1

G.R. No. 160597

July 20, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS
BOLANTE, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines
assails and seeks to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 21, 2003
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74398 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra in
Special Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by herein
respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:
1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and
Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;
2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her
registered name isRoselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can
remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and
private records; and
4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform
to the name she has always carried and used.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as
petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set
the hearing on February 20, 2001.
At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving
respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish
jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the
afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification
Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts."
On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's express March 26, 2001
directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing. Following another resetting,
what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001
and actually held. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several
documents without any objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra.
Among the documents thus submitted and marked in evidence were the following:
Exh. "A" - The Petition

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Exh. "B" - The Notice of Initial Hearing
Exh. "C" - The Certificate of Posting
Exh. "D" - The Appearance of the Solicitor General
Exh. "E" - The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
Exh. "F" - The Affidavit of Publication
Exh. "F-I" -The Newspaper Clippings
Exh. "G" - The Norluzonian Courier
Exh. "H" - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier
Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent
took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have her registered name
changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She also categorically stated
she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present correct
name.
An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republic's petition which cited the
decision of the trial court:
At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante] testified, among others,
that she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr. and presently residing at Bliss Angad,
Bangued, Abra since 1995 but before she resided in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth.
She presented her birth certificate and was marked as Exhibit J to establish such fact of
birth and to effect that the name Roselie Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true
and correct name but instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during her
school days, while being a government employee, and in all her public and private
records.
She presented her professional license issued by the Professional Regulation
Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountant
and a 'Quick Count' document all issued in her name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which
documents were marked as Exhibit K and Exhibit L and Exhibit M respectively. She
likewise marked her marriage license as Exhibit N to prove her marriage xxx.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she wanted to secure a
passport and wanted that the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not
have filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport.
On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the petition is her
realization that there will be a complication upon her retirement. 2 (Words in bracket
added.)
On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition, disposing as
follows:

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby approved and is granted by
this Court for being meritorious.
The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:
a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth from Roselie Eloisa Bringas
Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; and,
b) To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with Registry Regulations.
Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bangued, Abra for recording
and compliance.
SO ORDERED.3 (Underscoring added)
In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision of October 21, 2003, 4 the
appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, the Republic's present petition on the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3,
RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT
WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY
OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME
IS NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of
the CFI of Cebu,5 citing pertinent jurisprudence,6 non-compliance with these requirements would
be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change of name.
The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall
set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the

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hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, . The date set for the hearing shall not be within
thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice. (Underscoring added.)
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within
four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the
threshold that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective
publication.
We are not persuaded.
As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18, 2000
and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice
of hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of
the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the
Order, the initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month
prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the
CA,7 must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed
respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due
notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25,
2001.
It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001,
beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the
September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state and
correctly so that the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the
court with jurisdiction thereover.8
The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the whole
world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded
to make an objection of any and against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.9
In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites
concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing
must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks;
and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the
province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against
the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice of the hearing.
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may
appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall
appear on behalf of the Government. 10 The government, as an agency of the people, represents
the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government,
effectively represents the public.11 In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial
prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial
prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there
was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing.

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Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to
reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial
prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or
sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules.
In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the
requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on
the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for
purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a privilege and not a right.
Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of
birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. 12 Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name.
Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest. 13
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is
a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence
available.14 What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow
from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the
petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts."
With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper
and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name
and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth
record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her
driver's license, professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional
Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her
having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond
practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any
opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or
injury to the interests of the State or of other people. 16
The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that the requested
name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law
deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like
certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of one's
good moral character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for
any evil motive or fraudulent intent. Respondent's open court testimony, given under pain of
perjury and for which she was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime
under her registered name or under her present name (name that she is using) had convinced
the trial court of the bona fides of her request for change of name. As the CA correctly
ratiocinated:

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In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in
order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground
under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents
the less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.
Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition
is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as
police clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the
requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to
establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is
served upon the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition
is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any
oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition
for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition
is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the
requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added).
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic petition is
whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to
have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court
loathes to disturb the action thus taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 189476

February 2, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent)
is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
respondents certificate of live birth1shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008
at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN
RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office
stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of
Marriage."2 Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to
college3 showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child
where "Coseteng" appears as his surname.4 In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent

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ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."5
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, 6 respondent amended his petition by alleging
therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules
of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November
14-20, 2008.8 And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial
court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. 9
By Decision of January 8, 2009, 10 the trial court granted respondents petition and directed the
Civil Registrar ofMakati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE
OF PARTIES" [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to
"COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the
[respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, 11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for
review to the Court on pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES THE CHANGE OF
[RESPONDENTS] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND,
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE
DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH
CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding. 13
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date of marriage and
the name of respondents father from the entries in respondents birth certificate, 14 the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with respondents prayer reading:

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court
issue an orderallowing the change of name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that
the Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to
reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises. 15 (underscoring supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites
the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil
Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four
public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no
oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing. 16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.17 Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 18 In Alfon, the
Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known
since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She
merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then
would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx

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SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar andall persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present
case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be
made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth
certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed
by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote 20 in support of his claim that his change of
name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be
substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render
nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of ones name or the correction
of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and
underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory
remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as
reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar
of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries
in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who
have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that
change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry
in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which
involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz
Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of
her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which
is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth
certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 Bulan" are erroneous because she was
not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar
to change her name appearing in her childrens birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and

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to correct her civil status in Victorias birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and
place of marriage to "no marriage."
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court
involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial courts order directing the change of
Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have
been maderespondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as
well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely
affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier
mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the
Civil Code.24 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of
notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in
the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such
as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is
validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the
two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from
the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 25 In that case, Nadina
Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter
June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being,
according to Nadina, her daughters real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a

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"CONSTANCIA" wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the
petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of Junes family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before
the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the
annulment of the trial courts Order as Mary Joy was, by Barcos claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadinas petition
for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is
not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the
notice cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108.1awphi1 Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the
daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be
established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would
know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example,
a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of
his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have
been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as
the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth
certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of
Carlitos minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates
of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to "Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of
the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because their parents
Juan and Epifania were not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth
certificates of their children of his and his wifes date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their
marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition,
Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to "Marivel."
The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married
to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos parents rendered the trial of
the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial courts judgment void, this
Court held that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication
of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court

12
noted that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since the
petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for
correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife;
and, with respect to the Khos petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their
father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to
implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant
of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as partyrespondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner
to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified
through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8,
2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q0863058 is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32600 February 26, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet
and ANITA PO alias VERONICA PAO, assisted by her mother HELEN POA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be
joined in the same proceeding? This is the issue posed in this petition for review of a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. 1
The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the herein private respondent Anita Po
alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. 2 For this
purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's
name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT
CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner
was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother. The suit was
docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 642.
The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan
and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her
maternal grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not
Po Yu as erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She

13
assigns these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner
also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was christened as
Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given name and the latter being the correct spelling of
her surname; that since her childhood up to the present, she had always been known and
referred to as Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.
On the basis of these allegations, the petitioner asked the trial court to allow her change of name
and to order the correction of her records in the Local Civil Registrar's Office at La Trinidad,
Benguet to conform to the nameVeronica Pao. She also asked the trial court to order the
correction of her father's name recorded in her birth certificate from Po Yu to Pao Yu, as well as
her mother's name appearing as Pakiat Chan changed to Helen Chan.
At the hearing scheduled by the trial court on March 4,1969, the Office of the Solicitor General
presented its Opposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same. The thrust of the
said Opposition is that the remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by the mere
submission of the said Petition. The pertinent portions of the written arguments in the Opposition
are as follows
... A petition for change of name is filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court ...
and a petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register is filed
under Rule 108 of the same Rules... . Rule 103 and Rule 108 are distinct and
separate from each other and each provides for different requirements that must
be satisfied in order that a person may avail of any one of them. The present
petition apparently satisfies the requirements of Rule 103 on change of name but
fails insofar as the request for correction of certain entries is concerned because
the civil registrar concerned and the other parties affected by the corrections
sought to be made have not been included in the petition as required by section
3 of Rule 108. And from the nature of the change sought to be made by the
herein petitioner in her surname, it seems that orderly and proper procedure
requires that a correction be first made of the alleged errors in the names of the
petitioner's parents to justify her petition for change of name. Thus, petitioner
alleges that her father's name is correctly Pao Yu but the same is recorded in her
birth certificate as Po Yu However, in the said birth certificate, petitioner's name
appears as Anita Po following the name of her father as registered in the same
birth certificate, which is Po Yu. It therefore appears that until the name of the
father is shown to have been registered erroneously, there is no justification for
allowing the petitioner to use the surname Poa The importance and necessity of
first determining the propriety of the corrections sought to be made by the herein
petitioner before allowing her to change her name is magnified when it is noted
that the corrections sought involve the very identity of the parents of the herein
petitioner, without a clear-cut clarification of which, the court may unwittingly
allow itself to become an instrument in the substitution in a public record of the
Identities of certain persons.
In view of these circumstances, it appears that considered as a petition for
change of name, the present petition does not state a cause of action
considering that on the basis of the data appearing in the birth certificate,
petitioner's father is Po Yu and not Pao Yu And the present petition can not be
considered (sufficient) in form and substance as a petition for correction because
it does not satisfy the requirements set forth by section 3 (Rule 108) of the Rules
of Court and there is no allegation of how the alleged error was committed.
xxx xxx xxx 3

14
In a Decision dated July 24,1969, the trial court, with respondent Judge Feliciano Belmonte
presiding therein, ruled in favor of the petitioner. 4 The petitioner was allowed to change her name
from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. The court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents
as prayed for in the Petition in the registry of birth. The Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad
Benguet was ordered to implement the corresponding corrections.
On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General elevated the case
to this Court by way of the instant Petition. 5 The Solicitor General raises the following issues
(1) Whether or not the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao has
presented a proper and reasonable cause for the change of her name; and
(2) Whether or not the names Po Yu and Pakiat Chan appearing in the birth
certificate of Anita Po can be changed in the same proceeding for the change of
name of Anita Po.
The parties having submitted their respective briefs, the case is now submitted for decision.
We have gone through the entire record of the case and We find merit in the instant Petition.
The allegations of the private respondent are not disputed by the petitioner. The respondent
Judge rendered judgment in accordance with these undisputed facts. A conclusion of a court
drawn from undisputed facts raises a question of law. 6 The issues raised in the instant Petition
are directed against the conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge and drawn from
undisputed facts. Taking into account these observations and considering that the resolution of
the issues raised herein would not require this Court to re-examine the evidence presented
before the trial court, We hold that the two issues raised in this Petition are questions of law.
Inasmuch as the two issues are related to each other, they will be resolved together.
In fine, the petitioner maintains that her correct name is Veronica Pao inasmuch as Veronica is
her Christian name and Pao is the surname of her father. She does not, however, deny that the
name of her father appearing in her birth certificate is Po Yu and not Pao Yu. She assigns the
discrepancy to mere clerical error.
An examination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the supposed correct name of Veronica
Pao is predicated on the assumption that the correct name other father is Pao Yu and not Po
Yu as recited in her own birth certificate. The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the
name other father in her birth certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown to have been registered in
her birth certificate erroneously, there is no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the
surname Pao. The corrections sought by the petitioner involve the very Identity of her parents.
Surely, the propriety of such corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more
adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial court.
Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil registry
for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary
procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical
errors and not to a material change in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the
petitioner. 7 A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of
being corrected by reference to the record alone. 8 The petitioner seeks more than just the
correction of a clerical error.
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings

15
filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never
made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final
determination of the case cannot be made. 9
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be
substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render
nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction
of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the
same proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.
Accordingly, We hold that the Petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and
substance and should have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet in Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July 24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared to be without force or effect. The entries in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguet
pertaining to the petitioner Anita Po and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were
before such Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of La
Trinidad, Benguet for his information and implementation. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.

16
G.R. No. L-20874

May 25, 1966

IN RE PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JOSELITO YU.

JOSELITO YU, represented by his guardian ad litem, JUAN S. BARRERA, petitioner and
appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
Syquia Law Offices for petitioner and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. C. Zaballero and
Atty. J. Domingo de Leon for oppositor and appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad
litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in
his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of
Manila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of
name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy," that he
grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled
in school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also
stated."
Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule
103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.
In his appeal, petitioner1 contends that the lower court erred (1) in ruling that an alien cannot avail
himself of the provisions of the rules of court relating to change of name; (2) in concluding that in
this jurisdiction family or personal rights of an alien should be governed by the laws of his country;
(3) in concluding that a simple reason why an alien's name should not be changed by judicial
decree in this jurisdiction may be found in the inability of the local judicial authority to provide for
the alien's change of name in his passport; and (4) in engaging in judicial legislation beyond its
authority when it applied the law on change of name.
Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of
name.2 Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not
limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that
the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified,
signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name
asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the
requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.
The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and since under
Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad,
the converse of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an
alien must be governed by the laws of his own country. The major premise of the proposition may
be true in a general sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an individual
but one's family as well is known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code (Articles 364 to 373) contains
provisions for the use of surnames by legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, and adopted children,

17
as well as by women who are married, widowed or legally separated from their husbands. But a
change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in,
one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new
family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity,
civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of
words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of
appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). The situation is no different whether the person whose name
is changed be a citizen or an alien.
To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by
parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby
acquire certain families with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously
impressed on the public mind. But this is precisely the purpose of the judicial application to
determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. As held by this
Court in several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is not
a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and
the consequences that will likely follow (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, L-8035, Nov. 29, 1957; Tan v.
Republic, L-16384, April, 26 1962; Ong Te v. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962; Moore v.
Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In not one of those cases, however, has it been ruled that an
alien is not entitled to file a petition at all.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. L-18008

October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.
BARRERA, J.:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433)
a petition which reads:
1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three
years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;
2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable
Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R.
Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal
separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;
3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from
Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now;

18
4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that
she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are
had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the
provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of
the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon
petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married
name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.
The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code
which reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation
has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to
use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from
Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her
maiden name, giving as reason or cause therefor her being legally separated from the husband
Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to live together for many years.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the
petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change
of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased
to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to
change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil
Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however,
applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the
petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of Article 372.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner
owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is
however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was

19
based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner
and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod).
Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is hereby
set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered

G.R. No. L-18284

April 30, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ANA ISABEL HENRIETTE ANTONIA
CONCEPCION GEORGIANA, ISABEL VALDES JOHNSTON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Domingo T. Zavalla for oppositor-appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal taken by petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dated September 19, 1960 and its order of October 31, 1960, Hon. Andres
Reyes, presiding, prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the adopted child instead of
Valdes Johnston petitioner's married name at the time of the filing of the petition.
On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of
one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, then under
the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage situated in the city of Manila. The petition
shows that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino,
residing at 12 San Lorenzo Drive, Makati, Rizal; that the couple are childless; that the consent of
the Mother Superior of the orphanage and the husband of petitioner-appellant was obtained.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Notice of the hearing of the petition was issued and duly published as required by law, and after
hearing, the lower court rendered a decision granting the petition, with the following dispositive
part:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted declaring the child Ana Isabel
Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana freed from all legal obligations and obedience
and maintenance with respect to its natural parents and is, to all legal intents and
purposes, the child of the petitioner, with the corresponding change of surname VALDES,
which is the surname of petitioner.
The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname given to the
minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was denied by the lower
court in its order of October 31, 1960. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband by virtue of
Article 370, par. 1 of the new Civil Code, and because that is the surname (Valdes Johnston) she

20
used in filing the petition in the present case, under which she testified at the time of the trial, and
under which she is now known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had to be
known by her maiden surname, and the lower court should have decreed that the minor whom
she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using. She also argues that the
use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted child, as prescribed by the lower court, will create the
impression that she is the illegitimate child of petitioner-appellant begotten before her marriage, a
situation which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted.
The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is permitted to add
to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that appellant's surname is Valdes and
not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her
husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes
Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be misled into believing that
she was adopted by appellant's husband also, which is not true in this case.
We agree with the decision of the lower court authorizing or prescribing the use of the surname
Valdes by the adopted child. The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the
adopted minor to the use of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not
to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and
not Johnston, and as she made the adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and
not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a
personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond
Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of
making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own surname.
Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would indeed result, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the
surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.
For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would
mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the
case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the
adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.
It is to forestall befuddling situations pointed out above and other possible confusing situations
that may arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil
Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and
not that which is acquired by marriage.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below prescribing the use of the surname
"Valdes" by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, is hereby
affirmed. Without costs.

21
G.R. No. L-21194

April 29, 1966

HAW LIONG, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and Atty. J.
Domingo de Leon for oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano A. Asoy for petitioner-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte.
He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia Trading Company; that he
has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; that he wants to change his name to Alfonso
Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin;
that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the
Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending
case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing
to appear and answer the same.
After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin. The
government has appealed.
This Court has already had occasion to state the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or
civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oao vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, November
29, 1957). The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may
warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor,
or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change
of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is
necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).1wph1.t
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change of name
other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been known by that name
by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to
follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this claim which is merely supported
by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as Haw
Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son
of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name
that was given him upon birth is Haw Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a
Filipino citizen. This indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin
because that is the family name of his father "to conform with the customs and traditions and also for
sentimental reasons."
The true situation however is, as was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with
other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to be
called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friends asked him how
he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since then they started calling him by that
name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong and has not contracted with any person under
the name of Alfonso Lantin. We find, therefore, no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change
of name desired by petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside. The petition is denied, with costs.

22

G.R. No. L-20018

April 30, 1966
CHIU HAP CHIU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and J. Domingo de
Leon for oppositor-appellant.
Teodorico P. Labtic for petitioner-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance
of Davao. He testified that he was 30 years old, single, a doctor of medicine, and a resident of Davao City;
that the name given him at birth was Lo Hap Chiu; that during his school days, or from elementary school to
college, he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason he desires to have said name
adopted instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use of his name; and that the name given him in
his alien certificate of registration is Chiu Hap Chiu.
After the reception of the evidence, the court a quo granted the petition. It found that petitioner was born on
February 1, 1930 at Kulagsu, Fuken, China; that he is a Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of
residence; that he is a physician by profession and has no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes to
the government; that he desires to change his name from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu for the reason that
the latter is the name he used while studying in the school and because his present name and surname are
the same.
The government opposed the petition in view of its failure to find sufficient justification for the change of
name desired by petitioner.
This Court has already had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne
by individuals and entitles for purpose of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
matter of right. So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his
certificate of birth or in the civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, G.R.
No. L-8035, November 29, 1957). The following may be considered among others, as proper and
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for
change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimized; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I, p. 660).1wph1.t
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for change of name
other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged reason that that is the name given him in
his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but his claim was not satisfactorily proven, for aside from
his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by the
University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is nothing in the record to
show that he used said name from grade school to college for he failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove it. The truth is that he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and
in all the clearances secured by him from said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby
indicating that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He has not shown that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu
Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of Davao. Since the State has an interest in the
name borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a rule is established by the
name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no plausible reason for authorizing the change
of name desired by petitioner.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. No costs.

23

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS,
This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's prayer for a change of
name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the facts which are well-stated in
the questioned Order as follows: t.hqw
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be
changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978
and a copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for
the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor
General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal
Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence
and to submit the same for resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital
(Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her
parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken
cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been
residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for
twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College
using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high
school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing
(Exhibit E-4). Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage
under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor
(Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4).
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her
friends and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:

24
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall
if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge
that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the
surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become
known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally
authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the
father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her
testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who
reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for
change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to
the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as
legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father
invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not equivalent
to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R.
No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: t.hqw
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request
for change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon
although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from
the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished
her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she
exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully
her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to
avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner is allowed to change not
only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.