European Journal of Social Sciences Volume 19, Number 4 (2011)

Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A

Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU
Membership Quest of Turkey
Gkhan Saz
Center for Business Studies, University of Vienna, Brnner Strasse 72, A-1210, Vienna, Austria
E-mail: saz@goekhan.net
Abstract
This paper studies the recent rise of the public fear against Islam and Turkey in Europe. We
present an overview on the current tendencies and provide an informative synopsis on
Islamophobia in general and Turkophobia in particular. The quantitative part of the study
focuses on a regression analysis to model the relationship between the European dislike of
a Turkish EU membership and the Turkish population in Europe. Our results show that a
higher Turkish population share in the European host country corresponds to a higher
disapproval rate of Turkish membership in the EU. In the same vein, a lower Turkish
population share in the European host country corresponds to a lower disapproval rate of
Turkish membership in the EU. The positive statistical relationship is found to be highly
significant and of high effect size.

Keywords: EU and Turkey, European integration of Turkey, Islamophobia, Turkophobia,

1. Introduction
Recent surveys on the European stance towards a Turkish EU membership show that the perceived
religious and cultural divide has arrived at the center stage of the political debate in the European
Union (e.g. (Gallup 2009) and (Yilmaz 2009)). As the EU on an institutional level tries to be true to is
motto united in diversity, the public mood indicates the exact opposite in many key member
countries. Consequently, these tendencies did not go unnoticed by European right-wing politicians,
who are finding dramatically increasing reception among the EU public with their recent rhetorical
reorientation from an ethnic bias towards religious and cultural discrimination. On the other hand, the
negative reservations of the European public did not go unnoticed by the Turkish public, as recent
surveys show a striking increase in Euroscepticism in Turkey (e.g. (GMF 2010)). Combining the
evidence on these two recent trends points to frictions, which, if not timely alleviated, might culminate
in a clash of civilizations with a divide along the lines of culture and religion instead of a focus on the
commonalities of humanity, diversity and multicultural coexistence. And these negative developments
require the utmost attention of any politically and socially interested person in Turkey as well in
Europe.
In this regard, the European contentions and fear against Islam, Turks and Turkey are found to
be in close association and stand in a reinforcing relationship to each other. In view of this observation,
a quantitative and systematic analysis on the relationship of these entities will be essential to foster a
more thorough understanding of what is increasingly going wrong in the political liaison between
Turkey and the EU.
Our study contributes on two fronts to the existing literature. First, we provide a qualitative
overview on the recent developments and studies indicating the rise of Islamophobia and Turkophobia
in Europe. Second, we conduct a regression analysis to show that the negative feelings in the EU
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towards the EU membership of Turkey are indeed influenced by the negative experience with the
European Turkish population. In consequence, we provide evidence for the increasing Turkophobic
sentiments in Europe and verification that this occurrence thwarts the membership quest of Turkey.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on
Turkophobia and Islamophobia. Section 3 provides the quantification for the Turkophobic stance in
Europe by a regression analysis. The main reasons for the negative view on Turkey and the Turkish
population in Europe are presented in section 4. The final section 5 concludes the study and gives a
vital outlook for future research.

2. Turkophobia and Islamophobia in Europe

The political scenario of rising Turkophobia and Islamophobia in Europe and the associated
Euroscepticism in Turkey are among the most dangerous contemporary tendencies, which contribute to
the potential failure and deadlock of the European negotiation process of Turkey. All negative dicta
about Turks in Europe and more generally Muslims in Europe, e.g. Angela Merkels cheap shooting
Turkish integration by asserting the failure of multiculturalism in Germany or the former German
senator and board member of the Bundesbank Thilo Sarrazins obscure allegations that Muslims in
Germany, read Turks, are unproductive and have a culturally and genetically imposed disposition to
lower intelligence,1 have surely not helped to pour oil on troubled water. Similarly irritating is the high
approval rate of these race theoretical assertions in the general public in Germany.2 Further comments
from French president Nicolas Sarkozy about the Muslim culture and Turkey's EU membership only
makes the case worse. Austrian, Dutch and Bulgarian right-wing assertions add to the hostile stance,
and it becomes apparent that Islamophobia, or specifically Turkophobia, has become a widespread
phenomenon across Europe.
In this regard and most unfortunately, pseudoscience once again helps to stir the fear against
other cultures and religions in Europe. For example, the lack of scientific accountability of Mr.
Sarazzins book, which a more balanced and less biased review of the existing literature on genetic
sociology would have debilitated, is amplified by the circumstance that references in popular books
tend not to be critically reviewed by the average reader and hence rather blindly accepted as a matter of
fact coming from a source of authority. This constitutes a typical fallacy of defective induction or
argument of authority (Argumentum ad verecundiam) among the non-expert public and helps to veil
the verity that Mr. Sarrazin is by no means an authority in the domain of genetic sociology, on the
contrary, he can be considered a partly informed layperson in this regard at best, as his academic and
1

Some controversial quotes from Thilo Sarazzins assertions in his infamous book (Sarrazin 2010) and a recent interview:
Regardless of the come about of intelligence: At a higher relative fertility of the less intelligent, the average intelligence of
the general population will sink. [Referring to the higher fertility and lower intelligence of Muslim (Turkish)
immigrants in Germany] (Ibid. p.85, translated from German,)
The domestic differences in academic achievement levels apparently result largely from genetic differences in the
educational capability [of Muslim (Turkish) immigrants in Germany], else the stability [of the differences] in totally
different schooling systems is unexplainable. (Ibid., p.149, translated from German ).
I dont want the land of my grandchildren and great-grandchildren to be largely Muslim, that Turkish and Arabic is
spoken in wide circles, women wear headscarves and the daily rhythm to be dictated by the prayer call of the muezzins. If
I want to experience that, I can book a trip to the Orient (Ibid., p. 234, translated from German)
The cultural alienness of Muslim immigrants could be put into perspective, if those immigrants would bode a special
qualifying or intellectual potential. However, this is not noticeable. There are rather signs for the contrary and it is not
stipulated that this is solely due to the thoroughly educationally deprived background. Thus genetically dispositions play
a substantial role for immigrants from the Middle East, who in consequence of customary consanguineous marriages
cause an above-average rate of various genetic diseases. (Translated from the German interview in the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung on the 30th August 2010)
2
Source:
(http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:umstrittener-bundesbanker-sarrazins-popularitaet-zwingt-merkel-inauslaenderdebatte/50165523.html, (24.11.2010)) and (http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2010/09/03/german-politics-hit-byblowback-over-sarrazin/, (24.11.2010))

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professional career is restricted to the domain of economics and finance. The critical reviews from
academicians who are authorities in this field of studies often dont make it to the popular mainstream
or they remain in the domain of specific non-popular literature. That being said, it is symptomatic that
Mr. Sarrazin refers to proponents of ethnocentrism of intelligence, like Lynn, Vanhanen, Herrnstein
and Murray, when drawing his own conclusions about ethnic differences in intelligence in Germany,
but somehow utterly fails to mention authors who provide refuting replies to those studies. This fallacy
is borne out of a confirmation bias, the tendency to corroborate an idea with only positive evidence and
thus neglect objectiveness and a proper conduct of the scientific method (Gilovich 1993). This is an
example for the dangers of popular pseudoscience that provide factoids and half-truths to justify
scientific racism. And exactly such pseudoscientific analyses are most harmful for the greater good of
multiculturalism as they are often exploited as references for political instruments in European rightwing propaganda.3
But what is it exactly that the European public is afraid of? First and foremost we need to find
an explanation for the recent rise in the fear against Islam in Europe. The rise of Islamophobia comes
from a mixture of radical fundamentalist Islam, creeping out in the post-9-11 era, which created an
environment of fear and angst by wars and combats against terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan,
Yemen, Lebanon and parts of Africa. Adding to the equation the nuclear threat of Iran, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and of course all terrorist attacks after 9-11, especially the 2003 Istanbul bombings,
2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings and the European contention about
headscarves, the construction of mosques and the radical reactions on the so-called caricature conflict,
further helped fueling the Islamophobic stance in Europe.
But what has Islamophobia really to do with Turkophobia? Islamophobia is brought out of the
consistent reiteration of the medial illustrations of good versus evil and the accompanying subliminal
designations of Christianity versus Islam. It is further brought out of the repercussions of the stance of
a radical minority on the peaceful stance of the majority of a religious group and the inductive
approach in which generalizations have become common ground in Europe. Turkophobia can be
viewed as the extension of this stylized Islamophobia, which is brought out of cultural
misunderstandings, miscommunication, the lack of political vision and the virtually non-existing
policies of integration for the Turkish population in Europe.
Integration, as a matter of fact, is not a self-organizing organic entity, it involves the deep
collaboration, commitment and dedication of both socially contracting parties. It seems that up until
recently, many European countries awaited automatic integration into their societies without
acknowledging or really apprehending that different cultures might need different policies towards
integration. There is no one-fit-all strategy and it is an open-end process and once this is understood
and utilized, integration will become a more accommodating matter for Europe. Unfortunately, it is
still to date a characteristic of many EU countries to not acknowledge this reality, as integration is
treated within the ministry of interior, an institution traditionally ascribed to inner security issues, and
not in a more appropriate ministry solely focused on integration policies (e.g. Austria, Germany). In
turn, this peculiarity creates distrustfulness among many foreign countries with sizeable emigrant
minorities in EU host countries, as the treatment of integration in the ministry of interior signifies that
the host country views its immigrants as a security issue and thus exhibits the wrong token of respect
for other cultures (Ultsch 2010).

Other pseudoscientific and academically highly criticized for statistical malpractice but nonetheless popular books, which
draw on race theories, eugenics and genetics to explain ethnic differences in intelligence, are: (Cattell 1987; Shockley
1992; Robertson 1993; Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Pearson 1996; Robertson 1996; Rushton 2000; Lynn 2001; Lynn
and Vanhanen 2002; Levin 2005; Francis 2006; Lynn and Vanhanen 2006; Salter 2006).
An excellent exposition of the statistical fallacies and deceptions involved in an ethnocentric concept of intelligence is
given by (Lewontin, Rose et al. 1985; Lewontin 1993; Gould 1996). An analysis on the political motivation of scientific
racism is provided by (Tucker 1996; Tucker 2007) and wrong beliefs on the concept of race (Harrison 2009). A good
account on pseudoscience and its reasons and consequences is given by (Gilovich 1993; Shermer 2002).

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As a result, all these negative sentiments towards Islam have spilled over to Turks and in
consequence also to Turkey as a whole. What seems to be forgotten in the whole debate, however, is
that Turkey is a modern and secular country without a designated state religion. It is true that Islam is
in predominance in Turkey, but the subliminal association in Europe between radical Islam and Turkey
and Turks is wrong. More than that, the subliminal association between radical Islam and normal
Islam is outright wrong4 and there is simply no transitive relation between radical Islam, normal Islam
and Turks. It is also true that the majority of the first Turkish generation in Europe comes from rural
areas, with high illiteracy rates and cultural conservatism, but the generalization from a specific
minority of European Turks to all Turks in Turkey is an imprudent fallacy. What is true, though, is that
the fear against Islam in general in Europe is greatly influenced by the fear against radical Islam. And
this can be traced back to the general disenlightenment and the resulting false beliefs about Islam and
Turkey in the general public in Europe5 (e.g. (Yilmaz 2009)).
Some observers now say that the Islamophobic stance in recent years led to a general
Turkophobic stance in Europe and in consequence to a bleak outlook for Turkeys membership
aspirations. A recent study by (ESI 2010) tries to refute this argument based on the line of reasoning
that the EU is not prejudiced and has shown considerable concessions in regard of supporting the
accession efforts of Turkey. Rather than being discriminated, Turkey has often been favored and given
the benefit of the doubt by the EU, as the ESI authors argue, such as being given candidate status in
1999 despite failing the human rights criteria and having opened accession negotiations in 2005 in the
face of only partly fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. Notwithstanding their argumentation
that the average rate of opposition to Turkeys EU membership was somewhat steady around 30
percent in the public opinion of the Eurobarometer surveys from 2000 to 2008, they fail to mention the
dramatic downward trend after 2002 in Germany, France, Cyprus and Austria.
Although all signs from the EU indicate non-discrimination on an institutional level, the ESI
study misses a significant issue here and that is the rise of public Islamophobia in Europe since 2001. If
the Dutch politician Geert Wilders allows him public remarks such as There is no equality between
our culture and the retarded Islamic cultureI want the fascist Koran banned6 and his party PVV
gains 15 percent of the votes for the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in 2010, than there is an
undeniable and significant Islamophobic stance in the Dutch public, especially towards Turks if one
considers that they have the greatest share in the Muslim population of the Netherlands.7 If Austrian
politician H.C. Strache in his mayoral race for Vienna uses anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish Viennese
saga cartoons as a means of promotion, where he pictorially prompts a kid to use a slingshot to throw a
stone on Mustafas eye and rewards him afterwards for helping to chase away the Turk, and his rightwing party FP gains 27 percent of all votes in 2010, nearly doubling the votes from 2005, or gains
17.5 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections in 2008, than there is an unmistaken and substantial
Islamophobic and Turkophobic stance among Viennese and Austrians. The story continues in a similar
fashion for the recent success of Frances Front National, Italys Lega Nord, Switzerlands Union
Democratique Du Centre and Bulgarias Ataka, where right-wing anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic
rhetorics find increasing reception among the public. Other anti-Islamic parties also find increasing
4

6
7

According to Fawaz Gerges: Gallup conducted tens of thousands of hour-long, face-to-face interviews with residents of
more than thirty-five predominantly Muslim countries between 2001 and 2007. It found that - contrary to the prevailing
perception in the west that the actions of al-Qaida enjoy wide support in the Muslim world - more than 90% of
respondents condemned the killing of non-combatants on religious and humanitarian grounds. (Source:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/al-qaida-today-the-fate-of-a-movement, (24.11.2010))
According to a study by (KONDA 2007) on religiosity in Turkey only 9.7 percent of the Turkish population consider
themselves as fully devout Muslims fulfilling all religious obligations and almost 35 percent view themselves as believers
who do not fulfill religious obligations.
Interview in the Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam, (25.11.2010)
The country profile of euro-islam.info states: A June 2004 opinion poll revealed that 68 percent of respondents felt
threatened by immigrant or Muslim young people, 53% feared a terrorist attack by Muslims in the Netherlands, and
47 percent feared that eventually, the Netherlands would be ruled by Islamic law. (Source: http://www.euroislam.info/country-profiles/the-netherlands/ , (25.11.2010))

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attainment, such as Germanys newly founded Pro Deutschland and Pro Kln, the UKs British
National Party and Denmarks Stop Islamiseringen af Danmark.
The increasing public success of anti-Islamic campaigns induced a major reorientation of rightwing politics in recent years, as Jeanne Kay pointedly explains (Kay 2010): The far right's discourse
has shifted away from a racist line that excludes all non-whites and toward a stricter focus on Islam.
This has broadened the audience to include those who dont consider themselves racist, but decry
Islamic fundamentalism in the name of general values or the preservation of a monolithic national
culture. Using alarmist rhetoric to raise fears over the loss of a national identity, allegedly stifled by
ever-pervasive Islamic culture, far-right leaders select highly symbolic issues as their campaign
banners. In consequence to the recent right-wing success, this also led to transformations among
conservative parties like the CDU and SPD in Germany or the UMP in France, which exhibit some
tendencies towards more rightist views about Islam causing factional conflicts between the party
members.
That the 9-11 attacks and the radical Islam plays a significant role in the marginalization of
European Turks gets evidential from the solidarity study of (Denz 2003) among the Austrian public.
When asked for Here is a list of various groups of people. Could you please pick, who you dont want
to have as a neighbor?, about 15 percent of the Austrian population voted for Muslims in 1999. Three
years later in 2002 this number increased significantly to 25 percent, virtually putting Muslims into the
same unwanted-neighbor category as convicted persons, mentally ill persons and homosexuals (Ibid.
p.329). Denz links this deterioration to the increasing anti-immigrant and bigot political campaigns in
Austria and the terrorist attacks of 9-11.
In general, the study describes three variants of solidarity, macrosolidarity, mesosolidarity and
microsolidarity, which categorize the sense of fellowship based on the level of common societal bonds,
such as family bond or community bond. Authoritarianism, an indicator for personal attitude and
measure for orderliness, is hypothesized to decrease macrosolidarity, the solidarity for foreigners, and
increases microsolidarity, the solidarity for the family. On the other hand, education is hypothesized to
increase macrosolidarity and keep microsolidarity on roughly equal levels. Just in line with these
hypotheses, the study reveals interesting empirical results for Austria with the use of a causality
analysis: Authoritarianism causes a higher refusal of foreign neighbors and lower refusal on rightist
extremist neighbors, and higher education causes a lower refusal of Muslim neighbors. Altogether, the
results show that general macrosolidarity has increased from 1999 to 2002 while at the same time
specific macrosolidarity, as in the neighbor query, has substantially declined in Austria. In other words,
although the overall social desirability has increased, just as a more sensitized political correctness
would demand it, the real everyday attitudes towards foreigners have deteriorated in Austria. In
conclusion, Denz aptly suggests the important obvious: Education is the antidote to the xenophobe and
authoritarian trend in Austria and hence should be endorsed as a catalyst for bridge-building social
capital.
Another analysis reveals the significance of religion for the quest of EU membership of Turkey
(Toksabay-Esen 2010). According to a survey in 2009 by (Yilmaz 2009) for key EU member
countries on the public opinion against Turkish full membership, 39 percent say that Turkey is a
Muslim country and not compatible with the common Christian roots, hence religion accounts for the
single most important argument in the poll. Interestingly, this negative attitude is increasing with age
and declining with education, similar to Denzs findings in above. It is even more interesting to put this
result into perspective with another survey by (Gallup 2009), where cultural and religious issues in the
expansion of the EU were only considered to be the fourth important aspect with 20 to 22 percent.
Therefore in ordinary enlargements only 20 percent give importance to the religion, whereas in the
extraordinary case of Turkey 39 percent perceive religion to be an important aspect.
Now, what are the potential political consequences for Turkey? All these European countries
have one thing in common: they have plenty of Turkish and Muslim immigrants and dont like the idea
of a Turkish EU membership. Therefore, religion is seen as a major stumbling block for Turkey on the
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quest for EU membership, since it is publically regarded as an Islamic country in Europe, despite its
secular structure. Any continuation of the anxiety condition in Europe towards Islam will foster
popular opposition in key member states and undermine the accession efforts of Turkey. This political
scenario bears great potential to bring down the final bid for the EU accession of Turkey.

3. A Quantification of Turkophobia
The political position on accepting Turkey on an institutional level will be of secondary concern in
some EU nations since any new enlargement will be approved by a referendum (e.g.: France, Austria).
It seems unlikely in the foreseeable future that a referendum would pass in France and Austria, which
has the most Turkey-skeptic public opinion in the Union (Eurobarometer 69 Spring 2008: 85%
against Turkeys membership).8
The regular reports of the Eurobarometer survey show similar patterns in other EU nations
regarding the negative sentiments of EU citizens on Turkeys membership. In a relatively recent
Eurobarometer survey (69, Spring 2008) 55 percent on average in the EU27 are against Turkeys
membership and only 31 percent for a membership with 14 percent having no opinion. All in all, if we
take the 50+1 percent mark as a threshold, 14 nations out of the EU27 are against a Turkish
membership and only one nation is in favor. The rest of the EU27 seems to be undecided.
The strongest opponents are: Austria (85%), Republic of Cyprus (85%), Greece (78%),
Germany (77%), Luxembourg (75%) and France (71%).
The strongest proponents in the EU are: Romania (61%), Slovenia (49%), Sweden (46%),
Spain (46%), Hungary (45%), Poland (43%), Bulgaria (42%).
The other acceding countries seem to have a positive public opinion on Turkish Membership:
Macedonia (85%), Croatia (59%).
The pattern that emerges is clear: The public opinion in the core EU nations is mainly against
Turkish membership, whereas the remaining EU periphery consisting of EEC nations is mainly for a
Turkish membership, creating a conflict of interest.
Table 1:

Eurobarometer survey 69

Eurobarometer survey 69 - Spring 2008

QA44.8: For each of the following countries and territories, would you be in favour or against it becoming part of the
European Union in the future? Turkey
In favour
Against
Dont know
EU 27
31
55
14
Belgium
36
63
1
Bulgaria
42
38
20
Czech Republic
34
55
11
Denmark
32
62
6
(Germany West)
15
78
7
Germany
16
77
7
(Germany East)
20
72
8
Estonia
34
53
13
Greece
22
78
0
Spain
46
32
22
France
19
71
10
Ireland
29
42
29
8

The following hypothetical scenario depicts the situation exemplary: Imagine this: Nicolas Sarkozy drops his election
pledge to keep Turkey out of the EU; the Cyprus issue is resolved; the EU unblocks the eight frozen chapters in the
accession negotiations; successive Turkish governments plough slowly but surely through the massive reform agenda
required for EU membership; an accession treaty is signed in, say, 2015. But a year later, after 20 EU countries have
already ratified, the French and Austrians vote against the accession in national referendums. The EU is in crisis; Turkey
is enraged; other EU aspirants turn away in despair ((Barysch 2007), p. 1).

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Table 1:

Eurobarometer survey 69 - (Continued)

Italy
Republic of Cyprus
Cyprus (TCC)*
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxemburg
Hungary
Malta
The Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
The United Kingdom
Croatia*
Turkey*
The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia*
*) Non-EU countries

25
11
84
34
36
18
45
31
40
7
43
37
61
49
27
31
46
35
59
61
85

58
85
9
50
45
75
40
43
55
85
41
41
15
46
61
64
45
49
31
25
10

17
4
7
16
19
7
15
26
5
8
16
22
24
5
12
5
9
16
10
14
5

Interestingly, with the exception of the expected high disapproval rates in the Republic of
Cyprus and Greece, the EU countries with the highest Turkish immigrant population (e.g. Austria,
France and Germany) are particularly negatively biased on a Turkish membership. This view is shared
by (ICOT 2004), which states that the skepticism towards a Turkish membership in the EU seems to be
more pronounced for European countries with a significant Turkish minority.
This leads to the following hypotheses: A higher Turkish population share in the European host
country corresponds to a higher disapproval rate of Turkish membership in the EU. A lower Turkish
population share in the European host country corresponds to a lower disapproval rate of Turkish
membership in the EU.
The following table depicts the total population for the relevant EU countries, the Turkish
population shares and the corresponding Eurobarometer disapproval rates:
Table 2:

Turkish population in the EU

Total Turkish
Turkish population
Total population
population
share
Germany
82314900
2642000
3.210
France
63392100
370000
0.584
Netherlands
16358000
270000
1.651
Austria
8298900
200000
2.410
Belgium
10584500
110000
1.040
UK
60816700
70000
0.115
Denmark
5447100
53000
0.973
Sweden
9113300
37000
0.410
Italy
59131300
13532
0.023
Finland
5277000
3182
0.060
Ireland
4312500
545
0.013
Slovenia
2010400
259
0.013
Hungary
10066200
250
0.003
Source: Adapted from ICOT (2004, p.34), Eurostat, Wikipedia for IT, FI, IE, SI and HU,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_diaspora (14.05.2009)

485

Eurobarometer
disapproval rate
77%
71%
55%
85%
63%
49%
62%
45%
58%
64%
42%
46%
40%

European Journal of Social Sciences Volume 19, Number 4 (2011)

To give the relation a visual appearance the following graph has been created:
Figure 1: Turkish population vs. Eurobarometer disapproval rates

The regression line manifests the linear relationship between the Turkish population share and
the negative public opinion in Europe. It is assumed that the Turkish population share is the predictor
variable presuming that the causality is one-way from population share to Eurobarometer disapproval.9
A preliminary data analysis has been conducted and reveals that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(KS) proves to be non-significant for both variables, which is indicative for a normal distribution of the
Turkish population share data (D(13)=0.219, p>0.05) and the Eurobarometer data (D(13), p>0.05).
Serial correlations between errors are slightly positive (Durbin Watson=2.616) but within the limits of
acceptance from 1 to 3. The normality of the errors has been visually checked by inspecting the
histogram of the standardized residuals and the normal probability plot and the assumption on linearity
and homoscedasticity by plotting the standardized residuals against the standardized predicted values.
A KS test has also been conducted in order to quantify for the normality of the standardized residuals
(D(13)=0.14, p>0.05).
The data exploration reveals that the residuals are independent and identically (normally)
distributed (iid), homoscedastic and linear. Thus the constructed regression model seems to be accurate
for the sample as well as generalizable for the whole population.
The regression analysis shows that the Pearson correlation (R) of the relation is 74.5 percent
and the R2 is 55.6 percent. The adjusted R2 is 51.5 percent and shows the high cross-validation
accuracy of the model. Both, the regression coefficient B and the F-test are significant at the one
percent level (p<0.01). A summary is given in the following tables:

Technically speaking, in correlation research variables are measured simultaneously and so no cause and effect
relationship can be established (Field, 2005, p.113). However, here common sense dictates that the size of the Turkish
population is causative for the negative sentiments in Europe, and not the other way around.

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Table 3:

Model summary

Model Summaryb
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square
1
0.745a
0.556
0.515
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Tukish population in total population
b. Dependent Variable: Eurobarometer disapproval rate

Table 4:

Durbin-Watson
2.616

Coefficients of the model

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
50.157
3.455
9.992
2.694

Model
(Constant)
Percentage of Turkish
population in total population
a. Dependent Variable: Eurobarometer disapproval rate
1

Table 5:

Std. Error of the

Estimate
9.676

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
0.745

t
14.516
3.710

Sig.
0.000
0.003

F
13.761

Sig.
0.003a

ANOVA

ANOVAb
Model
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
1
Regression
1288.393
1
1288.393
Residual
1029.915
11
93.629
Total
2318.308
12
a. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of Turkish population in total population
b. Dependent Variable: Eurobarometer disapproval rate

Thus it can be concluded that the total share of the Turkish population in a European host
country is a good indication for the disapproval rate of a Turkish EU membership. A higher Turkish
population share in the host country corresponds to a higher disapproval rate and a lower Turkish
population share in the host country corresponds to a lower disapproval rate. Therefore the
aforementioned hypotheses have been confirmed. However, one should bear in mind that 44.4 percent
of the total variation could not be explained by the population size alone, which indicates the existence
of other variables that have an influence on the negative public opinion on Turkish membership in
Europe. Notwithstanding, the large effect size shows that the Turkish population share in the host
country constitutes a major antecedent for the aversion to the idea of a Turkish membership among the
European public, especially in the core countries.

4. The Raison Dtre for the Bias Against Turkey

A good explanation for the negative attitudes in the EU comes from (ICOT 2004). They assert that
these negative sentiments are an indication that Turkey is seen through the prism of experience of
Turkish immigrants, who often find it difficult to integrate into the societies of host countries. (Ibid.,
p. 29). Another potential reason is stated by (Petkova 2008), who finds that an emotional element
prevails over a rational one regarding a Turkish membership, ultimately holding people back from
having a positive attitude towards Turkey. This result is based on a survey in which the wording of the
original Eurobarometer survey question was changed to accommodate the hypothetic presumption that
Turkey fulfills all criteria, which led to an increase in the acceptance rate from 31 percent to 45
percent.

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Other survey results (Eurobarometer 2006) show that the cultural differences between Turkey
and the EU are one of the main determinants for the negative public opinion on Turkish membership.10
However, (Petkova 2008) states that the fear of a different culture is mainly based on misinformation
or a lack of information. This misinformation is clearly stirred up by the social image of Turkish
immigrants in Europe making it a tender spot for the acceptance of Turkey. The survey by (Yilmaz
2009) provides a confirmation for this view.
According to (Manco 2000) the truncated social image of the Turkish community in Europe
stems from following facts: lack of educational and vocational qualifications, forcing Turkish workers
into low-paying unskilled jobs (metal engineering, industrial and office cleaning, building, public
works, and the garment industry), a later phenomenon (immigration started after 1961), rural origins,
geographical concentration, clustering in underprivileged neighborhoods that are highly ethnically
structured (shops, cafes, mosques, etc.), family-based structure, cultural marginality due to ethnic
family traditions (code of honor, forced marriage), preservation of the native language, lack of mastery
of the host country's language, lack of economic qualifications, and the creation of community
organizations.
These characteristics play a central role in the marginalization of the social image of the
Turkish community in Europe further creating a negative elevation or spillover on the national brand
and country image of Turkey. It is of crucial importance for Turkey to change the social image of its
emigrants in Europe and thus its country image if it wants to convince the European public on a
Turkish membership. Simon Anholt, an author of the concept of national branding, puts this issue into
quite frank words: Turkeys brand image today in the West is in the same shape as if Atatrk had
never lived ((Barysch 2007), p.5).
Granted that the EU will expand its absorption capacity and Turkey fulfill all political and
economic criteria, Turkey might still be left out of the Union just because by the time being the
ultimate decision on accepting Turkey as a new member will lie in the hands of the EU citizens.
This view is shared by (ICOT 2004) and (Petkova 2008) who anticipate that a rift between
government policy and public opinion could deepen in some countries, eventually developing into a
serious problem by the time an eventual accession treaty is to be ratified. In response to the rejection by
the Europeans, the negative sentiments towards the EU will be stirred up among the Turkish public,
elevating Euroscepticism in Turkey even further.
Just as foreseen by the authors, as a reaction to the negative development in EU policy and
public opinion, the Turkish government announced in November 2008 that it would hold a similar
referendum on becoming an EU member once the negotiation talks are successfully finished.
The trend in the EU and in Turkey is clearly evident: The public opinion on Turkish
membership develops into diametrically opposing directions evidentially fomenting mutual distrust. In
other words, the Turks are reluctant in accepting a second-class treatment, which leads to a weakening
of the public trust regarding the EU. And the Europeans are tired of accepting another poor country
to the club, which in their opinion is culturally and geographically distant to Europe.
These mutually opposing positions clearly complicate the current and future political
relationship between Turkey and the EU and will influence the path towards further political
integration.

10

For example, a compendium of political statements (Petkova 2008):

Valerie Giscard dEstaing (former French president): Turkey is part of another culture, another way of life and its
integration would mean the end of Europe
Nicolas Sarkozy (French president): If Turkey were European, we would know it
Franz Fischler (European Commission): Turkey is a sui generis society, far more oriental than European

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5. Conclusion and Outlook

All in all, we found compelling evidence that the European sentiment towards a Turkish EU
membership is greatly influenced by the relative share of the Turkish population in Europe. Our
regression analysis shows that there is a high positive relationship between the disapproval rates as
measured by a Eurobarometer survey and the corresponding European countries share of Turkish
population, hence a higher (lower) Turkish population share in the European host country corresponds
to a higher (lower) disapproval rate of Turkish membership in the EU.
All our qualitative and quantitative results suggest that the country image of Turkey is
negatively influenced by the experience of the European population with Turkish immigrants. As the
social image of European Turks is bleak, it will be essential for Turkey to redirect its public relation
efforts in order to improve the predicaments and sentiments surrounding the national brand image. This
will be a Sisyphean challenge in view of the medium term EU membership aspirations of Turkey, as a
social image change is a time-consuming process. Nevertheless, if Turkeys aim of becoming an EU
member is of maximum principle order, it has to start to mitigate the social image of its emigrants with
immediate effect as the negative spillovers on its national image have become more than evident by
now. Any hesitation along these lines will have severe consequences for the long-term relationship of
Turkey and the EU, as the first signs of a deterioration are already manifest in recent surveys for both
regions.
Further studies on the social image and country image of Turkey will be essential to better
understand the antecedents of the negative image and to narrow down a more targeted mitigation
strategy. In this regard, we propose a closer attention to studies along the framework of (Martin and
Eroglu 1993; Pappu, Quester et al. 2007; Riefler and Diamantopoulos 2007; Oberecker, Riefler et al.
2008; Oberecker and Diamantopoulos 2011). These studies provide constructions on affinity,
animosity and country image in order to measure the latent feelings towards other countries and
therefore offer an integral outlook for the future research on Turkeys country and social image.

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