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osition.
182
NOUS
I am a millionaire.
183
DE SE AND DESCARTES
entials? An additional argument is needed: let me call it The Vacuity Argument. It claims that indexical terms do not describe the
objects they refer to, and therefore a sentence containing an indexical does not express a proposition, unless the indexical is standing for a name or a definite description.
Let 'Bd(Fb)' abbreviate, Jones believes, de dicto, that Fb'. Now, if
'Bd(Fb)' is true, the believer identifies b via the property of beingb (if 'b' is a definite description), or via the property of being called
'b' (if 'b' is a proper name). E.g., 'Jones believes (de dicto) that
the doctor is coming' implies that Jones identifies the object of his
belief as having the property of being the doctor; 'Jones believes
that Smith is coming', read de dicto, implies that Jones identifies
the object of his belief as called 'Smith'. In other words, the referring terms contribute to the propositional content of these sentences. What, then, is the propositional content of (1)? It is not
true that the utterer of (3) has identified himself either as beinghe, or as being called 'he'; even if there are such properties they
are properties of all males; also, it is not necessary for the editor
of Soul to identify himself as a male in order to utter (3). Hence
(1) cannot express a de dicto belief unless the indexical in it stands
for some name or description. If it does not, since no non-indexical
term can take its place, as the Irreducibility Argument claims, then
(1) cannot be interpreted de dicto. In this case what the editor of
Soul is said in (1) to believe is not a proposition.
II
NOUS
184
DE SE AND DESCARTES
185
annually, but forget that he is that happy editor. In this case Jones
will assert (4), but not (3). Boer and Lycan would then say that
(1) is unambiguously true. So let us grant this claim but ask: What
is it, then, that Jones forgot and therefore does not believe? Try
(1')The editor of Soul does not believe that he is a millionaire.
But this is impossible. (1) has the form 'Br(Fa)', and (1') has the
The two flatly contradict each other and cannot
form, '-Br(Fa)'.
both be true. Try then
(1") The editor of Soul believes that he is not a millionaire.
Fa)' and thus may be true if (1)
(1") is of the logical form 'Br(
is true. But (1 ") is false: poor Jones has no opinion on whether
he* is a millionaire or not; he neither believes that (3) is, nor that
(3) is not, true (de dicto). Surely there must be some way of describing this situation in plain English? But if (1) has but one
linguistic meaning, and it is, in this case, true, we have no way
of describing what Jones believes. This is absurd.
Finding it "hard to think of plausible explanation"' why we
tend to regard (1) as false in the above case, Boer and Lycan yet
argue that this is so with all de re belief. People tend to regard
'Jones believes that Fa' as false if Jones believes (de dicto) that Fb,
not knowing that a = b. Yet surely 'Br(Fa)' is then true? This argument, however, is fallacious. We can explain that tendency, in
the usual case, by saying that 'Bd(Fa)' is equivalent to a conjunction
of 'Br(Fa)' with several other sentences, some of which may be
false, and yet 'Br(Fa)' be true. But it seems that in our case, there
is no such false component (conjunct) of (1), as distinct from (1)
itself, to be blamed for (1)'s seeming falsity. But if we have to
consider (1), as usually used, to be false, then it is clear that
'believes' is used in (1) de dicto, or, at least, not de re.
For Lycan and Boer, 'I' is, in principle, dispensable: e.g., the
hunchback Igor, who refers to himself as 'Igor', does not have
any sentence like (3). But this is not true. Igor does have the term
'I' in his idiolect; it sounds like this: 'Igor'. That is to say, 'Igor'
does double duty in Igor's idiolect. Why else would he obey orders,
answer questions, etc. addressed to Igor and not, e.g., to Ivan?
Why does he always express the wishes of Igor and not those of
Ivan? If 'Igor believes that Igor is in danger', uttered by Igor,
is understood de re only, Igor's behavior is incomprehensible: for
why should he care if Igor is in danger? The only explanation is
that some tokens of 'Igor', used by Igor, mean 'I'. If Igor ceases
to believe that he is Igor he may still use 'Igor' to refer to Igor:
NOUS
186
e.g., as in some mentally disturbed people, he may correctly identify Igor's body as Igor's, but disclaim any responsibility for its
motions or any interest in its fate. That his behavior will then
radically change is enough evidence that his beliefs have changed,
too. Since his de re beliefs have not changed, de se is not de re.
Again we see that the term 'believes', as appearing in (1) and
(3), is much closer to de dicto than to de re belief. Jones' believing
(de dicto, of course) that p, is sufficient to explain why he acts as
he does, given that he does not like that p to be the case. Similarly,
'Bs(Fs)' being true of Jones is sufficient to explain why he acts as
he does, given that he does not like to be F. But 'Br(Fb)' being
true of Jones does not explain why Jones acts as he does, even if
he does not like b to be F. E.g., that Jones does not like his sister
to be in debt does not explain why he pays Mrs. Smith's debts
if he does not believe (in addition to his de re belief of Mrs. Smith
that she is in debt) de dicto, that Mrs. Smith is his sister.
III
So far, everything seems to indicate that the De Se Thesis is probably right: if (1) is not to be interpreted de re, we need another
sense of 'belief', akin to de dicto belief, which is not, however, a
relation between the believer and proposition. This seems to indicate the De Se Thesis. Should we, then, accept a non-propositional
theory of belief, in one of the versions suggested by Kaplan, Perry,
or Lewis?
The view advocated by D. Kaplan in his unpublished book
Demonstrativesis that a de se belief sentence does not describe the
believer as holding a proposition; but rather as standing in the
belief relation to an n-tuple, one of whose members is the believer
himself. The attribution of a belief to a person is mainly needed,
however, for the explanation of behavior by reasons. To say that
Jones did A because he believed that p, is not merely to cite a
cause of Jones' behavior (although it is that, too) but also to specify
Jones' own reasons for action. A belief must, therefore, be a representation of reality: the world according to Jones. But Kaplan's
version of the De Se Thesis makes this impossible, since, according
to it, what sentences like (1) express is not a mentally representable
version of reality. According to Kaplan, the editor of Soul himself
is a part of what (1) means. But the editor of Soul cannot be bodily
present right there in his own mind. How, then, can a belief
sentence, part of the meaning of which is the editor of Soul, all
200 pounds of him, be a reason for Jones' behavior or constitute
his view of the world? A set of external objects, such as Mr. Jones,
DE SE AND DESCARTES
187
NOUS
188
DE SE AND DESCARTES
189
exactly the same thing: Milan". That this is told as a joke (surely
what these monarchs wanted was not the same: why else did they
fight?) shows that McGinn's "first and fundamental" semantic
principle, that "the concept corresponding to an indexical word
type" (i.e., "what is in the mind of a thinker by way of a representation of the object of his thought") "is the same for any
token of that type" (ibid., p. 64), is quite untenable.
David Lewis takes belief sentences to report a direct self-attribution of a property to a person. Thus, to believe (3) is to selfattribute the property, is a millionaire; to believe that p, is to selfattribute is in a p-world, etc. But this, technically brilliant, move
merely conceals the problem instead of solving it. Our problem
was that in order to attribute a property to oneself one ought to
have some concept of oneself, which seems to require having some
representation of oneself in mind. How else would I know that
the property is attributed to me, rather than, say, merely stated to
exist? Claiming that self-attribution is "primitive" does not help
us understand the concept self, but that is precisely what we need
to understand in order to self-ascribe anything at all.
Another argument is this: For Lewis, 'I am tired' and 'you
are tired' have entirely different logical forms: the first is a selfascription of tiredness,the second, a self-ascription of being in a world
whereyou are tired. Implausible as it is, this is not the worst of it.
In 'I believe that I am tired' and in 'You believe that I am tired'
the very same sentence, 'I am tired', gets two different readings.
The first sentence is taken as a self-ascription of, believed to selfascribe tiredness; the second is a self-ascription of being in a world
whereyou ascribe tirednessto me. The second reading not only uses
an unreduced indexical (me); it also fails to match the reading of
'I' elsewhere.
Chisholm's theory, which is very similar to Lewis's, is subject
to more or less the same difficulties. Sosa's similar Perspectival
Theory takes propositions to have truth values at perspectives
where S is a person and t, a time. This technical refor<S,t>,
mulation of the problem, however, does not solve it. Suppose that
my belief that I am tired is true at <S,t>.
What is it that I
believe? How is 'I' interpreted? What are the truth makers which
make (1) false and (2) true at the same perspective? Lewis, Chisholm and Sosa avoid this question altogether.10
IV
We have arrived at a total impasse. Or have we conceded too much
too quickly to the Irreducibility Argument? There is a neo-Carte-
190
NOUS
sian argument intended to show that the indexical in (3), and the
quasi indicator in (1), may yet be eliminable after all.
Descartes may have discovered a term which any rational creature must be willing to use instead of 'I' in (3). Jones may be
ignorant of the fact that he is Jones, or the editor of Soul. But he
cannot be unaware of the fact that he thinks this very thought
about being a millionaire, i.e., that he is the believer of this belief
token. So then, we can say that the utterer of (3) must be willing
to utter, or think,
(5)
i.e.,
DE SE AND DESCARTES
191
NOOS
192
DE SE AND DESCARTES
193
NOUS
194
find Chisholm's or Lewis' "self" hard to understand, the demonstrative-guise approach seems very fruitful. But it, too, fails to
meet the test set by Castafieda himself. (3) cannot be synonymous
to
(11) That propositional guise (or: this I-slice) is so-and-thusly related to a millionaire.
because one may fail to identify the propositon expressed by (1 1),
interpreted de dicto, and yet believe (3). Moreover, (11) uses indexicals and thus fails to specify a complete proposition. It would
not help to replace those indexicals, e.g., by the definite description
'the propositional guise such that...' since there may be more than
one such guise; the uniqueness condition is violated and the definite
description will fail to refer.
Castalieda has set the standard on what a theory of first-person
demonstratives should do: it should formulate a semantic rule which
"can account for the de dicto reference that a speaker must be able
to make when she uses the first person pronoun". 17 But the semantic rule he proceeds to formulate (I-HE*), that a speaker who
uses the first person pronoun indexically refers to himself as himself,18
is uninformative. How does the proposition, that I myself as myself
am a millionaire, differ from the proposition, that I am a millionaire? I do not think that this Adamsian-Chisholmian move is
illuminating.
On the other hand I think that Castafieda's Cartesian gambit
does lead in the right direction. We saw, earlier, that all definitions
of 'I', by reference to one's own mental contents, or events, or
guises, etc. fail, because, unlike 'I', they do not guarantee an
infallible recognition of that which is referred to. Reference can
be achieved by descriptions, names, or demonstratives. A purely
qualitative definite description will never do, since one may fail
to believe it applies to the object it denotes. It may also fail the
uniqueness condition, and denote nothing. A name will not do
either: although it may refer to the right object, the believer may
not know, or forget, what this name denotes. An indexical will
not do at all: although a semantic rule may determine its reference,
the believermay not know this rule or confuse it with another. Descartes, and Castalieda's, challenge, however, was to find a semantic
rule for 'I' which not only would guarantee it against failure of
reference (Kaplan's rule, that 'I' refers to its user, is quite sufficient
for this) but would also give it a mentally representable meaning,
and guarantee that, whoever understands that meaning, cannot
fail to believe that it is satisfied by the reference of the said token
of 'I' and by it only. Can this challenge be met?
DE SE AND DESCARTES
195
V
Let us, then, make a fresh start, and get on a new road which
will, hopefully, lead us to find the propositional content of indexical
sentences. In his famous "On Referring", P.F. Strawson mentions
a bridge which has an "Unsafe for Lorries" sign posted on it.
Certainly, we get the message; but how? Where is the grammatical
subject of the sentence? Strawson suggests that, in such cases, the
subject is "understood". This is certainly true, but not sufficient.
How is it understood? It seems to me that the situation is essentially
this: What we have in front of us is not an open sentence which
lets us guess what its subject might be. Rather, what we have is
a completesentence, only part of which (the predicate) is referential.
The bridge was not used to refer to anything or to represent anything. The entity of which the referential part of the sentence is
predicated is present in the sentence, so to speak, "in person".
The grammatical subject of this sentence is the bridge itself.
In the said sentence, the bridge is displayed, not referred to.
Let us call such sentences, i.e., sentences parts of which consist
of items displayed, and not used to refer, display sentences.Display
sentences abound around us: the sign 'Keep Off' on a road; 'Shake
well', on a bottle; the date written at the head of a letter; 'New,
Improved' on a cereal box; '$100' on a dress, etc. John Searle,
in his SpeechActs, has suggested a very similar theory for quotations.19
Searle rejects the common view that the quotation operator is a
name-forming device; its function, he claims, is to serve as a display
box. An expression in quotes does not referto the enclosed words;
it displays them. Quotation producesthe item, to which the predicate
refers, without referring to it. The words, of which the sentence
says something, are right there in the sentence, in the display box.
No need to refer to them by a symbol. Unfortunately, Searle's
theory received very little attention: perhaps it didn't seem to have
other applications, and thus to be a mere change of nomenclature.
It seems to me, however, that the theory of display sentences is
very fruitful indeed, and can be successfully used in various areas
including that to which the present article is devoted.
If 'your father' and 'my brother' refer to the same object, they
specify different methods for locating it; thus, they have different
senses. Now what is the sense of a displayed item, which does not
refer and thus specifies no particular way or method for locating
anything? It makes some contribution to the meaning of the sentence, and therefore it has a sense of its own. But what is this
sense? It seems that it must be identical with the item itself, since
the item is not presented through one of its facets, or
NOUS
196
DE SE AND DESCARTES
197
198
NOUS
F- 't is wise'.
I- 'Socrates'
Again, the sentence 'Socrates taught Plato', as used, can be represented thus:
13.
etc.
F- 'Socrates, Plato'
20
H 'This bridge'
Words need not be referentially used. They, too, may be displayed in a sentence. E.g., in
16.
'Water'
H 'Water'
it is referentially used.
Written or spoken signs are not the only items which can be
used referentially: some mental items do also serve as words of
sort; they can be used to refer to things, and, qua terms, form
DE SE AND DESCARTES
199
sentences. Mental sentences, like ordinary sentences, express propositions. But what would a mental sentence be? Ordinary sentences
are formed by our convention, that juxtaposing the written (or
voiced) signs in some linear (spatial or temporal) proximity indicates our intention that they should serve as coreferential terms.
But how are mental sentences formed out of the diverse mental
contents? This calls for a short digression on the subject of the
epistemic presentness, selves, and intentionality.
If I am to have a belief about Jones I must somehow represent
Jones in my mind (and my beliefs are influenced by the way I
represent him). But we saw earlier that such representation is not
necessary when the object of my belief is itself a mental item. The
reason for this is that some mental items are epistemicallypresent to
others without representation. If I believe that, a year ago, I was
in pain, then that belief must contain some symbol which represents
the absent pain and refersto it. But if I believe that I am in terrible
pain right now, then, in the normal case, I do not have to represent
the pain symbolically: it, itself, is epistemically present to, and can
be made a part of, the concomitant belief. This particular belief
has a privileged epistemic access to this particular pain. They form
one thought: one mental sentence.
That some mental items be epistemically present to others is
conceptually necessary; otherwise, thinking would not have been
possible. If every object had to be symbolically represented in a mental item in order for that mental item to be about it, every train
of thought, which is extended in time, would have had to represent
its past parts continuously in every new temporal segment of the
process of thinking. Thus, each infinitesimal segment in the process
of thinking would have had to incorporate an infinite number of
symbolic representations of the previous segments. Since this is
not possible, we must conclude that some mental events may be
present to others themselves, in propriapersona, and not via symbolic
representations.
21
This inclusion of a thought's object in that very thought produces a minimal self: an entity which is reflectively self-aware. In
our example, such mini-self consisted of a certain pain, epistemically present to the thought about it. A merethought, i.e., a mental
sentence which includes only symbolic representations, is not a
self; but a thought to which another is present, is.
Perhaps this is the basic distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance: Knowing that I was (or
that someone else is) in pain, having all the information one can
have about that pain, etc., is nothing like being in pain. Being in
200
NOUS
1-[ Uones]
F-
[ill t].
[hunting t]
H [nice I].
which does not say that hunting is nice, but that it is sometimes
nice to think of hunting (i.e., some hunting-thoughts are nice).
Now, a certain belief about an experience which is epistemically
present to it, is the belief we look fQr: a belief which is infallibly
about oneself. The experience may be any experience at all; I shall
refer to it as 'e', but the believer does not refer to it: he has it.
The belief expressed in (3), that I am a millionaire, is structurally
described as follows:
DE SE AND DESCARTES
21.
e-
F- [M ((ix)
201
P (x, i))]
the 't' indicates the single argument place of predicates which refer
to single-object sequences (here it is e); 'P(ab)' is, 'b is an experience
of the person a'; 'Ma' is, 'a is a millionaire'. Let me stress again
that neither the name 'e', nor the mental term [e], which, in use,
refer to e, occur in the mental sentence described in (21). What
occurs in it is e itself. The believer attributes Being a Millionaire
to the experiencer of a displayed experience; the proposition he
believes is a display proposition.
An indexical sentence, then, abbreviates a mental display sentence of its user's. A quasi-indicator, on the other hand, attributes
maintaining a display proposition to someone else. The proposition
expressed by (1), then, is describable as
22.
B(s,e-
F- [M(Qx,
t) (P (x, i]).
where 's' is 'the editor of Soul.' (I.e., the editor of Soul believes
the display proposition expressed by [I am a millionaire]). This,
then, is the definition of the first person, as used:
2 3.
e -
[ (? x) P (x,
t)].
e -
(? x) [T(x,()].
202
NOUS
'
is short' -.
[t hurts] -I.
[t exists] -H.
[t bears P to a millionaire] H.
DE SE AND DESCARTES
30.
203
In this way we can express the general form of all indexicals, most
economically, thus:
31.
r(7
x)t 0
(x,
t]
-I.
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Adams, R.M. and Castaneda, H.N., "Knowledge and Self" (a correspondence), in Tomberlin, J.E. (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World (Hackett 1983), pp.
293-309.
Armstrong, D.M., Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge Unversity Press, 1973.
Boer, S.E. and Lycan, W.G., "Who, Me?" The Philosophical Review 89: 427-466 (1980).
Castaneda, H.N., "He*: On the Logic of Self-Consciousness",
Ratio 8: 130-157 (1966).
. "Indicators
and Quasi-Indicators",
American Philosophical
Quarterly 4: 85-100
(1967).
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(1974).
"Perception, Belief, and the Structureof Physical Objectsand Consciousness", Synthese 35: 285-351 (1977).
. "On
the
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Profile
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Dennett,
D.C.,
Reference",
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1981.
pp. 1-95.
Dummett, M.A.E., The Interpretationof Frege's
Evans, G., "Understanding
Demonstratives",
and Understanding, De Gruyter, 1981, pp.
Fodor, J.A., The Language of Thought, Crowell,
_
(Experiential)
"Indicators
Propositional
Attitudes",
The Monist
61:
501-523
Meaning
(1978).
Hintikka, J., "Cogito, Ergo Sum", Philosophical Review 71: 3-32 (1962).
Kaplan, D., Demonstratives (unpublished manuscript).
Lewis, D., "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se", The Philosophical Review 87: 513-545 (1979).
. Postscript in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Oxford 1983, pp. 156-159.
Madell, G., The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh University Press, 1981.
McGinn, C., The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts, Oxford, 1983.
Perry, J., "Frege on Demonstratives",
The Philosophical Review 87: 474-479 (1977).
. "The
Problem
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Indexical",
NOUS 13: 3-21 (1979).
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NOUS
204
NOTES
'Stalnaker (1981).
2Ibid., p. 130.
'Cf., e.g., Fodor (1975) and later writings.
4Castafieda (1977), pp. 327-335; Castafieda (1981).
"Boer and Lycan (1980).
Ibid., p. 461.
'Ibid., p. 460.
8Perry (1983).
"Reported in Stalnaker (1981), p. 149 (cf. also pp. 132-133) as a personal communication from Perry.
'0For other difficulties in the concept of truth at a perspective see Castafieda's reply
to Sosa in Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language and the Structureof the World, p. 391.
"I made the same suggestion a few years ago in Zemach (1977).
'2Stalnaker (1981), p. 142.
'Ibid., p. 145.
'4Cf. Castafieda (1966), Castafieda (1967), Castafieda (1968).
"A Castafiedaen position along these lines is presented by L. Rudder-Baker (1981).
'6Castanieda (1981 b), p. 311. Cf. also Castafieda (1977) and Adams and Castafieda
(1983).
'7Tomberlin (1983), p. 324-325.
'8Ibid., p. 325.
'Searle (1970), pp. 320-344. (Searle says 'present' rather than 'display'.)
2"For a detailed nominalistic version of this semantics where no set-theoretical entities
(such as sequences) appear, see Zemach (1982).
2'Some modern followers of Kant have used this argument incorrectly, I think, to
argue for what they call "The Unity of Consciousness"
and the existence of a transempirical, simple self. Cf. Chisholm (1981) and Madell (1981).
22Cf., e.g., Pitcher (1971), Armstrong (1973), Dennett (1969), Dennett (1978) and
Dennett (1982).
2"A Cartesian interpretation of Frege along similar lines is offered by Dummett (1982,
chapter 6) and Evans (1981).
241 wish to thank Ramon Lemes Leonard Carrier and William Lycan for helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper.