[G.R. No. L-23135. December 26, 1967.

]
TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, Petitioner-Appellee,
v. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA
PABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, Oppositors-Appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE OF WILLS. In petitions for probate the Courts area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, as the testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of
the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions thereof or the legality of any
devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid v. Nuguid, L-23445, June 23, 1996).
2. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED REVOCATION DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR
PROBATE. An alleged disposal by testator to prior to his death of the properties involved in his will is
no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
3. ID.; ID.; LACK OF INTEREST BARS OPPOSITION TO PROBATE. In order that a person may
be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in
the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (go The Hua v. Chuang
Kiat Hua, Et Al., L-17019, Sept 30, 1963) and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Teotico v. Del Val, L18753, March 26, 1965). Where oppositors do not take issue with the probate courts finding that they are
totally strangers to the deceased, or do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate
which must be protected, the order striking out their opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto
must be affirmed.
4. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; ORDER STRIKING OUT OPPOSITION TO PROBATE NOT
INTERLOCUTORY. An order striking out an opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that
the oppositors have no personality to intervene in the case is final, and therefore appealable insofar as
they are concerned.

DECISION
On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on
December 1, 1959. Said document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner
as sole heir of the testator.
The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) sets of oppositors appellants herein who
questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really
intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Aside from merely opposing the petition for
probate, the first set of oppositors Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed that they, instead
of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors, representing
themselves simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the will.
At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then rested his case on February 16,
1961. Reception of oppositors evidence was set for July 14, 1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors
moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks jurisdiction
over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed
by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death." Oppositors alleged that after
making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels
of land described therein, so that at the time of the testators death the titles to said lands were no longer
in his name.
Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal on July 17, 1961, supplemented it by another
opposition on August 14, 1961, and by a rejoinder on August 21, 1961. Finally, on October 22, 1962
petitioner moved to strike out the oppositors pleadings on two grounds, namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate
of the last will and testament of the testator; and
"2. That oppositors have no valid claims and interest in the distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid
testator and no existing valid right whatsoever."cralaw virtua1aw library
On October 18, 1963 the court a quo issued the order now subject of this appeal, which read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July 31, 1961, the same is hereby denied
for the allegations contained therein goes (sic) to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds
stated on said motion to dismiss are without merit. With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and
all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship
whatsoever within the fifth degree as pronded by law and therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to
the deceased whose will is under probate. This being so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other
pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition below being for the probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry
into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature. (Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966).
"To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of
the proceedings .. for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can
determine nothing more." (Alemany, Et Al., v. CFI of Manila, 3 Phil. 424).
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that the testator
had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one
thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
"The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly
executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation
become superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then,
again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from
subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath
or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy." (Fernandez, Et. Al. v. Dimagiba, L-23638 and Reyes, Et. Al. v. Dimagiba, L23662, October 12, 1967.)
In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quos finding that they "have no relationship
whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the
deceased whose will is under probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the
estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the
parties baptism and marriage certificates, support the said courts findings in this respect.
"It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor
or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, Et Al., L-17091, September 30, 1963);
and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or
one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor." (Teotico v. del Val, etc., G.R No. L-18753, March
26, 1965.)
"The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe
prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the
courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no
interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto." (Paras v. Narciso, 35
Phil. 244.)
Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground

that the order appealed from is interlocutory. We deferred action on the motion until after the brief of both
parties had been filed. The motion, although now practically academic in view of our resolution of the
main issues involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court striking out appellants
opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they have no personality to intervene in the case,
was final and therefore appealable order in so far as they were concerned.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors-appellants.
[G.R. No. L-12207. December 24, 1959.]
JUAN PALACIOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MARIA CATIMBANG PALACIOS, OppositorAppellee.
SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; PROBATE DURING LIFETIME OF TESTATOR; OPPOSITION TO INTRINSIC

VALIDITY OF THE WILL NOT ALLOWED. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or to the legality of
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly
has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially
so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance
of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OR POWER OF TESTATOR. "After a will has been probated during the lifetime
of a testator it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should
he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he had a chance
to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death would be in order"
(Report of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54). The reason for this comment is that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code).

DECISION
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing himself of the provisions
of the new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition
for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and
Andrea C. Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus
impairing her legitime.
After the presentation of petitioners evidence relative to the essential requisites and formalities provided
by law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate.
The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will
and, after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be
the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime, with costs against
petitioner.
From this last order, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, and
accordingly, the record was elevated to this Court.
It should be noted that petitioner instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will
availing himself of the provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which permit a
testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will, but to such petition
one Maria Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of
petitioner but that she was completely ignored in the will thus impairing her legitime. In other words,
Maria Catimbang does not object to the probate of the will insofar as its due execution is concerned or on
the ground that it has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather she objects to its
intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will.
We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly

has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially
so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance
of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
This is in line with our ruling in Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676, wherein we said: "The authentication
of the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does
not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these
points remain entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator it does not necessarily
mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also
be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death would be in order" (Report of the Code
Commission, pp. 53-54). The reason for this comment is that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code).
It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will
which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an
acknowledged natural daughter of the testator. This is an extraneous matter which should be threshed out
in a separate action.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 16763. December 22, 1921. ]
PASCUAL COSO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA ET AL., objectorsappellees.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE. In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.

DECISION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will on the
ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez.
The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator with said Rosario
Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way of
reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years
1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands, became
acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit relations with her for many years
thereafter. After his return to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and
remained in close communication with him until his death in February, 1919. There is no doubt that she
exercised some influence over him and the only question for our determination is whether this influence
was of such a character as to vitiate the will
The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc., 1144-1149.
"Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that
effect the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously
stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own.
". . . such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the
will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will,, or so near thereto as to be still operative,
with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of
testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made . . .

". . . and while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercised by one occupying an
improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person
sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the
testators free agency."cralaw virtua1aw library
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the sense above
expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this burden has been carried in the
present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does
not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and
make him express the will of another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by
profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a legitimate
sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of
gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown
in the present case.
"Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be
practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in
favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made." (Mackall v. Mackall, 135 U. S., 167.)
It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to dispose of his
property by will is limited to only a portion of his estate, and that under the law in force in these Islands
before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only outside influences affecting the validity of a
will were duress, deceit, and fraud. The present doctrine of undue influence originated in a legal system
where the right of the testator to dispose of his property by will was nearly unlimited. Manifestly. greater
safeguards in. regard to execution of wills may be warranted when the right to so dispose of property is
unlimited than when it is restricted to the extent it is in this jurisdiction There is, therefore, certainly no
reason for giving the doctrine of undue influence a wider scope here than it enjoys in the United States.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico Gimenez Zoboli is
hereby reversed and it is ordered that the will be admitted to probate. No costs will be allowed. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.
This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch
III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1chanrobles virtual
law library
One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of
residence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4,
1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special Proceeding No.
1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February
1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share
for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he
diamond partition on March approve extrajudicial on March 21, 1964. 3chanrobles virtual law library
On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of
Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that
Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but
Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger, different and
more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made
dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman

Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law

library
On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a
motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will
and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of
Adriana Maloto. 6chanrobles virtual law library
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio
Maloto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November
16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed
out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed from the order of
denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A
supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is improper was
issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No.
L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:
L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) - THE COURT RESOLVED
to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue of whether or not the
petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of respondent Judge was made on time, it
appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question. 7chanrobles
virtual law library
Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art issued a resolution dated July 15,
1969 which reads:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-30479,
Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the Court resolved
to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter of whether or not the
pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order of November 16, 1968
constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in question
indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein such matter will be more appropriately
determined. 8chanrobles virtual law library
Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9chanrobles virtual law
library
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND
REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT OR
ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF
EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD ALREADY ARRESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES OF
THEIR ASSIGNS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE REMEDY TENDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY HAVING
CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES. 10chanrobles virtual law library
In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the with on
the basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to be

Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the oppositors'
contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate
estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11chanrobles virtual law library
The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:
Ichanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR
PROBATE - SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IIchanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF THE
AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER CONCERNED IS NOW RES
ADJUDICATA chanrobles virtual law library
III chanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION FOR
PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN
NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE COURSE.12chanrobles virtual
law library
The instant petition for review is meritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of
Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the
same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding
that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No.
1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the
probate of the Will." 13And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate
remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question." chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to
the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana
Maloto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will
of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the
petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the
respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA
NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise.
Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will
annexed be issued to her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of
the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter
alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors
- who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line - were illegally preterited and that
in consequence the institution is void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto,
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will.
The court's area of inquiry is limited - to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the
will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon,
by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings - is not called upon to rule on the intrinsicvalidity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1chanrobles virtual
law library
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the
will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will.
Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But
petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is
the will intrinsically a nullity?chanrobles virtual law library
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us
on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a
complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable
statute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951chanrobles virtual law library
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain
amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die
to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I
have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegiblechanrobles virtual law library
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil
Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this
point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun
nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le
asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a
legitima.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno
cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia
forzosa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que
el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us,
to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa.
484.6chanrobles virtual law library
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon
wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 - 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d
611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7chanrobles virtual law library
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish;
to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de
heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854
of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir - nothing
more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the
nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se
aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de
heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es
completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o
todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando
el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de
herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad
del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la
institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results intotally abrogating the will. Because,
the nullification of such institution of universal heir - without any other testamentary disposition in the
will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the
roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal
Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando
parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho
sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal
base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los
herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese
distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta
que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones
que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria,
dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con
pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto
razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los
principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del
Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y
anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests
that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will - void because of preterition - would give the heir so
instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such
institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now
854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in
reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se
refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de
legado, mejora o donacion. 14chanrobles virtual law library
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as
universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
ensues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at
bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and
disinheritance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words:
"La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denominapretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es
siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as
disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will
itself. 20chanrobles virtual law library
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of
heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the

form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in
the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el
caso. 23chanrobles virtual law library
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their
legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24chanrobles virtual law library
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Nericase heretofore
cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second
marriage should be treated as legado and mejoraand, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of
the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total
or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application
at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus,
instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of
heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814,
which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution
of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because
they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is
undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again
an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil
Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The
entire will is null.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No
costs allowed. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-20234. December 23, 1964.]
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS

1. JUDGMENTS; PROBATE COURTS; ERROR OF LAW DOES NOT AFFECT JURISDICTION OF

NOR CONCLUSIVE EFFECT OF DECISION. An error of law committed in admitting a joint will to
probate does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court nor the conclusive effect of its final decision.
2. ID.; ID.; PROBATE DECREE OF JOINT WILL AFFECTS ONLY SHARE OF DECEASED
SPOUSE. A final probate decree of a joint will of husband and wife affects only the share of the
deceased spouse and cannot include the disposition of the share of the surviving spouse. The validity of
said joint will, in so far as the estate of the latter spouse is concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined
and adjudicated de novo.
3. WILLS; EFFECT OF VALIDITY OF JOINT WILL AS TO SHARE OF WIFE WHO DIES LATER
THAN THE HUSBAND. Where a husband and wife executed a join will and upon the death of the

husband, said will was admitted to probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous, and the wife
dies later, it is held that said first decree of probate affects only the estate of the husband but cannot affect
the estate of the wife, considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator, and a joint will being
prohibited by law, the estate of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heirs, unless some other valid will is shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the
testamentary heir is the only heir intestate of said wife.

DECISION
Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division (C.A.G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-3819) and
ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Petition,
Annex A, pp 2-4):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint
last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that our two parcels of land acquired
during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece,
whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela
Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot, and that while each of the testator is yet living, he or she will
continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned, the said two parcels of land being covered
by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon,
province of Cebu. Bernabe de la Cerna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to
probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due
publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of
October 31, 1939, in Special Proceedings No. 499, declara legalizado el documento Exhibito A como el
testamento y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Cerna con derecho por parte de su viuda superstite
Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al proprio tiempo segun el Exhibito A de gozar de los frutos de los
terrenos descritos en dicho documento; y habido consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes, se derecta
la distribucion sumaria de los mismos en favor de la legataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot previa
prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza en la suma de P500.00 para responder de cualesquiera
reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del finado Bernabe de la Cerna dentro de los aos desde
esta fecha. (Act. Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la Cerna). Upon the death of Gervasia
Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was
concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of
First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot, and her attorney, Manuel Potot
to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954 (Spec. Proc. No.
1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of the Will of Gervasia Rebaca)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being
executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art.
818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction
and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code) prohibits the making of a will
jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used; and
when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final
order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the
provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon v. Saavedra, 51 Phil.
267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying
assuming that the joint will in question is valid."cralaw virtua1aw library
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will
and testament, despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills,
whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code).
The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by
appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final

decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding
upon the whole world (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium (Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38
Phil. 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 1963 Ed., p. 322).
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree
admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that
the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken
with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this count, the dismissal of their action for partition
was correct.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the
probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could
not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over
whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her
estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the Civil Code, a will could not be
probated during the testators lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on
her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each
testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in
question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao v. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that
explained the previous holding in Macrohon v. Saavedra, 51 Phil., 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and
not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or
unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make
them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other
subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of
1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23763-R is affirmed. No costs.
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for
Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,Respondents.
DECISION
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter
died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandros death, Petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special
proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife
of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo
Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective
estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.1

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care
of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon
denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted.2 This dismissal became
final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by
the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement
the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion
to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties
of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs, private respondents filed a motion
for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory
Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1,
1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two
assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents
before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be
said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise
assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which
declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to
maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties.3 Private respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late
Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained
finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well
settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial
court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and
the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the
testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.5 Such final order makes the will
conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to
be probated,7 particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;8
and the due execution of the last will and testament.9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under
duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,10 that he was of
the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the
will has been authenticated.12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and

testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession,13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a
final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved
by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law14 become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of
which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful.16 The only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence,17 which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise
those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by
some other court.18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should
be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by
the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that an order merely declaring who are heirs and the
shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from
one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed.19 The trial court declared in
the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be
noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate
distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy
is preferred to intestacy.20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing
test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove
the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in
nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare.21 No intestate distribution of the
estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the
will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the
will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late
spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory
order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties
which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the
properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not
married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 8927. March 10, 1914. ]

ASUNCION NABLE JOSE ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARIA IGNACIA USON ET
AT.,Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; INTERPRETATION; SUCCESSION OF SISTERS AND NIECES. The following clauses
appeared in a will, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, referred to in my said
testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said
property exists at my husbands death, it is my will that at his death my sisters and nieces hereinafter
named succeed him as heirs.
"Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doa Antonia Uson, now
deceased, who has two daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried; Maria
Romualda Uson, widow of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson, married to Don Vicente Puzon; Eufemia
Uson, now deceased, who is survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria
Asuncion and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried, issue had by our deceased father Don
Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it
in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."cralaw virtua1aw library
Held, That the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters take per capita and in equal parts.

DECISION
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a
rodicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, referred to in my said
testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said
property exists at my husbands death, it is my will that at his death my sisters and nieces hereinafter
named succeed him as heirs.
"Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doa Antonia Uson, now
deceased, who has left two daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson,
married to Don Vicente Puzon; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is survived by three daughters called
Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson,
unmarried, issue had by our deceased father Don Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao
de Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which their
respective mothers would have taken if they had been alive at the time the will was made; that the
property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living
sisters should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each
one-sixth to be divided among said children equally.
This appeal taken from the judgment entered upon that finding, appellants asserting that under a proper
construction of the paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided equally
between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the
same share that a sister receives.
We are of the opinion that the appellants contention is well founded. We see no words or phrases in the
clauses quoted which lead necessarily to the construction placed upon those paragraphs by the learned
court below. On the other hand, we find expression which seem to indicate with fair clearness that it was
the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces. The court below
based its construction upon the theory that the other construction would be "an admission that the testatrix
desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left three children, more than her other deceased
sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and moreover both would be more favored than any of the
other four surviving sisters, one of whom was married at the time of the execution of the said codicil and
without doubt had children."cralaw virtua1aw library

As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that
after her husbands death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him
as heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library
We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and
identifies each one of her heirs then living, or each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her
husband in the property. Among those mentioned specifically are the nieces as well as the sisters. The
nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of
the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions.
In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it
seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the
intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to
take under her will by name "so that they may take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters
and relatives."cralaw virtua1aw library
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the owners
of her property on the death of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well as of
the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and nieces
shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the testatrixs intention
is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion
as to what she intended.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by declaring that, of the property passing under the
codicil hereinabove referred to, the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per
capita and in equal parts, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance.