenotactsbutpositionsofthefingersorexpressionsoftheface,
andinthosecasesthetextsdonotconsistofactseither.Inshort,textscanconsistofactsandbecomposedofsignsthatconsistofacts,buttheyneednotbeso.37
VI.AreTextsAggregatesorNonaggregates?
Somethingisanaggregateifitisacollection,set,orgroupofentitiesthatconstituteawhole.Somethingisnotanaggregateifitlacksthemultiplicitycharacteristicof
aggregates.Aggregatesarenecessarilycomplex,whereasnonaggregatesarenecessarilysimple.Theseconceptionsofaggregateandnonaggregateareverybroad.
Theyincludehomogeneoussubstancesinwhichthemembersofthegroupmayberelatedextrinsicallyonlyandalsoarrangementsofontologicallydiverseentitiesmore
closelyrelated,suchassubstancesandtheirfeatures.
FromtheunderstandingoftextsascomplexartifactscomposedofgroupsofentitiesusedassignsadoptedintheIntroductionandwhathasbeensaidintheprevious
section,weshouldexpectthatsuchcomplexitybereflectedintheirontologicalmakeup.Thefactthatthemostobviouscasesoftextswithwhichweareacquainted
areaggregatesofonesortoranothersupportsthispoint.ConsiderthescriptIamputtingdownonthispaperatthismoment.Itiscertainlyanaggregateoffeatures,
foritconsistsofcertainmarksonthepagethathavecertainshapesandsoon.Thescriptcouldinfactbeanalyzedintermsofvariousfeaturessuchascolororshape
andtherelationshipsamongthem.PuttingtogetherthefeaturecharacterofthetextthatIamnowwritingwithitsaggregatecharacter,wecouldclassifythetextasa
featureaggregatetypeoftext.
Asecondpossibilitymightresultwhenatextisconsideredasawholecomposedofasubstanceanditsfeatures.Inthiscasetherelevantaspectsofthetextareboth
thesubstanceanditsfeatures.Considerthecaseofthetextcomposedofawalletofacertaincolordiscussedearlier.Inthiscasethemeaningofthetextdependsnot
onlyonthewallet(substanceorsubstancecumfeatures,dependingonone'sviewofsubstance),butalsoonitscolor(feature).Thuswe

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haveamixedsortoftext,whichmaybecalledsubstanceorfeatureaggregatetext.Thereisnoreasonwhythistypeoftextmaynotbecomposedofmultiple
substancesandtheirfeatures.Atextcomposedofpebblesofdifferentcolorsarrangedinacertainwayonthebeachiscomposedofseveralsubstances(thepebbles)
andtheirfeatures(colors,arrangement,etc.).
Sofarwehaveseenhowanaggregateconceptionoftextsfitstheconceptionoftextswehaveadopted,butisitpossiblefortextsnottobeaggregates?Anaffirmative
answertothisquestionisnotviablebecauseofthenecessarycomplexityoftexts.Indeed,inourexperiencetextsalwaysareaggregates.Themostlikelycaseofa
nonaggregatetextwouldbethatofoneconsistingofasimplesubstance.Buttextscannotbecomposedofsubstancesconsideredapartfromtheirfeatures,letalone
onesimplesubstance.Asimplesubstance,withoutpartsorfeatures,anotioninitselfdifficulttoentertain,couldnotbecomposedofagroupofsignsusedtoconvey
textualmeaning.Asubstancemustbecomplexinsomesensetofunctionasatext,andifitiscomplexanditspartsorfeaturesfunctionassignsthatmakeupthetext,
thenthetextturnsouttobeanaggregateafterall.
Onemightstillwanttoarguethatinthiscasethecomplexityofthesubstanceisnotpartofthetext.Ifthefeaturesofthesubstancewerenotconsideredpartofthe
text,however,thesubstanceinquestioncouldnotreallyfunctionasatext.Indeed,itisquestionablewhetheritcouldfunctionevenasasign,forsignsalsomustbe
distinguishablefromotherthingstofunctionassignsandthusrequirefeatures,whichwouldentailcomplexity.Inshort,textsalwaysrequireaggregation.
VII.ExistenceandLocationofTexts
Theanswertothequestionconcernedwiththeexistenceandlocationoftextsiscloselyrelatedbothtotheuniversalityandtheindividualityoftexts.Thetheoriesthat
dealwiththisissuemaybedividedintotwosorts,dependingonwhethertheyidentifytheexistenceoftextswithmentalexistenceorwithextramentalexistence.The
formerlocatetextsinmindsandthelatterlocatethemoutsideminds.Ofthosethatlocatetextsinminds,threestandoutinparticular.Thefirstholdsthattextsare
locatedinthemindofGodthesecond,inthemindoftheauthorandthethird,inthemindoftheaudience.(Ofcourse,itisalsopossibletoholdcombinationsof
theseviews.)38Theaudienceissometimesidentifiedwithoneormoreparticularpersonsandatothertimeswiththesocialgroupconsideredasawhole.
Alltheseviewshaveimportantpointsintheirfavor.PuttingtextsinGod'smindisconvenient,foritsolvestheproblemofwherethesetextsarebeforeanyhumanbeing
thinksofthem.Puttingtextsintheauthor'smindmakessensebecause,afterall,theauthorissupposedtohavecreatedthetext.Finally,

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puttingthetextinthemindoftheaudiencehelpstoexplainhowaudiencescanunderstandtexts.
Theproblemwiththeseviews,however,isthattheyconceivetextsasmentalphenomenaofonesortoranother,andtextsneednotbemental.Therecanbephysical
texts,andinfactmosttextswithwhichweareacquaintedandthatfunctioneffectivelyinsocietyarephysicalinsofarastheirECTsarephysical.Itwillnotdotorestrict
textstoamentalsortofexistence.
Implicitintheviewthattextshaveonlymentalexistencearetwomisguidedassumptions:Thefirstistheidentificationofatextwiththemeaningindividualknowers
graspwhentheyunderstandatextthesecondistheconceptionofalltextualmeaningasmental.Ifoneassumesthattextsarethesameastheirmeaningsandmeanings
aremental,itfollowsthattextshaveonlymentalexistence.ButtextsarenotthesameastheirmeaningasalreadystatedandaswillbearguedinmoredetailinChapter
2,andtheviewthatmeaningisnecessarilymentaliscertainlyacontroversialonethatcannotbeused,withoutstrongsupport,toargueinfavorofsomeotherview.39
Therefore,theviewthatatextisalwayssomethingmentalandthatatexthasonlymentalexistence,basedonthementalcharacteroftheunderstandingofthatmeaning
byknowers,isnotprimafacieviable.
Theothersortoftheoryabouttheexistenceandlocationoftextsplacestextsoutsidethemind.40Andhere,again,wefindatleasttwoopinions.Forsomeauthors,
textsaretobefoundintheworldasobjectswithanexistencesimilartothatofotherobjects.Forothers,whoadoptaPlatonicapproach,textsarenotpartofthe
worldbutnonethelessarelocatedoutsidemindsinaplaceoftheirown,wheretheyhavearealitygreaterthanthatoftheworldorofminds.41
Thereisconsiderablemeritintheseviews.Textsappeartoustohavemorethanmentalreality,andinfactmosttextsweencounterarephysicalentitiesinsofarastheir
ECTsarephysicalentities.Hence,itmakessensetosaythattextsarepartoftheextramentalworld.TheadvantagesofthePlatonicposition,ofcourse,arerelatedto
thecausalexplanationoftheexistenceoftokentexts,fortheexistenceofarchetypaltextsseemstohelpexplaintheexistenceoftheircopies.
Neitheroftheseviews,however,seemsadequateinsofarasbothfailtoexplaintherelationoftextstotheirunderstanding.Iftextsaresimplyextramentalobjectsof
onesortoranother,orevenarchetypalideasofaPlatonicsort,howcantheybeunderstoodassomethingdifferentthanwhattheyare?Fortheunderstandingoftexts
isnottheunderstandingofwhattheirECTsare.WhenIunderstandthetext'2+2=4'Idonotunderstandcertainlinesandshapesmadeupofinkprintedonapiece
ofpaper.Rather,Iunderstandthattwoplustwoequalfourthatis,Iunderstandthemeaningofthoselinesandshapes.Theproblemwithviewsthatidentifytextswith
extramentalrealitiesisthattheyfailtotakeaccountofthefullnatureoftextstheydonotrealizethattextsareentities

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endowedwithmeaning,andnotjusttheentitiesthatconstitutethemconsideredapartfrommeaning.Inaddition,itshouldbeclearthatatleastsometextsaremental
andthusexistinminds,soitmakesnosensetoputalltextsoutsideminds.
Thepositionthatlocatestextsinthemindandtheonethatlocatestextsoutsidethemindmaketwomistakesofthesamesort,althoughindifferentdirections.First,
thosewholocatetextsinthemindidentifytextsexclusivelywithmeaningandunderstandmeaningassomethingmentalthosewholocatetextsoutsidethemindidentify
textsexclusivelywithECTsandunderstandECTsasnonmental.Bothpositionsleaveoutanessentialaspectoftextuality:TheformerleavesouttheECTsandthe
latter,themeaning.Second,thesepositionsrestrictthenatureofmeaningandECTstoeitherthementalornonmentalrealm.Inordernottofallintothesametraps,a
differentapproachisnecessary.Ishallpresentmyviewoftheexistenceandlocationoftextsasaconsequenceofthefactthattextscanbeuniversalandindividual,
physicalandmental.Letmebeginwithindividualphysicaltexts.
Likeotherphysicalindividuals,individualphysicaltextsareentitiesthatexistatacertaintimeandinacertainlocation.Thisisquiteevidentinthecaseofthetextof
suchworksasAristotle'sMetaphysics.Theindividualhistoricaltextofthatworkwasproducedatacertaintimeandplaceandaslongasitwasnotdestroyedit
continuedtoexistasotherindividualphysicalobjectsdo.Likewise,anindividualcontemporarytextofthesameworkwasproducedatacertaintimeandplaceand
enduresaslongasitisnotdestroyed.Ofcourse,ifnooneconnectsthephysicalECTsofthetexttothemeaningAristotlegavethem,thetextenjoysonlyalimited
existenceandonecouldarguethatinfactitsexistenceisnotasatextatallbutmerelyasECTs.Still,thefactthattheECTsinquestionwereoncerelatedtoameaning
cannotbechanged.
InadditiontothephysicaltextofAristotle'sMetaphysicstheremayalsobementalcounterpartsofit,saytheimagesofthetextinAristotle'smindorinthemindsof
thosewhobecomeacquaintedwiththephysicaltext.Theseimagesarealsoindividualtextsbuttheyarementalratherthanphysicaltheyarenoninstantiableinstances
ofatypeofmentaltextexistinginindividualmindsatsomeparticulartime.Theseindividualinstancesexistandarelocatedintime.Thequestionofwhethertheyare
alsolocatedinspaceisdifficulttoansweranddependsonthestatusofmindversusthatofphysicalobjects.Wewillhavetoleaveitunansweredhere,becausethe
determinationofthenatureofmindvisvisphysicalobjectscannotbesettledinpassing,althoughfromwhatIsaidearlieritshouldbeclearthatprimafacieIdonot
favortheidentificationofthementalandthephysical.Fortunatelyforourpresentpurposes,itisnotnecessarythatweanswerthisquestion.Itsufficestopointoutthat
individualmentaltextsexistinthemindofthoseindividualsubjectswhothinkthem.

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Thecaseofuniversaltextsisquitedifferentfromthatofindividualtexts.42Inthiscasethematterconcernsnottheexistenceandlocationof,say,theindividual
historicaltextofAristotle'sMetaphysics,butratherofthetypeoftextofwhichthatindividualtextisaninstance.Thisraisestheveryimportantbutdifficultquestionof
theontologicalstatusofuniversals,which,consideringthelimitationsofthecurrententerprise,cannotbedealtwithadequatelyhere.Ihave,however,providedan
extendeddiscussionofthisissueelsewhereand,therefore,tosavetimeandspace,IshallapplywhatIconcludedthereconcerninguniversalsingeneraltothecaseof
universaltextsinparticular.43
Mypositionwithrespecttotheexistenceofuniversalsisthatacategorysuchasexistenceisnotapplicabletothem.Moreover,becauselocationpresupposes
existence,locationalsocannotapplytouniversals.TotrytoapplythesecategoriestouniversalsistofallintowhatRylecalledacategorymistake.Itisliketryingto
answerquestionsaboutwhethergeometricalfigureshaveaparticulartasteorwhetherpainiscolored.Tastedoesnotapplyingeometryandcolordoesnotfunctionin
theworldoffeelings.Itmakesnosensetosaythattrianglestastebitterandcirclestastesweet.Althoughsometimesweusecolorstodescribemoodsandfeelings,as
whenIsay"Ifeelbluetoday,"suchusesareclearlymetaphoricalandunderstoodassuchbyeveryone.Totrytounderstandpainintermsofcolororgeometrical
figuresintermsoftasteleadstoconceptualconfusions.Likewise,thecategoriesofexistenceandlocationdonotapplytouniversalssuchascat,good,ortable.One
mayaskwhetheranindividualcat,sayChichi,existsornotorwhethersheisinmystudiowithmeatthetimeIamwritingthesewords,butitmakesnosensetoask
whether"cat"existsorishereorthere.
Thisviewshouldnotbeidentifiedwiththeviewthatuniversalsdonotexist.44Todothatwouldbetograntthatthequestion"Douniversalsexist?"or,inamore
specificform,"Doescatexist?"islegitimate.Andmypointispreciselythatsuchquestionsareillegitimate.Mypositionisthatoneshouldnotaskthissortofquestion.
Putthus,thisisalinguisticclaim.ButthisclaimhasalsoanontologicalcounterpartthatIexpressbysayingthatuniversalsareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceand
similarlyneutralwithrespecttolocation.
Ofcourse,ifoneweretoidentifyuniversalswithconceptsinindividualminds,thenobviouslyuniversalswouldbothexistandbelocatedinthoseminds
understanding'location'withtheprovisosmentionedearlier.TheconceptofcatIamcurrentlyentertaininginmymindbothexistsandisinmymind.But,again,that
doesnotmeanthattheuniversal"cat"existsorthatitislocatedsomewhere.Andmybusinesshereisnotwiththeconceptofcatinanyone'smind,butwiththe
universal"cat."ThatthesearequitedifferentIhaveexplainedelsewhere.45Hereitshouldsufficetoindicatethat"cat"isnotthesame

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as"theconceptofcat"andthatneitheristhesameas"theconceptofcatIhaveinmymind."
Ifmyviewoftheontologicalstatusofuniversalsasneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocationisadopted,thenuniversaltextscannotbesaidtoexistornotexistor
tobelocatedornotbelocatedanywhere.46Quauniversals,textsareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocation.Considertwoexamplesoftextsmentioned
earlier:
1.
2.

2+2=4
2+2=4

Thesetextsareindividualandbothexistandhaveacertainlocation.ThattheyexistisratherobviousbecauseIamcurrentlyperceivingthemandwhoeverreadsthis
bookwillbeabletodothesame.Andwiththatgoestheirlocation,becauseIcandescribethemasbeingatacertaindistancefromthetopofthepageandsoon.The
universalphysicaltypeoftexttowhichtheybelong,however,isnotlocatedinanyplacewhereImayperceiveit,norcanwesaythatitexistsordoesnotexist.
IcanalsosaythatIhaveamentaltextwhenIimagine1or2.Thattextwillalsoexistandbe"in"mymindwhateverthat'in'maymean.Butthattextisnotuniversal,
foritisnottheinstantiabletypeofwhichtheremaybeotherinstances.Indeed,itisaninstanceofatypeandthereforeisasindividualas1or2.ForthisreasonImay
legitimatelyspeakofitsexistenceandlocation.ButIcannotspeakoftheexistenceandlocationoftheuniversalofwhichitisaninstancewithoutgettingintoserious
conceptualmuddles.Thatmentaltype,justlikethephysicaltypeofwhich1and2areinstances,isneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocation.
AtthispointwemayconsideranobjectionagainsttheviewofuniversaltextsIhaveproposed.FromthedefinitionoftextspresentedintheIntroduction,itisclearthat
amongthenecessaryconditionsoftextsisthattheyhaveauthors.Butuniversaltextsareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocationwhereasauthorship
presupposesbothexistenceandlocation.Thusuniversaltextsmustnotbetexts.
Thisobjectionisbasedonamisguidedunderstandingofmyviewandthenatureofuniversality.Itassumesthatuniversalsareentitiesofsomesort,thatis,existents,
andthereforedistinctinrealityfromtheirinstances,thatis,theindividualsthatinstantiatethem.Thisiswhyonecouldaskthequestionofwhotheirauthorisapartfrom
theauthoroftheinstances.Twothingsappeartorequiretwoauthors.Indeed,thisisthesortofassumptionthatdrovemedievalstopositdivineideasandaskforthe
causalrelationbetweenthedivineideasandGod.Onceonegetsintothiskindofdialectic,thereisnowayout.AsIhavearguedelsewhere,theonlywayoutofthis
conundrumistocuttheGordianknot

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thatmakesitup,rejectingtheassumptionsonwhichitisbased.47Myviewisthatuniversalsareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceornonexistenceandthuscannotbe
consideredtobeentitiesotherthantheirinstances.Universality,likeindividuality,isamodethatdoesnotentailanentitativedistinctions.48Thus,thereisnoneedto
positanauthorofauniversaltextwhoisdifferentfromtheauthoroftheindividualtext.Thereisonlyoneauthorofatextandthatauthoristheauthorofboththe
individualandtheuniversal.This,ofcourse,doesnotexplainwhattheauthordoesvisvistheindividualanduniversaltexts,butsuchaquestioncanbeanswered
onlyafterweknowwhatauthorshipentails.IwillleaveitsdiscussionforChapter3.
Inlinewiththeprocedurewearefollowing,wheretextsareclassifiedaccordingtothecharacteroftheirECTs,thelocationandexistenceofindividualtextshasbeen
establishedonthebasisoftheexistenceandlocationoftheECTsthatconstitutethem.IftheECTsarephysical,thetextsexistintheworldasphysicalentitiesandif
theyaremental,theyexistinthemindasmentalentities.Andthesameprocedurehasbeenfollowedwithrespecttouniversaltexts.QuacomposedofECTs,textscan
stillbelongtoaphysicalormentaltype,butnonethelesstheyhavetheneutralitytowardexistenceandlocationpropertouniversals.Yetonemaywishtoinquire
whether,becausetextsareentitiesthatconveymeaning,theexistenceandlocationoftheECTsoftextsisinsufficienttodeterminetheirexistenceandlocationandthus
whethertheexistenceandlocationoftheirmeaningneedstobetakenintoaccountforthatpurpose.Itisallverywelltoclassifytextsaccordingtothecharacterof
theirECTS,forthathelpsusdistinguishamongthem,butwhenitcomestotheirexistenceandlocation,itwouldappearthatweneedtotakeintoaccountthestatusof
theirmeaningaswell.
Theanswertothisissuecanbederivedfromwhatwassaidaboutmeaningsearlier.Meaningscanbeindividualoruniversal.Ifmeaningsareuniversal,theyare,qua
universal,neutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocation.Butiftheyareindividual,theyhavetheexistenceandlocationappropriatetothoseindividuals.Thereforethe
answerastotheexistenceandlocationoftextsdependsagainuponwhatonetakestextstobe.
VIII.HistoricityofTexts
Thefactthatuniversaltextsareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocation,whereasindividualtextsarenot,raisestwosortsofquestions.Thefirstconcernsidentity:
Howareindividualanduniversaltextsthesame?Thisissuewillbestbeleftforthenextchapter,wheretextualidentityisdiscussed.Thesecondhastodowiththe
historicityoftexts.Canatextbebothhistoricalanduniversal?AboutthisIshallsayawordinpassinghere.

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Thereisnoproblemaboutthehistoricityofindividualtexts.Quaindividual,theyarefoundinacertainplaceatacertaintimeiftheyarephysicalandinamindata
certaintimeiftheyaremental.Theproblemsurfacesonlywithuniversaltexts,forIhavearguedthattextsarehistoricalentitiesandIalsoclaimthattheycanbe
universalandyetuniversals,quauniversals,donotseemtobehistoricalinsofarastheydonotexistinanyplaceoratanyparticulartimesincetheyareneutralwith
respecttoexistence.
Strictlyspeaking,inthesenseofexistingataparticulartimeandplaceforphysicaltextsandinaparticularmindandtimeformentaltexts,itisnotpossibleforuniversal
textstobehistoricalonlyindividual,thatis,token,textsarehistoricalinthissense.Universaltexts,beingneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocationcannotbe
historicalinthissense.Ifby'historical,'however,ismeantaninstantiatedratherthananuninstantiateduniversal,thenitisclearthatuniversalscanbehistorical.Inthis
sense,universalsthathavebeeninstantiatedintheworldarehistorical.TheuniversaltextofShakespeare'sHamletcanbeconsideredhistoricalinthissenseeven
though,quauniversal,itexistsnowhere.
IX.Conclusion
Textsareartifacts,entitiesendowedwithmeaningusedorintendedtobeusedbyauthorstoconveythismeaningtoothersinordertocarryoutadiversityof
purposes.Thisfacthasimportantimplicationsfortheirontologicalcharacterization,forthatcharacterizationmustincludeacharacterizationoftheentitiesthatconstitute
thetexts,ofthemeaningwithwhichtheyareendowed,andoftherelationbetweenthem.Becausetextsarefirstandforemosttheentitiesofwhichtheyare
constituted,theirontologicalcharacterizationmustincludeandbeginwiththecharacterizationofthoseentities.
InthischapterIhavearguedthat,ifoneacceptsadistinctionbetweensubstanceandfeature,textscanbeconstitutedeitherbysubstancesandtheirfeaturesorby
featuresalone,butnotbysubstancesalone,whetheritbeoneormany,consideredapartfromtheirfeatures.Fromthisitfollowsthattextsarealwaysaggregates.
Moreover,Ihavealsoarguedthattextscanbeuniversalorindividual.Universaltextsaretextsconstitutedbyentitiesthataresubjecttoinstantiationindividualtexts
areconstitutedbyentitiesnotsubjecttoinstantiation.
Textsmayalsobephysicalormental.Thisclassificationisimportantbecausewegenerallythinkoftextsasphysicalobjectsofonesortofanotherthataresubjectto
senseperception.Buttextscanalsobementalentitiesthatarenotsubjecttosenseperception.Therefore,itisamistaketounderstandtextualityasnecessarily
involvingaphysicalorperceptualaspect.

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Thedistinctionbetweenphysicalandmentaltextsbringstotheforequestionsthatotherwisemightnothavebeennoticed,suchasthequestionoftheorderofpriority
betweenphysicalandmentaltexts.Domentaltextsalwaysprecedephysicaltextsorviceversa?TheanswerIgavetothisquestionisthatthereisnosetorderof
prioritythatcanbeidentified.Insomecasesphysicaltextsprecedetheirmentalcounterparts,butinothercasesthereverseistrue.Questionsofpriorityandrelation
alsoarisewithinthecategoryofphysicaltextsbecausethiscategorycomprisesvarioustypesoftextsdependingonthesensewithwhichtheyareintendedtobe
perceived.Inparticularthisappliestothecomplexrelationbetweenoralandwrittentextsfortheonesfunctionattimesassignsoftheothersandviceversa.
Thisraisesinterestingquestionsoftextualidentity.Indeed,theconfusionbetweenphysicalandmentaltextslendssupporttotwopositions,bothofwhichturnouttobe
unacceptable.Thefirstconceivestextsasmentalentitiesandtendstoidentifythemwithunderstandingsthatsubjectshaveofthem.Thisinturnleadstotheconclusion
thatthereareasmanytextsasunderstandings.ThesecondconceivestextsasphysicalentitiesandtendstoidentifythemwithphysicalECTs.Thisleadstotheview
thattranslationsareimpossible.Thus,theclassificationoftextsintophysicalandmentalandtherecognitionoftheirdifferenceshaveimportantimplicationsfor
questionsoftextualidentity.IexploresomeofthesequestionsinChapters3.
Theindividualityoftextsraisesthequestionconcerningtheirprincipleofindividuation.BorrowingfromwhatIhavesaidelsewhere,Iclaimthattheonlynecessaryand
suffcientconditionofindividuationisexistence:Whatmakesanindividualnoninstantiableand,therefore,isthesourceofitsindividualityanditsdistinctionfromthe
universalofwhichitisaninstanceisthefactthatitexists.
Theuniversalityandindividualityoftextshaveimportantimplicationsforthequestionoftheirexistenceandlocation.Individualtextsexistandarelocatedinthesame
wayinwhichotherindividualsexistandarelocated.Moreover,theirlocationisdeterminedbytheircharacter.Iftheyarementalentities,theyexistonlyinamind,but
iftheyarenotmental,theyexistoutsidethemind.
Withuniversaltextsthesituationisdifferentfor,quauniversal,theyareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocationinthesensethatexistenceandlocationdonot
applytothem.However,theirinstancescanexistandbelocatedinthemindoroutsidethemind.
Somuch,then,fortheontologyoftextsbasedontheontologicalstatusoftheentitiesthatconstitutethem.Now,withrespecttotheontologicalstatusofmeaningwe
foundthatmeaningcanbeuniversalorindividual.Meaning,consideredinitself,quameaning,isneutralinsofarasithasnoparticularontologicalstatusapartfromthe
ontologicalstatusofparticularmeanings.Fromthisitfollowsthattextsofverydifferentsortscanhavemeaningsofdifferent

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sorts.Individualtextscanhaveuniversalmeaningsanduniversaltextscanhaveindividualmeanings.Thisconclusioninturnclarifiestherelationshipbetweentextsand
theirmeanings.Thisrelationshipmustbeconsideredasnothingreal,beingaresultmerelyofanintentionalandconventionaltieofameaningtoasetofentitiesthatare
selectedandarrangedtoconstituteatext.
Wecanalsounderstandfromwhathasbeensaidhowtextscanbehistorical.Whentextsareindividualthereisnoproblemintheirhistoricity,forindividuals,except
thosethatareactualbutnotsubjecttotime,arehistoricalentities.Thecasewithuniversaltextsisdifferent,forasuniversaltheyareneutralwithrespecttoexistence,
location,andtime.Theirhistoricity,then,isderivedfromthehistoricityoftheirinstancesuniversaltextsarehistoricalwhentheyhavebeeninstantiated.
Theseconclusionsraisemanyotherquestions.Someofthesehavetodowithidentityandthusconcerntheconditionsthatmaketextsthesameanddifferent.Others
havetodowiththerelationoftextstotheirauthorsandaudiences.Thefirstsetofquestionswillbetakenupinthenextchapterandthesecondinthetwothatfollow
it.

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2
Identity
ThelibraryoftheUniversityatBuffalocontainsseveralvolumeswiththetitleDonQuixotewhoseauthorisidentifiedasCervantes.Thesevolumesaredifferentin
importantrespects:Theyoccupydifferentspatiotemporallocationstheyareprintedondifferenttypescriptsthepapersofthebookshavedifferentconsistencies
pagesvaryonthenumberofwordstheyhaveandsoon.Nevertheless,ordinarypersonsregardthesevolumesascopiesofthesametextandusersofthelibrary
havenotroubleidentifyingthemassuch.1 Sowemayask,whatmakesthemthesame?Andmoregenerally,whatmakestextsthesame?
Thisquestionisnotonlyinterestinginitsownrightbutalsohasimportantimplicationsforotherphilosophicalissuesrelatedtotexts.Thequestionofatext'sidentityis
closelytiedtoissuesconcerningitscompletenessorincompletenessandwhatmightbecalleditsboundaries.Andanswerstothesequestionsinturnwilldetermine
boththeunderstandingandtheinterpretationoftexts.Likewise,theanswertothequestionoftextualidentitywilldeterminewhetheratextisnewornot,andthiswill
determinesuchthingsastheoriginalityofaparticularauthorandthedegreetowhichatexthasbeenplagiarized.Finally,mostofwhatissaidabouttextsinthisvolume
assumesthatthereissuchathingastextualidentity,sowecanhardlysidestepthequestionofwhatmakestextsthesame.
Apartfromtheimportanceandinterestthatthequestionoftextualidentitymayhaveforotherissuesinvolvedintextuality,itisinitselfpuzzlingbecausethebasic
approachesfrequentlyadoptedtoansweritposedifficulties.Fiveoftheseviewssuggestthemselves.2 Oneviewidentifiesatextwiththeentitiesusedtoconvey
meaningconsideredseparatelyfromthatoranyothermeaningnamely,whatIhavebeencallingECTs.Inatextcomposedofmarksmadeonapieceofpaper,the
conditionsofidentityofthemarks,apartfromthemeaningtheyaresupposedtoconvey,areconsideredtobetheconditionsoftheidentityofthetext.Thisview
encountersdifficulties,however.Werethisviewtobeaccepted,forexample,wewouldlackawayofdistinguishingtextsfromentitiesthatarenottexts.Moreover,
thisviewwouldallowatexttohave

Page46

contradictorymeanings,becausethesameentitiescanbeusedtoconveysuchmeanings.3
Asecondviewidentifiesatextwiththemeaningconsideredindependentoftheentities(ECTs)usedtoconveyit.Inthisway,theconditionsofidentityofatextapply
tothemeaningonlyandnottotheentitiesusedtoconveysuchmeaning.Itisnottheconditionsofidentityofthemarksmadeonthepaperthatdeterminetheidentity
ofawrittentext,forexample,butrathertheconditionsthatdeterminetheidentityofwhatitsignifies.4 Thedifficultywiththispositionisthatdifferenttexts,including
textsindifferentlanguagesthathavethesamemeaningbutdifferentECTs,wouldhavetobeconsideredthesametext.
Athirdpossibleviewholdsthattextsaretobeidentifiedwiththeentitiesusedtoconveymeaning(ECTs)consideredtogetherwithmeaning,whenmeaningistakenin
generalandnotidentifiedwithaparticularmeaning.Inthissense,theconditionsofidentityincludemeaningbutnotanymeaninginparticular.Theconditionsofidentity
ofawrittentextrepresentedbymarksonpaperincludetheconditionsofidentityofthemarksplusaconditionthatthemarkshavemeaning,butnotthatthemarks
haveanymeaninginparticular.5 Thedifficultywiththisviewissimilartothedifficultymentionedinconnectionwiththefirstviewpresented,forinaccordancewithit
thesametextcouldhaveanymeaningwhatever,andthatdoesnotseemacceptable.
Afourthviewidentifiestextswithcertainacts.6 ThisviewisderivativeofAustin'swellknownconceptionoflanguageintermsofspeechacts.7 Atext,then,wouldbe
aseriesofactssomeoneperforms.BecauseAustindistinguishedamongthreedifferentkindsofpertinentspeechacts,thequestionarisesastowhichofthese
constitutesatext.Thelocutionaryact,forAustin,istheactofutteringthattakesplacewhensomeonesays,forexample,''Pickuptheball,please."Itistheact
performedwhenoneuttersthesoundsthatconstituteanoraltext.(Thiscouldbeappliedaswelltowriting,ofcourse.)Theperlocutionaryactistheactofgetting
whoeverisaskedtopickuptheballtodoso.Itistheactperformedwhenthelocutionaryactproducesthedesiredeffect.Andtheillocutionaryactinthiscaseisthe
actofaskingsomeonetopickuptheball.Itistheactperformedwhenonesayssomethingthatis,whenoneperformslocutionaryacts.Withinthisframeworkone
couldidentifythetext'Pickuptheball,please,'asasetoflocutionary,perlocutionary,orillocutionaryactsorasasetcomposedofallorsomeoftheseacts.Inany
case,theimportantpointisthatatextbecomesasetofactsperformedbyaspeakerorwriter.Oneoftheproblemswiththispositionisthatitleavesnoplacefor
meaningtoplayaroleintextualidentity.Moreover,itconfusestheuse(i.e.,anact)ofatextwiththetext,justasitconfusestheactofutteringwiththeutterance.Yet
itisnottheactofuttering,buttheutterancejustasitisnottheactofwriting,butthewriting,throughwhichonecommunicatesmeaning.Sothetextcannotbetheact
ofutteringorwriting,evenifoneweretoaddtotheseperlocutionaryandillocutionary

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acts.Thetextmustbetheutteranceorthewritingconsideredinrelationtosomethingelse.8
Finally,thereistheviewIshalldefend,accordingtowhichtheconditionsofidentityofatextincludenotonlytheconditionsofidentityoftheentities(ECTs)usedto
conveyitsmeaning,butalsotheconditionsofidentityoftheparticularmeaningtheyareusedtoconvey.Thispositionisnotentirelywithoutdifficulty,however.Inthe
firstplace,theviewseemstoprecludethepossibilitythatatextmayhavedifferentmeaningsdependingonitscontextandhowitisused.Inthesecondplace,italso
seemstoprecludethepossibilitythatdifferentaudiencesunderstandthesametextdifferently.
Inspiteoftheimportanceoftheissuesinvolvedinandrelatedtotheidentityoftextsandtheconsiderableattentionthattextsarereceivinginrecentliterature,the
questionoftextualidentityisseldomexplicitlyraisedbyphilosophers.9 Textualcriticsbycontrastaremuchconcernedwiththisissue.Buttheirconcernrelatesmoreto
thequestionoftheidentityconditionsofparticulartexts,ratherthanoftextsingeneral.10Ishallhavesomethingtosayaboutthisintheconclusionofthischapter.In
thebodyofthechapter,Iproposetotakeupthegeneralquestionoftextualidentity.Mythesiswillbethattheconditionsoftextualidentityarecomplex,includingnot
onlyparticularmeaningbutalsosyntaxandcomposition.
I.Sameness
Forpresentpurposesandfollowingordinaryusage,Ishallregardtheterms'identity'and'sameness'asinterchangeable.Indeed,thereisverylittledifferencein
ordinarydiscoursebetweentheusageoftheseterms.'Identity'isalearnedtermderivedfromthelateLatinidentitas(inturnaderivativeofidem,whichmeans"the
same"),whereas'sameness'comesfromanOldNorsecommonroot.Intechnicaldiscoursetherecanbedifferencesintheusageoftheseterms,butasthoseare
idiosyncratictoparticularauthors,theyareirrelevanttomypresentpurposes.
Thenotionof"sameness"isoneofthemostversatileinourordinaryconceptualframework.Weapplyittoallsortsofthings,suchascolors,persons,times,spaces,
relations,essences,experiences,events,concepts,andsoon.Wespeakofpersonsortheirlivesasbeingthesameorofthesametypewesaythatadaughteristhe
sameasherfatherwithrespecttothisorthatcharacteristicwerefertotheuseofthesameconceptsindiscourseweagreethatsometimeswehavethesame
experiencesandwetalkaboutbeinginplacesatthesametime,beingessentiallythesame,andwitnessingthesameevents.Indeed,averylargenumberofexamples
couldbegivenheretoillustratetheusefulnessandpervasivenessofthisnotioninordinarydiscourse,butforourpurposestheexamplesprovidedshouldsuffice.

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Thenotionofsamenesshasobviousrelationshipstothenotionofsimilarity.Itisnotunusualtofindauthorsthatusetheterms'same'and'similar'interchangeably.This
issobecauseinordinarylanguagewedousethesetermsinterchangeablyinsomeoccasions.Forexample,wesometimessaythattwoobjectshavesimilarcolor
whentheyarebothcoloredred.Inthissense,thereisnodifferencebetweensimilarityandsameness.Butitislikewisetruethatweoftenusethenotionsofsimilarity
andsamenessdifferently,thusjustifyingthedifferentterms.Inthissense,importantdistinctionsaremadebetweenthetwonotions.Perhapsthekeydistinctionisthat
similarityunderstoodthusoccursalwaysinthecontextofdifference.Fortwothingstobesimilar,theymustalsobedifferentinsomerespect,althoughthedifferencein
questionmustrefertoaspectsotherthanthoseonwhichthesimilarityisbased.Thusonemayspeakoftwopersonsasbeingsimilarprovidedthattheydifferinsome
way.Iftheydonotdifferinanyway,thentheyareregardedasthesame.Theconditionsofsimilaritymaybeexpressedinthefollowingway:
XissimilartoYifandonlyifXandY(1)haveatleastonefeatureFthatisthesameinbothand(2)alsohaveatleastonefeatureF1thatisnotthesameinboth.

Featuresareunderstoodverybroadlyinthisformulation.Theymayincludeanythingthatmaybesaidofathingandthusnotonlyqualities,butalsorelations,position,
temporallocation,states,actions,andsoon.ThisbroadunderstandinghasbeenadoptedbothforconsistencywithwhatwassaidinChapter1andtofacilitate
discussion.
Incontrastwithsimilarity,samenessdoesnotrequireindeeditprecludesdifference.Thatdoesnotmeanthattwothingscouldnotberegardedasthesamewith
respecttosomefeatureorotheranddifferentwithrespecttosomethingelse.Adaughter,forexample,maybethesameasherfatherwithrespecttostubbornness
whilebeingdifferentwithrespecttogender.Thepointis,however,thatforthedaughterandfathertobethesamewithrespecttostubbornness,theirstubbornnesses
mustnotinvolveanydifferencewhatsoever.Ifthereweresomedifference,saythattheirstubbornnesseswerenotexactlythesameineveryrespectsothatonewere
strongerthantheother,onewouldspeakinsteadofa"similarityofstubbornness."Wemightexpressthisunderstandingofsamenessofthingsandsamenessoftheir
featuresinthefollowingtwopropositions:
XisthesameasYifandonlyifthereisnothingthatpertainstoXthatdoesnotpertaintoYandviceversa.
XisthesameasYwithrespecttoFifandonlyifthereisnothingthatpertainstoFofXthatdoesnotpertaintoFofY,andviceversa.

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Thefirstexpresseswhatmightbecalledabsolutesameness,becauseitappliestothewholeentityinquestionthesecond,whatmightbecalledrelativesameness,
becauseitappliesonlytoafeature(s)oraspect(s)ofanentity.11
PartofthereasonforthefrequentblurringofthedistinctionbetweensamenessandsimilarityinEnglishdiscourseisthatthetermoftenusedastheoppositeofbothis
'difference,'eventhoughthereexistsatermthatmoreproperlyexpressestheoppositeofsimilarity:'dissimilarity.'Similardifferentandsamedifferentaregenerally
regardedaspairsofoppositesinEnglish.Thisusagedoesnotnecessarilyextendtootherlanguages,however.IntheMiddleAges,forexample,aconcertedeffort
wasmadetokeepthenotionsofsimilarityandsamenessseparate,andthiswassupportedbytheuseofdifferentoppositetermsforeach.'Difference'(differentia)
wasused,atleastintechnicalphilosophicaldiscourse,astheoppositeof'similarity'(similaritas),whereas'diversity'(diversitas)wasusedastheoppositeof
'sameness'(identitas).12
Notallsamenessaboutwhichwespeakisofthesamesort.Thereareatleastthreefundamentalbutdistincttypesofsameness,whichIshallrespectivelycall
achronic,synchronic,anddiachronic.Achronicsamenessissamenessirrespectiveoftimeitmaybeunderstoodasfollows:
XisachronicallythesameasYifandonlyifXisthesameasY.

Bycontrast,synchronicsamenessanddiachronicsamenesshavetodowithtime.Synchronicsamenessmaybetakenthus:
XissynchronicallythesameasYifandonlyifXisthesameasYattimet.

Diachronicsamenessmaybeunderstoodinthefollowingway:
XisdiachronicallythesameasYifandonlyifXisthesameasYattimestnandtn+1.

Thedistinctionsbetweenachronic,synchronic,anddiachronicsameness,then,havetodowithtime.Inthefirstcase,samenesshasnoreferencetotimeatallinthe
secondcase,samenessappliesataparticulartimeandinthethird,itappliesattwo(ormore)differenttimes.Thesethreesortsofsamenessgeneratethreedifferent
problemsforphilosopherswhowishtoaccountforthem.Inthecaseofachronicsamenessphilosopherswillwanttodeterminethenecessaryandsufficientconditions
thatmakeathingthesameirrespectiveoftime.Thisisanotherwayofaskingwhatmakesathingbethethingitis,andtheanswerinvolvesidentifyingitsnecessaryand
sufficientconditions.Forthisreason,Iliketocallthisissuetheproblemofidentity.Becauseoftheatemporal

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characteroftheinquiryinvolved,atemporalentities,suchasuniversals,couldbeincludedinit.Indeed,thissortofinvestigationcanbeappliedtoanythingthatmay
becomethesubjectofphilosophicaldiscourse.Wemayaskaboutthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofanindividualperson,butalsoofuniversals,concepts,
propositions,events,andsoon.
Notethattheconditionsofachronicsamenessmayincludetemporalconditions.Thismaybethecasewhentheentitiesinquestionaretemporalinsuchawaythat
theirsamenessistiedtotheirtemporality.Forexample,onemaywanttoarguethatbeingbornatacertaintimeispartofthesamenessconditionsofanindividual
historicalfigureandsoon.Tosay,however,thattheconditionsofsamenessofXincludetemporalconditionsdoesnotentailthatthequestionofsamenesshastobe
framedintemporalterms.OnethingistoaskwhatmakesXtobeXandanothertoaskwhatmakesXtobeXataparticulartimeorwhatmakesXtobeXattwo
ormoredifferenttimes.TheconditionsofXbeingXmayincludetemporalconditionsbutthequestionisnottemporal.Thisisthedifferencebetweenachronic
sameness,ontheonehand,andsynchronicanddiachronicsameness,ontheother.
Thecaseofsynchronicsamenessisdifferentfromthatofachronicsamenessinsofaraswhatissoughtintheformeristoaccountforthenecessaryandsufficient
conditionsthatmakeathingbethethingitisataparticulartime.Thisdifferenceissignificantbecauseitrestrictstherelevanttypesofthingstotemporalones.Itwould
makenosensetoaskforanaccountofthesamenessofatemporalentitiesataparticulartime.Thus,forexample,questionsconcerningsynchronicsamenesscouldnot
applytouniversals,mathematicalentities,oreventoGodifGodisconceivedasbeingoutsideoftime,asinAugustine.Apartfromthissignificantdifference,achronic
andsynchronicsamenessaresimilarbecausetheiranalysesabstractfromthepassageoftimethisabstractioniswhatdistinguishesthembothfromdiachronic
sameness.
Indiachronicsamenesswhatisatstakeisthedeterminationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatmakeathingbethesameattwo(ormore)differenttimes.
Indeed,itisusualforphilosopherstospeakoftheproblemofaccountingfordiachronicsamenessastheproblemofaccountingfor"identitythroughtime"orasthe
problemof"temporalcontinuity."13Diachronicsamenessappliesonlytothoseentitiestowhichtemporalpassageapplies.Itmakesnosensetotalkaboutthe
diachronicsamenessofinstantaneousentitiesoratemporalentities.
Inthepresentcontextwearedealingwithtexts,whichcanbeuniversalorindividual,andthiswillaffectthesortsofquestionsconcerningthesamenessthatcanbe
appliedtothem.Universaltextsarenotsubjecttotime,whereasindividualtextsaretemporalnotonlyinsofarastheymaybelocatedintime,butalsoinsofarasthey
maybesubjecttothepassageoftimethereisnocontradictioninthenotionofaninstantaneoustext,butIknowofnotextthatby

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natureneedbeinstantaneous.Now,becauseuniversaltextsarenottemporal,questionsconcerningsynchronicordiachronicsamenessdonotapplytothem.But
certainlyonecanraisequestionsconcerningtheirachronicsameness.
Thequestionofwhatisinvolvedinaccountingforthesamenessofindividualtextsisnotasclearasitisinthecaseofuniversaltexts.Toanswerit,wemustpointout
thatthenotionsof"individualsameness"and"individuality"warrantdistinction.WesawinChapter1that"individuality"istobeunderstoodintermsofthenotionof
"noninstantiability,"but"individualsameness''involvestwonotions,thatof"noninstantiability"andthatof"sameness"proper.Thus,primafacieitwouldseemthatthe
problemofindividuationshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeprobleminvolvedinaccountingforindividualsameness.Thefirstproblemhastodowiththe
determinationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatmakeitpossibleforsomethingtobeanoninstantiableinstance,apartfromwhetheritistobeconsidered
thesameinanysense.Thesecondproblemhastodowiththeestablishmentofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionswherebyanindividual,apartfromwhatever
mightmakeitanoninstantiableinstance,isthesame.
Itmayturnoutdefactothattheconditionsinquestionarethesameforbothcasesand,therefore,thattheanswertotheproblemofindividuationturnsouttobethe
answertotheproblemoftheachronicandsynchronicsamenessoftheindividual.Buttheconditionsneednotbethesametheconditionsforindividuationmayturn
outtobeonlypartoftheconditionsforsameness.ThispointbecomesclearifwecomparewhatwassaidconcerningindividuationinChapter1withwhatwillbesaid
concerningindividualsamenesslaterinthischapter.
Thecaseofthediachronicsamenessofindividualsisdifferentfromthecasesofachronicandsynchronicsameness,forinthisinstancetheconditionsthatneedtobe
identifiedarethosethatmakeanindividualthesameattwo(ormore)times,nottheconditionsthatmakeanindividualbetheindividualitisapartfromtime(achronic
sameness)orataparticulartime(synchronicsameness).Imentionthisdistinctionbecauseinthepertinentliteratureitisnotinfrequenttofindauthorswhoidentify
individualitywithindividualdiachronicsamenessoratleastmakeindividualdiachronicsamenessanecessaryconditionofindividualityand,asaresult,consciously
identifyorunconsciouslyconfusetheproblemofaccountingforindividuationandtheproblemofaccountingforindividualdiachronicsameness.14
Anotherpropaedeuticmatterthatshouldberaisedherebeforeweproceedconcernsthedistinctionbetweentheproblemofaccountingforindividualsamenessand
thatofaccountingforthediscernibilityofindividualsameness.Fromwhatwehavediscussedconcerningthedistinctionbetweentheproblemofindividuationandthe
problemofthediscernibilityofindividualsonewouldsurmisealsoadistinctionbetweenindividualsamenessandthe

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discernibilityofsuchsameness.Indeed,inthecaseofmostthings,whethernaturalorartificial,thatdistinctionseemstohold.Theproblemofindividualsamenessisan
ontologicalproblemwhosesolutionconsistsintheidentificationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofthesamenessofindividuals.Theproblemofdiscernibility
isanepistemicissuethatinvolvestheidentificationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofourknowledgeoftheindividualsamenessofindividuals.Inonecasethe
questioninvolvesthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatareresponsibleforthesamenessofX.Intheothercase,theinquiryconcernsthenecessaryandsufficient
conditionsthatenableasubjecttounderstandXtobethesame.TokeepthesetwoissuesseparateandavoidunnecessarycomplicationsIprefertorefertothe
secondissueastheproblemoftheidentificationofindividuals.Moreover,whentheidentificationinquestioninvolvesthesametextattwodifferenttimes,thatis,
diachronicsameness,thenIrefertothesearchforitsnecessaryandsufficientconditionsastheproblemofthereidentificationofindividuals.Idiscussidentification
andreidentificationinaseparatesectionofthischapter.
A.AchronicSamenessofTexts
Theproblemofachronicsamenesshastodowiththedeterminationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatmakeentitiesthesameapartfromanyconsideration
oftime.Thequestionwithregardtotextsmaybetakentoapplytothefollowing:(1)theuniversalnotionof"text"itself(2)auniversal(i.e.,type)textofwhich
individual(i.e.,token)textsareinstancesand(3)individual(i.e.,token)texts,whetherinstantaneousorsubjecttocontinuity.Thus,thequestionofwhethertextsare
achronicallythesameiscomplex.Ifitisappliedtothenotionof"text"itself,thenthequestionsimplyraisestheissueastowhethersomethingisatextandthe
conditionsthatmakeitSo.15Butthequestionmayalsobeintendedtoaskwhatmakesaparticulartextthesameapartfromtheconditionsthatmakeitatext.Thatis,
wecouldbeaskingfortheconditionsthatmakethetextofCervantes'sDonQuixote,forexample,thetextthatitisandthisisthesameasaskingfortheconditionsof
theachronicsamenessoftheuniversaltextofCervantes'sDonQuixote.Finally,wemayaskforwhatmakeseachindividualinstanceofatext,sayanindividualcopy
ortokenofthetextofCervantes'sDonQuixotefoundinacertainlibrary,theindividualinstanceitis.Thislastquestionisconcernedwiththedeterminationofthe
principleofindividuationandwasdiscussedingeneralinChapter1.
1.AchronicSamenessofUniversalTexts
Thesecondwayofinterpretingthequestionconcernsthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatmakeauniversaltextthesame.Whatmakestheuniversaltextof
DonQuixoteortheuniversaltextoftheAmericanDeclarationofIndependence,forexample,thetextofDonQuixoteandtheAmericanDeclaration

Page53

ofIndependence?Tobringouttheproblemmoreclearly,letusconsiderafewtextsthathavebeenchosenforthefacilitywithwhichtheycanbehandled.Longer
textscouldbeusedtomakethesamepoints,butdealingwiththemwouldbequitecumbersome.
1.

2+2=4

2.

2+2=4

3.

Twoandtwomakefour.

4.

Twoplustwoequalsfour.

5.

Dosydossoncuatro.

6.

Dosmasdossoncuatro.

7.

TWOANDTWOMAKEFOUR.

8.

Fourtwoandtwomake.

9.

3+3=6

Ourordinaryintuitionswouldseemtodictatethatweconsider1and2astwoinstancesofthesameuniversaltextandlikewisewith3and7.Whenwespeakabout
thetextofOkham'sSummalogicaewemakenodistinctionbetweenthemanuscriptcopiesofitwrittenindifferentmedievalhandsandthoseprintedonapage.Nor
isthecoloroftheinkusedrelevant,northepaperorparchment,northesizeoftheletters,norevenwhetherthoselettersareallcapitalsornot.Wearealsoquite
certainonthebasisofourordinaryintuitionsthat9isnotthesameasanyoftheothermembersinthegroup,andthereasongivenwouldbemostlikelythatit
meanssomethingdifferentthantheothers.Moreover,mostpeople,Ibelieve,wouldnotregard5and6asthesametextsas1,2,3,4,7,8,or9.Theywouldargue
that5isatranslationof3,as6isof4intoadifferentlanguage.Thematterofwhether3and4or5and6aredifferenttextsornotwouldprobablyelicitsome
disagreement.Somewouldarguethat,becausetheymeanthesamething,arewritteninthesamelanguage,andcontainthesamekeywords('two'and'four,'inthe
Englishtext'dos'and'cuatro'intheSpanishtext)orfunctionallysynonymousones('and'and'plus,''y'and'mas,'etc.)theyarethesametext.Butotherswouldargue
thattheycannotberegardedasthesameevenunderthoseconditions,becausetheyarecomposedofdifferentsignsevenifthosesignsaresynonymous.Inaddition,
theymightpointout,therearedifferentphysicalcharacteristicstocontendwithaswell.
Theseconsiderationsillustratethatthesamenessofuniversaltextsisbynomeanseasytoestablish.Alistofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheachronic
samenessofuniversaltextsdoesnotseemtobereadilyavailable.Themostlikelycandidatesarethesamenessofmeaning,author,speechacts,audience,context,
arrangementofsigns,andsignsthemselves.

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a.SamenessofMeaning.Theconditionthatappearsatfirstasmostobviouslynecessaryinconnectionwiththeachronicsamenessofuniversaltextsissamenessof
meaning.Itakesamenessofmeaningtoindicateatleastthattwotextshavethesamemeaningiftheirtruthconditionsarethesame.Thus,'Dosydossoncuatro'and
'Twoandtwomakefour'havethesamemeaningbecausetheconditionsunderwhichonewouldbetruearethesameconditionsunderwhichtheotherwouldbetrue,
andtheconditionsunderwhichonewouldbefalsearealsothesameconditionsunderwhichtheotherwouldbefalse.Itis,ofcourse,commontofindtextsthathave
meaningstowhichtruthvaluecannotapply,suchascommands.Andtheremaybeotherexceptionstothisconceptionofmeaningsameness.Buttheminimal
understandingofsamenessofmeaningprovidedheremaygivearoughideaofwhatisinvolved.Thepresentationofasatisfactoryviewofmeaningidentitywould
requiremorespacethanIcanprovideforitinadiscussionoftextualidentity,thusIcannotaddressthemanyproblemsitposesatthispoint.
Onecouldeasilyseewhyitmightbearguedthatsamenessofmeaningisbothanecessaryandsufficientconditionoftheachronicsamenessofuniversaltextsthatis,
thatuniversaltextsthatmeanthesamearethesametext.Indeed,thisconditionallowsustodistinguish9from18previously,foritsmeaningisdifferentfromthatof
theothertextsonthelist.Thisconditionisparticularlyattractive,ofcourse,tothosewhoidentifyatextwithitsmeaning.
Therearevariouswaysinwhichthisviewmaybeassailed,however.Someofthesewaysareineffective,butIconsideratleastoneeffectiveagainsttheviewthat
samenessofmeaningisbothanecessaryandsufficientconditionoftextualsameness.
Althoughsamenessofmeaningdoesappeartobeanecessaryconditionoftextualsamenessinthesensethattextsthatdonotmeanthesamecouldnotpossiblybethe
sametexts,itwouldbedifficulttoarguethatitisalsoasufficientcondition.Thatitisanecessaryconditioncanbeseenclearlyinthereasonswhy9,forexample,isnot
thesametextasanyofthetexts18:itdoesnotsharethesamemeaning.Ontheotherhand,tohavethesamemeaningdoesnotseemtoensuretextualsameness.If
thatwerethecase,texts18wouldallbethesametext,somethingveryfewwouldbepreparedtoacceptandsomethingIcertainlydonotwishtodefend.Todoso
wouldimplythattwotextscomposedbydifferentauthorsindifferentlanguagescouldberegardedasthesametextprovidedtheirmeaningswerethesame.Itwould
alsosuggestthatapaintingandawrittentextwouldhavetoberegardedasthesametextiftheirmeaningswerethesame.Butnoneofthisseemsacceptable.
Therefore,wemustconcludethatsamenessofmeaningisanecessaryconditionoftextualsamenessunderthespecifiedstrictures,butitisnotasufficientconditionof
it.16
Theviewthatsamenessofmeaningisanecessaryconditionoftextualsamenessmightbesuspectinsomecases,however.For,althoughitisobvious

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thatitappliestothesortofshorttextswehavebeenusingasexamples,onemaywishtoarguethatitdoesnotapplyequallytoverylongtexts.Supposethatthereisa
changeinthemeaningofoneofthethousandsofsentencesthatmakeupthetextofDonQuixoteandthatsuchasentenceisrelativelyunimportantinthewholetext,
sothatachangeinitsmeaningdoesnotaffectthemeaningofanyothersentenceofthetext.CanwereallysaythatonetextofDonQuixoteisnotthesameasthe
other?Strictlyspeaking,itappearstobeso,butinpracticaltermsitdoesnotappeartomakemuchdifference.17Howcanthisdifficultyberesolved?
Thesolutionmaybegivenintwosteps.Accordingtothefirst,theissueraisedbythechangeinmeaningofthesentenceinquestiondoesnotconcerntextualidentity
butmeaningidentity.Theissueiswhetherthewholemeaningofatextisthesamewhenthemeaningofpartofthetextchangesbutthatchangeisinsignificant.Thus,
regardlessoftheanswer,onecanstillmaintainthatsamenessofmeaningisanecessaryconditionoftextualsameness.Accordingtothesecondstep,whetherthe
changeinthemeaningofthesentencemakesadifferenceornotwilldependonthefunctionofthetextwithintheculturewithinwhichandforwhichthetextwas
created,forultimatelythatculturedetermineswhatisessentialandwhatisnotessentialtothemeaningofatextandhencetoitsidentity.18
b.SamenessofAuthor.Apartfromsamenessofmeaning,otherwaystoaccountfortextualsamenessmaybeexplored,althoughsomeofthesedonotseemvery
promising.Considertheauthor.19Itispossibleinprincipletoarguethatauniversaltextisthesamewheneverithasthesameauthor.Butthisargumentdoesnotmake
muchsense,foritimpliesthatallthetextsanauthorproducesarethesameuniversaltextregardlessofthedifferencesamongthem.Onecould,ofcourse,arguethat
by"thesametext"inthiscaseismeant"partofthesametext."And,indeed,thissenseissometimesusedindiscourse.Wesometimesspeakofeverythinganauthor
hasproducedasasinglework.Butthatissomethingdifferentfromsayingthateverytextanauthorhasproducedisthesameuniversaltextinthesensethatitis
identicalwitheveryothertextproducedbyhimorher.Therefore,samenessofauthorcouldnotbeasufficientconditionofsamenessofuniversaltexts,forthe
conditionofsamenessofmeaningwouldbemissing.But,whatifthatconditionwereadded?Wouldsamenessofmeaningandsamenessofauthorcombinedensure
textualsamenessofauniversalsort?
Theanswerisnegative,forthesameauthormaycreatetwodifferentuniversaltextsthathavethesamemeaning,say,apoemandanessay.Indeed,thecaseofSt.
JohnoftheCross'sSpiritualCanticlecomestomind.Butsimplerexamplesaboundineverydayexperience,whereweusedifferentsentencestomeanthesame
thing.Texts1,3,4,5,and8couldhavethesameauthorandyet,

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inspiteofthatandthesamenessofmeaningtheyshare,wouldnotbethesameuniversaltext.
Somuchthenforthesufficiencyofauthorsfortheidentityofuniversaltexts.Butwhatofnecessity?Issamenessofauthoranecessaryconditionofthesamenessof
texts?Couldtherebetwoinstancesofthesameuniversaltextproducedbytwodifferentauthors?ThisisoneofthepuzzlingquestionsthatBorgesexploresinhis
"PierreMenard,AuthoroftheQuixote."Hisanswerisnegative,insofarasBorgesevergivesanunambiguousanswer.Heassumesthattheauthorsinquestionare
separatedbyimportanttemporalandculturaldifferencesthatalterthemeaningofthetext.AlthoughtheECTsofwhichthetextsarecomposedarethesame,the
meaningsofthoseECTsconsideredassignsaredifferentbecauseoftheculturaldistancebetweentheauthors.20IfwearetofollowtheunderstandingofBorges,itis
clearthatsamenessofauthormaybeanecessarycondition,butonlyinsofarastheauthoraffectssamenessofmeaning.
Whataboutcontemporaryauthors?Indeed,whataboutauthorswhoarealikeinsofarasthatispossible,sayidenticaltwinsraisedinthesameenvironmentandsoon?
Couldwenotsaythatinthatcasetheauthorsofthetextsaredifferentbutthetextsareofthesameuniversaltype,auniversalinstantiatedintwoinstances?Ifthisis
possible,samenessoftextsdoesnotrequiresamenessofauthorifby"samenessofauthor"ismeantthesameindividualperson.
Inshort,samenessofauthorappearstobeneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditionofthesamenessofuniversaltexts.Whenwesay"sameness"ofauthor,weare
speakingofnumericalsameness.Itisaltogetherpossiblefortwosimilar,butnumericallydifferentauthorstoproducethesametext.Thisisobviousfromthementioned
caseofidenticaltwins.Butdoesitmakesensetosaythatpersonswhoarenotonlydifferentnumerically,butalsodifferentinotherrespects,couldproducetwo
instancesofthesametext?
Inonewayitisobviousthatthiscanhappen,fortwopersonsmaydifferinrespectsthatwouldhavenorelevancetotheircomposingatext.Forexample,theymay
differinthefactthatoneofthemhasatinybirthmarkonhisbackandtheotherdoesnot.Butwoulditmakesensetosaythattwopersonscouldbeauthorsofthe
sametexteventhoughtheyhadsubstantialdifferencesinoutlook,education,andsoon?
Logicallyspeaking,Idonotseehowthequestioncanbeanswerednegativelyinallcases.Indeed,whenitcomestoshort,simpletexts,itdoesnotseemdifficultto
thinkofcounterexamples.Thereisnoreasonwhytwoauthorscouldnothaveproducedtwoinstancesofthetext"Please,donotsmoke"independentlyofeachother.
Butitisdifficulttoaccepttherealpossibilityofthishappeningwithlongandcomplicatedtexts,suchasthetextofDonQuixote.Itdoesnotseempossiblethatanyone
butCervantescouldhaveproducedforthefirsttimeaninstanceofthetextofDonQuixote.Andiftwopersonswereto

Page57

haveproducedinstancesofthesameuniversaltext,say,DonQuixote,independentlyofeachother,thenthosetwopersonswouldhavetobesimilarinrespects
relevanttothecompositionofthetexts.21
Note,however,thatinraisingthisquestionwehaveshiftedtoadifferentissue.Theissueoriginallyposedinthissectionwaswhethersamenessofauthor,regardlessof
whethertheauthorisconsideredindividualoruniversal(i.e.,atypeofauthor),isanecessaryorsufficientconditionfortextualidentity.Theanswertothatquestion
seemstobenegative.Thequestionthathasbeenraisednow,however,hastodowiththeconditionsofsamenessoftheauthor,assumingtheidentityofthetext.That
isadifferentquestion,whichIaddressinChapter3becausetoansweritweneedtoknowmuchmorethanwepresentlyknowaboutauthorship.Ishouldalsonote
thattheissuewehavebeendiscussingshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeseparateissueofwhetherauthorsarenecessaryorsufficentconditionsoftherebeingtexts.This
issueisaddressed,again,inChapter3.
Thereisonlyonecaseinwhichauthoridentitycouldbeconsideredtobeanecessaryconditionoftextualidentity.Thisoccurswhentheauthorissomehowtiedtothe
meaningofthetextsothatthemeaninginvolvessomethingabouttheauthor.Thiscanhappen,forexample,whentheauthorpresentshimselfinthetextasadramatis
persona.Butadramatispersona,asweshallseeinChapter3,isanauthordifferentfromtheauthorwehavebeendiscussinghere.ThelatterIcallthehistorical
author.Ibringthisuphereonlytopreemptapossibleobjection.
c.SamenessofSpeechActs.Acloselyrelatedpositiontotheonejustdiscussedviewsspeechactsasnecessaryorsufficientconditions(orboth)oftheidentityofa
text.Toputthematterthus,however,istoleaveitobscure,forspeechactscomeinagreatvariety.Atleastthreeclassesofthesemustbedistinguished,asnoted
earlier.22Locutionary,illocutionary,andperlocutionaryactscanbe,likeallotheracts,universalorindividual.Thus,whenwewishtodeterminewhetherthesameness
ofspeechactsisanecessaryorsufficientconditionforthesamenessofuniversaltexts,wemustdistinguishamongseveralpossibilities:(1)individuallocutionaryacts,
(2)universallocutionaryacts,(3)individualillocutionaryacts,(4)universalillocutionaryacts,(5)individualperlocutionaryacts,and(6)universalperlocutionaryacts.
Theidentityofnoneoftheindividualactsmentionedappearstobeanecessaryorsufficientconditionoftheidentityofuniversaltexts.Thisshouldbeclearfromwhat
wassaidearlierinthecontextofauthoridentity.Anindividualinstanceofanactofuttering,forexample,doesnotappeartobenecessaryorsufficientfortheidentity
ofauniversaltext.Twonumericallydifferentactsofutteringcanresultintwodifferentinstancesofthesametypeofutterance,which,iftheyhavethesamemeaning
andsoon,couldbethesametext.

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Andthesamecouldbesaidabouttheindividualillocutionaryandperlocutionaryacts.
Thesituationwithuniversalspeechactsseemstobedifferent,however.Considerthecaseoflocutionaryacts.Primafacie,itwouldseemnecessaryforaparticular
universaloraltexttobetheproductofthesametypeofutteringacts,forthetextisconstitutedbycertaintypesofutterancesthatareintrinsicallytiedtothetypeof
actsofutteringthem.Theactofutteringgoeswiththeutteranceandviceversa,soitwouldappearthattheactsofutteringarenecessaryfortheutteranceand
thereforeforthetextconstitutedoftheutterances.However,thisisnotcertain,foronecouldarguethatutteringthesoundsisnotreallynecessaryifonewereableto
producethesametypesofsoundsinsomeotherway.Moreover,theactsofutteringarecertainlynotsufficientfortheidentityoftheuniversaltextbecausethe
utterancesproducedbysuchactscouldhavedifferentmeanings.
Nowconsidertheperlocutionaryactsnamely,whatwedooraccomplishwhenwesaysomething,say,togetsomeonetoopenadoor.Istheidentityofthese
universalactsnecessaryorsufficientfortheidentityofauniversaltext?Itdoesnotseemnecessary,fortheperlocutionaryactscouldinprinciplebetheresultof
differentlocutionaryacts,anddifferentlocutionaryactswouldgiverisetodifferenttexts.Norcouldtheybesufficientbecausesometimesourlocutionaryand
illocutionaryactsareineffectiveinproducingperlocutionaryacts.IcanorderPetertoopenadoor,andhemayignoremyorder.
Thecaseofuniversalillocutionaryactsresemblesthatofuniversallocutionaryacts.Theiridentityisnotsufficientfortextualidentity,butitappearsnecessaryforit.Itis
notsufficientbecausethesameillocutionaryactscanbeperformedwithdifferentuniversallocutionaryacts.Differentsoundscanbeusedtoperformthesame
illocutionaryact.IcanorderPetertoopenthedoorinFrenchorSpanish,forexample.Anddifferentlocutionaryactsresultindifferenttextsbecauselocutionary
identityisnecessaryfortextualidentity.
Butillocutionaryidentityappearsnecessaryfortextualidentity,fortheillocutionaryactistheactofsayingsomething,andwhatissaidintheactisthemeaningofthe
text.23Butmeaningidentityisnecessaryfortextualidentity.Soitturnsoutthatillocutionaryidentityisnecessaryfortextualidentity.
Inshort,theidentityofauniversaltextrequirestheidentityofuniversalillocutionaryacts,butnotoflocutionaryorperlocutionaryacts.Noneoftheseacts,however,
providessufficientconditionsoftheidentityofauniversaltext.
NotethatIhavebeenspeakingaboutspeechactsintheusualway,asreferringtospeech.However,whathasbeensaidapplies,mutatismutandis,tolinguisticacts
notinvolvingspeech,suchaswriting,signaling,andsoon.
d.SamenessofAudience.Anotherfactorthatmaybeusedtoaccountforthesamenessofauniversaltextistheaudience.24Cansamenessofaudience

Page59

beanecessaryorsufficientconditionofthesamenessofuniversaltexts?Asfarasasufficientconditionisconcerned,itisclearthatitcannot,forthesameaudience
canbetheaudienceofdifferentuniversaltexts.Thesameperson,forexample,canbetheaudienceofthetextofHamletandthetextofDonQuixote,orof"2+2=
4"and"Thecatisonthemat."Ontheotherhand,whenitcomestobeinganecessarycondition,thesituationismorecomplexandthusnotsoeasilysettled.The
differenceinthesituationcomesaboutbecausetheauthormayhaveaparticularaudienceinmindforthetextandassuchthataudiencemayinfluenceinimportant
wayswhattheauthorproduces.Mosttextsareellipticaltheycontainlacunaemeanttobefilledbytheiraudiences.Themeaningtheauthorintendstoconveythrough
thetextisincompleteunlesswhattheaudienceismeanttosupplyistakenintoaccount.Itisnotnecessaryfortheaudiencetobetheindividualaudiencetheauthorhad
inmindtheaudiencethatispertinentisthetypeofaudiencetheauthorhadinmind,justasitisnottheindividualauthorthatispertinentfortheachronicsamenessofa
universaltextbutratherthetypeofauthor.Acertaintypeofaudiencecansupplytheneededelementsfortheuniversaltext.Asaresult,althoughsamenessof
audienceisnotasufficientconditionofthesamenessofuniversaltexts,itappearsindeedtobeanecessaryconditionofitincaseswherethetextcontainslacunaeto
befilledbytheaudience.
Now,someonemaywishtoarguethat,ifaparticulartypeofaudienceisanecessaryconditionofthesamenessofauniversaltext,thentheauthor(ortypeofauthor)
shouldalsobeone.Indeed,itistheauthorwholeavesout,intentionallyorunintentionally,thepartsofthetextmissinginthelacunaethattheaudiencemustfill.
Moreover,theauthor'ssubjectivityhasmuchtodowithatextanditsmeaning.Sohowcantheauthorbeleftoutiftheaudienceisthoughttobenecessary?Either
bothareleftoutorbothareputin.
Idonotwishtoarguethattheauthorisnotcloselyrelatedtothetextornotnecessaryforitsexistence.Indeed,asweshallseeinChapter3,theauthorisnotonly
responsiblefortheselectionandarrangementofsignsthatcomposeatextbutalsofortheoverallmeaninginthesensethatwillbeexplainedlater.Moreover,the
authorisalsoresponsibleforthelacunaethattheaudiencehastofill.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatsamenessofauthorisanecessaryorsufficientconditionoftextual
identity.Identityconditionsarenotthesameasconditionsofexistenceandthussomethingmaybeaconditionofexistence(inthiscase,letusassume,theauthor)of
something(thetext)thatisnotaconditionofitsidentity.Moreover,thereisanimportantdifferencebetweenauthorandaudiencenamely,incomposingatext,the
author,consciouslyorunconsciously,takesintoaccounttheaudienceandwhatitismeanttosupply.Signsareselected,arrangementsaremade,andmaterialsare
includedorexcludedwiththeaudienceinmind.Noneofthis,however,appliestotheauthor.Thus,theaudienceintendedbytheauthorisinsomecasesanecessary
partofthe

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puzzlethatdeterminesthemeaningofatextinthisspecialsense,whereastheauthorisnot,andinthatwaysamenessofaudienceappearstobeanecessarycondition
oftheachronicsamenessofsometexts.
e.SamenessofContext.Whatappliestotheaudienceinrelationtoachronicsamenessalsoappliestocontext:Contextisalwaysimportantforthemeaningoftexts,
forwhatappearstobethesametextmayhaveverydifferentmeanings,dependingoncontext,andthusturnouttobedifferenttexts.25Thethreat,"Don'ttouchthat
orI'llkillyou"hasquiteadifferentmeaningwhenitisaddressedbyamothertoachildreachingforafragileobjectorwhenitissaidbyapoliceofficertoaburglar
reachingforagun.Thisdoesnotmeanthatinallcaseswherethemeaningofatextchangesinaccordancewithcontexttheidentityofthetextalsochanges.Thereare
textswhosefunctionprescribesforthemmorethanonemeaning,orevenarangeofmeanings,andthuscannotbesaidtobedifferenttextsjustinvirtueofchanges
amongthemeaningsthatconstitutetheirlegitimaterange.Butinothertextsachangeofmeaningimpliesachangeintext.Sodifferentcontextsmayentaildifferent
meaningsandthusdifferentidentities,althoughsamenessofcontextdoesnotensuretextualsameness.Itisobviousfromeverydayexperiencethatdifferenttextscan
beandareutteredunderthesame(inallpertinentrespects)conditions.
Moreover,onemaywanttoarguethat,unlikethecaseoftheaudience,samenessofcontextcanneverbeanecessaryconditionoftextualsameness,forcontextsplay
noroleatallindeterminingthemeaningofsometexts.26Considertext1(2+2=4)earlier.Itwouldappearthatthemeaningofthistextcannotbealteredbythe
surroundingcircumstances,providedthatthesignsofwhichitiscomposedandthearrangementinwhichtheyareorganizedcontinuetohavethedeterminatemeaning
weassociatewiththem.Theexamplethathasbeengiven,however,isanunusualone,forthetextswenormallyuseincommunicationarenotmathematical.Most
frequentlywecommunicatewithtextsthattakeforgrantedthecontextasadeterminantoftheirmeaning.Amoresensibleview,then,wouldbetoarguethatsameness
ofcontextisnotpertinentforalltextsandassuchitisnotanecessaryconditionoftheirsameness,butthatitiscertainlynecessaryinthecaseoftextswhereitis
pertinentforthedeterminationoftheirmeaning.Noteagainthat,inthecaseofauthorandaudience,thesamenessofcontextthatispertinentisthesamenessoftypeof
contextnotofindividualcontext.Inshort,samenessofcontextisnotasufficientconditionoftextualsameness,butitisanecessaryconditionwheneverthemeaningof
thetextdependsonit.
f.SamenessofSignArrangement.Anothercandidatefornecessaryandsufficientconditionoftheachronicsamenessofuniversaltextsisthearrangementofthe
signsthatcomposeatext.Samenessofarrangement,however,cannotbeasufficientconditionoftextualsameness.Syntaxisnotenoughtomake

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twotextsthesame.Thisisquiteclearfromtexts1(2+2=4)and9(3+3=6)andfromwhathasbeensaidalreadyconcerningothernecessaryconditions.The
samesyntacticalstructuremaybecommontodifferenttextsandthereforecannotensuretextualsameness.Butisitanecessarycondition?Thequestionconcerns,for
example,texts3(Twoandtwomakefour)and8(Fourtwoandtwomake).Cantextsthathavedifferentarrangementsbeconsideredthesametexts?Ifwewereto
followourordinaryintuitioninthismatter,wewouldanswernegatively.Yetthematterisnotthatsimple.
Inshorttexts,itappearsthatanychangeinorderresultsinadifferenttext.
Insomecasesthereasonisevident:Themeaningofthetextisdestroyedormodified.Consider
1.2+2=4
Andletusexchangethe'4'forthefirst'2'thatappearsinthetext.Theresultis
10.4+2=2
Obviously,thetruthvalueof10isdifferentfromthatof1,sothetextscannotbethesame.Orconsider
3.Twoandtwomakefour.
Andletusscrambleitswordsthus:
11.Makeandtwofourtwo.
Theresultisgibberish,so3and11cannotbethesametext.Thereare,however,changesoforderthatdonotchangemeaning,eventhoughwedoseemtoregard
themasimplyingachangeoftext.Consider
8.Fourtwoandtwomake.
Ontheotherhand,inveryextensivetexts,sayKant'stextoftheCritiqueofPureReason,somechangesofordermaynotgenerallyberegardedassufficientto
warrantachangeofidentity.Thereasonforthisseemstobethattherelevanceandimportanceofachangeinorderhastobeseeninatotalcontext.Achangethat
resultsinachangeofmeaningclearlywillhavetoberegardedasimplyingachangeintheidentityofthetextatleastincaseswherethechangeofmeaningis
significant.Ifthechangeofmeaningmakeslittledifferencetotheoverallmeaningofatext,thenthetextcouldberegardedasthesameoratleast

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asfundamentallythesame.Evenwhenthereisnochangeofmeaning,however,modificationsinthearrangementofthesignscanstillberegardedassufficientto
changetheidentityofthetextincaseswherethosechangesalterthenatureorfunctionofthetextinsomesense.Thechangeoftext3totext8isagoodexample,for
thatchangeimpliesachangeinthefunctionofthetext.Whereastext3isprimarilyscientific,text8appearstobeliterary.Achangeinarrangementthatimpliesa
changeoffunction,then,impliesachangeinidentity.Fromthisweconcludethatsamenessofarrangementgenerallyisanecessaryconditionoftextualsameness.
However,incaseswherethatsamenessisviolatedbutthechangesinarrangementinquestionaresuchthatneitherthesubstantialmeaningofthetextnoritsfunctionis
altered,suchsamenessmaynotbeanecessaryconditionoftextualsameness.Again,asinthecaseofmeaning,whetheritdoesordoesnotdependsultimatelyon
whatisconsideredessentialbytheculturewithinwhichandforwhichthetextisproduced.Notethat,asinothercasesexaminedearlier,Ihavebeenspeakingofthe
typeofarrangementthatis,instancesofuniversalarrangementsdonotmatter.
g.SamenessofSigns.Finally,wecometosigns,thecomponentsoftexts.Thequestionwehavetoansweriswhethersamenessofsignsisanecessaryorsufficient
conditionofthesamenessoftexts.Thefirstproblemweencounterwiththisquestionconcernstheconditionsofthesamenessofsignsthemselves,foritisbynomeans
clearwhatconditionsareinvolvedinit.Interestinglyenough,thesearchforthoseconditionsissurprisinglysimilartothesearchfortheconditionsofthesamenessof
texts.
Themaindifferencebetweensignsandtextsisthatthemeaningoftextsisinparttheresultofthemeaningofthesignsofwhichtheyarecomposed,whereasthe
meaningofsignshasnothingtodowiththemeaningoftheircomponents.27Thus,forexample,'cat'isasign,butitisnotatextwhereas'2+2=4'isatextandnota
sign.
Thefactthatsomesignsmaynotbecomposedofsignsdoesnotmeanthattheyarenecessarilysimple.Indeed,thequestionofwhethersignscanbesimpleisnoteasy
toanswer.Mostsigns,liketexts,involvecomplexityandthereforesomekindofarrangement,aswellasanauthor,anaudience,andameaning.28Therelative
semanticsimplicityofsignsmakesirrelevanttheconsiderationofauthorsoraudiencesasconditionsofsameness,howeverfortwodifferentauthorscanverywelluse
thesamethingortypeofthingasasignofsomemeaning.Theaudienceisgenerallyirrelevantalso,becausetherelativesimplicityofsignsdiminishesthesemanticrole
playedbytheaudience.Ontheotherhand,contextisveryimportant.The''shot"aphysiciangivestoapatientiscertainlydifferentfromthe"shot"athiefreceivesfrom
apoliceofficer.
Havingsaidthisbywayofintroduction,letmegiveafewexamplesofsignstoseeifwecandetermineonwhatbasistheymayberegardedasthesame:

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a.

bear(noun)

b.

bear(noun)

c.

BEAR(noun)

d.

bear(verb)

c.

oso(noun)

f.

bare(adjective)

g.

rbea

OnthebasisofordinarycustomIwouldsaythatacarethesamesignd,e,andfarealldifferentfromoneanotherandfromacandgisnotasignatall,butsimply
asetofletters,eachofwhich,consideredseparately,isasign.Signsaandbhavethesamephysicalappearance,thesamemeaning,andthesamegrammatical
function.Signchasthesamemeaningandgrammaticalfunctionasaandbbutadifferentphysicalappearance.Signdhasthesamephysicalappearanceasaandb
butadifferentmeaningandgrammaticalfunction.SigneistheSpanishtranslationofa,b,andcandhasadifferentphysicalappearance,eventhoughithasthesame
meaningandgrammaticalfunction.29Signfisdifferentinappearance,meaning,andgrammaticalfunction,eventhoughwhenpronounceditsoundsthesameasad.30
Thedifferenceinpronunciationisirrelevant,however,becausesoundsthataresignsmustberegardedasdifferentfromwrittensignsalthoughtheymaybeusedto
conveythesamemeaning.31Itisimportantthatfhasthesamecomponentsasaandbbutthearrangementisdifferentandthatithasadifferentmeaningand
grammaticalfunction.Finally,gagainhasthesamecomponentsasadandf,butithasadifferentarrangement,whichmakesitlookdifferent,andhasnomeaning(that
ithasnomeaningentailsthatitisnotasignatall).
Fromallthisitwouldseemthatthekeyfactorstobeconsideredinthesamenessofsignsaremeaning,function,components,appearance,arrangement,andcontext.
Asinthecaseoftexts,samenessofmeaningseemstobeanecessaryconditionofthesamenessofsignsbutnotasufficientcondition.'Oso'and'bear'meanthesame
thingbutarenotthesamesign.And,although'bear'(thenoun)and'bear'(theverb)areexactlyalikeinallphysicalaspects,theyhavedifferentmeaningsandtherefore
arenotinstancesofthesamesign.
Somethingsimilarcouldbesaidaboutfunction,forfunctioniscloselyrelatedtomeaning.Themeaningof'bear'(theanimal)andof'bear'(theaction)aredifferentin
partatleastbecause'bear'functionsasanouninsomesituationsandasaverbinothers.32However,itisalsotruethatdifferentsignswithdifferentmeaningsmay
havethesamefunctionforexample,'bear'and'cat'inasentencesuchas'TheXisananimal,'where'X'isreplacedbyeitheroneofthem.Moreover,differentsigns
withthesamemeaningcanhavedifferentfunctions,asisclearinparaphrasesandcircumlocutions.Forthesereasons,itwouldseemthatsamenessoffunctiondoes
notensurethesamenessofsignsandthusthatsamenessoffunctionisnotasufficientconditionofsignidentity.

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Ontheotherhand,itwouldappearthatsamenessofsignsrequiressamenessoffunction.
Thecasewithappearanceissimilarlycomplicated.Indeed,'bear'and'bare'havethesameappearanceinsound,and'bear'(thenoun)and'bear'(theverb)havethe
samevisualappearanceandneitherthefirstpairnorthesecondarethesamesigns.33Appearance,therefore,cannotbeasufficientconditionofthesamenessof
signs.Butisitanecessarycondition?Notinallcases,because'BEAR'and'bear'arethesamesignandyetlookdifferent.34Thisindicatesthatonlysomeaspectsof
theappearanceofasignarerelevantfortheidentityofasignnamely,thosedeterminedbytheauthororgenerallyacceptedtobesoinaparticularcontextbya
linguisticcommunity.Color,arrangement,design,size,andsoonareallfeaturesthatcanbecomenecessaryconditionsofthesamenessofsigns,buttheyarenot
sufficientconditions,forsamenessofmeaningseemsalsotobenecessary.35
Wemaysay,then,thatthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheachronicsamenessofsignsarethree:(1)samenessofmeaning,(2)samenessoffunction,and(3)
samenessoffeaturesidentifiedbytheauthororacceptedinaparticularcontextbyalinguisticcommunityasrelevantformeaning.Notethatcontextshouldnotbe
underestimated.Indeed,thedifferencebetween'bear'(theverb)and'bear'(thenoun)dependsoncontext.Thetwoaredifferentbecausethefirstispartofsentences
suchas"Tobearsuchaburdenisavirtue,"andthesecondispartofsentencessuchas"Thebearlikedthehoneyitfoundinthejar."Theirfunctiondependsontheir
sententialcontext.36
BeforeleavingthediscussionofsignsIshouldmakeexplicitwhatappearstobearatherseriousimplicationoftheviewpresentedhere.Therequirementthatsigns
havethesamemeaningtobeachronicallythesameimpliesthatwordswhichhavedifferentmeaningsarenotthesamesign.Thisseemscounterintuitive,forwe
frequentlyregardasignasthesameevenifitisusedtomeandifferentthings.Take,forexample,theword'cape.'Inasentencesuchas"Sheworearedcape,"the
wordisusedtoindicateanarticleofclothing,butinsentencessuchas"Shespenttheweekendonacape,"itisusedtomeanapieceofland.37
Ihavetwoanswerstothisproblematthistime,althoughIhavesaidsomethingmoreaboutthismatterelsewhere,particularlywithrespecttotexts.38First,topreserve
thisintuition,wewouldhavetogiveuptoomuch.Forgivinguptherequirementofsamenessofmeaninginthecaseofsignsandalso,asaconsequence,inthecaseof
textscreatestoomanyproblems,makingitverydifficulttoaccountforsameness.Second,that'cape,'meaninganarticleofclothing,and'cape,'meaningpieceofland,
aretwodifferentsignsdoesnotmeanthattheyarenotthesameword,ifbywordonereferstoacertainartifactdevelopedinalanguagethatisusedtoconveyoneor
moremeanings.Byunderstandingwordsinthisway,wecanpreservethetheoryproposedhereconcerning

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signsandtextsandthecommonsenseintuitionthat'cape'isthesameinsomesenseinthetwosentencesjustgiven.Wehaveacaseofdifferentsignsbutthesame
word.
Havingidentifiedtheconditionsofthesamenessoridentityofsigns,wecanreturntothetopicunderdiscussion:Whethersamenessofsignscanbeanecessaryora
sufficientconditionofsamenessofuniversaltexts.Forthereasonsalreadystatedinconnectionwithtext3(Twoandtwomakefour)andtext11(Makeandtwofour
two),weseethatsamenessofsignscouldnotbeasufficientcondition.Nonetheless,itwouldseemthatsamenessofsignsisanecessaryconditionofthesamenessof
texts,becauseadifferenceofsignsmayaffectbothmeaningandappearance.Considerthefollowingtwosentences:
12.
13.

Hewasarespectableman.
Hewasadignifiedman.

Clearlythesetwosentences,althoughhavingthesamestructure,andsoon,meandifferentthingsifthetermsofwhichtheyarecomposedarebeingusedinthe
ordinarysense.Thus,theyconstitutenotonebuttwotexts.Ontheotherhand,whatdowemakeofthefollowing?
14.
15.

ThePhilosopherwrotetheMetaphysics.
AristotlewrotetheMetaphysics.

Andofthefollowing
16.
17.

Hemadeacontributiontothefund.
Hemadeadonationtothefund.

Intexts14and15wehavetwosentencesthatareexactlythesameexceptthattext14usesanhonorifictitletorefertoAristotleandtext15useshispropername.In
texts16and17wehaveasimilarcaseexceptthatherethedifferenceconcernstheuseoftwodifferentbutsynonymoussigns,'contribution'and'donation.'Istext15
thesametextastext14andtext17thesameastext16?Ibelievemostofuswouldwanttoanswernegativelybecausethetextsarenotcomposedofthesamesigns,
evenifthosesignsweretoberegardedashavingthesamemeaning.Indeed,someauthorswouldfinditobjectionableifsomeoneweresystematicallytoexchangeall
instancesof'Aristotle'intheirwritingsby'thePhilosopher.'Theymightobjectthat,althoughthereferentofthetermisthesame,theychose'Aristotle'andnot'the
Philosopher'becausetheywantedtolookatAristotleasanauthorratherthanasaphilosopher.Whetherthismakessenseornotisdebatable.Forourpurposes,
however,itisimportantthatauthorswouldobjecttotheexchangeofexpressions.39Similarly,

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authorswouldfindobjectionablethesubstitutionof'contribution'for'donation,'eveniftheycouldnotgiveareasonwhythey,inthefirstplace,hadnotusedthe
formertermratherthanthelatter.Oncethequestionisposed,however,theymightobjecttotheexchangebecauseofthedifferingfeaturesofthewords,andsoon.In
apoem,forexample,thesounddifferencebetweenthetwowordsmaybeimportantfortheintendedrhyme.Oritmaybethatonewordisfavoredovertheother
becauseitismoresophisticated,andsoon.
Stillsomeonemightwanttoarguethatthetextsmeanthesamethingandthusthereisnoreasonwhytext14couldnotberegardedasthesameastext15andtext16
asthesameastext17.And,indeed,theywouldbethesameiftextswereidenticaltotheirmeaningsorsamenessofmeaningwereasufficientconditionoftextual
identity.Butiftextsarenottheirmeanings,butaregroupsofentities,usedassigns,whichareselected,arranged,andintendedbyauthorstoconveyspecificmeanings
toaudiencesincertaincontexts,andmeaningisnotasufficientconditionoftextualsameness,thentexts14and15cannotbethesamenorcantexts16and17.They
areclearlycomposedofdifferentsigns.Thattexts14and15,ortexts16and17,mayactuallydothesamejobdoesnotchangethefactthattheyaredifferenttexts,
justassomeofthesignsofwhichtheyarecomposedaredifferentsignshavingthesamemeaningandeventhesamefunction.Ofcourse,samenessofsignsinturn
dependsonwhatisregardedassemanticallysignificantorsignificantinaparticularcontext.
Inshort,then,wehaveexaminedvariousconditionsthatappearedtobegoodrequirementsoftheachronicsamenessofuniversaltexts,butwefoundthatnoneof
themtakenbyitselfconstitutesasufficientconditionoftextualsameness.Moreover,wefoundthattheauthor,speechacts,audience,andcontextarerelatedtothe
samenessofuniversaltextsonlyinsofarastheyaffectmeaning.Samenessofmeaning,then,incorporatestheseconditionswhentheyarepertinent,andthusthereisno
needtolistthemasconditionsseparatefromthesamenessofmeaning.Thisisnotthecase,however,withthesamenessofarrangementandsamenessofsign
composition.Wefoundthatuniversaltextswiththesamemeaningbutcomposedofdifferenttypesigns,orofthesametypesignsarrangeddifferently,cannotbe
consideredthesameuniversaltext.Thusarrangementandsigncomposition,althoughnotsufficientconditionsoftextualsameness,maybecomeindependently
necessaryconditionsofit.Thereasonisquitesimple.Textsaremixedentities.Theyareentitieswithmeaning.Theirconditionsofsamenessmustincludeconditionsof
entitativesameness(arrangementandcomposition)andmeaning.Alltheseconditionstogetherconstitutethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheirachronic
sameness.Wemayformulatethoseconditionsthus:
AuniversaltextXisachronicallythesameasauniversaltextYifandonlyif(1)XhasthesamemeaningasY,(2)XandYhavethesametype

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ofsyntacticalarrangement,and(3)XandYarecomposedofthesametypesigns.

Theseconditionsshouldbetakenwiththeprovisosnotedthroughoutthediscussion.Althoughitiscleanertoapplythemstrictly,infactourpracticesshowthatsome
changesarenotconsideredsufficientlyimportanttoalteridentity.Wemight,then,speakofabsoluteidentitywhentheseconditionsareappliedwithoutqualification,
andofrelativeidentitywhentheseconditionsarerelaxedonthebasisofcommunalpracticesconcerningwhatisconsideredsamenessofmeaning,syntactical
arrangement,andsigns.40
2.AchronicSamenessofIndividualTexts
Anindividualtextisaninstanceofauniversaltext.ThecopyofthetextofDonQuixotethatIreadwhenIwasinhighschool,forexample,isanindividualtext,an
instanceoftheuniversaltextofDonQuixote.Thequestionbeforeusconcernsthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofitssamenessapartfromtemporal
considerations.
Asaninstanceofauniversaltext,anindividualtextsharesallthefeaturesoftheuniversalexceptfortheuniversaltext'sinstantiability.Consequently,theconditionsof
achronicsamenessthatapplytotheuniversaltextmustalsoapplytotheindividualtext.Butthoseconditionsalonewouldnotbesufficientforachronicindividual
sameness,becausetheconditionsofuniversalsamenessapplytoalltheinstancesoftheuniversal.Whatconditionorconditions,then,mustbeaddedtotheconditions
fortheachronicsamenessoftheuniversal(ofwhichtheindividualisaninstance)that,takentogetherwiththem,wouldaccountfortheachronicsamenessofthe
individual?Inshort,whatmakesanindividualtexttheindividualtextitis?
Putthus,itmightappearthattheissueweareraisinghereisthesameastheissuediscussedinChapter1undertherubric"theproblemofindividuation."However,
therearedifferencesbetweenthetwothatshouldnotbeoverlooked.Theproblemofindividuationinvolvesthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheindividuality
oftexts.AndIproposedthatthoseconditionsreducedtoone:existence.Theproblemoftheachronicsamenessofindividualtextsconcernsthedeterminationofthe
necessaryandsufficientconditionsofanindividualtext,notjustofitsindividuality.Thus,theconditionsfortheachronicsamenessofindividualtextsincludesthe
conditionsofindividualityandalsotheconditionsofthetypeoftextthetextisnamely,theconditionsoftheuniversaltext.Hence,thenecessaryandsufficient
conditionsoftheachronicsamenessofindividualtextsarethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheachronicsamenessoftheuniversalsofwhichthetextsare
instances,takentogetherwiththeconditionsoftheirindividuality(i.e.,existence).Forwhatmakesanindividualtextwhatitis,isbothwhatmakesitthetypeoftextit
istogetherwithwhatmakesittheindividualitis.Thus,

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AnindividualtextXisachronicallythesameasanindividualtextYifandonlyif(1)XisaninstanceofthesameuniversaltextofwhichYisaninstanceand(2)X'sexistenceisthe
sameasY'sexistence.

Thisconclusionappliestoallindividualtexts.Nowletusturntosynchronicsameness.
B.SynchronicSamenessofTexts
Unlikeachronicsameness,synchronicsamenessappliesonlytotemporalentities.Itmakesnosense,then,tospeakofthesynchronicsamenessofuniversals.
Synchronicsamenessappliesonlytoindividuals,foronlyindividualscanbesubjecttotime.Forallintentsandpurposes,thereisnodifferencebetweentheconditions
oftheachronicsamenessofindividualtextsandtheirsynchronicsameness.Synchronicsamenessisthesameasachronicsamenessexceptthatitistakenatacertain
time.Thetimerestrictiononlyeliminatesentitiesnotsubjecttotimeandmakesnodifferenceforthosethataretemporal.Hence,thereisnoneedforustodwellonthis
issue.Ishallturn,then,todiachronicsameness,inwhichtimeplaysamoresignificantrole.
C.DiachronicSamenessofTexts
Diachronicsamenessappliesonlytoindividualtextsthataresubjecttothepassageoftime.Thesetextsmaybedividedintofeatureaggregatesandsubstance/feature
aggregates.Accordingly,Ishalldividethediscussionbetweenthediachronicsamenessoffeatureaggregateandsubstancefeatureaggregatetexts.
1.DiachronicSamenessofIndividualFeatureAggregateTexts
Twobasicviewsseektoaccountforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsthatarefeatureaggregates,asubstantialviewandafeatureview.
a.SubstantialView.Accordingtothesubstantialview,thediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsthatarefeaturesofsubstancesisaccountedforintermsofthe
substancesofwhichtheyarefeatures.41Thisviewmaybeformulatedasfollows:
AnindividualfeatureaggregatetextXattimetnisthesameasanindividualfeatureaggregatetextYattimetn+1ifandonlyifthereisaSsuchthat(1)Sisanindividualsubstance,
(2)bothXandYarefeaturesofS,(3)XandYbelongtothesametype,and(4)Sisthesameattnandtn+1.

Thus,thediachronicsamenessofanindividualtextcarvedonarockisaccountedforbythediachronicsamenessoftherockonwhichthetextis

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carved.Thetextattnisthesameasthetextattn+1becausethetextisanaggregatesetoffeaturesthatbelongstoanindividualsubstancethatisthesameattnandtn+.
Thisviewseemstomakesenseforatleasttworeasons.Inthefirstplace,becauseinasubstancefeatureontologythefeaturesareontologicallydependentonthe
substance,itmakessensetoarguethatthesubstanceaccountsforboththeexistenceandtheidentityofitsfeatures.Ifthedestructionofthesubstanceresultsinthe
destructionofitsfeatures,onewouldexpectthatthepersistenceofthesubstancewouldresultinthepersistenceofitsfeatures.Second,weseemtobecomeawareof
thediachronicsamenessoffeaturesonthebasisofthediachronicsamenessofthesubstanceofwhichtheyarefeatures.Iknowthattheindividualtextofacertainsort
IseecarvedonanindividualstoneattnisthesameasanindividualtextofthesamesortIseecarvedonanindividualstoneattn+1becauseIknowtheyarecarvedon
thesamestone.Indeed,ifIknewthatthestoneswerenotthesameIwouldprobablyconcludethatthetextsarenotthesameindividualtexteveniftheywere
instancesofthesametypeoftext.
Whenoneexaminesthesereasonsfurther,however,theyarenotascompellingastheyfirstseem.Letustakethefirstone,accordingtowhichthediachronic
samenessoftheindividualsubstanceseemstoaccountforthediachronicsamenessoftheindividualtextbecausethetextisontologicallydependentonthesubstance.
Itisfarfromclearthatthisisso,foratextcanchangewhilethesubstanceonwhichitisfoundremainsfundamentallythesame.Thediachronicsamenessofan
individualsubstanceisnotasufficientconditionforthediachronicsamenessofitsfeatures.Onecanimagine,forexample,thatastoneonwhichatextiscarved
persistswhilethetextiserodedorerased.Itistruethatinsuchacasethestonewouldhaveundergonesomechange,butthechangecouldberegardedasminor.
Perhapsthetextinquestionismerelyandsuperficiallyscratchedonthestone.Inthatsituation,thetextcouldbeeasilydestroyedwithabitofsandingalthoughthe
stonewouldforallintentsandpurposesbethesameandwouldcertainlybesubstantiallythesame.
Perhaps,evenifsubstantialdiachronicsamenessisnotasufficientconditionofthediachronicsamenessoffeatures,itmaybearguedthatitisanecessaryconditionof
theirdiachronicsameness,becausethefeaturesofasubstancedonotseemtobeabletoexistunlessthesubstanceexists.Takethecaseofthecarvedtextonastone.
Itappearsthatunlessthestoneexistsandpersiststherecanbenotextthatpersists,forthedestructionofthestonewouldautomaticallyresultinthedestructionofthe
text.
Thematterisnotsosimple,however.Letussupposethatthestoneaboutwhichwearespeakingdoesnotceasetoexistallofasuddenbutissubjectedtoaprocess,
ofsayelectrolysis,wherebyitsmoleculesarereplacedbymoleculesofsomemetal,sothatafteracertainperiodoftimetheoriginalstonehasbecomeapieceof
metal.Ifunderthoseconditionsoneregardsthepieceof

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metalasthesameastheoriginalstone,eventhoughallitsfeatures(weight,color,consistency,etc.)exceptforitsshapeandtexturehavechanged,onecouldstillargue
thatthediachronicsamenessofthesubstanceisanecessaryconditionofthediachronicsamenessofthetext.Butifthepieceofmetalisregardedasadifferententity
fromtheoriginal,whichseemsamorereasonableview,thennosubstantialdiachronicsamenessunderliesthetextualdiachronicsameness.Ofcourse,onecould
alwaysquestionwhetherthereisatextualdiachronicsamenessunderthoseconditions.Butcanwereallyarguethatthereisnot?Whetherthereisornotdependsin
factonwhatisregardedasessentialforthetext.Ifonlytheshapeofthecarvingisinvolved,thenitisclearthatthetextisthesame,fortheparticularshapeofthe
carvedtextonthestonehasnotchangedwiththesubstantialchangesthatthestonehasundergone.Ontheotherhand,ifitisnotshapealonethatisregardedas
essentialtothetext,andsay,colorisalsooftheessence,thenthesubstantialchangehasentailedachangeinthetextandthediachronicsamenessofthetexthasbeen
interrupted.
Inshort,substantialdiachronicsamenesscanbeconsideredneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditionofthediachronicsamenessofindividualfeatureaggregate
texts.Itispossibletohaveindividualfeaturetextsthatpersisteventhoughtheindividualsubstancesonwhichtheydependundergosubstantialchangeanditisalso
possibletohaveindividualfeaturetextsthatdonotpersistinspiteofthediachronicsamenessoftheindividualsubstancesonwhichtheydepend.Thisobjection
underminesthesubstantialviewofdiachronicsamenessofindividualtextsthatarefeaturesofotherentities.
Partofwhathasbeensaidalsoappliestotheotherreasonusedtojustifythesubstantialviewnamely,thatwebecomeawareofthediachronicsamenessofsuchtexts
throughthediachronicsamenessoftheirsubstances.ForevenifIknowthatasubstancehasnotchangedsubstantially,thisdoesnottranslateintoknowledgeabout
thediachronicsamenessofitsfeatures.Forexample,takeapieceofwaxthathasatextimprintedonit.Wecouldsubjectthewaxtosomeheatenoughtomakethe
imprintedtextdisappearandthenreimprintatextofasimilartype.Inthiscasewehavethesamepieceofwaxandyetwehavetwodifferentinstancesofthesame
typetextthatis,wehavetwoindividualtextsratherthanone.Underthesecircumstances,knowledgeofthediachronicsamenessofthewaxwouldnotensure
knowledgeofthediachronicsamenessoftheindividualtext.Indeed,onthebasisoftheappearanceofthepieceofwax(i.e.,thesubstance),thetextseemstobethe
same,whereasinfactitisnot.Thus,knowledgeofsubstantialdiachronicsamenesscannotbeasufficientconditionofknowledgeofthediachronicsamenessof
individualfeaturetexts.
Likewise,knowledgeofsubstantialdiachronicsamenessisnotanecessaryconditionofknowledgeofthediachronicsamenessofindividualfeaturetexts.Herewecan
gobacktotheexampleofthestonethathasbeenreplacedbymetal.Onecouldarguethatinthiscasewehavetwosubstances,knownas

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such,andyetthetextisthesame,becausewhatisessentialtoitasatextisitsshape,whichhasnotchanged,ratherthananyofthefeaturesofthesubstancethat
changedwhenthesubstancechanged.Considerationssuchasthesepavethewayforasecondtheoryofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsbasedonfeatures
ratherthansubstance.
b.FeatureView.Accordingtothefeatureview,thediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsthatarefeaturesofotherentitiesisaccountedforintermsnotofthe
samenessoftheindividualsubstanceofwhichtheyarefeatures,butratherintermsofthesamenessofthefeaturesofthesubstancethatarenotconstitutiveofthe
substance.Andheretwopossibilitiessuggestthemselves.Oneidentifiesthefeaturesthataccountfordiachronicsamenesswithfeaturesotherthantheaggregateof
featuresthatconstituteatext.Theotheridentifiesthefeaturesthataccountfordiachronicsamenesspreciselywiththeaggregateoffeaturesthatconstitutethetext.The
firstpossibilitycouldbeexpressedasfollows:
AnindividualfeatureaggregatetextXattimetnisthesameasanindividualfeatureaggregatetextYattimetn+1ifandonlyifthereisaSsuchthat(1)Sisasetofoneormore
features,(2)ScontainsnofeaturesthatarepartofXorY,(3)XandYbelongtothesametype,and(4)Sisthesameattnandtn+1.

Thesecondalternativemaybeunderstoodthus:
AnindividualfeatureaggregatetextXattimetnisthesameasanindividualfeatureaggregatetextYattimetn+1ifandonlyifthereisaSsuchthat(1)Sisasetofoneormore
features,(2)ScontainsthoseandonlythosefeaturesthatconstituteXandY,(3)XandYbelongtothesametype,and(4)Sisthesameattnandtn+1.

Ifthispositionistakeninthefirstsense,thennotmuchcanbesaidinitsfavor.Indeed,ithasthedisadvantagesofthesubstanceviewandnoneofitsadvantages.For
howcouldonearguethatthediachronicsamenessofanindividualtextistobeaccountedforbyfeaturesthatareconstitutiveneitherofthesubstancethatsustainsthe
textnorofthetextitself?Takethecaseofthetextcarvedonastone.Letusassumethatthestoneisporousandhasbeenstainedred.Letusfurtherassumethatcolor
isnotessentialtothetextcarvedonit.Then,wemayask,howcancolorexplainthediachronicsamenessofthetextcarvedonthestone?Onecouldarguethatit
mightexplainthediachronicsamenessofthestone(somethingquitedebatablebutthatIwillacceptatthemomentforthesakeofargument)andthatinturnthe
diachronicsamenessofthe

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stoneaccountsforthediachronicsamenessofthetextcarvedonit.Butthisisnottosaythatthecoloraccountsforthediachronicsamenessofthetext.Onthe
contrary,whataccountsforthediachronicsamenessofthetextisthediachronicsamenessofthestone.Thatis,wearebacktothesubstanceview.Forfeaturesto
accountforthediachronicsamenessofatexttheymustdosodirectly,notmediately.Inshort,nofeaturescanaccountforthediachronicsamenessofanindividual
textaslongasthefeaturesinquestionarenotconstitutiveofthetext.
Theotherpossibilityistoarguethatthefeaturesthataccountforthediachronicsamenessofanindividualtextarethosethatconstitutethetext,suchasacertaindepth
inthecarvingofacertainshape,andwhateverisestablishedbyconventiontobeessentialforaparticularsetoffeaturestobeusedasthetext.Thisviewalsoseems
reasonableprimafacie,forwhatcouldbetteraccountforthediachronicsamenessofsomethingthanitsconstitutivefeatures?Itwouldappearquitesensibletoargue
thatifXandYhavethesamefeatures,theyarethesamething.
Theproblemwiththisansweristwofold:First,thesamenessofatypeoffeaturesdoesnotentailthesamenessofindividualfeatures.Thatanindividualtextata
particulartimehasthesametypeofshapeanddepthasanotheratsomeothertimedoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheyarethesameindividualtextthatis,one
individualtextisdiachronicallythesameastheother.Samenessoftypeoffeaturesisanecessaryconditionoftheindividualdiachronicsamenessoftexts,butitdoes
notappeartobeasufficientconditionofit.
Second,ifbythisanswerismeantthatsamenessofindividualfeaturesiswhataccountsfortheindividualsamenessofthetextthroughtime,thisagainwillnotdo,for
theexplanationbegsthequestion.Whatisneededistheidentificationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofalackofchangeinindividualfeatures,nota
statementtotheeffectthatchangehasnotoccurred.Anexplanationofhowtheindividualfeaturesofanindividualtextarediachronicallythesameisstillwanting.
Inshort,theviewthatattemptstoaccountforthediachronicsamenessofindividualfeatureaggregatetextsintermsoffeaturesdoesnotseempromising.Iturnnextto
thediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsthataresubstance/featureaggregates.
2.DiachronicSamenessofIndividualSubstance/FeatureAggregateTexts
Inthecaseofindividualtextsthataresubstance/featureaggregates,theissueofdiachronicsamenessissimplifiedbythefactthatinourexperiencethesetextsare
alwaysphysicalobjects.(Mentaltextsarealwaysfeatureaggregatesandwehaveruledoutdiscussingnonmentalnonphysicaltextsinthisbook.)Theproblem,then,of
accountingforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsthataresubstance/featureaggregatesisverysimilartothatofaccounting

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forthediachronicsamenessofsuchindividualthingsastreesandcats.Oneimportantdifferenceshouldbekeptinmind,however:Texts,unliketreesandcats,arethe
resultofconvention,andtherefore,theirdiachronicsamenessissubjectedtoepistemicconditionsthatarenotoperativeinthecaseofotherobjects.
Manyviewscanbeusedtoaccountforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsofthesubstance/featureaggregatetype.ButIshalldealwithonlythreeofthemost
importantofthese:thebundleview,thefeatureview,andthebarecontinuantview.Someoftheseviewsareobviouslyverysimilartotheviewsusedtoaccountfor
individuality,buttheyshouldnotbeconfusedwiththem,fortheiraimisquitedifferent.42
a.BundleView.Thebundleviewarguesthatthecompletesetoffeaturescharacterizingasubstance/featureaggregatetextmakesitthesameindividualtextat
differenttimesthatis,accountsforitsdiachronicsameness.Intheexampleofthetextcomposedofpebbleslyingonthebeach,thecolorofthepebbles,theirsize,
shape,texture,relativeposition,andsoonensurethediachronicsamenessoftheindividualtext.Thisviewmaybeputasfollows:
Anindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextXattimetnisthesameasanindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextYattimetn+1ifandonlyif(1)XandYbelongtothesame
typeand(2)thecompletesetoffeaturesoftheindividualsubstance(s)usedtomakeupXattnisthesamesetoffeaturesoftheindividualsubstance(s)usedtomakeupYattn+1.

Attheoutsetthispositionseemsquiteviable.Firstofall,itwouldseemthatinfactthefeaturesofanindividualtextmakeusawareofitbeingthesametext,thus
accountingforitsdiachronicsamenesswerecognizeindividualtextsbytheirfeatures.Moreover,anindividualtextdoesnotseemprimafacietobeanythingmorethan
thefeaturesthatmakeitup,andsoitstandstoreasonthatthosefeaturesensureitsdiachronicsameness.
Yet,abitofreflectionrevealsseriousweaknessesinthebundleviewaswellasinthetwoargumentsusedtosupportit.Inthefirstplace,iftextsareepistemicentities
insofaraswhattheyaredependsoncertainknownconventions,itisclearthatonlyelementsthatareepistemicallyaccessiblecanbeconsideredessentialtotexts.43
Butnotallthefeaturesofsubstancesthatareusedastextsareorcanbeknowninthecircumstanceswheretheyfunctionastexts.Forexample,theinternal
consistencyofthepebblesthatcomposeatextonthebeachisgenerallybeyondtheobservationalhorizonoftheauthorwhocomposedthetextandtheaudiencethat
issupposedtounderstandit.Therefore,suchconsistencycannotplayaroleinthereidentificationofthetext.Andthesamecouldbesaidconcerningmanyother
featuresofthesubstancesthat

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constitutesubstantialtexts.Itmakesnosensetoargueforthebundleviewbasedontheclaimthatwebecomeawareofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts
throughthefeaturesoftexts.
Itispossible,however,tointerpretthebundleviewinadifferentway.Thebundletheoristmightarguethatitisnotthebundlesoffeaturesofthesubstancesthat
constitutestextsthataccountforthediachronicsamenessofsubstance/featureaggregatetexts,butratherthebundlesoffeaturesthatconstitutethetextsthemselves.
Theformulationofthisview,then,wouldhavetobechangedtosomethinglikethis:
Anindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextXattnisthesameasanindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextYattimetn+1ifandonlyif(1)XandYbelongtothesametype
and(2)thecompletesetofpertinentfeaturesthatconstitutesXatt1isthesamesetoffeaturesthatconstitutesYattn+1.

Itisnot,forexample,allthefeaturesofthepebblesthatconstitutethetextonthebeach,suchastheirinternalconsistency,weight,andsoon,thataccountforthe
diachronicsamenessoftheindividualtext.Itisratherthesemanticallysignificantfeaturesofthepebbles,whichquatextualfeatureshavebeenconventionallyselected
asessentialtothetextandarethusepistemicallyaccessible.Wehavetwobundles:thebundleoffeaturesofthesubstancesusedtomakeupthetextandthebundleof
featuresthatconstitutethetext.Someofthefeaturesaresurelycommontobothbundlessay,theshapeofthepebbles,butothersarenot.Theinternalconsistencyof
aparticularpebbleneednotbeapartofthefeaturesofthetext,andthearrangementofthepebbles,whichispartofthetext,isnotacharacteristicofanyoneofthe
pebblesthatconstitutethetext.Itmaybethatthepebblesarearrangedintheshapeofatriangle.Triangularityisacharacteristicofallthepebblestakenasagroupbut
notofeachofthepebbles,fornoneofthepebblesneedbetriangularinshapetobearrangedtriangularlywithotherpebbles.
Inshort,then,theobjectionwehaveconsiderediscompellingagainstonlythefirstformulationofthebundleview,notthesecond.Thisdoesnotmean,however,that
theaccountofthediachronicsamenessofindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextsintermsofbundlesoffeaturesisoutofthewoods.Twootherobjections
undermineit.Thefirstisthat,evenifweconsideronlythefeaturesofatextquatext,excludinganyfeatureofthesubstancesthatcomposeitbutarenotsemantically
significant,thediachronicsamenessofallthefeaturesarenotnecessaryorsufficientconditionsforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts.Forexample,inthetext
onthebeachweknowthatthenumberandarrangementofthepebblesarefeaturesofthetextandthuspartofthebundleoffeaturesthatpresumablywouldaccount
forthediachronicsameness

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ofthetext.ButIbelievethatinatextoriginallycomposedofthousandsoflettersdisplayedonacomputerscreen,thelossofoneortwoletterswouldnotgenerally
(thereareexceptions,ofcourse,dependingontheplaceoccupiedbytheletters,etc.)resultinafundamentallydifferenttext.Sosomefeaturesoftextsseemnottobe
essentialtotheirdiachronicsameness,andthisseriouslyunderminestheviewthatthebundleofallofatext'sfeaturesaccountforthatsameness,evenwhensuch
featureshavesemanticsignificance.
Inasimilarwayitcanbearguedthatevenallthefeaturesofatextdonotconstituteasufficientconditionofthediachronicsamenessofanindividualtext.Thereasonis
simple.Thefeaturesofatext,evenifindividual,donotentaildiachronicsameness.Tobeanindividualfeatureisnottobethesameindividualfeatureattwo(ormore)
differenttimes.Thus,evenifwehadtwosetsofindividualfeatures,thatis,ofnoninstantiableinstancesofthefeatures,andevenifthoseindividualinstancesbelonged
tothesametype,stillthatwouldnotmakethemthesameindividualfeaturesandhencewouldnotensuretheirdiachronicsameness.
Toillustratethepoint,takeasetofindividualfeaturesS1thatconstitutesatextattimetn.Attimetn+1wealsohaveasetofindividualfeaturesS2thatisinfactlikeS1
becauseitisasetofindividualfeaturesandfeaturesofthesametypeasthefeaturesthatmakeupS1.ThequestionweneedtoanswerishowS1attnisthesameasS2
attn+1,butthiscannotbedoneonthebasismerelyofthefactthattheyaresetsofindividualfeaturesthatbelongtothesametype.
Thepointofthesetwoobjectionsistwofold:(1)Wecanhavethesameindividualtextattwodifferenttimeseventhoughthetextchangessomeofitsfeaturesand(2)
havingnodifferenceinfeatures,thatis,intheirtype,individuality,andnumber,doesnotensureindividualdiachronicsameness.Forthesereasons,thebundleview
doesnotadequatelyaccountfortheindividualdiachronicsamenessoftextsthataresubstance/featureaggregates.
b.SelectedFeatureViews.Thefailureofthebundleviewmaypromptotherproposals.Anaturalresponse,particularlytomakeupforthefirstdeficiencyindicated
concerningthebundleview,istosaythatnotallthefeaturesofanindividualtextofthesubstance/featureaggregatevarietymakeuptheconditionsofitsdiachronic
sameness,butonlycertainfeaturesofit.Thuswemightsaythat
Anindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextXattimetnisthesameasanindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextYattimetn+1ifandonlyif(1)XandYbelongtothesame
typeand(2)oneormorefeaturesofXattnarethesameasoneormorefeaturesofYattn+1.

Amongthemanyfeaturesofphysicaltexts,materiality,quantity,andspatiotemporallocationstandoutasthosethatmightappearbestableto

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accountfordiachronicsameness.Materiality,forexample,wouldseemtobeaprimecandidate.Afterall,goingasfarbackasAristotle,matterhasbeenconceivedas
thesubjectofchange,thesubstratumthatensuressamenesswithintheprocessofchange.Thus,itisthestuffoutofwhichasubstance/featureaggregatetextismade
thatensuresitsdiachronicsamenessinspiteofchangesinotherfeaturesofthetextsuchascolor,texture,andthelike.
Yet,matterseemshardlyagoodcandidatetoensurediachronicsamenessfor,evenifinfactitcouldensurediachronicsameness,itdoesnotmeettheepistemic
requirementtobeidentifiedasanecessaryandsufficientconditionofatext.Matterisnotsomethingwithwhichobserverscanbeacquainted.Weperceiveextension,
color,andsoonbutnotmatter.Althoughitcouldbearguedthatmatterfunctionsasthenecessaryandsufficientconditionofthediachronicsamenessofthephysical
substanceorsubstancesthatconstituteatext,itwouldnotthenfunctionasthenecessaryandsufficientconditionofthediachronicsamenessofthetext.
Theproblemswithquantityaredifferentfromthosefacedbythematerialview,forquantity(saydimensionsorweight)seemsperceptual.Thusinprinciplequantity
couldfunctionasthebasisofthediachronicsamenessofindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetexts.Todoso,however,quantitymustbeselectedasanecessary
andsufficientconditionofthetextinquestion,foritisconceivablethatatextmaybepreservedwhileitssizeisshrunkanditsweightundercut.Supposethatthetext
onthebeachaboutwhichwehavebeenspeakingiscomposedofballoonsratherthanpebbles.Evenifweletsomeairoutoftheballoons,thusshrinkingtheminsize,
wewouldstillregardthetextasthesameunless,ofcourse,wehadstipulatedthatthesizeoftheballoonsweresemanticallysignificant.Andsomethingsimilarwould
bethecaseifwecutthenumberofpixelsthatconstituteatextdisplayedonacomputerscreen.
Moreimportantthantheseconsiderations,however,istheobjectionalreadyraisedagainstthebundleview,whichappliesnotonlytothatpositionbuttoanyfeature
view.Itarguedthat,evenifafeatureorsetoffeatures(includingquantity,ofcourse)isanecessaryconditionforthediachronicsamenessofanindividualtext,it
cannotfunctionasasufficientconditionofitbecauseitdoesnotaccountfortheindividualsamenessofthosefeatures.Inotherwords,thattextXattnandtextYat
tn+1areofsuchandsuchatypeorhavesuchandsuchtypeoffeatures,isnotasufficientconditiontosaythatXisindividuallythesameasY.
Theanalysisofrelationalfeaturesfollowsalongsimilarlines.Considerspatiotemporallocation.Itwouldseematfirstthat,forphysicaltextsthataresubstance/feature
aggregates,spatiotemporallocationwouldnotonlybeanecessarybutalsoasufficientconditionofdiachronicsameness.Uponreflection,however,itisclearthat,
althoughspatiotemporallocationmightbeanecessaryconditionofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsofthissort,itis

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certainlynotasufficientconditionofit.Atextdoesnotcontinuebeingthesameindividualtextthroughtimesimplybecauseitislocatedintimeandspace.Atextcan
belocatedintimeandspaceandyetbereplacedbyanother,eitherinstantaneouslyorthroughaslowprocessinwhichitssemanticallysignificantfeaturesarechanged.
Amoresensibleviewistoarguethat,notjustspatiotemporallocation,butspatiotemporaldiachronicsamenessiswhataccountsforthediachronicsamenessof
individualphysicaltextsofthesubstance/featureaggregatesort.Hereagain,mattersarenotsosimple.Firstofall,wemustbeclearastowhatspatiotemporal
diachronicsamenessmeans.Onethingthatitshouldnotnecessarilymeanisthattextsoccupythesamespacethroughoutadeterminedperiodoftime.Forthesame
textcancertainlychangeplacesandremainthesame.Spatiotemporaldiachronicsamenessshouldbeunderstoodtomeanthattherearenospatiotemporalgaps
betweenonespatiotemporallocationandanotherThatis,itshouldmeanthattherearenointerruptionsinthespaceorspacesoccupiedbyatextatvarioustimes.If
wehaveatext,say,X,locatedatspaceSnattimetn,andwehaveatextYlocatedatspaceSn+1attimetn+1,wecansaythatXisspatiotemporallycontinuouswithY
iftherearenointerruptionsbetweenSnandSn+1inthetimesrepresentedbytnandtn+1.Now,thispositionarguesthatifXisspatiotemporallycontinuouswithYthen
XisthesametextasYandthereforethereisdiachronicsamenessbetweenXandY.
Theflawinthisargumentisthat,althoughitmakesconsiderablesensetoarguethatspatiotemporaldiachronicsamenessisanecessaryconditionofthediachronic
samenessofindividualphysicaltexts,itdoesnotseemplausibletoarguethatitisalsoasufficientconditionofit.Indeed,wecouldhavecasesinwhichtherehavebeen
nospatiotemporalinterruptionsandyetthefeaturesdeemednecessaryfortheidentityofthetexthavebeenchanged.Considerthecaseofatextthatiscomposedof
whitemarbleballsarrangedinaparticularway,inwhichthespatiotemporalarrangementoftheballsmeansthatphilosophersareliarsbutthecoloroftheballsstands
forthenegationofwhateverthearrangementoftheballsconveys.Thus,themeaningofthetextisthatphilosophersarenotliars.Nowletussupposethatwealterthe
coloroftheballstored,whichmeansemphaticaffirmation,withoutchangingthearrangementoftheballs.Undersuchconditionsitwouldcertainlymakesensetosay
thattheredballsarespatiotemporallycontinuouswiththewhiteballs,butitwouldnotmakesensetosaythatthetextcomposedoftheredballsisthesameasthe
textcomposedofthewhiteballs.Indeed,onetextcontradictstheother,soonecouldnotverywellarguethattheyarethesameindividualtext.Hence,asinthecase
ofthenonrelationalfeaturesoftexts,relationalones,suchasspatiotemporallocation,arenotsufficientconditionsofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts.

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c.BareContinuantView.Thebarecontinuantviewisadialecticalresponsetothedifficultiesofviewsthataretiedtofeatures.Ifnoneofthefeaturesofatext,taken
singlyorinconjunctionwithothers,isnecessaryandsufficienttoaccountforthediachronicsamenessofatext,whataccountsfordiachronicsamenessmustbeabare
continuantthatis,anentitywhosefunctionistoensurecontinuitybutthathasnofeaturesinitselfotherthanthefeaturesthatareperceivedasfeaturesofthetext.
ManypreKantianviewsofsubstancefallintothiscategoryandsodosomecontemporaryviewsofindividuation.Theviewmaybeformulatedasfollows:
Anindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextXattnisthesameasanindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetextYattn+1ifandonlyif(1)XandYbelongtothesametypeand
(2)thereisanindividualentityEsuchthat(i)EhasnofeaturesotherthanthefeaturesofXandY,(ii)EiscommontoXandY,and(iii)Eisthesameattnandtn+1.

Notethattherearesimilaritiesbetweenthispositionandthesubstantialview,butthedifferencesarestriking.Mostimportantamongthelatteristhatthecontinuant
neitherisasubstanceintheAristoteliansensenorhasanyfeaturesofitsown.
Thestrengthofthissortofpositionliesbothintherecognitionthataprincipletoaccountforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsisrequiredandalsothatno
theorybasedonthefeaturesoftextsseemstoaccountforsameness.Theproblemswiththeviewstemfromthesamesourcethatunderminesalltheoriesidentifying
decharacterizedentitiesasprinciplesofsomethingelse.Inthecaseoftexts,inparticular,thisisadevastatingflaw,fortextsareepistemicentities,andtherefore,their
constituentsmustbesubjecttoacquaintance.Whenitcomestodiachronicsameness,somethingweareorcanbeacquaintedwithmustserveasbothnecessaryand
sufficientconditionsofthatsameness.Anentitywhoseexistenceispositedonlyontheoreticalbaseswillnotdo.
Onelineofdefenseagainstthisargumentistosaythatwearesomehowacquaintedwithbarecontinuants.Butthislineofargumentationisunconvincing.Ihavedealt
withthissortofargumentelsewhere,soIdonotseetheneedtorepeatmyobjectionsagainstithere.44
Anotherlineofdefenseistoarguethatweareactuallyacquaintedwiththebarecontinuantthroughthefeaturesofthetext.Thislineofdefensealsoisflawedinsofaras
thosefeaturesdonotprovideaproperbasisfordiachronicsameness.Thediachronicsamenessofthebarecontinuantremainsmysteriousandcanhardlyaccountfor
thediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts.

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3.ConditionsfortheDiachronicSamenessofIndividualTexts
Eventhoughwehavenotfoundintheviewssofardiscussedanyonethatwouldaccountsatisfactorilyforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts,wehavenot
wastedourtime.Thediscussionhasrevealedthemostimportantflawsoftheviewsexaminedandinsodoinghasindirectlyestablishedcertainrequirementsthata
viableviewshouldfulfill.Theserequirementsarefour.Thefirstoftheseisthat,whateverconditionsareidentified,theymustbenecessaryconditionsoftheindividual
textwhosediachronicsamenessisbeingaccountedfor.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheymustbenecessarytothesubstanceofwhichthetextisafeatureaggregatewhen
thetextisofthatsortortothesubstancesandfeaturesthatconstitutethetextinsubstance/featureaggregatetexts.Therearefeaturesofsubstancesthatarenot
necessarytothetextsthatarethemselvesfeaturesofthosesubstances.Ontheotherhand,therearefeaturesofsubstancesthatarenotnecessaryforthesubstances
butarenecessaryforthetexts.Andtherearefeaturesofsubstancesthatarenotnecessaryfortextsconstitutedofthosesubstances.Whatisimportantisnotthestatus
oftheconditionwithrespecttothesubstanceofwhichanaggregatetextisafeaturebutthattheconditionsbeconstitutiveofthetext,whetherthetextsarefeature
aggregatesorsubstance/featureaggregates.
Thesecondrequirementhastodowiththeepistemiccharacteroftexts.Nothingthatisnotsubjecttoacquaintancecanfunctionasaconditionofthediachronic
samenessofindividualtexts,fortextsareepistemicallyaccessibleentities.
Third,diachronicsamenesscannotbeaccountedforintermsoffeaturesquafeaturesalone,evenifthosefeaturesarenecessaryforit.Thereasonisthatfeaturesare
notbythemselvesindividual.
Finally,theconditionsofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsmustbebothnecessaryandsufficient.Partoftheproblemwiththetheoriesdiscussedearlier
restedontheidentificationofonlysomeconditions,particularlynecessaryones,ratherthanallconditions.Anappropriatetheory,then,musttakecaretoincludeall
conditionsbothnecessaryandsufficient.
TheviewIproposeisthattwoconditions,whentakentogether,arenecessaryandsufficientforthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts.Thisviewcouldbe
formulatedasfollows:
AnindividualtextXattnisthesameasanindividualtextYattn+1ifandonlyif(1)XandYbelongtothesametypeand(2)theexistenceofYiscontinuouswiththeexistenceofX.

Condition(1)ismeanttogathertheconditionsoftheachronicsamenessofuniversaltextsthatassuchalsoapplytotheinstancesofthosetexts.

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Condition(2)ismeanttoindicatethatthecontinuousexistenceoftheindividualtextisanecessaryconditionofitsdiachronicsameness.Continuityisnecessary
becauseitispossibletohavetwoindividualtextsexactlyalikeinallrespectsattwodifferenttimesthatarenotthesameindividualtextonlycontinuitybetweenthem
willensuretheirindividualidentity.Thetwoconditionstakentogetherformthesufficientconditionofdiachronicsameness.Moreover,theseconditionsapplybothto
featureaggregateandsubstance/featureaggregatetexts.
II.Difference
Fromwhathasbeensaidconcerningsamenesswecanlearnmuchaboutdifference,fordifferenceistheoppositeofsameness.Indeed,Iwouldclaimthatthetwo
notions,asIhaveunderstoodthemhere,aremutuallyexclusive.
Correspondingtothetwounderstandingsofsamenessthatweregivenearlier,wemaypresenttwounderstandingsofdifferenceasfollows:
XisdifferentfromYifandonlyifthereissomethingthatpertainstoXthatdoesnotpertaintoYorviceversa.
XisdifferentfromYwithrespecttoFifandonlyifthereissomethingthatpertainstoFofXthatdoesnotpertaintoFofYorviceversa.

Likewise,justassamenessmaybetakenachronically,synchronically,ordiachronically,socandifference:
XisachronicallydifferentfromYifandonlyifXisdifferentfromY.
XissynchronicallydifferentfromYifandonlyifXisdifferentfromYattimet.
XisdiachronicallydifferentfromYifandonlyifXattimetnisdifferentfromYattimetn+1.

Ourconcerninthischapterhasbeenwiththesamenessanddifferenceoftexts.Andwehavefoundthattextscanbeachronically,synchronically,anddiachronically
thesame.Moreover,justastextsmaybeachronically,synchronically,anddiachronicallythesame,sotheymaybe,mutatismutandis,differentinthesameways.For
ourpurposes,however,onlytwocasesofdifferencemeritexaminationnamely,theachronicdifferenceoftheuniversaltextandthediachronicdifferenceofthe
individualtext.
Thequestionoftheachronicdifferenceofuniversaltextshastodowiththeidentificationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatmaketextsdifferent

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irrespectiveoftime.Forexample,wemayaskwhatthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsareforsometextnottobethetextofDonQuixote.Theanswerisnot
difficult:Itisnecessaryonlythatatleastoneoftheconditionsspecifiedaboveforachronicsamenessbemissing.Theconditionsweresamenessofmeaning,syntactical
arrangement,andsigncomposition.Ifoneormoreoftheseismissing,thenatextisnotthesameasthetextwithwhichitisbeingcompared,andistherefore,different
fromit.
Likewise,forthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts,threeconditionswereidentifiedinadditiontothejustmentionedones:individuality,samenessoftype,and
continuousexistence.Ifanyoneoftheseismissing,thenthetextsinquestionarenotthesameandmustbedifferent.
III.IdentificationandReidentificationofTexts
Toidentifysomethingmeanstosingleitoutandtoreidentifyitmeanstoidentifyitasthesame.IidentifythesheetofpaperonwhichIamwritingwhenIamableto
singleitout,separatingitfromthosethingsthatsurroundit,saythetableonwhichitrests,thepenwithwhichIammakingmarksonit,andthesheetofpapernexttoit
onthetable.Toreidentifyinvolvesmorethanidentification,itinvolvessinglingoutsomethingattwoormoretimesandregardingitasthesame.Reidentification
requiresthreelogicalstages:thesinglingoutofathingatonetime,sayasheetofpaperthesinglingoutofathingatanothertime,sayasheetofpaperandthe
identificationofthetwoasthesame,thesamesheetofpaper.
Theinterestthatidentificationandreidentificationhaveforphilosopherscentersaroundthequestionofthepropercriteriaforidentificationandreidentification.The
term'criteria'underscorestheepistemologicalnatureoftheissues,forcriteriarefertothemarksthatallowustoidentifyorreidentifysomething.Inbothcasesit
involvesknowledge:Inthefirst,itisknowledgeofsomethingasbeingitselfandalsodistinctfromotherthingsandinthesecond,itisknowledgeofsomethingasbeing
itselfandthesameattwoormoretimes.Bothissuesconcerntheexplanationofhowknowersknow,ratherthanofthewaythingsthatknowersknoware.
Theproblemsofidentificationandreidentificationaretoagreatextenttheepistemologicalcounterpartsoftheontologicalproblemsofidentitydiscussedearlier.Sofar
wehavediscussedwhatmakesuniversaltextsachronicallythesameandwhatmakesindividualtextsachronically,synchronically,anddiachronicallythesame.The
issuesofsynchronicanddiachronicidentitydonotapplytouniversaltextsbecausetheyarenotsubjecttotimeanditspassageonlyindividualtextscanbe
synchronicallythesamebecauseonlytheyaresubjecttotime,andsimilarlyonlytheycanbediachronicallythesamebecauseonlytheyaresubjecttothepassageof
time.

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Puttingtheseissuesepistemically,then,wemayaskforthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofknowingthatuniversalandindividualtextsareachronicallythesame
andthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofknowingthatindividualtextstowhichappropriatetemporalqualificationsapplyaresynchronicallyanddiachronicallythe
same.Theproblemofidentificationistheepistemologicalcounterpartoftheontologicalproblemsofdeterminingthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheachronic
samenessofuniversalandindividualtexts,aswellasthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofthesynchronicsamenessofindividualtexts.Theproblemof
reidentificationistheepistemologicalcounterpartoftheontologicalproblemofdeterminingthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofthediachronicsamenessof
individualtexts.
Itisaltogetherpossiblethatthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatsolveontologicalproblemsalsoapplytotheirepistemologicalcounterparts.Thereisnoreason
whythecausesthatexplainthesamenessofasheetofpaperthroughtimecannotbethereasonwhyweknowitasthesamesheetofpaperatdifferenttimes.One
mightwanttoarguethatthefeaturesofthesheetofpaperaccountforbothitssamenessthroughtimeandourunderstandingofthatsameness.However,althoughthe
necessaryandsufficientconditionsthatsolveontologicalproblemsmaybethesameasthosethatsolveepistemologicalones,theyneednotbeso,fortheyarenot
meanttoaccountforthesamething.Therefore,itisadvisablethatontologicalandepistemologicalproblemsingeneralbetreatedseparatelytoavoidconfusion,andI
havedonesowithregardtotheproblemsthatconcerntexts.Iwilldiscusstheepistemologicalproblemsofidentificationandreidentificationverybrieflyhere,
however,formostofwhatwassaidearlierconcerningtheontologicalproblemsofsamenessapplieshereaswell,anditwouldbesuperfluoustorepeatit.
Thequestionswehavetoaddressunderidentificationarethree:(1)Whatarethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforidentifyingauniversaltext?(2)Whatarethe
necessaryandsufficientconditionsforidentifyinganindividualtextconsideredapartfromtime?(3)Whatarethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforidentifyingan
individualtextataparticulartime?Althoughquestions2and3arelogicallydifferent,inthisepistemologicalcontext,justasinontology,theyamounttothesameand
thereforecanbeconflated.Concerningreidentificationonlyonequestionneedstobeaddressed:Whatarethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforreidentifyingan
individualtextthatis,identifyingtheindividualtextasthesameattwoormoretimes?
Fromwhathasbeensaidearlierweknowtheconditionsoftheachronicontologicalidentityofuniversaltexts:samenessofmeaning,samenessofsyntactical
arrangement,andsamenessoftypesigncomposition.Theseconditions,ofcourse,donotensureepistemologicalidentityforthatweneedtohaveknowledgeofthese
conditions.Inshort,theconditionsoftheepistemologicalidentificationofauniversaltextamounttotheknowledgeoftheconditionsof

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ontologicalidentityoftheuniversaltext:knowledgeofthesamenessofmeaning,knowledgeofthesamenessofsyntacticalarrangement,andknowledgeofthe
samenessoftypesigncomposition.
Fromwhathasbeensaidconcerningontologyandepistemology,itfollows,however,thatitisprimafaciepossiblethatknowledgeofalltheconditionsofontological
identitywillnotbenecessaryforepistemicidentification.Indeed,itispossiblethattheknowledgeinquestionbeofconditionsotherthanthoseforontologicalidentity.
Butthispossibilityisnotavailableinthecaseoftheachronicidentificationofuniversaltexts,fornothingisinauniversaltextbuttheontologicalconditions,andunless
weknowtheyareallfulfilled,wecannotknowwhetherthetextisthesame.ToknowthatsomethingisthetextofDonQuixoteIhavetoknowthatthetexthasthe
samemeaning,thesamesyntacticalarrangements,andthesametypesignsasthetextofDonQuixote,otherwiseIcannotbesurethatthetextisindeedthetextof
DonQuixote.Therefore,theontologicalformuladevelopedearliershouldbemodifiedtoread:
AuniversaltextXisknowntobeachronicallythesameasauniversaltextYifandonlyifitisknownthat(1)XhasthesamemeaningasY,(2)XandYhavethesamesyntactical
arrangement,and(3)XandYarecomposedofthesametypesigns.

Theadaptationofthisformulatoindividualtextswillnotyieldachronicandsynchronicsamenessinthecaseofthosetexts,however.Theformulawouldlookas
followsforthecaseofachronicsamenessofindividualtexts:
AnindividualtextXisknowntobeachronicallythesameasanindividualtextYifandonlyifitisknownthat(1)XhasthesamemeaningasY,(2)XandYhavethesame
syntacticalarrangement,and(3)XandYarecomposedofthesametypesigns.

Andtheformulawouldlookasfollowsinthecaseofsynchronicsameness:
AnindividualtextXisknowntobesynchronicallythesameasanindividualtextYattifandonlyifitisknownthat(1)XhasthesamemeaningasY,(2)XandYhavethesame
syntacticalarrangement,and(3)XandYarecomposedofthesametypesigns.

Thereasonthattheseformulasarenoteffectiveinyieldingachronicandsynchronicsamenessofindividualtextsisthattheyspecifyonlyconditionsofuniversal
sameness.Thus,althoughXandYare,inaccordancewiththoseconditions,ofthesametype,theyneednotbeindividuallythesame.Conditionsofindividual
samenessmustbeadded.Thismeansthatforindividualtextsthe

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problemofachronicandsynchronicidentityistheepistemologicalcounterpartoftheontologicalproblemofindividuationthatis,itisconcernedwithhowweknow
thatatext,overandabovebeingatextandthetypeoftextitis,isalsoanindividualtext.
Thenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatservetoidentifyordiscernindividualscanbequitedifferentfromtheconditionsthatindividuate.45Nordothey
necessarilydifferonlyinsofarastheconditionsforepistemologicalidentificationinvolveknowledgeoftheconditionsofontologicalidentification,whereasthe
conditionsofontologicalidentificationinvolvenosuchknowledge,aswesawinthecaseofuniversaltexts.Thecaseofindividualtextsisdifferentfromthatof
universaltexts.Therootofthedifferenceisthatindividualtextsareimmersedincircumstancesthatmakepossibletheiridentificationinvariousways.Forexample,
colorincertaincontextsmaybesufficienttoidentifyaphysicaltext,evenifitisneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditioninanothersetofcircumstances.This
problemisnotparochialtotextsbutaffectsallindividuals,andbecauseIhavedealtwithitindetailelsewhere,weneednotdwellonitheretoanygreatextent.46Let
itsufficetosaythatwebecomeacquaintedwithindividuals,whethertextsornot,inavarietyofways,dependingonthedifferentfeaturestheyhaveandthe
circumstancesthatsurroundthem.Incaseswherethosefeaturesappeartobesimilar,howeverultimatelytemporalandspatiotemporalcoordinatesbasedonthe
absolutepointofviewrepresentedbyasubjectindividuateepistemologicallythatis,identifyanindividual.
Somethingsimilartowhathasbeensaidconcerningidentificationandindividuationcanbesaidconcerningtheissueofreidentificationanddiachronicsameness.The
diachronicsamenessoftextsinvolvesthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofthesamenessofanindividualtextthroughtime.Itentailsexplaining,forexample,what
makesanindividualtextthesameattwodifferenttimes,determiningaswellunderwhatcircumstancesandonthebasisofwhatfactorsatextcouldnotbethesame.
Thisisallverydifferentfromtheissueinvolvedinreidentification.Thelatterhastodowiththedeterminationofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofour
identificationofthetextasthesameattwoormoredifferenttimes.Itinvolves,therefore,thenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheknowledgethatasubjectmay
haveofatextwithwhichoneisacquaintedatonetimeasthesameasatextwithwhichoneisacquaintedatothertimes.Samenessthroughtimehastodowiththe
causesofafeatureoftheworld,whereasreidentificationhastodowiththecausesofafeatureofaknower'sknowledgeabouttheworld.
Notethattheultimatestatusof''theworld"doesnotaffectthisdistinctionaslongastheworldisnotidentifiedwithaknower'sknowledgeoftheworld.Theworld
maybe,forallweknow,ideal.Oritmaybe,assomepostKantianphilosophersclaim,consciousness,orpartofconsciousness,oreven

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phenomenal.Noneofthismakesanydifferenceaslongaswhatisunderstoodby'theworld'isnotidentifiedwith"knowledgeoftheworld."Aslongasthisdistinction
ispreserved,therecanbeadifferencebetweenthecausesoftheworld,orwhathappensinit,andthecausesoftheknowledgeaknowerhasoftheworld.
Asimilarproceduretotheonefollowedtoestablishthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofidentificationcanbefollowedtoestablishtheconditionsof
reidentificationofanindividualtext.Earlierinthischapter,Ipresentedthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtextsinthe
followingformula:
AnindividualtextXattnisthesameasanindividualtextYattn+1ifandonlyif(1)XandYbelongtothesametypeand(2)theexistenceofYiscontinuouswiththeexistenceofX.

Convertingthisformulaintoanepistemicmode,wecouldsay,then,that
AnindividualtextXattnisknowntobethesameasanindividualtextYattn+1ifandonlyifitisknownthat(1)XandYbelongtothesametypeand(2)theexistenceofYis
continuouswiththeexistenceofX.

Clearly,iftheseconditionsaresatisfied,weknowthattheindividualtextXisthesameastheindividualtextY,butasinthecaseoftheidentityofindividualtexts,itis
sometimespossiblesuccessfullytoreidentifyindividualtextsonthebasisofconditionsotherthanthese.Forexample,inaworldwheretheonlyredthingisan
individualtext,thetextcanbereidentifiedbyitsredcolorandweneednotknowanythingaboutcontinuousexistence.Butinourworld,mattersarequitedifferent.
IV.Conclusion
IbeganthischapterbynotingthatinthelibraryoftheUniversityatBuffalothereareseveralvolumeswiththetitleDonQuixotethat,althoughdifferentinmanyways,
usersofthelibraryregardasthesame.Thisraisestheparticularquestionofwhatmakesthemthesameandinamoregeneralwayofwhatmakestextsthesame.
Afterposingthequestion,wesawthatfivedifferentanswerssuggestthemselves.Theseanswerswerebasedonconceptionsoftextsas(1)theentitiesthatconstitute
them,(2)theirmeaning,(3)theentitiesthatconstitutethemconsideredtogetherwithmeaning,(4)certainacts,and(5)theentitiesthatconstitutetextsconsideredas
havingnotjustmeaningbutaparticularmeaning.Accordingly,theidentityoftextswasconceivedinfivedifferentways.

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Unfortunately,allfiveencounterdifficulties,buttheleastobjectionablewayisthefifth,soIsetouttoexplainitsadvantages.Tocarryoutthattask,however,Ihadto
clarifythenatureofthequestion,foritsapparentsimplicityhidesconsiderablecomplexity.Thiscomplexitycomesfromtwosources:first,thenotionofsamenessitself
and,second,theobjecttowhichthesamenessissupposedtoapply.Samenessistobedistinguishedfromsimilarityandmaybetakenachronically(i.e.,irrespectiveof
time),synchronically(i.e.,intermsoftimebutirrespectiveofthepassageoftime),anddiachronically(i.e.,intermsofthepassageoftime).
Achronicsamenessmayapplytoanythingwhatever.Therefore,inrelationtotexts,wefoundthatitcouldbeusedtoreferto(1)textsquatexts,(2)universaltexts
(whetherofthesubstance/featureaggregatevarietyortheteatureaggregatevariety),and(3)individualtexts.Whenappliedtotextsquatexts,thequestionofachronic
samenessamountstothequestionofwhatmakesatextbeatext.ThisquestionwasalreadyansweredintheIntroduction,wherethedefinitionoftextswaspresented.
Onlywhenthequestionreferstouniversalorindividualtextsdoesitbecomesignificantlydifferentfromthequestionofdefinition.Inthatsensewewanttoknow,first,
whatmakesachronicallythesamedifferentcopiesofthetextof,say,DonQuixotefoundintheuniversitylibraryand,second,theconditionsofachronicsamenessof
eachindividualcopyofthetextofDonQuixote.
Theattempttoanswerthefirstquestionledustoaconsiderationofthebasicelementsthatplayrolesintextuality:meaning,author,speechacts,audience,context,
signarrangement,andsigns.Theconclusionreachedwasthatuniversaltextsareachronicallythesamewhentheyhavethesamemeaning,displaythesamesyntactical
arrangements,andarecomposedofthesametypesigns.ThisexplainshowallcopiesofthetextofDonQuixoteinthelibraryareachronicallythesameuniversaltext,
fortheyfulfilltheseconditionseventhoughtheyoccupydifferentlocations,areprintedindifferenttypescriptsonpapersofdifferentconsistencies,havevarying
numbersofwordsperpage,displaydifferentcolorsofink,andsoon.
Somuch,then,fortheachronicsamenessofuniversaltexts.WestillhadtoconsidereachofthosecopiesofthetextofDonQuixote,fortheconditionsofthe
achronicsamenessofindividualtextscannotbethesameasthoseofuniversaltexts,otherwiseindividualcopiesofatextwouldbeuniversaltextsandviceversa.
TheanswertothisquestionwasgatheredinpartfromtheanswergiveninChapter1concerningtheindividuationoftextsandinpartfromwhatwassaidintheearlier
partofthischapterconcerningtheachronicidentityofuniversaltexts.InChapter1,Iconcludedthattheonlynecessaryandsufficientconditionofatextbeing
individualisitsexistence.SoIonlyneededtoaddtothistheconditionsthatapplytotheuniversalofwhichtheindividualisaninstance.

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Thus,theconditionsoftheachronicsamenessofanindividualtextaretheconditionsthatmaketheuniversalofwhichitisaninstanceachronicallythesameplus
existence.ThisexplainsbothhowthecopiesofDonQuixoteinthelibraryarecopiesoftheuniversaltextofDonQuixoteandhowtheyareindividualcopiesofit.
Thequestionofsynchronicsamenessdidnotneedseparateattention.Synchronicsamenessappliesonlytotemporalindividualsbutitsconditionsdonotdifferfromthe
conditionsofachronicsamenesswhenappliedtoindividuals.Hence,noextensivediscussionofitwasgiven.
Thesituationwithdiachronicsamenessisdifferent,however,insofarastheconditionsthatapplytoitarequitedifferentfromthosethatapplytosynchronicsameness.
Likesynchronicsameness,diachronicsamenessappliesonlytoindividuals,butitappliestoindividualssubjecttothepassageoftime.Theseconditionsestablishwhat
makestheindividualtextof,say,DonQuixoteIreadyesterdayinthelibrarythesameIamreadingtoday.Notethatthisquestiondoesnotconcerntheepistemic
questionofhowIknowtheyarethesame.Thelatterquestionwasansweredlaterinthechapter.
Naturally,complicationsarisefromthefactthatsometextsaresubstance/featureaggregatesandothersarefeatureaggregates.Wediscussedseveraloftheviewsto
whichthesecomplicationsgiverise.Theconclusionreached,however,wasthatsuchcomplicationsdonotaffecttheissuesubstantiallyandthatasinglesetof
conditionsappliestoallindividualtextssubjecttodiachronicsameness.Theseconditionsaresuchthattwoindividualtextsarethesamediachronicallywhenthetexts
belongtothesametypeandthereisacontinuityofexistencebetweenthem.
Theothersideofsamenessisdifference,andsosomethinghadtobesaidaboutit.Asacorrelativeofsameness,thesamethingthatappliestosamenessapplies,
mutatismutandis,todifference.Textsaredifferentifandonlyiftheyviolateanyofthespecifiedconditionsofsamenesstheyareachronicallydifferentifandonlyif
theydonothavethesamemeaningortheydonotdisplaythesamesyntacticalarrangementandsoforth.Andtheyarediachronicallydifferentifandonlyiftheydonot
belongtothesametypeandsoon.
Withrespecttotheissuesofidentificationandreidentification,itwasestablishedthatmuchthatneededtobesaidaboutthemcouldbederivedfromwhathadbeen
saidearlierwithappropiatemodification.Thus,thequestionconcernedwiththenecessaryandsufficientconditionsoftheidentificationofauniversaltextamountstoa
questionconcerningthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofidentitytakeninanepistemiccontextthatis,theknowledgeoftheconditionsoftheidentityofthe
universaltext:meaning,syntacticalarrangement,andtypesigncomposition.
Thecaseofindividualtextsissomewhatdifferentinsofarastheidentityofindividualtextscanbedeterminedinavarietyofways,dependingonthe

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circumstancesinwhichtheyarefound.Ultimately,however,spatiotemporalcoordinates,basedonanabsolutepointofviewrepresentedbyasubject,servethis
purposeinthecaseoftextssubjecttospaceandtime.
Finally,withrespecttothereidentificationofindividualtextsattwoormoretimes,knowledgeofthetext'ssamenessoftypeandcontinuousexistencewouldensure
effectiveidentification.Butthereareconditionsunderwhichotherfactorsmayalsobeeffective.
Havingsummarizedtheresultsatwhichwearrived,Iwouldliketoturnnowtosomeoftheimplicationsoftheviewoftextualidentitypresentedhere.Considerthe
caseofthevariousvolumesinthelibrarywiththetitleDonQuixote.Inwhatsensearethesetextsthesameandinwhatsensearetheydifferent?Fromwhathasbeen
said,itfollowsthattheyareinstancesofthesameuniversaltext.Onlyoneuniversaltextisinvolvedaslongasthecopiesinquestionhavethesamemeaning,syntactical
arrangement,andtypesigns.Asinstances,however,thesecopiesaredifferent.Thereis,therefore,nothingpuzzlingabouttheidentityofthevarioustextsofDon
Quixotecurrentlyinthelibrary.
Ifthetextsinquestiondidnothavethesamemeaning,syntacticalarrangement,ortypesigns,thentheywouldhavetobeconsidereddifferent,notonlyasindividuals,
butalsoasuniversals.AnEnglishtranslationofDonQuixoteisnotthesametypetextastheSpanishtextevenifthetranslationhasthesamemeaning.Thisexample
bringsbackthedistinctionbetweenatextandawork.47Theconditionsofidentityofatextandaworkarenotthesame.Theconditionsofidentityofatextinclude
samenessofmeaning,buttheconditionsofidentityofmostworksincludeonlysamenessofmeaning,forworksarethemeaningsofcertaintexts.EnglishandSpanish
textsmayhavethesamemeaningandthusrepresentthesamework,buttheyarenotthesametypeoftextbecausetheydifferinsyntacticalarrangementsandarenot
composedofthesametypesigns.
Inasimilarway,onemayarguethatoralandwrittentextsarenecessarilydifferenttypesoftextsevenwhenoneistakenasasignoftheotherandbothhavean
additionalcommonmeaning.Thesounds"Thecatisonthemat"Iutterandthewrittenmarks'Thecatisonthemat'aretwodifferenttexts,eventhoughtheyare
relatedinsuchawaythatonemaymeantheotherinadditiontomeaningthatthecatisonthemat.Thequestionoftheidentityoforalvs.writtentextsraisedearlier
maybeconfidentlyanswerednow.Notethatwhathasbeensaidconcerningtheidentityoforalandwrittentextsalsoappliestomentaltexts.
Anotherquestionraisedatthebeginningofthischapterhadtodowiththenoveltyofatextandthecorrespondingoriginalityofanauthor.Whenandtowhatdegreeis
anauthororiginal?Thisclearlydependsonthenoveltyofthetextheorsheproduces.Butwhatdeterminesnovelty?Accordingtowhathas

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beensaidhere,noveltyhastodowithdifference,specificallytheintroductionofdifferenceinatext.Novelty,therefore,willdependontheviolationoftheconditions
oftextualsameness.
Anydifferencedisplayedbyatextmakesitanditsauthororiginaltothatextent.Now,weknowthattextsareartifactsconstitutedbyentitiesendowedwithmeaning
byanauthortoconveymeaningtoanaudienceundercertaincircumstances.Thusanyaspectoftheentitiesortheirmeaningthatsetsthetextapartfromothertextsis
anelementofnovelty.Theelementofnoveltymaybetheuseofanentityalreadyinusetoexpressameaningthatisdifferentfromtheonetheentityhasbeen
previouslyusedtoexpress.Sentencesinalanguage,forexample,maybegivennewmeaning.Likewisethereisanelementofnoveltyintheuseofanewentityforthe
expressionofameaningthatisnotnew.Sentencesofanartificiallanguage,forinstance,arenewtextsinthissenseevenwhentheirmeaningisnotanythingnew.
Finally,theremaybeanewmeaningforanewentity.Herethenoveltyismuchhigherthanthenoveltyinthecasesjustdiscussed.Whensomeone,forexample,not
onlycreatesanewentitybutalsoendowstheentitywithanewmeaning,thecircleoftextualnoveltyandauthororiginalityiscomplete.Anoriginalworkwrittenin
Esperantobytheinventorofthatlanguagewouldbeacaseinpoint.Thisdoesnotmean,ofcourse,thatsuchatextwouldbemorevaluablethanthetextofDon
Quixote.Textualvalueisnotaresultoforiginalityalonebuthastodowith,amongotherthings,theculturalfunctionofthetext.
Therequirementofsamenessofmeaningfortextualidentityhasanimportantimplication.Ifsamenessofmeaningisarequirementoftextualidentity,thenwhentwoor
morepersonsunderstandatextdifferentlyitcannotbesaidthattheyunderstandthesametext.Supposethattwopersons,P1andP2,hearthesamesound,"Fire!",
utteredbyathirdperson,P3,andthatP1understandsittomeanthatthereisafireandP2understandsittomeanthatsheistoshoot.Inthiscase,thetwopersonsdo
notunderstandthesametext,becausetwomeaningsareattachedtothesound.Yet,thereisonlyonesound.Andtheauthorpresumablyproducedonlyonetext,sois
thereoneortwotexts?
Theanswertothisproblemisthatwemustkeepinmindthattheconditionsofidentityoftheentitiesusedtoconstituteatextaredifferentfromtheconditionsof
identityofthetext,justastheconditionsoftheidentityofworksaredifferentfromtheidentityconditionsoftexts.Textsareartifactsconstitutedbyentitieswith
meaningandthustheirconditionsofidentitycomefromthesemanticallysignificantfeaturesoftheentitiesthatcomposethemandfromtheirmeaning.Ifthesepointsare
keptinmind,thenwecanseethatthesameentitycanbeusedatthesametimebydifferentpersonstoconveydifferentmeaningsandthusasdifferenttexts.The
sound"Fire!"utteredbyP3andheardbyP1andP2isonesound.But,becausethemeaningattachedtoitbyP1isdifferentfromthemeaningattachedtoitbyP2,we
havetwodifferenttexts.Whethertheyare

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thesametextP3producedisaltogetheradifferentmatter.ItispossiblethatP3producedthetextunderstoodbyP1,ortheoneunderstoodbyP2,orneither.Infact,it
ispossiblethatP3producednotextatall,butsimplymadeasoundbecauseshewastryingouthervocalcords.
Doesthismean,then,thatwheneveroneunderstandsatextdifferently,oneunderstandsadifferenttext?Thisseemstobecounterintuitive,forwefrequentlyallowfor
differentunderstandingsandinterpretationsofthesametext.Theanswertothesequestionsdependsonthenatureofunderstandingandinterpretation,soIhave
discussedthemelsewhereinsomedetail.48Forourpresentpurposesitissufficienttosaythatthelimitsofmeaningofatextdependontheculturalfunctionofthe
text.Atextwhosefunctionisreligioushasdifferentlimitstoitsmeaningthanatextwhosefunctionisliteraryorlegal.Theculturalfunctiondeterminesthelimitsofthe
meaningandthereforetheidentityofthetext.
Thisbringsmetotheissuethatconcernseditors.Whataretheidentityconditionsofparticulartexts,saythetextofDonQuixote,bothoftheuniversalandthe
individual?TheanswerthatIhaveprovidedtothequestionofidentityanswersthisquestiononlyinageneralwaythatis,Iidentifytheconditionsofidentityofall
universalandindividualtexts.ButIdonotsayanythingabouttheparticularconditionsthatapplytoaparticularuniversaltextanditsinstances,say,theuniversaltextof
DonQuixoteandthecopiesofitwehaveinthelibrary.Tosay,forexample,thattheconditionsofdiachronicidentityofitincludesamenessofmeaning,oftypeof
syntacticalarrangement,andoftypeofsignsdoesnothelptheeditor.Fortheeditorwishestoknowwhichphysicalfeaturesofthetext,forexample,areidentity
conditionssothattheycanbepreservedordiscardedintheeditionofthetextbeingproduced.ShouldonetakeintoaccountearlierdraftsofDonQuixotemadeby
Cervantes?ShouldonepreferarevisedversionofthetextproducedbyCervantesbutneverpublished?
TheschemeIhavepresentedheredoesnotanswerthesequestions.Thereasonisnotthatthequestionsarenotimportantorinteresting.Theyare.Thereasonisthat
theyarenotthequestionsaphilosophercanorshouldanswer.Remember,thelimitsoftextualmeaningareestablishedbytheculturalfunctionofatextandthat
functionisnotdeterminedbyphilosophersbutbytheculturethatusesthetext.Theculture,then,determinesthefunctionand,therefore,theconditionsoftextual
identityofparticulartexts.Editorswillreceivenoconcretehelpfromme.Theyhaveajobtodo,andonlytheycandoiteffectively.Ofcourse,differencesofopinion
occur,butthatispreciselypartoftheprocess.Whichtexteditorseditandwhichmodificationstheymakeinitwilldependonthefunctionofthetextandthepurpose
oftheedition,andtheyarebetterequippedtodothatjobthanphilosophers.

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3
Author
Inmostperiodsofthehistoryofphilosophy,philosophershavehadverylittletosayaboutauthorsoftextsingeneral.Afterall,itseemsamatterofcommonsensethat
theauthorofatextisthepersonorpersonswhocomposedit.1 Whatcantherebethatiscontroversialinthis?Yet,uponcloserscrutinyahostofquestionscanbe
raisedconcerningauthorsandtheirrelationstotexts.Onemayask,forexample,abouttheidentityoftheauthor,for,uponreflection,itbecomesclearthatmostoften
textsarenottheresultofonepersononly,butofmultiplepersonswhothroughtimehavecontributedtothetext.Whichofthesepersonsistobeconsideredthe
author,then?Thepersonwhofirstproducedahistoricaltextthatnolongerexistsbutisanancestorofthecontemporarytextwehave?Oraretheeditorswhochoose
amongvarioustextualreadingstheonestheythinkarethebesttobeconsideredtheauthorsofthetext?Andwhatrolesdotheaudienceandsocietyatlargeplayin
thisprocess?Ifmosttextsareellipticalandrequirecompletionbyaudiences,doestheaudiencenotplayanauthorialroleaswellinthisrespect?Finally,weknowthat
societiesareresponsiblefornaturallanguagesandmosttextsarecomposedofnaturallanguages,sowemayask:Issocietyatlargenottobeconsideredsomehow
responsiblefortextsandinsomesensetheirauthor?2
Otherquestionsthatmaybeexaminedconcerntheexactfunctionoftheauthor:Whatisitthatauthorsdo?Aretheyresponsibleonlyforthearrangementofthesigns
thatcomposetextsoraretheyalsoresponsibleforthemeaningsofthetexts?Inmanywaystheydonotseemtoberesponsibleforeitherofthem,becausetheycreate
neither,usingmostoftensignsandmeaningsalreadyavailable.Whatdoauthorscreate,then,ifanything?Oristhefunctionofauthorsotherthancreation?
Therearealsoquestionsconcerningwhethertherecanbetextswithoutauthors.Consider,forinstance,thecaseofatextthat,likesocalledfoundart,appearstobe
theresultofnointentionaldesignsay,agroupofpebblesonthebeachthatspellsomewordswhichhaveawellknownmeaningandwhosearrangementand
positionistheresultoftidesandwind.Inthiscaseweseemtohaveatextthathasnoauthor.Yet,thewholeideaofanentity

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havingmeaningwithoutbeingtheproductofintentionaldesignseemsnotonlypreposterousbutalsocontrarytothedefinitionoftextsadoptedintheIntroduction.
Onemayalsoaskquestionsconcerningthelimitationsthatknowledgeofanauthorofatextmayplaceonanaudience'sunderstandingofthetext.ConsidertheBible.
ThosewhobelieveitisthewordofGodseethepreceptsforhumanconductitcontainsasdivinecommandstobefollowedbyallhumanbeings.Butthosewho
believetheBibletobeapurelyhumanproductconsideritspreceptsmererecordsofthebeliefsofacertainsocietyatacertaintimewithnoprescriptiveforceforany
othersociety.Clearly,knowledgeofanauthorbyanaudiencemayalterthewaytheaudienceunderstandsatext.Towhatextent,then,wemayask,isknowledgeof
theauthorsrequiredfortheunderstandingofatextandtowhatextentdoessuchknowledgeinfluenceanaudience'sunderstandingofthetext?
Finally,questionsmayberaisedaswellconcerningtheinnersubjectivestatesofauthorsandtheirrelationstothemeaningsoftextsofwhichtheyareauthors.Isthe
meaningoftextstobefoundinthatsubjectivity,whichalwaysremainssomehowprivateandidiosyncratic,ordoesthemeaningoftextstranscendthesubjectivityof
authors?Theanswerstothesequestionsareimportant,foruponthemdependahostofotherissuesrelatedtotheunderstanding,interpretation,anddiscernibilityof
texts.3
Obviously,manyinterestingissuescanberaisedconcerningauthorsandtheirrelationtotexts.InthischapterIproposetoconcentrateonfivesuchissues:theidentity
oftheauthor,thefunctionoftheauthor,theneedforanauthor,therepressivecharacteroftheauthor,andthenatureandimplicationsoftheauthor'ssubjectivity.I
beginwiththeissueoftheauthor'sidentity,forunderstandingtheauthor'sidentityfacilitatestheclarificationandsolutionofotherproblemsthatsurroundthenotionof
author.
Notethattheauthorsoftextsneednotberestrictedtohumanbeings.Anybeingcapableofbothintentionalactionandunderstandingtexts,whetherhumanornot,can
producetexts.Certainly,iftherearebeingssuchasGodandangels,theymustbecapableofproducingtexts.Butrecentstudiesshowthatnonhumananimalstoomay
becapablenotonlyofusingsigns,andevenperhapstexts,butalsoofinstitutingthem.Forourpurposes,itisirrelevantwhethertheauthorsoftextsaredivine,angelic,
human,ormerelyanimal,althoughsuchquestionsarerelevantinaninvestigationofintentionalbehavior.BecauseIamnotconcernedwithintentionalbehaviorperse
here,however,Ineednotdwellonthismatteranyfurther.Itshouldbekeptinmind,then,that,althoughthediscussionofauthorshipherecentersonhumanauthors,
whatissaidaboutthemmayapplyalso,mutatismutandis,tononhumanauthors.

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I.IdentityoftheAuthor
InaccordancewiththedefinitionoftextsgivenintheIntroduction,itwouldseemthatifthereisatextthereisanauthor,fortheauthoristheonewhoissupposedto
selectandarrangetheentities,usedassigns,thatcomposethetexttoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudienceinacertaincontext.Butatextmayturnouttobemore
thanone,socorrespondingly,theremaynotbejustoneauthor.Indeed,inATheoryofTextuality,severaldifferenttextswereidentified:theactual(itselfdividedinto
historical,contemporary,andintermediary),theintended,andtheideal.Moreover,therearealsouniversalandindividualtextsasnotedearlierinChapter1.This
raisestheproblemofidentifyingandcharacterizingthevariousauthorsthatgiverisetothosedifferenttexts.Iwouldliketodistinguishfourdifferentauthors:the
historicalauthor,thepseudohistoricalauthor,thecompositeauthor,andtheinterpretativeauthor.
A.HistoricalAuthor
Thehistoricalauthoristhesubjectwhoproducedthehistoricaltext,thatis,thehistoricalartifactwecallatextandthatconsistsincertainentitiesusedassignsand
intendedtoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudienceinacertaincontext.4 Thissubjectmayinfactturnouttobeseveralsubjects,foritisnotunusualtohaveseveral
personscooperateinthecompositionofatexteitherintheprocessofselectionandarrangementofsignsorintheprocessofdeterminingthemeaningthatistobe
conveyed.Thisprocedureisquitefrequentinscience,forinstance,butitisalsosometimesfollowedinliterature.Thecaseofthevoluntarycooperationofseveral
subjectsintheproductionofatextshouldbekeptseparatefromcaseswhereatextissubjectedtomodificationsbysubjectsotherthantheoriginalauthorwithoutthe
knowledgeandconsentofthatauthor.Inthesecasesthosewhomodifytheoriginaltextarealso"historicalauthors,"buttheyarenottheauthorsoftheoriginal
historicaltextonlyofmodifiedversionsoftheoriginalhistoricaltext.Fortheconsiderationofsuchcases,then,itisusefultointroduceadistinctionbetweenthe
originalhistoricaltextandwhatmightbecalledderivativehistoricaltexts.Theauthoroftheformerinturncouldbecalledtheoriginalhistoricalauthorandthe
authorsofthelattersubsequenthistoricalauthors.Itshouldbeclear,however,that,basedonwhatwasestablishedinChapters1and2,theoriginalhistoricaltext
anditsmodifiedversionscannotbeconsideredthesameunlessthemodificationsmadeontheoriginalhistoricaltextthatresultinthemodifiedversionsofitarenot
suchthattheychangetheconditionsoftextualidentityestablishedinChapter2.
Althoughthehistoricalauthor(Ishallrefertothispersoninthemasculinesingularthroughoutthechaptertoavoidconfusion)mayturnouttobea

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groupofsubjectsratherthanasinglesubject,heisnottobeconfusedwiththecompositeauthorthatwillbediscussedshortlythehistoricalauthorisonlyoneofthe
authorsorgroupofauthorsthatmakeupthecompositeauthor.Thehistoricalauthoris,then,theauthorofthehistoricaltext.Notethatthisauthorexistedhewasan
actualsubjectwholivedatacertaintimeinhistory.Althoughheactuallylived,however,wedonotknowhimexactlyashewasforvariousreasons.
Firstofall,thereismuchabouthimwedonotknowatall,afactthatgivesrisetohistoricalcontroversy.TakeAristotle,forexample:Doweknowhowhefeltabout
Alexander?Doweknowofalltheexperiencesduringhischildhoodwhichinfluencedhispointofview?Whatsortsoftastesdidhehave?Andsoon.Moreover,what
wedoknowabouthimhasbeenfilteredthroughmuchspeculationandlore.Itisalsocoloredbytheideaswehaveabouthisthought.Hemayappeartousmore
commonsensicalandapproachablethanPlato,butwashereallythatway?Isnotourperceptionofhimandhischaractershapedinawaybyaninterpretational
traditionthatbeganevenduringhislifetime?IdonotmeantosuggestthatweknownothingaboutAristotleorthatallweknowisamatterofconjecture.Leastofall
amIsuggestingthatsuchconclusionsapplytoallauthors.WhatIamsuggestingisthattheauthorofwhatIhavecalledthehistoricaltextistherealhistoricalfigure,
butourknowledgeofthathistoricalfigureisatbestanapproximationofwhattheauthorinfactwas.ThecompositefigurethatweknoworthinkweknowiswhatI
callthepseudohistoricalauthor.Thehistoricalauthorispresentedtousonlyinthepersonaofthepseudohistoricalauthor.
Beforeweleavethehistoricalauthortoturntothepseudohistoricalauthorthereisaquestionwhichisofsomeinterest.Whenweconsiderthehistoricalauthor,do
weconsiderthepersoninquestionthroughouthislifeordoweconsiderthatpersonatonlyacertainpointinhislife,sayatthemomentofcomposingthetextoratthat
momentandbefore,excludingthefuture?Thequestionisinterestingbecausepersonschangethroughouttheirlivesandthosechangessuggestthattheauthorwho
composedatextmaynotbethesameauthorseveralyearshence.IstheauthoroftheTractatusthesameastheauthorofthePhilosophicalInvestigations?
Thisquestionisnotonlyinterestingbutalsodifficulttoanswer,becauseitinvolvesissuesofpersonalidentity,issuesthathavebeenafocusofphilosophical
controversyforcenturies.5 Ibelieve,however,thatwemaydealwiththisquestionhereinawaythatsidestepsthoseissues.WhatIproposeistodistinguishbetween
twoquestions:thequestionofpersonalidentitythroughtimeandthequestionofauthorialidentitythroughtime.NotethatIshallassume,forpresentpurposesandin
ordertofacilitatethediscussion,thatauthorsoftextsarealwayspersons,althoughitisaltogetherpossible,asearlier,thatsomeanimalsnotonlyunderstandbutalso
producesimpletexts.This

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difficultycouldbeavoidedeitherbypositingsomekindofrudimentarypersonhoodinsuchanimalsorbyspeakingofsubjectsratherthanpersonsinthiscontext,asI
didearlier.Whatwillbesaidherewouldapplyeitherway,andsoIwillignoretheissue.
Returningtothequestionofauthorialidentity,myclaimisthatoneneednottreatthequestionofpersonalidentityandthequestionofauthorialidentityasthesame.
ThefirstinvolvesdeterminingwhetherpersonP1att1isthesameasP2att2forinstance,whetherthepersonWittgensteinatthetimetheTractatuswaswrittenisthe
samepersonasthepersonWittgensteinatthetimethePhilosophicalInvestigationswaswritten.Toanswerthissortofquestiononewouldhavetodiscussthe
natureofpersonsandtheconditionsthatwouldensurepersonalidentitythroughtime.
Now,asweshallsee,thefunctionofauthorshastodowiththecreationoftexts.Thismeansthattheidentityconditionsofauthorsarerelatedtotheidentityconditions
oftexts.Thus,ifapersoncreatedatextatacertaintimebutcouldnothavecreateditatsomelatertimebecausehehadchangedinanysignificantway,thenthe
personofthelatertimecannotbeconsideredtheauthoroftheearliertext,evenif,quaperson,hewerethesame.Inshort,conditionsofpersonalidentityingeneral
arenotsufficientconditionsofauthorialidentity.ThepersonWittgensteinatt1andatt2maybethesamepersonaccordingtopersonalidentitycriteria.Buttheauthor
oftheTractatusmaynotbetheauthorofthePhilosophicalInvestigationsinsofarasthefirstauthorcouldnothaveproducedthesecondbook,andtheauthorof
thesecondbookcouldnothaveproducedthefirst.6 Thehistoricalauthor,then,isonlythatperson,atthatjunctureofhistory,whoproducedthehistoricaltextin
questionorthatsamepersonatsomeotherjunctureofhistorywherehecouldproducethesametext.
Inconclusion,ifwhatwemeanbyhistoricalauthoristhepersonwhohappenstohavecomposedaparticulartext,thenweneednotrestrictthatpersontoa
historicaltime,place,orconditions.Butifwhatwemeanbyauthoristhecomposerofatext,thenwecannotsaythattheauthoristhesamewhentheconditionsthat
makepossibletheauthorialfunctionthatproducedthetextinquestionaremissing.Fromthisitfollowsthatpersonalidentityispresupposedbyauthorialidentity,so
thatiftheauthorofatextattwodifferenttimesisthesame,necessarilythepersonisthesame.IfWittgenstein,theauthoroftheTractatusandtheInvestigations,is
thesame,thenthepersonwhocomposedthetwobooksisthesame,butnotviceversa.Thereasonforthisisthatthereareaspectsofapersonthatareessentialto
authorialidentitybutnottopersonalidentity.7 Forexample,acertainviewmaybeessentialforsomeonetobetheauthorofatextinwhichthatviewisdefended,but
viewsarenotessentialtotheidentityofpersons,becausepersonscanchangetheirviewswithoutchangingtheiridentity.

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Thispositiondoesnotentailthattwodifferenttextscannoteverhavethesameauthor.Forwhatmakesanauthorthesameisthecapacitytoproduceatextandhaving
anadditionalcapacitytoproducesomeothertextdoesnotnecessarilyconflictwithit.SaythatapersonproducestextsT1andT2.Accordingtowhathasbeensaid,
theauthorofT1andT2canbethesameaslongas,atthetimeofproducingT1,theauthorofT1couldalsohaveproducedT2and,atthetimeofproducingT2,the
authorofT2couldalsohaveproducedT1.NorshouldoneconcludefromthisthatsomeotherpersonwiththecapacitytoproduceT2isalsotheauthorofT1andvice
versasimplyinvirtueofthatcapacity.Forthatotherpersonisnotthesameperson,andpersonalidentityisanecessaryconditionofauthorialidentity.
Thispositionentailswhatappearstobeanundesirableconsequencenamely,thattherecannotbesignificantdevelopmentsinthesameauthor.Foranauthorwho
changessignificantly,presumablycouldnotbesaidtobethesameauthorhewasbeforethatchangebecausehecouldnot,afterthechange,producethetexthe
producedbeforethechange.Indeed,onemaywanttopushthispointfurtherandsaythatanychangesthatoccurinapersonthatwouldprecludethepersonfrom
havingthecapacitytoproducethesametextwouldresultinachangeofauthorship.
ConsiderthefactthatitwouldbehardforanyonetoarguethatthethreeyearoldchildAristotlewastheauthorofthetextoftheCategories.Whatwemeanbythe
authorofthetextoftheCategoriesisthematureAristotle,whoinfactproducedthebook,oralternativelywemeanthepersonAristotle,whoatsomepointinhislife
producedthebook.ThepointofthedistinctionbetweenauthorandpersonIproposeisnottodoawaywithordinaryandperfectlyunderstandablewaysofspeaking.
Thepointistointroduceatechnicalmeaningof'author'thatcapturestheuniquerelationanauthorhastoatextandtheimplicationsofthatrelation.Itismyclaimthat
suchatechnicalsenseof'author'isinfactembeddedinsomethingswesayaboutauthorsevenifitisnotsoembeddedineverythingwesayaboutthem.Therefore,it
ishelpfultobringthenotionoutintotheopenanduseittoclarifythenotionofauthorshipanditsrelationtothenotionofatext.
Fromwhathasbeensaiditfollowsfurtherthattheidentityofthehistoricalauthor,asdistinctfromthatofthepersonwhoistheauthor,iscontingentontheidentityof
thetextandnotviceversa.Wealreadysawthattheidentityofatextdoesnotdependontheidentityofthehistoricalauthor,eventhoughitmaydependonthatofthe
pseudohistoricalauthorwhenthisisadramatispersona.Inthecaseofthehistoricalauthor,theidentityofthetextandtheconditionsofsuchanidentityplayan
importantrole.ThisbringsmetothepointIwanttomakenamely,thatthetypeoftextinquestionplaysaroleinthehistoricalauthor'sidentity.Theconditionsof
identityofthehistoricalauthorofadiary,then,mightbedifferentfromtheconditionsofidentityoftheauthorofa

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novel,orofasignsuchas'Nosmoking.'Thishelpssolvemanyproblemsraisedbywhatappeartobecounterexamplestothisview.
Havingproposedatechnicaldistinctionbetweenthehistoricalauthorofatextandthepersonwhoistheauthorofthattext,letmeproposethatforthesakeof
simplicityIcontinuetospeak,unlessotherwisenoted,ofthehistoricalauthorasthepersonwhoplaystheroleofhistoricalauthor.Thiswillfacilitatelaterdiscussions.
Forexample,itwillfacilitatethediscussionofthecategoryofauthorasaudienceIintroduceinChapter4.Strictlyspeaking,inaccordancewithwhathasbeensaid
here,thiscategoryshouldbethatofthepersonwhoisthehistoricalauthorandalsoplaystheroleofaudience.Butthiswayofspeakingiscumbersome,evenif
precise,andso,forconvenience'ssake,Ishallnotadoptit.
B.PseudoHistoricalAuthor
Thepseudohistoricalauthormaybeunderstoodintwoways.Inoneway,heissimplyacompositeofwhatweknoworthinkweknowaboutahistoricalauthor
independentofwhatthehistoricalauthorwishesotherstothinkconcerningthecomposerofthetext.8 Inanotherway,thepseudohistoricalauthoristhepersona
whomthehistoricalauthorwishesotherstothinkcomposedthetext.9 Ineithercase,thepseudohistoricalauthor,unlikethehistoricalauthor,neverexistedasareal
person.Letmetakeuptheformerofthesetwowaysofunderstandingthepseudohistoricalauthorfirst.
Manyhistoriographerswouldratherrefertothepseudohistoricalauthorunderstoodinthiswayasthehistoricalauthor.Theydothisbecausetheywishtorestrict
themeaningofhistorytoanaccountofeventsandeliminatethenotionofhistoryastheeventsofwhichanaccountmaybegiven.However,thisisacontradictory
positionthatconfusestheissue.10Ifwemaintainthedistinctionbetweenhistoryasaseriesofeventsandhistoryastheaccountthehistorianprovidesofthoseevents,
thenwecanspeakofthehistoricalauthorasthefigurewhoispartofhistoryinthefirstsenseandofthepseudohistoricalauthorasthefigurewhoispartofhistoryin
thesecondsense.Thepseudohistoricalauthoristheauthorwethinkproducedthehistoricaltext.Weknowhimfromthedescriptionsthathiscontemporariesand
otherhistorianshaveleftusaswellasfromtheclueswefindabouthiminthetextheisthoughttohavecomposed.Itisaltogetherpossiblethatthehistoricalauthorfits
allormostofthedescriptionsthatmakeupthepseudohistoricalauthor,althoughinfacttherewouldalwaysbesomethingleftoutsay,thethoughtshedidnot
expressbutthatinfluencedhischoiceofwordsatthemomenthewrotethewordsaraballaeinhistreatiseDemagistro.Itisalsopossiblethatthehistoricalauthor
doesnotfitmostorevenanyofthedescriptionswehaveofhimexceptfortheattributiontohimoftheauthorshipofthetextinquestion.Indeed,eventhatmaybe
questionable.11

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ThetermIuseforthiscategoryofauthorshipisintendedtounderscorethatthepseudohistoricalauthorisaviewofthehistoricalauthorratherthanthehistorical
authorhimself.Itdoesnotnecessarilyentailthatthepseudohistoricalauthorisalwaysinaccurate.Itislogicallypossiblethataparticularpseudohistoricalauthorisa
completelyaccurateviewofaparticularhistoricalauthor,butthisisamerepossibility.Infact,althoughpseudohistoricalauthorsmaynotcontainanyinaccuracies,
theyarealwaysincomplete,imprecise,andfrequentlydocontaininaccuracies.
AgoodexampleofthesortofcasethatraisestheissuestowhichIhavebeenreferringisthatofthenotoriousPseudoDionysius.'PseudoDionysius'isthename
historianshavegiventotheauthorofagroupoffourimportanttreatiseswrittenintheearlypartoftheMiddleAges:OntheDivineNames,OnMysticalTheology,
OntheCelestialHierarchy,andOntheEarthlyHierarchy.ThroughouttheMiddleAgeshewasidentifiedwithDionysius,whomSt.Paulissupposedtohave
convertedtoChristianityinAthensaccordingtoActs13:34.Indeed,itwasnotuntiltheRenaissancethattheidentityofDionysiuswasquestionedbyLorenzoValla.
TodayweknowthathecouldnothavebeenthemanconvertedbySt.Paul,becausehisworksdependonProclus,datinghimtoatleast400yearsafterhis
conversionwassupposedtohavetakenplaceinAthens.Whoistheauthorofthementionedtexts,then?ForoverathousandyearsitwasDionysius,buttodayitis
believeditwasprobablyanecclesiasticfromSyriawholivedaroundthefifthcenturyA.D.Themedievalpersonaisclearlyapseudohistoricalauthor,buteventhe
picturewehaveofhimtodaymustbeconsideredonlyremotelyliketheactualhistoricalfigurewhowrotethementionedtextsandcalledhimselfDionysiustogivehis
workstheweightofauthoritynecessarytoensuretheirsurvivalandinfluence.Indeed,thehistoricalauthorofthetreatisesmusthavehadakeensenseofthe
importanceofthepseudohistoricalpersona.
TheimportthatapseudohistoricalpersonahasiswelldemonstratedbytheauthoroftheBookofDanieloftheHebrewScriptures.Inthiscase,thehistoricalauthor
ofthebookidentifiedDanielasitsauthortomakethestatementsinthebookappearascrediblepredictionsofthefuture,whereasinfacttheeventspredictedhad
alreadypassed.
Theseexamplesalsoillustratethenotionofthepseudohistoricalauthorunderstoodinthesecondsensegivenearlier.Inthissense,DionysiusandDanielarethe
personasthatthehistoricalauthorsofthetreatisesinquestionwantedotherstobelieveweretheauthorsofthetreatises.Obviously,therearemanyreasonswhya
historicalauthorwilluseapseudonymratherthanhisownname.Sometimesthesereasonshavetodowiththedangerouscharacteroftheopinionsexpressedinatext,
atothertimeswithcertainadvantagesthattheauthormaydrawfromanonymity,andstillatotheroccasionswithacertaineffectandunderstandingthatthehistorical
authormaywishtoproduceintheaudienceby

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theuseofapseudonym.Theseneednotbetheonlyreasons,ofcourseothersmaybeavailable,butthereisnoneedforustogothroughthemhere.
Thesecondsenseinwhichwehaveunderstoodthepseudohistoricalauthor,namely,asthepersonawhomthehistoricalauthorwishesustothinkcomposedthetext,
isnotexhaustedbytheuseofpseudonyms.Anevenmorefrequentuseofapersonaoccurswhenanauthorputshimselfinatextinsomeway,thatis,whenhe
becomesadramatispersona,ashappenswhenChaucerassumestherolesofbothauthorandpilgriminTheCanterburyTales.12Thismaybedoneinmanyways:
asasignerofaPrefaceorIntroduction,asoneofthecharactersinthetext,asthenarratororcomposerofthetext,asoneofthepersonstowhomcharactersinthe
textreferevenwhenthatpersonplaysnodirectroleintheeventsdescribedinthetext,asanautobiographicalI,andsoon.Inallthesecaseswehaveapersonathat
playsadirectorindirectroleinthetext.Thisdramatispersonaisapseudohistoricalauthor,becauseheisalwayspresentedasrepresentingthehistoricalauthor,
disclosingpartsofhisidentity.Itisnotimportant,bytheway,whetherthepersonaadoptedbythehistoricalauthorinthiscontextisorisnotaresultofaconscious
effortonthepartofthehistoricalauthortodeceiveorinfluencetheaudience.Whetheritisornot,itisnonethelesspresentedinacertainlight,inacertaincontext,and
onlypartially.Wemustbecareful,then,todistinguishbetweentheauthorofatextandtheauthorinthetext,fortheyplaydifferentrolesandhavedifferentfunctions.
Discussionofthevariousdescriptionsthatmakeupthepseudohistoricalauthorinthefirstsensegivenbringsmetofourpoints.ThefirstisthatItakethedescriptions
thatmakeupthepseudohistoricalauthortobegenerallyintendedbythehistorianswhoproposethemingoodfaithtocommunicateinformationconcerningthe
historicalauthoronlythroughoccasionalbadfaithorbecauseofunintendedmistakesmadebyhistoriansdotheynotdescribeaccuratelythehistoricalauthor.Itisthe
historicalVoltairethathistorianswishtodescribewhentheydescribetheauthorofCandide,eventhoughtheymightmakemistakesinthosedescriptionsowingto
incompleteorfaultyinformationortofaultyhistoricalmethodology.Ofcourse,notinfrequently,historianswillfullydistortthehistoricalrecordfornonhistoricalreasons
topresentafigureinagoodorbadlight.Forexample,thepictureofStalinpaintedbymanyNorthAmericanhistoriansishardlyflattering,whereasRussianhistorians
untilrecentlytendedtowhitewashmanyofStalin'sactionsandlookatthemasminorpecadillos.Suchwillfuldistortionsproduceaseffectivepseudohistoricalauthors
asthedescriptionspresentedbyhistorianswhoactingoodfaithdo.Indeed,sometimestheyaremoreeffective,becausethehistorianswhoproducethemtake
advantageofcertaindesiresandaspirationsintheaudiencefor,whichtheyproducethehistoricalaccount.Butthatshouldnotobscurethepointthatinmostcases
historiansactingoodfaith.Incontrast,theauthorswhointentionallyuseapseudonymfortheirtextsdonothavethesamemotivestheir

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purposeismostoftentodeceivetheaudience.Andthoseauthorswhoputthemselvesinthetextmayormaynothavedeceptioninmindconcerningtheirtrueidentity.
Thisbringsmetothesecondpoint,thatthereareconstraintsonthepseudohistoricalauthor.Thepseudohistoricalauthorisnot,asmaybesuggestedbysomecritics,
whoidentifyitwiththehistoricalauthor,afictionontheinterpreter'smindresultingfromfreewheelingfancy.13Thepseudohistoricalauthorisalwayspositedasthe
historicalauthorofthetextandthusasahistoricalpersonwhoactuallyproducedthehistoricaltext.Thisimpliesthatthefigureofthepseudohistoricalauthormustbe
historicallycredible.TheauthorofthetextofDonQuixotecannotbe,forexample,apharaohofancientEgypthemustbesomeoneSpanish,livinginthesixteenth
century,andsoon.Moreover,asauthorofthetext,thefigureofthepseudohistoricalauthormustbeconcordantwithwhatthetextreveals,eitherdirectlyor
indirectly,aboutitsauthor.Isaydirectlyorindirectlybecauseauthorssometimesexplicitlyrevealthemselvesinvariouswaysintexts,buteveniftheydonot,textstell
ussomethingaboutthem.Itisawellknownprinciplethateffectstellussomethingabouttheircauses,andsoweshouldexpectfortextstotellussomethingabouttheir
authors.Thefigureofthepseudohistoricalauthor,then,mustbecredibleasauthorofthetext.WecannotimputethetextofAugustine'sDemagistrotoVoltaireor
thetextofCandidetoAugustine.Butwemustresisttheviewthatpositswhatthetexttellsusaboutanauthorasclearandsubjecttostrictrules.Textsarecomplex
artifactscomposedofentitiesthatareusedtoconveymeaning,anditisbynomeanseasytoestablishthefeaturesofthepersonwhoproducedatextbasedonan
examinationofthetextalone.Thusthenotionofimplicationsuggestedbysometoexplainwhattextstellusabouttheirauthorsistoostrong.14
ThethirdpointthatIwishtobringupisthat,strictlyspeaking,thereareasmanypseudohistoricalauthorsunderstoodinthefirstsenseasthereareversionsofthe
historicalauthorentertainedbyaudiences.EachmemberoftheaudienceofatextwhohasanideaofwhoStalinorVoltairewere,hasconstructedapseudohistorical
authorthatmayormaynotbethesameasthepictureconstructedbysomeoneelse.Itisnotonlypossiblebutinfactfrequentforeventhesamepersontohold
differentviewsaboutthesamehistoricalfigureatdifferenttimes.Thenumberofpseudohistoricalauthors,then,ispotentiallyinfinite.
Fourth,becauseitisdoubtfulthatthepseudohistoricalauthor,whetherunderstoodinthefirstorsecondsense,everexisted,itisalsodoubtfulthathecouldhave
producedanyofthetextsthatmaybeattributedtohim.Itisdoubtfulthathecouldhaveproducedeitherthecontemporaryorthehistoricaltexts.Andhecouldnotbe
consideredtheauthoroftheintendedtext,forthattext,asIarguedinChapter3ofATheoryofTextuality,islittlemorethana

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phantompositedbythoseinterpreterswhofindcertainmistakesorinfelicitiesinthetextswithwhichtheyaredealing.15Ofcourse,sometimesonthebasisoftheidea
theyhaveofthehistoricalauthor,namely,thepseudohistoricalauthor,interpreterswillargueforoneparticularunderstandingofatextratherthananother,intheir
attempttodiscovertheintentionoftheauthorfromananalysisoftheirideaofthatauthor.Butthatisallaconstructionbasedonconjectureinwhichinterpretersmay
bemistaken.Soitcannotreallybearguedconvincinglythatthepseudohistoricalauthoristheauthoroftheintendedtext.
Norcanitbearguedconvincinglythatthepseudohistoricalauthoristheauthoroftheidealtext,fortheidealtextisthetextthatthehistoricalauthorshouldhave
produced,whereasthepseudohistoricalauthoristheinterpreters'ownconceptionofwhothehistoricalauthoractuallywas.Theidealtextcannotbetheproductof
anauthorthatissupposedtobehistoricalandisactuallytakentohaveproducedthehistoricaltext.Thepseudohistoricalauthor,then,isnottheauthorofanytext,in
factheisonlytheauthorpositedbysomeoneasauthorofthehistoricaltext.
C.CompositeAuthor
Thecompositeauthoristheauthorofthecontemporarytext.Thecontemporarytextistheversionorversionsofthehistoricaltextthatwehave,resultingfromthe
vicissitudestowhichthehistoricaltexthasbeensubjected.Theplayersinthecompositionofthecontemporarytextarethree:thehistoricalauthorwhoproducedthe
historicaltextthevariousscribesortypesettersinvolvedinthetransmissionofthehistoricaltextfromthemomentofitsproductiontothepresentandtheeditorswho
havetriedtoputtogetheradefinitiveoratleasthistoricallyaccurateversionofthehistoricaltext.Eachoftheseplayersorgroupsofplayershasanimportantrolein
theformationofthecontemporarytextand,therefore,mustbeconsideredpartialauthorsofthattext.Thecontemporarytextistheresultofthecumulativeeffortsofall
thosewhohadahandinproducingit.
Theroleofthehistoricalauthoristoproducethehistoricaltext,whetheroriginalorderivative,butthatisjustthebeginningoftheprocessthatgivesusthe
contemporarytext.Thedifferentscribesortypesettersthatcopiedthehistoricaltextfromwhichotherscribesandtypesettersmadeothercopies,andsoon,arealso
responsibleforpartoftheshapethecontemporarytexthas.Intheprocessofcopyingscribesmakemistakestheymisswordstheymisreadexpressionstheyaddor
eliminatepunctuation,andinsomecasesevenaddclarificationsandglosses.Thissortofthingwasmorefrequentbeforetheuseoftheprintingpress(infactitwas
standardprocedurethen),whentextswerecopiedbyhandandeachprocessofcopyinginvolvedthepotentialofsubstantialchanges.Butevenaftertheinventionof
theprintingpress,typesetters

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continuetomakefrequentmistakesandsomeauthorsdonothavetheopportunity,patience,inclination,oreventheexpertisetocorrectthem.16
Eveninthecaseofrecenttexts,thedistinctionbetweenthehistoricaltextandthecontemporarytextissignificantand,thus,thedistinctionbetweenthehistoricalauthor
andtheauthorofthecontemporarytextisaswell.Itisbecauseofthemistakesandchangesthatoccurinvariousversionsofthetextthattheneedarisesforthework
ofaneditor,whoplaystheroleofthirdauthorcomponentofthecompositeauthor.Theroleofeditorsistomakedecisionsamongvariousreadingsofatext,collating
thevariousversionsandchoosingwhattheyconsiderthebest,measuredbycriteriaestablishedbythemselvesorbytheeditorialtraditionwithinwhichtheywork.17
Theeditoriallaborinvolvedinthemodernproductionofancientandmedievaltextsisextraordinarilyimportantbecauseonlyseldomdoestheautographversionofa
textsurvive.Inmostcases,whatwehavearemanymanuscriptsthatcontainwidelydifferingreadingsofaparticularpassage.Inthesecircumstances,theeditor
constructsthefamilytree(stemma)ofmanuscripts,determiningwhichbranchisthebest,withtheultimategoalinmindofreconstructingthebestpossibleversionof
thetext.Thisinvolvesnotonlyenormousknowledgeofthelanguage,thought,andstyleoftheauthorinquestion,butalsoknowledgeofthesubjectmatterdiscussed
bytheauthor.Theeditorwillbecalledupontochooseamongvariousreadingsofatext,tocorrectmistakes,tostraightenoutunintelligibleorcorruptpassages,andin
generaltogiveusasensibleandcredibleversionofatext.Todothis,theeditorwillhavetoactinmanyinstancesastheauthorofthetext,thinkingthroughwhatheor
shetakestobetheproperreadingandphrasing.Theeditorialroleisparticularlyimportantincaseswherethereisonlyoneextantmanuscript,forthentheeditor
becomesthesolearbiterofhowthetextistoberead.18Allthisindicatesthat,ofthethreeauthorswhomakeupthecompositeauthor,theeditorissecondin
importanceonlytothehistoricalauthor.19
D.InterpretativeAuthor
Theinterpretativeauthormaybeunderstoodintwodifferentways.Inonewaythisauthorissimplyanaudience(oneormorepersons)thatistryingtounderstanda
textandinsodoingendsupwithanunderstandingthatdiffersfromtheunderstandingofthemeaningofthehistoricaltext.Inthissense,bychangingtheconditionsof
identityofthetext,theaudiencecreatesanewtextofwhichitbecomestheauthor,althoughtheaudiencemaythinkitisdealingwiththehistoricaltext.Naturally,this
doesnotentailthattheaudiencehasselectedandarrangedtheentitiesthatconstitutethetextandthatitusesassigns.Thusitsauthorialroleissomewhatdiminished,
butitisstillthereinsofarasthenewtextisitscreation,evenifunintended.20

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Thetextcreatedbytheinterpretativeauthorisidealinthesensethatitexistsonlyinthemindoftheaudience,thatis,theperson(Orpersons)whoreconstructsthe
text.Theidealtext,then,isaconstructinsomeone'smind,anditisthatmindthatisitsauthor,becausethatmindproducestheidealtextwhileitscanstheECTsofthe
contemporarytextitexamines.
Theinterpretativeauthor,takeninthissenseofaudience,however,doesnotalwayshaveinmindtheconstructionofanidealtext.Mostoftenhisaim(incaseheisa
singleperson)issimplytounderstandthehistoricaltext.Often,however,heendsupconstructinganidealtextratherthanunderstandingthehistoricalone.
Platonistswillwanttoargue,nodoubt,thatitisnotinterpretersoftextstakeninthestatedsensethatcreatetheidealtext.Interpretersmerelyavailthemselvesofthe
idealtheydonotcreateit,butsimplydiscoveritthroughakindofmentaldialectic.Ihavenoprimafacieobjectiontoconceivingtheidealtextinthiswayandholding
thattheinterpreterisnottheauthoroftheidealtextbutakindofconveyorofit.Ifthatisthecase,thenthequestionarisesastotheidentityoftheauthoroftheideal
textandwhetherinfactsuchatextrequiresanauthor.PlatowouldhavethetextwithouttheauthorAugustinewouldhaveGodastheauthorofthetextandothers
wouldfollowotherpaths.Butallthis,althoughinterestingandinneedofananswer,isimmaterialtousatpresent.
Theinterpretativeauthormayalsobeunderstoodinasecondsense,however.Inthissense,hisfunctionistomakeitpossibleforanaudience,separatedfromthe
historicaltextbyvariouscircumstances,tounderstandthetext.Thisisdonebyaddingsomethingtothetext,namely,anothertext,suchasacommentary.21The
interpretativeauthorunderstoodinthissecondsenseistheauthorofaninterpretation.
Whathasbeensaidaboutthevarioustypesofauthorswehavediscussedsuggeststhatthehistoricalauthorisinmanywaysparadigmaticofauthorshipforthisauthor
isresponsibleforthehistoricaltext,withoutwhichnoothertextandnootherauthorispossible.Moreover,asweshallseewhenwecometothenextsectionofthis
chapter,thefunctionofthehistoricalauthordeterminesandcontrolstoagreatextentthefunctionsoftheotherauthors.Forthesereasons,generally,whenonespeaks
ofanauthorofatext,onereferstothehistoricalauthor.Thehonorifictitleofauthorisusuallyaccordedonlytothehistoricalauthor.Thisisinlinewiththevery
etymologyoftheterm'author,'fromauctor,whichinLatinmeans''hethatbringsabouttheexistenceofanobject,orpromotestheincreaseorprosperityofit,
whetherhefirstoriginatesit,orbyhiseffortsgivesgreaterpermanenceorcontinuancetoit."22Itisalsoinlinewithordinaryusage,asanydictionarywillbear.This
view,however,isquitedifferentfromthepositionespousedbysome

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contemporaryphilosophers,forwhomthepseudohistoricalauthorfunctionsparadigmatically.23
Anothercolloraryofwhathasbeensaidaboutthevariouscategoriesofauthorsexaminedisthatsomeofthemmayoverlap.Wealreadynotedthatthehistorical
authorispartofthecompositeauthorinsofarasheistheauthorofthehistoricaltext.But,moreover,itisalsopossibleinprinciple,althoughseldominfact,fora
historicalauthortobecomeacompositeauthorinthesenseinwhichheisresponsibleforthereconstructionoftheversionofthehistoricaltextwehaveataparticular
timeandplace.Tothisitmustbeaddedthatthecompositeauthorfrequentlyoverlapswiththefirstwayinwhichweunderstoodtheinterpretativeauthor.Indeed,Iam
temptedtosaythatnocompositeauthorispossiblewithoutthatauthorplayingalsotheroleofinterpreter,sincetheconstructionofatextthatisdifferentfromthe
historicaltextbutistakentobethesameasit,seemstoimplyanunderstandingofthetextdifferentfromtheunderstandingitshistoricalauthorhad.Thisisnotquite
right,however,fortherearesituationsinwhichthecompositeauthorismerelyascribewhomakesaninaccuratecopyofthehistoricaltext,andscribescandothis
withoutpayinganyattentiontothemeaningofthetexttheyarecopyingindeed,thatisfrequentlythereasonwhytheymakemistakesinthefirstplace.
Havingdiscussedtheidentityoftheauthor,wemustnowdealwiththequestionoftheauthor'sfunction.Thisquestionisnotassimpleasitappearsatfirstsight.
II.FunctionoftheAuthor
Thefunctionofanauthorvaries,dependingontheauthorinquestion.Thefunctionofthehistoricalauthoristoactastheprimarycauseofthehistoricaltextinsofaras
heisinchargeofselectingandarrangingthesignsthatcomposeatexttoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudienceinacertaincontext.Thefunctionofthecomposite
authorissimilartothatofthehistoricalauthorinsofarasthisauthoralsoseekstoproduceatext.Thedifferencebetweenthetwoisthat,inthecaseofthehistorical
author,thisproductionisnotsubjecttoanyconstraintsimposedbythepreexistenceofawholetextoranyofitsparts,exceptofcourseforthesignsbelongingtothe
languageinwhichthetextisproducedwhentheauthorisnotthecreatorofthosesigns.Inthecaseofthecompositeauthor,however,theauthorseekstoreconstruct
thehistoricaltextasitwasfirstcreatedbythehistoricalauthor.Whatiscommonbetweenthesetwoauthorsisthattheircausalrelationshipisdirectedtowardthetext.
Thereconstructionthecompositeauthorcarriesoutconcernsboththereconstructionoftheentitiesthatconstitutethehistoricaltextandtherecognitionofthemental
relationoftheseentitiestoacertainmeaning.Itinvolves,therefore,

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thereconstructionoftheentitiesthatconstitutethetextandtheunderstandingofthemeaningofthetext.
Bycontrast,theprimaryfunctionofboththepseudohistoricalandtheinterpretativeauthorsisepistemological,althoughtheycanalsohaveotherfunctions.Their
primaryfunctionisnottoproducethetextbuttodiscloseitsmeaningtoanaudiencethatis,tomakepossibletheunderstandingofatextbyanaudience.Inthecase
ofmostpseudohistoricalauthors,whatwehaveisacertainpictureofthehistoricalauthorwhetherintendedbythehistoricalauthorornot,correctornot,or
positedbythehistoricalauthororputtogetherbyothersthatinfluencesthewayaudiencesunderstandthetext.Thisauthorhasnocausalrelationtothehistorical
textitscausalrelationistotheunderstandingofthattextoritscontemporaryversionsthataudiencesmayhave.Incaseswherethepseudohistoricalauthorfunctions
asadramatispersonainthetext,however,itsfunctiongoesbeyondepistemologybecauseitisaconstitutivepartofthetext.Theauthorisrepresentedinthetextby
signsandplaysacharacterroleinthework.
Thefunctionoftheinterpretativeauthordependsonhowthisauthorisconceived.Iftheinterpretativeauthorisconceivedassomeonewhodevelopsanunderstanding
ofthetextviacertaincriteria,thentheauthorisinstrumentalincausingthatunderstanding.Butifwhattheinterpretativeauthordoesistoproduceaninterpretationof
thetexttofacilitateitsunderstandingbyanaudiencethathasdifficultyindoingsobecauseofitscontextualdistancefromthehistoricaltext,thentheinterpretative
authorfunctionsdirectlyasacauseoftheinterpretationandindirectlyasacauseoftheunderstandingtheinterpretationproducesintheaudience.Thefunctionofthis
authorwithrespecttothetext,then,isepistemological,becauseitsaimisunderstandingevenifitmaybeconsideredmetaphysical,thatis,causal,withrespecttothe
interpretation.
Letmenowtakeupthefunctionsofeachoftheseauthorsandexploretheminfurtherdetail.Ibeginwiththefunctionofthehistoricalauthor.
A.FunctionoftheHistoricalAuthor
Thetaskofthehistoricalauthoristoselectandarrangethesignsthatcomposeatexttoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudienceinacertaincontext.Atleasttwo
importantelementsmustbeconsideredfortheunderstandingofthefunctionofahistoricalauthor.Thefirstistheactivityinwhichtheauthorengagesthesecondisthe
objecttowardwhichthatactivityisdirected.
Beginningwiththesecond,weknowthatatextisagroupofentities,usedassigns,selectedandarrangedbyanauthortoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudience.
Wealsoknowthatthemeaningisnotthesignsthatareselectedandarrangedtoexpressit.Finally,weknowthattheconnectionbetweentheentitiesusedasatext
andthemeaningofthetextisconventional.Sowemayask,Forwhichoftheseisthehistoricalauthorresponsible?Ishe

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responsibleforthemeaning?Isheresponsiblefortheentitiesthatcomposethetext?Isheresponsiblefortheconnectionbetweenentitiesandmeaning?Orshouldwe
saythatheisresponsiblefortwoofthethreeorforallthree?Withrespecttothefirst,wemayask,Whatisentailedbythe"selectionandarrangement"ofthesigns
andhowisthistoberelatedtothecreativitygenerallyattributedtohistoricalauthors?Ourinquiryinfactamountstotheidentificationofwhatmakessomeonea
historicalauthor,thatis,thenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofahistoricalauthor,andthusentailsfurtherunpackingthegeneraldescriptionthatwehavebeenusing
thusfarofahistoricalauthor.Moreover,sincethenotionofhistoricalauthorisafunctionalone,visvistexts,ourinquirywillberestrictedtoafunctional
interpretationofthatnotion.Inthissense,whatfollowscomplementsratherthanduplicateswhatwassaidearlieraboutthehistoricalauthor.
Letmebeginwiththenotionofcreation.Thisnotionhasbeenandstillismuchcontestedanddiscussedinphilosophy.24WithintheJudaeoChristiantheological
contextthatstandsbehindWesterndiscussionofthisnotion,creationisgenerallyunderstoodtoinvolveboththeproductionofsomethingseparate(adextra)andalso
theproductionofsomethingfromnothing(exnihilo).IntheWesterntradition,onlythedivinityisregardedasbeingabletocreateinthisway.Humanauthorsoftexts,
then,couldnotbetakentobecreatorsinthissense.Butthereisalsoasecondaryandlessstringentunderstandingofcreation.Inthissense,tocreateissimplyto
producesomethingnew(denovo)andseparate,eveniftheproductioninvolvespreexistingmaterials.Itisinthesenseofcreationdenovoandadextra,butnotex
nihilo,thatartistsaresaidtocreateartobjectsanditisinthissensethatanauthorcanbesaidtocreateatext.Thehistoricalauthorofatextproducessomethingnew
andseparateoutofpreexistingmaterials.
Thatatextissomethingseparatefromthehistoricalauthorappearstoposenoseriousdifficultiesattheoutset.Mosttextsareobjectsthatenjoyanexistence
independentoftheirhistoricalauthorsandoftenexistlongaftertheirhistoricalauthorshaveceasedtoexist.Thereisacategoryoftexts,however,whoseseparateness
isnotasclearnamely,mentaltexts.Formentaltextsappeartodependontheauthorfortheirexistence,andfurthermore,theyseemtobepartoftheauthorinsome
way.
Iwouldliketoargue,however,thatinspiteoftherelationofdependenceamentaltextmayhaveonthemindofthehistoricalauthororanyoneelsewhomightbeable
tothinkit,italsohasanobjectivestatusthatdistinguishesitfromtheauthor'smindandthusmaybeconsideredseparatefromitinthissense.Historicalauthorsare
relatedtotexts,includingtextsthathaveneverlefttheirminds,assubjectsarerelatedtoobjects,andassuchtextsaresomethingotherthansubjectsevenifthey
dependonsubjectsfortheirexistence.Thisisallthatisneededtomaintainthatatextisseparatefromitshistorical

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authorandthusthatitisproducedadextra.For,althoughtheremaynotbeanyphysicalseparationbetweenthetwo,indeedifwearedealingwithamindanda
mentaltexttherecouldnotbeone,atextanditshistoricalauthorarestilldistinctentities.Thatthisissomaybeeasilyillustratedbyconsideringthatonecanimagine
thetransferenceofamentaltextfromonemindintoanother.IfwethinkofmindsasTVmonitorsandofmentaltextsastheimagestheyreproduce,itisobviousthat
severalmindscanhavethesameimagesimultaneouslyoratdifferenttimes.25
Thenoveltyofatextismoredifficulttoexplainthanitsseparateness.Thefirstthingthatneedstobesaidisthat,althoughtheremaybesomemeritintheviewthat
creationexnihiloentailscreationdenovo,thereisnomeritinthecontraryposition:Noveltydoesnotrequireproductionoutofnothing.Butifcreationdenovodoes
notentailcreationexnihilo,whatdoesitentail?Itneedentailnomorethanthecreationofsomethingdifferentfromwhatwasalreadythere,sothatnoveltyinvolvesa
kindofdifference.26
Differencescomeinawidevarietyandnotallofthemneedberegardedaspertinenttothenoveltyofatext.AswesawinChapter2,onlysomeofthemaresufficient
foratextnottobethesameassomeothertext.Moreover,thewaysinwhichdifferenceismeasureddependinturnonwhetherthetextinquestionisuniversal,say,
theuniversaltextofDonQuixote,orinstancesofthatuniversal,say,copiesofthetextofDonQuixote.Thedifferencesthatcountasfarastheuniversaltextis
concernedaredifferencesofmeaning,syntacticalarrangement,andtypesigncomposition.Somechangesinaudienceandauthoraresufficientlysignificanttoallowus
tospeakof"anewtext."Butthesemodificationshavetobeofthesortthatchangethemeaningofthetext.TheseconditionshavebeendiscussedatlengthinChapter
2,sothereisnoneedtorepeatthemhere.
Thedifferencesthatcountasfarasanindividualtextisconcernedarethedifferencesrelevantfortheuniversaltextofwhichtheindividualisaninstanceinadditionto
conditionsofindividualityandcontinuousexistence.Anewindividualtextiseitheronebelongingtoadifferenttypefromthatofallotherindividualtexts,oronethat
belongstothesametypeasothersbutdoesnotfulfilltheconditionofcontinuousexistence.
Havingestablishedtheconditionsthatmakeatextdifferentand,therefore,new,wecannowseeinwhatsenseahistoricalauthoristhecreatorofatext:Tocreatea
textistoproduceanewtextthusahistoricalauthorisacreatorofatextinsofarasheproducesadifferenttextaccordingtothespecifiedways.27
Strictlyspeaking,tobeanauthorofatext,then,entailsthattheauthorhascreatedanewuniversaloranewindividualtext.28Buttheelementofnoveltycanappearin
variousareas.Inthecaseofuniversaltexts,itisinthemeaning,syntacticalarrangementofthesignswhichcomposethetext,andthe

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typesigncomposition.Inthecaseofindividualtexts,itisinthosementionedwithregardtouniversaltextsandthosethataffectindividualidentitiessuchasindividuality
andcontinuousexistence.Anauthormaycreateanewuniversaltextbygivingnewmeaningtosignsandarrangementsalreadyinuseorbyexpressinganalready
knownmeaningwithnewsignsorthenewarrangementsofsignsalreadyinuse.Thisentailsthattheauthorofatextneednotberegardedascreatorofthemeaningof
atextorevenoftherelationbetweenthatmeaningandtheentitiesthatconstitutethetext.Quaauthor,heneedbeconsideredcreatoronlyinsofarasheisresponsible
foratextthatisdifferentfromallothertexts.Thus,anauthorofatextunderstoodinthesenseofcreatorofthetextneednotbeconsideredtheauthoroftheworkin
caseswherethemeaningofthetextisawork.29Theworkmaybesomethingalreadyknown.Inthissense,forexample,translatorsaretheauthorsofthetextswe
calltranslationsbecausetheyputtogethersignsinnewarrangementseventhoughtheyexpressmeaningsalreadyexpressedbyothersigns.Whathasbeensaid
concerninguniversaltextsandtheirrelationtoauthorsapplies,mutatismutandis,toindividualtexts.
Atthispointweencounteradifficulty,forwehavebeenspeakingofuniversaltextsaswellastheirinstancesandofnoveltyinboth.But,ifuniversaltextsneitherexist
norarelocatedintimeorspace,aswasarguedinChapter1,itisnotclearhowhistoricalauthorscanfunctionascreatorsofuniversaltexts.Itwouldseemtomake
sensetospeakofhistoricalauthorsascreatorsofindividualtexts,forbotharehistoricalentitiesthatexistinatemporalorspatialdimension.Butdoesitmakesenseto
speakofhistoricalauthorsascreatorsofuniversaltextsthatareneitherhistoricalnorspatiotemporalinanysense?Yet,wedowanttosay,forexample,that
CervantescreatedthetextofDonQuixote,eventhoughthattextcanbemultiplyinstantiatedandthusmustbeconsidereduniversal.Thesameproblemariseswith
artisticandculinarycreationswewanttosaythatachefcreatedanewsoupifhecreatedanewkindofsouporrecipeforasoup.30
ToanswerthisquestionwemustgobacktosomethingthatwassaidinChapter1.Auniversaltext,thatis,theuniversaloftheinstancesofatext,isnotanentity
distinctinrealityfromthoseinstances.Auniversalandaninstanceofitarenottwodistinctthingsthatrequiretwodistinctauthors.Thequestionoftheauthorshipofa
universaltextasdistinctfromthatofitsinstancesshouldnotcomeupifonekeepsinmindtheontologicalcharacterofuniversals.Thereisonlyoneauthorofatext
oftheuniversalandofitsinstances.Thereisonecomplication,however,foritisnottheauthorofeveryinstanceofatextthatisconsideredtobetheauthorofatext.
Indeed,ifthatweresotherewouldbemanyauthorsofthesametext,becausedifferentpeoplemayproducedifferentinstancesofit.Onlytheagentwhoproducedthe
firsthistoricalinstanceofatext(moreonthislater)isconsidereditsauthor.Thenotionofhistoricalauthorisahistoricaldesignationthatreferstotherelationofone
historicalphenomenon

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tootherhistoricalphenomena.Thereisadistinctionbetweentheagentwhofirstproducesaninstanceofauniversaltextandthoseagentswhoproducesubsequent
instances,andthisdistinctiongivesrisetotheviewthatuniversaltextshavehistoricalauthors.Inthissense,ahistoricalauthoristheauthorofauniversaltextwhenhe
isthefirstonewhoconsideredthetypeoftextofwhichheproducedaninstance.Theothersarenothistoricalauthors,becausetheyarereproducingwhatsomeone
elsehadalreadyconsidered.31
Havingstatedthathistoricalauthorscreatetextsdenovoandadextra,butnotexnihilo,andthatauthorscreateuniversaltextsonlyinsofarastheyproduceinstances
ofthem,onemaywanttoaskwhetherinfacthistoricalauthorsshouldbedescribedasdiscoverersratherthancreatorsofuniversaltexts.Istheirfunctionnotinfactto
findsomethingthatwasinasenseavailableallthetimebutthathadneverbeennoticedbefore?Inthissensetheauthorisonlyapersonwhorevealsordiscloseswhat
washiddenorhadgoneunnoticed.
Thisconclusiondoesnotfollowfromtheunderstandingofauthorshipthathasbeenpresentedhere.Itistruethatconsideredfrommypositionuniversaltextsare
neithercreatednornotcreated,becausetemporality,location,existence,andtheircontrariesarenotcategoriesthatapplytothem.Itmakesnosensetospeakofthe
creationofsomethingthatneithercanexistnorcannotexist,andlikewisewiththeothercategoriesmentioned,forcreationinvolvesthenotionofcausingtoexistata
certaintimeorlocation.Inthatsensehistoricalauthorscannotbecreatorsofuniversaltexts.Butinthatsensetheycannotbediscoverersoftextseither,forthenotion
ofdiscovery,justlikethenotionofcreation,involvesthenotionsofexistence,temporality,orlocation.Todiscoversomethingistomakeknownordisplayata
particulartimeorplacesomethingthatalreadyexisted.ButaccordingtotheviewdefendedinChapter1,thesecategoriesdonotapplytouniversaltextsconsideredin
themselves,soitmakesaslittlesensetosaythatauthorsdiscoverthemasitdoestosaythatauthorscreatethem.Fromthisstandpoint,universaltextsdonotseemto
becreatedordiscovered.
Fromanotherstandpoint,however,matterslookdifferent.Ihavealreadyarguedthatuniversaltextshaveauthorsandcanbeconsideredtobethecreationofauthors
insofarastheirinstanceshaveauthorsandhavebeencreatedbythem.Soourquestionamountstothequestionofwhethertheauthorsoftheinstancesofuniversal
textsarebetterdescribedasdiscoverersratherthanascreators.Hence,weneedtodeterminewhichcategoriesapplytothoseauthors.
Thesituationwithrespecttoinstancesofuniversaltextsisquitedifferentfromthesituationwithrespecttouniversaltexts,forthecategoriesofexistence,temporality,
andlocationapplytoallofthem,exceptmentaltexts,towhichonlythefirsttwoapply.Inprinciple,individualtextscan,therefore,becreatedanddiscoveredinsofar
asthecategoriesmentionedapplytothem.Thequestion,then,iswhethertheirhistoricalauthorsarebestdescribedastheir

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creatorsordiscoverers.Tosaythattheyaretheircreatorsistosaythattheyhaveproducedsomethingdifferentthatdidnotexistassuchbeforetosaythattheyare
discoverersistosaythattheyhaveuncoveredsomethingthatexistedbeforebutwasnotknown.Theargumentfordiscoveryisbasedonthefactthatindividualtexts
areinstancesofuniversalsandthusareprecededbythem.Butexistenceandtemporalitydonotapplytouniversaltextsandthustheprecedenceinquestioncannotbe
temporalorexistential.Itisnotpossibletoarguethattheexistenceofindividualtextsisprecededbytheexistenceoftheuniversaltextsofwhichtheyareinstances.
Undertheseconditionstheonlyalternativeistoholdthatthefirsthistoricalinstanceofauniversaltexthasnotbeendiscoveredbut,rather,hasbeencreatedbyits
historicalauthor.Nowwecangobacktouniversaltextsandseethattheytoocannotbedescribedasbeingdiscovered,fortheirinstancesarenotdiscovered.
Theunderstandingofthefunctionofhistoricalauthorspresentedheremakesroomfortheimportantdistinctionbetweenauthoranduser.Toexplainthisdistinction,let
megobacktothemainpointofthediscussionandnotethatthehistoricalauthorofatextisthepersonresponsibleforthefeaturesthatmakeatextdifferentfrom
othertexts.Thehistoricalauthorcreatesatextinsofarasheproducesatextualartifactthatisdifferentfromallothertextualartifactseitherinmeaning,syntactical
arrangement,orsigntypecomposition.Bycontrast,thosepersonswhousethetextarenotresponsibleforthefeaturesthatmakeatextdifferentfromothertexts.The
userofatextdoesnotcreateadifferenttext,butmerelyemploysatextofwhichthereisatleastonepreviousinstance.
Historicalauthorsmayalsobeusers,sincetheyareresponsibleforthedifferencesintextspreciselybecausetheywishtousethetextstoconveysomemeaning.Very
oftentextsarecreatedandusedsimultaneously,aswhensomeoneusesanexpressionforthefirsttimebutitisnotthecasethatthecreationofatextimpliesitsuse.
Someonemay,forexample,createatextandnotuseit,aswhenawomanwritesapoemforthemanshelovesandnevergivesittohim.Authorsmayalsoattimes
usetextsaftertheyhaveproducedthem,say,thatthewomandoesafterallgivethepoemtoherlover.Finally,authorsmaybeconsideredpartialusersinsofarasmost
timesthetextstheyproducearecomposedoflinguisticsignsandformulasalreadyinuse.Alongnovelmaybecomposedofsentencesandexpressions,manyof
whicharecommonlyused,eventhoughthecompletetextofthenovelisdifferentfromallothertextsproduceduntilthetimesuchatextwascreated.Clearly,historical
authorsmaybe,andoftenare,users,butusersneednotbehistoricalauthors.
NotethatIhaverestrictedthediscussionofauthorvs.usertouniversaltexts,butsomethingsimilarcanbesaidconcerningindividualtexts.Nothingphilosophically
interestingresultsfromsuchadiscussion,soIhaveomittedit.
Somephilosopherswanttoreservethenotionofauthorofatextforthosepersonswhoalsoproduceworks,thuseliminatingthecreatorsofcleverphrases

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andthelikefromthecategory.32Ifindthisunacceptable,becausethematterofwhatisorisnotaworkisapurelyhistoricalaffairdependentonculturalconventions,
andauthorialcreativitycanbeevidentasmuchinatextofaworkasinonethatdoesnothaveawork.
ItisalsomisleadingtoidentifywhatIhavecalledherethehistoricalauthorwiththewriterofatext.33Thenotionofwriter,likethenotionsofspeakerandimaginer,
areclosertothenotionofuserthantothenotionofauthor.Awriterissimplysomeonewhoproducesawrittentext,andthisneednotimplythatthetextisoriginalin
anysenseandthereforethatthewriterisitsauthor.Andthesamecanbesaidofspeakersorimaginersoftexts.Atthesametime,itisnotthecasethatwriters,
speakers,andimaginersneedbemerelyusers,sincetheproductionofanoriginalwrittentextimpliesanauthor.Thescramblingofthesecategoriessotypicalofsome
oftheliteratureontextualityisunfortunate,oftenresultinginconfusionratherthanenlightenment.Letmegobacknowtoauthors.
Thereisthepossibilitythatmorethanonepersonmaycreateinstancesofthesametext,eithersimultaneouslyoratdifferenttimes,independentofeachother.Insucha
case,thequestionarisesastowhethereachofthepersonsinquestionistobeconsideredahistoricalauthororonlyoneofthem,theothersbeingusers.Letme
separatethetwoandrestrictthenumberofpersonsandinstancesoftextstotwoforthesakeofsimplicity,althoughtheprinciplesinvolvedmayalsoapply,with
appropriatemodifications,tocasesofmorethantwoinstancesandpersons.
Case1.Twoandonlytwoinstancesofthesametextareproduced,andtheyareproducedsimultaneouslybytwopersonsindependentofeachother.
Case2.Twoandonlytwoinstancesofthesametextareproduced,andtheyareproducedattwodifferenttimesbytwopersonsindependentofeachother.
InCase1bothpersonsfulfillthecriteriaofauthorshiptheyhavecreatedadifferentandthereforenewtext.Bothpersonsareauthorsofthetextandbothofthemare
equallyandrightlyso.Thisisnotverydifferentfromwhathappenswithscientificdiscoveriesmadesimultaneouslybyscientistsworkingindependentlyofeachother.34
Thismeansthatinprincipletherecanbemanyhistoricalauthorsofthesametext.Bythe"same"textismeant,ofcourse,the"sametype"oftext,fortheindividual
texts,theinstances,arenumericallydifferentineachcase.Theconditionoftherebeingmorethanoneauthorofthesametextisthattheauthorsinquestionbethefirst
onestohaveselectedandarrangedthegroupofsignsthatconstitutethetexttoconveythespecificmeaninginquestiontothesametypeofaudienceinthesametype
ofcontext.Isaythe"sametype"of

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audienceandcontextbecauseitissamenessoftypeandnotnumericalsamenessinthesecategoriesthatisrelevantforthepreservationofmeaning.
Thus,itispossibleinprinciple,forexample,thattherebemanyhistoricalauthorsofthetextofDonQuixote,andIdonotmeanmanycollectively,inthewayinwhich
theAmericanDeclarationofIndependencehasmanyauthors,butmanyauthorsdistributively,inthewayinwhichCervantesisthehistoricalauthorofthetextofDon
QuixoteandShakespeareistheauthorofthetextofHamlet.35Butthispossibilityismerelylogical.Ifitweretoberealized,therewouldhavetobenotonly
samenessofsignsandsyntacticalarrangement,butalsosamenessoftypeofcontextandaudienceinsofarasthesemayaffectthemeaningofthetext,andthefulfillment
ofalltheseconditionsdoesnotseemlikely.Indeed,thedifferenthistoricalauthorswhowouldcomposethetextofDonQuixote,forexample,wouldthemselvesmost
likelyhavedifferentfeaturesthatmightaffectthewaytheyviewthemeaningofthetexttheycompose.Fordifferentpersonstobeauthorsofthesametypeoftext,
theywouldhavetohavethesamerelevanttypesoffeaturesthemselvesaswellasbeplacedinthesametypesofcircumstances,eventhoughtheywouldnothaveto
benumericallythesame.Andsuchrequirementsseemtobeverydifficultindeedimpossiblefromthepracticalstandpointtomeet.Forallintentsandpurposes,
then,itwouldseemthateachtexthasonlyonehistoricalauthor,althoughthisappliesonlytolongandcomplicatedtexts.Thepossibilityofhavingmanyauthorsofthe
sametextincreasesproportionallyastheirlengthandcomplexitydecrease.Itisaltogetherpossiblethatmanyinstancesofthetext"Pleasedonotsmoke"werefirst
producedindependentlybymanyhistoricalauthorsatthesametime.SeveralpersonsmayhavereactedthatwayattheEnglishCourtwhensomeonefirstbrought
tobaccotoEnglandfromtheAmericasviaSpain.
Case1suggeststhelogicalpossibilityoftherebeingmorethanonesimultaneoushistoricalauthorofatext,butourdiscussionillustratesthedifficultiesofactualizing
suchapossibility.Case2raisesasimilarpointbutinasituationwheretheproductionofthetextbytwodifferentauthorsworkingindependentlyofeachotherisnot
simultaneous.Dowehaveoneortwoauthors,then?Iftwopersonsattwodifferenttimesproducetwoinstancesofthesametextindependentlyandthetextis
differentfromallothertexts,itwouldseemreasonabletoconcludethattheybothareauthorsofthesametext.Indeed,ifthisispossibleforalltextsandevenlikelyfor
shortandsimpleones(asinCase1),itwouldseemevenmoreobviousinCase2,wherethepersonsinquestionworkseparatelynotonlyintermsofspacebutalso
oftime.
Yet,somethingseemstobewrongwithregardingsomeoneasahistoricalauthorofatextwhenanotherinstanceofthetexthasalreadybeenproducedpreviouslyby
someoneelse,evenifsuchproductioniscarriedoutwithoutknowledgeoftheexistenceofthatinstance.Letustakeanexamplefromtheartsandsupposethat
someone,unacquaintedwithPicasso'sTheOld

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Guitarist,weretoproduceapaintingexactlylikethatofPicasso.WouldwecallthesecondTheOldGuitaristanoriginalpainting?Wouldwevalueitaswevalue
Picasso'spainting?Mostofuswouldbeinclinedtoanswernegatively.Butwhy,andhowarewetoreconcilethisanswerwiththeclaimofauthorshipbyboth
persons?
Thepoint,ofcourse,isthatsomeonewhoproducesaninstanceofatextofwhichotherinstanceshavebeenproducedwithoutknowledgeofthoseinstancesisa
creatorofthetextinsofarashehasproducedsomethingnewwithinhisexperience,butcannotbeconsidereditshistoricalauthorbecausehehasnotproduced
somethingnewwithinalargercollectiveexperience.Someoneelsehaspriorclaimtonoveltyinthelargercontext.Thisindicatesthatauthorshipishistoricaland
contextual.Tobeahistoricalauthorentailsthecreationofsomethingnewatacertaintimeinhistoryandwithinaparticularsetofcircumstances.Novelty,withinor
withouttherealmoftextuality,isahistoricalphenomenon.36
Moreover,thereisanotherreasononthebasisofwhichonemaydoubttherecanbetwoauthorsofthesametextundertheconditionsspecifiedinCase2:whenthe
textislongandcomplex.Historydoesnotrepeatitselfand,foraslongandascomplicatedatexttobeproducedattwodifferenttimes,suchrepetitionwouldbe
requiredbecausetextualidentitywouldpresupposeidentityincontext,audience,andsoon.Thisdoesnotappeartobelogicallyimpossible,butthefactual
impossibilityatleastinthecaseoflongandcomplicatedtextsappearstobequiteanobstacle.
Inconclusion,thefunctionofthehistoricalauthorofatext,quahistoricalauthor,istoproduceatextthatdiffers,quatext,fromallothers.Theremaybemorethanone
historicalauthorofatextdistributively,althoughitisunlikelythatlongandcomplicatedtextshavemorethanonehistoricalauthor.Ontheotherhand,thereisno
reasonwhythehistoricalauthorofatextmaynotbemorethanoneperson.CertainlythetextoftheAmericanDeclarationofIndependencewastheresultofthework
ofseveralpersonswhoproduceditandthuscannotbeconsideredtohaveonlyoneauthor.Norarehistoricalauthorspreventedfromalsobeingusersoftexts,
includingthosetheycompose.
Atext,indeed,mayhavemanyusers.Everytimewequoteapoetoruseaclichweareusingtextswhosehistoricalauthorsareotherthanourselves.Butthatis
somethingthatdoesnotneedfurtherexplanation.Perhaps,however,itmaybeinordertoaddheretheratherobviouspointthattouseatextdoesnotnecessarily
implyplagiarism.Plagiarisminvolvesthemisrepresentationofourselvesasauthorsoftexts.Usersoftextsarenotplagiaristsunlesstheyrepresentthemselvesasthe
historicalauthorsofthetextsinquestion.
Moreover,withrespecttoquoting,perhapsweshouldmakeclearthatinsomecircumstances,quotinginvolvesthekindofcreativitycharacteristicofauthorsrather
thanusers.Ifatextistakenoutofcontextanditsmeaning

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changed,thenthepersonwhoquotesthetextisactingasaninterpretativeauthorratherthanasamereuserofthetext,fortheresultisnotaninstanceoftheuniversal
historicaltextbutratheraninstanceofanewtextthathappenstohaveincommonwiththehistoricaltextthesametypeofconstitutingentities(ECTs).Someofthe
implicationsofthispointarediscussedinthenextchapter.
Finally,letmealsodrawattentiontothedistinctionbetweenhistoricalauthorandtranslator.Thisdistinctionhadbeengenerallywellrespecteduntilrecently,whenthe
suggestionhasbeenmadethattranslatorsareinsomesenseauthors.ThisviewisconcordantinmanywayswiththepositionIhavedefended,accordingtowhichthe
historicalauthorofatextisthepersonresponsibleforcreatinganew(universal)text.Thus,translators,insofarastheyproduceadifferentcompositionand
arrangementofsignsfromtheoriginalone,evenifthemeaningofthetextisthesame,arehistoricalauthors.Theyarehistoricalauthorsofthetranslationofthetext,
whichofcourseisalsoatextbuttheyarehistoricalauthorsneitherofthehistoricaltextnorofthework.Theyarenothistoricalauthorsofthehistoricaltextbecause
theyarenotresponsibleforthetypeofartifactusedbythehistoricalauthortoconveythemeaningheintendedtoconvey.Andtheyarenothistoricalauthorsofthe
workfortworeasons:first,becausetheworkisthemeaningofthetextandthatissupposedtobethesameforthehistoricaltextanditstranslationsecond,because
whetherthepersonresponsibleforthatmeaningistheauthorofthehistoricaltextornot,thehistoricalauthorofthetranslationisnottheauthorofthatmeaning.
Atranslationitselfisahistoricaltext,forithasahistoricalauthorandwasproducedatsomepointintime.Butthehistoricaltextthatisthetranslationshouldnotbe
confusedwiththehistoricaltextoftheworkwhichhasbeentranslated.
Translators,then,arehistoricalauthors,butonlyofthetranslations,notofthehistoricaltextsoftheworkstheytranslate.Moreover,theiroriginalityisrestrictedtothe
choiceandarrangementsofthesignstheyuseinplaceofthesignsandarrangementsusedbythehistoricalauthorofthehistoricaltextoftheworktheytranslate,and
eventhereitislimited,forthechoiceofsignsandtheirarrangementsisdictatedtoagreatextentbythemeaningthatistobeconveyed.Indeed,translatorstryto
communicatemeaningsandworkstopersonswhocannotunderstandthetextsofhistoricalauthors.Tothatextent,theyareinmanywaysinterpreters,andtranslations
areinterpretations.37Translatorsareauthorstosomeextent,buttheycannotbeconsideredonequalfootingwiththehistoricalauthorsofthetextstheytranslate.38
B.FunctionoftheCompositeAuthor
Thereareimportantsimilaritiesbetweenthefunctionofthehistoricalauthorandthatofthecompositeauthor.Thesimilaritieslieinthatbothhaveas

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theiraimtheproductionofthehistoricaltext.Thus,theobjectatwhichtheireffortsaredirectedisthesame.However,withthisthesimilaritiesend,forinthecaseof
thehistoricalauthor,theaimistoproducesomethingnewanddifferentfromwhatwasalreadyavailablethatiswhywespokeofcreationwhenwespokeaboutthe
textproducedbythehistoricalauthor.Buttheaimofthecompositeauthorisnottocreateanewtextinthesenseofproducingatextwhichisdifferentfromeverytext
thathasexisteduntilthatpoint.Indeed,iftheresultoftheactivityofthecompositeauthorwereacreationinthissense,thensuchactivitywouldbeconsideredafailure
andthecompositeauthorwouldnotbeacompositeauthorinvirtueofthatactivity,butahistoricalauthorofanewtext.Theaimofthecompositeauthoristorecreate
thehistoricaltext,thatis,torecoverwhathadbeenlostorforgotten.Inthatsense,thereisanelementofrelativenovelty:Thecompositeauthorpresentssomething
newtoanaudiencethatdidnothaveitbefore.Butthisisnotabsolutenovelty,forthelostorforgottenhistoricaltextissupposedtoprecedethetextproducedbythe
compositeauthor.
Theremayalsobeanelementofnoveltyinthetextproducedbythecompositeauthorifthecompositeauthorfailstorecreatethehistoricaltextandcreatesa
differenttextinstead.ItisforthesereasonsthatIcalledthetextproducedbythecompositeauthorthecontemporarytext,ratherthanthehistoricaltext,forthere
maybe,andoftenare,substantialdifferencesbetweenthetwo.
C.FunctionofthePseudoHistoricalAuthor
Thepseudohistoricalauthoristhepersonaanaudiencebelieves,orisintendedtobelieve,isthehistoricalauthorofatext.Assuch,itisgenerallymythical,althoughit
mayapproximateinvariouswaysthehistoricalauthor.
Asamoreorlessaccurateviewofthehistoricalauthor,thepseudohistoricalauthorcannotbeconsideredtohavecreatedanythinginfact,eventhoughheis
presentedpreciselyasthecreatorofthehistoricaltext.Thefunctionofthepseudohistoricalauthorisprimarilyepistemological.Thepseudohistoricalauthoris
supposedtohelpusunderstandevenifitmaydojusttheoppositeinsomecasesatext.Knowledgeabouttheidentityofanauthorissupposedtohelpusfigure
outwhatthetextmeans.Thepseudohistoricalauthordoesnotcreateanythingandisnotthecauseofatextthepseudohistoricalauthorfunctionsratherasoneof
thecausesoftheunderstandinganaudiencederivesfromatextforitregulatesandinfluencestheunderstandinganaudiencederivesfromatext.
Thereisoneexceptiontothisconclusion,however.Whenthepseudohistoricalauthorisadramatispersonainthetext,itsfunctionismorethanepistemic,foritisone
ofthefactorsthatdeterminestextualmeaningandthus

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textualidentity.ConsiderthecaseofChaucerinTheCanterburyTales,whereheplaystheroleofauthorandpilgrim,creating,reporting,andaffectingthetales.In
situationssuchasthis,thepseudohistoricalauthorfunctionsbothepistemicallyandontologically.
D.FunctionoftheInterpretativeAuthor
Theinterpretativeauthormaybeunderstoodintwoways:asanaudiencethatdevelopsanunderstandingofatextorasapersonwhoaddssomethingtoatextto
enableanaudiencetounderstandit.Inneithercasedoestheinterpretativeauthorhaveacausalrelationofcreativitytothehistoricaltext,andhencethereislittlein
commonbetweenthisauthorandthehistoricalauthor.Ontheotherhand,theinterpretativeauthordoeshavesomethingsincommonwithboththecompositeauthor
andthepseudohistoricalauthor.Therearesimilaritiesbetweenhisfunctionandthatofthecompositeauthorinsofarastheinterpreterseekstounderstandthe
historicaltextandinsodoingrecreateitsmeaninginhisorherownmindandinthemindofacontemporaryaudience.Tothatextenttheinterpretativeauthoris
involvedinataskthatishistoricalandmirrorsthereconstructivetaskofthecompositeauthor.39Thedifferencesbetweenthetwoliefirstinthatthecompositeauthor
isconcernedwiththetextasawholetheentitiesthatconstituteitandthemeaningwhereastheinterpretativeauthorisconcernedwithonlythemeaning.Second,
theinterpretativeauthor,understoodinthesecondsensementionedearlier,addstothehistoricaltextwhateverhedeemsnecessarytoproduceacontemporary
understandingofit,whereasthecompositeauthortriestoavoidanysuchadditions,beingconcernedprimarilywiththerecreationofthehistoricaltextasitwaswhen
firstproduced.Finally,itisfrequentlylegitimatefortheinterpretativeauthortogobeyondthemeaningthatthehistoricalauthorofthetextandhiscontemporaneous
audienceassociatedwiththehistoricaltext,whereasitisneverlegitimateforthecompositeauthortodoso.40
Therearealsosimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthefunctionsofthepseudohistoricalauthorandtheinterpretativeauthor.Themainsimilarityisthatthefunctionof
both(withtheexceptionofthecaseinwhichthepseudohistoricalauthorisadramatispersona)isepistemological:theyaffectunderstanding.Assuchtheyhaveno
causalrelationshiptothehistoricaltext.Thedifferencesbetweenthetwoarefirstofallontological.Thepseudohistoricalauthorisaprojectionofanaudiencethat
triestounderstandatext,buttheinterpretativeauthorisanactualperson(orpersons)whosetsouttounderstandatextortomakeitunderstandableforanaudience.
Second,thepseudohistoricalauthoristheproductoftheactivityoftheinterpretativeauthorandnotviceversa.Finally,theinterpretativeauthor,understoodinthe
secondwayspecifiedearlier,isthecreatorofaninterpretation,whereasthepseudohistoricalauthorcreatesnothing.

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Havingdiscussedthefunctionoftheauthor,wemustnowturntothemuchdebatedissueofwhetherthereisaneedforanauthoratall.Cantheretherecanbetexts
withoutauthors?
III.NeedforanAuthor
Thequestionofwhethertextshaveauthorsisonethathasbeenexplicitlyraisedonlyrecently.Indeed,fromacommonsensepointofviewitwouldseemthatifthereis
atexttheremustbeormusthavebeenanauthorthatproducedit,41althoughtheexistenceofanauthorisnotsufficienttomakesomethingatext.Werefertoart
objects,tools,andotherartifactsaswellastothoughts,ideas,andactionsashavingauthors,buttheseobjectsarenotnecessarilytexts.Iftheyturnouttobetextsitis
notsolelyinvirtueofthefactthattheyhaveauthorsbutowingtootherfactorsaswell.Theviewthathavinganauthorisnotwhatdeterminesthatsomethingbeatext,
however,isnottheoneunderfireincontemporarycircles.Rather,theviewthathasrecentlybeenattackedholdsthatauthorsarenecessaryfortexts,thatis,thatthere
canbenotextswithoutauthors.Theattackersfallintotwogroups.Themostradicalpositionarguesthattextsneverhaveauthors.42Alessradicalpointofview
maintainsthat,althoughsometextshaveauthors,notalltextshavethem.43
Variousfactorshavefueledtherecentinterestintheviewthattexts,oratleastsometexts,donothaveauthors.Onesuchfactoristheoftennoticedpointthatnotonly
textsbutalsotheirmeaningsareindependentoftheauthorsthatcomposethem.Textshavea''life,"touseastandardmetaphor,andanexistenceoftheirownafter
theyarecreatedthathasverylittletodowiththosewhocreatethem.Theircreatorsmayinfactdiewhilethetextsremainandcontinuetoexertdirectinfluenceon
audiences.Mostoldtexts,asopposedtorecentlyproducedtexts,fallintothiscategory.Alsoalongtheselines,itisnotedthatoftenweunderstandthemeaningofa
textwithoutknowinganythingaboutitsauthor.Thisismostclearlythecasewithsimple,ordinarytexts,suchasthe"Nosmoking"signpostedintheclassroomwhereI
teach.Therearescoresofanonymoustextswhosemeaningisnotseriouslyquestionedinspiteofourignoranceofwhoproducedthem.ThetextoftheepicpoemEl
Cid,forexample,isoneofthem.Itslanguage,structure,andnaturemakeitarelativelyeasytexttounderstand,eventhoughnooneknowswhoputittogether.
Finally,therearecaseswherepersonsotherthantheauthorofatextunderstandthetextbetterthantheauthor.Thisisoftenthecasewithverycomplicatedtexts,for
example,wherecommentatorswhohavedevotedtheirlivestostudyingthesetextsaresometimesthoughttoknowmoreaboutthemandtheirmeaningsthanthe
authorswhoproducedthem.TherecanbebetterAristoteliansthanAristotle,ifyoulike.
Theseconsiderationsfuelthespeculationthatauthorsarenotnecessaryfortexts.Theyalsoleadtoanotherimportantpointthatresultsinthesameconclusion

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namely,thatthemeaningofatexthasmoretodowithitsaudiencethanwithitsauthor.Indeed,somegosofarastosaythatthemeaningofatexthasnothingtodo
withtheauthorbutissolelyuptotheaudiencethelatter,ratherthantheauthorwhocomposedthetext,determinesthemeaning.44
Morespecificreasonscanbegivenforthepositionsthatonlycertaintextshaveauthorsorthatnotextshaveauthors.Forexample,onemaywishtoarguethatitis
certainlyoddtospeakofsignssuchasthewordsorlettersofnaturallanguagesashavingauthors.And,indeed,itisoddtotalkinthisway,butthereasonisnotthat
thewordsandlettersusedinnaturallanguagesdonothaveauthors,ratherthattheirauthorsarefrequentlyanonymouswedonotknowwhotheyareorthese
wordsandlettersaretheresultofcollectiveratherthanindividualefforts.Wegenerallyassociateauthorshipwithknownpersonsandwithindividualsratherthan
groups.Thecaseofthesymbolsusedinartificiallanguagesshouldhelpusseethepoint,forIdoubtanyonewouldobjecttocallingwhoeverproducedanartificial
languageitsauthor.Ifthepersoninquestionisnotanauthor,whatishe?Amaker?Aproducer?Aninventor?Adiscoverer?Noneofthesetermsseemtoapplyas
well.
Similarsortsofreasoningsprobablyarebehindtheviewthatnoticesandsimpletextsdonothaveauthors.Itisdifficulttopinpointthefirstpersonwhocombinedthe
words'no'and'smoking'intothetext'Nosmoking'toconveytherequestthatsomeonenotsmoketobacco.BeforetobaccowasintroducedinEurope,such
combinationmaynothavebeeninuseand,ifinuse,itcouldnotpossiblyhavebeenusedtomeanwhatwemeanbyittoday.Yet,someonemusthavebeenthefirst
person(orpersons)tohavedonethis,whichmeansthatthetexthasanauthorinthegeneralsenseindicated.
Itisnotthelengthofatext,however,thatmayprecludeitfromhavinganauthor,forsomeveryshorttexts,suchastheJapanesepoemsknownashaiku,are
universallyacceptedashavingauthors.EarlierIreferredtorelativesimplicityasanotherreasonthatmaybegivenforcertaintextslackingauthors.Butagainahaiku
canbequitesimple.Soitdoesnotlookasifthelengthordegreeofcomplexityhaveanythingtodowithwhetheratexthasanauthorornot.Istheresomething,then,
thatisrequiredoftextsthathaveauthors?
Anotherpossibilityisthatonlythosetextscapableofmultipleinterpretationshaveauthors.45Now,thiswillnotdoasitstands,foranytextcanbethesubjectof
multipleinterpretationseventhemostsimpletextscanbeunderstooddifferently,whethercorrectlyorincorrectly,bydifferentpeopleandindifferentcontexts.The
interpretationsinquestionmustbe,ifnotcorrect,atleastallowable.Atexthasanauthor,then,onlyifthetextisofsuchasortthatitislegitimateforanaudienceto
understanditindifferentways.
Unfortunately,thisviewhasatleastoneundesirableconsequence:Itexcludesfromthecategoryoftextswithauthorsscientifictreatisesthatallowonlyonelegitimate
interpretation.IamthinkingofsuchtextsasEuclid'sElements

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andNewton'sPrincipia.Thosewhocomposedthesetextswantedtoconveyaveryclearandspecificmessageaboutthesubjectmatterandnotavarietyofviews
aboutit.Andthesamecanbesaidconcerningshortertextsusedinordinaryspeech.WhenIaskmydaughter"toopenawindowtoletfreshairintoastuffyroom"I
meanexactlythatIwanthertoopenawindowtoletfreshairintoastuffyroomandforsomeoneelsetounderstandwhatIsaydifferentlyistomisunderstandit.
Itcannotbe,then,thatonlytextswithasubstantialrangeoflegitimateinterpretationscanhaveauthors.So,wearebackatsquareone.Itistruethatitisquitedifferent
inmanywaystobetheauthorofthetextofDonQuixoteandtheauthorof"Nosmoking."Butthedifferencesareamatterofdegree.Fundamentally,thosewho
producedbothtextswereengagedinthesamekindofactivity,thecreationofsomethingnew.Forthatreasonbothtextscanhaveauthors.
Theconfusionassociatedwiththequestionofwhethertextsrequireauthorshastodoinpartwiththecomplexityofthequestionandinpartwithwhatismeantby
'author.'Therefore,tobringsomeclaritytoitsdiscussion,wemustexamineitinthecontextofthevariousauthorsdistinguishedearlier.
A.NeedfortheHistoricalAuthor
Twoquestionshavingtodowiththehistoricalauthorshouldbedistinguishedtopreventconfusion.Thefirstaskswhetheritispossiblefortextstoexistwithoutcauses
thesecondaskswhetheritispossiblefortextstoexistalthoughtheydonothavesubjectswhointendtoconveysomespecificmeaningthroughthemamongtheir
causes.Theanswertothefirstquestionseemsquitestraightforward.Itmakesnomoresensetoholdthattextscanexistwithoutcausesthanthatthereisrainwithout
somethingthatproducesit.Nomatterwhatentitiesareusedtomakeuptexts,whetherartificialornatural,thoseentitiesandthetextstheymakeupmusthavecauses.
Unless,likeHume,wearewillingtochallengethewholenotionofcauseandtoacceptthatthereareentitieswithnocauses,wemustacceptthattextstoocannotexist
withoutcausesthatbringthemabout.
Theanswertothesecondquestion,bycontrast,isnotaseasilydetermined.Somemaywishtoarguethat,indeed,sometextsareproducedwithoutthecausalagency
ofsubjectswhointendtoconveysomespecificmeaningthroughthem.Variousexamplesmaybecitedtosupportthisargument,butIshallrefertoonlytwo.46Oneis
thecaseof"found"texts,towhichreferencehasalreadybeenmade.Considerthecaseofsomeonewhoiswalkingonthebeachandfindsagroupofpebbles
arrangedinthesamewayinwhichanEnglishspeakerwouldputthemifhewishedtoformthetext'Nosmoking.'Granted,Ihavenotheardofanyonefindingsuchan
arrangementofpebblesand,indeed,itseemsdifficulteventoimaginethatthearrangementwouldoccurnaturally,withouttheintentionaloperationofasubject.Butit
iscertainly

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logicallypossibleforthistohappen.Acombinationofhighwinds,tides,andsooncouldinprincipleproducethearrangementinquestion.Andifthatisthecase,so
goestheargument,thenwehaveaninstanceofatextinwhoseproductionsubjectshavenotplayedarole.47
Attheoutsetitappearsasiftherewereonlytwowaysofansweringthisobjection.Oneistodenythatthearrangementofpebblesonthebeachisatexttheotheris
tofindanauthorforthearrangement.Butbothofthesealternativesrunintodifficulties.Thefirstalternativehastoaccountforthefactthatasubjectwalkingonthe
beachgotmeaningoutofthearrangement.Thesecondhastocontendwiththeproblemthatnosubjectproducedthearrangement.Mustwethenacknowledgethat
authorsarenotalwaysnecessaryfortexts?
Iwouldliketoproposeadifferentwayoutofthisdilemma,basedonthedistinctionbetweentheentitiesthatconstituteatext(ECTs)andatextitself.48Theentities
thatconstituteatextarewhateverisusedtoconveymeaning,consideredapartfromboththemeaningandthefactthattheentitiesconveythismeaning.Examplesof
theseentitiesarethepebblesonabeachaboutwhichwehavebeenspeaking,oranyotherphysicalormentalentitiesthatconstitutetexts.Thetext,bycontrast,is
thoseentitiestakenasconveyorsofcertainmeanings.Now,sincewehavetwosortsofthings,theentitiesthatconstitutethetextandthetextitself,thecausesthat
accountforthemneednotbethesame.Inourexample,thecausesthatproducetheparticularpebblesandtheirarrangementonthebeachneednotbethesameas
thecausesthatproducethetext(thatis,thepebblesandtheirarrangementunderstoodashavingacertainmeaning).Themeaning"Nosmoking"anditsconnection
withthearrangedpebbleswasnotproducedbythewindandthetide.Thecauseofthatmeaninganditstietothearrangedpebblesistheresultofwhoeverfirst
connectedtheshapesandarrangementinstantiatedbythepebblestothemeaning.Butthen,wemayask,isthepersonwalkingonthebeachtheauthorofthetexton
thebeach,forsheseemstobethefirsttothinkofthepebblesandtheirarrangementashavingmeaning?Againwemustdistinguish.For,althoughsheisthefirstwho
identifiedtheindividualpebblesandtheirarrangementfoundonthebeachashavingmeaning,shemaynothavebeenthefirsttohaveconnectedtheparticularsortof
arrangementthepebblesdisplaytothisparticularmeaning.Ifsheunderstoodthearrangementofthepebblestomean"Nosmoking"becauseshealreadyknewthat
thiscertainarrangementmeant"Nosmoking,''thensheisnottheauthorofthetext.Sheisnottheauthorofthetextinsofarasshedidnotfirstmaketheconnectionin
question.Sheisratherauser,forsheuseswhatisalreadyavailable.
Thiscaseisquitedifferentfromcaseswhereasubjecttakesanaturalobjectandusesitasatextbystipulativelyconnectingittoameaning.Insuchacase,thesubject
whomakestheconnectionisobviouslytheauthor,andthusthissortofcaseposesnodifficultyfortheviewIhavebeendefendinghere.Thissort

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ofsituationissimilartothecaseof"foundart,"where,forexample,apieceofdriftwoodispickedupbysomeoneatthebeach.Thepieceofdriftwoodisanaesthetic
objectthat,forthisreason,attractstheattentionofasubjectwhothenusesitasanartobjectbydisplayingitonthemantelpiece.Theartistinthiscaseisthesubject
whopickedupthepieceofdriftwoodanddisplaysit,eventhoughitwasnaturewhichproducedtheobjectthathasbecomeart.49
Inshort,weneednotdenythatthearrangementofpebblesonthebeachconstitutesatext,normustweidentifythepasserbyastheauthorofthetexttoholdthattexts
musthaveauthors.Foratextisnotjusttheentitiesofwhichitisconstituted,butratherthoseentitiesintendedasconveyorsofacertainmeaning.Intheexampleofthe
pebbles,theintentiontoconveyacertainmeaningwiththeparticulararrangementexemplifiedbythepebblesbelongstowhomeverthinksofitfirst.Thepasserbyneed
notbetheauthorunlesssheisinfacttheonewhofirstestablishestheconnectionbetweenaparticulararrangementofentitiesandameaning.Butanauthortheremust
be,fortheconnectioninquestionisamatterofconvention,notofnature,andconventionsrequiresubjectstoadoptthem.50
Inthecaseofthepebblesitisnottoodifficulttoenvisionthepasserbyastheauthorofthetext.Thisissobecauseseeingatextcomposedofpebblesonabeach
involvesa"creative"mentalselectionofwhatobjects,featuresofobjects,andarrangementsavailableonthebeacharesignificantandthusconstitutethetext.The
proofofthatprocessofmentalselectionisthatnoteveryonemayseethetext.Thisisverysimilartowhathappenswhensomeonelooksatacloudandseesacamel
orwhenapersonlookingatstarsseespatternsinthem,suchasabigdipper.Selectionandarrangementdonotrequirephysicalalterationremember,sometextsare
mental.Butthepasserbyisnotsoeasilyidentifiableasauthorinothercases.
Asecondexamplethatmaybeusedtoimpugntheneedforcausalagentsistheproverbialexampleofthemonkeywho,givensufficienttime,willeventuallytypea
copyofShakespeare'sHamletbyrandomlyhittingthekeysofatypewriter.Thismaybetakenasacounterexampletotheproposedviewbecausethemonkeyin
questionknowsnothingaboutthemeaningofthetextitproduces,doesnothaveanyknowledgeofthesignsofwhichitiscomposedorthesemanticorsyntactical
significanceoftheirarrangement,andhasnointentiontoconveymeaning.Andyet,thereitis:themagnificenttextofHamlet,typedbythemonkey.
TheveryideathatamonkeywouldbeabletoproducethetextofHamletisfarfetched,andweallknowthattheprobabilitiesinquestionareinfinitesimal.Butthis
observationwillcertainlynotdoawaywiththecounterexample.51
Threealternativestrategiessuggestthemselvesattheoutsettodealwithit.Thefirstistodenythatwhatthemonkeyhasproducedisinfactatext52the

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secondistoarguethatthemonkeyistheauthorofthetext53andthethirdistoholdthatwhoeverfirstgotholdofthemonkey'smanuscriptandunderstooditas
Hamletistheauthor.54Butnoneofthesealternativesappearstobeprimafaciesatisfactory.Thefirstdoesnotappeartoworkbecausetheobjectthemonkey
producedcanbereadandunderstoodbyanyonewhoknowsEnglishinthewayonewouldreadandunderstandanycopyofthetextofHamletproducedbya
person.Thesecondalternativedoesnotseemsatisfactorybecausethemonkeyknowsnothingaboutthemeaningofwhatithastypedand,therefore,hasnointention
ofcommunicatingthatoranyothermeaning.AndthethirddoesnotappearacceptablebecausetheauthorofHamletisnotthepersonwhofoundthemonkey's
typescriptbutShakespeare.
Followingwhatwassaidconcerningthecaseof"foundtexts,"onecouldtrytodevelopasolutionbydistinguishingbetweentheentitiesproducedbythemonkeyand
thetextofHamlet.Theentitiesproducedbythemonkeyconsistofcertainmarksonapaper,whereasthetextismadeupofthosemarksinsofarastheyareintended
toconveymeaning.Inthisrespect,theexampleisverysimilartotheoneofthepebblesonthebeachandcanbeanalyzedinthesameway.Themonkeyistheagent
thatproducesthemarks(thecounterpartofthewindandthetides),theauthorofthetextisShakespeare,whofirstconnectedthosemarkstotheworkormeaning
thatweknowasHamlet,andthepersonwhofindsthemonkey'stypescriptismerelyauserofthetext(thecounterpartofthewalkeronthebeach).
Somedifficulties,however,underminethissolution.Forexample,itmightbearguedthatthetypescriptproducedbythemonkeyhasmeaning,regardlessofwhether
anybodyfindsitoranyonehasauthoredthetext.Suppose,say,thatthemonkeyproducedthetextofHamletbeforeShakespeareexisted(orsupposethat
Shakespeareneverexisted)andsupposefurtherthatnooneeverfindsthetext.Underthesecircumstancescanwesaythatwehaveatext,andifwedo,whoisthe
author?InthissituationwecannotholdthatShakespeareistheauthorofthetextorthattheauthoristhefinder,forShakespearedoesnotexistandthetypescripthas
notbeenfoundbyanyone.Yet,wemightliketoholdallthesamethatthetypescripthasmeaning.ForthetypescriptiscomposedofsignsbelongingtoEnglishand
arrangedinwaysthatareconsistentwiththesyntacticalrulesofEnglishgrammarinsuchawaythattheycouldberecognizedasmeaningfulbyanyonewhoknows
English.Indeed,ifoneweretofindthetypescriptafterall,onecouldreadit,understandit,andevencouldpassastheauthorofHamletbypeddlingthemanuscriptas
one'sown.55Thuswearejustifiedinasking,then,Whoistheauthorinthissituation?
Onemighttrytoanswerthisquestionbysayingthatthereasonwhythecaseofthemonkey'stypescriptraisesthesequestionsisthatitiscomposedoflettersand
wordsartifactscreatedbysubjectstoconveymeaningthathaveestablishedmeaningsbecauseofthisthetypescriptappearstohavemeaning

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eventhoughithasnoauthor.56Themonkeyisusingestablishedlinguisticsignstoproducethetypescript,andifthesesignsmakesenseatalltheydosobecausethey
arearrangedinaccordancewiththegrammaticalrulesoftheEnglishlanguage.Thus,theconnectionbetweenthetypescriptandmeaningthatresultsinatextislatentin
theacceptedmeaningsofthesignsandtheirarrangement.Thereis,then,nosinglesubjectwhocanbecalledtheauthorofthetextinthisexample,butratherthe
subjectswhodevelopedthelanguageanditsrulesfunctionaslatentauthorsofthetext.Thereisasubjectcomponentinthecausalcomplexthatisresponsibleforthe
monkey'sHamlet,andthiscomponentisrepresentedbythelanguageinwhichthetextiscomposed,whichisinturnaresultofthefactthatthemonkeytypesona
machinemadebysubjectstoproducelinguisticsigns.Thisisquiteevidentinthecaseofashorttextlike'Fire!'accidentallytypedbyamonkey,fortheauthorofthe
text(thecounterpartofthetextofHamlet)isnotthemonkey,butwhoeverconnectedtheshapeofthecomposite'Fire!'withthemeaningthattexthasinEnglish.
Onemightalsoaddthat,ifamonkeystrikesthekeysofatypewriter,itmostlikelydoesthisbecauseithaswatchedhumansdoso.Andthisthereforeinvolvesa
subjectorsubjectsinanindirectwayaswell.Imitation,however,isnotanecessaryconditionofthetextualityofwhatthemonkeyproduces,becausethemonkey
couldhitthekeyswhetherithadseenanyonedosoornotandthemonkeyhasnointentiontoconveymeaningindoingso.
Thecaseofthemonkey'stypescript,then,doesnotappeartobeexactlylikethatofthepebblesonthebeach,forinthecaseofthepebblesitispossibletoholdthat
thepasserbyistheauthorofthetextatleastintheunusualcaseinwhichsheisthefirstpersontoattachmeaningtotheshapesformedbythepebbles.Nordoesthe
caseofthemonkey'stypescriptseemexactlylikethatinvolvedintheidentificationofcloudformationswithanimalsandthelike,whichwedooccassionally.Inthis
caseonecouldarguethatthepasserbyistheauthor,becausesheistheonethatconnectsthecloud,say,withacamelorthearrangementofcertainstarswithabig
dipper.Butthemonkey'stypescriptiscomposedofwellestablishedlinguisticsigns,namely,lettersandwords,thatarenotsoonthebasisofasimilarityobservedby
someone,butonthebasisofacceptedconventions.Thereaderofthemonkey'stypescriptcannotbeconsideredtobe"creative"inthewaythepasserbyatthebeach
orthecloudwatchercan.
Inspiteofallthathasbeensaid,however,wedonotseemtohavesolvedtheproblemposedbythetextofHamletproducedbyamonkey,forthecasesofthetext
ofHamletandthetext'Fire!'aredifferentinsofaras'Fire!'isawellknownandfrequentlyusedtextinEnglish,butthetextofHamlet(asproducedbythemonkey)is
anoriginal,newproduct.Societyorwhoeverinventedthetext'Fire!'maytakeauthorialcreditforit,butnooneseemstodeserveauthorialcreditforthetextof
Hamlet.Themonkeycannottakecredit

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foritbecauseitknowsnothingaboutthemeaningandhasnointentiontoconveyit.Societycannottakethecreditbecauseithasnotcreatedtheparticulartextof
Hamletaboutwhichwearespeaking,althoughithascreatedalanguagewhosepossiblearrangementsincludeonesuchasthatofthetextofHamlet.Moreover,ifwe
weretogiveauthorialcredittosocietyinthiscase,whycouldwenotgiveauthorialcredittoitinthecaseinwhichShakespeareisinfactthepersonwhocomposed
thetext?Finally,thefinderofthemonkey'stypescriptcannottakeauthorialcreditbecauseheorshedidnotcreatethetypescript,themeaning,ortheconnection
betweenthetypescriptandthemeaning.Weseem,then,nottohaveadvancedtowardasolutionofthiscase.ThetypescriptofHamletproducedbythemonkeyis
eithernotatextor,ifitisatext,hasnohistoricalauthor.
Letusexplorethesecondalternativefirstnamely,thatthetexthasnohistoricalauthor.Onecouldarguethatthisispossiblebecauseacomplexsetofcausescan
cometogetherandbychanceproducewhatundernormalcircumstancesonlyanauthorcanproduce.Thus,inthelastanalysisitwouldseemtobetruethatinatleast
onetypeofcasetherecanbetextswithouthistoricalauthorsthatis,therecanbetextswithoutsomeonewhointentionallyselectsandarrangesthesignsofwhichthe
historicaltextiscomposedtoconveyaspecificmeaningtoanaudienceinacertaincontext.Butthisisananomaly,anexception,anddoesnotmeanthattheexistence
ofthetextcannotbecausallyexplainedeventhoughsuchacausalexplanationincludesanelementofchance.Moreover,thisviewmustbedistinguishedfromthe
viewsdescribedearlierinwhichtextswereconsiderednottohaveauthorsatall,atleastnotalways.Fortheunderstandingofwhatitmeanstohaveanauthorinthose
viewsandtheonepresentedhereisdifferent.
ThisalternativemaybeclarifiedfurtherbyreferringbacktothediscussionofmeaninginChapter1.Therewesawthattextualmeaningisrelatedtocertainentitiesthat,
whenconsideredbyasubject,canyieldunderstandingofthemeaninginthesubject.Moreover,becausetextsmusthavemeaning,itappearsthatsubject
understandingisrequiredfortextuality.Theproblemwiththecasesofthemonkey'stypescriptand"foundtexts"isthattheyareunderstandabletoaudiencesthatwere
notinstrumentalinproducingthemandyettheywerenotunderstoodbytheagentsorcausesthatproducedthem.
Now,inthecaseofsignsandtextsthatwereproducedbyagentsbeforetheywereaccidentallyreproducedbycausesunawareoftheirmeaning,itisobviousthattheir
authorsarethosewhofirstconsciouslyproducedthem.Thereisnoproblemhere.Moreover,thereisnoproblemconcerningsignsthatarefirstregardedassignsby
someoneotherthanthecausesthatproducedtheentitiesofwhichtheyareconstituted.Inthiscase,thatsomeoneistheauthor.Theproblemariseswithtextsthatare
producedbyunconsciouscauses,makesense,andhaveneverbeenproducedbeforebyconsciousagents.Thiswouldbethe

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caseofthetextofHamletproducedbyamonkeybeforeShakespeareproducedit.Onewaytotrytodispelanylingeringdoubtsistoarguethatinthiscasethereare
consciousagentswhodevelopedthesignsandruleswherebythosesignscouldbearranged.Thus,althoughnosingle,overallconsciousagentisresponsibleforthe
text,thereareconsciousagentswhoseintentionsmakepossibletheconnectionbetweentheworkHamletanditstext.Indeed,themeaningoftextsandthereforethe
textsthemselvesaretheresultofamultiplicityoffactors,evenwhenanauthorcanbeidentifiedastheirproducer.57Soitmakessensetoarguethatthesefactors,
consideredtogether,makeupfortheabsenceofwhatisrequiredundernormalcircumstances.
Finally,itcouldbeaddedthatitispreciselythecomplexnatureoftextsandthefactthattheirmeaningisinparttheresultofthemeaningofthesignsofwhichtheyare
composedthatmakesthisexplanationplausible.Ifthecomponentsofanentityaremeaningfulandfallintosemanticallysignificantarrangements,theentityisboundto
beatextevenwhennosubjectisresponsibleforthatentity.
Still,thetruthofthematterisnotonlythatthisalternativeviolatesthedefinitionoftextsadoptedintheIntroductionbutthatitseemstogocontrarytosomeofourmost
basicintuitionsabouttextuality.Theideathattherecanbetextswithoutauthorswhointendtoconveysomespecificmeaningthroughthemseemsabsurd.But,then,
canthealternativeview,thatthemonkey'stypescriptisnotatext,bedefended?IbelieveitcanbecauseIthinkthatitsimplausibilitystemsfromanassumptionthathas
goneunquestionedinthediscussionsofar.Theassumptionisthatthetypescripthasmeaning.Butcanwereallyquestionthisassumption?Afterall,anyreaderwho
knowsEnglishandreadsthemonkey'stypescriptseemstounderstandit.Moreover,thetypescriptiscomposedofwordsbelongingtotheEnglishlanguagethat
appearinarrangementsinaccordancewiththegrammaticalrulesofthelanguage.So,howcananyonepossiblyarguethatthetypescriptisnotatextbecauseitdoes
nothavemeaning?
Ifoneexaminestheexampleinmoredetail,however,itbecomesclearthatthesituationisnotthatsimple.Thereasonisthatthemeaningofthesignsofwhichthe
typescriptiscomposedisnotclearbecausesigns,liketexts,arehistoricalentities,theproductsofconventionaluseswhosemeaningschangefromtimetotime.Thus,
themeaningofthemonkey'stypescriptinthesixteenthcenturymightbedifferentfromitsmeaningintheeighteenthorthetwentiethcenturies.Becausethemonkeyisa
historicallyneutralentity(nothavinganunderstandingofwhatithastyped)andthetypescripthasnotbeenproducedinasocialcontext(thereisnoaudienceforit),
wecannotpossiblysaythatthemeaningofthetypescriptisthisratherthanthat.58
Consideranotherexample.Supposethemonkeytyped'Fire!'insteadofthetypescriptofHamlet.Inthiscasewehaveasituationwherethemeaningof

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'Fire!'isundetermined,forthereareseveralpossiblemeaningsthatcouldbeattachedtoit,whichareincompatible.Doesit,mean,forexample,thatsomeoneshould
pullthetriggerofafirearm?Ordoesitmeanthatacertainbuildingisonfire?OrisitmerelyareportofsomeonewhoislearningtheuseoftheEnglishword'fire'?The
pointisthatcontextisessentialformeaningandatypescriptthatlackscontextmustlackmeaning.NotethatthepointIammakingisnotepistemic,although
epistemologyconfirmsit.Wehavenowayofknowingthemeaningofwhatappearstobeatextoutsideitshistoricalcontexttextsoutsidehistoryaresilent.Thepoint
Iammakingisontological,foritconcernsthefactthat,forentitiestoacquiremeaningandbecomesignsandforsignstocomposetexts,theymustbepickedand
endowedwithmeaningincertainarrangementsatsomepointinhistory.Otherwisetheyarenomorethantheentitiestheyare.Textsoutsidehistoryarenottexts.
Noristhisviewaffectedbythefactthataparticulartextmayhavearangeofmeaningsorbeopenendedinmeaning.Thedeterminationofthelimitsofmeaningis
establishedultimatelybytheculturalfunctionofatextandthatculturalfunctiondependsonhistoricalcircumstances.Thus,suchfunctionandhistoricalcircumstances
arenecessarytoestablishtherangeofmeaningevenincasesinwhichsucharangeisopenended.Whatthemonkey'stypescriptlackspreciselyisadeterminantof
therange.Soitcannotbearguedthatthecaseofthemonkey'stypescriptisthesameasthecaseofatextthathasbeendeterminedbyculturalfunctiontohavean
openendedrangeofmeaning.
Ourconclusion,then,isthattextsdoneedhistoricalauthors,fortextswithoutauthorsaretextswithouthistoryandtextswithouthistoryaretextswithoutmeaningthat
is,theyarenottexts.Thus,inspiteofwhatappeartobecounterexamples,historicalauthorshipisanecessaryconditionoftextuality.
Theseconsiderationsopenupanotherpossibilityfortypescriptssuchastheoneproducedbythemonkey.Itisthat,afterall,theonewhofindsthetypescriptforthe
firsttimemayfunctionasitsauthor.Forwhatthatpersondoesistofixthemeaningofthesignsofwhichthetypescriptseemstobecomposedinaccordancewiththe
usagesandconventionsofthetime.Ofcourse,theoriginalityofthisauthorwouldberatherlimitedandwouldbeinmanywayssimilartothatoftheinterpretative
author,butnonethelesstherewouldbeanauthorialthrusttosuchactivity.
B.NeedforthePseudoHistoricalAuthor
Thepseudohistoricalauthorisamentalconstructthatisbelievedbyanaudienceorconstructedbysomeone(sometimesthehistoricalauthor)toleadanaudience
tobelieveittobethehistoricalauthor.Theanswertothequestionwhethertherecanbetextswithoutpseudohistoricalauthorsiseasilydeterminedifwecompare
thisquestionwiththequestionsraisedintheprevioussectionconcerningthehistoricalauthor.Thereasonitiseasilydeterminedisthat

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itcanbebasedonempiricalevidence.Inoureverydayexperienceweareacquaintedwithscoresoftextsthathavenopseudohistoricalauthors.Forexample,I
doubtverymuchwhetheranyonehasanideaabouttheauthorofthe"Nosmoking"signpostedintheclassroomwhereIteachonThursdays.Indeed,signs
understoodinthesenseofnoticespostedaremostlyregardedasnothavingauthors.Thatdoesnotmeanthatanyonebelievesthattheyareuncaused.Obviously,
someonepaintedthewordsonthewall,someoneorderedthempainted,andsomeonemusthavebeenthefirstpersonwhoputthewordstogethertoconveythe
commandnottosmoke.Butnoonebotherstothinkaboutthepersonswhodidthesethings.Thereasonisthatthemeaningsofthosesignsaresoclearand
contextuallytransparent,andthesignsinquestiongenerallyhavesolittleoriginalityandvalueinthemselves,thatitisunimportanteitherforunderstandingorintermsof
proprietaryinterestswhotheirauthoris.Thisisnotalwaysso,however,evenwithrelativelysimplesigns.Weareinterestedinidentifyingapersonwhopainteda
swasticaonatombstoneofaJewishcementery,forthatinvolvesaviolationofthelawandrevealssomethingaboutthemindandbeliefsofthepersonwhodidit.59
Butingeneralsignswhosemeaningisclearandwhoseimportissimpledonotelicitapseudohistoricalauthor.Thepseudohistoricalauthorisaconstructofan
interpreterwhowishestoknowmoreaboutatextorwishestopassjudgmentuponitsauthor.
Textsofliterary,philosophical,religious,orscientificworks,forexample,elicitpseudohistoricalauthors.Thereasonisthattheyaresubjectsofinterpretationsor
presentcharacteristicsoforiginalityandvaluethatleadtothedevelopmentofproprietaryinterestsinthem.Evenifatextissemanticallytransparent,itcanelicita
pseudohistoricalauthorasaresultofitsoriginality,forexample.Wewanttoknowandhaveimagesoftheauthorsofwellknownclichseveniftheirmeaningisquite
clear.
Theidentificationofpseudohistoricalauthorswithhistoricalauthorsseemstobethemainreasonwhysomephilosophersholdthepositionthattextsdonotrequire
authorsandthatsometextsdonothaveauthors.Forwhattheyreallymeanisthatsometextsdonothavepseudohistoricalauthorsanddonotneedthemforcarrying
outtheirfunction.60
Theviewthatnotextshaveauthorsisareactiontotheobviousfactthatsometextsdonothavepseudohistoricalauthorsandthatthereisnoabsolutelyreal
demarcatingcriteriabetweenthosethatdoandthosethatdonot.Thosephilosopherswhoadoptthisviewsolvetheproblemofauthorshipbyholdingthatonlyworks,
whichtheyunderstandastextsthathavebeensubjectedtointerpretation,haveauthors.Textsthathavenotbeensubjectedtointerpretationhavenoauthors(i.e.,
pseudohistoricalauthors)butonly"writers"(i.e.,historicalauthors).61
Myobjectionstothispositiongonotsomuchagainstwhatitmaintainsconcerningthepseudohistoricalauthorbutagainstwhatitholdsaboutworks

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andtexts.Ialreadypresentedmyobjectionstotheseaspectsoftheviewelsewhere,soIneednotrepeatthemhere.62Themainmeritoftheviewisthatitrecognizes
thepseudohistoricalauthorasamentalconstruct,theproductofaninterpretationofatext.
C.NeedfortheCompositeAuthor
Arecompositeauthorsnecessaryfortexts?Doalltextshavecompositeauthors?Theanswertobothquestionsisnegative.Thecompositeauthoristheauthorofonly
thosecontemporarytextsthatarenotthehistoricaltext,fortheauthorofthehistoricaltextisthehistoricalauthor.Thecompositeauthoriscomposedofthehistorical
author,thescribesthatmadecopiesfromthetokenhistoricaltext,andtheeditorswhotriedtoreconstructthehistoricaltext.Ifitturnsoutthatthetokenhistoricaltext
survives,thecontemporarytextisthehistoricaltextanditsauthorisnotthecompositeauthor,butthehistoricalauthor.Similarly,ifthehistoricaltextwaslostbefore
anycopiesofitweremade,therecanbenocontemporarytextandcorrespondinglynocompositeauthor.Therearecompositeauthorsonlyofcontemporarytexts
thatarenothistoricaltexts.Thismeansthatnoteverytexthastohaveacompositeauthor.
Havingsaidthat,however,weshouldaddthatmostoldtextssurviveincontemporaryversionsand,eveniftheoriginaltokensurvives,copiesaremadeofitwhich
differfromthattokeninvariousways.Undersuchconditions,itturnsoutthatwegenerallyknowhistoricaltextsthroughcontemporarytexts,andthisentailsthe
existenceofcompositeauthorswhoputthemtogether.
D.NeedforanInterpretativeAuthor
Cantherebeatextwithoutaninterpretativeauthor?Althoughthenotionofinterpretativeauthoriscomplex,theanswertothisquestionisthesame.Ontheonehand,
iftheinterpretativeauthorisunderstoodasanaudiencethathasanunderstandingofthetextwhichdiffersfromthatofthehistoricalauthor,thenmanytextshaveno
interpretativeauthors.Somemaynothavethemsimplybecausenooneelsebutthehistoricalauthorisacquaintedwiththem.Othersmaynothavethembecauseallof
theaudiencesacquaintedwiththetextsunderstandthemintheways,inwhichthehistoricalauthorsunderstoodthem.
Ontheotherhand,iftheinterpretativeauthorisunderstoodassomeonewhoproducesaninterpretationofatexttofacilitatetheunderstandingofthetextbyan
audience,thenagainnotalltextsneedtohaveoractuallyhaveinterpretativeauthors.Manytextsaresemanticallytransparentandneednointerpretationinordertobe
understoodbyanaudience.Audiencescontemporaneouswiththehistoricalauthorandthetextheproducedoftenneednointerpretationproducedbysomeoneelse
tounderstandthetext.Onlywhenthetextisextraordinarilycomplexortheaudienceiscontextuallyseparatedfromthetextareinterpretationsneeded.Ofcourse,if
theaudienceofatextiscomposedofpersonsnotfamiliarwiththelanguageusedinthetext,aninterpretationinthe

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formofatranslationisnecessaryevenincaseswhenthetextinquestionissimpleandclear.
Wecansee,then,thatthequestionofwhetheralloranytextshaveauthorsdependsverymuchontheidentityoftheauthorandthewaythequestionisunderstood.
Oncethesemattersareclarified,itbecomesevidentthatalltextshavecauses.Wealsoknowthatalltextshavehistoricalauthorsbutonlysomehavecomposite
authorsandinterpretativeauthors.Theyhaveinterpretativeauthorswhentheseareunderstoodeitherasauthorswhodifferintheirunderstandingofthehistoricaltexts
fromtheunderstandingsthehistoricalauthorshadofthemorwhoproduceinterpretationsofhistoricaltextsforthesakeofaudiences.
ThenotionofauthorIhaveproposedisverygeneral,sotherecanbenotonlyauthorsofworksandcomplextextsbutalsoofsimpletextsandevenofsigns.Thus,for
example,itispossibleforsomeonetobetheauthorofindividualsignsinanartificiallanguage,aslongasthesignsinquestionarenewinsomeway.Likewise,there
areauthorsofshorttextsthatfunctionassignswhensignsareunderstoodasnotices,suchasthe'Nosmoking'signpostedinmyclassroomandofshorttextsthatare
notsignsinthissense,aswhenIsay,"IvisitedEgyptfouryearsago."InthischapterinparticularIhavebeenspeakingoftheauthorinreferencetotexts,butthe
understandingimplicitinwhathasbeensaidallowsfortheextensionofthisnotiontosignsandworks.
Theviewsofsomerecentphilosophers,however,wouldseemtogocontrarytothisconceptionofauthorship.Forsome,onlycomplextextshaveauthorsandfor
othersonlyworksdoso.Inthissense,tobeanauthorimpliesmorethanjustbeingthecreatorofatextitinvolveswhateverismeantbysayingthatonehascreateda
workoraparticularlycomplextext.
Oneofthereasonsbehindthedesireofsomecontemporaryphilosopherstosaythatonlycertaintextshaveauthorsisthattheyholdliterarytextsasparadigmaticof
textuality,whereindeedthelegitimaterangeofinterpretationsisusuallybroad.Isuspectthattheydothisbecausesomehowtheybelievethatinliteratureonefindsthe
epitomeoftextualcreativity.Andtheymayberighttosomeextentinthisbelief,insofarasliteratureimposesfewerconstraintsonitspractitionersthan,say,philosophy
orscience.Buttheyarewronginmaintainingthattextsthatallowforalesserrangeoflegitimateinterpretationsanddisplaylessoriginalitycanhavenoauthors.They
haveauthorsindeed,eventhoughthoseauthorsmaybelesscreativethantheauthorsofothertexts.
IV.RepressiveCharacteroftheAuthor
Anotherimportantreasonwhysomerecentphilosophershavearguedagainsttheneedordesirabilitytopositauthorsoftextsisthattheyseethefunctionofauthorsas
fundamentallyrepressive.63Althoughviewsonthismatter

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differwidely,therepressioninquestionisinterpretedasakindoflimitationontheparameterswithinwhichatextmaybeunderstoodandasanimpositionofacertain
understandingofatextonanaudience.Thefigureoftheauthorclosestherangeofpossibleunderstandingsofatext.Thispointhasbeenmadeinmanyways,butit
canbeeasilyillustratedbysayingthat,ifatextisidentifiedashavingbeencomposedbyaparticularauthor,ourknowledgeandopinionoftheauthor,hisviewsand
authority,willimposeboundariesonthewaysthetextmaybeunderstood,sothatotherwaysofunderstandingitmayberegardedasspuriousorillegitimate.Thisnot
onlylimitsthefreedomoftheaudience,subjugatinganddominatingitinvariousways,butalsomaypreventadeeperandbroaderunderstandingofthetext,forthe
textisseen,then,onlyasanexpressionofanagentthatrevealstoussomethingaboutthatagent.64Thus,forexample,thesocalledTheologyofAristotlewas
believedintheMiddleAgestobeaworkbyAristotle,andthisbiasedscholasticstowardacertainunderstandingofthetextofthatwork,notonlyproducing
historicallyincorrectinterpretationsofitbutalsocurtailingthefreedomofthosewhosoughttounderstandit.Nowthatweknowtheworkdoesnotbelongto
Aristotle,wehavebeenabletoappreciateitsstrongNeoPlatonicflavor.
TheauthoraccusedofexercisingrepressioniswhatIcalledearlierthepseudohistoricalauthoritisthisauthorthatfunctionsepistemically,influencingthewayan
audiencemayunderstandatext.Itmakesnosensetospeakofthehistoricalauthorasrepressive,becausethisauthorissimplythepersonwhoproducedthehistorical
text,andeverythingweknowabouthimispartofthepseudohistoricalauthor.Thehistoricalauthorhasnoepistemicsignificanceheexistsepistemicallyonlythrough
thepseudohistoricalauthor.Thehistoricalauthorisametaphysicalentity,butepistemicallyheistheauthorIknownotwho.
Likewise,itdoesnotmakesensetospeakofthecompositeauthorasrepressive,forthisauthortoohasnoepistemicsignificance.Theonlywayinwhichonecould
speakofthecompositeauthorasrepressiveisinsofarasinproducingthecontemporarytextwhichmayormaynotdifferfromthehistoricaltextheshapesthe
objectofunderstanding.Acertaineditionofatext,forexample,willallowonlyacertainrangeofunderstandings,whichmayormaynotcoincidewiththerange
allowedbyadifferentedition.
Finally,theinterpretativeauthormayeffectclosureiftakenastheproducerofaninterpretationforthesakeofanaudience.Insofarasaninterpretationyieldsacertain
understandingorrangeofunderstandingsofatext,itinfluencesthosewhocomeintocontactwithitandthusstandsinthewayofotheranddifferentunderstandings.In
manywaystheworkofscholars,particularly''authoritative"ones,imposesorcanimposeasmany,orevenmore,limitsontheunderstandingoftextsasthoseimposed
bypseudohistoricalauthors.Inwhatfollows,however,Iwilldiscussprimarilytherepressivecharacterof

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thepseudohistoricalauthor,foritisthisauthorthatmoreclearlycanfunctionrepressively,anditisthisauthorthatisidentifiedintheliteratureasrepressive,although
generallywithoutrecognitionofitstruepseudohistoricalnature.
Oneneednotadvocatetheextremeviewthattextshavenohistoricalauthorstoavoidtherepressionassociatedwithauthorship.Amorereasonableapproach,easily
documentedincontemporaryliteratureisthatatextshouldbeunderstoodapartfromwhatweknowaboutthehistoricalauthor,thatis,independentofthepseudo
historicalauthor,eventhough,indeed,oneacceptsthatthereisahistoricalauthorofthetext.Thetextissupposedtospeaktotheaudienceforitself,independentof
anyrelationshipthatitmayhavewiththepseudohistoricalauthorthatis,withwhatweknowaboutthehistoricalauthor.For,onceatextisseenasbelongingtoan
author,theunderstandingoftheaudienceislimitedincertainwaysandchanneledincertaindirections.
Thispointofviewmakesquiteabitofsenseinthecontextofadescriptivistviewofpropernames.Descriptivistviewsofpropernamesholdthatpropernameshave
meaninginadditiontoreferenceandthusarenodifferentfromdefinitedescriptions.65ConsiderthecaseofSocrates,forexample.Accordingtodescriptivists,
'Socrates'referstoSocratesbutmeans,say,"theteacherofPlato."Moreover,theyarguethatwhatdeterminesthereferenceofapropernameispreciselyits
meaning.Sothat'Socrates'referstoSocratespreciselybecauseitmeans"theteacherofPlato."If'Socrates'meant"themostfamousdiscipleofPlato,''thenitwould
referinsteadtoAristotle.Weneednotgetinvolvedintheintricaciesofthedescriptivisttheorytoseethatsuchatheorylendssupporttotheviewthattheuseofthe
nameofanauthorinconnectionwithatextimposesontheaudienceofthetextcertainlimitationsandleadsincertaindefiniteinterpretativedirections.
Oneobviouswaytoargueagainsttheviewthattheuseofthenameoftheauthorinconnectionwithatextisrepressive,istoadoptareferentialtheoryofproper
names.Thereferentialviewholdsthatpropernameshavereferencebutnomeaningor,toputitassomewhosupportthisviewdo,thattheirmeaningistheir
reference.66Themeaningof'Socrates'issimplySocratesandnotthesortsofdescriptionsthatdescriptivistsclaim.Thisis,soreferentialistshold,theprimaryfeature
ofpropernamesandtheonethatdistinguishesthemfromcommonnames.Naturally,iftheuseofanamedoesnotcarrywithitanykindofdescriptivebaggage,it
becomesverydifficulttoarguethattheattributionofatexttoanauthorsomehowlimitstheaudience'sunderstandingofitordirectssuchanunderstandingalong
certainways.
Ifeitherofthesetheorieswereaccepted,thetaskofdecidingontherepressivecharacteroftheauthorwouldbeeasier.Therecentliteratureonpropernames,
however,hasmadeclearthatneitherofthesetheoriesisunassailable.Thishasgivenrisetootherviews.Amongthese,themostpopularisthesocalledcausaltheory
ofpropernames.67Themaintenetsofthistheoryarethree:

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(1)propernameshavereferencebutnomeaning(2)thereferenceofpropernamesisinitiallyfixedthroughdescriptions,butthenamesarenotsubsequentlyor
necessarilytiedtothoseoranyotherdescriptionsand(3)afterthereferenceofthepropernamehasbeenfixedinaninitialact(calledbyproponentsofthisview
baptism),referenceisfixedthroughacausalchainofcommunicationinwhichspeakerswholearnthenamemustintendtouseittorefertothebearerofthename
intendedbythepersonfromwhomtheylearnedit,allthewaybacktotheoriginalbaptism.
ElsewhereIhavearguedthatnoneofthesethreetheoriesisacceptableintheforminwhichitisusuallypresented.68Myobjectiontothemisthattheytendto
emphasizeonlyoneaspectoftheprobleminvolvedinthemeaningandreferenceofpropernames,neglectingtheothers.BecauseIhavealreadydealtwiththese
mattersatsomelength,itisnotnecessaryformetodwellonthemhere.ItshouldsufficetopointoutthattheviewIpropose,whichIcallthethreefoldview,holds
thatthreequestionsmustbeansweredinthismatter:(1)Whatisthefunctionofpropernames?(2)Howarepropernamesestablished?(3)Howdolanguageusers
learntousepropernameseffectively?Theanswertothefirstisthatthefunctionofpropernamesistorefer.Theanswertothesecondisthatpropernamesare
establishedthroughakindofbaptism.Andtheanswertothethirdisthatlanguageuserslearntousepropernamesthroughdescriptions.
Whenweapplythisviewtothequestionofrepressionconcerningtheuseofthenameofanauthorinconnectionwithatext,weseethat,indeed,aswiththe
descriptivistposition,thereisroomforlimitationandthusrepression.For,althoughthefunctionofpropernamesisnottodescribebuttorefer,welearntousethem
throughdescriptions,andmemoriesofthosedescriptionsmaycolorourunderstandingoftexts.ThismeansthatIcannotdevelopaneffectiveargumentagainstthose
whoholdtheuseofthenameofanauthorinconnectionwithatexttoberepressive,basedonthetheoryofpropernamesIfindmostacceptable.Imust,then,either
acceptthatsuchuseisrepressiveoradoptadifferentstrategy.BecauseIamnotconvincedthatwemustgiveintothetheoryofrepressionsoeasily,Iproposeto
takethesecondcourseofaction.
Mystrategyconsistsinarguingthatthetheoryoftherepressivecharacteroftheauthorreliesonafaultyassumption,andoncethisassumptioniseliminatedthe
necessitywithwhichthosewhofavorthistheoryseetheauthorasrepressivedisappears.Theassumptioninquestionisthattolimittherangeofunderstandingoftexts
issomehownecessarilybadbecauseitcurtailsthecreativityoftheaudienceinitsefforttounderstandatext.Thisassumptionistrueonlyiftheaimoftheaudienceis
exclusivelycreative,butthatisnottheaimoftheaudienceinmost,letaloneall,cases.Althoughcreativityisdesirableandmustbeencouraged,itiscertainlynota
goodthingineverysituation.Therearegoodandbadwaystobecreative,dependingonthegoalsbeingpursued.For

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example,asurgeonwhoisoperatingonsomeone,shouldbyallmeansbeencouragedtobecreativeinsofarasthenovelproceduresintroducedareconducivetothe
wellbeingandpromptrecoveryofthepatient.Anewwaytoperformtheoperationthat,say,diminishesbleeding,shouldcertainlybeencouraged.ButIdonotthink
anyonewouldwanttoencouragethesurgeontobenovelandcreativeinawaythatwouldproduceexcessivebleeding,thusharmingthepatient.Unbridledcreativityis
notnecessarilyagoodthingforsurgeons.Indeed,mostsurgicaltrainingisgearedtoteachsurgeonstestedprocedurestowhichtheyshouldadhereinthepracticeof
theircraft.Theintroductionofexperimentalproceduresisnodoubttobeencouragedalso,otherwisesurgeonswouldstillbeoperatingastheydidlongagoandno
progressinsurgerywouldhavebeenmade,butsuchexperimentalproceduresaretobeencouragedonlywithinwelldefinedboundaries,wheregoalsareclearly
statedandpursued.
Ifweapplywhathasbeensaidconcerningsurgeonsandoperationstoaudiencesandtheirunderstandingoftexts,itbecomesclearthattheimpositionoflimitationson
theinterpretationoftextsisnotnecessarilynefarious.Whethercreativityinunderstandingisorisnotabadthingwilldependonthegoalorgoalsthatsuchan
understandingistoachieve.Ifthegoalofsuchanunderstandingistograspwhattheauthorhadinmindwhenheproducedthetextorwhattheaudience
contemporaneouswiththeauthorunderstoodwhenitunderstoodthetextandsoon,thenitisclearthatanylimitationthatwillfacilitatetheachievementofthosegoals
willbegood,whereasthosethatdonotwillbebad.If,forexample,myaimistounderstandhowPlato'scontemporariesunderstoodthetextoftheTimaeus,itwould
helptolimittheparametersofitsmeaningbyaconsiderationoftheculturalcontextwithinwhichthedialoguewasproduced.Toattempttounderstandthedialogue
apartfromitsculturallocationwouldmakenohistoricalsense.
Ofcourse,ifthegoalofmyreadingofthetextoftheTimaeusisnottounderstandwhatPlatomeantandwasunderstoodbyhiscontemporaries,butrathertotestmy
creativity,toseewhatIcandowithatext,thenanylimitationsimposedbyaknowledgeabouttheauthorwouldhamperthataimandthusbenefarious.Theimposition
oflimitationsontheunderstandingoftextsisnotnecessarilybadand,consequently,neitherarethelimitationsthattheconsiderationofitsauthormayimpose.
Thisconclusion,however,doesnotentailthattheconsiderationoftheauthorisalwaysbeneficial.Insomecasestheconsiderationoftheauthormayindeedbe
perniciousinthesensethatitpromotesunderstandingsandusesofatextthatarenotconducivetotheunderstandingthatissought.Aninterestingcaseofthissituation
occurredintheMiddleAges.TheauthorofFonsvitaewasaJewbythenameofIbnGabirol.YetintheMiddleAgeshewasthoughttobeaChristian,called
Avicebron.Naturally,theresultofthisconfusionwasnotonlythattheuseoftheFonsvitaewasnotobjectionabletoChristian

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theologiansindeeditbecamequitepopularatthetimebuttheworkwasunderstoodinChristianterms.Themisunderstandingconcerningtheauthorofthetext
madepossibleitssurvival,butitalsodistancedthescholasticunderstandingsofthetextfromwhateverIbnGabirolintendedorhiscontemporaneousaudiencegrasped
throughthetext.
Ihavearguedthatthefunctionoftheuseofanauthor'snameandwhatweknowaboutthehistoricalauthor,namely,whatIcallthepseudohistoricalauthor,in
connectionwithatextisneithernecessarilyrepressivenornecessarilybeneficialandthus,byimplication,thatitcanberepressiveorbeneficial,dependingonthegoals
beingpursuedandthecircumstancesinvolved.Thosegoalsandcircumstancesalsodeterminewhataspectsofthepseudohistoricalauthorproverepressiveor
beneficial.Forexample,iftheaimistounderstandthephilosophicalpointofviewexpressedbyatext,itwouldseembothpertinentandbeneficialtoconsiderother
philosophicaltextsbelievedtohavebeenproducedbythepseudohistoricalauthor.Ontheotherhand,itmightbeofnouse,andperhapsevenpernicious,toconsider
thepersonalpsychologicalidiosyncrasiesoftheauthor.69
Thereis,therefore,agooddealofsenseinthenotionthatauthorshipisrepressive,butthecurrentbalanceofopinionhasswungtoofarinthatdirection.Thereare
bothbeneficialandnefariouseffectsofauthorshipandbothhavetobetakenintoaccountinasensibletheoryoftextsandtheirrelationstoauthorsandaudiences.
Needlesstosay,thenefariousorbeneficialeffectsofauthorshipdependtoagreatextentontheaccuracywithwhichthepseudohistoricalauthorknownbythe
audiencereflectsthehistoricalauthoraswellasonthepurposesforwhichatextisused.Accuracyconcerningthepseudohistoricalauthorentailsknowledgeofthe
historicalauthorasasubject,andthereforeweneedtoturnnexttotheauthor'ssubjectivity.
V.SubjectivityoftheAuthor
Mostoftherecentcontroversysurroundingtheauthorsoftextshascenteredonthenotionofsubjectivityandwhatthatimpliesfortheunderstandingandinterpretation
oftexts.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatauthorsaresubjects,somethingwhichIdonotwishtodispute.Whatisnotalwaysclearhencethecontroversyis,first,what
subjectivityisandtheroleitplaysintheproductionofatextand,second,towhichoftheauthorsofatextitapplies.Ishallbeginbydiscussingsubjectivityandthen
turntotheauthorstowhichitmayapply.
Muchofthecontemporarydiscussionofthisnotionisopaquepartlyasaresultofthepoeticlanguagefrequentlyusedinconnectionwithitandpartlybecausean
attemptisseldommadeatdistinguishingvarioustypesofsubjectivity.Ishalltrytoclarifymattersbothbyavoidingtheuseofmetaphoricallanguage

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andbydistinguishingupfrontamongvarioustypesofsubjectivitythatmaybeappliedtotheauthorofatext.
Subjectivityingeneralhastodowithwhatisunderneath,afactrevealedbytheetymologyoftheterm'subject,'fromwhich'subjectivity'isderived.'Subject'comes
fromsubjectum,whichinLatinreferstowhatislyingunder.Inspiteofthisverygeneralunderstandingoftheterm,thenotionofsubjectvariesfromdisciplineto
discipline.Ingrammar,thesubjectisopposedtothepredicateandconsistsofapartofasentencethatissyntacticallydetermined.Inlogic,also,thesubjectis
opposedtothepredicate,butitsdeterminationisnotbasedonsyntax,ratherithastodowithlogicalform.Thus,whatisagrammaticalsubjectmaynotalwaysbea
logicaloneandviceversa.Inethics,thesubjectmaybeunderstoodinatleasttwoways.Inoneway,itistheinitiatorofaction,andinanother,itisthereceiverof
action.Inmetaphysics,thesubjecthasbeeninterpretedinwidelydifferentways,butitisfrequentlyopposedtofeatures(properties,accidents,qualities,
characteristics)andissaidtobethatinwhichthosefeaturesinhereortowhichtheyadhere.
Someoftheseunderstandingsofsubjectarerelevantfortheunderstandingof'author.'Theethicalnotionofsubjectasinitiatorofactionappliestotheauthor,who
indeedproducesthetext.Authorsarealsosubjectsinthemetaphysicalsenseofhavingfeaturesthatarerelatedtothetextstheyproduce.Finally,thelogicaland
grammaticalnotionsofsubjectalsoapplytoauthors,sincetheterm'author'canbecomethegrammaticalsubjectofasentenceandthenotionofsubjectcanfunction
aslogicalsubject.Noneoftheseunderstandingsofwhatitistobeasubject,however,hasattractedasmuchattentioninphilosophicaldiscussionsconcernedwith
authorsastheepistemicnotionofsubject.Thereasonforthisshouldbeobvious:Textsareusedforcommunication,andcommunicationhastodowithknowledge.
Thesinglemostimportantfeatureofasubjectconsideredepistemicallyisthatitdisplaysconsciousness.Muchhasbeenwrittenabouttheontologyofconsciousness,
thatis,aboutwhetheritisarelation,astate,aquality,andsoon.Allthat,althoughphilosophicallyinteresting,haslittletodowiththeissuethatconcernsushere,soI
shallignoreit.Forourpurposesitissufficienttounderstandconsciousnessasakindofawareness.Somephilosophershaveidentifiedconsciousnesswithself
consciousness,sothattobeconsciousisalwaystobeconsciousofoneself.Thisunderstandingofconsciousness,however,istoorestrictive,forwecanbeconscious
ofthingsotherthanourselveswithoutinfactbeingconsciousofourselves.Ican,forexample,beawareofthepaperonwhichIamwritingwithoutbeingawareof
myself.
Consciousnessisnotapassiveactivityinwhichasubjectactssimplyasthereceptorofwhateverheorsheisconsciousof.Indeed,manyphilosophershavenotedthat
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Aristotleclearlyindicatedthattheworkingsofthemindinvolvebothactiveandpassiveelements,andsomemedievalauthors,followinghim,notedthateveninanact
ofawareness(simpleapprehension)apartofthemindactivelyabstractsfromthedataitreceivestograspitpassivelyandallthisbeforeengaginginanykindof
judgment.70Thepointatstakeisthatevengraspingthepresenceofanobjectinvolvesaprocessoffittingthatobjectintosomekindofcategorialstructureof
concepts.Indeed,thisextendstothemostbasicperceptions.Oneperceivespainorpleasure,redorblue,andsoon,whichentailsacategorizationoftheperception
insomeway.Thus,evenifasubject,consideredepistemically,isnotinvolvedinanyoutwardlynoticeableactivity,itisengagedinanactiveroleofcategorization,
fittingtheperceptionintotheconceptualandexperientialframeworkitpossesses.
Thismeansthatasubjectbringstoatextaconceptualandexperientialframeworkthathasmuchinfluenceonhowthesubjectrelatestothetextitself.Thesubjectivity
ofanauthor,then,ispreciselytheframeworkofconceptsandexperiencesthatmakeasubjectwhatheorsheisandhowthatsubjectviewstheworld.71
WhatIhaveinmindhereisnotthesortofgeneralcategorialschemethatfunctionsasagridofexperienceforKant.IfKantisright,thatschemeissomethingthatalso
mustaffecttheproductionofatext,butitdoessoinageneralway,whichiscommontoallsubjects.NordoImeanthecommonculturalandsocialcategoriesthata
subjectshareswithothersubjectswhobelongtothesamecultureorsocialgroup.For,again,thesearecommonfactorstomanysubjectsand,therefore,displaya
certainobjectivityandpubliccharacterthattruesubjectivitylacks.WhatIhaveinmindconcerningsubjectivityisratherthepeculiarelementsthateachindividual
subjectbringstoconsciousnessandthusinfluencetheuniquewayinwhichheorsheviewstheworld.Thiskindofpersonalframeworkmakeseachsubjectinterpret
thesamepictureindifferentwaysandthusunderstandhisorhersurroundingsdifferently.72
Havingpresentedabriefcharacterizationofsubjectivity,wemustnowdeterminetowhichoftheauthorsdiscussedearliersubjectivityappliesandhowitdoessoin
relationtotexts.Thereisnodifficultywiththeapplicationofsubjectivitytoboththehistoricalauthorandthecompositeauthor,forbothofthesearepersonsorgroups
ofpersonswhobringtotheproduction(inthecaseofthehistoricalauthor)andtothereconstruction(inthecaseofthecompositeauthor)acomplexconceptualand
experientialframeworkthatinfluenceshowtheyconstructorreconstructthetext.Thetextinthiscontextmustbeseenasthelocusoftheconfluenceofvariousfactors:
theobjectsorfeaturesofobjectsselectedassignsbytheauthor,themeaningstheauthorwishestoconvey,theauthor'sviewsconcerningtheaudienceofthetext,the
author'sawarenessofthecontextualfactorsrelevanttothetext,andthewholeconceptualandexperientialframeworkthatconstitutestheuniquenessofthesubject,
hisorhersubjectivity.

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Theconsciousnessoftheauthorfunctionsasacaldronwherethetextisproduced,andinthatconsciousnessmanyofthedisparateelementsthatdeterminethe
meaningofatextaretobefound.
Itshouldbeobvious,then,thatthesubjectivityofboththehistoricalandthecompositeauthorsaredeterminingfactorsintheshapesthatthehistoricaland
contemporarytextsfinallytake.Assuch,thosesubjectivityhaveadirectinfluenceonthetextsinquestion.
Bycontrast,thesubjectivityoftheinterpretativeauthorhasnodirectbearingonthetextitsdirectinfluenceisexercisedovertheunderstandingofthetextderivedby
theinterpretativeauthorhimselforbytheaudienceforwhichheproducesaninterpretation.ItfollowsfromtheconceptionoftheinterpretativeauthorIhavepresented
thattheinterpretativeauthorhasadirectinfluenceontheunderstandingofatextbyanaudience,regardlessofwhetherheisconceivedasanaudiencethat
understandsthetextorasthecreatorofaninterpretationintendedtomakeanaudienceunderstandthetext.Ineithercase,thecomplexframeworkofconceptsand
experiencesoftheinterpreterwillhaveabearingontheunderstandingofthetextbytheaudience.Inthefirstcasethisissobecausethatsubjectivitydirectlyaffects
howtheinterpreterhimselfunderstandsthetextandinthesecond,becausethatsubjectivitydirectlyaffectstheinterpretationproducedbytheinterpreter,whichinturn
directlyaffectstheunderstandingderivedbytheaudience.Ofcourse,inthelattersensetheinfluenceontheaudience'sunderstandingisindirect,throughtheinfluence
oftheinterpretation.
Thecasewiththepseudohistoricalauthorisdifferent,however.Thepseudohistoricalauthordoesnotseemtohaveanysubjectivityatall,afactthatprecludeshis
subjectivityfrominfluencingtheunderstandingofthetextbytheaudience.Forthepseudohistoricalauthorisnotapersonbutamentalconstructentertainedbythe
interpretativeauthor.HowcanmyviewofAristotle,forinstance,besaidtohaveanysubjectivity?Theanswertothisquestionisthat,strictlyspeaking,thepseudo
historicalauthorhasnosubjectivity,andtherefore,hissubjectivitycouldnotaffecttheunderstandingofatext.Theonlywayinwhichapseudohistoricalauthoraffects
theunderstandingofatextisthroughtheinterpretativeauthor.Ifanysubjectivityisinvolvedinthisprocess,itisthesubjectivityoftheinterpretativeauthorandnotthat
ofthepseudohistoricalauthor.
Thereisnothingmysticalaboutthesubjectivityoftheauthor.Thesubjectivityofanauthorisnomorethantheepistemicallyrelevantfeaturesofauthorsandofthe
contextswithinwhichtheyproducetextsastheyseethem.Yet,althoughnotmysterious,thissubjectivityistremendouslyimportantandinfluentialwhenitcomestothe
significanceofatext,foritisinthiscontextthatthetextmakesthesenseintendedtobeconveyedbyitshistoricalauthor.Moreover,itisalargelyintangibleelement
whoseroleinthecreationofatextandinits

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interpretationismostdifficulttoascertain.Itisnotmysterious,becausethereisnothingincomprehensibleorirrationalaboutitthatdefiesexplanation,butitismost
oftenbeyondourcapacitytoreachitwhenitbelongstoanyoneotherthanourselves.Indeed,evenwhenitdoesbelongtous,itisdifficulttounravelbecauseofour
immersioninitandthedifficultiesinvolvedinobjectifyingit.Ifinordertograspitthesubjectivityoftheauthormustbeobjectified,itisperhapsimpossibletograspit
withoutchangingitthusmakingitvirtuallyinaccessible.Somepsychologists,likeFreud,seeevendeeperandinaccessibleunconsciousaspectsinhumansubjectivity.
Iftheirviewsarecorrect,thenthesubjectivityofauthorsislargelybeyondourreach.
VI.Conclusion
Bywayofconclusion,letmerecountbrieflythemainpointsmadeinthischapter.Ibeganbyposingaseriesofquestionsconcerningauthorsandtheirrelationsto
texts.Thefirstandperhapsmostpressingofthesehastodowiththeidentityoftheauthor,foruponcloseexaminationitturnsoutthatwhenwespeakofauthorswe
maymeanwidelydifferentthings.Textsthemselvesaremultiple,soitisonlytobeexpectedthattherebealsomanyauthors.Iidentifyfour.Thehistoricalauthoristhe
personwhoproducesthehistoricaltext,and,althoughmostoftenthisauthorisasingleperson,inmanycasesthisisnotso.Iargue,moreover,thatauthorialidentity
mustbedistinguishedfrompersonalidentity.Itisquitepossibleindeedfrequentthatthesamepersonmayhaveproducedtwodifferenttexts,buttheconditions
underwhichthefirsttextwasproducedaresuchthatunderthosesameconditionsthesamepersoncouldnothaveproducedthesecondtext.Thus,theidentityofthe
authorswhoproduceatextmaybedifferenteventhoughtheidentityofthepersonsisthesame.
Whatweknowaboutthehistoricalauthorisusuallyquitelimited,sowemustdistinguishbetweenhimandthepseudohistoricalauthor.Thelatteriseitheracomposite
ofwhatweknoworthinkweknowaboutahistoricalauthor,orthepersonathehistoricalauthorwishesustobelievecomposedthehistoricaltext.Mostofushave
differentinformationandperspectives,sotherearemanypseudohistoricalauthorsinthefirstsensenoted,asmanyasthedifferentconceptionsaudienceshaveofhim.
Thepseudohistoricalauthorneverexistsinrealityoutsidethemindofsomepersonorpersons,butheexercisesepistemicinfluenceovertheaudience.
Thecompositeauthoristheauthorofthecontemporarytext.Itiscomposedofallthosewhoinonewayoranother,aseditors,scribes,andsoon,helpedputtogether
theversionofthehistoricaltextwehave.Dependingonthestateandhistoryofthehistoricaltext,thisgroupofauthorsistremendouslyimportant.

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Finally,theinterpretativeauthoristheauthoroftheidealtext.Heisthepersonorpersonswhosetouttoreconstructthehistoricaltextusingvariouscriteria.
Perhapsthemostimportantquestionconcerningauthorshastodowiththeirfunction,andthereforeIdevoteagoodportionofthechaptertothistopic.TheviewI
defendisthatauthorsarethecreatorsoftextsandmustbedistinguishedfromtheirusers.Thecreatorofatextissomeonewhoputstogetheranindividualinstanceof
auniversaltextthathasnotbeeninstantiatedbefore.Creationhastodowithnoveltyintheproductionofsomethingseparateandotherfromtheproducer.Itdoesnot
involve,inthiscase,theproductionofsomethingoutofnothing,butonlytheproductionofsomethingnewandseparate.Thenoveltyinquestion,inthecaseofa
universaltextcanbeinthesignsofwhichthetextiscomposed,intheirarrangement,orinthemeaningofthetext.Inthecaseofanindividualtext,thedifferencesmay
havetodowiththosespecifiedforuniversaltextsorwiththeconditionsofindividualityandcontinuousexistence.Itisnot,however,thecreationofanyinstanceofa
universaltextthatmakessomeoneanauthor,butthecreationofthefirsthistoricalinstanceofauniversaltext.
Strictlyspeaking,theconditionsofauthorshiparethosewehavespecified.However,becausethereisalwaysthepossibilitythatmorethanoneauthormay
simultaneouslycreatefirstinstancesofauniversaltext,anditisalsopossiblethatonemayhavecreatedaninstanceofauniversaltextofwhichotherinstanceshad
beenproducedbefore,withoutknowledgeofsuchinstances,itwouldseemthatinsomecasestheremaybemorethanoneauthorofatext.Thatis,itispossiblethat
therebemorethanoneauthorwhenthisisunderstooddistributivelyratherthancollectively.Yet,althoughwemaybewillingtoacceptmultipleauthorshipincasesof
simultaneouscreation,incasesofnonsimultaneouscreationweregardthecreatorofthefirsttemporallyproducedtextastheauthor.Thisindicatesthehistoricaland
contextualnatureofauthorship.Authorshipalwaysoccursatacertaintimeandwithinparticularcircumstances.
Afterthequestionofauthorialfunctioncomesthequestionofwhetherauthorsarenecessaryfortexts.Wefoundthatthisapparentlystraightforwardquestioncouldbe
unpackedintotwootherquestions,oneconcernedwiththeexistenceoftextswithoutcausesthatbringthemaboutandtheotherconcerningtheneedforsomeone
whoselectsandarrangesthesignsofwhichatextiscomposedwiththeintentionofconveyingsomespecificmeaningtoanaudienceincertaincircumstances.The
answertothefirstquestionwasthattexts,likeanythingelse,cannotexistwithoutcausesthatbringthemabout.Inansweringthesecondquestionalso,wefoundout
thattextscannotexistwithoutauthors,forwhatappeartobetextswithoutauthorslackmeaningandthusturnoutnottobetexts.

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NextItookuptheallegedrepressivecharacterofauthors.Bythisismeantthatknowledgeoftheauthorofatext,whethercorrectorincorrect,tendstoimpose
limitationsonthewayonemayunderstandthetextandthuslimitstheinterpretativefreedomoftheaudience.Theconclusionofthediscussionwasthatknowledgeof
theauthorofatextcanberepressivebutthatitcanalsobehelpful,dependingontheendpursuedbytheaudience.Ifwhattheaudienceseeksistodiscoverwhat
authorsunderstoodwhentheyunderstoodthetextsinquestion,thenaccurateknowledgeabouttheauthorscannotbeotherthanhelpful.Ontheotherhand,iftheaim
oftheaudienceistogivefreereigntoitsinterpretativefancy,thensuchinformationwouldturnouttobecounterproductive.
Finally,Idiscussedthequestionoftheauthor'ssubjectivityanditsrelevancefortheunderstandingoftexts.Iunderstandsubjectivityastheuniqueframeworkof
conceptsandexperiencesthatinfluenceshowasubjectviewstheworld.Theauthor'ssubjectivity,then,consistsoftheepistemicallyrelevantfeaturesofauthorsand
thecontextswithinwhichtheyproducetextsinvariousways.Thereisnothingmysteriousaboutsubjectivityunderstoodthus,eventhoughitmaynotbepossiblefor
thoseotherthanthesubjectoreventhesubjecthimselforherselfincertaincircumstances,toknowit.
Textsareproducedbyauthorstoconveymeaningtoaudiences.Therefore,havingdiscussedauthorship,wemustnowturntotheaudience.

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4
Audience
Theaudienceistherealorimaginarygroupofpersonswhoareinfactacquainted,couldbeacquainted,oraremeanttobeacquaintedwithagiventext.
Etymologically,theterm'audience'referstoagroupoflisteners.Thismeaningofthetermgoesbacktoatimewhentheprimaryformofacquaintancewiththeworkof
anauthorwasthroughthespokenword.Fromtheinventionoftheprintingpressuntilthetimewhentheuseoftheradiobecamewidespread,however,writtentexts
weretheprimarywayoflearningaboutanauthor'swork.And,althoughcontemporarymediahavechangedthattoacertainextent,inscienceandthehumanitiesitis
stilltruethattheaudienceforanauthor'sworkconsistslargelyofreaders.Formypresentpurposes,thedistinctionbetweenreadersandlistenersisimmaterialand,
hence,Ioftenrefertoanaudienceasagroupofreaders,althoughwhatIsayaboutitapplies,mutatismutandis,tolistenersaswell.
Thenotionofaudienceraisesallsortsofinterestingphilosophicalissues.Perhapsthemostobviousoftheseiswhethertextsmusthaveaudiencesatall.Someauthors
claimthattheydonot,becausetheythemselveshavenoaudienceinmindwhentheycomposeatext.Yet,iftextsareintendedtoconveymeaning,itwouldappear
thattheymustatleastbeintendedforaudiences.Howisthisconflicttoberesolved?Addingtothepuzzleisthequestionoftheidentityoftheaudience.Isthe
audiencewhoeverisintendedbytheauthortounderstandthetext?Istheaudiencewhoeveractuallycomesintocontactwiththetext?Oristheaudiencewhoever
potentiallycouldcomeintocontactwiththetext?Apartfromthis,becauseaudiencesarecomposedofindividualpersons,wemustaskhowtheseindividualpersons
arerelatedandwhethertheirunderstandingoftextsistobetakencollectivelyordistributively.1
Moreover,theunderstandingoftextsvariesfrompersontoperson,implyingdifferencesbetweenthewayinwhichtheauthorunderstandsthetextandthewaysothers
understandit.Doesthisimplythataudiencesalwaysdistortthemeaningoftexts?Isthereanadversarialrelationshipbetweenaudiencesandauthors?Canaudiences
intentionallymisunderstandtexts,oristheirmisunderstandingalwaysunintentional?Andifitisintentional,asitappearstobeinsomecases,doesthatnotcreatea
problem,foranintentional

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misunderstandingseemstoimplyacorrectunderstanding?Finally,thewayparticularaudiencesrelatetotextsdependstoagreatextentonthefactthataudiencesare,
orarecomposedof,subjects,andsubjectsbringwiththemtheirsubjectivity.Buthowisthesubjectivityofaudiencestobeunderstood,andwhatroledoesitplayin
anaudience'sunderstandingoftexts?Doessubjectivityalwaysdetermineunderstanding,andifso,doesitleadinexorablytomisunderstanding?
Someoftheissuesraisedbytheconsiderationofaudienceshavetodowithaudiencesthemselvesconsideredapartfromanyrelationtheymayhavetotexts,but
othersarisepreciselywhenonetriestoprovideanaccountoftherelationbetweenaudiencesandtexts.Myconcerninthisbookiswithtexts,sothelattersortsof
issuesaremorepertinent.However,someoftheselatterissuescannotbediscussed,ordiscussedwell,withoutreferencetothesolutionoftheformerissues.Ishall,
therefore,addressissuesofbothsorts.Fiveissuesinparticularseempertinentandinsomewayscorrespondtosomeoftheissuesraisedconcerningauthorsinthe
precedingchapter:theidentityoftheaudience,thefunctionoftheaudience,theneedforanaudience,theaudience'ssubjectivity,andthesubversiveandrepressive
characteroftheaudience.
I.IdentityoftheAudience
IntheprecedingremarksIhavebeenspeakingoftheaudienceofatextasiftheaudience'sidentitywereclear.And,indeed,inmanywaysweallhavesomeideaof
whatanaudienceis.Abitofreflectionreveals,however,differencesamongvarioustypesofaudiencesthatprovesignificantfortheunderstandingoftherelation
betweenatextanditsaudience.Ishallbeginthen,byattemptingtoclarifytheidentityoftheaudience.First,Ishalltakeupthedifferenttypesofaudiencesthatatext
mayhaveand,second,Ishalldiscussthenumberofpersonsthatmaycomposethem.
A.TypesofAudience
Thereareatleastfivedifferenttypesofaudiencesforatext.Ihavenamedthemasfollows:authorasaudience,intendedaudience,contemporaneousaudience,
intermediaryaudience,andcontemporaryaudience.
1.AuthorasAudience
Fromthemomentanauthorhasputsomethingdowninwriting,hassaidsomething,orevenhasthoughtaboutthepartsofthetextheiscomposingthatarealready
established,evenifonlyprovisionally,andgoesbacktowhathehaswritten,said,orthought,hebecomesanaudience.2 Ifthetextiswritten,itacquiresastatusmore
independentfromtheauthorthanifitisspokenorthought.Butevenaspokentextorathoughttextcouldbeexaminedbyanauthorasanaudienceexaminesitwhen
itisrecordedonatapeorintheauthor'smemory.

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Inallcases,theauthorwhoapproachesthetexthehascomposedmayfunctionasaudienceinsofarashegoestothetextwiththeaimofunderstandingit.Indeed,the
wholeprocessofcomposingatextinvolvestheauthorinacontinuousswitchingbackandforthbetweentherolesofauthorandaudience,whetheraswriterand
reader,speakerandlistener,orthinkerandrememberer.Toseetheeffectofwhathesaysandhowhesaysit,heneedstolookatitasanobserverratherthana
composer.3
Inmanyways,theeffectivenessofauthorsdependsontheirdexterityatthisswitchingofrolesandunderstandingtheneedsofanaudience.Goodwriters,forexample,
sayonlywhatneedstobesaidtoconveyacertainmeaningtheyusewhattheaudiencealreadyknowstodeterminewhattowritetheyareeconomicalandeffective.
Badwriters,ontheotherhand,repeatmaterialtheaudiencealreadyknowsandfailtosaywhatisnecessaryforunderstandingtheyarethusboringorunclear.The
abilityoftheauthor,then,tobecometheaudienceandseehisownworkasanaudiencewould,isvitaltomakinghiswritingeffective.Thereisnothingparadoxicalor
oddinconsideringtheauthorastheaudience,althoughhecannotbetheaudiencepreciselyinsofarasheplaystheroleofauthor.Onlyinsofarasanacquaintanceand
identificationwiththeneedsoftheaudiencehelphiminhisroleofauthorproperlyspeakingcantheauthorbetheaudience.
Evenwheretheauthordoesnotcomposeatextwithanaudienceinmind,asisthecaseofthepratitionersofthenouveauroman,forexample,theprocessof
composition,revision,andcorrectionforceuponhimtheroleofaudience.Thedifferenceisthatinsuchcasestheauthordoesnotseektoimpersonatesomeoneother
thanhimselfwhomhe,consciouslyorunconsciously,identifiesastheaudienceofthework.Yet,thecriticalstancethatleadshimtomakechangesinthetextindicates
thathehasdistancedhimselffromthetextandadoptedtheroleofaudience.
Butwhatofthecaseofanauthorwhoproducesatextinastreamofconsciousness,mechanically,withoutevergoingbacktoit?Orconsiderthecaseofanauthor
likeSartre,whoisreputedtohavewrittenCritiqueofDialecticalReasonwithoutgoingbacktowhathehadwritten,becausehedidnotcaretorevise,tokeepwhat
hehadsaidconsistent,andsoon?Canitstillbearguedthattheauthorfunctionsasaudienceinthesecases?Theanswerisaffirmative,forevenintheseunusualcases
theproductionofatextinvolvesadditionsofsignstoprevioussignsandthuschangesofoverallarrangementinprevioussignarrangements,implyinganunderstanding
ofthoseprevioussignsandsignarrangements.Thisassumes,ofcourse,thatwhatisbeingproducedisatext.Ifwhatisbeingproducedaredisconnectedsignsand
thereisnoresultingtext,thenwemightbetemptedtoconcludethattheauthordoesnotfunctionasaudience.Buteveninthiscircumstance,althoughnotanaudience
ofatext,inmostcasestheauthorwouldstillfunctionasaudienceofsignsorpartsofsigns.

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Thereasonisthatmostsignsarecompositesofsoundsorsymbolsandthustheircompletioninvolvessomeawarenessandmemoryintheprocessofproductionof
theircomponents.
Considersomeonewhoisproducingasentencesuchasthefollowing:''Havingarrivedatthispointinmydeliberations,Ineedtoreflectfurtherontheprobleminorder
tofindnewwaysofsolvingitthatwillnotonlysatisfymycravingforclarityandadequacybutalso...."Andletussupposethatthepersonwhogotasfarasthe'also'
thatmarkstheendofthesentenceaswehaveitistheauthorofthetext.Itstandstoreasonthat,tocompletethesentence,theauthorwillhavetohavepresentinhis
mindinsomesensethefirstpartofthesentence,understandingwhatitmeansandthusactasanaudiencewithrespecttoit.Howcouldheotherwisecompletethe
sentence?Indeed,becauseinmostcasestextsarecomposedofnaturallanguageswhoseuseprescribestheuseofcertainsignsindeterminatearrangements,itis
necessaryforusersofthoselanguagestobeawareofthesignsandthearrangementstheyhaveproducedinordertoaddtothemfurthersignsandproducedifferent
overallarrangements.Andthisprocedureentailsaroleofaudienceevenforthosewhoareengagedintheproductionoftextsandare,therefore,authors.Thepoint,
then,isthattobeanauthorentailsalsoplayingtheroleofaudience.Thereverseisnottrue,however,fortheactiveroleaudienceshavetoplayintheunderstandingof
textsdoesnotgenerallyentailauthorship,unlesswearespeakingofaudiencesasinterpreters.4
Anauthormayfunctionasaudienceinprocessesotherthanthatofcomposition.Afteratexthasbeencompleted,anauthoroftengoesbacktoit,interpretingand
judgingit,thusassumingtheroleofaudienceinstillanothersense.TheclassiccaseincontemporaryphilosophyisWittgenstein,whoseemstohavebeenconcernedin
hislatercareerwithattackingsomeofthetheseshehaddefendedinhisearlierwritings.5 Amorecommonexampleisthatofanauthorwho,afterwritingabook,
spendssomeofhistimeclarifyingordefendingwhathesaidinit.
Knowledgeofthehistoricalauthorofatextcanbebothhelpfulandharmfultothosewhoseekanaccurateunderstandingofahistoricaltext.Itcanbeharmfulinsofar
asadistortedpictureofthatauthor,thatis,averyinaccuratepseudohistoricalauthororanaccuratebutpartialpseudohistoricalauthor,canbemisleading.Butin
somecasesitcanalsobehelpful.Naturally,becausetheauthoralsomayfunctionasaudience,knowledgeoftheauthorasaudiencemaybelikewisehelpfulorharmful
tootheraudienceswhoseektounderstandatext.
2.IntendedAudience
Theintendedaudienceisthepersonorgroupofpersonsforwhomtheauthorcomposesthetext.6 Theauthormaysometimesostensiblydedicateawork

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tosomeone.Inthatcaseheprobablyintendsforthatpersontoreadit,ifwearedealingwithawrittentext,andeitherprofitbyitordosomethingfortheauthor.Many
famousbooks,andnotafewinfamousones,werededicatedtopowerfulfiguresfromwhomtheauthorssoughtfortune,protection,andotherfavors.Andmany
otherswereintendedfortheedificationofthosetowhomtheywerededicated.
Apartfrompersonstowhomaworkmaybeexplicitlydedicated,authorsoftenhaveinmindspecificgroupsofpersonsasaudience.Philosophersusuallywritefor
otherphilosophers,scientistsforscientists,andsoonandfrequentlyevenforsmallgroupswithinthoseclasses.Onlyliteraryauthorsgenerallyaimforawider
audience,buteventhenthereareaudiencerestrictionsthathavetodowitheducation,culture,andlanguage,amongothers.
Itisnotnecessarilythecasethattheintendedaudienceofatextbethepersonorpersonstowhomthetextisaddressed.Authorsoftensayandwritethingsfor
personsotherthantheonestowhomtheyspeakandforwhomtheyostensiblywritethem.7 WhenthepresidentoftheUnitedStates,forexample,speakstoagroup
offarmersinIowaandsayssomethingthreateningaboutsubsidizedfarminginEurope,hisintendedaudienceprobablyincludesthepoliticalleadersofthenationswho
subsidizefarminginEuropeandisnotrestrictedto,orperhapsevenintendedtobe,necessarilythefarmerstowhomheisspeaking.
Whatdistinguishestheintendedaudiencefromthethreethatstillremaintobediscussedisthattheintendedaudienceneednotbecomeacquaintedwiththetextin
questionorevenexistatall.Theintendedaudiencemaynevercomeintocontactwiththetextandmayinfactbenomorethanafigmentoftheauthor'simagination.
Theremaybenopersonsofthesortintendedasaudiencebytheauthor,andifthereare,thereisnoassurancetheywilleverencounterthetext.Incidentally,itshould
notbetakenforgrantedthattheintendedaudienceisalwayscontemporarywiththeauthor.Manyauthorsfeelthattheircontemporariescannotunderstandthemand
thuswriteforfuturegenerations.AcaseinpointisRousseau.
Anunderstandingoftheintendedaudiencehelpsotheraudiencesintheunderstandingofatext,foritpresentsthemwiththepersonorgroupofpersonsthattheauthor
thoughtwouldbemostaffectedbythetext.Inthatsense,theintendedaudienceindirectlyrevealssomeoftheauthor'sintentionsandhowthetextshouldbe
approached.If,forexample,weknowthatatextisintendedforprofessionalphilosopherswhoworkwithinacertainphilosophicaltraditionandsharecertain
assumptionsaboutmethod,wewillbeinabetterpositiontounderstandandevaluatethetextthanifwedonot.Forthenitwouldbeeasierforustosupplythose
methodologicalassumptionsthattheauthortookforgrantedtheaudiencewouldsupply.

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3.ContemporaneousAudience
Thecontemporaneousaudienceiscomposedofallthosepersonswhoarecontemporaneouswiththehistoricalauthorandhavebecomeorcouldbecomeacquainted
withthetext.Theysharewiththeauthormuchthatother,lateraudiencesdonotsharewithhim.Livingduringthesametimeperiod,evenifinadifferentcountryand
culture,wouldseemtoentailsomebasicandcommonelements,althoughthismaynotalwaysbethecase.Quaaudience,anilliteratetribesmanwillhaveverylittlein
commonwithaNobellaureateinliteratureeveniftheyarecontemporaries,anditisprobablytruethat,conceptually,acontemporaryAristotelianwillhavemorein
commonwithAristotlethanwithaselfproclaimedpostmodernist.
Bythecontemporaneousaudience,then,Idonotmeantorefertopersonswhoareculturallyandeducationallyfarremovedfromthehistoricalauthor.Imean
membersofhisandsimilarsocialgroupswhohavethebasiceducationalandculturaltoolstobeinprinciplecapableofunderstandingthetextinquestionandwhoare
roughlycontemporaneouswiththeauthor.8 Undertheseconditions,thisaudienceisbetterpreparedtounderstandthetextthansubsequentaudiences.
Thecontemporaneousaudiencemaybetheintendedaudienceincasesinwhichtheauthorofatextidentifieshiscultural,educational,andtemporalcontemporaries
withtheaudienceofthetext.Butitneednotbeso.Theintendedaudiencemaybeonlyoneofthemembersofthecontemporaneousaudienceoronlyasubgroupof
thataudience.Oritmayturnoutthattheauthorintendsasaudienceafuturepersonorgroupofpersons,asnotedearlier.
Knowledgeofthecontemporaneousaudienceofatextcanbeveryhelpfultothosewhoseektounderstandthetext,providedsuchknowledgeisaccurate.Itis
reasonabletosupposethatthecommonculturalandsocialcontextsharedbytheauthorandthecontemporaneousaudiencedeterminestoagreatextenttherulesand
proceduresforthecompositionandunderstandingoftextsunderwhichboththeauthorandtheaudienceoperate.Thelanguageusedbytheauthor,forexample,is
alsoinmostcasesthelanguageofthecontemporaneousaudience.WecanlearnmuchaboutPlato'sdialoguesifweknowsomethingaboutAthensatthetimehe
wrotethemandthekindofGreekspokenandwrittenatthetime,aswellasabouttheculturalandsocialmoresoftheperiod.Iftheknowledgeonehasofthe
contemporaneousaudienceofatextisnotaccurate,however,thenitmaymisleadratherthanhelpinthedeterminationofatext'smeaning.
4.IntermediaryAudience
Theintermediaryaudienceconsistsofthegroupofpersonswhohaveormayhavebecomeacquaintedwiththetext,butwhoareneithercontemporaneous

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withtheauthornorcontemporariesofthosewhoaretryingtounderstandthetext.Theyare,therefore,separatedfromtheauthornotonlybyindividualidiosyncrasies
butalsobytime.Livingatadifferenttimeandunderdifferentconditions,thecontextwithinwhichtheywouldapproachthetextisdifferentfromthatofthehistorical
author'scontemporaneousaudienceanditisalsodifferentfromthecontextinwhichtheinterpreter'scontemporarieswillreadit.Howdifferentthecontextiswillvary
notonlywiththetemporalseparationbetweentheintermediaryaudienceandthemomentatwhichthehistoricaltextwasproduced,butalsowiththedegreetowhich
theideologicalassumptionsandclimateoftheagehavechanged.Temporaldistanceisnotdirectlyproportionaltoconceptualdistance.Sometemporallyverydistant
agesmaybeclosertogetherconceptuallythanotheragesthataretemporallycloser.
Knowledgeofthisaudienceishelpfultointerpretersonlywhereintermediaryaudienceshaveproducedinterpretationsofthehistoricaltextandsuchinterpretations
survive.Inthesecases,knowledgeoftheintermediaryaudiencemayhelpintheunderstandingoftheinterpretationsofthehistoricaltexttheyproducedandthus
indirectlyhelpintheunderstandingofthehistoricaltext.Thisispossible,ofcourse,becausetheyarecontextuallyclosertointerpretersthantheauthorandthe
contemporaneousaudience.Iftheintermediaryaudiencesdidnotproduceinterpretationsorsuchinterpretationshavenotsurvived,thenthereisnothingthat
knowledgeofthemcancontributetolaterunderstandingsofthetext.Theroleofintermediaryaudiencesisveryimportantintheprocessoftransmissionand
understandingoftextsfrompastagesfarremovedfromthetimewhenaninterpreterisseekingtounderstandthosetexts.
5.ContemporaryAudience
Thecontemporaryaudienceiscomposedofthegroupofpersonswhohaveormaybecomeacquaintedwiththetextandarenottheauthor,hiscontemporaries,orthe
intermediaryaudience.Insomecases,itwillconsistsimplyinthegenerationofpersonsthatcomesafterthecontemporaneousgeneration.Ifthatisthecase,thenthere
willnotbeanintermediaryaudiencebetweenthecontemporaneousandthecontemporaryaudiences.Inallothercases,however,therewillbeatleastonegeneration
ofpersonsthatmaybeacquaintedwiththetextbetweenthecontemporaneousaudienceandthecontemporaryaudience,allowingforanintermediaryaudience.
Thedifficultyforthecontemporaryaudiencetounderstandahistoricaltextisnotonlyoneoftemporal,cultural,orconceptualdistancebetweenthetextanditself,but
alsothefactthatitmayhaveatitsdisposalinterpretationsofthetextprovidedbyboththecontemporaneousandtheintermediaryaudiencesandsometimesevenby
theauthorhimself.Furthermore,thenumberofinterpretationstendstoincreaseastimepasses.Theseinterpretationscanbebothhelpfulandunhelpfultothe
contemporaryaudienceindeveloping

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understandingsofthetext.Theycanhelpinsofarastheyestablishbridgesbetweenthecontemporaryaudienceandthehistoricaltext,buttheycanalsobeobstacles
insofarastheymaybemistakenandmayleadthecontemporaryaudienceintodirectionswhichtakeitfartherfromratherthannearertothemeaningofthehistorical
text.
BeforeIturntothecompositionoftheaudience,itshouldbemadeclearthatthedistinctionsamongthevariousaudiencesidentifiedherearenottobeconsidered
hardthereissomedegreeofoverlap.Forexample,thecontemporaneousaudiencemaybecomposedofpersonsofdifferentages,someofwhomonemayargue
couldalsobecomepartoftheintermediaryaudience,oreventhecontemporaryaudience.Thispossibilityunderscorestheartificialcharacterofthesecategoriesand,
therefore,thepossibilityofgroupingaudiencesinotherwaysoraddingothercategoriestotheonesIhavepresented.Forexample,inadditiontothecategories
suggested,onecouldaddthatofhistoricalaudience,whichwouldcomprisethecategoriesofauthorasaudienceandofcontemporaneousaudience.9 Stillothers,
whichIdonotuse,arealsopossible.Theartificialcharacterofthesecategories,however,doesnotunderminethepointsIhavemadeorthehermeneuticaland
heuristicusefulnessofthecategories.
Wehavediscussedthevarioustypesofaudiencesthatatextmayhaveintermsoftheidentityofthosewhoconstitutethem.Nowweturntothecompositionofthe
audience.
B.CompositionoftheAudience
SofarIhavebeenspeakingabouttheaudienceasifitalwayswereplural,exceptforthecaseoftheauthor(whocouldalsobepluralbutaboutwhomIhavegenerally
beenspeakinginsingularterms).Yetthepluralityofmostaudiencesdiscussedcouldbeunderstoodintwoways:distributively,asapluralitycomposedofsingle
personswhobecomeormaybecomeacquaintedwithatextintheirindividualprivacyorcollectively,asagroupunderstandingoftexts.Thelattersuggeststhata
pluralityofindividualpersonscancometogetherasawholeandactcollectivelyasaudience.Theseconsiderationsraiseinterestingquestionsconcerningtherelation
betweenaudiencesandtexts.
Atextislikeapieceofapuzzlethatmakessenseonlyasanelementofalargerwhole,andtheaudiencesuppliesanimportantpartofthatlargerwhole.However,that
theaudiencecanbesingleorpluralmayentailthatwhatissuppliedbytheonemightbedifferentfromwhatissuppliedbytheotherand,therefore,theunderstanding
ofatextbyanindividualpersonmaybedifferentfromitsunderstandingbyagroup.Inonewaythisdoesnotseemalarming.WemayagreethattheunderstandingI
haveofthetextoftheAmericanDeclarationofIndependenceisdifferentinsomewaysfromthecollectiveunderstandingtheAmericanpeoplehaveofit,butwemay
notregardthisasalarming

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becausethedifferencesinquestionarenotsignificant.Ontheotherhand,thisfactmaybecomealarmingifthosedifferencesaresuchthatthereisnohopeofbringing
themtogetherinsomeway.Afterall,itisnogoodtometounderstandatextdifferentlythansocietyatlargeunderstandsit.IfIunderstanda'NoParking'signas
meaning"noparkingforeveryoneelsebutmyself"Iwillmostlikelygetaparkingticketandwillhavetopayafine.10
Theundesirableinferencethattheindividualpersonandthegrouphavedifferentunderstandingsoftextsispredicatedontheassumptionthattheindividualpersonand
thegrouparesomehowtotallyunconnectedoratleastthattheirconnectionisirrelevantortootenuoustoaffecttheirrespectiveunderstandingsoftexts.Andthereis
noquestionthattherearegroundsonwhichtodefendthisassumption.Afterall,theunderstandingofanindividualpersonappearstotakeplaceinherownmind,
separateandunconnectedfromthatofothers.Understandingseemstobeaprivateaffairthatcanbedescribedasactsofanindividualperson'smind.Thus,the
understandingIhaveofthetextoftheAmericanDeclarationofIndependenceismineandminealone,knownonlytomeintheprivacyofmyconsciousness.By
contrast,whatagroupunderstandsappearstobesomethingpublic,sharedbyallmembersofthegroup.Hence,whatthetextoftheAmericanDeclarationof
IndependencemeansforAmericansconsideredasagroup,sotheargumentgoes,issomethingpublicanddifferentfromwhatitmeanstome.
Onewayinwhichonemighttrytoobjecttothisconclusionistoarguethatthefactthatanunderstandingispublicisnotsufficienttomakeitdifferentfromasocalled
privateunderstanding.Thepublicunderstandingof'2+2=4'isthattwoplustwoequalfour,andthatisalsomyprivateunderstandingofit.
Butthisreplydoesnotappeareffective,foritmightberetortedthatthedifferenceincontextrepresentedbytheindividualpersonincontrastwiththegroupwillensure
thatunderstandingwillbedifferent.Mosttextsareellipticalandthecontextinwhichtheyarefoundaffectstheirmeaningasmuchasthesignsofwhichtheyare
composedandthearrangementofthosesigns.Butthecontextinvolvedinthecasewhereanindividualpersonunderstandsatextisradicallydifferentfromthecontext
thatthegroupbringstobearontheunderstandingofatext.Theindividualpersonhasaveryparticularsetofassumptions,beliefs,andsoonthataretheresultofthat
person'spastandexperience.Andthiscontrastswiththeassumptionsandbeliefscommonlysharedbythegroup.Becausetheunderstandingoftextsdependsin
significantwaysonthecontextofassumptionsandbeliefswithinwhichtheyareplaced,itstandstoreasonthattheunderstandingofatextbyanindividualpersonwill
differfromtheunderstandingofthesametextbyagroup.
Thosewhodonotwishtoacceptthisconclusionhaveonlytwocoursesofaction.Thefirst(1)istoarguethattherearenosignificantdifferences

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betweenanindividualpersonandagroupthesecond(II)istoarguethat,althoughtherearesignificantdifferencesbetweenthem,theirrelationsaresuchthatthey
makepossibleacommunityofunderstanding.
LetmebeginwithI.Thisviewcantaketwoforms.One(1)reducesthegrouptotheindividualpersonsthatcomposeittheother(2)reducestheindividualpersonsto
thegrouptowhichthepersonsbelong.Thefirstreduction(1)canbeaccomplishedbypointingoutthatthegroupisnothingotherthanthepersonsthatcomposeit.
Thereisnocommonmindtoagroupoverandabovethemindsofthepersonsthatcomposethegroup.Thus,whateverunderstandingofatextagrouphasisnothing
otherthanthedistributiveunderstandingsofatextthemembersofthegrouphave.Thedifferencebetweentheunderstandingbyanindividualpersonandthe
understandingbyagroupofpersonsissimplythedifferencebetweenoneunderstandingandseveralunderstandings.
Theproblemwiththissortofreasoningis,first,thatitdoesnotaccomplishwhatitsetsouttodo.Byreducingthegrouptotheindividualsofwhichitiscomposed,it
doesnoteliminatedifferencesofunderstandingamongindividualmembersofthegroup.Second,itfailstodistinguishbetweenunderstandingandtheobjectof
understanding.Ifunderstandingisanactofthemindandtheobjectofunderstandinginthecaseoftextsistheirmeaning,itispossibletohavenumericallydifferent
understandingsofthesamemeaning.11Andforthisitisnotnecessarytoreducegroupstoindividuals.
Theotherreductionistapproach(2)triestoreduceindividualpersonstothegrouptowhichtheybelonginordertoshowthatpersonsandgroupscanhavethesame
understanding.Thismaybedonebynotingthatwhatisrelevantintermsofcontextfortheunderstandingoftextsareassumptionsandbeliefs,andtheassumptionsand
beliefsofindividualpersonsaresociallyderived,thatis,theyarethesameasthecommonassumptionsandbeliefsofthegrouptowhichthepersonsinquestion
belong.Thus,forunderstandingtexts,groupsandtheirindividualmembersarethesame,becausetheysharecommonassumptionsandbeliefs.
Theobviousmistakeofthispositionisnotthatitholdsourconceptshaveasocialorigin.Inthatitmayberight,providedoriginisunderstoodcorrectly,althoughIam
notpreparedtodefendthisviewhere.Themistakeisratherthatthispositionrulesoutthepossibilityofhavingthoseconceptscombineinthemindofindividual
personsindifferentwaysfromthoseinwhichtheyappearinthesocietyatlargeorinothermembersofthesociety.Indeed,forthisviewtobecorrect,allmembersof
thegroupwouldhavetothinkalikeandthemerepossibilityofadifferentwayofthinkingwouldhavetoberuledout.Butnoneofthisaccordswithourexperience,for
wedothinkdifferentlyfromthewayothermembersofthegroupstowhichwebelongthink,astheexistenceofthevariousargumentswehavebeendiscussinghere
clearlyindicates.Moreover,individualpersonsoftenalsodisagreewithviewsgenerallyheldbysocietyatlarge.

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Thereductionofindividualpersonstothegrouporofthegrouptotheindividualpersonsthatcomposeitis,then,undesirable.ThepositionIwouldliketodefend(II)
holdsamiddlegroundbetweenthesetwoextremeviews.Itacceptsthattherearedifferencesbetweenindividualpersonsandgroupsthataresignificantwhenitcomes
totheunderstandingoftexts,butatthesametimeitholdsthatthereareimportantrelationsbetweenthesepersonsandgroupsthatarealsosignificantforsuchan
understanding.Thoserelationsmakepossiblecommonunderstandingsoftexts.
Ontheonehand,Iampreparedtoacceptthatanindividualpersonengagesinactsofunderstandingthatareseparateandprivateand,therefore,cannotbesharedby
otherpersonsorbyagroup.Thegroupinfacthasnoactsofunderstandingsuchasthoseoftheindividualperson.Whatisusuallyreferredtoasthe"understandingof
atextbyagroup"issomeagreedupontextwhichisaddedtotheoriginaltext.Thisiswhat,togetherwiththetext,Icallaninterpretation.Moreover,itisalsotrue
thatanindividualpersonhasexperiencesthatareuniqueandresultofteninviewsandbeliefsthatareidiosyncratic.Theseexperiencesareretainedintheindividual
person'smemory(orsubconsciousifoneiswillingtoacceptsuchanotion).Thegroup,ontheotherhand,hasnomemoryofthesortindividualshave,wherecommon
experiencescouldbestored.Society'smemoryarearchivesandlibraries,thatis,collectionsoftextsandrecordsandthereforegenerallydifferentfromaperson's
memory(orsubconscious),whichisnotprimarilytextual.Forexample,thememoryIhaveofmycollegegraduationconsistsofaseriesofimagesandexperiencesthat
donotfunctionassignsforanythingelse.Bycontrast,thecollectivememoryofthateventconsistsprimarilyofaseriesoftextsnewspaperarticles,records,andso
onkeptinvariousarchivesandlibraries,althoughtheremayalsobesomephotographs,paintings,andevenfilms.
Allthisseemslargelyuncontroversial,butnolessevidentisthefactthataperson'sbeliefsdependtoagreatextentonaconceptualframeworkinheritedfromsociety.
Norisitlessevidentthatsocietydependsonitsmembersfortheconceptsandviewsitdevelops.Theinterdependencebetweenpersonandgroupoccursatvarious
levels.Humanbeingsdiffergeneticallyfromeachother,andindividualsurvivalisalsoconnectedtoothermembersofthegroup.Buttheseandothersimilar
relationshipsarenotsignificantwhenitcomestotheunderstandingoftexts.Forthelatterwhatisimportantisthatpersonsaresociallydependentformanyofthesigns
theyuseandtherulestheyemploytoarrangethem,aswellasforthemeaningstheyconveythroughthem.Inturnsocietydependsonindividualpersonsforthe
preservationofthemeaningsthatsignsaresupposedtoexpress,fortheentitiesthatmakeuptextsarenotbythemselvescapableofproducingunderstandingnordo
theycontainorimplymeanings.Theindividualperson,therefore,isnotasemanticislandisolatedfromthemainlandofsocialmeaningnoristhegroupsemantically

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separatefromtheindividualpersonsthatcomposeit.Therelationsbetweenthegroupanditsmembersmakepossibleacommunityofunderstanding.Thiscanbe
illustratedbythewayagrouparrivesatanunderstandingofatext.
Letustakeaphilosophyclassasagroup,composedofsaytenstudentsandafacultymember,thatistryingtounderstandAnselm'snotoriousargumentforthe
existenceofGod.TheclassbeginsafterallitsmembershavereadthetextofChapters14oftheProslogion.Consequentlywecanassumethateachmemberofthe
classhasanunderstanding,whichmayormaynotbedifferentfromtheunderstandingsofothermembersoftheclass,ofAnselm'sargument.Oncetheclassassembles
anddiscussionbegins,itbecomesclearthattheunderstandingsofthetextbydifferentmembersoftheclassdonotalwaysagree.Onepersonarguesthatfaithisa
necessaryconditionfortheargumenttowork,andshebasesherviewsonsomestatementsattheendofChapter1oftheProslogion.Anotherpersonarguesthat
faithisnotanecessaryconditionfortheargumenttoworkbasedonAnselm'sstatementsattheendofChapter4,butgrantsthattheargumentisprecededbya
statementoffaith.Stillanotherstudentpointsoutthatthereseemtobetwoargumentsratherthanone,onegiveninChapter2andtheotherinChapter3.Andsoon.
Whatwehave,then,isseveralunderstandingsofthetextthatdiffersometimesinminorandsometimesinmajorways.Yet,wemustnotforgetthateventhosethat
differinmajorwayshavemuchincommon.Indeed,itisbecausetheyhavemuchincommonthatdisagreementispossible,fordisagreementimpliescommunication
andcommunicationentailscommonground.Thiscommonground,ofcourse,hastodowithsignsandtheirmeaningandarrangement,aswellaswithacontextof
presuppositionsandbeliefsthatmakescommunicationpossible.
Butletusfurtherassumethat,onthebasisofthediscussion,theclassasawholethatis,everyoneofitsmemberscomestoacceptthesameunderstandingof,if
notthewholetext,atleastsomepartofit.Forexample,letusassumethateveryoneinclassunderstandshowAnselm'snegativeandcomparativeformulationis
significantlydifferentandstrongerthanDescartes'saffirmativeandsuperlativeformulationofwhatGodis.12Andletusassumefurtherthatthiscommonunderstanding
istheresultofthegiveandtakethathastakenplaceinclass.Whatdoesthiscommonorgroupunderstandingamountto?Ifbyunderstandingwemeananact
wherebysomethingisunderstood,thenthecommonorgroupunderstandingboilsdowntothenumericallydifferentunderstandings,thatis,thenumericallydifferent
acts,ofeachmemberoftheclassinthissensethereisnooneunderstanding,ontologicallyspeaking,thatisotherthantheindividualactsofunderstandingofeach
person.Ontheotherhand,ifbyunderstandingismeantthemeaningthatisunderstood,thatis,themeaningunderstoodthroughtheindividualactsofunderstanding,
thentheunderstandingiscommontoallmembersofthegroup.Finally,itisalsoclearthatthecausesofboththeindividualandcommonunderstandings

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arethegroup'sinteraction.True,itispossiblethatunderstandingcouldhavecomeaboutinastudent'smindoutsideclassandindependentoftheclassdiscussion.But
inourexampleitwasasaresultofthatdiscussionthatithappened.Thepoint,then,isthatagroupdoeshaveanimportantcausaleffectonindividualunderstandings,
foritconfrontstheindividualpersonwithviewsthatheorshemaynotconsider.Thisinturnistheresultofthedifferentconceptualcontextswithinwhicheachperson
functions.Thegroupmakesaccessibletoitsmemberscontextswithwhichtheymaynotbeacquainted,thusexpandingthesemanticpossibilitiesofatextforthem.
Nowletusgobacktothevariousaudiencesdiscussedearlierandaskwhichoftheseaudiencesisparadigmaticoftheaudienceofatext?Itisclearthatitisnotthe
authorwhenheactsasaudience,forthisis,indeed,aviewforwhichIhadtoargueandwhichisnotintuitivelyobviousbyanymeans.Norisitthecontemporary
audienceortheintermediaryaudience,forthoseaudiencesvaryandappeartoberemovedbothfromthetextanditsauthorinwaysthatpreventthemfrombeing
consideredparadigmaticoftheaudienceofatext.Tworemain,then,theintendedaudienceandthecontemporaneousaudience.Bothoftheseseemtohavestrong
claims.Thefirstbecauseitistheaudiencetheauthorhadinmind,assuminghehadoneinmind.Thesecond,becauseitistheaudiencethat,whetherornottheauthor
hadinmindanaudience,mostlikelyfitstheroleofaudiencemoreappropriatelyandisbetterpreparedtounderstandthetext.Bothofthesehavestrongclaims,then,
andIbelievearegenerallyregardedasparadigmatic.
Anotherpointthatshouldbenotedbeforewemoveontothenextsectionisthattheaudiencesofatextmayalsofunctionasauthors.Themostobviouscaseisthatof
anaudiencethatmisunderstandsatextorinterpretsitinidiosyncraticways.ThemisunderstandingofatextbyanaudienceinvolvesendowingtheECTsofthe
historicaltextwithameaningdifferentfromthemeaningtheyhadinthehistoricaltextandhencetheproductionofaninterpretationthatresultsinanewtext.Thisis
oneoftherolesoftheinterpretativeauthororaudienceasauthor.Thesecondrole,thatofaddingtoatexttohelpothersunderstandit,alsoimpliesanauthorialrole,
buttheresultingtextisadifferentone.Theformerauthorialfunctioncanapplytoanyoftheaudiencesdiscussedpreviously,fortheyallcouldmisunderstandthetextor
understanditidiosyncraticallyandthusfunctionauthorially.Thepointisnotthatthesamepersonorpersonsmayfunctionsometimesasaudienceandsometimesas
author.That,ofcourse,isalwayspossible.Thepointisthatthesamepersonorpersonsmayfunctionasaudienceand,invirtueofthatfunction,whentheexerciseof
thatfunctionresultsinmisunderstandingoridiosyncraticunderstanding,mayfunctionaswellasauthor.Allthisneedstobetakenintoaccountfortheunderstandingof
howaudiencesfunctioninrelationtotexts.

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II.FunctionoftheAudience
Thegeneralfunctionofanaudienceistounderstandatextindeed,whatcharacterizesanaudience,quaaudience,isthatitismeanttounderstandatext.Theauthor,
bycontrast,whenactingasauthor,isrelatedtoatextasitscreatorand,therefore,hasashisaimtoselectandarrangethesignsofwhichthetextiscomposedinsome
waythatwillconveyaspecificmeaningandthusproduceunderstanding.Ofcourse,theultimategoalofanauthorincreatingatextmaybemorethanjusttoproduce
understanding.Theauthormaybetryingtocausesomebehaviororemotionintheaudience.Ortheauthormayjustbetryingtoventafeeling.Insuchcases,the
primaryfunctionofatextmaynotbetoproduceunderstandingonthepartofanaudience.Forexample,theintendedeffectofanordertoopenadoorisanactionon
thepartofthepersontowhomtheorderisgiven.Ifthatpersonisconsideredtobetheaudienceofthetext,thenitwouldseemthatthefunctionofaudiencesisnot
necessarilytounderstandbutratherthefunctionwilldependverymuchonwhattheauthorofatextintendstoaccomplishwiththetext.
Tothisonemightanswerthateveninthesecasessomeunderstandingonthepartoftheaudienceisaprerequisitefortheeffectiveaccomplishmentoftheauthor'sgoal.
13Understandinginsomesenseisnecessaryfortheulteriorgoaltobeachievedevenifthatgoalisnotunderstanding.Moreover,becausethisunderstandingismeant
totakeplaceonthepartoftheaudience,thefunctionoftheaudiencemustincludeunderstandingafterall.
Thisanswer,however,isnotaltogethersatisfactoryformypurposes,becauseitwouldstillunderminetheviewIwishtodefendnamely,thattheprimaryfunctionof
anaudienceofatextistounderstandthetext.Indeed,ifweweretorestwiththisanswerwewouldhavetograntthatthereisnoprimaryfunctionofaudiencesqua
audiences,fortextshavemanyfunctionsotherthantoproduceunderstandingandthereforeaffectaudiencesinmanydifferentways.
Adifferentandmoreeffectiveanswerinvolvesmakingadistinctionbetweenthepersonorpersonsforwhomatextisintendedandthevariousrolesthatthepersonor
personsinquestionareintendedtoplay.14Puttingthisdistinctiontouse,wecouldclaimthatonlywhensuchpersonsfunctioninaroleinwhichtheyareprimarily
intendedtounderstandatextdotheyfunctionasaudiences.Whentheyplayotherroles,theycannotbeconsideredtobeaudiencesproperlyspeakingunderthese
circumstanceswhateverroletheyareintendedtoplaydetermineswhotheyare.Thus,anaudience'sfunctionis,indeed,tounderstandatexteveniftheaimofthetext
istoproducesomeothereffectinthepersonorpersonsforwhomitisintended.
Letmegiveanexample.WhenpersonP1saystopersonP2,''Cleanthehouseinthisway,"P1intendsP2tofunctionasaservantwhocarriesoutP1'sorders.Inthat
capacity,P2isnotanaudience.However,P1'sactionofusing

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atexttoorderP2tocarryoutcertaintasksimpliesalsothatP1intendsP2tounderstandwhatP1says.InthislattercapacityP2isanaudience.Thus,P2isbothaservant
andanaudience,andthereisnoconflictbetweenthetwo,althoughP2isnotaservantinsofarasheisanaudienceoranaudienceinsofarasheisaservant,andhecan
beaservantwithoutbeinganaudienceandviceversa.
Thatthefunctionofanaudienceistounderstanddoesnotmeanthattheaudiencemustbeconsideredpassive,assomehistoriographersusedtothink.15Onthe
contrary,theaudienceapproachesthetextactively,butitsrelationtothetextandtheaimithas,quaaudience,aredifferentfromthosethatcharacterizeauthors.16The
primarythrustofauthorsistocreateanewtext,whereasthatofaudiencesistounderstandatextalreadycreated.Bothareengagedinconnectingmeaningtoentities,
butauthorsarefreerthanaudiencesinsofarastheydetermine,withwhatevermaterialstheyhaveattheirdisposal,thecharacterofthetextstheycompose.Audiences
arelessfreebecausetheyarepresentedwithafaitaccomplitheirchallengeisnottoproducetextsbuttounderstandalreadyexistingtexts.Perhapsthedifferences
betweenthefunctionofauthorsandaudienceswillbecomeclearerifwelookatwhatisinvolvedintheunderstandingofatextbyanaudience.
Theactivecharacteroftherolesaudiencesplayinunderstandingtextsisevidentatseverallevels.17First,itispresentatthelevelofacquaintancewiththetext.Ifthe
textisphysical,thisacquaintancewilltaketheformofperceptionifthetextismental,thenitwillconsistinsomekindofnonphysicalawareness.Mosttextswithwhich
weareacquaintedarephysical,sowewill,forthesakeofsimplicity,dealonlywiththem.Apartfromacquaintancewithorperceptionofatext,theaudiencemust,
second,understandthemeaningofthesignsofwhichthetextiscomposed.Thisinvolvesconnectingeachsigntosomemeaning.Third,theaudiencemustrecognize
thesignificanceofthearrangementinwhichthesignsappear.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheaudiencemustbeawareoftherulesaccordingtowhichthesignsthat
composethetextarearrangedinthesensethatthepersonorpersonswhocomposetheaudiencecouldexplicitlyformulatetheserules.KnowledgeofEnglish
grammarinthissense,forexample,isnotrequiredfortheunderstandingofEnglishtextsthisisparticularlyevidentinthecaseoforaltexts.Whatisrequiredisonly
theskilltoderivesemanticsignificancefromsyntacticalarrangements.Finally,theaudiencemustalsofillinthelacunaepresentinthetext.Mosttextsareelliptical
theycontaingapstobefilledwithmaterialssuppliedbytheaudienceaccordingtocontext.Textsarelikemaps,whereonlyprominentlandmarksarerecordedif
takenbythemselves,theyprovideatbestageneraloutlineoftheconceptualterraintheychart.18Someofthesegapsareintentional,andtheymayhaverhetorical
forceothersaresimplytherebecausetheauthorunconsciouslytakesforgrantedwhatissupposedtofillthemup.Inbothcasesanaccurateunderstandingofatext
requiresthattheaudiencesupplyappropriatematerialstofillthesegaps.

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Withrespecttothelacunae,moreover,itisnotalwaysthecasethatthereisoneandonlyonewaytofillthem.Takethecaseoflacunaethatareintentionallyleftbythe
author.19Insomecasestheyaremeanttobefilledinonlyoneway.Thisisthesituationinthecaseofcertaingapsinmostmedievalmanuscripts,forexample.Owing
totherelativescarcityandhighpriceofmaterialstobeusedforwritingsurfaces,medievalauthorsfrequentlyleftouttheconclusionofsyllogisms.Theyrecordthefirst
twopremisesandhadthemfollowedbyanetceteraandnoconclusion.Itisthejobofthereadertofillintheblank,asitwere.Atthetimethesetextswerewritten
thistaskwasprobablyeasy,becausethemembersoftheaudienceforwhichthetextsweremeantwereawareoftherulesforfillingintheblanks,appropriate
terminology,andsoon.But,asanyonewhohastriedtodothistodayknows,itisbynomeanseasyforacontemporaryreader,eventhoughtheauthorsofthetexts
intendedthoseblankstobefilledinonlyoneway.
Thereisnoreason,however,whyauthorsshouldnotintendtohavethelacunaeintheirtextsfilledindifferentways,someofwhichtheymayhavethoughtas
possibilitiesandothersthatdidnotoccurtotheminparticular,althoughtheymayhaveanticipatedthepossibilityoftheirexistence.Thereisnoreason,forexample,
whyanauthormaynotleaveunwrittenthelastchapterofanovel,lettingtheaudiencesupplytheendingaccordingtoitsimagination.Indeed,thereareexamplesofthis
sortofprocedureincontemporaryliterature.Andmuchhumorisbasedpreciselyontextualambiguityowingtoincompleteness.
Whathasbeensaidconcerningintentionallacunaewouldseemprimafacietoapplyalsotounintentionallacunae.Afterall,onecouldarguethat,ifthereisagap,there
maybeoneormorewaystofillit.Butthismaynotbeasitseems.Unintentionallacunaeareduetotheauthor'sassumptionthatthetextsayssomethingwheninfactit
saysitonlybecausetheauthorisunintentionallysupplying(frequentlythroughcontext)someelementmissinginthetext.Insuchcases,itwouldseemmoresensibleto
surmisethattheauthorisusingonlyonecontextratherthanseveral.Indeed,useofseveralcontextsforthesamegapwouldseemtopresupposeconsciousnessof
themandthusofthegap,whichispreciselywhattheauthordoesnothaveinthiscase.Therefore,itdoesnotseemlikelythatunintendedlacunaecanbefilledinmore
thanonewaybytheaudiencewhilerespectingthehistoricalintegrityofthetext.Oneobviousexceptiontothisruleoccurswhenthereareseveralequivalentwaysto
fillthegap,forinsuchacaseitdoesnotmattermuchwhichoneischosen.Butthisisnotthecompletestory,althoughitisallIneedtosayatthispointaboutlacunae
andaudienceunderstandinginthiscontext.20
Fromwhathasbeensaiditfollowsthattheroleoftheaudienceinunderstandingtextsisactiveinsofarasithastoconnectmeaningwithsignsandtheirarrangement
andfillinintendedandunintendedgaps.Lestalingering

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temptationremaintoviewthesetaskspassively,IwouldliketobringinanotherconsiderationthatIhopewillbesufficienttoillustratetheactiverolethataudiences
playinunderstandingtexts.ThisistheviewforwhichIhavearguedatlengthelsewhere,thattheunderstandingofatleastsometextsrequiresvaluejudgmentsabout
theviewsthosetextspresent.21Iarguedforthispositionbynotingthatwhenwetrytounderstandthepast,wemustengageinbothreconstructionandevaluation.
Reconstructioninvolvesfillinginwhatisunstatedaswellasthecontextevaluationinvolvesmakingvaluejudgmentsofvarioussorts,includingjudgmentsconcerning
truth.Andthisappliestotextsaswell.Tounderstandatextinitshistoricaldimensionwemustsupplyacontextandmakevaluejudgmentsregardingwhatthetext
meansbasedonwhatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot,whatistrueornot,andwhatishistoricallypossibleornot.Allthisindicatesthattheaudienceisengagedina
processwhichcanhardlybedescribedaspassive.
Tothismustbeadded,finally,thatatleastthreeoftheaudiencesidentifiedearlierinthischapterhaveacausalroleintheproductionofatext.Inonecasethisroleis
direct,forwhentheauthorfunctionsasaudienceduringtheprocessofthecreationofatext,hisunderstandingofthepartofthetexthehascreatedaffectswhathewill
dosubsequentlyinadirectway.Theauthorandtheaudienceareoneperson,sotheysharetheknowledgethatdeterminestheultimateshapeofthetext.Inallother
cases,however,theroleoftheaudienceisindirect,fortheaudiencedoesnotreallyparticipateefficientlyintheproductionofthetextonlytheauthordoesthat.The
audienceexercisesanindirectcausalinfluenceonthetextthroughtheauthor.Thismayinvolveconsciousnessinthecaseoftheintendedaudience,whereanauthor
explicitlyconsidersanaudienceforwhomheisproducingatextanddesignsthetextaccordingly.Butitneednotbeconsciousinthecaseofthecontemporaneous
audience,whenanauthordoesnotexplicitlyconsideranaudiencebuthisactionsimplytheexistenceoftheaudience.Inthiscase,thepresenceandinfluenceofthe
audiencecannotbedeniedbecausetheauthorusesparticularsetsofsignsbelongingtonaturallanguagesandhemustfollowrulesconcordantwiththeusesoftextsby
particulargroupsofpeople.22Philosophersmostoftenwriteforphilosophersinalanguagetheythinkcanbeunderstoodeveniftheyarenotconsciouslywritingfor
philosophers,andsodosociologists,physicists,andsoon.Thus,theinfluenceoftheaudienceonatextbeginsevenbeforetheaudienceisacquaintedwithit.
Noteveryaudience,however,actsaspartialcauseofatext.Becausetheinfluenceofanaudienceiscarriedoutthroughanauthor,onlytheaudienceasapersonwho
isalsoanauthorortheaudienceasconceivedbytheauthor,whetherconsciouslyorunconsciously,hasthisroleonlytheauthorasaudienceortheintendedand
contemporaneousaudiencescanbeinvolvedinthisprocess.

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Inshort,theroleoftheaudienceintheunderstandingoftextsisactive,butthisdoesnotentailthattheroleoftheaudienceistobeconfusedwiththeroleoftheauthor.
Thesortofactivityinwhichtheaudience,quaaudience,engagesisdifferentfromthesortofactivitytheauthor,quaauthor,performs.Thattheaudienceisnotpassive
doesnotmeanthatitsactivitymustbeequatedwiththatofauthors,assomethink.23Iftheroleofaudienceswerenotdistinguishablefromthatofauthors,there
wouldbeonlyauthorsandthepurposeoftexts,theconveyanceofmeaning,wouldbefrustrated.Thependulumofcontemporaryopinionseemstohaveswungtoo
farinfavorofanactiverolefortheaudience.Anaudienceisactiveintheunderstandingofatext,butdoesnotcreateit.Thetextisalreadyanexistingrealityevenif
incompleteandsubjecttodiverseunderstandingsbeforetheaudienceencountersit,andtheaudience'sroleisnottochangeitbuttograspitsmeaningand
significance,evenifinsomecasesthemeaningandsignificanceareopenended.Inthatsense,theroleofanaudienceislikethatofthehistorianwhowishestoaccount
forthepast.Audiencesaredirectedtowardthepast,whereastheroleofauthorsisfundamentallyantihistorical.Thefunctionofauthorsisdirectedtowardthefuture.24
Beforeweleavethissection,wemustraisethequestionastowhetherthedistinctionsamongthevariousaudiencesdiscussedinSectionIaffecttheconclusionswe
havereachedconcerningthefunctionofaudiences.Wehaveseenthatitdoes,atleastinthecausalroleaudiencesmayindirectlyplayinthecreationoftexts,because
onlytheauthorasaudienceandtheintendedandcontemporaneousaudiencesplaysucharole.However,whenitcomestotheprimaryfunctionofaudiences,thatis,
theunderstandingoftexts,thetypeofaudienceseemstomakenodifference.Althoughtheauthorasaudienceandtheintended,contemporaneous,intermediary,and
contemporaryaudiencesmayopperateatdifferenttimesandunderdifferentcircumstances,theirprimarygoalisstilltounderstandthetext.Theymay,aswehaveseen
withthecausalfunctionexercisedbytheauthorasaudienceandtheintendedandcontemporaneousaudiences,haveothersecondaryfunctionsaswell.Indeed,
knowledgeoftheauthorandoftheintended,contemporaneous,andintermediaryaudiencesonthepartofthecontemporaryaudiencemayhelpthecontemporary
audiencetounderstandatextbetter,butthatdoesnotchangetheprimaryfunctionofthoseaudiences.Inshort,whathasbeensaidconcerningvarioustypesof
audiencedoesnotaffecttheconclusionsreachedinthissectionconcerningtheprimaryfunctionofanaudience.
III.NeedforanAudience
Theviewthattextsaremeantforaudiencesandthusthatanaudience,eitheractualorimagined,isanecessaryconditionoftextsisoneofthoseassumptionsthat,even
ifseldomexplicitlystated,isgenerallyimplicitlyaccepted

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inthepertinentliterature.25Recently,thisviewhascomeunderfire,however,fromsomeauthorswhoclaimthattheirbusinessisnotwithanaudienceatall.
Practitionersofthenouveauroman,suchasAlainRobbeGrillet,believethatforawritertheaimistowrite,andwhetherwhatthewriterwritesisreadornotis
actuallyunimportant.26(RobbeGrillet'sthirdnovel,Jealousy,soldonly300copiesinthefirstyeareventhoughhewasalreadyfamousatthetime.)Accordingtothis
perspective,anaudienceisneithernecessarynorimportantfortheauthorhenceitsconsiderationcouldnotbenecessaryorimportantfortheexistenceor
understandingofatext.
Thispointofviewappearssensibleatfirst.Indeed,ifsomeauthorsclaimingoodfaiththatwhentheyproducetextstheydonotintendtoconveyanykindofmeaning
toanyone,howcananyonearguethattheiraimisinfacttodoso?Toarguethatwaywouldimplyeitherthatwethinktheyarelyingorthatwethinktheydonotknow
whattheyintend.Thefirstalternativedoesnotmakesenseunlesswecanproduceareasonwhytheywouldwishtolie.Ifwecannot,thenwemustassumetheyspeak
ingoodfaith.
Further,adherentstothispointofviewcaneasilypointtoexamplesinwhichtextsareusedforpurposesotherthantoconveymeaningtoaudiences.Theymightcite,
forinstance,thecaseofexpressionsthataremeanttoventemotion,aswhensomeoneuttersaprofanitywhileinastateofrage.Likewisetheymaynotethatthe
writingofapoemmayhaveatherapeuticpurposeratherthanacommunicativeone.Somepersonsexperienceasenseofreleaseandcontentmentaftertheyhave
writtenapoem,evenifthepoemisnotmeantforanyoneandiskeptprivateorisdestroyedafteritiswritten.Finally,onemightargueanauthorwhoproducesatext
inastreamofconsciousness,inamechanical,nonreflectiveway,couldhardlybesaidtobeworkingonsomethingmeanttobeunderstoodbysomeoneelse.
Inspiteoftheimpressivecasethatmaybebuilttosupporttheviewthataudiencesarenotnecessaryfortexts,someobservationscanbeusedtounderminethis
position.Thefirstoftheseisthattextsarelinguisticinnature,andlanguageispublicratherthanprivate.Itisneithernecessarynorpertinenttorecountthemany
argumentsthathavebeenusedinsupportofthisviewinthiscentury.Letitsufficetosaythatthenotionofaprivatelanguageisseldomdefendednowadays,andI
sharetheviewthatsuchanotionisuntenable.27Hence,iflanguageispublicandtextsarecomposedoflanguage,theymustthemselvesbepublic.Anobviousquestion
thatcomesupatthispointiswhysomeonewhoseaimisnottocommunicatewithotherswoulduseamediumthatisnonprivate.Doesthismakeanysense?Itwould
seemthattheproductionoftexts,justastheuseoflanguage,carrieswithittheintenttocommunicateregardlessoftheparticularintentionoftheauthor.Whetheror
notanaudienceactuallyreceivesthatcommunication,orwhethertheauthorhadanideaofaparticularaudienceoranyaudienceinmind,doesnotmatter,forthe
procedure

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thatauthorsundertake,thesignsthattheyusetocomposeatext,therulesthattheyfollowinarrangingthem,andsoonentailnotonlyanaudiencebutaparticular
audience.Forexample,anauthor'suseofEnglishwordsinatextsurelyentailsthattheaudienceofthetextiscomposedofpersonswhoknowEnglish,andanauthor's
useofasymboliclanguageoflogic,impliesthetextisintendedforthosewhoareusedtosuchsymbolism.Finally,asalreadynotedearlier,authorsfunctionas
audiencesevenwhentheydonotconsciouslygobacktothetextstheyareproducingtocompletethem.Theroleofauthordependsontheroleofaudienceandthusit
isnotpossibletoengageintheproductionofatextwithoutadoptinginsomesensetheroleofaudience.
Butwhatoftheexamplesjustgiven?Dotheynotshowthatanaudienceissuperfluous?Theanswertothisquestionisnegative,fortheexamplesshowonlythattexts
havemultiplefunctions,notthattextsarenotmeantforaudiences.Theutteranceofaprofanitymayhavethefunctionofexpressingangerwemightsaythat
expressingangerisoneoftheillocutionaryactsperformedwhenthelocutionaryactisperformed.Butthefunctionoftheprofanitymightalsobetoscareorshock
someoneinadditiontoventingemotion,andinthatcasewemustassumethatsomecommunicationisintended.Theuseofalanguageinthecompositionofapoem
intendedprimarilyasreleaselikewiseindicatesapublicdimensiontothepoeminadditiontotheauthor'saimofrelease.Perhapstheauthorisafraidofwhatthepoem
revealsabouthimself,andthatiswhyhekeepsitprivateorevendestroysit,buttheactofproducingentailsapublicaimofcommunication.Thesamecouldbesaid
withrespecttothepractitionersofthenouveauromanandstreamofconsciousnesstexts:Quatexts,composedoflanguage,theyimplyapublicdimensionthatin
turnimpliesanaudience.Inaddition,allofthemhaveauthorsandtheroleofauthorpresupposestheroleofaudience.Evenwherenootheraudienceisintended,the
authorfillsthatroleinthecompositionofthetext.
Letmefinishbypointingoutthatclaimstotheeffectthataudiencesareunnecessaryfortextsareoftenbasedonaconceptionofaudiencethatexcludesboththe
contemporaneousaudienceandtheauthorfrombeingpartoftheaudienceofatext.Suchclaimsusuallytakeforgrantedthattheaudienceofatextistheintended
audiencethatis,theaudienceconsciouslyandexplicitlyintendedbyanauthortounderstandthetextheisproducing.And,indeed,iftheaudienceisconceived
exclusivelythus,itisquiteclearthatnoteverytexthasanaudience,formanyauthorsdonotintendanypersonorgroupofpersonstounderstandthetextthey
produce.Thatdoesnotmean,however,thatthetexthasnocontemporaneousaudience,forifthetextiscomposedinanaturallanguage,thisimpliesthatitis
understandablebythosewhounderstandandusethislanguage.Indeed,theverycompositionofatextinalanguageimpliesa

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nonprivatecharacterandthusanactualoratleastpossibleaudience.Finally,thenarrowidentificationofanaudiencewiththeintendedaudienceleavesoutthe
audiencethatisabsolutelyindispensibletoatextnamely,theauthor.Foreventhepractitionersofthenouveauromanandauthorswhocomposetextsinastream
ofconsciousnessmodefunctionasaudienceswhiledoingso.Hence,thereisalwaysanaudienceforatext,evenwhentheauthorhasnoparticularaudienceinmindat
thetimeofcomposition.
IV.CharacteroftheAudience
Muchdiscussionincontemporarycircleshasbeenabouttherepressivecharacterofauthors,atopicdiscussedinChapter3.Whathasgenerallybeenignoreduntil
relativelyrecently,particularlyinliterarycircles,isthesubversiveandrepressivecharacterofaudiences.28Letmebeginwiththesubversivecharacter.
A.SubversiveCharacter
Ihavechosentheword'subversive'toconveytheparticularfeatureofaudiencesthatIwishtodiscussbecausethetermhasaverynegativeconnotationandalso
becauseliterallyitmeans"toturnupsidedown."Now,thataudiencescananddofrequentlyunderstandtextsverydifferentlyfromthewaytheirauthorsunderstand
themisafactofourexperience.29Considerthefollowingexample.
Astudentinoneofmyseminars,wherethisissuewasbeingdiscussed,citedanexcellentexampleofthisphenomenon.Hisroommatewroteashortstoryforan
Englishcoursethatwassupposedtobereadtotheentireclass.Inthestory,hemeanttoputforththeargumentthatwidespreadhomosexualitycouldcausethe
terminationofthehumanracebecauseheterosexualbehaviorisnecessaryforthepreservationofthespecies.Beingaratherconservativetype,andsomewhatnaive,
hetookthisargumentveryseriouslybutwasworriedabouttheimpactthestorywouldhaveintheclass,forheknewthatseveralopenlyhomosexualstudentswere
enrolledinit.Yet,hehadnocauseforconcern.Hisclassmateslovedthestory,fortheytookitasaspoofonthesortofhomophobiacommonincertaincirclesofour
society.
Thisisagoodexampleofhowanaudiencecanarriveatanunderstandingofatextthatiscontrarytotheunderstandingintendedbyitsauthor.Thereasonswhythe
authorandtheaudiencehaddifferentunderstandingsofthetextareeasytoidentify.Ineachcase,theywereworkingunderdifferentassumptions.Theclasscouldnot
conceivethatanyonewouldtakethestoryatfacevalueandthusproceededtounderstanditironically(whichbytheway,isinperfectaccordwiththesortofaim
pursuedbymuchliterature).Theauthor,

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bycontrast,didnotseethetextironically,butratherunderstooditnonironicallybecauseitmadesensetohiminthatway.
Thataudiencescanunderstandtextsinwaysthatcanbedescribedasnothinglessthansubversive,thatis,inwaysoppositetothewaytheauthorsofthetexts
understoodthem,raisestwoimportantissues:(1)whetheraudiencescanunderstandtextsdifferently,andevencontrarily,tothewaytheirauthorsunderstoodthem
andyetnotmisunderstandthemand(2)whetheritislegitimateforaudiencestounderstandatextinwayswhichtheauthordidnothaveinmindorwhicharecontrary
towhattheauthorhadinmind.Shouldtheaimofaudiencesbenomorethantheunderstandingoftextsinthewaysinwhichtheirauthorsunderstoodthem?Orisit
legitimateforaudiencestogetoutoftextsmorethanauthorsputinthem,orevensomethingcontrarytowhatauthorsputinthem?Indeed,wemaygoevenfurtherand
askwhetheraudiencescanunderstandtextsbetterthantheirauthors?TheseareimportantquestionsforwhichanswersneedtobeprovidedandIhavedoneso
elsewhere.30Theissuethatconcernsushereiswhetheraudiencesthatmisunderstandtextsaretobeconsideredsubversiveandthesenseinwhichthatsubversive
charactershouldbeunderstood.Canwedescribetheactofmisunderstandingatextassubversive?
Theanswertothisquestiondependslargelyonwhatismeantbysubversive.Toclarifytheissueletusconsiderthreedifferentcasesinwhichtextualmisunderstanding
mayoccur.Thefirstisacaseinwhichmisunderstandingofatextoccurseventhoughtheaudiencewantstounderstandthetextandisdoingeverythingthatcan
reasonablybedonetodoso.Thisisfrequentenoughandisduetoavarietyoffactorsthatarequiteevidentineverydayexperienceandneednotconcernusatthis
moment.Thesecondcaseisoneinwhichmisunderstandingofatextoccurswiththefullcomplianceoftheaudience'swill.Inotherwords,theaudiencewantsto
misunderstandatextanddoesso.Thisagainisquitefrequentinourexperience.Inaheatedargument,oneofthecontestantsmaymisunderstandsomethinghis
opponentsayspreciselybecausehewantstocornertheopponentandwishestouseanyammunitionhecantoachievehispurpose.Inthissituation,Iassumethatthe
audience(i.e.,oneofthecontestants)misunderstandsbecauseitwantsto,butitdoessowithoutunderstandingwhattheauthorofthetextmeans.Thereis,moreover,
athirdpossibilitynamely,thatthemisunderstandingoccurseventhoughtheaudienceunderstandswhattheauthormeansbut,ignoringit,goesontoactasifwhatthe
authormeantwerewhattheaudiencewisheshimtomean.Thefirstkindofmisunderstandingmaybecalledunintended,thesecond,intendedbutunsconsciousand
thethird,intendedandconscious.
Thefirstofthesekindsofmisunderstandings,theunintended,seemsimmunefromcriticism.Ourexperiencetestifiestothefactthatmisunderstandingsarefrequently
unintendedindeed,oftentheyareregrettedbytheparty

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whomisunderstood.Thesecondandthirdkindsofmisunderstanding,however,arenotbeyondcriticism.Considerthethirdintendedandconscious
misunderstanding.Onemayobjecttothisbypointingoutthatthiskindofmisunderstandingimpliesacorrectunderstandingofthetextandthuscanhardlybea
misunderstanding.Strictlyspeaking,thisseemstoberight.Misunderstandinginthissensepresupposesunderstandingandthuscannotberegardedasa
misunderstanding.ItdoesnotseempossibletoclaimthatIwillfullythinkthatPetermeantthatMaryshouldsmokeinthisroomandconsiderthatamisunderstandingof
whatPetersaid,whenIunderstandwhatPetersaidasmeaningthatMaryshouldnotsmokeinthisroom.However,theremaybenodifficultyinthiscaseafterall,
providedwekeepinmindthatinthiscasewehavetwodifferentacts,theoriginalactofunderstandingandasubsequentactofmisunderstandinginwhichtheaudience
engagesbecauseitwantsto,say,conveythatmisunderstandingtosomeoneelsesothattheauthorbemisunderstood,andsoon.Thus,wereallydonothavethesame
thingbeingbothanunderstandingandamisunderstanding.Rather,wehavetwoacts,oneofunderstandingandoneofmisunderstanding,whichnotonlyare
ontologicallyseparatebutalsoyielddifferentcausalanalyses.
Theproblemofthesecond,themisunderstandingthatisintendedbutunconscious,isthatitpostulatesawillfullmisunderstandingwithouthavinganunderstanding.
HowcanIthinkthatPetermeantthatMaryshouldsmokeinthisroom,andconsiderthatawillfulmisunderstandingofwhatPetersaid,whenIunderstandwhatPeter
saidonlyasmeaningthatMaryshouldsmokeinthisroom?Itwouldappearthatwillfulmisunderstandingrequiresunderstandingandthusthatitalwayshastobe
conscious.
Idonotbelieve,however,thatexperiencebearsthisconclusion.Inmanycasesweknowthat,whenweadoptacertainunderstandingofatext,weare
misunderstandingitpreciselybecauseweseethatitcouldnotbeunderstoodaswechoosetounderstandit,eventhoughwedonotreallyknowwhatitmeans.
Indeed,insomecasesweknowthattheauthorcouldnothavemeantwhatwesayhemeansbecauseitwouldobviouslybeunhelpfultohisargument,orbecausehe
deniessuchaviewelsewhere,butnonethelessweattributesuchmeaningtothetext,thuswillfulymisunderstandingit.
Havingclarifiedthreedifferentcasesofmisunderstanding,wemaynowgobacktotheword'subversive'andseehowitisthataudiencesmaybesubversive.By
callinganaudiencesubversiveonemaymeanthreedifferentthings:(1)thatanaudiencehasmisunderstoodatext,buthasdonesounintentionally(2)thatanaudience
hasmisunderstoodatextintentionally,butwithoutknowingthemeaningthetexthasand(3)thattheaudiencehasmisunderstoodatextintentionally,knowingthe
meaningofthetext.Ofthesethree,itseemstomethatonlythelasttwosensestrulywarranttheuseoftheterm'subversive.'Audiencesaresubversivewhenthey
intentionallydivorcethetextfromits

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meaning,buttheyarenotsubversiveiftheirmisunderstandingisnotintentional.Whenaudiencesactsubversively,theyarenotactingasaudiencesbutasauthors,even
thoughtheymaystylethemselvestobeaudiences.InsuchcasestheirfunctionturnsouttobeinterpretativeinoneofthesensesdescribedinChapter3,wherethe
audiencewasunderstoodtobesearchingforanidealtextofitsowndevising.Undertheseconditions,anaudienceisindeedsubversiveinsofarasitpretendstobe
whatitisnotandatthesametimedistortsthemeaningofthetext.
Sofarwehavebeenspeakingoftheaudienceofatextasifitwereone.However,wesawearlierthattherearefourdifferentaudiencesofatext:theauthor
consideredasaudience,andthecontemporaneous,intermediary,andcontemporaryaudiences.Itisquiteobviousthatwhathasbeensaidconcerningsubversiveness
easilyappliestoallthesebutthefirst.Thereisnodifficultyinconceivingacontemporaneousaudience,forexample,asbeingsubversiveinitsunderstandingofatext.
Wefrequentlyseethisinpoliticaldebates,wheretextsaretakenoutofcontextandthuspurposefullymisunderstood.Andthesamecanbesaidaboutthe
contemporaryandintermediaryaudiences.Itisfrequenttofindphilosopherswhoseattitudetowardhistoricaltextsissuchthattheirunderstandingsofthosetextsare
filledwithhistoricalinaccuracies.Sometimesthisistheresultofapurposefulattituderesultingfromideologicalorapologeticconsiderationssometimestheyare
unintendedconsequencesresultingfrompoormethodologicalproceduresbasedonmistakenhistoriographicalprinciplesandothertimestheyaretheresultofthe
philosopher'sframeofreference,whichtendstocolorhisorherperspective.31Theonlyaudiencetowhichsubversionseemsdifficulttoapplyistheauthorwhenhe
isconsideredasaudience,butevenheretherearesituationswhereonemightwanttoarguethatsubversivenessispossible.
Considerasituationinwhichanauthorhascomposedatextexpressingapointofviewthatlaterontheauthorrealizesisdangerousinsofarasitmayimperilhiswell
beingbecausethoseonwhomhedependsforthatwellbeingdisagreeorcondemnthepointofview.Andsupposethat,whentheauthoriscalledtotaskbythose
personsconcerningtheviewsthetextexpresses,heindicatesthatitwasnotatalltheviewheintendedtoconveythroughthetextbutsomeotherviewthatisinperfect
accordancewiththeviewofhisquestioners.Coulditnotbearguedthat,inacasesuchasthis,theauthorissubvertingthetextandthusunderstandingitinawaythat
purposefullydistortsitsmeaning?Moreover,heisdoingsonotbecausehemayhaveforgottenwhatheoriginallymeantandthusunintentionally,butratherbecausehe
intendstochangethetext'smeaningtosavehisskin?Iamnotspeakingofretractions,suchasthoseofAugustineandGalileo,butofattemptsonthepartofauthors
intentionallytodistortthemeaningoftextstheyhavecomposed.

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Itdoesnotmakeagreatdealofsensetoarguethatauthorscanbecomesubversiveaudienceswhiletheprocessofproductionisgoingon,butthereisnothingodd
aboutacceptingthattheycanbecomesoatperiodsaftertheprocessofproductionhastakenplace.Thiscanhappenasaresultoffactorsthatmakeitintheirbest
interesttomisunderstandtextstheyhaveproduced.32
B.RepressiveCharacter
Apartfromthesubversivecharacter,onemayalsoraisethequestionastowhetheraudiencesexerciserepressioninwayssimilartothewaysauthorsmayact
repressively.AnextendeddiscussionoftherepressivecharacterofauthorswaspresentedinChapter3,sothereisnoneedtosaymuchaboutrepressionitselfhere
whatwassaidtheresufficesforourpurposes.Itisenoughtoremindourselvesthatrepressionisunderstoodhereasinvolvingtheimpositionoflimitationsonothers
andthustheexerciseofpoweranddominionoverthem.
Anauthorcouldbeunderstoodtoexercisepoweranddominionovertheaudiencesofthetexthecreatesinsofarashelimitstherangeofunderstandingsofthetext
opentothoseaudiences.Moreover,wesawthatitwasnotthehistoricalauthor,butthepseudohistorical,thecomposite,andtheinterpretativeauthorsthatcould
functionrepressively.Nowwemeantoask,first,whetheritmakessensetosaythataudiencesalsomayberepressivebyexercisingunduepoweranddominionand,
second,abouttheidentityofthepersonswhoaretheobjectofrepression.
Toacertainextenttheanswertothesequestionshasalreadybeengiveninsofarasitwasgrantedearlierthattheinterpretativeandcompositeauthorsarealso
audiences.Asaudiences,theyunderstandtextsandthatunderstanding,whencommunicatedtootheraudiences,imposesconstraintsonthoseotheraudiences.
Audiencesexercisepoweranddominionoverotheraudienceswhenevertheirunderstandingofatextguidesandlimitstheunderstandingofthoseaudiences.The
contemporaneousaudiencemayindeedexercisepowerovertheintermediaryandthecontemporary,andtheintermediaryoverthecontemporary.Obviously,because
thereisanorderoftemporalpriorityamongthese,theexerciseofpowerisunidirectionalandpointstowardthecontemporaryaudience.
Thisisnotall,however,foraudiencescanalsoexercisepowerovertheauthor,includingthehistoricalauthor,evenwhenthoseaudiencesdonotactuallyexist.This
occursthroughtheauthor'sviewsabouttheaudience.Anauthormayfeelconstraintsnotonlyonwhathecansaybutalsointhewayhesaysitbecauseofthe
audienceshethinksmayhaveaccesstothetextheproduces.Philosophersinparticularhavefrequentlybeenconsciousoftheseconstraintsandhavedealtwiththem
invariousways.Averroes,forexample,

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adviseshisphilosophicalreadershisintendedaudiencethattheyshouldbecarefulwithwhattheysaybecauseonlythosebrightenough,educatedenough,and
withsufficientleisuretothinkphilosophicalissuesthroughcanbetrustedwithphilosophicalinformation.Forthosewho,eitherbecauseoftheirdeficientnature,
insufficienttraining,orlackoftime,cannotunderstandwhatphilosopherssayareliabletomisunderstanditandcausesufferingtophilosophers.33Thisisatestimonial
tothepoweraudienceshaveoverauthors.
But,wemayask,isthepowerofaudiencesoverotheraudiences,andevenoverauthors,tobeunderstoodalwaysasrepressive?Theanswertothisquestionis
negativebecausetherepressiondependsontheobjectiveinquestionandthecircumstancesinvolved.ThatIhavetowriteinEnglishbecausemyaudiencereads
Englishimposesonmecertainconstraints,becauseattimesitseemstomethatIcoulddobetterinmynativetongue.Buttheconstraintsarenotrepressiveinsofaras
therearenoseriousanddeleteriousconsequencestomyadherencetothedemandsofmyaudiencetheremaybesomeinsofarasmyEnglishspeakingaudience
mayfeelthatthetextIproduceisnotclearenoughorlacksthelusterthatanativespeakerofEnglishcouldgiveit.Ontheotherhand,if,likeAverroes,Icouldnot
criticizethepresidentoftheuniversitywhereIteachbecausewereItodosoIwouldlosemyjob,wehaveobviouslyacaseofperniciouslimitationandthus
repression.
Somethingsimilarmayapplytothepowerexercisedbyaudiencesonotheraudiences.Itwouldbeacaseofrepressionforanaudiencetoexercisepowerover
anotherifsuchpowerpreventedthesecondaudiencefromunderstandingatextcorrectly.Supposethatateacherisexplainingacertainequation,andstudentA
understandsitinonewayandstudentBisguidedbyA'sunderstanding,wheninfactAhasmisunderstoodtheequation.Thismaybetakentoberepressive,perhaps,
butitwouldcertainlynotberepressiveforAtoinfluenceBprovidedAisrightandB'sobjectistounderstandtheequationcorrectly.Ofcourse,Iamassumingthat
noexternalconstraintsareinvolved.Ifsomewere,theinfluenceofAwouldberepressiveeveniftheoutcomeweredesirable,butitisquestionablethatinsuchcases
Awouldbeactingasanaudience.
Theaudience,then,justliketheauthor,mayactrepressivelybutneednotdoso.Repressionisnotinthenatureoftheaudience,justasitisnoteitherinthenatureof
theauthor.
V.SubjectivityoftheAudience
Onthematterofthesubjectivityoftheaudience,notmuchcanbeaddedtowhatwassaidinChapter3concerningthesubjectivityoftheauthor.Audiences,like
authors,aresubjects,andhowthataffectstextsisinmanywayssimilarinbothcases.

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Asinthecaseoftheauthor,theepistemicdimensionsofsubjectivityaremostimportantwhendiscussingtherelationofanaudiencetoatext.Moreover,that
subjectivityislikewisetobeinterpretedasaframeworkcomposedoftheconceptsandexperiencesoftheaudience.Inthecaseofagroupaudience,thisframework
isthegroup'saccumulationofpertinentindividualviewsandconceptswheretheaudienceiscomposedofonlyoneperson,itisthepertinentconceptsand
experiencesofthatperson.
Thesubjectivityoftheaudiencefunctionsasacontextwithinwhichatextisencounteredandonthebasisofwhichitisunderstood,forinthatsubjectivitythe
connectionbetweentheentitiesthatconstitutethetextandthemeaningofthetextismade.Moreover,withinthatsubjectivity,intheconceptsandexperiencesthat
composeit,theaudiencefindsboththerulesandelementsthatallowthesubjecttofillinthelacunaeinthetext.Finally,inthecontextofthatsubjectivity,theactsof
understandingoftheaudiencetakeplaceandthusthemeaningofthetextisgrasped.
Quasubjectivities,thesubjectivityoftheauthorandthatoftheaudiencearenodifferent.Theirdifferencesstemfromtwoothersources.Thefirstisthattheauthorand
theaudienceareindividuallydistinctsubjects(exceptinthecaseoftheauthorconsideredasanaudiencediscussedearlier).Thisnumericaldistinctionopensupthe
possibility,indeedthecertaintyinourworldofexperience,ofadiversityofconceptualframeworksandexperiencesthatmodifyinimportantwaystherelationship
betweeneachofthesubjectsandthetext.
Thesecondsourceofdifferencehastodo,asshouldbeexpected,withthedifferentrolesofauthorandaudience.Theauthorfunctionsasthecreatorofthetext,
whereastheaudienceisexpectedtounderstandit.Thesubjectivityoftheauthor,then,hasadirectcausalrelationtothetextandwhatitwillbe.Bycontrast,the
subjectivityoftheaudience,exceptwheretheaudienceinquestionistheauthor,hasadirectcausalroleonlyintheunderstandingtheaudiencederivesfromthetext.
Itscausalroleonthetextitselfisonlyindirect,insofarastheauthorconsciouslyorunconsciouslyconsiderstheaudienceinthecompositionofthetextandshapesthe
textinsuchawaythatitwillhavetheeffecthedesiresontheintendedaudience.Thesubjectivityoftheauthor,then,directlyaffectswhatthetextis.Thesubjectivityof
theaudienceaffectsthetextonlyindirectly,butitdirectlyconditionstheunderstandingtheaudiencehasofthetext.34
Inthediscussionofauthors,adistinctionwasdrawnbetweentwopartsofthesubjectivityofauthors:nonindividualexperiencesandculturalelementsauthorsbring
withthemtothecompositionoftexts,ontheonehand,andthepurelyindividualelementsuniquetothem,ontheother.Now,ifthesubjectivityoftheaudienceistobe
understoodinasimilarway,thenwemustconcludethatsuchsubjectivityincludesthesetofconceptions,beliefs,andexperiencesuniquetotheaudience.Butthis
createsaproblem.For,ifthisissoandthe

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understandingoftextsisrootedinthatsubjectivity,thenitfollowsthateachaudiencemayunderstandtextsdifferentlyandalsodifferentlyfromthewaytheirauthors
understoodthem.
Thesituation,however,isnotasseriousasitlooks,fortworeasons.Thefirstisthatthesubjectivityofaudiencesincludescommonelementsofculturethatfunctionas
bondsandbridges,asinfactlanguagedoes.Thesecondisthat,eventhoughtheexperiencesandbeliefsofdifferentpersonsmayvarywidely,theyareexperiences
andbeliefsofhumanpersonsandthusarerootedinacommonfoundation.Subjectivitydoesnotimplycompletedifferenceandconsequentlyalienation.Itispossible
tograntuniquenesstosomeelementsofthesubjectivityofauthorsandaudiencesandyetacceptthattheycanunderstandtextsinthesameway.Thecommon
elementsmakecommonunderstandingpossibletheelementsofdifferencemakepossiblethecreativitydisplayedbyauthorsandexplainthedifferentunderstandings
andmisunderstandingsoftextsbyaudiences.
VI.Conclusion
Letmeclosethischapterbystressingthemainpointsmadeinit.Firstinorderofimportanceisthat,contrarytoapositionrecentlyadoptedbysomephilosophersand
literarycritics,audiencesarenecessaryconditionsoftextuality.Therearenotextsiftherearenoactualorpotentialaudiencesforthosetexts.Indeed,becauseIhave
arguedthatauthorsfunctionasaudiencesduringthecreativeprocess,myviewisthatthereisalwaysanaudienceforatext,evenifinsomecasesthataudienceis
restrictedtotheauthorofthetext.
Asecondpointthatneedstobestressedisthatthefunctionofanaudienceofatextistounderstandthetext.Thisfunction,contrarytoformerlywidespreadviews,is
notwhollypassivebutinvolvesbothpassiveandactiveelements.Theaudiencedoesnotjustreceiveunderstandingtheunderstandingoftextstakesactive
participationandworkandinvolvesfillinglacunae,tyingartifactstomeanings,reconstruction,andevaluation.
Thisactivecharacteroftheaudienceleadstothepossibilitythattheaudiencemaybesubvertingtheintendedmeaningoftexts.Inthisarea,theviewdefendedhereis
thataudiencesmaymisunderstandtextsinthreedifferentways:unintentionally,intentionallybutwithoutknowingthemeaningofthetext,andintentionallybutknowing
themeaningofthetext.Onlyinthelasttwosensesmayanaudiencebesaidtoactsubversively,forinthefirstthechangeinthemeaningofthetextisunintentional.
Withrespecttotherepressivecharacterofaudiences,weconcludedthataudiencescanfunctionrepressivelywithrespectbothtootheraudiencesandtoauthors.But
suchafunctionisnotpartofthenatureofaudiences,dependingonthecaseinquestion,theobjectivepursued,andthecircumstancessurroundingit.

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Audiencesturnouttobeofvarioussorts.Inadditiontotheauthorofatext,whoincomposingthetextfunctionsinpartasitsaudience,therearealsointended,
contemporaneous,intermediary,andcontemporaryaudiences.Audiences,therefore,varyagreatdealandwiththemvarythecontextsinwhichtextsareapproached,
leadingtodifferentunderstandingsofthesetexts.Moreover,audiencescanbecomposedofasinglepersonormanypersons,whichagainmayleadtodifferent
understandingsoftexts.Thesedifferentunderstandingsarenottheresultofameredifferenceinthenumberofpersonsoroftheindividualpersonsthatcomposethe
audience.Rather,theyaretheresultofthesubjectivityoftheaudiencenamely,individualexperiencesandviewsinthecaseofsinglepersonsandcommoncultural
traitsandbeliefsinthecaseofgroupsofpersons.Moreover,becausetheaudienceaffectstextsindirectly,throughtheauthor'sintentionsbasedonhisknowledgeof
theaudience,thissubjectiveaspectoftheaudienceacquiresextraordinaryimportancefortheunderstandingoftexts.

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Conclusion
IntheprecedingpagesIhavepresentedaviewoftheontologicalstatusandidentityoftextsandoftherelationshipoftextstoauthorsandaudiences.Itcompletesthe
basicelementsofthetheoryoftextualitywhoselogicalandepistemologicalfoundationsIpresentedinATheoryofTextuality.
ThemaintenetsofthepartofthetheoryIhaveexploredherearethattextsareontologicallycomplexandconstitutedbyentitiesconsideredtohaveamentalrelation
tomeaning.Theentitiesinquestioncanbeindividualoruniversal,physicalormental,andsubstancesorthefeaturesofsubstances.Buttextscanbeconstitutedonlyby
substancesconsideredascharacterizedbyfeaturesorbythefeaturesofsubstances.Moreover,textsarealwaysaggregateswithmeaningsbut,liketheirmeanings,
theycanbeindividualoruniversal.
Individualtextshavetheexistenceandlocationpropertotheindividualsinquestion.Incontrast,universaltextsareneutralwithrespecttoexistenceandlocation,and
theirhistoricityisthehistoricityoftheirinstances.
Theidentityconditionsoftextswhetherwearespeakingofachronic,synchronic,ordiachronicidentityincludetheidentityconditionsoftheentitiesofwhichthey
areconstitutedandtheirmeaning.Accordingly,theidentificationandreidentificationoftextsrequireknowledgeofthoseconditionsinmostcases.
Thenotionofauthorisnotunivocal.Onecandistinguishamongseveralauthorsofatextandthereforeseveralfunctionsaswell,althoughthehistoricalauthoris
generallyregardedasparadigmatic.Historicalauthorsareresponsiblefortheelementsofnoveltyinatexttheycreatetextsandthereforearenecessarytothem.
Theoftendiscussedrepressivecharacterofanauthorisnotalwayssoandneverappliestothehistoricalauthor.Whenrepressionoccurs,itisexercisedbytheview
anaudiencehasofthehistoricalauthorthatis,bythepseudohistoricalauthor.
Theaudiencealsoisnotunivocalandneitherareitsfunctions.Theaudiencecontemporaneouswiththehistoricalauthorisparadigmatic,anditsfunctionisto
understandthetext.Textsareneverwithoutaudiencesfortheauthorincludesthefunctionofaudience.Audiences,likeauthors,canactrepressively,andtheycanbe
subversivewhentheydistortthemeaningoftexts.
Theseviewsareintendedtoreflectourmostbasicintuitionsabouttexts,toeliminatesomeoftheinconsistenciesthatcharacterizethoseintuitions,and

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todeepenourunderstandingofthephilosophicalissuesposedbytexts.Theyhavenoclaimtocompleteness.Evenasuperficialglanceatwhathasbeenaccomplished
willrevealimportantgapsthatneedfilling.Forexample,Isayverylittle,exceptinpassing,abouttheethical,political,andaestheticissuesthatcanberaisedin
connectionwithtexts.Ihavenotconsideredtheissuesofpower,ideology,andeconomicsthathavebeenraisedinsomeoftherecentliteratureontexts.Ihave
omitteddiscussionofnotionssuchasdocument,version,draft,discourse,andthelike,whicharethespecialpurvueofeditors.Ihavelargelyignoredmattersinvolved
intherelationoftextstoculture,society,andhistory,althoughIhavepaidsomeattentiontotheseinATheoryofTextuality.EvenintheareasIdiscuss,suchas
ontology,manyquestionshavebeenleftunansweredandothershavenotbeenraisedatall.Forexample,Ihaveignoredissuesofontologyandtaxonomythatarise
fromthepeculiarcharacterofcertaintextssuchasdramatictexts,althoughIbelievemytheorycontainstheelementsnecessarytodealeffectivelywiththeseissues.
AndIhavepaidinsufficientattentiontoissuesofparticularinteresttotextualcriticsconcernedwiththeidentityoftexts,althoughagainIbelievemytheorycontainsthe
elementsnecessarytoaddressthoseissuessuccessfully.Myonlyexcusefortheseomissionsisthattofillthegapsinasatisfactorymannerwouldhaveturnedthisbook
intoaverylargeandunwieldyvolume.Inspiteoftheseshortcomings,however,IhopetheviewsIpresentconstituteagoodstartforthosewhoconcernthemselves
withtextuality.
ThepositionIhavepresented,incompletethoughitmaybe,laysthegroundworkforanapproachtotextsthatmakessomeheadwayatleastintheclarificationofthe
issuesposedbytextuality,theinterrelationofthoseissues,andthearticulationofaconsistenttheorythatcouldbeusedasapointofdepartureforfuturediscussions.
Imakenoclaimstofinalityorultimatetruth.Myhopeisthatthosewhohavestayedwithmehaveprofitedfromtheireffortandhavefoundinthediscussionthekindof
stimulationthatwillleadthemtoexaminefurthertheissuesIraiseandtodeveloptheirownviewswithrespecttothoseandotherrelatedissues.Thetruelifeofthe
mindisactiveandsoItrustthereadingofthisbookwillleadtoactivityandnotrest.Inthatsense,Iwouldratherhaveitproduceactivedisagreementthancontented
acquiescense.

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Notes
Introduction
1.ATheoryofTextuality,PartI.
2.Thereareordinarysensesoftheterm'sign.'Forexample,'sign'maymeananoticepostedsomewhere.ButthisisnotthesenseIhaveinmindhere.
Chapter1.OntologicalStatus
1.AristotlehimselfneversettledontenthenumbervariesbutintheCategoriesheliststen.See1b25,p.8.
2.Amongothercategoriesusedtodescribetheontologicalstatusoftextsareaction,event,process,possibility,andassemblages.SeeSectionVandn.37inthis
chapter.SeealsoRicoeur,''TheModeloftheText:MeaningfulActionConsideredasaText."Themostambitiousattempttodatetoestablishanontologyoftextsby
atextualcriticappearsinShillingsburg's"TextasMatter,Concept,andAction."
3.Itdoesnotfollowfromthis,however,thattextsarerelations,assomephilosopherspropose.Seen.30.
4.Gracia,Individuality,pp.45ff.
5.Noteveryoneagreeswiththisstatement.SeeMargolis,"TheOntologicalPeculiarityofWorksofArt,"p.47.ForPeirce,seeCollectedPapers,vol.4,par.537.
6.Cf.Castaeda,"IndividuationandNonIdentity,"p.132bandBunge,"Quesunindividuo?"p.123.
7.Mostscholasticsafterthetwelfthcenturybelievedso.See,forexample,Surez,Disputationesmetaphysicae,Vol.5,1,4,and5,7inGracia'stranslation,pp.
32and139ff.
8.Aristotle,Categories2a11,p.9.
9.Cf.Ayer,"Individuals,"pp.1ff.,andmydiscussioninIndividuality,pp.5860.
10.Forthemuchdiscussedproblemoftheontologicalstatusofartobjects,seeZemach,"Nesting,"pp.296ff.Gracia,Individuality,pp.1023Wolterstorff,
"Toward

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anOntologyofArtWorks,"pp.115ff.Margolis,"TheOntologicalPeculiarityofWorksofArt,"pp.4550andIngarden,whodevotestheentireTheLiterary
WorkofArttothisissue.Wolterstorff'sviewisthatworksofartare"kinds"(i.e.,universals).Margolis'sviewisthattheyaretokensofatypethatexistembodied
inphysicalobjects.AndIngardenspeaksofidealconcepts.AsIhavepointedoutintheplacenoted,theontologicalstatusofaworkofartdependsverymuchon
whatoneunderstandsby'workofart,'andsomethingsimilarappliestotexts.Theutteranceofanoraltextappearstoberelatedtothetextinwayssimilartothe
waysinwhichtheperformanceofamusicalpieceisrelatedtothepiece.
11.AsTansellehaspointedoutinARationaleofTextualCriticism,p.51,notwoprintedbooksareexactlyalike,evenwhentheyusethesametypeofscript.But
Iamdiscountingdifferencesthatinpracticedonotmakeuschallengetheidentityofatext.Indeed,Iamassumingthatdifferencesinscript(uncialvs.Gothic,for
example)donotaltertheidentityofthetext.MoreonthisinChapter2.
12.Sometextualcriticsfollowanentirelydifferentstrategytheyappeartoidentifythetypeoruniversalwiththeworkandthetokensorindividualswiththetexts.
See,forexample,McLaverty,in"TheModeofExistenceofLiteraryWorksofArt,"pp.8386.AndShillingsburgseemstoidentifytheuniversalwiththeworkand
itsinstanceswithwhathecallsmaterialtexts.See"TextasMatter,Concept,andAction,"pp.75and81.Neitheroftheseproposalsworksinmyscheme.
13.Theremaybequestionsastowhetherthemeaningsof3and4arethesame,buteveniftheywerenot,thiswouldnotweakenmyargumentirreparably,forthe
questionswouldbeabouttheexampleandnotaboutthepointtheexampleissupposedtoillustrate.
14.Gracia,Individuality,pp.14178.
15.Ibid.,pp.17078.
16.Anotherwayoflookingattextsistoseethemassensibleandnonsensibleratherthanphysicalandmental.Thiswayofclassifyingthemgoesbacktothetraditional
classificationofsignsinthatway.Butobviouslythisisarelationalwayoflookingattextsandsignsthatdoesnottellusmuchabouttexts,orsigns,themselves.The
Conimbricensesthoughtofsignsasbothsensibleandnonsensible.SeeDesigno,q.1,a.1,p.6.Butthisviewisnotuniversallyshared.ForAugustine,forexample,
allsignsaresensible.SeeDedoctrinachristiana,2,5,p.35.
17.Thattextsarephysicalinthissensedoesnotentailthateverythingaboutthemisphysical,fortextsareECTswithmeaning.Foranauthorwhorejectstheclaim
thattextscanbephysical,seeJones,PhilosophyandtheNovel,p.181.AmongthosewhoargueforthephysicalityoftextsareHowardHill,in"VarietyinEditing
andReading,"p.55,andProctorandAbbott,inIntroductiontoBibliographicalandTextualStudies,p.3.Thecontroversyoverthephysicalvs.thenonphysical
characteroftextsmostoftentakesplaceinthecontextofeditorialpolicy.Traditionaleditorialpolicyhaslookedupontextsasstablephysicalobjects,theproductsof
authorialintention.Butthisview

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hasbeenchallengedbythosewhoclaimthattextsarenotproductsbutprocesses,andunstableratherthanstable.SeeShillingsburg,"TheAutonomousAuthor,
theSociologyofTexts,andPolemicsofTextualCriticism."Forotherviewsonthisissue,seeEggert,"TextualProductorTextualProcess"McLaverty,"Issuesof
IdentityandUtterance"andGrigely,"TheTextualEvent."
18.Theclassificationofphysicaltextsaccordingtothesensesthroughwhichtheymaybeperceived,coupledwiththekindofordinarylanguageweusetotalkabout
theobjectswesenseandsensations,producesconsiderableambiguity.Strictlyspeaking,itisonethingtospeakaboutaphysicalentitythatmaybeperceivedina
certainwayandanothertospeakaboutthesensationitself.Itisonethingtospeakoftheentitythatisthecauseofasmellandanothertospeakofthesmellitself.But
oftenthisdistinctionisnotmade,asisevidentfromthewaywespeakaboutsound.SothequestionarisesastowhethertheECTsofanolfatorytext,forexample,are
theentitiesthatproducecertainsmellsorarethesmellsthemselves(thesensations)oftheolfatorytext.Thisraisesthekindofissuesthatdroveearlymodern
philosopherstodistraction.Idonotwishtogetintothiscontroversyhere,butIdowanttoalertthereadertotheambiguitythatcharacterizesthediscussionandisa
directresultofamuchdeeperambiguityinthewaywespeakabouttheobjectswesense.
19.Itusedtobethecasethatoraltextsweretakenasparadigmaticoftextualityinmanyquarters,butdeconstructionistshavechallengedthisposition,identifying
textualitywithwriting(criture)ratherthanspeech(parole).Thisshifthasimportantimplications,asAbramspointsoutin"TheDeconstructiveAngel,"pp.428ff.,
leadingtosomeoftheviewsIexploreinChapter4ofATheoryofTextuality.Theproblematicnatureoftherelationandorderofprioritybetweenwrittenandoral
textshasbeenrecognizedatleastasfarbackasPlato.SeePhaedrus27478,pp.51924.
20.Augustine,Deliberoarbitrio2,pp.28788.
21.Forsomerecenthermeneuticistsandtextualcritics,onlywrittentextsqualifyastexts.Thereason,theyargue,isthatonlywrittentextshavethepermanencethat
goesbeyondthecircumstancesoftheircompositionandthatisnecessaryfortextuality.Butthisisnotright,fororaltextscanbetapedandthuscanhaveasmuch
permanenceaswrittentexts.RicoeurrestrictstextualitytowrittentextsinHermeneuticsandtheHumanSciences(1989),p.108.Grigely,however,hasarguedfor
oraltextsin"TheTextualEvent,"pp.187ff.
22.Otherdifferenceshavebeensuggestedaswell.Searlesuggestsadegreeofpermanencein"ReiteratingtheDifferences,"p.200.Ricoeurhassuggestedthatinoral
textsthemeaningofthetextcoincideswiththespeaker'sintentionbutinwrittentextsthisisnotthecase,inInterpretationTheory,p.29.
23.ThePhaedrusnotesthatwritingisanimageofspeech(276b)andAristotlethoughtthatwrittenwordsarealwayssignsofspokenwords(OnInterpretation,ch.
1,16a3,p.40).Thisviewwassubsequentlyadoptedbymanyscholastics,suchasSurezandtheConimbricenses.

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24.AsSearlehasnoted,thedependenceofwritingonspokenlanguageisahistoricallycontingentfact,forartificiallanguagesreversethisdependencewithout
contradiction."ReiteratingtheDifferences,"p.207.SeealsoShusterman,"TheAnomalousNatureofLiterature."
25.ForPeirce,thisappliesonlytotokens,fortokensaredirectlysignsfortypesandindirectlysignsforwhateverelsetheysignify.Dipert,"TypesandTokens,"p.
588.
26.Ihavebeenspeakingasifthesametextcouldhavemorethanonemeaning.InfactIopposethisfaondeparlerbothinChapter2ofthisbookandinChapter4
ofATheoryofTextuality.Atexthasonlyonemeaning,butthatmeaningcanbebroad,varied,andevenopenended,dependingontheculturalfunctionofthetext.
27.Thisdoesnotentailthatperceptionisacriterionofphysicalityindeed,presumablymatterisphysicalandyetitisnotperceivable.Iammerelyindicatinga
differencebetweenonekindofphysicaltextandmentaltexts.
28.Theliteratureonthistopicisstaggering,butaplacetostartisFeigl'sThe"Mental"andthe"Physical.
29.Iamomittingdiscussionofanissuefrequentlydiscussedbyphilosophersandothers:therelativevalueandrealityoftextsquabearersofmeaning.InthePlatonic
tradition,exemplifiedbyAugustineandothers(seeDemagistroIX,25),meaningsareregardedasmorevaluableandrealthanthesignsusedtoconveythem.For
somerecentauthors,likeDerrida,theorderisreversed(see"SignatureEventContext").SeealsoGreetham,"[Textual]CriticismandDeconstruction,"p.4.
30.TherelationofECTstomeaningcoupledwiththeassumptionthatmeaningisalwayssomethingpresentinasubjectisprobablythereasonwhyGadamer,for
example,speaksoftextsasiftheywererelations.TruthandMethod,pp.262and267.WachterhauserattributestoGadamertheassumptionthattextsarerelations
in"InterpretingTexts,"p.441.
31.Seen.8.
32.Forsomeofthebackgroundtothesedistinctions,seePorphyry'sIsagoge.
33.Anotherreasonthatcouldbegivenisthattheverynotionofsubstanceincludesthenotionoffeaturesandthereforethatitmakesnosensetospeakofsubstances
consideredapartfromtheirfeatures.Idonothavethespacetodiscussthemeritsofthisreason,butforsomeonewhohasarguedinfavorofthenotionof
characterizedsubstances,seeLong,"ParticularsandTheirQualities."
34.SeeNehamas,"Writer,Text,Author,Work,"p.277,and"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.688.Nehamasvacillates,however,betweencharacterizingtextsasactionsand
astheproductsofactions(seethefirstarticle,p.278).SeealsoBakhtin,SpeechGenresandOtherLateEssays,p.105.
35.ForAustin,seeHowToDoThingswithWords.

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36.ThisisperhapswhatMcLavertyisgettingatin"IssuesofIdentityandUtterance,"p.140.
37.Otherpositionshavebeendevelopedbytextualcritics.Shillingsburgthinksoftextsasprocessesin"TheAutonomousAuthor,theSociologyofTexts,and
PolemicsofTextualCriticism"Grigelyconceivesthemaseventsin"TheTextualEvent"Hayarguesforaviewofthemaspossibilitiesin"DoesTextExist?"and
McGanndefendstheviewofatextasapolytextoranevercompleteassamblage.UnfortunatelyIlackthespacetodojusticetothesepositions.Sufficeittosay,
first,thattheseviewsconceivetextsasunstablebecauseofthefluctuationofwhatIhavecalledECTs,theirmeaning,orboth.Second,someofthesepositionscanbe
accommodatedwithinmyframeworkbecausetheauthorsdonotalwaysaddressthesameontologicalissueIhaveraised.Third,someofthecategoriesusedbythese
authors,suchasprocessandevent,canbereducedtothecategoriesofsubstanceandfeatureIhaveused.
38.Foranaltogetherdifferentapproachtothisquestion,seeHay,"DoesTextExist?"Sheconceivesatextasnothingactualbutratherasanecessarypossibilityin
relationtoapretext,aposttext,andawrittenwork.ThenotionofpretextwasfirstpositedbyBelleminNolinLetexteetl'avanttexte.Asimilarapproachis
thatofMcGann,forwhomatextis"aseriesofactsofproduction,"aneverendingassemplageorpolytextCritiqueofModernTextualCriticism,p.52.Among
textualcriticsthefirsttoraisethequestionoftheexistenceandlocationoftextswereBateson,inEssaysinCriticalDissent,p.10,andWelleckandWarren,in
TheoryofLiterature.McLavertytakesuptheissuein"TheModeofExistenceofLiteraryWorksofArt,"butisconcernedprimarilywiththedifferencebetwen
textualandnontextualworks.Thequestionheasksis:"IftheMonaLisaisintheLouvre,whereareHamletandLycidas?"ThisisaninterestingquestionforwhichI
havenotimehere.SufficeittosaythatthewrittentextofHamletisadifferenttextfromtheoraltextofHamlet.Thewrittentextinthiscaseplaystheroleascore
playsforasymphony.SeemyATheoryofTextuality,ch.3.
39.Cf.Putnam,Reason,TruthandHistory,p.19.
40.Mostauthorswhoconceivetextsasphysicalholdthisview.Seethereferencesinn.17.
41.Fortheseauthorsatextisanidealthing.SeeTanselle,ARationaleofTextualCriticism,pp.6465.ComparethistoShillingsburg'snotionofaworkasanideal
entity,in"TextasMatter,Concept,andAction,"p.49.IhavediscussedthenotionofanidealtextinATheoryofTextuality,ch.3.
42.Theconfusionbetweenindividualsanduniversalsisrampantintheliteratureontextsandartobjects.ItleadsGadamer,forexample,tosomeofhisenigmatic
statementsabouttheexistenceofgamesandworksofart.SeeTruthandMethod,pp.110and95.SearleaccusesDerridaofsimilarconfusionsin"Reiteratingthe
Differences."
43.Gracia,Individuality,pp.10412.

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44.Orwiththeviewthattextsdonotexist.Amongthosewhodenyexistence,whetherfactualormental,totexts,isDeMan,in"TheRhetoricofBlindness,"p.107.
Theviewthatdeniesexistencetouniversalstakesmanyforms.SeemyIndividuality,pp.7085.
45.Individuality,p.74.
46.ItakeitthatitissomethinglikethisWollheimhadinmindin"OnanAllegedInconsistencyinCollingwood'sAesthetic,"p.259.
47.Gracia,"CuttingtheGordianKnotofOntology."
48.Gracia,Individuality,pp.13440.
Chapter2.Identity
1.Noteveryoneagrees.Manyrecenttextualcriticsholdthatnewtextsarenotthesame.Forexample,Grigelyarguesthatnotextisiterableorrepeatable,foreach
iterationorrepetitionisanewtextowingtothenewcircumstancesthatsurroundtheiteration.See"TheTextualEvent,"pp17186.Idonotintendtoshowthat
Grigelyiswrongbutratherthatthereisasenseinwhichwecanspeakoftextsasbeingthesameandasbeingdifferent.
2.Thereareothersaswell,ofcourse.Forexample,thereisaviewthatconsidersauthorialintentionasdeterminantoftextualidentity,butthisviewpresupposesthe
notionofanintendedtext,whichIrejectedinChapter3ofATheoryofTextuality.Thenotionofintendedtextisfrequentlyusedintheliterature.SeeTanselle,A
RationaleofTextualCriticism,pp.70ff.
3.ThisisonewaytounderstandDerrida'sview(forasecondway,refertothethirdview,whichfollows).Thepossibilityofdifferentandevencontradictorymeanings
doesnotbotherDerridaladiffranceisforhimoftheessenceoflanguage"SignatureEventContext,"particularlypp.18384,and19293.Meilandhasalso
accusedHirschofholdingthisview.See"InterpretationasCognitiveDiscipline,"pp.3233.Shillingsburgalsoappearstosubscribetoaversionofthisviewin
ScholarlyEditingintheComputerAge,p.49.SeealsoGoodman,LanguagesofArt,pp.116and207.
4.ThispositionhasbeenattributedtoGadamerbyWachterhauserin"InterpretingTexts,"pp.442and45355,wherehecriticizesit.Itappearstobedefendedby
Fish,inIsThereaTextinThisClass?p.vii.
5.Thisisalessradicalversionofthefirstviewdescribed.ItmayalsobeawayofunderstandingDerrida'sposition.Seethereferenceinn.2,andGrigely,"The
TextualEvent,"p.170.
6.See,forexample,McGann,TheTextualCondition,p.4.
7.SeeAustin,HowToDoThingswithWords,pp.98ff.

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8.McLavertyhasdefendedtheviewofatextasanutterance,butheunderstandsanutteranceastheproductofcertainactssuchasputtingforth,issuing,expressing,
publishing,andsoon.Healsobringsinauthorialintention,notintentionofmeaning(asdoHirschandothers),butofutterance.Atextistheintendedproductof
certainauthorialactssuchaspublishing.See"IssuesofIdentityandUtterance,"particularlypp.140and144.BakhtinalsodescribesatextasanutteranceinSpeech
GenresandOtherLateEssays,p.105.
9.Foranexception,seeCurrie's"WorkandText."
10.SeveralofthearticlesinCohen'sDevilsandAngelstakeupthisissue.ParticularlyrelevantisMcLaverty's"IssuesofIdentityandUtterance."
11.Thereisnogeneralagreementonthebestwaytounderstandsimilarityandsameness(identity).Forarecentbutdifferentunderstandingofthesenotions,see
Brennan,ConditionsofIdentity,p.6.
12.Cf.Gracia,IntroductiontotheProblemofIndividuationintheEarlyMiddleAges,p.26.
13.Cf.Chisholm,"IdentitythroughTime,"pp.25ff.Diachronicsamenessisnotthesamenotionasduration.DurationinvolvesforXtobethesameattnandtn+1
(diachronicsameness)andtohavebeenthesamethroughoutthetimeelapsedbetweentnandtn+1.TheconditionsforX'sdurationbetweentnandtn+1involvemore
thantheconditionsofdiachronicsameness.Idiscusstheseconditionslater,inthecontextofthediachronicsamenessofindividualtexts.
14.Cf.Gracia,Individuality,pp.3841,and"NumericalContinuityinMaterialSubstances."
15.IhavediscussedthismatterinChapter1ofATheoryofTextuality.
16.Quine'sviewthatnotwosentencesfromtwodifferentlanguagescanhavethesamemeaningdoesnotunderminetheviewthatanecessaryconditionoftextual
identityismeaningidentity,althoughitdoesprecludethepossibilitythattwosentencesfromtwodifferentlanguagescouldbetextuallythesame.See"Indeterminacyof
TranslationAgain,"pp.910.
17.Thisopinionisfrequentlyputintopracticeandsometimesexplicitlyvoiced.Foraninstanceofthelatter,seeIngarden,TheLiteraryWorkofArt,p.11.
18.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.Thisismysolutiontotheissueraisedbytextualcriticsconcerningwhatisessentialandaccidentalintexts,andappliesnotonly
tomeaning,butalsotofeaturesofthetexts'ECTs,spellings,andsoforth.SeeShillingsburg,"AnInquiryintotheSocialStatusofTextsandModesofTextual
Criticism"Tanselle,"TextualStudyandLiteraryJudgment"andThorpe,PrinciplesofTextualCriticism,ch.5.
19.Themostrecentversionofthisviewconsidersatextasanutteranceoruseof"awordsequence"andthusmakestheauthor,astheonewhoengagesinthe
speech

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act,aconditionoftextualidentity.See,forexample,TolhurstandWheeler,"OnTextualIndividuation,"p.188.Notetheuseoftheterm'individuation'inacontext
where,inaccordancewithmynomenclature,whatisatstakeistheidentityofauniversal.
20.Borges,"PierreMenard,AuthoroftheQuixote,"p.43.
21.Theissueofauthorialidentityhasbeenmuchdiscussedinreferencetoforgeriesinart,andtheissuesraisedinthatcontextdirectlyaffecttheanswertoour
questioninthecaseofartistictexts.However,becausenotalltextsareartistic,ageneraldiscussionoftextualityneednotdwellonthespecificissuesthataffectthem.
Foradiscussionoftheseissues,seeDutton,"ArtisticCrimes"Koestler,"TheAestheticsofSnobbery"andLessing,"WhatIsWrongwithaForgery?"
22.Forspeechacts,seethereferencetoAustininn.7.
23.ThemeaningcannotbeidentifiedwiththeillocutionaryoranyotherofthespeechactsdistinguishedbyAustin,althoughtheperformanceoftheseactsnecessitates
thatthelocutionhavemeaningandreference.Austin,HowToDoThingswithWords,p.94.
24.Wachterhauserhasbrieflydiscussedthepossibilityofatranscendentalegoasthekeytotextualidentityin"InterpretatingTexts,"p.454.
25.Cf.Tolhurst,"OnWhataTextIsandHowItMeans,"pp.4ff.
26.SeeKatz,PropositionalStructureandIllocutionaryForce,p.14.AttheoppositeextremeisDerrida,"SignatureEventContext."
27.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.1.
28.Thisdoesnotentailthattheauthorandaudiencemustbehistoricallyidentifiable.Signsarepartoflanguageandassuchgenerallyhavethesamefeaturesvisvis
authorsandaudiencesthatlanguageshave.SeeChapter2ofATheoryofTextuality.
29.Therearecasesinwhichasignbelongstotwodifferentlanguagesbuthasthesamephysicalappearance,meaning,andgrammaticalfunction(e.g.,thenoun'taco'
isusedbothinSpanishandEnglishforataco).Inthesecasesthecontextisdeterminative,foritwillidentifythelanguagetowhichthesignbelongsandthusallowfor
differentidentity.ForthesakeofsimplificationIamignoringregionalusesof'taco.'
30.Therearealsocasesofwrittensignsthatlookthesamebutaredifferentandarepronounceddifferently.Thisisthecaseof'read'inthepresenttenseand'read'in
thepasttense.
31.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch3.
32.GoodmanandElginmakesyntacticalfunctionthenecessaryandsufficientconditionoftextualidentityin"InterpretationandIdentity,"pp.54ff.Bythesyntaxofa
languagetheymean"thepermissibleconfigurationofletters,spaces,andpunctuationmarks"(p.58).

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33.Tospeakonlyofspellingratherthanappearance,asisfrequentlydone,doesnotdojusticetothecomplexityoftheissue.Forspellingasaconditionofidentity,
seeWilsmore,"TheLiteraryWorkIsNotItsText,"p.312.Goodmangoesfurtherthanthisheidentifiesworkswithtexts,makingsamenessofspellinganecessary
andsufficientconditionoftheidentityofworks.SeeLanguagesofArt,p.115.
34.Ofcourse,capitalsmayfunctionsemantically.Forexample,theuseofcapitalsontheInternetisunderstoodtomeanthatthetextisbeingshouted.
35.Thus,'labor'and'labour'arethesamesigninspiteofthedifferentspelling.Inthiscasetheexplanationisthat'o'and'ou'signifythesamething.QuaECTs,'labor'
and'labour'aredifferent,butquasignstheyarethesame.Foradissentingopinion,seethetextofGoodmantowhichreferencewasmadeinn.32.
36.Cf.Wittgenstein,TractatusLogicoPhilosophicus3.318ff.,pp.52ff.Thesesententialcontextsneednotbesentencesinwhichthesignisusedtheycanbe
sentencesofthemetasysteminwhichthesignismentioned.
37.TheexampleandtheproblemarediscussedbyGoodmanandElginin"InterpretationandIdentity,"p.58.
38.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
39.Mostoftheobjectionswouldbebasedonthefactthat'Aristotle'isapropername,whereas'thePhilosopher'couldbeconstruedasadefinitedescription.But
thenitisquestionablewhether'thePhilosopher'isreallyadefinitedescription.SeeKripke,NamingandNecessity,p.26Searle,SpeechActs,p.173andGracia,
Individuality,pp.22729.
40.Thedifferencebetweenfeatureaggregateandsubstance/featureaggregatetextsdoesnotmakeasubstantialdifferenceforachronicsamenesssoIamleavingout
thediscussionofthesecases.
41.IncaseswheretheentitythathasthefeaturesisnotasubstanceintheAristoteliansensebutratheranotherfeature,thisviewwouldholdthatthesubstancealso
providestheconditionsofidentity.
42.SeeIndividuality,ch.4.
43.SeemyATheoryofTextuality,ch.1.
44.MycriticismisfoundinIndividuality,pp.8889.Foradefenseoftheview,seeAllaire,"BareParticulars."
45.Gracia,Individuality,pp.2124.
46.Ibid.,pp.17996.
47.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.1.
48.Ibid.,chs.4and5.

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Chapter3.Author
1.Authorsarenotnecessarilyrestrictedtotexts.Wefrequentlythinkofauthorsinconnectionwithotherthings,includingdeeds.Hobbes,forexample,thoughtof
authorsinthecontextofanyaction.Leviathan1,16,p.125.
2.HistoricalquestionsalsomayberaisedconcerningtheoriginandhistoryofthenotionofanauthorIndeed,Barthes,amongothers,hasclaimedthatthefigureofthe
authorisamoderncreation.ButIwilldispensewiththissortofhistoricalquestionhere.ForBarthes'sviews,see"TheDeathoftheAuthor,"pp.14243.
3.SomeofthesehavebeenaddressedinATheoryofTextuality,chs.46.
4.ThehistoricalauthorhasparallelstowhatNehamasandotherscallwriter.Thenotionof"writer,"however,istoorestrictive,forthereareauthorsofbothoraland
mentaltexts,forexample.SeeNehamas,"WhatanAuthorIs,"pp68586,and"Writer,Text,Work,Author,"pp.272ff.alsoCurrie,"WorkandText,"p.333.
Morganusestheexpression"historicalagent''torefertothehistoricalauthorin"AuthorshipandtheHistoryofPhilosophy,"pp.331and35455.
5.Foraguidetotheliteratureonpersonalidentity,seeA.O.Rorty,TheIdentityofPersons.
6.By'couldnot'Idonotmeanlogicallyimpossiblebutonlyfactuallyso.
7.Unamunomakesasimilarpointin"OntheReadingandInterpretationofDonQuixote,"p.977.Foradifferentview,seeCruttwell,"MakersandPersons,"p.489.
8.ThenotionofpseudohistoricalauthorunderstoodthushassomeparallelstoFoucault'sandNehamas's"author."SeeFoucault's"WhatIsanAuthor?"pp.121ff.,
andNehamas's"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.689,and"Writer,Text,Work,Author."Morgan,in"AuthorshipandtheHistoryofPhilosophy,"seemsfurthertodividewhat
Ihavecalled,thepseudohistoricalauthorintothesurrogateauthorandtheactualauthor.Thesurrogateauthoristheauthorconstructedbyaninterpreterwhen
subjectingatexttoanalysistheactualauthorisalsoconstructedbytheinterpreter,butisratheranidealofwhattheauthorisandhasnodeterminatecontent(seepp.
342and355).Cf.Walton'snotionof"apparentartist"in"StyleandtheProductsandProcessesofArt,"pp.88ff.
9.Inthissense,thepseudohistoricalauthorisafictioncreatedbythehistoricalauthorInart,suchauthorshavebeencalledfictionalcreators.SeeWalton,"Style
andtheProductsandProcessesofArt,"p.82.DickiespeaksofthedramaticspeakerofaworkinAesthetics,p.116.
10.Gracia,PhilosophyandItsHistory,pp.4445.Maintainingthedistinctiondoesnotentailarealisticpositionwithrespecttohistory,fortheultimatestatusofthe
eventsofwhichthehistorianprovidesanaccountmaystillbeunderstoodindifferentways.Thecontradictionarisesfromholdingthatanaccountofeventsisthesame
thingastheeventsofwhichitisanaccount.Forthecontroversybetweenrealistsandantirealists,

Page183

realists,seethearticlesbyGoldstein,Krausz,Levine,andMakkreelinTheMonist74,2(1991).
11.Forthisreasonitisamistaketothinkaboutthepseudohistoricalauthorasamerelypartialorincompletehistoricalauthor,asSchmitzhassuggestedin"The
ActualNatureofPhilosophyDisclosedinItsHistory."
12.Foucaultspeaksofa"secondself'inthisconnectionin"WhatIsanAuthor?"pp.12930.
13.Cf.Miller,"Ariachne'sBrokenWoof,"p.59.
14.See,forexample,Booth,TheRhetoricofFiction,p.71.Foracriticismofthisview,seeNehamas,"Writer,Text,Work,Author,"pp.27374.
15.Thenotionofintendedtextisusedfrequentlyintextualcriticism.SeeTanselle'sARationaleofTextualCriticism.
16.ConsiderthepoorstateinwhichWhiteheadleftProcessandReality.SeetheEditors'PrefacetotheCorrectedEdition,byGriffinandSherburne,pp.vx.
17.Foradiscussionofvarioustypesofeditionsandeditorialtraditions,seeMcGann,TheTextualCondition,pp.4868.Foradiscussionofhowtheoretical
stancesinfluenceediting,seeGreetham,"TheManifestationandAccommodationofTheoryinTextualEditing."
18.Thishasledsometosaythateditingalwaysinvolves"disfiguration."Cf.Greetham,"[Textual]CriticismandDeconstruction,"p.19.
19.ManycriticsunderminetheimportanceoftheeditorbutShillingsburgisawelcomeexception.SeeScholarlyEditing,p.93,and"TheAutonomousAuthor,the
SociologyofTexts,andPolemicsofTextualCriticism."Tansellenotesthatinsomecasestheeditorbecomesineffect"acollaboratoroftheauthor""TextualStudy
andLiteraryJudgment,"p.114.
20.SeeATheoryofTextuality,chs.4and5.McGannhasnotedthat"readersandeditorsmaybeseen...asauthorsandwriters"(TheTextualCondition,p.
95).SeealsoShillingsburg,"TheAutonomousAuthor,theSociologyofTexts,andPolemicsofTextualCriticism,"pp.3941,and"TextasMatter,Concept,and
Action,"pp.72ff.
21.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.5.
22.LewisandShort,ALatinDictionary,p.198.
23.SeethereferencestoNehamasandothersinthesectiondevotedtothepseudohistoricalauthor.
24.See,forexample,Tomas,CreativityintheArts.
25.Twoqualificationsneedtobeadded.First,itshouldbeobviousthatmyargumentrestsontheviabilityofasubjectobject,mindcontentofminddistinction.

Page184

Second,theunderstandingofadextraIhaveprovidedisdifferentfromtheunderstandingofadextrausedinChristiantheology.InChristiantheologytheworld
cannotbeafeatureofGod'smind,malgrBerkeley.Butamentaltextispreciselythat,afeatureofwhoeverthinksit.
26.Understoodinthisway,notallcreationexnihiloentailsnovelty.Itispossibleforadivinity,forexample,tocreateaduplicateofanentityoutofnothingwhatever.
Inthissense,onemightwanttodistinguishnewnessfromnovelty,fortheduplicatewouldbenew,becauseitdidnotexistbefore,butitwouldnotbenovel,becauseit
isacopyofsomethingelse.Forpurposesofourdiscussion,however,Iwillignorethedistinctionbetweennoveltyandnewness.
27.Theviewthatcreativityinvolvestheproductionofsomethingnewiswidespread.SeeTomas,CreativityintheArts,pp98.ff.Butsomehaveproposeda
distinctionbetweencreatingandmaking.
28.Cf.Wolterstorff,"TowardanOntologyofArtWorks,"pp.137ff.
29.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.3.
30.Cf.Glickman,"CreativityintheArts,"p.140andMargolis,"TheOntologicalPeculiarityofWorksofArt,"p.45.
31.Foradifferentsolutiontothisproblem,seeMargolis,ibid.,pp.46ff.
32.Cf.Nehamas,"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.686.
33.Barthesintroducesadistinctionbetweenauthorandscriptorin"TheDeathoftheAuthor,"p.145,andNehamasandothersalsospeakofthe"writer"incontrast
tothe"author."Seen.4.
34.Cf.GoodmanandElgin,"InterpretationandIdentity,"p.64,andWolterstorff,"TowardanOntologyofArtWorks,"p.137.Inthecaseofshorttextsthenotion
ofsimultaneousproductiondoesnotposeseriousproblems,butinthecaseoflongonesitdoes.Itisnotclear,forexample,whatisrequiredforsimultanietyinthe
productionofatextaslongasDonQuixote,whichwasnotwrittenatonceandwhichtheauthorcorrectedatvarioustimes.Thisdifficulty,however,shouldnotcloud
theissueweareaddressing.
35.GoodmanandElginrefertotheseas"jointlyauthored"and"multiplyauthored"texts."InterpretationandIdentity,"p.64.
36.Foradifferentviewaboutthisissueinthecontextofart,seeKoestler,"TheAestheticofSnobbery."Seealsomy"Falsificacinyvalorartstico."
37.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.5.
38.Itispossibletoimaginecases,howeverinwhichthetranslatorismoreoriginalthanthehistoricalauthorofthetextheorshetranslates.Thiscanoccur,for
example,whentheoriginalityofthehistoricalauthorislimited,saytofewofthetypesignsusedinthetext.Insuchacaseitmayturnoutthatthetranslatorismore
originalifthe

Page185

typesignsheusesdisplaymorenovelty.Consider,forexample,FitzGerald'stranslationofOmarKhayyam'sRubaiyat.
39.ThisviewisnotcompletelyopposedtotheviewproposedbybothFoucaultandNehamas.Accordingtothem,theroleoftheinterpreteristocreatenew
meaningsforatextthataredifferentfromthemeaningunderstoodbythehistoricalauthor.InChapter4ofATheoryofTextuality,Iarguethatitislegitimatefor
audiencestounderstandatextinwaysthataredifferentfromthewaysinwhichthehistoricalauthorandhiscontemporaneousaudienceunderstooditincaseswhere
thefunctionofthetextallowsit.Moreover,Ialsoholdthatthemeaningofatextisnotlimitedbythemeaningthehistoricalauthorandhiscontemporaneousaudience
understood,again,incaseswherethefunctionofthetextallowsit.AndImaintainthatinsomecasesitisthefunctionofaudiencestocreatenewmeaningsfortexts
thatis,wherethefunctionofthetextsinquestionispreciselydeterminedbythecultureandsocietyofwhichtheyarepart.ButIrejecttheviewthatthefunctionof
audiencesisalwaystocreatenewmeanings,forthatwoulddefeattheverypurposeoftexts.
40.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.5.
41.CfPlato,Phaedrus276e.Inspiteofrecentattacks,thisviewisstilldefendedtoday.See,forexample,Hirsch,"ThreeDimensionsofHermeneutics,"pp.25960,
andJuhl,"TheAppealtotheText,"pp.27787.
42.Accordingtooneversionofthisposition,theauthorisnotthepersonwhocreatedthetextbut"afunction"developedbypostRenaissanceliterarycritics.See
Foucault,'"WhatIsanAuthor?"p.121.Thisdoesnotimply,however,thatthereisnopersonwhoputstogethertheentitiesthatconstitutethetext,butthatpersonis
nottheauthorofthetext.Cainmakesthispointin"AuthorsandAuthorityinInterpretation,"p.619.Buttherearemoreextremeversionsofthisview.Barthes,for
example,holdsthat"oneneverknowsifhe[i.e.,theauthor]isresponsibleforwhathewrites(ifthereisasubjectbehindhislanguage)fortheverybeingofwriting
(themeaningofthelaborthatconstitutesit)istokeepthequestionWhoisspeaking?fromeverbeinganswered.''S/Z,p.140.Hemakesasimilarpointin"The
DeathoftheAuthor."
43.Nehamas,"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.685,and"Writer,Text,Work,Author,"p.275.
44.Thus,themeaningissaidtobe"constructed"ratherthan"discovered"bytheaudience.SeeStern,"FactualConstraintsonInterpreting,"p.205.Idiscussthisview
inChapter5ofATheoryofTextuality.
45.Nehamas,"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.686,and"Writer,Text,Work,Author,"pp.281ff.Notethatby'interpretation'ismeantunderstandinginthiscontext.
46.Otherexamplesarethecaseofpersonswhotalkintheirsleep,areinatrance,mumblesomething,orareunderhypnosis.Canthesoundsthesepersonsutterbe
consideredtextseventhoughthereseemstobenointenttoconveymeaning?Thequestionofsleep,Freudianslips,trances,hypnosis,andthelikecanbeexplainedin
termsofsubconsciousintentions,butthecaseinwhichonemakessoundsthataretakenas

Page186

meaningsomething,eventhoughtheuttererdoesnotintendthemtodoso,cannotbeexplainedinthesameway.Anotherexampleisthatofcomputergenerated
texts.SeeDickie,Aesthetics,p.112.Dickieusesthisexampletoargueagainstintentionalistswhowishtoidentifythemeaningofatextwiththeauthor'sintention.
Foradifferentlineofargumentagainstintentionalism,seeMcGann,TheTextualCondition,ch.2,pp.48ff.MoreonthisinChapter4ofATheoryof
Textuality.
47.Similarexampleshavebeenusedintheliterature.SeeKnappandMichaels,"AgainstTheory,"pp.727ff.
48.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.1.
49.Someaestheticiansintroducedistinctionsbetweendifferentsensesofartworkorartobject,givingprimarystatustosuchthingsaspaintingsandthelikeandonlya
secondary,derivativestatustothingsclassifiableasfoundart.SeeDickie,ArtandtheAesthetic,pp.25ff.ThesedistinctionsdonotaffectthepointIammaking.
50.SeeJuhl,"TheAppealtotheText,"p.282,andSearle,SpeechActs,pp.16ff.
51.Alessfarfetchedcasewithwhichmostofusareinfactfamiliaristheutteranceofsoundsbyaparrot.Aparrotpresumablydoesnotunderstandwhatitsays,but
whatitsaysappearstohavemeaning.Somescholasticsarguedthat,becausetheparrothadnounderstandingofwhatitsays,whatitsayshasnomeaningandthus
cannotbeconsideredtobesigns.Othersrejectedthisviewandfoundthesoundsutteredbytheparrottobesignificant.ThefirstviewwasdefendedbyPedro
HurtadodeMendoza,Logica8,2,23thesecondwasdefendedbyThomasComptonCarleton,Logica42,3,10.
52.Juhl,"TheAppealtotheText,"p.284.SeealsoKnappandMichaels,"AgainstTheory,"p.728.
53.GoodmanandElgin,"InterpretationandIdentity,"pp.6364.
54.Thosewho,likeBarthesandFish,emphasizetheaudienceintheconstructionofatext,mustacceptthisview.SeeBarthes,"TheDeathoftheAuthor,"andFish,
"InterpretingtheVariorum."
55.ThisseemstobeDickie'spositionwithrespecttocomputergeneratedtexts.Aesthetics,p.112.
56.Intheseventeenthcentury,thewordsthatcomposelanguageswerefrequentlycomparedtomoney.Justasmoneyacquiresvaluefromthewilloftheprinceand
notfromthosewhouseit,sowordshavemeaningfromthosewhomadethem.Cf.Dascal,"LanguageandMoney."Themetaphororiginatesinthescholastic
discussionsofsignsgoingbacktotheMiddleAgesandstillpersiststodayinauthorslikeDavidsonandRicoeur.ForitsusebyRicoeur,see"CreativityinLanguage,"
p.121.
57.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
58.SeeGrigely,"TheTextualEvent,"p.179,andDanto,TheTransfigurationoftheCommonplace,pp.3536.

Page187

59.Inthiscaseweareprobablytalkingaboutasignratherthanatext,butthepointappliestobothtextsandsigns.
60.This,Ibelieve,isbehindtheoftenquotedstatementofSamuelBeckett,"Whatmatterwho'sspeaking,someonesaid,whatmatterwho'sspeaking."SeeTextsfor
Nothing,p.16.
61.Cf.Nehamas,"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.688,andthereferencesinn.4.
62.SeeATheoryofTextuality,ch.2.
63.SeeFoucault,"WhatIsanAuthor?"pp.124ff.,andNehamas'sexpositionofFoucaultin"WhatanAuthorIs,"p.686.Nehamasinfactarguesagainstthe
necessarilyrepressivecharacterofauthorsinthesamearticle,pp.69091,andin"Writer,Text,Work,Author,"p.287.ButBarthesacceptsanddevelopsasimilar
viewin''TheDeathoftheAuthor."
64.ThispointismadeclearbyNehamasinhisdiscussionofFoucault,"Writer,Text,Work,Author,"p.271.SeealsoMcGann,TheTextualCondition,ch.2.
65.SeeRussell,HumanKnowledge,p.303andSearle,Intentionalityp.232.
66.SeeMill,ASystemofLogic,p.21Russell,LogicandKnowledge,pp.2001andWittgenstein,Tractatus3.203,p.47.
67.SeeDonnellan,"ProperNamesandIdentifyingDescriptions"and"ReferenceandDefiniteDescriptions,"pp.4648andKripke,NamingandNecessity,pp.96
and59,n.22.
68.Gracia,Individuality,pp.21626.
69.IdiscussthisissueinthecontextofphilosophicaltextsinPhilosophyandItsHistory,pp.22931.
70.]Aquinas,Summatheologiae1,85,5,vol.1,pp.56364.
71.Thenotionsof"frame"and"framework"haveattractedattentionfromthoseworkingonartificialintelligence.SeePetfi,"AFrameforFrames"Schank,
ConceptualInformationProcessing,p.367andWinston,ArtificialIntelligence,pp.23536and26570.
72.Thisdoesnotentail,asRortyseemstothink,thatsubjectiveisassociatedalwayswiththe"emotional"or"fantastical,"fornoteverythingoriginatinginasubjectis
ofthissort.ForRorty,seePhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature,p.339.
Chapter4.Audience
1.Aswithauthors,thereisnoprimafaciereasonwhyweshouldnotincludenonhumansinthecategoryofaudiences.Irefertomembersofaudiencesaspersonsfor
thesakeofsimplicityandeconomy.
2.McGannnotesthat"authorsandwritersmaybeseen...asreadersandeditors."TheTextualCondition,p.95.Note,however,thatstrictlyspeakingitisnotthe

Page188

authorwhoplaystheroleofaudience,butthepersonplayingtheroleofhistoricalauthorwhoabandonsthisroleandadoptstheroleofaudience.Forourpresent
purposes,however,thisprecisionmakeslittledifferenceanddoescausesomeawkwardness.InthiscontextIshallrefertothepersonwhoplaystheroleof
historicalauthorasthehistoricalauthor.
3.Theneedforarealdistinctionbetween"speaker"and"listener"isoftendeniedbyphilosophers.See,forexample,ThomasComptonCarleton,Logica42,4.
4.ReferbacktoChapter3,whereIdiscusstheinterpretativeauthor.
5.Thereareothercasesinwhichtheauthorinquestionisconsciousofthesituation.Forexample,Allairetalksabouttheauthorofapaperhewroteyearsbeforeand
aboutthepaperitselfasifhewerenottheauthorofit.See"Berkeley'sIdealismRevisited,"p.197.
6.Ecohasproposedtheviewthatitisthetext,ratherthantheauthor,thatdeterminesitsaudience.TheLimitsofInterpretation,p.55.
7.Tolhurst,"OnWhataTextIsandHowItMeans,"p.12.
8.Fishreferstothisaudienceasthe"intendedreader."Apartfromthefactthatthisnarrowstheaudiencetoreaders,italsodoesnottakeintoaccountthattheauthor
mayhaveintendedsomeoneinparticularforthetext.IsThereaTextinThisClass?,p.160.
9.Gracia,ATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
10.TosimplifymattersIamassumingattheoutsetthatwhenagroupissaidtounderstandP,100percentofthemembersofthegroupunderstandP.Inordinary
experiencethisisnotalwaysso.'AgroupunderstandsP'oftenmeansthatamajorityofthemembersdo,justas'Americansfavortaxcuts'oftenmeansthatamajority
ofthemdo.
11.Gracia,ATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
12.Cf.Gracia,"'ASupremelyGreatBeing."'
13.Gracia,ATheoryofTextuality,ch.1.
14.ThisdistinctionissimilartotheonedrawninChapter3betweenpersonandauthor.
15.Theconcernforthefreedomoftheaudienceiswhatdrivesmanypostmodernists.SeeBarthes,S/Z,p.10.
16.Waltonhasarguedrecentlythattoomuchemphasisisputonthedifferencesbetweenaudienceandauthorinthecaseofartobjectsandthattheirrolesareclosely
analogous"StyleandtheProductsandProcessesofArt,"pp.77ff.Isympathizewiththispointofview,aswillbecomeclearimmediately,butnonethelessthereare
differencesbetweentheserolesinthecaseoftextsthatcannotbeignoredthefeaturesthatapplytoartobjectscannotbeextendedtotextsinthisinstance.

Page189

17.Evenpriortothelevelsmentionedhere,theactiveroleoftheaudienceisevidentintheselectionofatextorpartsofatextforobservationandunderstanding.
Panofsky,"TheHistoryofArtasaHumanisticDiscipline,"p.8.TansellehasemphasizedandillustratedtheactiveroleofaudiencesinChapter2ofARationaleof
TextualCriticism.
18.Ingardenspeaksofthemas"schematizedstructures,"sortofskeletonsinwhichthefleshissuppliedbyaudiences.SeeIngarden,TheLiteraryWorkofArt,pp.
264ff.andEco,TheLimitsofInterpretation,p.47.ButthefillingsthattheaudiencehastoprovidearenotofthesortthatFishsuggests.ForFish,thefillingsare
openandthuscanneverbeincorrectormisguided,fortheaudience"makes"thetext.SeeFish,''InterpretingtheVariorum,"p.482.Foradiscussionandcriticismof
thisview,seeAbrams,"HowToDoThingswithTexts,"pp.576ff.
19.Fortextualgapsingeneral,seeIser,Prospecting,pp.9ff.,and"TheReadingProcess,"pp.3141alsoMowitt,Text,p.8.
20.IsaysomethingmoreinATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
21.Gracia,PhilosophyandItsHistory,pp.7288.
22.Phelan,"ValidityRedux,"p.105.Theroleoftheaudienceisalsoindirectwhenanauthorconsultswithit,orobservesitsreaction,andasaresultmakeschanges
inatext.
23.ForFish,theaudiencecreatesthetext.See"InterpretingtheVariorum,"p.482.
24.Gracia,ATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
25.Barthesmakesitexplicitwhen,inhisdesiretodoawaywiththeauthor,hemakestheaudience(i.e.,thereader,forhim)responsiblefortheunityofatext."The
DeathoftheAuthor,"p.148.
26.AsEcopointsout,"inastructuralistframework,totakeintoaccounttheroleoftheaddresseelookedlikeadisturbingintrusion"(TheLimitsofInterpretation,
p.44).BlackandChomskyhavearguedagainsttheneedforanaudiencein"MeaningandIntention,"p.264,andProblemsofKnowledgeandFreedom,p.19,
respectively,butDavidsondisagreesinInquiriesintoTruthandInterpretation,p.272.Onthisissue,seealsoRicoeur,HermeneuticsandtheHumanSciences,
p.108,andRosenblatt,TheReadertheText,thePoem,ch.4,pp.4870.
27.Forthenotionofaprivatelanguageandtheargumentsforandagainstitspossibility,seeSaundersandHenze,ThePrivateLanguageProblem.Even
deconstructionistslikeDerridarejectthenotionofaprivatelanguagesee"SignatureEventContext,"p.180.
28.Therearereasonsforthisneglect.Forexample,accordingtoBarthes,theaudience(i.e.,thereaderforhim)couldfunctionneithersubversivelynorrepressively.It
couldnotdothefirstbecausetextshavenohistoricalorauthorialmeaning,oreven

Page190

reality,apartfromtheaudienceitcouldnotdothesecond,becauseaudiencesare"withouthistory,biography,[or]psychology..."("TheDeathoftheAuthor,"
p.148).Sometextualcritics,however,havenotedthepoint.Greethamspeaksof"suppression"and"disfiguration''inthecontextofeditorialreadings."[Textual]
CriticismandDeconstruction,"pp.1520inparticular.HegarnerssupportfromHaroldBloom,ArchibaldHill,andPauldeMan.Shillingsburgdiscussesreaders
andthesubversionoftextsin"TextasMatter,Concept,andAction,"p.36.
29.GoodmanandElgin,"InterpretationandIdentity,"p.55.SeethediscussionofthisissueinChapter4ofATheoryofTextuality.Thisisperhapswhatled
Foucaulttosaythatsignsarenotbenevolent."Nietzsche,Freud,Marx,"p.65.TheabusetowhichaudiencesmaysubjecttextswasnotedasearlyasPlato.
Phaedrus275e,p.521.
30.Gracia,ATheoryofTextuality,ch.4.
31.Gracia,PhilosophyandItsHistory,pp.223ff.
32.Still,inaccordancewithwhatwassaidinChapter3,onemaywanttoarguethatinsuchcases,althoughthepersonoftheauthorisstillthesame,thehistorical
authorofthetexthasceasedtoexist,forthepersonsubjectingthetexttomisunderstandingcouldnotcreatethehistoricaltext.Andthisappliesalsototheperson
subjectingthetexttomisunderstandingbecausehecouldnotcreatethetextasaresultofmemoryloss,forexample.Butifthepersoniscapableofcomposingthe
text,eventhoughhedoesnotwishtodosoforwhateverreasons,thenmattersaredifferent.
33.Averroes,OntheHarmonyofReligionandPhilosophy,pp.63ff.
34.Theexceptiontothisprincipleisthecaseoftextsthat,becauseoftheirculturalfunction,arereceptivetocreativeunderstandingsbyaudiencesseeChapter4ofA
TheoryofTextuality.

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Page205

IndexofAuthors
ThisIndexwaspreparedbyYishaiyaAbosch.
A
AagaardMosgensen,Lars,195
Abbott,CraigS.,174,200
Abrams,M.H.,175,189,191
Adler,Mortimer,191
Allaire,EdwinB.,181,191
Anselm,152
Aquinas,Thomas,187,191
Aristotle,9,29,30,37,38,65,78,94,96,117,130,131,136,137,146,173,175,191
Augustine,20,50,100,103,164,175,176,191
Austin,J.L.,33,46176,178,180,191
Averroes,165,190,191
Avicebron,133
Ayer,A.J.,173,191
B
Bakhtin,MikhailM.,176,179,192
Barden,Garrett,195
Barnes,Annette192
Barthes,Roland,182,184,185,186,187,188,189,192
Bass,Alan,194
Bateson,F.W.,177,192
Beardsley,MonroeC.,192
Beckett,Samuel,187,192
BelleminNol,Jean,177,192
Berkeley,George,184,188
Berton,Carolo,202
Black,M.,189,192
Bloom,Harold,190
Booth,Wayne,183,192
Borges,JorgeLuis,56,180,192
Bouchard,DonaldF.,195
Bowers,F.192
Brennan,Andrew,179,192
Bunge,Mario,173,192
C
Cain,WilliamE.,185,192
Cairns,Huntington,200
Carleton,ThomasCompton,186,188,192
Cascardi,AnthonyJ.,199
Castaeda,HctorNeri,173,193
Cervantes,Miguelde,1,45,52,56,90,108,112
Chasolles,M.,193
Chaucer,Geoffrey,99,116
Chisholm,RoderickM.,193
Chomsky,Noam,189,193
Cicero,21
Cohen,Philip,179,193,194,196,197,199,201
Collingwood,R.G.,178
Conimbricences,The,174,175,193
Cruttwell,Patrick,182,193
Cumming,Robert,195
Currie,Gregory,179,182,193
D
Daniel,98
Danto,ArthurC.,186,193
Dascal,Marcelo,186,193
Davidson,Donald,186,189,193
Davis,T.,193
DeLuca,Vincent,193
DeMan,Paul,178,190,194

Page206

Derrida,Jacques,176,177,178,180,189,194
Descartes,Ren,152
Dickie,George,182,186,194,203
DionysiustheAreopagite,98
Dipert,RandallR.,176,194
Donnellan,K.,187,194
Douglas,K.,203
Duckot,Oswald,194
Dutton,D,180,194
E
Eco,Umberto,188,189,194
Eggert,Paul,175,194
Eisenberg,Paul,194
Elgin,CatherineZ.,180,181,184,186,190,195
Euclid,118
F
Faigley,Lester,194
Feigl,Herbert,176,194
Fish,Stanley,178,186,189,194
Foucault,Michel,182,183,185,187,190,195
Freud,Sigmund,138
G
Gabler,HansWalter,195
Gadamer,HansGeorg,177,178,195
Galileo,164
Gallagher,D.,195
Gibaldi,J.,196
Glickman,Jack,184,195
Goldstein,LeonJ.,183,195
Goodman,Nelson,178,180,181,184,186,190,195
Grabonicz,GeorgeG.,197
Gracia,JorgeJ.E.,173,174,177,178,179,181,182,187,188,189,190,194,195,196,202
Greetham,D.C.,176,183,196
Greg,W.W.,196
Griffin,D.R.,183,203
Grigely,Joseph,175,177,178,186,196
H
Hamilton,Edith,200
Hamlyn,S.,193
Hancher,Michael,196
Harari,Josu,196
Harris,Wendell,196
Hartshorne,Charles,200
Hay,Louis,177,196
Henze,DonaldF.,189,201
Hernadi,Paul,196
Hill,Archibald,190,197
Hilton,N.,193
Hirsch,E.D.Jr.,178,179,185,197
Hobbes,Thomas,182,197
HowardHill,T.H.,174,197
Hume,David,119
I
IbnGabirol,133,134
Ingarden,R.,179,189,197
Iser,Wolfgang,197
J
Jameson,Fredric,197
JohnofSalisbury,v
Jones,J.R.,203
Jones,Peter,174,197
Juhl,P.D.,185,186,197
K
Kant,Immanuel,61,78,84,136
Katz,JerroldJ.,180,197
Kearns,JohnT.,197
Kenney,E.J.,197
Kermode,Frank,197
Kiefer,H.E.,193
Knapp,S.,186,198
Koestler,Arthur,180,184,198
Krausz,Michael,183,198
Kripke,SaulA.,181,187,198
Kristeva,Julia,198
L
Lang,Berel,203
Lessing,Alfred,180,198
Levine,MichaelP.,183,198
Lewis,CharltonT.,183,198

Page207

Lewis,H.D.,203
Long,DouglasC.,198
M
Mailloux,Stephen,198
Makkreel,RudolphA.,183,198
Margolis,Joseph,173,174,184,198
Marsh,R.C.,201
Maxwell,J.C.,196
McGann,JeromeJ.,177,178,183,186,187,198
McKenzie,D.F.,198
McLaverty,James,174,175,177,179,199
McLeod,Ian,198
Meiland,J.W.,178,199
Mendoza,PedroHurtadode,186
Meyer,Paul,194
Michaels,W.B.,186,198
Mill,JohnStuart,187,199
Miller,J.Hillis,183,199
Miller,NancyK.,199
Morgan,MichaelL.,182,199
Mowitt,John,189,199
Mozart,Amadeus,24,25
Munitz,M.K.,193
N
Nehamas,Alexander,176,182,183,184,185,186,199
Newton,Isaac,119
O
Oakshott,Michael,197
O'Doherty,Brian,199
Ogden,C.K.,203
Ohmann,Richard,199
Okham,Williamof,53
Ormiston,G.L.,195
P
Panofsky,Erwin,189,199
Parker,Hershel,200
Pebworth,TedLarry,200
Peckham,Morse,200
Peirce,CharlesSanders,11,173,176,200
Petfi,J.S.,187,200
Phelan,James,189,200
Picasso,Pablo,12,112,113
Plato,36,103,131,133,146,175,185,190,200
Porphyry,176,200
Porter,C.,194
Proclus,98
Proctor,William,174,200
PseudoDionysius,98
Putnam,Hilary,177,200
Q
Quine,W.V.,179,200
R
Reagan,CharlesE.,200
Ricoeur,Paul,173,175,186,189,200
Ribeiro,Alvaro,193
RobbeGrillet,Alain,159
Rorty,AmlieOksenberg,182,200
Rorty,Richard,187,201
Rosenblat,LouiseM.,189,201
Rousseau,JeanJacques,145
Russell,Bertrand,187,201
Ryle,Gilbert,38
S
Said,Edward,201
Sartre,JeanPaul,143
Saunders,JohnTurk,189,201
Scaltas,Theodore,201
Schank,RobertC.,187,201
Schmitz,Kenneth,183,201
Schrift,A.D.,195
Schwartz,S.,194
Sclafni,R.J.,203
Searle,JohnR.,175,176,177,181,186,187,201
Shakespeare,William,41,112,121,122,124,125
Sherburne,D.W.,183
Shillingsburg,PeterL.,173,174,177,178,179,183,190,201
Short,Charles,183,198
Shusterman,Richard,176,202
Simon,Sherry,195
Skinner,Quentin,202
Smith,BarbaraHerrustein,202

Page208

Smith,EdwardL.,Jr.,202
Socrates,16,131
Stalin,Joseph,99,100
Stern,Laurent,185,202
St.JohnoftheCross,55
Stout,G.F.,202
Stuart,David,200
Surez,Francisco,173,175,202
Sullivan,ErnestW.,II,200
T
Tanselle,G.Thomas,174,177,178,179,183,189,202
Thompson,J.,200
Thorpe,James,202
Todorov,Tzvetan,194
Tolhurst,W.E.,180,188,202
Tomas,Vincent,183,184,203
Tompkins,JaneP.,197
U
Unamuno,Miguelde,182,203
Urmson,J.O.,203
V
Valla,Lorenzo,98
Vogler,T.A.,193
Voltaire,FranoisMarieAronetde,99,100
W
Wachterhauser,Brice,180,203
Walton,KendallL.,182,203
Warren,Austin,177,203
Warren,EdwardW.,200
Weber,Samuel,203
Weiss,Paul,200
Welleck,Ren,177,193,203
Wheeler,S.C.,180,203
Whitehead,AlfredNorth,203
Wicker,Brian,203
Wilsmore,Susan,181,203
Winston,P.H.,187,203
Wittgenstein,Ludwig,95,144,181,187,203
Wollheim,Richard,178,203
Wolterstorff,Nicholas,173,174,184,203
Y
Young,Robert,198
Z
Zemach,E.M.,173,203

Page209

IndexofSubjects
Thisindexisintendedasaguidetoreaderswhowishtofindthemainplaceswherekeytopicsandtermsarediscussed.Noattempthasbeenmadetorecordallthe
placeswherethosetopicsandtermsarediscussed.
A
act(s):
illocutionary,33,46,5758,160,180
locutionary,33,46,5758,160
perlocutionary,33,46,5758
speech,5758,180
universalvs.individual,5758
actualauthor,182
actualtext(s),7
aestheticexperience,6
aestheticobject,121
aggregate(s),34,41
artifact(s),56
vs.artobject(s),6
historical,12
vs.text(s),5,9,41
artisticexperience,6
artobject(s),5,6,121,177,186,188
artifactualityof,6
vs.audience(s),6
vs.author(s),6
vs.creation,106
ontologicalstatus,173174
vs.sign(s),6
vs.text(s),5,6,12
audience(s),2,8,141169,187,188,189,190
vs.artobject(s),6
vs.author(s),59,91,92,99100,141142,155,157158,160,188
compositionof,148153
contemporaneous,116,146,153,160,165,169,171
contemporary,116,147148,153,165,169
determinedbytext(s),188
freedomof,130,140,188
functionof,141,154158,168,171,185
historical,148
identityof,141153,169
individualvs.typeof,59
intended,144145,153,160,166,169
intermediary,146147,153,165,169
andinterpretativeauthor(s),102,116,128
asinterpreter(s),144
knowledgeof,144,145,146,147
andmeaning(s),118
needfor,141,158161,189
vs.oraltext(s),155
paradigmatic,153,171
repressivecharacterof,142,165166,168,171,189190
samenessof,5860,86
andsigns,143
subjectivityof,142,166168
subversivecharacterof,142,161165,168,171,189190
author(s),1,2,8,91140,182,183,184,185,186,187
actual,182
vs.artobject(s),6
asaudience(s),97,142144,153,160,164,165
vs.audience(s),59,91,92,99100,155,157158,160,188
vs.composer(s),95
composite,94,101102
contemporary,56
functionof,91,95,104117,139,154,157158,171,185
historical,53,57,9397,104,138,171,182
humanandnonhuman,92
identityof,93104,138139,180
individual,11,59
intentionof,4,2729,9192,121126,161,169,174,178,179,186
interpretative,102103,104,126,139,153
andmeaning(s),118,189
andmultipleinterpretations,118
needfor,117129,139
ofatextvs.inthetext,99
vs.oraltext(s),182
originalhistorical,93
originalityof,45,88,126
vs.person(s),9497,188,190
pseudohistorical,94,96,97101,138,171,182
andrepression,92,129134,
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Page210
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140,165,171,187
samenessof,5557,86
ofsign(s),118,129
vs.society,91
vs.subject(s),134138
subjectivityof,59,92,134138,140,167
subsequenthistorical,93
surrogate,182
vs.translator(s),108
typeof,58
vs.universalandindividualtext(s),3940
vs.user(s),4,110,139
ofword(s),118
ofwork(s),108,129
vs.writer(s)2,127,183,184,187
awareness:
vs.intention(s),4
vs.subjectivity,136
B
barecontinuant,78
C
categorymistake,38
commonnames,131
compositeauthor(s),94,101102,104,138
compositionof,101
andcontemporarytext(s),101,128
vs.editor(s),101
functionof,104,114115
vs.historicalauthor(s),94,101
vs.interpretativeauthor(s),116
needfor,128
vs.recreation,115,116
andrepression,130
vs.scribesortypesetters,101
andsubjectivity,136
contemporaneousaudience(s),116,146,153,160,165,169,171
vs.contemporaryaudience(s),147
vs.intendedaudience(s),146
knowledgeof,146
paradigmatic,71
contemporaryaudience(s),116,147148,153,165,169
vs.contemporaneousaudience(s),147
vs.intermediaryaudience(s),147
contemporaryauthor(s),56
vs.historicalauthor(s),102
contemporarytext(s),7,91,100,101,115
andcompositeauthor(s),101,128
vs.pseudohistoricalauthor(s),101
context,45
conceptual,153
cultural,133
individualvs.typeof,60
andmeaning,126
samenessof,60,86
sentential,64,181
ofsigns(s),62
social,125
creation,106111,184
vs.discovery,109110
andhistoricalauthor(s),106111
ofindividualtext(s),109110
andliterarytexts,129
vs.repression,132133
culturalfunctionoftexts,67,89,126,176,190
D
definitedescription(s),131,181
definitionoftext(s),3
diachronicsamenessofindividualfeatureaggregatetexts,6872,87
featureviewof,7171
substantialviewof,6871
diachronicsamenessofindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetexts,7278,87
barecontinuantview,78
bundleviewof,7375
materialityand,76
quantityand,76
selectedfeatureview,7577
spatiotemporallocationand,7577
difference,8
achronic,80
achronicofindividualtexts,8081
achronicofuniversaltexts,8081
diachronic,80
vs.diversity,49
vs.novelty,107
vs.sameness,80,87
vs.samenessandsimilarity,4849
synchronic,80
discernibility:
vs.identificationandreidentification,17
vs.individuation,17
vs.sameness,5152
discovery:
vs.creation,109110
vs.historicalauthor(s),109110
ofindividualtext(s),109110
diversity,49
divineideas,39
dramatispersona,57
andpseudohistoricalauthor(s),96,115,116
duration,179
E
ECTs(entitiesthatconstitutetexts),3
individualityof,1218
vs.mentaltext(s),24
oral,13
physicalor
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Page211
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mental,13,1826
assign(s),1213
vs.sign(s),3
vs.text(s),3,2629
universalityof,1218
existence:
andindividuality,18
andindividualtext(s),3941,42
andindividuation,42,67
mentalandextramental,3540
ofpseudohistoricalauthor(s),100
oftext(s),18,3540,117,171
anduniversal(s),178
anduniversaltext(s),3841,42
F
feature(s),48
definitionof,29
vs.substance(s),29,41,176,181
vs.text(s),2934
foundart,91,121
function:
ofaudience(s),141,154158,168,171,185
ofauthor(s),91,95,104117,139,154,157158,171,185
ofcompositeauthor(s),104,114115
culturaloftexts,67,89,126,176,190
ofhistoricalauthor(s),104114,188
ofinterpretativeauthor(s),105,116117
ofpseudohistoricalauthor(s),105,115116
ofsign(s),6364
H
historicalaudience(s),148
historicalauthor(s),53,57,9397,104,138,171,182
vs.compositeauthor(s),94,101
vs.contemporaryauthor(s),102
andcreation,106111
derivative,93
vs.discovery,109110
functionof,104114,188
vs.historicaltext(s)93
knowledgeof,144
needfor,119126
numberof,111112
original,93
asparadigmatic,103104,171
vs.person(s),9497
aspseudohistoricalauthor(s),97
vs.pseudohistoricalauthor(s),100,127
andrepression,130131
andsubjectivity,136
vs.translator(s),114
vs.user(s),113114
vs.writer(s),111,182
historicaltext(s),7
vs.historicalauthor(s),93
vs.pseudohistoricalauthor(s),100
history:
asaccount,97,182183
asseriesofevents,97,182183
I
idealtext(s),7,101,103,177
identification,8,17,52,8185,8788
vs.discernibility,17
vs.identity,8182
ofindividualtext(s),8285
vs.individuation,84
ofuniversaltext(s),8283
identity,1,4590
seealsosameness
absolutevs.relative,67
ofaudience(s),141153,169
ofauthor(s),93104,138139,180
vs.identificationandreidentification,8182
ofmeaning(s),54,58
personalvs.authorial,9497,138,182
problemof,49
vs.sameness,47
oftext(s)8,4590,171,174,178,179
throughtime,50
illocutionaryact(s),33,46,5758,160,180
individual(s),10,17
audience,59
author,11,59
context,60
vs.noninstantiability,11,17
vs.sameness,51
vs.substance(s),11
individualact(s),5758
individuality:
ofECTs,1218
existenceasconditionof,18
ofmeaning(s),1416,2629,4243
asamode,40
vs.sameness,51
oftexts,1218,42
individualtext(s),1,2,918,3940
achronicdifferenceof,8081
creationof,109110
discoveryof,109110
andexistenceandlocation,3941,42
historicityof,41
identificationof,8285
noveltyin,107108
reidentificationof,8285
samenessof,51,8688
andtime,5051
individuation:
vs.discernibility,17
andexistence,42,67
vs.identification,84
vs.individualsameness,51
principleof,18,3942,52,67
problemof,17,51,67
oftexts,1718,42
instantiability,11
instantiation,1,12
andhistoricity,41
multiple,1,12

Page212

intendedaudience(s),144145,153,160,166,169
vs.author(s),144,157
knowledgeof,145
intendedtext(s),7,100101,183
intention(s),1,2
vs.artifact(s),56
andauthor(s),4,2729,9192,121126161,169,174,178,179,186
vs.awareness,4
subconscious,185
intermediaryaudience(s),146147,153,165,169
vs.contemporaneousaudience(s),147
vs.contemporaryaudience(s),147
knowledgeof,147
intermediarytext(s),7
interpretativeauthor(s),102,103,104,126,139,153
asaudience(s),102,116,128
vs.compositeauthor(s),116
functionof,105,116117
andidealtext(s)101,103,177
needfor,128129
vs.pseudohistoricalauthor(s),116
andrepression,130131
andsubjectivity,137
vs.user(s),114
L
language,5
artificial,176
private,159,189
andsign(s),180
vs.text(s),5,6
locutionaryact(s),33,46,5758,180
M
meaning:
andaudience(s)andauthor(s),118
authorial,189
constructedvs.discovered,185
andcontext,126
identityof,54,58
individualityof,1416,2629,4243
limitsof,90,185
asmental,3637
vs.mentaltext(s),2324
samenessof,5455,86
ofsign(s),16
andtext(s),37,46
oftext(s),3,24,2629,118
textual,4
vs.universal(s)ofECTs,13
universalityof,1416,2629,4243
mentaltext(s),2326,37
vs.ECTs,24
vs.meaning(s),2324
vs.physicaltext(s),2426
vs.work(s),25
vs.writtentext(s),24
misunderstanding(s),typesof,162163
N
nonaggregates,34
noninstantiability,11
andindividual(s),17
novelty:
vs.authorship,113
vs.difference,107
inindividualanduniversaltexts,107
vs.newness,184
relativevs.absolute,115
O
ontologicalcharacterization,7
ontologicalstatus:
ofartobject(s),173174
oftext(s),943
ontology,7,9
oraltext(s):
vs.author(s),182
andfunctionofaudiences,155
asparadigmatic,175
relationtowrittentext(s),2126,175,177
utteranceof,174
P
perlocutionaryact(s),33,46,5758
person(s):
vs.author(s),9497,188,190
vs.group(s),150152
vs.historicalauthor(s),9497
andidentity,9497,138,182
vs.society,150152
physicalandnonphysicaltexts,1826,3637,4142,171,175,176
polytext,177
posttext,177
pretext,177
propernames:
causaltheoryof,131132
vs.commonnames,131
anddefinitedescriptions,131,181
descriptivistview,131
referentialtheoryof,131
andrepressionofauthor,131132
threefoldview,132
proposition(s),15
pseudohistoricalauthor(s),94,96,97101,138,182
vs.contemporarytext(s)100
createdbyhistoricalauthor(s),182
asdramatispersona,96,115,116
existenceof,100
asfictional,182
functionof,105,115116
ashistoricalauthor(s),97
vs.historicalauthor(s),97,100,127
vs.historicaltext(s)100
vs.idealtext(s)101
vs.intendedtext(s)
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Page213
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vs.interpretativeauthor(s),116
asmentalconstruct(s),126,127
needfor,126128
asparadigmatic,104
andrepression,130
andsubjectivity,137
R
reader,taskof,156
reidentification,8,17,52,8185,8788
vs.diachronicsameness,84
vs.discernibility,17
vs.identity,8182
ofindividualtext(s),8285
repression:
audience(s),142,165166,168,171,189190
andauthor(s),92,129134,140,165,171,187
andcompositeauthor(s),130
vs.creation,132133
andhistoricalauthor(s),130131
andinterpretativeauthor(s),130131
andpropernames,131132
andpseudohistoricalauthor(s),130
S
sameness,1,8,4590
seealsoidentity
absolutevs.relative,49
achronic,8,4950,86
achronicofindividualtexts,6768,86
achronicoftexts,5268,86
achronicofuniversaltexts,86,5267
ofaudience(s),5860,86
ofauthor(s),5557,86
ofcontext(s),60,86
diachronic,8,4950,51,86,179
diachronicofindividualfeatureaggregatetext(s),6872,87
diachronicofindividualsubstance/featureaggregatetext(s),7278,87
diachronicofindividualtext(s),7980,87,179
diachronicoftext(s),6880,86
vs.difference,80,87
vs.discernibility,5152
vs.identity,47
individual,51
vs.individuality,51,86
ofindividualtext(s),51,8688
ofmeaning,5455,86
ofsign(s),6267,86,118,129
ofsignarrangement(s),6062,86
vs.similarity,48,86,179
ofspeechact(s),5758,86
synchronic,8,4950,86
synchronicoftext(s),68,87
sign(s),3
achronicsamenessof,64
appearanceof,64
arrangementof,6062
vs.artobject(s),6
andaudience(s),143
authorsof,118,129
vs.context(s),62
vs.convention,4
definitionof,34
vs.ECTs,3,1213
functionof,6364
andlanguage(s),180
meaning(s)of,16
asnotices,127,129
samenessof,6267,86,118,129
sensesof,173
vs.substance(s),35
vs.text(s),3,62
vs.word(s),64
speechact(s),33,46,5758,180
subject(s):
authoras,134138
epistemic,135
ethical,135
grammatical,135
logical,135
metaphysical,135
uniquenessof,136
subjectivity:
ofaudience(s),142,166168
ofauthor(s),59,92,134138,140,167
andawareness,136
andcategories,136
andcompositeauthor(s),136
andconsciousness,135
vs.emotion,187
andhistoricalauthor(s),136
andinterpretativeauthor(s),137
andjudgment,136
andpseudohistoricalauthor(s),137
substance(s):
vs.barecontinuant(s),78
characterized,176
definitionof,29
vs.diachronicsamenessofindividualfeatureaggregatetext(s),6872
vs.feature(s),29,41,176,181
vs.individual(s),11
vs.sign(s),35
vs.text(s),2934
surrogateauthor,182
T
temporalcontinuity,50
text(s):
achronicsamenessof,5268,171,187
achronicsamenessofindividual,6768
achronicsamenessofuniversal,5267
asactions,176
asacts,3334,46
actual7
asaggregatesornonaggregates,3435
vs.artifact(s),5,9,41
artistic,180
vs.artobject(s)5,6,12
asassemblages,177
audience(s)of,2,8,141169,187,188,189,190
withoutaudiences,2,
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Page214
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141,158161,189
authorin,99
author(s)of,1,2,8,3840,91140,182,183,184,185,186,187
withoutauthor(s),1,117129,139
computergenerated,186
contemporary,7,91,100,101,115
contextof,45,60,62,64,86,125,126,133,153,187
conventionalityof,4,9
culturalfunctionof,67,89,126,176,190
definitionof,3
derivativehistorical,93,101
determinesaudience,188
diachronicsamenessof,6880,171
diachronicsamenessofindividualfeatureaggregate,6872
diachronicsamenessofindividualsubstance/featureaggregate,7278
differenceof,8,8081
asECTs,45
asECTswithmeaning,46
vs.ECTs,3,2629
asECTsrelatedtomeaning,910,2629
asevents,177
existenceof,18,3540,117,171
vs.feature(s),2934
asfeatureaggregate(s),3435
asformsofaction,3334
''found,"119,122
function(s)of,4,67,60,62,158,159,160,185
gustatory,2021
historical,7,11,91,93,94,100,115
ashistoricalentities,1
historicityof,4041,43,126,171
ideal,7,101,103,177
identificationof,8,8185,8788,171
identityof,1,8,4590,171,174,178,179,
seealsosameness
individual(ity)oruniversal(ity)(of),1,2,918,2629,3941,52,107109,171
individualfeatureaggregate,6872
individuationof,1718,42
instantiationof,1
intended,100101,183
intentionand,1,2
intermediary,7
jointlyauthored,184
vs.language(s),5,6
linguisticfunctionof,6
literary,129
locationof,3540,171
logicof,37
material,174
andmeaning,37,46
asmeaning(s),46
meaningof,3,24,2629,118
mental,2326,37,39,4142,171,176,182
relationtomeaning(s),2629,171
modalclassificationof,7
multipleinstantiationof,1
multipleinterpretationsof,118
multiplyauthored,184
noveltyof,8889,107108,171
olfatory,2021,175
ontologicalstatusof,943
oral,19,2123,42,58,88,182
originalhistorical,93,101
physicalvs.nonphysical,1826,36,4142,171,175,176
aspolytext,177
aspossibilities,177
asprocesses,177
asproductsofaction(s),176
reidentificationof,8,8185,8788,171
asrelations,173,176
samenessof,1,8,4590
sensiblevs.nonsensible,174
vs.sign(s),3,62
vs.substance(s),2934
substancefeature,33
assubstance/featureaggregate(s),35
synchronicsamenessof,68,171
tactile,20
astokens,174
universal,3841,52,107109
useof,5
user(s)of,4,113114,120,122
asutterance(s),179
valueof,89
visual,21
vs.work(s),5,6,88,89,127
written,19,2123,42,88
textualmeaning,4
functionalviewof,4
ideationalviewof,4
referentialviewof,4
token,11,176
translator(s),108,114,184
type,11,176
ofaudience,59
ofauthor,58
ofcontext,60
U
understanding:
communityof,152
differentconceptionsof,152153
bygrouporindividualperson(s),150153
vs.misunderstanding,162164
publicvs.private,149
universal(s),10
andexistence,178
andlocation,38
ontologicalstatus,39
universalact(s),5758
universality:
ofECTs,1218
andexistence,3841
ofmeaning(s),1416,2629,4243
asamode,40
universaltext(s),1,2,918,3841
achronicdifferenceof,8081
creation
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of,108109
discoveryof,108109
andexistenceandlocation,3841,42
historicityof,41
identificationof,8283
noveltyin,107108
samenessof,5152,8687
andtime,5051
user(s)oftext(s),4,113114,120,122
vs.author(s),4,110,139
vs.historicalauthor(s),113114
vs.interpretativeauthor(s),114
utterance,46,186
W
word(s),14
author(s)of,118
vs.sign(s),64
work(s)5
author(s)of,108,129
asideal,177
identityof,88,89
vs.mentaltext(s),25
vs.text(s),5,6,88,89,127,177,181
asuniversal(s),174
world,vs.knowledgeoftheworld,8485
writer(s):
aimof,159
vs.author(s),2,127,183,184,187
vs.historicalauthor(s),111,182
writing:
vs.language,176
vs.speech,175
writtentext(s),19,2123,42,88
vs.mentaltext(s),24
vs.oraltexts,175
relationstooraltext(s),2123,42,177.