G.R. NO.

142628

February 6, 2007

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS

OF
PETRA
CAPISTRANO
PIIT,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
(DARAB), DAR REGION X DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO,
FORTUNATO
TELEN,
EMERITA
OLANGO,
THERESA
MONTUERTO, DOMINGO H. CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR
U. POLLEY, FIDELA U. POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR
UCAB, EMERIA U. LIM, EMILITO CLAPERO, ANTONINA RIAS,
AURILLIO ROMULO, ERWIN P. CLAPERO, EVELITO CULANGO,
VILMA/CRUISINE ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO
CABARIBAN, and SABINA CANTORANA, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issue presented for
resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has
jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
The antecedent facts:
Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in
Cagayan de Oro City which measured 123,408 square meters
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. Springfield
Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No.
2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No.

2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters.1 Springfield

developed these properties into a subdivision project called
Mega Heights Subdivision.2
On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice
of Coverage,3 placing the property under the coverage of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. There being an opposition from the heirs
of Petra Piit, the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. X-305.
On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A.
Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the
property as residential and not suitable for agriculture.4 The
Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial
Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous.5 The
decision became final and executory6 and Springfield
proceeded to develop the property.7
The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from
judgment of the DARAB Decision, docketed as DARAB Case No.
0555. In its Decision dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted
the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage. It
also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed
with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the
property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.8
The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering
the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries
the amount of Twelve Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand,
Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the

value of the property since the property has already been

developed into a subdivision.
On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners)
filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 40, a petition
for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995
and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that
the DARAB decision was rendered without affording petitioners
any notice and hearing.9
On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an
Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.10
On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
44563.11 Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of
judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a
different color. According to petitioners, what it sought before
the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not
certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having
been rendered without due process of law.12
In the assailed Decision13 dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed
the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have
jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a coequal body.14

However, on January 12, 1999, the CA ordered the elevation of

the DARAB records before it, declaring that it "overlooked the
fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ of prohibition
against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which they
claim to be patently void."15 Forwarded to the CA were the
records of the original case filed with the DARAB-Region X, and
it appearing that the petition for relief from judgment and its
pertinent records were forwarded to the DARAB Central Office,
the CA issued another Resolution on December 20, 1999,16
requiring the DARAB Central Office to forward the records of
the case. But after receipt of the records, the CA simply denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution17 dated
February 23, 2000 without specifically resolving the issues
raised concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR ERROR OF
LAW IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
TO JUSTIFY ITS CONCLUSION DIVESTING THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION VESTED BY LAW OVER
CASES WHERE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WAS NOT
EXPRESSLY GRANTED TO ANY OTHER COURTS [SIC] OR
TRIBUNAL, IN EFFECT, MODIFYING THE APPLICABLE LAW
ON THE MATTER.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS IRREGULARLY DISMISSED

PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AFTER IT
HAD RESOLVED TO ENTERTAIN PETITIONERS' PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION AND TO REVIEW THE DARAB
PROCEEDINGS, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
III
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, BEING THE HIGHEST
TEMPLE OF RIGHTS, AND TO AVOID SERIOUS
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND NEEDLESS DELAYS, IS MOST
RESPECTFULLY URGED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
PETITION FILED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 44563 IN THE EXERCISE
OF ITS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION, AS IF THE PETITION
WAS ORIGINALLY LODGED BEFORE IT.18
Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129,
there is no provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of DARAB judgments. Petitioners,
however, contend that the RTC may take cognizance of the
annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the RTC
with general jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered
under such general jurisdiction. According to petitioners, "this
is but a logical consequence of the fact that no other courts
were expressly given the jurisdiction over such actions."19
Petitioners further argue that the CA was in error when it
summarily ignored their application for a writ of prohibition, as
it was necessary to restrain the DARAB from enforcing its void
decision; and even if the DARAB decision was valid, the writ of

prohibition could have enjoined the execution of the DARAB

decision since there have been changes which will make the
execution unjust and inequitable.
In their Joint-Comments, the farmer-beneficiaries and the
DARAB (respondents) refute petitioners' allegation that they
were not afforded due process in the DARAB proceedings,
stating that petitioners were impleaded as a party thereto, and
in fact, they attended some of the hearings although their
counsel was absent. Respondents also adopt the CA's ruling
that the RTC is not vested with any jurisdiction to annul the
DARAB decision.
As stated at the outset, the main issue in this case is whether
the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.
Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the
DARAB decision was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before
the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129
or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on August
10, 1981.
It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg.
129, a court of first instance has the authority to annul a final
and executory judgment rendered by another court of first
instance or by another branch of the same court. This was the
Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals.20 Yet, in subsequent
cases,21 the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of
comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance

and the branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried

by the same court or branch which heard the main action.
The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v.
Sayo,22 where the Court expressed that pursuant to the policy
of judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference between
concurrent and coordinate courts should be regarded as highly
important in the administration of justice whereby the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.
With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129,23 the rule on annulment
of judgments was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which
vested in the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA)
the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA
with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As
provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose
decisions are exclusively appealable to the CA are those, which
under the law, R.A. No. 5434,24 or its enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the CA.

Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any
power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies.
However, in BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,25 the Court ruled that the RTCs
have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of
the National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial
body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts
or omissions of an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that
despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC
had the power to entertain petitions for annulment of
judgments of inferior courts and administrative or quasijudicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with
the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the Court recognizing the
power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul final
judgments.26 Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that
the RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, such
authority pertained only to final judgments rendered by inferior
courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such
inferior courts.
The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether
the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior
court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an action for
the annulments of its judgments. The answer is no.
The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order
Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory
powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure

adopted on December 26, 198827 specifically provides for the

manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or
awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision,
order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any
agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian
reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,
may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as
provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an
appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or
Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB
decisions to the CA.28
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.29
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with
the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA
was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the
petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5,

1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the
same.
This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for
annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA.
As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the
CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment
of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not
expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano,30 the
Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory
judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals,31
where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final
decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Recent rulings on similar cases involving annulments of
judgments of quasi-judicial bodies are also quite instructive on
this matter.
In Cole v. Court of Appeals,32 involving an annulment of the
judgment of the HLURB Arbiter and the Office of the President
(OP), filed with the CA, the Court stated that, "(U)nder Rule 47
of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is
confined to decisions of the Regional Trial Court on the ground

of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction x x x." The Court

further ruled, viz.:
Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of
judgment are fraud and lack of jurisdiction, said petition cannot
prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought to be
annulled was not rendered by the Regional Trial Court but by
an administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the
President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment
of the HLURB or the Office of the President. Assuming
arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the same should have been dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, because no error of judgment was imputed to the
HLURB and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of
jurisdiction are beyond the province of petitions under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, as it covers only errors of judgment. A
petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy,
hence no error of judgment can be the subject thereof. Besides,
the Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have
jurisdiction over the cases brought before them in line with our
ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated
on March 17, 2000, where the aggrieved townhouse buyers
may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential Decree
No. 957, otherwise known as "Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In Macalalag v. Ombudsman,34 the Court ruled that Rule 47 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments

or final orders and resolutions covers "annulment by the Court

of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the
petitioner." Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final
orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The
Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an
aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and the
right to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in
criminal or non-administrative cases.
While these cases involve annulments of judgments under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, still, they still find
application in the present case, as the provisions of B.P. Blg.
129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on
annulment of judgments are identical.
Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of
the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of
quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such
authority.
Further, petitioners are also asking the Court to take
cognizance of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition, which they claim was not acted upon by the CA,
citing the Court's action in Fortich v. Corona35 where the Court

took cognizance of the petition previously filed with the CA due

to compelling reasons. The Court is not persuaded to do so.
Fortich involved a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr.
Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC),
which was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. for a period of 10 years. During the existence of
the lease, the DAR placed the entire 144-hectare property
under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at
P2.38 million. When the NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon AgroIndustrial Development Association) filed an application for
conversion due to the passage of Resolution No. 6 by the
Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon and Ordinance No.
24 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon,
reclassifying
the
area
from
agricultural
to
industrial/institutional, the same was disapproved by the DAR
Secretary and instead, the property was placed under the
compulsory coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program for distribution to all qualified beneficiaries. This
prompted Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon to file an
appeal with the OP, while NQSRMDC filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari, and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
The OP then issued a Decision dated March 29, 1996 reversing
the DAR Secretary's decision and approving the application for
conversion. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denied the
DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period of 15 days, and it was also declared

that the OP Decision dated March 29, 1996 had already

become final and executory.
Because of this, the farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike
on October 9, 1997, protesting the OP's decision. In order to
resolve the strike, the OP issued a so-called "Win/Win"
resolution on November 7, 1997, modifying the decision in that
NQSRMDC's application for conversion is approved only with
respect to the approximately 44-hectare portion of the land
adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department
of Agriculture, while the remaining approximately 100 hectares
traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for
agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries.1awphi1.net
A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court36 was then filed with the Court, which
was contested by the Office of the Solicitor General on the
ground that the proper remedy should have been to file a
petition for review directly with the CA in accordance with Rule
43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In resolving the issue, the Court recognized the rule that the
Supreme Court, CA and RTC have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus. However, due to compelling reasons and in the
interest of speedy justice, the Court resolved to take primary
jurisdiction over the petition in the interest of speedy justice,
after which the Court nullified the act of the OP in re-opening
the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996

Decision which had already become final and executory, as it

was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
It must be stressed at this point that the Court, as a rule, will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.37
The Court finds no compelling circumstances in this case to
warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule. The Fortich case is
not analogous with the present case such that the Court is not
bound to abandon all rules, take primary jurisdiction, and
resolve the merits of petitioners' application for a writ of
prohibition.
In the present case, the assailed DARAB Decision dated October
5, 1995 granting the petition for relief from judgment and
giving due course to the Notice of Coverage was made pursuant
to a petition for relief from judgment filed by the DAR, albeit
petitioners are contesting the validity of the proceedings held
thereon. On the other hand, in Fortich, the OP's "Win/Win"
resolution dated November 7, 1997 was made motu proprio, as
a result of the hunger strike staged by the farmer-beneficiaries.
Further, the OP's "Win/Win" Resolution dated November 7,
1997 in the Fortich case is a patently void judgment since it was
evident that there was already an existing final and executory

OP Decision dated March 29, 1996. In this case, the assailed

DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 appears to be regular
on its face, and for its alleged nullity to be resolved, the Court
must delve into the records of the case in order to determine
the validity of petitioners' argument of lack of due process,
absent notice and hearing.
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally
to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts,
the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.38 The
question of whether the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995
is null and void and enforceable against petitioners for having
been rendered without affording petitioners due process is a
factual question which requires a review of the records of this
case for it to be judiciously resolved.
The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition,
which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB
Decision dated October 5, 1995. On this score, the CA found
that the application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition
was actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB
decision. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside
in three ways;39 and a collateral attack, whereby in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof,40 is one of these. This
tenet is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge
void acts from its records.41 Despite recognizing the need to
resolve petitioners' application for the writ of prohibition in its
Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless

summarily denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its

Resolution dated February 23, 2000,42 leaving the matter
hanging and unresolved.
At first, the Court considered resolving the merits of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration concerning their
application for a writ of prohibition against enforcing the
DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995. Thus, in a Resolution
dated June 5, 2006, the Court directed the CA to transmit the
records of DARAB Case No. 0555, which was previously
required by the CA to be forwarded to it per Resolution dated
December 20, 1999.43 However, as of even date, the CA has not
complied with the Court's Resolution. Withal, upon reexamination of the issues involved in this case, the Court deems
it more judicious to remand this case to the CA for immediate
resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, re: their
application for the writ of prohibition.
Moreover, the radical conflict in the findings of the Provincial
Adjudicator and the DARAB as regards the nature of the subject
property necessitates a review of the present case. In this
regard, the CA is in a better position to fully adjudicate the case
for it can delve into the records to determine the probative
value of the evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial
Adjudicator and of the DARAB. In addition, the CA is
empowered by its internal rules to require parties to submit
additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the
ends of substantial justice, and further order the transmittal of
the proper records for it to fully adjudicate the case. After all, it
is an avowed policy of the courts that cases should be

determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties

for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the
ends of justice would be served better
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. This case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to
resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition in their Motion for Reconsideration.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the records be remanded
forthwith to the Court of Appeals.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101974*

July 12, 2001

VICTORIA
P.
CABRAL,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELIGIO P. PACIS,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION III, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, FLORENCIO ADOLFO, GREGORIO LAZARO,
GREGORIA ADOLFO and ELIAS POLICARPIO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition

before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) for the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles
issued in favor of private respondents. The patents and titles
covered portions of the property owned and registered in the
name of petitioner.
Petitioner alleged therein that she was the registered owner of
several parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-1670 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,1 among
which is a parcel of land described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu164390. The petition further averred that as early as July 1973,
petitioner applied with the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for the reclassification or conversion of the land for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. The application
for conversion, however, was not acted upon. Instead, on April
25, 1988, Emancipation Patents, and, thereafter, Transfer
Certificates of Title, were issued in favor of private
respondents.
Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs on the grounds
that: petitioner had a pending application for conversion and
reclassification; the lots covered by the emancipation patents
included areas not actually tilled by private respondents;
private respondents had illegally transferred their rights over
the parcels of land covered by the emancipation patents;
private respondents are deemed to have abandoned their
rights over the properties; and the subject property was taken
without just compensation.

On January 19, 1990, petitioner filed with the DAR itself

another petition for the cancellation of the same Emancipation
Patents and Torrens Titles.
On January 29, 1990, petitioner received a letter from the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, stating, among other things, that in order "that your
petition be given due process by this Office, your petition will
be forwarded to the legal section of this office for legal action."
On February 11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an
order dismissing the petition2 for cancellation of Emancipation
Patents, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby
orders the DISMISSAL of the petition of Victoria P. Cabral
for lack of legal and factual basis' likewise, this office
request[s] that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens
on the original copies of Emancipation Patents issued to
petitioners covering the subject landholdings be
CANCELLED by the Office of the Register of Deeds
concerned.
SO ORDERED.3
The Regional Director likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration dated July 11, 1990. Consequently, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals questioning
the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of
due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for

reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting petitioner to

turn to this Court for relief, alleging that:
(a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION III ACTED
WITH JURISDICTION WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND
RESOLVED THE CONVERSION APPLICATION AND/OR
CANCELLATION OF CLT/EP PETITION OF PETITIONERAPPELLANT;
(b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT OUTSIDE OF THE BARANGAY AGRARIAN
REFORM COMMITTEE (BARC), IT IS THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) THAT
HAS JURISDICTION OVER AGRARIAN REFORM CASES,
DISPUTES OR CONTROVERSIES;
(c) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE
PROCESS AS ALLEGEDLY SHE LOST HER OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD AFTER THE JUNE 27, 1990 HEARING.4 On April 21, 1993, petitioner filed with this Court an urgent
motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner alleged that private respondent Gregoria Adolfo had
conveyed the land awarded to her to the Aqualand
Development Corporation and the Sta. Rita Steel Resources
Corporation. These corporations, in turn,
x x x converted the parcel of land from agricultural to
commercial and industrial and have constructed high

adobe stone walls[,] commenced the construction of a

steel finishing plant and other structures for the
manufacture of steel products[,] and are putting in place
more installations to complete all facilities necessary for
their business. As a matter of fact, they have just applied
for a building permit for the construction of a two (2)
storey office condominium/business office building. xxx5
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the Court issued the
temporary restraining order prayed for. The Court enjoined Sta.
Rita Steel Resources and Aqualand Development Corporation,
its officers, agents, representatives and/or persons acting in
their place or stead from continuing the construction of
building and the like on the landholding of petitioner, pending
final resolution of the petition.6
Petitioner contended before the Court of Appeals that
jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Agrarian Board (DARAB), not the Regional
Director. Addressing this argument, the Court of Appeals held
in its Decision:
Relevant to the issue raised is Ministry Administrative
Order No. 2-85, Series of 1985, effective July 24, 1985
(Annex 2, Comment) which empowers all DAR Regional
Directors to hear and decide cases which include the
issuance of Decisions/Resolutions, the recall and
cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) if such
is the necessary consequence of the facts and
circumstances of the case.

A later directive, DAR Memo Cir. No. 5, Series of 1987

(Annex 3, Comment), clothed the Regional Directors as
titular regional heads, with powers to hear and resolve
cases involving lands in their respective jurisdiction in
order to achieve the expanded and comprehensive
agrarian reform program of the present administration,
and to tackle the issue of huge number and increasing
backlog or unresolved cases in the DAR Central Office.
Additionally, a memorandum dated September 14, 1987
(Annex 4, Comment) addressed to the Director, Bureau of
Land Acquisition Development, by the then Director,
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, contains a decisive
opinion regarding the question on order of cancellation
issued by the Regional Director, DAR Region III, to wit:
"The Regional Director is now authorized to
hear/investigate and hereby resolve cases arising
from the implementation of CLT pursuant to PD 27
and amendatory and related decrees and letter of
instructions, rules and regulations as well as conflict
of claim in landed estates and resettlement areas and
such other lands as have been placed under the
administration and disposition of this Department."7
In its Resolution dated September 17, 1991, the Court of
Appeals also made reference to Section 13 of Executive Order
No. 129-A, which authorized the delegation of the adjudication
of agrarian reform cases to regional offices. It further cited
certain provisions of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure

providing for, among others, delegated jurisdiction, and

concluded that:
x x x the Regional Director cannot be faulted with
assuming jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
powers and functions of the DARAB may be delegated to
the regional office x x x.
While it is true that the jurisdiction is vested with the
DARAB, the Regional Director took cognizance of the
instant case invoking the delegated powers and functions
upon him.8
Evidently, the DARAB, in the Court of Appeals' view, had
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Director over the
case. Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the
jurisdiction of the DARAB is exclusive of the DAR Regional
Director.
Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional
Director may have had over the cancellation of emancipation
patents, it lost with the passage of subsequent laws.
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the
Mechanism for the Implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program)9 granted DAR quasi-judicial powers
to adjudicate agrarian reform matters, thus:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is
hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving

implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
xxx
Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129
Reorganizing and Strengthening Department of Agrarian
Reform and for other purposes) subsequently provided for the
creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting it
the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases:
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is
hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2)
Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary,
the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3)
others to be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Secretary as members. A
Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The
Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect
to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under
Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These
powers and functions may be delegated to the regional
office of the Department in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Board.

Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in

Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Law of 1988 (CARL).11 Section 50 thereof states:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
xxx
CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in two
newspapers of general circulation.
In order "to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding before it," the DAR
is mandated "to adopt a uniform rule of procedure" (Second
par., Section 50, R.A. No. 6657), which is, at present, the DARAB
Revised Rules.12 The Rules were promulgated on December 26,
1988.
The provisions of Rule II (Jurisdiction of the Adjudication Board)
of the Revised Rules read:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.
The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have
primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to

determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,

controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be
limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian
laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and
determination and payment of just compensation,
fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance
compensation, amortization payments, and similar
disputes concerning the function of the Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of
orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the
Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their
amendments under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and LBP;

d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership

or representation in compact farms, farmers'
cooperatives and other registered farmers'
associations or organizations, related to land covered
by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage,
foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or
other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the
administrative correction thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or
concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP and other
agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive
prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
SECTION 2. Delegated Jurisdiction. The Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicators (RARAD) and the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicators (PARAD) are empowered and
authorized to receive, hear, determine and adjudicate all
agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection
therewith, arising within their respective territorial
jurisdiction.

SECTION 3. Functional Relationships. The Board shall

exercise functional supervision over the RARADs; and the
PARADs. For administrative purposes, however, the
RARADs and the PARADs are deemed to form part of the
DAR Regional Office where they are stationed, and as
such, shall be given administrative support by their
respective Regional and Provincial offices, in terms of
office space, personal services, equipment and supply, and
other facilities.
SECTION 4. Role of the RARAD. The RARAD shall be the
Executive Adjudicator in his region directly responsible to
the Board. As such, he shall coordinate and monitor the
work of the PARADs in his region and see to it that their
dockets do not remain clogged. He shall receive, hear, and
adjudicate the following cases:
a) Cases that cannot be handled by the PARAD on
account of inhibition or disqualification;
b) Cases brought directly before him which for some
cogent reason, cannot be properly handled by the
PARAD concerned;
c) Cases of such complexity and sensitivity that the
decision thereof would constitute an important
precedent affecting regional or national interest; and
d) Such other cases which the Board may assign to
him.

SECTION 5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have

exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify,
alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, and other
dispositions of its RARAD and PARAD.
SECTION 6.Enforcement Powers. The members of the
Board and its RARADs and PARADs are empowered to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony,
require submission of reports, compel production of books
and documents and answers to interrogatories, and to
issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writs of
possession, writs of execution and other writs to enforce
its orders and decisions thru sheriffs or duly deputized
officers.
For such purpose, whenever necessary, it may call upon
the police and military authorities for assistance in the
enforcement and execution of its decisions, orders, writs
and other processes.
In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board vs. Court
of Appeals,13 this Court observed that:
x x x the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction [as set forth in
Section 50 of the CARL] is exercised through hierarchically
arranged agencies, namely, the DARAB, RARAD and
PARAD. The latter two exercise "delegated authority,"
while the first exercises appellate jurisdiction over
resolutions, orders, decisions and other dispositions of the
RARAD and the PARAD.

On the other hand, Executive Order 129-A, in Section 24

thereof, defines the functions of the Regional Offices as
follows:
SECTION 24. Regional Offices. The Department shall have
twelve (12) Regional Offices. Each Regional Office shall be
headed by a Regional Director who shall be assisted by an
Assistant Regional Director for Operations and an Assistant
Regional Director for Administration.
The Regional Offices shall be responsible for the
implementation of laws, policies, plans, programs,
projects, rules and regulations of the Department in its
administrative region. For such purposes, it shall have the
following functions.
a) Prepare and submit plans and programs for the
regions on:
1) Land acquisition and distribution;
2) Information and education;
3) Land use management and land development;
4) Agrarian reform beneficiaries development;
b) Provide technical assistance to Provincial Offices
and Municipal Agrarian Reform Offices in the
implementation of approved plans and programs;

c) Conduct operations research and evaluation of

agrarian reform implementation within the region;
d) Coordinate with other government and private
agencies and farmers and farm workers' organizations
at the regional level, to carry out programs/projects
for the general welfare of agrarian reform
beneficiaries;
e) Maintain an information system in coordination
with the established monitoring system;
f) Review and evaluate reports and other documents
submitted by the Provincial Offices and Municipal
Agrarian Reform Offices and agrarian reform
clientele;
g) Submit periodic feedback as may be necessary in
the service of the Department's clientele.
In addition, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in
Chapter 5 (Field Offices), Book IV (The Executive Branch)
thereof, provides:
SEC. 26. Functions of a Regional Office. (1) A regional
office shall:
(a) Implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules
and regulations of the department or agency in the
regional area;

(b) Provide economical, efficient and effective service

to the people in the area;
(c) Coordinate with regional offices of other
departments, bureaus and agencies in the area;
(d) Coordinate with local government units in the
area; and
(e) Perform such other functions as may be provided
by law.
(2) x x x
SEC. 27. Duties of a Regional Director. The Regional
Director shall:
(1) Implement laws, policies, rules and regulations
within the responsibility of the agency;
(2) Implement agency programs in the region;
(3) Exercise the management functions of planning,
organizing, directing and controlling;
(4) Appoint personnel to positions in the first level
and casual and seasonal employees; and exercise
disciplinary actions over them in accordance with the
Civil Service Law;
(5) Approve sick, vacation and maternity leaves of
absence with or without pay, for a period not beyond
one year;

(6) Prepare and submit budget proposals for the

region to the central office, administer the budget of
the regional office, authorize disbursement of funds
pursuant to approved financial and work programs,
and administer the budget control machinery in the
region;
(7) Approve requisition for supplies, materials and
equipment, as well as books and periodicals, and
other items for the region, in accordance with the
approved supply procurement program;
(8) Negotiate and enter into contracts for services or
furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
regional office involving an amount not exceeding
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) within a given
quarter, provided that authority in excess of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) may be further
authorized by the proper department or agency head;
(9) Approve claims for benefits under existing laws;
(10) Approve requests for overtime services;
(11) Promote coordination among regional offices,
and between his regional office and local government
units in the region;
(12) Provide housekeeping services for the regional
office;

(13) Approve application of personnel for permission

to teach, exercise a profession, or engage in business
outside of office hours, in accordance with standards
and guidelines of the Civil Service Commission;
(14) Issue travel vouchers authorizing employees to
travel on official days within the region for a period
not exceeding thirty days;
(15) Approve attendance of personnel in conferences,
seminars, and non-degree training programs within
the region;
(16) Authorize the allocation
provincial/district offices; and

of

funds

to

(17) Perform such other duties and functions as may

be provided by law or further delegated by the head
of agency or other proper authorities concerned.
Title XI of Book IV of the same Code, dealing specifically with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, provides:
SEC. 18. Regional Office. The Regional Office shall be
responsible for supporting the field units and supervising
program implementation of the Department within the
region. It shall:
(1) Implement laws, policies, plans, rules and
regulations of the Department in the regional area;

(2) Develop and implement a regional personnel

management program;
(3) Prepare, submit, execute and control the budget
of the region;
(4) Prepare and properly maintain books of accounts;
(5) Pay salaries and wages and other approved
vouchers;
(6) Provide administrative services to the regional and
provincial offices;
(7) Prepare and submit plans and programs for the
region on:
a. land tenure development
b. information and education
c. land use management and land development
d. legal services
e. agrarian reform beneficiaries development
(8) Provide technical assistance to the provincial
offices and agrarian reform teams in the
implementation of approved plans and programs;
(9) Extend effective legal assistance, advice or service
to agrarian reform beneficiaries;

(10) Conduct operations research and evaluation of

agrarian reform program implementation within the
region;
(11) Coordinate with other government and private
agencies and farmer organizations at the Regional
level through the Agrarian Reform Coordinating
Council, to carry out programs/projects for the
general welfare of the agrarian reform beneficiaries;
(12) Coordinate para-legal services;
(13) Maintain a data-based information system in
coordination with the established monitoring system;
(14) Review documents submitted by the Provincial
and Team Offices or by the clientele;
(15) Submit periodic feedback and recommend policy
changes and/or modification of procedures on
program implementation; and
(16) Perform such other functions as may be
necessary in the service of the clientele.
The foregoing provisions were already in effect when petitioner
filed her petition in the BARC in 1990. And it is amply clear from
these provisions that the function of the Regional Office
concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws while
that of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.

The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the enforcement

and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.14 Thus, the
Regional Director is primarily tasked with "[i]mplement[ing]
laws, policies, rules and regulations within the responsibility of
the agency," as well as the "agency program in the region."15
The second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the
determination of rights and obligations of the parties. To aid
the DARAB in the exercise of this function, the Rules grant the
Board and Adjudicators the powers to issue subpoenas16 and
injunctions,17 to cite and punish for contempt,18 and to order
the execution of its orders and decision,19 among other powers.
The Rules also contain very specific provisions to ensure the
orderly procedure before the DARAB, RARADs and PARADs.
These provisions govern the commencement of actions, venue
and cause of action,20 the service of pleadings,21 the
presentation of evidence,22 motions,23 appeals24 and judicial
review.25 Notable are provisions intended to prevent
multiplicity of suits such as the rules on one suit for one cause
of action,26 the joinder of causes of action,27 and the
assignment of all incidents of a case to the Adjudicator to
whom the case is assigned.28 No such powers were granted or
provisions adopted when the purported delegation was made
to the Regional Director or since. The DARAB Rules grant
broader powers to the Board and the Adjudicators and contain
more detailed rules on procedure than those provided by the
orders, circulars, memoranda and opinions cited by the Court
of Appeals delegating jurisdiction to the Regional Director.

The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13

of E.O. No. 129-A authorizes the DARAB to delegate its powers
and functions to the regional office in accordance with the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Board. The authority
purportedly provides additional justification for the Regional
Office's jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the
DARAB, through its Revised Rules, has delegated such powers
and functions to the RARADs and the PARADs, which, under
Section 3 of the Rules, "are deemed to form part of the DAR
Regional Office where they are stationed."
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most
administrative agencies, is granted with a fusion of
governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasijudicial and the executive. The growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws
have impelled this constantly growing tendency toward such
delegation.29
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to
allow a duplication of functions between agencies. Duplication
results in confusion between the various agencies upon whom
these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies
are supposed to serve. It divides the agencies' resources and
prevents them from devoting their energy to similarly
important tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is
evident in the various laws' distinct delineation of the functions
of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office.
Accordingly, the Court must reject the theory of concurrent

jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We hold that

the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject
case.
In view of this conclusion, we need not resolve the issue of
deprivation of due process allegedly suffered by petitioner in
the proceedings before the Regional Director.
WHEREFORE, the petition is given DUE COURSE and
GRANTED.The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The restraining order issued per
this Court's Resolution dated May 17, 1993 is hereby made
permanent.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

Victoria P. Cabral vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 101974 (July 12, 2001)

Facts:
Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of several parcels of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan among which is a parcel of land
described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390. As early as July
1973, petitioner had already purportedly applied for the
reclassification or conversion of the land for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). The application for conversion, however, was not acted
upon. Instead, on April 25, 1988, Emancipation Patents and thereafter,
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in favor of private respondents.
Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs with the BARC on January
16, 1990 and on January 19, 1990, filed another petition for the
cancellation of the said Emancipation Patents and Torrens Title.
The said petition was dismissed in an Order dated February 11, 1990 by
then Regional Director Eligio Pacis. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of due
process. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied prompting the petitioner
toturn to the Supreme Court for relief. Also, on April 21, 1993,
petitioner filed with the Court anurgent Motion for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order alleging that respondent GregoriaAdolfo
had already conveyed the land awarded to her to the Aqualand
Development Corporationand the Sta. Rita Steel Resources Corporation

for the conversion of the land from agricultural tocommercial and

industrial purposes. In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the Court
issued thetemporary restraining order prayed for.
Issue:
Who has jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as contended by
the Petitioner or the Regional Director?
Held:
Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may
have had over the cancellation of emancipation patents is lost with the
passage of subsequent laws.
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the Mechanism for
the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program)
granted DAR quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform
matters, to wit: "SECTION 17.
Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.

The DAR is hereby vested with quasi- judicial powers to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)."

Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129

Reorganizing andStrengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and
for other purposes) subsequently providedfor the creation of the
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting it the powers and
functionswith respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases: "SECTION 13.
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

There is hereby created an AgrarianReform Adjudication Board

under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be composed of
theSecretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be
designated by the Secretary, theAssistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and
three (3) others to be appointed by the President uponrecommendation
of the Secretary as members. A Secretariat shall be constituted to
support theBoard. The Board shall assume the powers and functions
with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under
Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers
andfunctions may be delegated to the regional office of the Department
in accordance with the rulesand regulations promulgated by the
Board."
Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in Republic
Act No. 6657, otherwiseknown as the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of
1988 (CARL). Section 50 thereof states: "SECTION 50.Quasi-Judicial
Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except thosefalling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of

Agriculture (DA) and the Departmentof Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR).
CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in two
newspapers of generalcirculation.In order "to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding before it," the DAR is mandated "to adopt a
uniform rule of procedure" (Second par.,Section 50, RA. No. 6657),
which is, at present, the DARAB Revised Rules. The Rules
were promulgated on December 26, 1988.
The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13
of E.O. No. 129-A authorizes theDARAB to delegate its powers and
functions to the regional office in accordance with the rulesand
regulations promulgated by the Board. The authority purportedly
provides additional justification for the Regional Office's
jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the
DARAB,through its Revised Rules, has delegated such powers and
functions to the RARADs and thePARADs, which, under Section 3 of the
Rules, "are deemed to form part of the DAR RegionalOffice where they
are stationed."
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative
agencies, is granted with afusion of governmental powers, in this case, a
commingling of the quasi-judicial and theexecutive. The growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws have impelled thisconstantly growing tendency toward such
delegation.

In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a

duplication of functions between agencies. Duplication results in
confusion between the various agencies upon whomthese
powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are supposed to
serve. It divides theagencies' resources and prevents them from
devoting their energy to similarly important tasks.
The intention to avoid this very situation is evident in the various laws'
distinct delineation of thefunctions of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and
the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, theCourt must reject the theory of
concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We holdthat
the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case

G.R. No. 142501

December 7, 2001

LEONARDA
L.
MONSANTO,
petitioner,
vs.
JESUS AND TERESITA ZERNA AND COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The filing of a criminal action carries with it the civil liability

arising from the offense. However, the trial court cannot
adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence and
powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon
the criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil
awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties
because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the January 12, 2000 Decision1 and the March
16, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 55440. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision
reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for lack of jurisdiction,
the assailed order of September 4, 1996 is hereby
RECALLED, SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL and VOID. The
parties, if they so desire, should refer their dispute before
the agrarian authorities. No pronouncement as to costs."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna (herein private respondents)
were charged with qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 5896,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte,
Branch 6. This case was later re-raffled and transferred to

Branch 4 of the same judicial region. The Information against

private respondents was amended on June 8, 1995. It is
reproduced hereunder:
"That on or about February 25, 1995, up to the following
month of March, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, being then the overseers of
some banana plants on the land owned by one Leonarda
Monsanto and principally devoted to coconut trees, and
having access to said land as such, with grave abuse of
confidence reposed [i]n them by the said owner, with
intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal, harvest and carry away coconuts
from the premises of the said plantation, which the said
accused then processed into copra with a total value of
P6,162.50, belonging to said Leonarda Monsanto, without
her consent and against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of said Leonarda Monsanto in the aforesaid sum
of P6,162.50, Philippine Currency."5
After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge
on July 24, 1996. It held as follows:
"x x x [T]he harvest in the land by the [accused] was done,
not for the purpose of stealing the coconuts or the copra,
but more to confirm their claim that they are tenants of
the land. In fact the lack of intent to gain is shown by the
fact that they immediately deposited the proceeds with

the barangay captain and did not even claim a share [in]
the proceeds of the copra.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the

[accused] are not tenants of the land and the cash deposit
[from] the proceeds of the copra with the barangay
captain belongs to the private complainant, Leonarda
Monsanto. However, considering the lack of intent of the
[accused] to gain, no criminal liability for theft has been
committed by them."6
It then disposed of the case in the following manner:
"WHEREFORE, the criminal case for qualified theft against
the [accused] Jesus Zerna and Teresita Zerna is hereby
ordered dismissed and their bail bond cancelled. The
barangay captain of Buru-un, Iligan City is hereby ordered
to deliver the amount of P5,162.50, representing the
proceeds [from the] copra sold by the [accused] to the
private complainant, Leonarda Monsanto."7
The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information
was P6,262.50. However, the awarded amount was only
P5,162.50 which was deposited by private respondents with
the barangay secretary of Buru-un8 on March 2, 1995, after
deducting P340 (harvesting cost) and P760 (labor cost). Thus,
petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration praying
that the remaining sum of P1,100 be returned to her.9

In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the

Motion and ordered private respondents to return the amount
of P1,100.10 It ruled thus:
"In his motion for reconsideration, the private prosecutor
prays that with respect to the civil aspect of the case, the
accused be made to return the amount of P1,100.00 which
they appropriated for themselves from the gross proceeds
of the stolen property.
"Opposing the said motion, counsel for the accused avers
that the amount P1,100.00 was due to the accused as
compensation for their labor and equity demands that
they [be] entitled to it.
"The Court has already adjudged that the accused are not
guilty of theft and therefore, they cannot be considered to
have stolen the coconuts. But the motion has raised
another issue.
"Are the accused entitled to the amount of P1,100.00 as
compensation for labor in harvesting the coconuts and
processing these into copra?
"The accused plead equity in their favor since [there]
appears to be no law applicable to the incident in
question. However, for equity to apply, good faith must
exist.
"From the findings of this Court, the harvesting of the
coconuts and processing of the same into copra were not

with the consent of the private complainant. In fact, if the

proper criminal charge were made, which could be unjust
vexation, the accused could have been convicted as their
acts certainly vexed the private complainant by their
harvesting the coconuts and selling the copra. Therefore,
without good faith, since the Court found that they did the
acts complained of in an attempt to confirm their tenancy
claim, equity was wanting.
"The accused could not be entitled to compensation for
their labor done without the consent of the private
complainant since, obviously, there was no contract of
labor between them for the harvesting of the coconuts
and processing of these into copra.
"Even our laws on quasi-contracts do not allow
compensation [for] the accused.
"Without equity or any law in their favor, the accused are
therefore not entitled to compensation for their vexatious
acts."11
After a review of the records and the pleadings of the parties,
the CA, on appeal, ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to order private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of
P1,100. Because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy
relationship, the matter fell within the primary and exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). It added that inasmuch as the RTC
had no jurisdiction to rule on the civil aspect of the case ergo, it

had no appellate authority over the matter under a writ of

error.
The appellate court thus "recalled, set aside and declared null
and void" the September 6, 1996 RTC Order requiring the
return of the P1,100 to petitioner.
Hence, this Petition.12
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for
the Court's consideration:
I
"Is the Regional Trial Court automatically divested of
jurisdiction over a criminal case where an agrarian issue is
argued as a defense, no matter how flimsy?
II
"Does the Court of Appeals have any competence to
review an RTC Decision which ha[s] become FINAL as not
appealed from, on the basis of a Notice of Appeal which
was SPECIFICALLY and simply directed against an
adscititious ORDER issued subsequent to that Decision?"13
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.

First
DARAB Jurisdiction

Issue:

Petitioner claims that the RTC was divested of its criminal

jurisdiction when the CA annulled and set aside the September
4, 1996 Order. We disagree.
A careful review of the CA Decision shows that it merely set
aside the September 4, 1996 RTC Order directing private
respondents to pay P1,100 to petitioner. It did not annul the
July 24, 1996 RTC Decision acquitting private respondents of
qualified theft. Being an acquittal, the judgment became "final
immediately after promulgation and cannot be recalled for
correction or amendment."14
The trial court considered the return of the P1,100 as part of
the civil aspect of the criminal case. As petitioner did not
consent to the harvesting of the coconuts and the processing of
the same into copra, then there was no basis to award the
amount to private respondents. In the words of the trial court,
"[w]ithout equity or any law in their favor, the accused are
therefore not entitled to compensation for their vexatious
acts."15
But what is the RTC's basis for ordering the return of P1,100
after it had already acquitted private respondents of qualified
theft? Does the amount constitute civil liability? Let us clarify.
Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2)
breach of contract or (3) tortious act. The first is governed by

the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by the Civil
Code.16
In the case at bar, there is no question that the RTC had
criminal jurisdiction to try private respondents for the crime of
qualified theft. In the normal course, it had authority to
determine whether they had committed the crime charged and
to adjudge the corresponding penalty and civil liability arising
therefrom.
On September 4, 1996, the RTC issued an Order requiring
private respondents to return the P1,100 to petitioner on the
ground that petitioner had not consented to the harvesting of
the coconuts or to their conversion into copra. Such order
appears inconsistent with the trial court's finding that private
respondents had not committed the crime of qualified theft. In
People v. Pantig,17 the Court held that where there is no crime
committed, there can be no civil liability that can arise from the
criminal action or as a consequence thereof, as follows:
"Where the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as [a] consequence of the
criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him. The liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount so received by him
may not be enforced in the criminal case but in a civil
action for the recovery of the said amount."

The foregoing ruling has been modified by the current Rules.

Thus, paragraph 2 of Section 2, Rule 120 of the present Rules of
Court provides that "[i]n case the judgment is of acquittal, it
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."
In the present set of facts, however, the RTC did not have
jurisdiction to make a finding on the civil liability of the accused
who were acquitted.
Specifically, we believe that the resolution of the issue of who is
entitled to the P1,100 falls squarely within the jurisdiction of
the DARAB. EO 22918 vested the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Department of Agriculture (DA).
Section 13 of EO 129-A,19 on the other hand, created the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
which was specifically tasked with the power and the function
to decide agrarian reform cases. The DARAB, under Section 1,
paragraph (a), Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure,
exercises primary jurisdiction -- both original and appellate -- to

determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,

controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations. The provision reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.
The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have
primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall
extend over but not [be] limited to the following:
'a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian
laws.'"
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements -- whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to agriculture,
including (1) disputes concerning farm workers' associations; or
(2) representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,

changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such

tenurial arrangement.20
In Estates Development Corporation v. CA,21 the essential
elements of a tenancy relationship were listed in this wise:
"For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must
exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order
for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it
would be essential to establish all its indispensable
elements to wit: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee 2) subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee and 6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee."
Petitioner claims that private respondents were not her
tenants, and that they raised the defense of tenancy in the
criminal case merely to escape prosecution for qualified theft.
On the other hand, private respondents assert that they were
petitioner's tenants, as shown by the evidence adduced by the
parties before the RTC.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that
an agrarian dispute existed between the parties. First, the
subject of the dispute between them was the taking of

coconuts from the property owned by petitioner. Second,

private respondents were the overseers of the property at the
time of the taking of the coconuts, as can be gleaned from the
Kasabutan (or Agreement) executed between them on
November 25, 1991, which reads thus:
"I, MRS. LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, am the owner of that
land located at Tonggo, Mimbalot, Buru-un, Iligan City.
This JESUS [Z]ERNA, whose wife is TERESITA ZERNA, had
requested that he be allowed to oversee Mrs. Monsanto's
Banana plants under the agreement that he (Jesus Zerna)
would be paid for his labor for each banana plant cut in
Tonggo."
"When I (Jesus Zerna) no longer want to oversee or wish
to stop overseeing, Mrs. Leonarda Monsanto cannot force
me to continue in the same way that I cannot force Mrs.
Monsanto to hire me if my services are no longer
needed."22
Third, petitioner allowed private respondents to plant coconut,
coffee, jackfruit and cacao as shown by the said Agreement,
pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:
"And if I (Jesus Zerna) can plant coconut trees [o]n that
land, I will be paid for them according to their ages. I
(Jesus Zerna) am also allowed to plant coffee, jackfruit and
cacao, under the same agreement."23
Finally, a tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as
regards the harvesting of the agricultural products, as shown by

the several remittances made by private respondents to

petitioner. These are substantiated by receipts.24
A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in
writing, expressly or impliedly.25 In the present case,
undisputed by petitioner is the existence of the Kasabutan,
which contradicts her contention that private respondents
were mere overseers. In any event, their "being overseers does
not foreclose their being also tenants," as held in Rupa v. Court
of Appeals.26 Evidently, the resolution of the agrarian dispute
between the parties is a matter beyond the legal competence
of regular courts.
To repeat, petitioner is claiming the questioned amount of
P1,100 as the balance of the proceeds from the copra sale,
which the RTC awarded her. Private respondents contend that
this P1,100 is their compensation, pursuant to their tenurial
arrangement with her. Since this amount is inextricably
intertwined with the resolution of the agrarian dispute
between them, we believe that the Court of Appeals did not
commit any reversible error in holding that it was DARAB that
had jurisdiction to pass upon this civil matter.
Second
Lack of Jurisdiction Not Waived

Issue:

Petitioner argues that jurisdiction was not raised as an issue in

the appeal ergo, the CA should not have ruled on it.
We disagree. As a general rule, an appeal is limited to a review
of the specific legal issues raised in the petition by the parties.

However, even if not raised, an error in jurisdiction may be

taken up.27 Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings -- even on appeal.28 In
Del Rosario v. Mendoza,29 we have ruled as follows:
"Indeed there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no
question may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be considered by the
reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage."
The reason is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by law, not by the courts or the parties themselves.
"Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of
this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the
courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone
to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in
character. x x x."30
In the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the
criminal case against private respondents; however, it acted
beyond its jurisdiction when it effectively ruled on the
agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. Private
respondents had raised before it the issue of tenancy by way of
defense, and apparently interwoven with the agrarian dispute,
were the acts complained of by petitioner: the harvesting of the
coconuts, their conversion into copra and, later, the sale
thereof. Thus, the RTC should have confined itself to the
determination of whether private respondents were guilty of

qualified theft, instead of automatically awarding the proceeds

of the copra sale to petitioner. Such matter, being an offshoot
of the agrarian dispute between the parties, is cognizable
exclusively by the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Leonarda L. Monsanto vs. Jesus and Teresita Zerna and the
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142501 (December 7, 2001)
Held:
The filing of a criminal case carries with it the civil liability arising from the
offense. However,the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are
beyond its competence and powers. Thus,while a court may have
authority to pass upon the criminal liability of the accused, it cannot
makeany civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the
parties because this matter is beyondits jurisdiction.
In the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the criminal case
against privaterespondents; however, it acted beyond its jurisdiction
when it effectively ruled on the agriculturaltenancy relationship
between the parties. Private respondents had raised before it the issue
of tenancy by way of defense, and apparently interwoven with the
agrarian dispute, were the actscomplained of by petitioner: the

harvesting of the coconuts, their conversion into copra and, later,the

sale thereof. Thus, the RTC should have confined itself to the
determination of whether private respondents were guilty of
qualified theft, instead of automatically awarding the
proceedsof the copra sale to petitioner. Such matter, being an offshoot
of the agrarian dispute between the parties, is cognizable
exclusively by the DARAB