Gonzales v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108811
May 31, 1994

Ponente: Justice Vitug

Facts:
This appeal for certiorari rooted from a criminal complaint for Qualified Seduction.
Said complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Obando, Bulacan. Upon the
arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to the charge mentioned above. However,
when the defense was about to rest its case, the prosecution filed a motion so that the
accused would answer to a charge for rape since the evidence submitted indicated that
rape and not qualified seduction. The lower court dismissed the case on the ground that
there is no sufficient evidence to prove the crime of Qualified Seduction as charge in the
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal is proper

Held:
No. The dismissal of the charge for qualified seduction is clearly sanctioned by
the above-quoted rule in order to pave the way for the filing of the proper offense for the
crime of rape. The accused cannot invoke double jeopardy; for that kind of jeopardy to
arise, the following requisites must be extant: (1) The previous complaint or information
or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraigned and has

pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
dismissed without his express consent.

When all the above elements concur, a second prosecution for (a) the same
offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said
offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the
first offense charged, can be rightly barred.

Here, there is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did not have the requisite
jurisdiction to try the offense of rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the
Regional Trial Court to take cognizance of. Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 2560 for qualified seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was provisional
but likewise with the express consent of the accused (herein petitioner).

People of the Philippines v. Galigao

G.R. Nos. 140961-63
January 14, 2003

Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago

Facts:
Bobby Galigao was charged with rape before the Regional Trial Court of Calapan
City, Oriental Mindoro. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty of the charge.
Thereafter, the lower court found Galigao guilty of the charge against him and
sentences him to suffer three (3) death penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in sentencing the accused-appellant with
death penalty for the three (3) rapes when rape as a heinous crime was not yet
punishable by death when he committed the same

Held:
No. The death penalty could thus be decreed; nevertheless, Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, recognizes that
in death penalty cases the High Tribunal puts to a vote not only the Issue of guilt of an

appellant but also the question on the imposition of the death penalty itself. The law
provides thus:

Sec. 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: ART. 47. In

what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of Death Penalty
Cases. The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed
under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when
upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. All told, we are convinced of the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for two counts of rape committed against his
daughters, Dorivie and Deborrah. But given the circumstances attendant to this case,
there is sufficient justification in imposing on accused-appellant the reduced penalty of

reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

People of the Philippines v. CFI of Quezon

G.R. No. 48817
October 29, 1993

Ponente: Justice Bellosillo

Facts:
The instant petition rooted from the validity of the judgment of acquittal penned
by a trial judge detailed to a vacant branch of the court but promulgated after a
permanent judge has been duly appointed to the vacancy. Gregorio Malco was charged
with attempted rape before the Court of First Instance of Quezon. Judge Montecillo,
Presiding Judge of Branch III, was designated pro tempore to take over Branch
X. However, on June 9, 1978, Judge Antona was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch
X. He took his oath and assumed office the following day, terminating ipso facto the
temporary designation of Judge Montecillo. The latter acquitted Malco of attempted
rape. Special Counsel Quintana moved to set aside the judgment of acquittal, however,
Judge Antona denied the same on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction
"to review and declare illegal the actuation of a co-equal Court."

Issue:
Whether or not the decision of Judge Montecillo was null and void inasmuch as
he was no longer judge-designate of Branch X when his decision was promulgated
Held:
No. Consequently, in the instant case, the judgement of acquittal penned by
Judge Montecillo must be declared valid. It is not necessary that he be the presiding
judge of Branch X at the time his decision was promulgated since even after the
expiration of his temporary designation at Branch X he continued to be an incumbent of
Branch III. After all, where a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) is divided
into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct and separate from the
others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or
information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said
branch of the judge alone, to the exclusion of the others.

Sadio v. Regional Trial Court of Antique

G.R. No. 94143
September 24, 1991

Ponente: Justice Cruz

Facts:
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court of Antique declared
the small town lottery in said province as illegal. Hence, Edgar Sadio filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Antique, a criminal complaint against Hon. Maceda
for issuance of an unjust interlocutory order in violation of Article 206 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the offended party in a criminal case has a right to appeal if the
case is dismissed

Held:
No. The Court has held that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar continuation
of the civil case connected therewith where: (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt; (2) the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil; or (3) the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal
act of which the accused is acquitted.
The case at bar does not come under any of the above exceptions. The
petitioner's criminal complaint alleged that Judge Maceda had Issued the interlocutory
order in violation of Sadio's right to due process under Article III, Section 1, of the
Constitution. Judge Misajon declared in her order dismissing the charge that Sadio was
in fact given the opportunity to be heard and offered testimonial and documentary
evidence on February 26 and 28, 1990, "which (Judge Maceda) considered in issuing
his order of March 16, 1990." In finding that the petitioner had not been denied due
process, Judge Misajon in effect completely exonerated Judge Maceda and thus also
extinguished the civil action connected with the criminal case. In this situation, the
petitioner could not have, as a mere complaining witness, appealed the dismissal of the
criminal action even on its civil aspect only. The civil action was deemed dismissed with
the criminal action. The criminal aspect of the order could have been appealed since
double jeopardy had not yet attached because the accused had not yet been arraigned.
But only the prosecutor could have done this because he had complete direction and
control of the prosecution of the case, as we have Held in several cases. No appeal
having been filed by him, the order of dismissal became final and unappealable after the
lapse of the reglementary 15-day period.

Sumalpong v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123404
February 26, 1997

Ponente: Justice Francisco

Facts:
Aurelio Sumalpong was charged with the crime of attempted homicide. The
accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits followed.
Thereafter, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime charged. Accusedappellant contends that the petitioner's appeal where he endeavors to weaken the

complainant's credibility by pointing out an alleged inconsistency between the latter's

sworn statement and his testimony in open court.

Issue:
Whether or not inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses affect their
credibility
Held:
No. Time and again this Court has held that inconsistencies in the testimony of
witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such
inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken their credibility and suggest that they are
telling the truth. 9 The aforesaid rule finds application to the case at bench for the
matter of who was shot first by the petitioner is clearly insignificant and does not change
the established fact that the petitioner had indeed fired at both the complainant and the
latter's wife. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not
impair the credibility of the witness where there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the assailant.

People of the Philippines v. Subingsubing

G.R. Nos. 104942-43
November 25, 1993

Ponente: Justice Padilla

Facts:

Napoleon Subingsubing was charged with the crime of rape in three (3) separate
informations. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. He
interposed that there was no rape since the complainant consented to the sexual
congress between them. The lower court found Subingsubing guilty of the crime of
rape in view of the complainants testimony.
Issue
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
Held:
No. Appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape does not mean, however,
that his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character. If that were so,
considering the Facts of this case, it may be cause for right-thinking men and women to
discern a gap or fissure in the legal order, one that cries moreover to be bridged.
As things stand, for failing to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, it is
incumbent upon us to set aside the trial court's judgments of conviction for rape.
However, the Court must state that it finds conclusive evidence (no less than the
accused-appellant's admission) that on 25 November 1989, the accused Napoleon
Subingsubing had sexual intercourse with Mary Jane Espilan when she was only 16
years of age. The complainant and the accused were living in the same house. The
accused is the uncle of the complainant, brother of her own mother.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12
years to 18 years of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit: any person in public authority, priest, home-servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with
the education and custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying
circumstance in the offense.

Estrada v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 162371
August 25, 2005

Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez

Facts:
This case rooted from an information charging Mary Helen Estrada with Estafa
before the RTC of Las Pias City. The petitioner jumped bail, thus said lower court
Issued an Order considering the same to have waived her right to present evidence.
Hence, the lower court rendered a decision based only on prosecution evidence. The
case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals via certiorari and/or mandamus.
Accordingly, while the case was in the lower court, said petitioner signed an undertaking
stating that in case of her failure to appear during the trial despite due notice, her
absence would constitute as an express waiver of her right to be present during trial and
promulgation of judgment and the lower court would then proceed with the hearing in

absentia.

Issue:
Whether or not the promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed by the Rules
of Court

Held:
Yes. Clearly, promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules.
Hence, in Pascua v. Court of Appeals, it was Held that such promulgation is valid
provided the following essential elements are present: (a) that the judgment be recorded
in the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereof be served upon the accused or
counsel. The factual circumstances in said case are analogous to the case at bar. It is
presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings are made
of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural requirement of
the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner
does not question non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of the judgment

in the criminal docket.Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her
non-receipt of the notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a
notice of change of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides,
promulgation could be properly done even in her absence, subject to the service of a
copy of the decision upon her or her counsel and the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket. In the present case, therefore, since the records bear out the fact that
copies of the decision were sent by registered mail to the given addresses of petitioner
and her counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez, and there is no question that the judgment was
indeed recorded in the criminal docket of the court, the promulgation was valid.

De Villa v. Director of Prisons

G.R. No. 158802
November 17, 2004

Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago

Facts:
Reynaldo De Villa was convicted with the crime of Rape and is currently serving
his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City. His son, June De Villa filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that during the trial of
the case, he was unaware that DNA was used to determine if he is the father of the
victims child. The petitioner asked the Court for a new trial to consider newly
discovered evidence such as a DNA test.

Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus can be utilized to
collaterally attack his conviction

Held:
No. A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified,
altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible
in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be
corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law.

In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a courts appreciation of the
evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the
function of said writ. A survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates
that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an

extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.

We have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not
to be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy.

Resort to the writ

of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is

rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction.

If, for instance, it can be

demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be
granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.

Martinez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 170409

January 28, 2008

Ponente: Justice Tinga

Facts:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime
inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez Emita, who in turn inherited
them from her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that
sometime in 1992, petitioner, whose real name as appearing in her birth certificate is
Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the
descendants of Celedonia, and under that name applied for free patents over the
properties with the Community Environmental and Natural Resources Office of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus Issued
in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later filed an application
for land registration over the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This
impelled private respondents to file the instant complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud
and misrepresentation in their procurement

Held:
No. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,

justice and due process. On this point alone, the petition could be denied outright.
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only by homestead
patent, sale, and lease, judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and
administrative legalization or free patent. One claiming private rights as basis of
ownership must prove compliance with the Public Land Act which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. Each
mode of disposition is appropriately covered by a separate chapter of the Public Land
Act. There are specific requirements and application procedures for every mode.

People of the Philippines v. Calo, Jr.

G.R. No. 88531
June 18, 1990

Ponente: Justice Bidin

Facts:
Mariano Corvera, Sr. (father of private petitioner), was gunned down inside the
courtroom of the RTC of Butuan City, Br. II. The following day, a complaint was filed
before the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan City, charging the alleged assailant, Pablo
Macapas (at large), the herein private respondents and two (2) unidentified persons,
with murder. Investigating City Fiscal Mariano Balansag found a prima facie case and
prepared the corresponding Information for Murder against private respondents as
accused. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 19, 1988,
Fiscal Mariano Balansag was gunned down near his residence as he was about to
report to his office. An information for murder was eventually filed in connection with the
death of Mariano Corvera, Sr. recommending "no bail" for the accused-respondents.
Executive Judge Rosarito Dabalos Issued an order directing a re-raffle, and at the same
time, fixing the amount of bail for private respondents at P50,000.00 each. The Court of
Appeals set aside the assailed order and directed the trial court: "(a) to immediately
Issue and serve new warrants of arrest against private respondents as wen as the
accused at-large Pablo Macapas; (b) to determine without delay by conducting the
requisite hearing whether the evidence of guilt is strong; and thereafter (e) to resolve
whether or not bail should be granted, and in the affirmative, to fix the same in
accordance with law.

Issue:

Whether or not the granting of bail to the accused be null and void

Held:
Yes. While the rule is, as Held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General
may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines or the State in
criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and the Issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition
at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient
personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao's order granting bail to the alleged
murderers of his (private petitioner's) father. The order dated February 24, 1989
granting bail to accused-respondents should have been declared null and void and in
violation of procedural due process. The prosecution in the instant case was not given
adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and to present within
a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present.

Obosa v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114350
January 16, 1997

Ponente: Justice Panganiban

Facts:
On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged the
accused Jose T. Obosa three others with murder on two counts, by separate amended
informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambushslaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D.
Calderon, which occurred on August 2, 1987, at about 6:30 in the evening, at La Huerta,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St.
Andrew Church near the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information
alleged that the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of his
rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor recommended no
bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong.

Issue:
Whether or not Obosa, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder (a capital
offense) for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local Governments
Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2)

counts of homicide may be granted bail after such conviction for homicide, a non-capital
offense.

Held:
No. While the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the
discretion of the Court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending the bail
should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with
the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of
justice. And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that,
although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses, nevertheless, when
imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of six (6) year and
circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused
may commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to a considerable
likelihood that the accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled.