The Arguments from the Sciences (79. 3-80.

6)
They used the sciences in many ways to establish that there are ideas, as
he says in the first book of On Ideas. And the arguments he seems to
have in mind here (nun)4 are the following (toioutoi):5
79.5

I
If every science does its work by referring to some one and the same
thing, and not to any of the particulars, then for each science there would
be some other (allo) thing besides (para) the sensibles, which is everlasting and a paradigm of the things that come to be within that science
(ton kath' hekasten epistemen ginomenon). And this sort of thing
(toioutorif is the idea.

II
Further, the things the sciences are sciences of, these things are. And the
sciences are of some other things (allon) besides (para) the particulars;
for these (i.e. the particulars) are indefinite (apeira) and indeterminate 79.10
(ahorista), whereas the sciences are of determinate things (horismenon).
Therefore there are some things besides the particulars, and these things
are the ideas.
in

Further, if medicine is the science not of this health but of health without
qualification, there will be some health itself.7 And if geometry is the
science not of this equal and of this commensurate but of equal without
qualification and of commensurate without qualification, there will be
some equal itself and some commensurate itself. And these things are the 79.15
ideas.
IV

Now these (toioutoi)s arguments do not prove what they set out to prove,
that there are ideas; but they do prove that there are some things besides
the particulars and sensibles. But it does not immediately9 follow that if
there are some things that are besides the particulars, they are ideas; for
there are the common things (ta koina) besides the particulars, and we
say that the sciences are in fact (kai)10 of them.

v
Further, (there is also the objection that if these arguments succeeded,
they would prove) that there are also (kai) ideas of the things falling 79 20

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under the crafts. For (F) every craft also refers the things that come to be
by its agency (hup' autes) to some one thing; and (IF) the things the
crafts are crafts of, these things are, and the crafts are of some other
things besides the particulars. And (IIF) this last {argument},11 in
addition to the fact that, like the other arguments, it does not prove that
there are ideas, will seem to establish that there are also ideas of things
for which they do not want ideas (as well as of things for which they want
80 ideas). For if, because medicine is the science not of this health but of
health without qualification, there is some health itself, then this will also
apply to each of the crafts. For none of them is of the particular or the
this either, but each is of the (F) without qualification that it is about.
For example, carpentry is of bench without qualification, not of this
bench, and of bed without qualification, not of this bed. And sculpture,
80. 5 painting, house-building, and each of the other crafts is related in a
similar way to the things that fall under it. Therefore there will be an idea
of each of the things that fall under the crafts as well (as of the things
that fall under the sciences), which they do not want.
The One over Many Argument (80. 8-81. 22)
They also use the following (toioutos) argument to establish that there are
ideas:

I
If each of the many men is a man, and if each of the many animals is an
80. 10 animal, and the same applies in the other cases; and if in the case of each
of these it is not that something is predicated of itself but that there is
something which is predicated of all of them and which is not the same as
any of them (oudeni auton tauton on), then this is12 some being besides
(para) the particular beings which is separated from them and everlasting. For it is in every case (aei) predicated in the same way of all the
numerically successive (ton kat' arithmon allassomenon) (particulars).13
And what is a one in addition to (epi) many, separated from them, and
80. 15 everlasting is an idea. Therefore there are ideas.

IIA
He says that this argument establishes that there are ideas both of negations and of things that are not (kai ton apophaseon kai ton me onton).
For one and the same negation is predicated of many things, including
things that are not, and it is not the same as any of the things of which it

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15

is true. For not-man is predicated of horse and of dog and of everything

besides man, and for this reason it is a one over (epi) many and is not the 80.20
same as any of the things of which it is predicated. Further, it always
remains, since it is true in the same way of similar things (i.e. of the
numerically successive particulars). For not-musical is true of many
things (of all those things that are not musical) in the same way, and 81
similarly not-man is true of all those things that are not men. Therefore
there are also ideas of negations.
IIB

This is absurd. For how could there be an idea of not being? For if one
accepts this, there will be one idea of things that are different in genus
and different in every way, such as line and man, since all these are not- 81.5
horses. And there will also be one idea of indeterminate and indefinite
things (ton ahoriston te kai ton apeiron); and also of things of which one is
primary, one secondary (for man and animal, of which one is primary,
one secondary, are both not-wood), and of such things they did not want
genera or ideas.
Ill

And it is clear that this argument too does not validly deduce that there
are ideas; rather, it too tends to prove that what is predicated in common
is something other than the particulars of which it is predicated (allo einai 81. 10
to koinos kategoroumenon ton kath' hekasta hon kategoreitai).
IV

Further, the same people who want to prove that what is predicated in
common of a plurality of things (pleionon) is some one thing, and that
it is an idea, establish this from negations. For if someone denying
something of a plurality of things denies it by referring to some one thing
(for someone saying 'man is not white, horse is not (white)', does not
deny something peculiar to them in each case but, by referring to some 81.15
one thing, denies the same white of all of them), then someone affirming
the same thing of a plurality of things will not be affirming something
else (allo) in each case, but there will be some one thing he affirms
e.g. manwith reference to some one and the same thing. For as
with negation, so with affirmation. Therefore there is some other being
besides the being in sensibles, which is the cause of the affirmation that
is both true of a plurality of things and also common; and this is the 81.20
idea.
This argument, then, he says, produces ideas not only of things that are

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affirmed but also of things that are denied. For in both cases (there is a
reference to) the one (thing) in the same way (homoios).
The Object of Thought Argument (81. 25-82. 7)
81.25 The argument that establishes from thinking that there are ideas is the
following (toioutos):
I

If, whenever we think of man, footed, or animal, we are thinking (a) of

something that is (ti ton onton) and (b) of none of the particulars (for
the same thought remains even when they have perished), then clearly
there is (something),14 besides (para) the particulars and sensibles,
which we are thinking of whether or not they are. For surely we are not
82 then thinking of something that is not. And this is a form (eidos)15 and
idea.
II

He says, then, that this argument also establishes that there are ideas of
perishing and perished things, and in general of particular and perishable
things, such as Socrates and Plato. For (a) we also think of them, and (b)
we retain and preserve an appearance of them even when they no longer
82.5 are.16
Ill

Indeed, we also think of things that in no way are (ta med' holds onta),
such as hippocentaur and Chimaera.
IV

So (hoste) neither does this (toioutos) argument validly deduce that there
are ideas.
LF adds (82. 7-9):
So this (toioutos) argument from thinking too does not validly deduce
that there are ideas, but (it does validly deduce) that there is something
else besides the particulars. Now the universal17 which is in the particulars
(to katholou to en tois kath' hekasta) also fits this (descriptioni.e. it is
something besides particulars), and it does not necessarily introduce an
idea.

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17

The Argument from Relatives (82. 11-83. 33)

The argument that establishes from (ek) relatives that there are ideas is 82 n
the following (toioutos):

I
In cases where some same thing is predicated of a plurality of things
(pleionori) not homonymously, but so as to reveal some one nature, it is
true of them either (a) because they are fully (kurios) what is signified by
the thing predicated, as when we call Socrates and Plato man; or (b) 83. i
because they are likenesses of the true ones, as when we predicate man
of pictured (men) (for in their case we reveal the likenesses of man,
signifying some same nature in all of them); or (c) because one of them is 83 5
the paradigm, the others likenesses, as if we were to call Socrates and the
likenesses of him men.

II
And when we predicate the equal itself of the things here, we predicate it
of them homonymously.18 For (a) the same account (logos) does not fit
them all. (b) Nor do we signify the truly equals. For the quantity in
sensibles changes (kineitai) and continuously shifts (metaballei) and is not
determinate (aphorismenon). (c) But neither do any of the things here 83. 10
accurately receive the account of the equal.

in
But neither (can they be called equal non-homonymously) by one of
them's being a paradigm, another a likeness. For one of them is not a
paradigm or a likeness any more than another.
IV

And indeed, if (ei de kai) someone were to accept that the likeness is not
homonymous with the paradigm, it always follows that these equals are
equals by being likenesses of what is fully and truly equal.

But if this is so, then there is something which is the equal itself and 83. 15
which is fully (equal), in relation to (pros) which, by being likenesses,
the things here both come to be and are called equal. And this is an idea,
being a paradigm fand likenesst19 of the things that come to be in
relation to it.

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Translation
VI20

This, then, is the one argument that establishes that there are ideas even
(kai) of relatives (pros ft'). It seems more carefully and more accurately
and more directly to aim at the proof of the ideas. For this (houtos)
argument does not, like the ones before it, seem to prove simply (haplos)
83.20 that there is some common thing besides the particulars, but rather
(it seems to prove) that there is some paradigm of the things here which
is fully. For this seems to be especially characteristic of the ideas.
VII

He says, then, that this argument establishes that there are ideas even
(kai) of relatives. At least (goun), the present proof has been advanced
on the basis of the equal, which is a relative. But they used to say that
83.25 there are no ideas of relatives. For in their view the ideas subsist in
themselves, being, in their view, kinds of substances, whereas relatives
have their being in their relation to one another.
VIII

Further, if the equal is equal to an equal, there will be more than one
(pleious) idea of equal. For the equal itself is equal to an equal itself. For
if it were not equal to something, it would not be equal at all.
IX

Further, by the same argument there will also have to be ideas of

unequals. For opposites are alike in that there will be ideas corresponding
83.3o to both or to neither; and the unequal is also agreed by them to be in
more than one thing (pleiosiri).

x21
Again, he made this opinion common ground when he spoke of it as his
own, saying 'of which things we say there is no in-itself (kath' hauto)
genus', speaking of 'genus', instead of 'reality' or 'nature', if a relative is
83.33 indeed like an appendage, as he said elsewhere.
Third Man Arguments
E U D E M U S ' V E R S I O N (83.

34-84. y)22

The argument introducing the third man is the following (toioutos):

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19

They say that the things that are predicated in common of (F) substances 83.35
are fully (kurios) (F) 23 and are ideas. Further, things that are similar to 84
one another are similar to one another by sharing in some same thing,
which is fully this (i.e. fully F); and this is the idea. But if this is so, and
if what is predicated in common of things (tinori), if it is not the same as
any of those things of which it is predicated, is something else besides it24 84.5
(for this is why man-itself is a genus, because it is predicated of the
particulars but is not the same as any of them), then there will be a third
man besides the particular25 (such as Socrates or (kai)26 Plato) and
besides the idea, which is also one in number.
A R I S T O T L E ' S V E R S I O N (84. 21-85. 3)27
The third man is also proved in this way:
If what is predicated truly of some plurality of things (pleionon)2& is
also (some) other thing (allo) besides (para) the things of which it is
predicated, being separated (kechorismenori) from them (for this is what 84.25
those who posit the ideas think they prove; for this is why, according to
them, there is such a thing as man-itself, because the man is predicated
truly of the particular (katti hekasta) men, these being a plurality, and it
is other (allo) than the particular men)but if this is so, there will be a 85
third man. For if the (man) being predicated is other than the things of
which it is predicated and subsists on its own (kaf idian huphestos), and
(if) the man is predicated both of the particulars and of the idea, then
there will be a third man besides the particular29 and the idea. In the
same way, there will also be a fourth (man) predicated of this (third
man), of the idea, and of the particulars, and similarly also a fifth, and so
on to infinity.

Alexander adds (85. 4-13):

This argument is the same as the first one.30 For this31 results for them
because they took similar things to be similar by sharing in some same 85.5
thing. For men and the ideas (of men) are similar. Now he refuted both
of the arguments that seemed more accurate, the one on the ground that
it established ideas even of relatives, and the other on the ground that it
introduces a third man and then multiplies men to infinity. And a similar
multiplication will be suffered by each of the other things of which they
say there are ideas. While various people used the first exposition of the 85.10
third manincluding Eudemus, who clearly used it in the first book of
On Dictionthe last was used by (Aristotle) himself in the first32 book
of On Ideas and a little later in this work.33

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