Accepting Testimony

Author(s): Matthew Weiner

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 256-264
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Vol.53,No.211
ThePhilosophical
Quarterly,
ISSNoo31-8o94

2003
April

DISCUSSIONS

ACCEPTING TESTIMONY
BY MATTHEW WEINER

I defend
theacceptance
arejustj#ed
in accepting
principle
for testimony
(APT), thathearers
unless
havepositive
evidence
itsreliability,
local
Elizabeth
Fricker's
testimony
they
against
against
view.Localreductionism,
thathearers
needevidence
thedoctrine
thata particular
reductionist
piece
is reliable
aretobejustified
in believing
be
it,mustonpainofscepticism
oftestimony
if they
that
tosometestimony;
I argue
that(APT)
complemented
bya principle
grants
default
justification
I consider
is theprinciple
twoalternative
weaker
as complements
to local
required.
principles
one
results
unless
weaccept
is
reductionism;
(APT)as well,whiletheother
yieldscounter-intuitive
tooweaktoenable
localreductionism
toavoidscepticism.
I. Introduction
as a source
Recentlymanyphilosophershave stressedthe importanceof testimony
of our knowledge.Duringa day in a strangecity,we relyon whatwe are told and
have been told forall mannerof information,
even forthe knowledgeof what city
we are in.' As Sosa says,'we relyon testimony
forour graspof history,
geography,
science and more'.2 If we were not generallyjustifiedin acceptingthe word of
accountof testimony
others,we would knowverylittle.To avoid this,a satisfactory
mustconformto the'non-sceptical
constraint':
NSC. Testimonyoftenjustifiespeople in beliefswhichtheycannotconfirmat first
hand, includingbeliefsabout the (near or distant)past, beliefsabout places
alia.3
theyhave nevervisited,and beliefsabout science,inter
We mustask,then,whatconsequences(NSC) has fortheepistemology
oftestimony.
ElizabethFrickerhas argued fora 'local reductionist'
view of testimony,
which
disclaimsthe need to findevidenceforthe generalreliability
of testimony,
but emof any particular
phasizesthe need to examinetheevidenceforthe trustworthiness
I See C.AJ.Coady,Testimony:
a Philosophical
Study
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,1992),pp. 6-7.

2 E.

and Coherence',
in B.K. MatilalandA. Chakrabarti
Sosa,'Testimony
(eds),Knowing
Words
Kluwer,1994),PP-59-67,atp. 59from
(Dordrecht:
3 (NSC) is muchlikeChristopher
Insole's'common
senserestraint':
seehis'SeeingOffthe
Local Threatto Irreducible
ThePhilosophical
Knowledge
byTestimony',
Quarter~y,
50 (2000),
ofthedialectic
ingeneral
owesmuchtoInsole's.
pp.44-56,atp. 44; myexposition
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ACCEPTINGTESTIMONY

257

piece of testimonythat we accept. In particular,Frickerdenies that we should

the benefitof the doubt: thereare manykindsof testimony
alwaysgive testimony
thatwe shouldnot believeunlesswe have some specificevidencethatsupportsits
Thus she denies the 'acceptanceprinciplefortestimony'(derived
trustworthiness.
fromBurge):
APT. We arejustifiedin acceptinganythingthatwe are toldunlessthereis positive
evidenceagainstdoingso.4
I shall argue thatlocal reductionism
without(APT) willbe unable to satisfy(NSC).
To avoid widespreadscepticismabout testimony,
we mustgrantdefaultjustification
to all testimony.
2. Localandglobalreductionism
As a preliminary,
I should say somethingabout the idea of defaultjustification.
I
shall definea default
as a justification
forbeliefthatdoes not depend on
justification
otherbeliefsbased ultimately
on the believer'spast or currentexperiences.Experiences which ground beliefsprovidinga justificationover and above any default
evidence
for that projustificationfor believingsome propositionprovidepositive
position.The question is when, if ever, someone has a defaultjustificationfor
believingtestimony.
Hume's accountoftheepistemology
oftestimony
grantsit no defaultjustification
whatsoever.On his account, the justificationswe gain from testimonycan be
reduced to justifications
gained fromperception,memoryand reason. We believe
because of 'our observationof theveracityofhumantestimony',
whichis
testimony
'discoveredby experience'.5
In my terms,the Humean view is that our experience
is reliable.This evidenceitselfcannotrely
givesus positiveevidencethattestimony
on whatwe have been told,since otherwisewe would not be justifiedin accepting
theevidenceuntilwe had establishedsomejustification
foracceptingthetestimony.
The Humean view thusrequireswhat Frickercalls a 'global' reduction,which
'would requirethata hearerhave evidencethatmostofwhatshehaseverlearnt
through
is true,
wherethisevidencedoes notin any way reston knowledgeacquired
testimony
Frickercallsthisviewoftestimony
by herthroughtestimony'.6
globalreductionism:
GR.

To be justifiedin believingmuch of what I am told, I musthave positive

evidenceof the truthof mostof what I have been told,wherethisevidence
reliesonlyon non-testimonial
justifications.7

Fricker,however,denies that global reductionis necessaryto justifyrelianceon

Ratherthan treatingall testimony
at once, we can focuson a particular
testimony.
4This is a specialcase ofBurge'soriginal
whichis notrestricted
to
acceptance
principle,
seehis'Content
102 (1993),
testimony:
Preservation',
Review,
Philosophical
pp.457-88,atp. 467.
5 Hume,Enquiries
HumanUnderstanding
andConcerning
thePrinciples
ed.
Concerning
ofMorals,
P.H. Nidditch
UP, 1975),?X,p. 88.
(Oxford
6 E.
inMatilalandChakrabarti,
Fricker,
'Against
Gullibility',
pp. 125-61,atp. 134andthenexttwointhefirst
7 I havecastthisprinciple
personin ordertoavoidconflating
evidence
withevidence
as Humeseems
gathered
byan individual
gathered
bythecommunity,
to:seeCoady,Testimony,
pp.8o-i.
Quarterly,
2003
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MATTHEWWEINER

258

is provided(p. 133) 'when a

What Frickercalls a localreduction
piece of testimony.
hearer has evidence that the particular
speaker in questionis to be trustedwith
utterance,withoutassumingthisveryfact'.Local reductionism
respectto her current
forrelyingon any particularpiece of
requiresa local reductionas a justification
testimony:
LR.

To be justifiedin believinga particularthingthatI have been told,I must

of thatspeakerwithrespectto thatpiece of
have evidenceof the reliability
wherethisevidencedoes notrelyon thattestimony.
testimony,

In (LR), partofthehearer'sevidenceforthecurrentutterance'strustworthiness
may
come fromtestimony
otherthanthecurrentutterance.Only relianceon thecurrent
utteranceis excluded.
It is debatable whetherlocal reductionismis compatiblewith grantingdefault
to any testimony.
Fricker,as I shall show,thinksthatsome but not all
justification
us
default
but Insole has arguedthatthisis inconsistent
gives
testimony
justification,
withlocal reductionism.
Ratherthanattemptto resolvethisquestion,I shallmodify
local reductionism
to makeroomexplicitly
fordefaultjustification:
LR*. To be justifiedin believinga particularthingthatI have been told,I must
eitherhave defaultjustification
forbelievingthatthe testimony
is reliable,or
have positive
evidence of the reliabilityof that speakerwith respectto that
wherethisevidencedoes notrelyon thattestimony.
piece oftestimony,
To apply (LR*) we need a principlethatstateswhen testimony
givesdefaultjustification.(APT) is one such principle,givingdefaultjustificationto all testimony;
otherprinciplescould give defaultjustification
to some subsetof testimony,
or to
none at all. (LR*) with(APT) is arguablynot locallyreductionist
at all, since the
clause requiringa local reductionis never invoked.It does, however,share with
local reductionism
the characteristic
thatourjustification
forbelievinga particular
whenthereis any
piece oftestimony
dependson the evidencethatit is trustworthy,
positiveevidenceforor againstitstrustworthiness.
(GR) can be dismissedquickly:it is incompatiblewith(NSC). For both(GR) and
(NSC) to hold,individualhearerswould have to be able to gatherpositiveevidence
forthe generalreliability
of testimony,
whichwould requireconfirming
the truth,
withoutrelyingon any testimony,
of manyof the thingsthattheyhave been told.
This is implausible;as Coady pointsout (p. 82), 'it seems absurd to suggestthat,
that [(GR)]
individually,we have done anythinglike the amount of field-work
even in the first-hand
observationsthatwe use to
requires'.We relyon testimony
of our informants.
For instance,ifAlice tellsme
gatherevidenceforthe reliability
that she will mail a letter,I may wish to verifythistestimonyas evidenceof her
veracity,by watchingherdropan envelopeintoa certainblue metalcontainer.But,
watchingthis,I onlyknowthatI have seen Alice mail a letterbecause I have been
told thatsimilarcontainersare mailboxesor thatpeople have receivedlettersI put
in them.If I gave up all beliefsgained throughtestimony,
I could nevergatherthe
evidencethatallowed me to get themback. (GR) thusviolates(NSC), thatwe are
justifiedin believinga wide rangeoftestimony.
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ACCEPTINGTESTIMONY

259

This argumentagainst(GR), however,does not immediatelytell against(LR*),

even a version of (LR*) on which no testimonyprovides defaultjustification.
forbelievingtestimony
Accordingto thisversionof local reductionism,
justification
for
evidence
the
but I may be able to
trustworthiness,
requirespositive
testimony's
to providethe evidenceforthe trustworthiness
of thistestirelyon othertestimony
itselfis explicitly
forbidden.Thus ifAlice has
mony.Only relianceon thistestimony
said she willmail a letter,I mighttryto obtainevidenceofherveracitybywatching
her do so. My knowledgethatshe is mailinga letterwill depend on testimony,
for
instance,about whatmailboxeslooklike,butthisneed notbe Alice'sown testimony.
Thus I shall have obtainednon-circularevidenceforher veracity,and therebyfor
the truthof her futuretestimony.So long as a local reductionof one piece of
can relyon othertestimony
in thisand similarways,then(LR*) willnot
testimony
an
in orderto satisfy
amount
of
field-work
require impossible
(NSC).
We mustask, then,when a local reductionof testimony
can relyon othertesticannot
mony.In thenextsectionI shallarguethat(LR*) withno defaultjustification
oftenenoughto salvage(NSC).
relyon testimony
somedefaultjustification
3. Theneedfor
For beliefsbased on past testimony
to be availableforuse in a local reduction,those
beliefsmust themselvesbe justified.Accordingto (LR*), this requires positive
evidenceforthe trustworthiness
of the past testimony,
unlessthattestimony
gives
defaultjustification.
As Leslie Stevensonpointsout, our relianceon testimony
can
involve'a regressofdependence,justifying
A's testimony,
or thatofpeople likeA, or
about topicslikep, by appeal to thetestimony
ofB, or ofpeople ofa kind
testimony
whichB exemplifies,
or about topicslike q'.8 If no testimony
givesdefaultjustificato
tion,thenwe need positiveevidencein orderto accept each piece of testimony
which we might appeal, and the regresscan only end with testimonywhose
can be establishedwithoutappeal to anyothertestimony.
reliability
of thisregress-stopping
would requireposiEstablishingthe reliability
testimony
tive evidence for its trustworthiness
which does not presupposethe reliabilityof
at all. Anyothertestimony
thathad been reducedto thistestimony
would
testimony
in turn be supportedby this non-testimonial
positiveevidence. Only testimony
evidencein thisway would be acceptable,according
supportedby non-testimonial
to (LR*), withoutdefaultjustification;
would fallvictimto the
any othertestimony
Since (NSC) requiresthatwe shouldbe justifiedin accepting
regressofjustifications.
testimonyon a wide range of subjects,to satisfy(NSC) we would have to have
evidencein supportof testimony
on a wide rangeoftopics.
positivenon-testimonial
This, however,would amountto a global reduction;theargumentagainst(GR) has
shownthatwe cannotgatherpositivenon-testimonial
evidencein supportofenough
to satisfy
So
without
default
testimony
(NSC).
(LR*)
justification
collapsesinto(GR).
Bothare incompatiblewith(NSC): theyexcludetoo manytestimonial
justifications.
To avoid thiscollapseinto(GR), we mustsupplement(LR*) withsome principle
which testimonygives defaultjustification.
This privilegedtestimony
determining
8 L.F.

Stevenson,'WhyBelieveWhat People Say?', Synthese,

94 (1993),PP. 429-51,at p. 437.

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MATTHEWWEINER

260

can stoptheregressofdependence:testimony
believedon a defaultjustification
can
evidence
a
local
of
other
for
reduction
providepositive
testimony.
non-privileged
mosttestimony
Thus theargumentthatitis impossibleto confirm
withoutappealing
will not bear on (LR*), when it is combinedwith a principle
to othertestimony
(thoughI shallshowin ?5 thatsimilarargumentsrefute
grantingdefaultjustification
weak
default
excessively
justification
principles).
I shallargue that(APT) is the necessarydefaultjustification
principle,so thatwe
arejustifiedin believinganything
we are told,unlessthereis positiveevidenceagainst
the testimony'strustworthiness.
(APT) gives defaultjustificationto all testimony
ratherthan a proper subset. Weaker principleswhich privilegeproper subsets,
I claim, face one of two problems.The firstproblemoccurs when acceptingthe
weakerprinciplebut rejecting(APT) yieldsimplausibleresultsconcerningwhether
certainbeliefsarejustified.The secondproblemoccurswhentheweakerprincipleis
too weak to allow (LR) and (NSC) to be reconciled.
weakerprinciplesimplicitin Fricker's
I shalldefend(APT) againsttwoalternative
analysis;each weakerprinciplefacesone ofthesetwoproblems.The first
principleis
thatwe have defaultjustification
forbelievingwhatwe are toldbeforewe
essentially
reach fullmaturity,
but not afterwards.
This, I argue in ?4, yieldscounter-intuitive
resultsconcerningtestimonial
The second principleis essentiallythat
justification.
everyoneis competentto formaccurate beliefsconcerningcertain topics, and
that we have defaultjustificationforbelievingtestimonyon those topics.This, I
arguein ?5,is too weakto reconcile(LR*) with(NSC).
4. Developmental
testimony
Frickerpointsout thatwhetherthisis justifiedor not, everyoneacceptstestimony
at an earlyage. It is duringthis'developmentalphase' that 'a person
uncritically
comes to know the world-picture
of common sense,includingthe common sense
conceptionof the link of testimonyitself'.9Once we have acquired the common
sense world-picture,
we enterthe maturephase, in which'the natureof testimony,
as a linkwhich[commonsense]reveals,entailsthatour beliefin whatotherstellus
shouldalwaysbe governedby our monitoring
of themfortrustworthiness'
(p. 403).
For Fricker,the common sense world-picture
provides the backgroundagainst
whichwe learn new things,but it is commonsense not to accept whatwe are told
unlessour monitoring
is trustworthy.
Yet
yieldspositiveevidencethatour informant
the commonsenseworld-picture
includesmanythingsthatwe weretoldduringthe
developmentalphase and accepted withoutrequiringpositiveevidence.So we are
if we werejustifiedin
onlyjustifiedin acceptingthe common sense world-picture
simpleacceptanceofdevelopmental-phase
testimony.
This suggeststhe'acceptanceprinciplefordevelopmentaltestimony':
APDT. We arejustifiedin acceptingsomethingthatwe are toldduringour developmentalphase,unlessthereis positiveevidenceagainstdoingso.
This principlejustifiesus in acceptingthecommonsenseworld-picture,
because the
9 Fricker,
Reductionism
and Anti-Reductionism
in theEpistemo'Tellingand Trusting:
logyofTestimony',Mind,o104(1995),PP- 393-411,at p. 402.
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ACCEPTINGTESTIMONY

26I

pieces ofthatpictureare acquiredby acceptingtestimony

duringthedevelopmental
the
of
local
reductions
of testimony
On
therefore,
may end
phase.
(APDT),
regress
at a piece of the common sense world-picture,
whichwe are justifiedin accepting
withoutpositiveevidence.So (LR*) complementedby (APDT) may allow us to gain
testimonial
on thewide rangeof topicsrequiredby (NSC); at least,the
justification
I
have
of global reductiondoes not show
argument
presentedagainstthepossibility
thatwe cannotreducemosttestimony
to thecommonsenseworld-picture.
The objectionto (APDT) is that it privilegestestimonyheard in the developmentalphase over testimony
heard in thematurephase,whereasthereis no reason
forthis.If (APDT) holdsbut (APT) does not,thentestimony
heard in the developmentalphase providesjustification
forbeliefin theabsenceofpositiveevidenceofits
but testimony
heardin thematurephase providesno justification
without
reliability,
thispositiveevidence.This is the wrongway round.Developinghearersare surely
worsejudges of testimony
thanmaturehearers.In the developmentalphase we are
not yet familiarwiththe conditionsunderwhichpeople lie or make mistakes;we
and
begin to learn these thingsas we adopt the common sense world-picture,
we shalllearnmorewithmatureexperience.So developingthinkers
are morelikely
to neglectsomethingthatfora maturethinkerwould be evidenceof testimony's
and thejustification
thattheyget fromunsupportedtestimony
should
unreliability,
be seen as weakerthanthejustification
thatmaturethinkers
get fromunsupported
testimony.
Two maturethinkers,
Alice and Sarah, are each wonderingwhat the yellow
boxes on streetcornersdo. Each was once toldthatthe boxes controltraffic
lights,
and each has no otherevidenceconcerningthe matteror concerningthe reliability
of that testimony.
Alice, however,was told thisin her developmentalphase, and
Sarah was toldit in hermaturephase. SurelySarah's entitlement
to beliefis at least
as strongas Alice's. Afterall, when Sarah was told,she had alreadymasteredthe
common sense criteriaforwhen testimonyis not to be believed; thatshe has no
evidence againstthe testimony'sreliabilitymeans that the testimonydid not fail
thesecriteria.When Alice was toldwhattheboxes do, she had notyetmasteredthe
commonsensecriteriaforacceptingtestimony;
she mighthave failedto detectsome
of
or
that
would
have servedas evidenceagainstthe
signs insincerity incompetence
had she been moremature.To putthisanotherway,Alice acceptedwhat
testimony,
she was toldat an age whenshe did notfindanything
fishyabout Santa Claus. Yet if
we accept (APDT) and deny the stronger(APT), we are leftwith the counterintuitive
resultthatAlice isjustifiedin believingwhatshe was toldand Sarah is not.
I concludethat,ifwe accept (APDT), we shouldalso accept the stronger(APT).
Otherwisetestimonyheard in the developmentalphase will be privilegedover
heard in the maturephase, thoughthereis no reason to believeit more
testimony
reliable.
5. Mundane
testimony
alike in an implausibleway. Fricker(p. 407)
(APT) may seem to treatall testimony
pointsout that'somepeople or typesofpeople on some topicsare reliable,otherson
othersaren't'.She suggeststhatwe may generallymake thedefaultassumptionthat
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MATTHEWWEINER

262

reflectsthe teller'sbeliefs,but thatwe may make the defaultassumption

testimony
thatthosebeliefsare correct'withrespectto a subclassoftellingsonly,vizthosewith
subjectmattersforwhich common sense psychologicalknowledgelicensesone to
expect the speaker to be competentabout them: such as her name, where she
whatis in clear view in frontof her,and so forth'
lives,whatshe had forbreakfast,
take
I
it,
(p. 405).
particularly
giventhe listof examples,thatFrickermeans to pick
out subjectmattersabout whichall speakersmay be expectedto be competent,in
the absence of evidenceto the contrary.I shall call thesesubjectmattersmundane
topics;
theylargelycomprisethingsthatare readilyavailable to speakers'sensesand
memory,as wellas things(suchas one's date ofbirth)thatalmosteveryoneis toldby
someonewho saw or rememberedit.
Fricker'saccount of defaultassumptionssuggeststhe acceptance principlefor
mundanetestimony:
APMT. We are justifiedin acceptingsomethingthat we are told concerninga
mundanetopicunlessthereis positiveevidenceagainstdoingso.'0
This principle,I shall argue, is too weak to reconcile (LR*) with (NSC). The
problemis that too few topics of testimonyare mundane. If we requirepositive
evidencetojustifybelievingtestimony
on anynon-mundanetopic,we shallneverbe
on thewiderangeoftopicsrequiredby (NSC).
justifiedin believingtestimony
An example is knowledgeof historicalhappeningsbeyond living memory.
Common sense does not tellus thateveryoneis competentconcerningany but the
mostfamoushistoricalhappenings,so historyis not a mundanetopic.Most of our
historicalbeliefscome fromtestimonysomehow;what licensesus to accept this
licensethistestimony's
testimony?
(APMT) willnotdirectly
acceptance.Ifwe accept
will
(APMT) but not (APT), a local reductionof a piece of historicaltestimony
require positive evidence of the testimony'sreliabilitythat depends only on
testimony
acceptedthrough(APMT) and on our own observation,
memoryand induction.I shallshowthatthoughthismaybe practicalforshortchainsoftestimony,
it will be undulyburdensomeforthe lengthychains thatstretchback to historical
events.
(APMT) would sometimesallow us to gain justificationfor accepting nonmundane testimony
by acceptingtestimonyon a mundane topic that impliesthe
speaker'scompetenceconcerningthenon-mundanetopic.SupposeJanettellsMary
thatthe Pittsburgh
Pirateswon today'sbaseball game. This is not a mundanetopic,
since common sense does not tell Mary thateveryoneknowswhetherthe Pirates
won today.Thus (APMT) does notjustifyMary in acceptingthistestimony
without
furthersupport.Suppose further,
however,thatJanet says that she attendedthe
game. This is mundane,since commonsense tellsMary thatJanetknowswhether
she attendeda baseball game today; so by (APMT) Mary is justifiedin believing
thatJanet attendedthe game. This in turnprovidesevidence thatJanet knows
whetherthe Pirateswon, whichjustifiesMary in acceptingJanet's originaltestimonythattheydid win.
10(APMT)is muchliketheprinciple
(TCP) proposedby Stevenson,
'WhyBelieveWhat
like(NSC).
PeopleSay?',p. 442,whodoesnotclaimthatityieldsanything
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ACCEPTINGTESTIMONY

263

As a chainoftestimony
proceeds,however,theevidencethatmustbe citedgrows
unwieldy.Suppose Mary tellsBarbara thatthe Pirateswon today. If
increasingly
it is common
adds
that
Mary
Janet told her so, thiswill be mundane testimony;
sense that Mary knows whetherJanet told her something.So (APMT) justifies
Barbara in believingthatJanettoldMary thatthe Pirateswon. The problemis that
is reliable.For her to
so farBarbara has no positiveevidencethatJanet'stestimony
said
that
she
attendedthegame.
must
also
tell
her
that
evidence,
thatJanet
Mary
get
(APMT) justifiesBarbara in believingthatJanet said this,since whatJanet told
Mary is mundane for Mary; given this, (APMT) justifiesthe belief thatJanet
attendedthe game,sincewhethershe attendedthe game is mundaneforJanet;this
beliefin turnprovidespositiveevidenceforthe reliability
ofJanet'sreporton the
for
outcomeof the game. If Barbara thenwishesto give anyone else justification
believingthatthe Pirateswon, she mustsay thatMary said thatJanetsaid thatthe
Pirateswon,and also thatMarysaid thatJanetsaid thatshe had attendedthegame.
This recapitulation
ofthewholechain oftestimony
willquicklybecome impractical,
fora chainbeginningwithan eyewitness
to a historicalevent.
particularly
Anotherstrategy
forobtainingpositiveevidencefora teller'sreliability
would be
to verifyothertestimony
thatthecurrenttestiby thattellerand to inferinductively
mony was reliable. This strategy,however,faces a dilemma. Either the other
testimonythatwe verifyis mundane or it is not. VerifyingMary's testimonyon
mundane topicswill not provide evidence for her reliabilityon a non-mundane
topic. It will only reinforcewhat commonsense tellsus, thatshe is competenton
mundanetopics(and sincere).Evidenceofherreliability
on non-mundanetopics,by
mustgo beyondthesedeliverancesofcommonsense.On theotherhand,
definition,
ifwe seek to verifyMary's testimony
on non-mundanetopics,we face theproblem
ofhow to do so. My discussionofhistoricaltestimony
has shownhow difficult
it is to
on a non-mundanetopicifthehearercan relyon testimony
verify
testimony
onlyas
what
permitted
by (APMT). The fewcases in whichthehearermaybe able to verify
evidencefor
Mary has said concerningnon-mundanetopicswillnot yieldsufficient
hergeneralreliability
on non-mundanetopics.
(APMT) alone, then,is too weak. If we restrictdefaultacceptanceto mundane
we lose testimonial
on a wide varietyof topics.(LR*) with
testimony,
justification
fails
to
it
reduces
us
to scepticismabout almostall but the
(APMT)
satisfy(NSC);
plainesteyewitness
reports.
6. Testimony
under
theacceptance
principle
To conclude,I shall show that(APT) does not face the problemsthat(APDT) and
if we have default
(APMT) face. (APMT) yieldstoo littletestimonial
justification;
justificationonly on mundane topics,we are not able to obtain testimonial
justificationon the wide range of topicsrequiredby (NSC). On (APT), we are justified
in acceptingtestimony
on any topicso long as thereis no positiveevidenceagainst
that
accepting
testimony.This will immediatelyallow us to obtain testimonial
on thewide rangeoftopicsrequiredby (NSC).
justification
of
(APT) will also allow us to obtain positiveevidencefor the trustworthiness
When one piece of testimony
confirms
what
many individualpieces of testimony.
? The EditorsofThePhilosophical
Qjarterly,
200oo3

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MATTHEW WEINER

264

thiswill
anothersays,itwillprovidepositiveevidenceforthetruthofthattestimony;
thus
for
the
truth
of the
and
for
the
evidence
reliability
speaker's
providepositive
restof that speaker'stestimony.On the otherhand, two pieces of contradictory
of the
testimonymay each provide positiveevidence against the trustworthiness
other.In thisand similarways we may obtain a wide varietyof evidenceforand
withoutdoingan impossofvariouspieces of testimony,
againstthe trustworthiness
This showshow (LR*) with(APT) can come close to a
ible amountof field-work.
can be acceptedwithout
strictlocal reductionist
view;thoughanypiece oftestimony
a local reduction,ifthereis no positiveevidenceforor againstit,the acceptanceof
most testimonywill depend on a local reductionin which we do considerthe
availablepositiveevidence.
resultsconcerning
(APDT) was rejected because it yields counter-intuitive
over maturetestimony.
(APT)
by privileging
developmentaltestimony
justification
asymmetries
equally,so it willnotyieldthe counter-intuitive
privilegesall testimony
We are
that(APDT) does. Its verysymmetry,
however,may seem counter-intuitive.
not inclinedto givecredenceto all testimony
equally,even whenwe are toldthings
by strangersand we seem to have no evidence concerningtheir testimony.A
strangerwho tellsus thetime(evenwithno watchvisible)seemsmorecrediblethan
a stranger
who givesus a stocktip.
under (APT). Experienceshould
We can, however,accountforthisasymmetry
teach us thatstocktipsare particularly
likelyto be unreliable.Eitherwe willhave
stock tips, or we will have confirmedit
confirmedthis directlyby investigating
in
what
human
indirectly
by learning
psychologyleads people to tellothersabout
This experienceprovides
financialmatterseven when theylack good information.
positiveevidenceagainsta stocktip even when we have no particularinformation
is enoughto providepositiveevidence
about the speaker;the topicof thetestimony
ofitsuntrustworthiness.
Accepting(APT), then,allows us to justifyour extensiverelianceon testimony
while avoidingcounter-intuitive
neitherof the proresultsconcerningjustification;
can do so. Under (APT), verifying
is about as burdentestimony
posed alternatives
- either
some as it oughtto be. When thereis somethingfishyabout the testimony
we have specificevidenceagainstits trustworthiness,
or generalexperiencetellsus
thatthissortoftestimony
is not reliable- thenwe need positiveevidencebeforewe
are justifiedin believingwhat we are told. When thereis nothingfishyabout the
however,we arejustifiedin givingitthebenefitofthedoubt.'"
testimony,
University
ofPittsburgh

I An earlier
versionofthispaperwasreadat theGraduateConference
in Philosophy
at
theUniversity
of Illinois,Urbana-Champaign;
MarkSargentcommented
and GaryEbbs
chaired.Thankstoaudiencemembers
forhelpful
AmandaCoenand
discussions,
particularly
BenBayer.Thanksalsoforextremely
comments
toNuelBelnapandtworeferees
for
helpful
ThePhilosophical
Quarterly.
C The EditorsofThePhilosophical
Quarterly,
2003

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