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CASE ON ARTICLE 15- SUPERIOR STRENGTH

PEOPLE VS PANGANIBAN
G.R. No. 97969. February 6, 1995.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO PANGANIBAN, ELPIDIO TERRIBLE,
LAMBERTO REDONDO, DOMINGO HINGAN, MAGUIN SAPUES and NICOLAS PERIA, accused,
DOMINGO HINGAN and NICOLAS PERIA, accused-appellants.
Evidence; Witnesses; Except when expressly mandated, the law does not require that the testimony of a lone
witness must be corroborated.Even without the testimony of Maglinao, the prosecution still has evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the accusedthe eyewitness account of Armando Medel.
Except when expressly mandated, the law does not require that the testimony of a lone witness must be
corroborated. If credible and positive, such testimony is sufficient to convict.
Same; Same; The sequence in which the accused fired at the victim refers to a trivial matter and minor detail
which does affect the witness' credibility.The supposed inconsistency between the direct testimony of
Armando Medel that Hingan, Panganiban, Redondo, Peria, Terrible and Sapues, in this order, fired at the
victim and the declaration in his affidavit to the effect that four (4) persons shot his father first by Hingan,
followed by Panganiban, Redondo and Peria, in that order, may be explained by the fact that the CIS
investigator who reduced the declaration of Armando given in a question-and-answer form could have typed
it carelessly or inaccurately due to haste or could have misapprehended the order in which the names were
given by the declarant. In any case, the sequence in which the accused fired at the victim refers to a trivial
matter and minor detail which does affect the witness' credibility. The same can be said of the type of
firearms used by the assailants and the exact number of assailants. What is crucial and material is that
Armando Medel actually saw the assailants fire their weapons at the victim.
Same; Same; It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse
somebody other than the real culprit.There is no proof that Armando Medel deliberately falsified his
testimony. His relationship with the victim could not have impelled him to perjure and implicate the
appellants in the crime. On the contrary, his being the victim's son rendered his testimony even more
credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody
other than the real culprit.
Same; Same; Inconsistencies on minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.As earlier
mentioned, the alleged inconsistencies in Armando Medel's testimony do not affect his credibility. This Court
has time and again held that such inconsistencies, if merely on minor details, do not impair the credibility of
witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailant.
Same; Same; If the defense fails to prove that a witness was moved by any improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.Through the
testimony of appellant Hingan's wife, the defense tried to prove that the authorities (not Armando Medel)
implicated her husband's group because they were angry with the appellants. Said testimony, however, being
mere hearsay, was correctly disregarded by the trial court. Thus, failure of the defense to prove that Armando
Medel was moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony,
specifically the portions found credible by the trial court, is entitled to full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi becomes unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself
and his relatives and not by credible persons.Positive identification of the appellants as two of the culprits
also demolished their alibi. Aside from its inherent weakness because of the facility with which it can be
fabricated, alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and
his relatives and not by credible persons. In this case, by admitting that Ulango was only a half hour away by
walking from Makiling, the defense even failed to prove that the appellants were so far away from the scene
of the crime that it would have been impossible for them to have committed the crime.
Murder; Illegal Possession of Firearms; The accused could not be convicted of murder with the use of an
illegally possessed firearm when there is no proof on the aspect of illegal possession of firearms.The
culpability of the appellants for the killing of 2Lt. Reymundo Medel has therefore been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Court cannot agree with the trial court that they should be convicted of
murder with the use of an illegally possessed firearm. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that there is no
proof on the aspect of illegal possession of firearms.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; While a victim may have been warned on possible danger to
his person, in treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it
impossible for the victim to retaliate.The Solicitor General therefore correctly recommended that the
appellants be held liable for murder only the killing having been qualified by treachery. While it is true that
the victim had been warned by his son on the possible danger to his person, in treachery, what is decisive is
that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. The
sudden and unexpected attack on 2Lt. Medel as he bent to pick up his rooster proved treachery.

Same; Same; Same; Abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.Evident premeditation was not
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. However, abuse of superior strength which is alleged in the
information, is absorbed by treachery.
Same; Conspiracy; Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.Undoubtedly, conspiracy
may be inferred from the mode or manner in which the offense was carried out as well as the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense. Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is the act of
all. [People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91(1995)]
KAPUNAN, J.:
Guillermo Panganiban, Elpidio Terrible, Lamberto Redondo, Domingo Hingan (or Hinggan), Maguin Sapues and
Nicolas Peria were charged with the crime of murder with the use of illegally possessed firearms in an
information dated 16 February 1982 which reads as follows:
That on or about August 18, 1981 at Brgy. Makiling, Calamba, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring confederating and mutually helping with one another,
armed with unlicensed caliber .45 pistols with intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with treachery and evident premeditation attack, assault and shot at 2Lt. Raymundo Medel PC
(retired) thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim Raymundo Medel.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
use of unlicensed firearm and superior strength attended the commission thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the six accused, Redondo and Sapues have remained at large while Panganiban who had been arrested
and had posted a bailbond, jumped bail before his arraignment. Trial of the case, which proceeded as accused
Terrible, Peria and Hingan who all pleaded not guilty to the charge, established the following:
In the afternoon of August 18, 1981, the victim, retired constabulary 2Lt. Reymundo Medel, and his son,
Armando, who were residents of Tanauan, Batangas, went to Barangay Makiling, Calamba, Laguna to attend a
wake in the residence of Mariano Quilitis and a cockfight (tupada) beside Quilitis' house. 1 Upon their arrival,
Armando noticed that Hingan and Peria were at the baklayan while Panganiban, Redondo, Terrible and Sapues
were by the sitawan, around thirteen (13) meters from the baklayan. 2 As Armando and his father watched
the card game of baklay, Hingan placed a bet and put his .45 caliber gun on the table with its muzzle pointed
towards 2Lt. Medel. 3 Hingan said, "Matagal magsolo itong ating babarilin." 4 One by one, the people
gathered around the baklayan slowly moved away but when Armando told his father to leave because he felt
something bad might happen, his father told him that Hingan and his companions were just drunk. When
Armando left the baklayan to urinate,
he saw garand and carbine rifles stacked on the sitawan ("nakasandal sa sitawan"). 5 He also saw long
firearms behind a mango tree. 6
As Armando and his father proceeded to the ulutan, they were followed by Hingan and Peria who were
signaling to the rest of their group ("hudyatan nang hudyatan") and pointing to his father. 7 Even as they left
the gaff fixer and proceeded to the cockfight arena after matching their cock with a protagonist, Hingan and
Peria were still behind them. After his father's rooster lost in the cockfight, Armando noticed Redondo and
Panganiban approaching the sitawan and Sapues and Terrible going towards the mango tree. Then Redondo,
Panganiban, Sapues and Terrible assumed a prone position. Armando also noticed that Hingan and Peria were
at a distance of around three (3) meters from the rear left side of his father. As his father bent to pick up his
rooster, Armando heard a gunshot and saw that his father was hit on the left side of his head. Armando
looked back and saw Hingan and Peria running away. As he turned to look at his father, Armando saw him fall
down. Just then, successive shots rang out from the sitawan. Redondo and Panganiban rose from prone
position while firing their guns. Sapues and Terrible who were to Armando's left, also fired their firearms.
Armando then ran to his father's Volkswagen car, broke its glass window and took his father's gun under the
seat. He returned to the scene and fired at Redondo, Panganiban, Terrible, Sapues and Peria as they retreated
to the west. Armando consumed one magazine or seven (7) bullets of his father's .45 caliber pistol but did not
appear to have hit any of the assailants. 8

2Lt. Raymundo Medel died of "cerebral, intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal hemorrhage, massive, due to gunshot
wounds." 9 Dr. Esmeraldo Plastina, municipal health officer of Calamba, conducted the autopsy and found
that the victim sustained seventeen (17) gunshot wounds of varying sizes on various parts of his body.
The defense interposed denial and alibi in their bid for exoneration. According to Peria, on August 18, 1981,
he was in Ulango, Calamba, Laguna, weeding a corn plantation owned by a certain Carandang of Batangas.
He was on the job from 7:00 o'clock in the morning until 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. His alibi was
corroborated by his wife, Adelina Peria.
Hingan was tried partly in absentia 10 but his wife, Delia, testified that she and her husband were in the
house of her mother in Ulango in the evening of August 17, 1981. Early the following day, her husband
fetched water, chopped firewood and, after lunch, weeded their ricefield together with her. They went home
at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Her husband never left the ricefield between 1:00 and 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. Teofila Peria, 11 mother of accused Panganiban and mother-in-law of Hingan, corroborated Delia's
testimony in its material points.
After due hearing, the trial court 12 rendered the judgment of conviction on January 14, 1991 disposing of the
case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Domingo Hingan and Nicolas Peria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder with the use of illegally possessed firearm and hereby sentences said accused to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and for the death of Lt. Raymundo Medel, to indemnify jointly and severally,
the heirs of said deceased the sum of P30,000.00 and actual damages in the sum of P15,490.00 and to pay
the costs.
Accused Elpidio Terrible whose guilt has not been established by the prosecution is hereby acquitted of the
crime charged.
The Court cannot made (sic) any pronouncement against the other accused namely, Guillermo Panganiban,
Lamberto Redondo, and Magin Sapues, as the Court has never acquired jurisdiction over them. Since
warrants of arrest have been issued against them but they are nowhere to be found, and so that this case
may not remain pending, let the case against them be archived until said accused are finally arrested.
SO ORDERED.
Hingan and Peria have interposed the instant appeal where, in their separate briefs, they contend that the
trial court erred in convicting them of the crime charged solely on the testimony of Armando Medel, a biased
witness, whose declaration was not only full of contradictions and inconsistencies but some portions of which
were discredited by the trial court. Appellants also aver that the trial court erred in totally disregarding the
testimony of prosecution witness Romeo Maglinao while adopting a portion of the testimony of Armando
Medel when both testimonies were of "equal value and significance." 13
Prosecution witness Maglinao corroborated Armando Medel's eyewitness account with respect to the identity
of 2Lt. Medel's assailants. In discrediting Maglinao's testimony, the trial court emphasized Maglinao's
admission that he came to know the assailants' names only after Armando Medel had revealed them to him.
The trial court also opined that Maglinao's identification of the accused, specifically Hingan and Peria, was
"open to serious doubts" because Maglinao himself swore that he was "not able to freely recognize the faces
of the perpetrators of the shooting." 14
While some of the details of the shooting as recounted by prosecution witnesses Armando Medel and
Maglinao were not accurate, nevertheless, as found by the lower court, eyewitnesses Armando Medel and
Maglinao clearly and positively identified appellants as among those who fatally shot and killed his father.
Armando could not have been mistaken as to the identity of appellants. Prior to the shooting incident, he had
met appellants at various cockfights in Calamba. 15 At the precise time of the shooting, he was just three (3)
meters away from the victim while appellants were also of that distance from the left rear of the victim. 16
Even without the testimony of Maglinao, the prosecution still has evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the culpability of the accused the eyewitness account of Armando Medel. Except when expressly
mandated,
the law does not require that the testimony of a lone witness must
be corroborated. 17 If credible and positive, such testimony is sufficient to convict. 18

The supposed inconsistencies and incredibilities in Armando Medel's testimony, such as that portion where he
said he could distinguish the gunshots coming from different kinds of firearms which were fired successively,
does not dent the prosecution's case.
The supposed inconsistency between the direct testimony of Armando Medel that Hingan, Panganiban,
Redondo, Peria, Terrible and Sapues, in this order, fired at the victim 19 and the declaration in his affidavit 20
to the effect that four (4) persons shot his father first by Hingan, followed by Panganiban, Redondo and Peria,
in that order, may be explained by the fact that the CIS investigator who reduced the declaration of Armando
given in a question-and-answer form could have typed it carelessly or inaccurately due to haste or could have
misapprehended the order in which the names were given by the declarant. In any case, the sequence in
which the accused fired at the victim refers to a trivial matter and minor detail which does (not) affect the
witness' credibility. The same can be said of the type of firearms used by the assailants and the exact number
of assailants. What is crucial and material is that Armando Medel actually saw the assailants fire their
weapons at the victim. In Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court held:
It is perfectly within the discretion of the trial court to accept portions of the testimony of a witness as it may
deem credible and reject those which it believes to be false. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
a positive rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence (People v. Pacis, 130 SCRA 540
[1984]); People v. Surban, 123 SCRA 218 [1983]). Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be
shown to have wilfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. Even then, where he is found to have
done so, this does not make his entire testimony totally incredible. The court may still admit and credit those
portions worthy of belief depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities
of the case (People v. Molina, 213 SCRA 52 [1992]; People v. Arbolante, 203 SCRA 85 [1991]; People v. Osias,
199 SCRA 574 [1991]).
There is no proof that Armando Medel deliberately falsified his testimony. His relationship with the victim
could not have impelled him to perjure and implicate the appellants in the crime. On the contrary, his being
the victim son's rendered his testimony even more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 22 As earlier mentioned,
the alleged inconsistencies in Armando Medel's testimony do not affect his credibility. This Court has time and
again held that such inconsistencies, if merely on minor details, do not impair the credibility of witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. 23
Through the testimony of appellant Hingan's wife, the defense tried to prove that the authorities (not
Armando Medel) implicated her husband's group because they were angry with the appellants. 24 Said
testimony, however, being mere hearsay, was correctly disregarded by the trial court. Thus, failure of the
defense to prove that Armando Medel was moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was
not so moved and his testimony, specifically the portions found credible by the trial court, is entitled to full
faith and credit. 25
Armando Medel claimed that his father was killed because one of the accused, Guillermo Panganiban,
suspected that 2Lt. Medel killed Panganiban's father. 26 True or not, this evidence of motive is not essential
for conviction considering that Armando Medel positively identified the appellants as among the killers of his
father. 27
Positive identification of the appellants as two of the culprits also demolished their alibi. 28 Aside from its
inherent weakness because of the facility with which it can be fabricated, alibi becomes more unworthy of
merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives and not by credible persons. 29
In this case, by admitting that Ulango was only a half hour away by walking from Makiling, 30 the defense
even failed to prove that the appellants were so far away from the scene of the crime that it would have been
impossible for them to have committed the crime. 31
The culpability of the appellants for the killing of 2Lt. Reymundo Medel has therefore been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Court cannot agree with the trial court that they should be convicted of
murder with the use of an illegally possessed firearm. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that there is no
proof on the aspect of illegal possession of firearms. What is available in the records is the ballistician's
testimony 32 and the Ballistics Report No. D-202-86 33 showing that the fragments of fired bullets recovered
from the scene of the crime had not been fired from the caliber .30 garand rifle with serial number 2357152
which was submitted for examination.

The Solicitor General therefore correctly recommended that the appellants be held liable for murder only 34
the killing having been qualified by treachery. While it is true that the victim had been warned by his son on
the possible danger to his person, 35 in treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a
manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. 36 The sudden and unexpected attack on 2Lt.
Medel as he bent to pick up his rooster proved treachery.
Evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution. However, abuse of superior strength
which is alleged in the information, is absorbed by treachery. 37
Undoubtedly, conspiracy may be inferred from the mode or manner in which the offense was carried out as
well as the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. 38 Conspiracy having been
established, the act of one is the act of all. 39
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the appellants considering that no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime. 40 However, pursuant to
recent jurisprudence, the indemnity imposed by the trial court shall be increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, appellants Domingo Hingan and Nicolas Peria are hereby convicted of the crime of murder for
the killing of 2Lt. Reymundo Medel and accordingly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They shall
solidarily indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Philippine National Police is directed to cause the immediate arrest of the other accused in this case in
order that they may face trial. Cost against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
CASE ON ARTICLE 18 UNLAWFUL ENTRY
PEOPLE VS SUNGA
PEOPLE VS BAELLO
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appelle, vs. ARSENIO SUNGA Y REYES (alias)
ARSENIO LOPEZ, defendant-appellant.
Francisco Sevilla for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The herein accused is Arsenio Sunga y Reyes (alias) Arsenio Lopez who was prosecuted for, and convicted of,
the crime of qualified theft in that with intent of gain he had taken away, without the consent of the owner,
certain pieces of jewelry and other valuables worth in all P3,277, equivalent to 16,385 pesetas. The penalty
imposed upon the accused was ten years of presidio mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum aforesaid, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
The theft was considered as qualified theft on account of the proven and undenied fact that the appellant is
fourteen times a recidivist.
Counsel for defense in this instance does not assign any error to the judgment appealed from, which he finds
in accordance with the facts and the law of the case.
However, the prosecution, maintaining that the defendant should be punished in accordance with paragraph
1 of article 518 of the Penal code in relation with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code, recommends
that in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
prescribed in article 520, in the medium degree, that is to say, seven years, four months and one day of
presidio mayor.
An examination of the record shows without a shadow of doubt the guilt of the accused. His alibi is absolutely
worthless as a defense.

The only matter that under the facts of the case concerns us is the determination of the penalty that should
be imposed. We are in accord with the prosecution as to the legal provisions applicable to the case. However,
we find that the accused entered the inhabited house through a window, which was not the proper entrance
to the house, and, therefore, there is present in this case the circumstance of scaling a house which, had it
been alleged in the complaint, would have made ht crime robbery (Article 508 of the penal Code, second
paragraph before the last), but as this circumstance was not alleged, it must be considered as an aggravating
circumstance (No. 21, article 10, Penal Code), with the result that, in the absence of any extenuating
circumstance, as in the present case, the penalty must be raised to the maximum degree.
On the other hand the subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused is not permitted by the law
because the principal penalty is not correctional, but afflictive, in nature. (Arts. 25 and 51 of the Penal code.)
The judgment appealed from is modified and the appellant is sentenced to undergo ten years of presidio
mayor, to return to the owner the article stolen, descried in the complaint, or their value of P3,277, to the
accessories prescribed in article 57 of the Penal Code, and to the payment of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 101314July 1, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
"TOTONG," accused-appellant.

vs. JOHN AMET BAELLO Y GUINTIVANO @

The Solicitor General plaintiff-appellee.


Tomas J. Caspe for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:


In an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, on 18 October 1990, accused
John Amet Baello @ "Totong" was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The accusatory portion of
the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of October, 1990 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro-Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with
one @ "Jerry"; whose true identity and present whereabout is still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding
with one another, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, entered the
house of one Eustaquio Borja y Reyes thru the window at the second floor of the said house, an opening not
intended for ingress or egress, and once inside the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following items, to wit:
___________
P14,769.00
belonging to Eustaqiuo Borja y Reyes, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount
of P14,769.00; and that by reason and on the occasion of the robbery, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, armed with bladed instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one
Veronica Borja y Ramos on the vital parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. 1
The case was docked as Criminal Case No. 84253 and raffled off to Branch 156 of the said court.
At his arraignment on 13 November 1990, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. 2 Trial in the merits
commenced on 18 December 1990.
After trial, the RTC promulgated its decision 3 on 19 July 1991 finding the accused guilty as charged. The
adjudicatory portion thereof read as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused JOHN AMET BAELLO y Guintavino @ "TOTONG"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "robbery with homicide" under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry and hereby sentences said accused to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Veronica Borja y
Ramos in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the sum of P50,000.00 by way of reparation of the stolen
cassette, camera and assorted jewelries (sic), to pay the further sum of P41,672.00 by way of reimbursement
of the burial and other related expenses and the additional sum of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment. 4
From this adverse decision, the accused interposed an appeal which this Court accepted in a resolution dated
30 September 1991. 5
The factual antecedents of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 10 October 1990, at about five 5:00 o'clock in the morning. Barangay Captain Eustaquio R. Borja awoke to
find out that the front door of his residence at No. 164 Evangelista Street, Barangay Santolan, Pasig, MetroManila, was open and that their television set in the sala was missing. Eustaquio told his wife about what he
saw and together they proceeded upstairs to the second floor to check on their 22-year old daughter,
Veronica Borja. They noticed that the door to her room was open. Upon entering the room, they were shocked
to find the bloodied corpse of their daughter lying in bed. The window of her room was open. Eustaqiuo
instructed his wife not to touch the body while he summoned the authorities. He proceeded to the Barangay
Hall from where he called the police. The couple later discovered that a cassette player, a camera, and
various pieces of jewelry in their daughter's cabinet, all worth about P50,000.00, were likewise missing. 6
On the same day, P/Capt. Florante F. Baltazar, Medico-Legal Officer of the PC/INP Crime Laboratory Services,
performed an autopsy on the body of the victim. He concluded that the cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds." 7 He stated in his
autopsy report that the victim suffered a total of four stab wounds; that the stab wound inflicted on the
victim's neck, which severed her jugular vein, was a fatal one; and that at the time of the autopsy (3:25
p.m.), the victim had been dead for more or less ten to twelve hours. 8
At 6:00 p.m., the police were able to recover the missing television set from the house of Eugenio Tagifa (or
Tadifa), the husband of the accused's sister. 9 Tagifa was brought to the police station for questioning. On 11
October 1990 at 10:55 a.m., Tagifa executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" wherein he pointed to the accused as
the person who had placed the television set under the stairs of his house. 10
On 13 October 1990 at 5:30 p.m., the accused was captured in Bangkal, Makati by elements of the
Intelligence and Special Operations Unit (ISOU) of the Pasig Police and brought to the police station. 11 He
made an oral admission of his participation in the commission of the crime. 12 He was then endorsed to the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for formal investigation. 13
The accused was asked if he could understand, read and write Tagalog, and he replied that he could. 14 The
accused was likewise asked if he could afford the services of counsel; he answered that he could not. 15 Upon
being asked if he was willing to avail of the services of Atty. Eber Generoso of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), the accused replied in the affirmative. 16 Atty. Generoso then brought the accused away from the
police investigators so that the two of them could talk privately. 17 Atty. Generoso inquired from the accused
whether or not he had any participation in the crime and told him that if he had none, he must not make any
admission or statement as this would be prejudicial to him. The accused, however, said, "Attorney, aaminin
ko na ho total ginawa ko naman." The accused then told Atty. Generoso that he was the one who took the
television set but denied having killed Veronia Borja. 18 Afterwards, the police started the formal
investigation of the accused in the presence of Atty. Generoso.The accused gave his statement before the
police and this was reduced into writting and marked at the trial as Exhibit "L." Atty. Generoso read the
statement to the accused and then let the accused read it himself. 19 The accused gave then signed Exhibit
"L," after which Atty. Generoso also signed the same.
The body of the said document reads as follows:

On the other hand, the defense presented only two witnesses, viz.: the accused, testifying pro se, and his
mother, Anita Baello.
The version of the accused is as follows:
He was born in Leganes, Iloilo but resides with his mother at No. 145 Evangilista Street, Santolan, Pasig,
Metro Manila. He only reached the fourth grade of elementary school. He was at the house of his cousin after
having watched a movie when the police came. They handcuffed him and then brought him to the Pasig
Police Headquarters. He was immediately detained and not subjected to any investigation. Afterwards, he
was mauled inside the jail by Antonio Gabriel, the nephew of Capt. Borja, and two of Gabriel's companions.
These persons beat him up by kicking and punching his stomach and back, and striking his back and buttocks
with a "baston." He was unable to recall the day when his statement was taken down, though he remembers
it was in the afternoon. On that particular afternoon, he was taken downstairs and told that he would be given
a lawyer to assist and defend him. However, Atty. Generosa, the lawyer assigned to him, simply sat down and
stared at him without doing anything. Atty. Generoso told him that he would be going somewhere and then
left for about an hour. When Atty. Generoso came back, the statement was already typewritten and Atty.
Generoso merely signed it after which the accused was asked to sign, which he did as he was promised that
he would be released after signing.
While he was downstairs, a policeman asked him carry a television set. At first, the accused refused to do so,
but then the policeman shouted at him. Since he got scared, he carried the television set. His picture was
then and presented as Exhibit "0-6" by the prosecution. All the time downstairs, the police only asked for his
name, age, civil status and nothing more.
Anita Baello testified thus: When she visited her son, the accused, in jail a week after his arrest, she saw
contusions on his body; he complained to her of chest pains because of the beatings he had received. She
visited her son every other day and when she visited him sometime in the first week of January 1991, he told
her that he could not bear anymore the beatings he received from Antonio Gabriel. Their lawyer then wrote a
letter to the jail warden and after that, her son was not hurt anymore. When she visited him later, she was
surprised to see Gabriel in the same cell with her son; the latter told her he was not able to sleep for three
nights because he was being pricked with a needle, so she complained to the police after which her son was
separated from Gabriel. 21
In his brief, 22 the accused submits the following assignment of errors:
1
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS FULLY AND DULLY ASSISTED BY A
COUNSEL ENGAGED BY HIM AND IN FURTHER [sic] HOLDING THAT HIS EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
2
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXIST IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
3
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION NAMELY,
EUGENIO TAGIFA AND PRUDENCIO BAGASINA FOR IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THESE WERE INCONSISTENT,
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND EXAGGERATED.
4
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY AND CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME
CHARGE [sic] CONSIDERING THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
In his first assigned error, the accused maintains that he was not "fully and duly assisted by a counsel
engaged by him." Hence, his extra-judicial confession is constitutionally infirm and inadmissible in evidence.
The records of the case, however, clearly belie this allegation of the accused. While it is true that Atty.
Generoso was not initially his counsel of choice, the fact remains that after the accused was asked if he could

afford the services of counsel and he answered in the negative, he was informed that he would be provided
with one Atty. Generoso of the PAO to assist him during the investigation. He then voluntarily accepted
the services of Atty. Generoso. This was in compliance with paragraph (1), Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Apropos is the case of People vs. Parojinog. 23 Parojinog was arrested for triple murder. Before the start of the
investigation, the police apprised Parojinog of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice and told
him that if did not have one, a certain Atty. Fernando Fuentes III of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO)
would be engaged to assist him. He agreed to have Atty. Fuentes as his lawyer. Atty. Fuentes assisted
Parojinog during the entire investigation after which Parojinog signed his extra-judicial confession. Atty.
Fuentes also signed the document. Later on, Parojinog assailed the confession, contending that Atty. Fuentes
was not his counsel of choice. This Court refuted him thus:
Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12(1).

Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offenses shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In
the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire
proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor
Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first
time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during the trial. Thus, it was too late.
Likewise, in the People vs. Masongsong, 24 we dismissed similar plaint in the wise:
To accept the appellant's contention that he was in effect denied justice since the counsel assigned to him
was not really his choice is ridiculous. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, every lawyer is presumed
to have knowledge of the law as well as the training in procedure sufficient to enable him to protect his client.
Furthermore, the accused was given sufficient time to choose his own counsel had he opted to so. His failure,
therefore, to request for another counsel negates his claim of denial of the right to choose his lawyer.
And in People vs. Pinzon, 25 this Court made the following disquisition:
There is no merit in the above argument. We agree with the Solicitor General's view that:
. . . the entire process of custodial investigation was conducted in the manner required by the Constitution.
Atty. Saldivar informed appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, as anything he says in said investigation
could be used against him. Appellant was likewise informed of his right to counsel and that if he could not
afford to pay [for] the services of one, he could avail of the free legal services of the CLAO, which offer
appellant accepted. By said acceptance, Atty. Saldivar became appellant's counsel of choice, and the fact
that appellant had no previous acquintance with Atty. Saldivar did not render null and void appellant's
otherwise valid extra-judicial confession. Atty. Saldivar was present from the time appellant's statements
were taken up to the time appellant affixed his signature thereon. In fact, Atty. Saldivar's signature appears
on the statement. Plainly, the admission in evidence of appellant's sworn statement does not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.
Exhibit "L" completely belies the allegation that the accused was not fully assisted by Atty. Generoso during
the investigation. Said document discloses that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights by Atty.

Generoso in extenso. Atty. Generoso conferred with the accused, warned the latter of the consequences of his
confession and even advised him not to make any; however, the accused insisted on going ahead with his
confession, although he only confessed to the robbery.
It was only after the said conference that the accused gave a statement. After it was completed, Atty.
Generoso again explained to him the contents and the adverse effects of his confession, but the accused
found himself at ease with his conscience by voluntarily affixing his signature therein. If, indeed, he had any
objections to his statement, he should not have signed Exhibit "L," or he should have at least voiced out such
objections to Atty. Generoso. Atty. Generoso, as an officer of the PAO, would not have affixed his signature in
the extra-judicial confession as counsel for the accused had he known of any infirmity in its execution. 26 If
he did so, he would have been remiss in the performance of his duty and unfaithful to his office. But there
must be convincing proof of that for he has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
his duty.
The accused likewise assails what he perceives to be "a preconditioned (sic) of the mind on the part of the
investigator as well as the counsel that an admission was about to take place and for that the accused must
be assisted only in this aspect." 27 He then labors under a misconception. In People vs. Layuso, stated:
This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the presence of a
lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to prelude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extra-judicial statement or testimony in open
court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.
The accused jointly discusses the remaining assigned errors. He contends that there was no evidence of
conspiracy with respect to the crime of robbery with homicide, and faults the trial court for giving full
credence to the testimonies of prosecution witness Eugenio Tagifa (his brother-in-law) and Prudencio
Bagasina. He alleges that Eugenio Tagifa testified against him because the former was threatened with arrest
and
prosecution. 29 The accused likewise impugns the testimony of Prudencio Bagasina as "inconsistent, highly
improbable and exaggerated."
These contentions are as hollow as those offered to support the first assignment of error.
Anent his claim of lack of evidence of conspiracy for the crime of robbery with homicide, the accused has
absolutely nothing but vague conclusions in between which he fears to openly express, that since he
confessed only to robbery and that since it was only Jerry, his companion, who killed Veronica Borja, he could
only be held liable for robbery but not for robbery with homicide. Indeed, the accused deliberately and
carefully confined his participation to the robbery, and the prosecution had no direct evidence that the
accused took part in the killing of Veronica. But the accused is not thereby absolved from any liability for her
death. Once conspiracy is established between the accused Jerry in the commission of the crime of robbery,
the accused would be equally culpable for the homicide committed by Jerry on the occasion of the robbery,
unless the former proved that he endeavored to prevent Jerry from committing homicide. In People vs. de la
Cruz, 30 we said: "The rule is likewise settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery
with homicide unless proof is presented that the accused tried to prevent the killing." Accused offered no
such proof.
The conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was sufficiently and convincingly established in this case. As
admitted by the accused in his sworn statement, he and Jerry had a prior agreement to commit robbery in the
house of Eustaquio Borja. Together they went to the latter's house at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 10
October 1990, entered the house through the window at the second floor, and once inside, he got the
television set while Jerry got the other items, and then, together again, they left the house with their loot.
These acts taken as a whole are more than sufficient to establish a common design between Jerry and the
accused to commit robbery; such acts eloquently showed nothing less than a joint purpose and design, and a
community of interest which established beyond doubt the existence of a conspiracy. 31 It is axiomatic that
direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be shown by acts and circumstances from which may
logically be inferred the existence of a common design 32 or may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense is perpetrated. 33

Accused's claim that his brother-in-law, Eugenio Tagifa, testified against him because "he was intimidated
with arrest and prosecution" is purely conjectural. It is to be noted that the accused does not, in the main,
dispute the prosecution's evidence that he was the one who placed the television set under the stairs of
Tagifa's house and that he was seen carrying it on his shoulders in the early morning of 10 October 1990. All
that the accused could do was to raise a feeble and unsubstantiated denial.
On the witness stand, Tagifa identified the sworn statement he executed on 11 October 1990 (Exhibit "A")
and openly admitted that it was the accused who brought the television set, thus:
QWho brought the TV set under your stairs if you were not the one?
AMy brother in law, sir.
QCould you identify him, Mr. witness?
AYes, sir.
QWill you point him now?
AYes, sir. (witness pointing to a person who identified himself as John Amet Baello, the accused in this case).
34
The due execution of Tagifa's sworn statement was not put in doubt during his cross-examination by the
counsel for the defense. The impression then that Tagifa leaves us is that he was telling the truth. The trial
court, which was obviously in a better position to decide the question of his credibility, having heard him and
observed his deportment and manner of testifying, gave full faith and credit to Tagifa's testimony. We accord
it the highest respect, especially considering that we find no fact or circumstance of value in the said
testimony that it had overlooked or misappreciated and which if considered, may alter the result. 35
Prudencio Bagasina's testimony deserves a separate treatment. He had the temerity to testify in open court
that he was just brought to the police station and then made to sign a prepared statement, which was
marked as Exhibit "P." He denied having been investigated at all. In said sworn statement, he declared that in
the early morning of 10 October 1990, he saw the accused along Daang Kalabaw at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila, carrying a television set the same television set identified by Tagifa. The trial court immediately
perceived that he was lying through his teeth and held him in contempt, thus:
COURT: The witness is hereby cited in contempt for making untruthful statements until further orders from
this Court. Send him to the provincial jail, for twenty-four hours. Let the hearing be continued on another
date. 36
In short, the trial court gave full faith and credit to Bagasina's sworn statement. We find no compelling reason
to disagree with the trial court.
The aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry 37 was properly appreciated against the accused as he and
his companion, Jerry, had entered the Borja residence through the second-floor window, a way not intended
for ingress. The evidence likewise shows that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity 38 was present in
the commission of the crime as the darkness was taken advantage of by the malefactors and such
circumstances facilitated their evil designs.
WHEREFORE, the judgement of conviction the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 156), Metro Manila in
Criminal Case No. 84253 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Cost against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CECILIO BINONDO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Self-Defense; When the accused admits having killed the victim but invokes selfdefense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies with the
accused.Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when the accused admits having killed the
victim, but invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing

evidence lies with the accused. To do that, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. For even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it may not be
disbelieved after the accused admitted responsibility for the killing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No compelling reason existed for the Court to disturb the trial courts findings that
appellant did not act in self-defense.Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question
of fact. Being so and in the absence of any showing that the court a quo failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen
and heard the witness during the trial, was in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling
reason, therefore, existed for this Court to disturb the trial courts findings that appellant did not act in selfdefense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellant did not present clear and convincing evidence for the court to
sustain the claim of self-defense.The accused-appellant did not present clear and convincing evidence for
the court to sustain the claim of self-defense. The trial court refused to give credence to accused-appellants
story that the deceased went to his house purposely to kill him. There were no findings that the victim was
guilty of unlawful aggression or unjust provocation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere shouting threats and poundings on the door of the accused-appellants
house were not held by the court to constitute unlawful aggression.Even assuming that his story were true,
the oral threat made by Domiciano to kill him unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act clearly showing
his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute unlawful aggression. Mere shouting threats and
poundings on the door of the accused-appellants house were not held by this Court to constitute unlawful
aggression.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of self-defense is likewise negated by the physical evidence.Not only
was there an absence of unlawful aggression in the case at bar, but the claim of self-defense is likewise
negated by the physical evidence. The accused-appellant suffered no harm or injury physically. The number
and nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim proved that if at all, the attack came from the accusedappellant. The victim had no chance to defend himself even if armed. The medico-legal certificate issued by
the municipal health officer attests to a total of seven wounds all of which were located on the vital parts of
the body. The means employed becomes unreasonable and unnecessary when after the aggression had
ceased and the victim no longer posed any threat of further attack, the accused-appellant continued inflicting
injuries on the victim who fell to the ground helpless.
Same; Same; Treachery; The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was evident from the
testimony of the accused-appellant himself.The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
evident from the testimony of the accused-appellant himself. According to him, his wife arrived ahead of the
victim and he was apprised of the fact that the victim was on his way to their house and was threatening to
kill him and his son. He had enough time to prepare himself, his weapons and surroundings in a way that he
would have the advantage of position and could deliver the first blow without risk to himself from his unwary
victim. This he accomplished by putting off all the lights inside the house and by positioning himself near the
kitchen door where he could not be seen at once. The accused-appellant employed means, methods or forms
in the execution of the offense which tend directly specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. These facts established by evidence on
record clearly constitute treachery, which raised the crime to murder.
Same; Same; Cruelty; When the killing was done with cruelty by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, it was likewise qualified to murder.
Furthermore, when the killing was done with cruelty, by deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, it was likewise qualified to murder. (Italics
supplied). No greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to sever the head
therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any violence directed towards it cannot be
interpreted in any other manner than an outrage to his corpse. [People vs. Binondo, 214 SCRA 764(1992)]
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
On May 25, 1990, the Honorable Godardo A. Jacinto, Presiding Judge of Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City rendered a decision in Criminal Case No. CBU-9795, entitled" People of the Philippines vs. Cecilio
Binondo, Rosendo Binondo, Valentina Binondo, Nicolasa Binondo, Severino Binondo, and Damian Soriano".
finding Cecilio Binondo guilty of murder and acquitting the rest of his co-accused as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds the accused Cecilio Binondo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to further indemnify the Heirs of Domiciano Dinopol in the sum of P30,000.

On the ground of reasonable doubt, a verdict of acquittal is hereby entered for the accused Rosendo Binondo,
Valentina Binondo, Nicolasa Binondo, Damian Soriano, and Severino Dinopol, and their bail bonds are
therefore cancelled.
Costs against Cecilio Binondo.
SO ORDERED. 1
On appeal, the accused-appellant raised the following errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE AND
FINDING HIM GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED APPELLANT.
The facts as may be gathered from the records of the case are as follows:
At about 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, prosecution witnesses Maximo Dinopol
and his wife Pablita, who were neighbors of the accused-appellant Cecilio, saw accused-appellant with seven
other persons carrying a naked body of a dead person into his (Cecilio) yard. The aforesaid witnesses alleged
having heard accused-appellant tell his companions that they should have nothing to worry about because he
will take sole responsibility for the death of the victim.
On that same evening, accused-appellant brought the head of the decapitated victim to the police station at
the municipal building. This was received by Pat. Esmeraldo dela Pea who was at the station during that
time although his tour of duty would yet start at 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. He asked
preliminary questions to the accused-appellant. When the Station Commander arrived, the latter took over
the investigation. After a brief interview with the accused-appellant, he sent Pat. Franklin Anion and CHDF
Boy Padilla to retrieve the body of the victim from the house of the accused-appellant. The Station
Commander ordered Rosendo and Valentina, companions of the accused-appellant to bring the air rifle
(escopita) and bolo used by accused-appellant to the Municipal building.
Dr. Ferraren, Municipal Health Officer of Ginatilan, Cebu, conducted the autopsy examination and issued the
Medical Certificate which reads as follows:
This certificates that at about 1:45 o'clock p.m. of February 24, 1986, a human head, severed from its body,
identified by Pfc. Rotillo Sieres of the Simboan Police Force as that of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol of same force,
had been examined by the undersigned at the Municipal building, Simboan, Cebu, and findings were as
follows:
a)eyes half closed:
b)wound incised, about 4 inches long, lower jaw, with underlying bone cracked
c)wound, lacerated about 1/2 inch parietal, left;
d)wound, lacerated about 1/2 inch parietal, right.
On the same day, at about 2:20 in the afternoon, a beheaded human body had also been examined at the
residence of the parents of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in Samboan and the significant findings are as follows:
a)Wound, incised, 4 1/2" x 1" anterior, thorax, right;
b)wound, incised about 4" x 1" at the level of the Xphoid, right;
c)wound, incised about 4 1/2" x 1/2", left lateral side of the body;
d)wound, incised about 4" x 1/2" deltoid, left;
e)wound, incised about 4 inches supraeliac, left;

f)wound, incised about 6 inches, abdomen, some intestines exposed and some portions severed.
Sgd. TRIFANA M. FERRAREN, M. D.
March 6, 1986. 2
The accused-appellant Cecilio Binondo declared that he killed Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in self-defense and
presented his version of what transpired, as follows:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, he, together with his wife, Valentina Binondo, his
son, Rosendo, and Brgy. Councilman Severino Dinopol went to the house of the spouses Bilanghilot to drink
tuba thereat. They left the house at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. When they were near the Barangay
Health Center of Basak, the victim, carrying a gun with the left hand and a bolo in his right hand, suddenly
emerged from under the mango tree and approached him in an angry mood at the same time brandishing his
bolo as if in an act of charging him, saying: "Why are you looking for me? What is your purpose? 3 Valentina
interceded and tried to pacify Domiciano. To avoid getting into trouble with the enraged victim, he opted to
walk away from him and proceeded home with his son Rosendo. Severino also went home ahead of Valentina.
About five minutes after he and Rosendo arrived at their house, Valentina came gasping for breath telling him
to close all windows and doors because Domiciano was following her and he said he would kill Cecilio and
Rosendo. Right away he secured the front door, shut off all the lights and got his air gun and bolo to defend
himself and his companions should Domiciano carry out his threat. He also asked Rosendo to go upstairs to
take care of his (Rosendo) wife and children on the second storey.
Pat. Domiciano Dinopol finally arrived and he tried to force open the main door but failed. He asked Cecilio to
come out: shouting "Cilio, come out I will break your head. 4 Domiciano went towards the kitchen door,
awaiting the attack by Domiciano.
Domiciano forced open the kitchen door. When he was about to enter with his head protruding inside the
kitchen, Cecilio aimed his rifle at the head of Domiciano. From a distance of about one and one half (1-1/2)
feet, he fired the rifle. When this happened, Domiciano was still holding his firearm and his bolo.
After a single shot from the air gun, Domiciano turned his head towards him and aimed his gun at him. Before
Domiciano could fire his gun, Cecilio attacked him with his bolo, his purpose to let the latter loosen his hold
on his weapons. This was followed by five or six more strokes on the neck and body to be sure that Domiciano
would drop his weapons. Domiciano finally dropped his weapons and fell to the floor. Except on the skin of the
nape, the head was almost severed from the body. Knowing of Domiciano having an amulet which could
revive him if his body is doused with water, he finally decided to cut off his head completely. Immediately
thereafter, he carried the victim's body to the municipal building and surrendered to the police authorities.
The trial court refused to give credit to his plea of self-defense and convicted him of murder on the basis of
his admission of killing Domiciano Dinopol.
We find this appeal to be without merit and find the defendant's plea of self-defense as completely incredible.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when the accused admits having killed the victim, but
invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence
lies with the accused. To do that, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution were weak, it may not be disbelieved after the accused admitted responsibility for the killing. 5
Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and in the abscence
of any showing that the court a quo failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance
that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the witness during the trial,
was in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, existed for this court
to disturb the trial's court findings that appellant did not act in self-defense. 6
The accused-appellant did not present clear and convincing evidence for the court to sustain the claim of selfdefense. The trial court refused to give credence to accused-appellant's story that the deceased went to his
house purposely to kill him. There were no findings that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression or unjust
provocation.

Even assuming that his story were true, the oral threat made by Domiciano to kill him unaccompanied by any
other unequivocal act clearly showing his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute unlawful
aggression. Mere shouting threats and poundings on the door of the accused-appellant's house were not held
by this Court to constitute unlawful aggression. 7 Furthermore, as the accused-appellant himself testified that
he extinguished all sources of light inside the house, there could not have possibly been any form of attack
which may be said to be immediate and imminent from the victim upon the person of the accused-appellant.
Putting out the lights inside the house threw the house in total darkness that the victim could not be in a
position to locate him physically.
Not only was there an abscence of unlawful aggression in the case at bar, but the claim of self-defense is
likewise negated by the physical evidence. The accused-appellant suffered no harm or injury physically. The
number and nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim proved that if at all, the attack came from the
accused-appellant. The victim had no chance to defend himself even if armed. The medico-legal certificate
issued by the municipal health officer attests to a total of severe wounds all of which were located on the vital
parts of the body. The means employed becomes unreasonable and unnecessary when after the aggression
head ceased and the victim no longer posed any threat of further attack, the accused-appellant continued
inflicting injuries on the victim who fell to the ground helpless. From his testimony it was evident that when
he delivered the blows with his bolo, he was aiming at his victim's body and not simply on the victim's had
hand which he claimed was aiming the gun at him. 8 It was also clear that he was aware that his blows were
hitting the victim; 9 that his victim was profusely bleeding; 10 and that even before his victim fell to his
kitchen floor, the victim's weapons had already dropped and he was
defenseless. 11 What absolutely negated the existence of a "reasonable necessity of the means employed in
repelling the attack" was the fact that the appellant decapitated the victim. The claim that the victim
possessed an amulet which could revive him did not justify that last and final act of cutting off the victim's
head. A dead man could not have possibly posed any further resistance or launch an attack, be it imminent or
remote.
Having found the absence of self-defense, what is incumbent upon us is to determine whether or not there
was any attending circumstance which will qualify the killing to murder.
We hold that the crime committed was murder.
The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was evidence from the testimony of the accusedappellant himself. According to him, his wife arrived ahead of the victim of he was apprised of the fact that
the victim was on his way to their house and was threatening to kill him and his son. He had enough time to
prepare himself, his weapons and surroundings in a way that he would have the advantage of position and
could deliver the first blow without risk to himself from his unwary victim. This he accomplished by putting off
all the lights inside the house and by positioning himself near the kitchen door where he could not be seen at
once. The accused-appellant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the offense which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. These facts established by evidence on record clearly constitute treachery, which
raised the crime to murder.
Furthermore, when the killing was done with cruelty, by deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, 12 it was likewise qualified to murder. (Emphasis
supplied). No greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to server the head
therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any violence directed towards it cannot be
interpreted in any other manner than an outrage to his corpse.
As regards the mitigating circumstances claimed by the accused-appellant, We hold that the trial court erred
in not appreciating voluntary surrender in favor of the accused. This may be off-set by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellant could, not
however, claim incomplete self-defense as there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
However, the killing was accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim,
thus constituting the crime into murder. Treachery may be considered as a mere aggravating circumstance
which may be set off by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For reasons indicated, and in the light of the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, We hold that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed subject to the modification that the defendant is ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, with costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

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