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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR
AURELIO
TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR
EULOGIO
MANANQUIL,
NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM,
BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the
Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS
WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON
OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO,
petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center
stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would reexamine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of
similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked
lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide
public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among
laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990
and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5,
1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had
been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise,
the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex
crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in
the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the
subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause
of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on
March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the
same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours
from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator
Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more
extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal
issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted
against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against
granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are
raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed
in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it
is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted
against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the
doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority,
the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are
presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long
ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the
1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which
precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a
new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the
effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the
crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which
includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which
graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in
effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than
accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful
less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either
as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt
or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That
is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling
merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial
of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information
filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in
Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged
in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty
imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity
with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime
that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct
so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been
initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to
law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the
warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining
the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art.
III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled,
however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make
such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16
Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one
hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what
some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former
and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present,
that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with
the resolution of issues properly within the original competence
of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally
applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses
(G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner
Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the
same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against
them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 9010941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim
in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody
and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of
rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies
the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by
law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country
than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is
allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless
killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much
in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to,
or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing
rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no
exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City
seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the
public peace and stymies every effort at national economic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define
and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for
alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary
investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent
irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this
Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner
could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD
No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the
petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law
while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general
law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of
People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which
were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,
June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to
reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either
as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not
be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate
prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case
and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and
has not been substantiated by evidence other than his selfserving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation is
another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior
voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extrajudicial confession was done with regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF
DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE
THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that
the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW (R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not
applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal
of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who
are still at large, in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of
Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with
unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a
police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his
death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a
policeman who was then in the performance of his official
duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of
"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its
first witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to
"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the
promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was
still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of
August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and
Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to
assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio
Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting
facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora
acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed
eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez,
acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions
to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the
two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately
proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.
Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a
series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.
Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to
save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby
BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.
Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is
dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back
up. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and
fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora
testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues because
of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he
noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him
together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of
the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin
while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have
fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious
offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counsel
did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect,
his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the
proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible
abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the
sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering
that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the
law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his
certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally
examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's
statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the
same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of
everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that
he assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to its
termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of
Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they
informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I
introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of
Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with Rodrigo
Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his
lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in
connection with that investigation which was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from
the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin
was killed notwithstanding that in response to the command of
Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles
Real and Cabildo. Without considering that the passengers in
the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired
a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor
de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian passengers,
Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father
Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself
a hero on this occasion for, against the command of the
Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing
and advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to
those who had been wounded.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes
later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief of police of
the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman
Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in
Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers
resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the
death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic
police station. When it was on Calle Real near Cabildo, in
Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had
stationed themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin
Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue
and Sison.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in
number, had in the meantime, arranged themselves in a firing
line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General
Luna opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position
the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle occupied by
Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with
companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of
the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros.
As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle,
policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon
of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately
into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt
of the accused had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All
of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum
imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292.
The court, however, distinguished fines from that of a
defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals
E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan
Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and
Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was
imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera,
Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of whom a
fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided
proportionately among the defendants.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just
been made, we are indebted in large measure to the
conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable
George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition case and of the
Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case. As
stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the
defendants, the proof is substantially the same in both cases.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as
made by the trial court in this case. The rule is again applied
that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of
the trial court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstances of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
(U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs.
Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar,
no such fact or circumstance appears.
OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the
defendants and appellants. Two the assignment of error merit
little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its
counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case),
in which it is attempted to establish that Vicente Casimiro,
Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano
Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero
Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol,
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1451 March 6, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO
TOLENTINO,Defendant-Appellant.
Rafael Palma and Gibbs and Kincaid for appellant. Office of
the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon
an information charging him with the crime of "uttering seditious
words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, committed as follows:
That said Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May,
1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter
seditious words and speeches and did write, publish, and
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
which tend to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the
execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others to
cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which
suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of
the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious
words and speeches are false and inflammatory, and tend to
incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the
government established by law within the Philippine Islands, and
tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers of the people
of said Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and
breaches of the public peace; which said false, seditious, and
inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are in Tagalog
language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino,
and which was presented by him and others on the said 14th
day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon gayon at Bukas'
(Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow). An exact translation of the
said drama is included in the information, and various parts
are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama
directly and necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and
meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community
and
the
safety
and
order
of
the
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the
time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a
spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are
satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to
incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to
conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to
be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose
of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another
in its stead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to
commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear
from the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a
purely literary and artistic production wherein the legendary
history of these Islands and their future, as imagined by the
author, are presented merely for the instruction and
entertainment
of
the
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation
of the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than
two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The
smouldering embers of a wide-spread and dangerous
insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and
there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required
the use of the armed forces of the Government for their
suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong, composed of
persons whose announced purpose and object in organizing
was the overthrow of the present Government, was actively
engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these Islands
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas,
point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them
that here in the Philippines our government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they
come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government
under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this
dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez
de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed
my own self.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter
above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local
periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto
Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or
letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken
wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a
limb of a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls
our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty)
infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to
remain loyal to the government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of
the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the
government are against the public peace, and are criminal not
only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but
because they are conducive to the destruction of the very
government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as
seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings
since early times in England. (V op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of
government, consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the
ministers of state, the courts of justice, must be recognized as
holding functions founded on sound principles and to be
penned the opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the
peace," as used in the constitutional provision relied upon,
excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses,
... " 22 He traced its historical background thus: "A brief
consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege in
England will, we think, show the source whence the expression
"treason felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn, and leave
no doubt that the words were used in England for the very
purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation of the
parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to
apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." 23 Story's treatise on
the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter being
quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the
peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend
to all indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact
attended with force and violence, as those which are only
constructive breaches of the peace of the government,
inasmuch as they violate its good order." 24
As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick
25 and Willoughby 26 could use practically identical appraising
such immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great
importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance
as arrest of the person is now almost never authorized except
for crimes which fall within the classes exempt from the
priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is aptly
summarizedby Cooley: "By common parliamentary law, the
members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil
process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable
time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from
the same." 27 A prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus
excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should be Philippine
law, if deference were to be paid to what was explicitly agreed
upon in the Constitutional Convention.
2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of the
writs of certiorari sought by petitioners considering that Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public
officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular
or special session, arrest or charge any member thereof except
in case such member has committed a crime punishable by
DECISION
September 13, 1985
G.R. No. L-37168-69 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ,
alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL
PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and
ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Ernesto P.
Pagayatan for accused-appellants.
Relova, J.:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong; Rogelio
Bugarin, alias Boy; Cresencio Siazon, alias Ising; Manuel
Puzon, alias Noling; Domingo Hernandez, alias Doming; and,
Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, were indicted for murder and
double attempted murder with direct assault in the then Court of
First Instance of Cagayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158S. Likewise, Delfino Beltran was charged with attempted murder
in Criminal Case No. 160-S.
After trial they were convicted and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused DELFINO
BELTRAN alias Minong, ROGELIO BUGARIN alias Boy,
CRESENCIO SIAZON alias Ising, MANUEL PUZON alias
Noling, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ alias Doming and CEFERINO
BELTRAN alias Ebing, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder for the death of VICENTE QUIROLGICO. There
being no mitigating circumstance, the Court has no other
alternative than to impose the maximum penalty provided for by
law. Accused Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin, Cresencio
Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo Hernandez and Ceferino
Beltran are hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of
As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both fell down. Mayor
Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino also suffered
injuries. When the firing had stopped, they decided to bring
Vicente to the hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3)
men came out of the Puzon Compound and fired at the fleeing
vehicle. They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and
Noling Puzon. Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong
Beltran and Boy Bugarin tried to give chase. After a while, all the
six men returned inside the compound.
An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente Quirolgico died.
Autopsy examination on the deceased Vicente Quirolgico
showed the following findings:
1. Gunshot wound. inlet wound at the posterior portion of right
Mid-axillary line, at the level of the 5th costal ribs at the back,
traversing the right side of the chest, harrowing the right lung,
and fracturing the four (4) postal ribs on the right side front
causing an outlet wound almost six (6) inches long over the right
side of the chest diagonally from above the right nipple
downward near the right mid-axillary line. The inlet has almost
one (1) cm. diameter.
2. Gunshot, wound left knee inlet wound at the exterior and
posterior side of the left knee. almost (1) cm. diameter, directed
towards the medial side of the left knee, fracturing the left knee
and inlet wound two (2) inches long.
3. Gunshot wound of the right thigh, inlet wound, anterior on
front side of the right thigh at the middle thirds, measuring
almost one (1) cm. diameter.
4. Gunshot wound at the internal angle of the left eye inlet
wound almost one (1) cm. diameter, directed downwards and
medially traversing the right side of the face.
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to
Gunshot wound of the chest and left eye. (Exh. "B", p. 10,
Records).
and the examination on Mayor Quirolgico shows the following
injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, face right;
(2) Wound, gunshot, upper lips right;
(3) Wound, gunshot, leg, right;
(4) Wound, gunshot, big toe, right;
(5) Wound, gunshot, 2nd toe, right (Exh. "A-1", P. 22, Record)
and on Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, the following injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, amper fated index, middle and ring fingers,
right;
(2) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep lumbar region,
right;
(3) Wound, lacerated 1/4 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep forearm, left.
(Exh. "A", p. 20, Record.)
On November 23, 1982, this Court, upon receipt of the
information of the death of appellant Cresencio Siazon alias
Ising on February 17, 1982 due to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest
Secondary to Carcinoma Liver, Pulmonary Tuberculosis," from
Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Officer-in-Charge, New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, as well as the Comment filed by the Solicitor
General on the aforesaid information, Resolved to dismiss the
case insofar as the criminal liability of the deceased Cresencio
Siazon alias Ising is concerned.
Appellant Rogelio Bugarin claims that between 5:00 and 5:30 in
the afternoon of January 11, 1972,, the armed men inside the
passing jeep of Mayor Quirolgico fired at Rogelio Bugarin, who
was then standing at the main gate of Puzon Compound. After
the armed men had passed by, Rogelio Bugarin proceeded to
the office of Congressman Puzon where he met Ebing Beltran
and Delfino Beltran who both asked him about the gun reports.
They just dismissed the incident as no one was hurt. Rogelio
Bugarin played guitar while waiting for supper.
Around 10:30 in the evening of the same date, or after
appellants had taken their supper at Puzon Compound, they
heard an unusual sound which appeared to be a six by six truck
that was bumped. Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of the
same day, Delfino Beltran, posted himself as guard and
positioned himself in front of the gate of the Rural Bank. While at
the place he saw a group of persons, numbering more than ten,
along the road in front of the Rural Bank. Among the group of
armed men, he was able to recognize the Chief of Police of
Ballesteros, Gavino Collado, holding a swinging flashlight,
Gerry, Bundok Usita and Bunti Pinzon. When the group reached
the gate of Puzon Compound, he peeped and took hold of the
gate with an iron chain. Accidentally, he dropped the chain and
eyewitnesses, namely:
Carmelita Collado who declared the following:
Q Will you inform the Honorable Court who was that one
shouting?
A Minong Beltran, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform the Court what was that?
A I heard the voice of Mr. Minong Beltran saying, 'Cida, Cida,
you bring out the guns now I have already shot at the BRQ jeep
and they are sure to come back.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Can you tell us what you saw at that time?
A I saw these three persons, Minong Beltran, Boy Bugarin and
Domingo Hernandez, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else did you see if any?
A When these three persons came out, they were already
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform this Court what was that?
A Upon coming out, Delfino Beltran ordered Doming Hernandez
to go to the right side of the old office of Congressman Puzon
and he also instructed Boy Bugarin to seek cover to the Rural
Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During all these time that these were happening, the going
out of Doming Hernandez, of Bugarin; the ordering of Minong
Beltran to the two, did you see any other persons inside the
compound of Congressman Puzon aside from the three?
A After the three had placed themselves in their respective
positions, I saw persons coming out but I was not able to
recognize them. (tsn., pp. 5-7, 42-45, Nov. 18, 1972 hearing.)
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico testified as follows:
Q And do you know what happened after you walked a few
steps to the south?
A When I was looking very well around the vicinity, at the
southern part of the Rural Bank about the corner of their fence,
and as I tried to look intently, I recognized the face of Minong
Beltran.
xxx xxx xxx
Exhibit 'S', in this particular case, will you tell us your findings
about the presence of gunpowder? A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is
positive of gunpowder. (tsn., pp. 52, 55, 57, & 58, January 8,
1973 hearing)
The above findings further confirm the truth of the statements of
eyewitnesses Gavino Collado, Patrolman Usita, Mayor
Quirolgico and Carmelita Collado that appellants traded shots
with the Mayor's group, using long or high powered guns. Anent
the second assigned error, We agree with the trial court's finding
on the existence of conspiracy. In the case at bar, the sequence
of events that transpired in the evening of January 11, 1972,
from the time Delfino Beltran first fired upon the passing jeep of
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico, driven by witness Ernesto
Alvarado at around 9:00, the subsequent preparations for the
arrival of the Mayor as testified to by eyewitness Carmelita
Collado, the shooting on the other passing jeepney to further
provoke the Mayor, and the simultaneous and sudden firing at
the Mayor's group which had just arrived at about 12:00
midnight in the scene of the crime; the final shooting of the
fleeing Mayor; and, the simultaneous common retreat and
escape of all the accused, established the presence of
conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, it is enough that at the time
the offense was committed, the participants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution, as may be inferred
from the attendant circumstances (People vs. Manalo, 133
SCRA 626). Further, conspiracy does not require an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence, as conspiracy
legally exists if, at the time of the offense, the accused had the
same criminal purpose and were united in its execution.
Appellants' conduct and/or actuations before, during and after
the commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 158S are circumstances proving conspiracy. Conspiracy having
established, the act of one is the act of all. It is no longer
necessary to specifically lay out the particular participation of
each participant. Relative to the third assigned error, the trial
court properly appreciated the existence of the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. From
9:00 in the evening to 12:00 midnight of the same day,
appellants had three (3) long hours to meditate and reflect on
their evil design and they clung in their determination to kill the
Mayor, which fortunately failed.
Premeditation is present where there was a lapse of two hours
from the inception to execution.
The existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
shown in the simultaneous and sudden firing by the accused on
the newly arrived Mayor's group, without warning. We are
convinced that they employed means, methods or forms which
could have tended directly or insured the accomplishment of
their evil design against the Mayor, with whom they have no
personal grudge, without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which the offended party had made. No one from
herein appellants sustained a scratch as they were really
prepared for the coming Mayor. With respect to the fourth
assigned error, the claim of Delfino Beltran that he had just
acted in self-defense, suffice it to say, that the one invoking this
justifying circumstance must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that all the necessary requisites of self-defense are present,
namely: (1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the offended
party; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. Delfino Beltran had not
proved any one of these. Thus, his claim of self-defense was
properly dismissed by the trial court. Regarding the fifth
assigned error, considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in
authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the
time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official
duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding
of the trial court that appellants are guilty of attempted murder
with direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and Pat.
Tolentino is correct. Relative to the last assigned error, following
Our latest ruling in People vs. Nicolas Canamo, et al., G.R. No.
62043, promulgated on August 13, 1985, We agree with
appellants that they should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, as they in fact presented
themselves voluntarily to the authorities. However, this
mitigating circumstance is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. WHEREFORE, in
Criminal Case No. 158-S, with the modifications that for lack of
knives with which the accused were then armed and provided,
thereby inflicting the following wounds in the victim, viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length
and half (1/2) cm. in width, ten (10) cm. depthness located at the
left anterior aspect of the trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal
space, 5 cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented horizontally and directed vertically and slightly to the
back. Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width,
eleven and a half (11 1/2) cm. depthness, located at the right
anterior aspect of the trunk, at the level of the 2nd intercostal
space about five (5) cm. away from the anterior and midline, the
wound was oriented horizontally and directed downward and
slightly to the back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at
the left anterior aspect of the trunk about 26 cm. below the left
clavicle and four (4) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented obliquely.
4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1)
cm. in width, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk
about twenty-one (21) cm. below the right clavicle and eight (8)
cm. away from the anterior line. The wound was oriented
obliquely.
5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length,
half (1/2) cm. in width located at the anterior aspect of the upper
extremity about nine (9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a half
(1 1/2) cm. away from the anterior mid-line and medially. The
wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in
width located at the lateral aspect of the right upper extreme
about five (5) cm. above the elbow joint and five (5) cm. away
from the posterior midline laterally. The wound was oriented
horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper
extremity the wound of entrance measuring about three and a
half (3 1/2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width located at the
posterior aspect of the forearm above five (5) em. below the
elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the anterior mid-line
medially. The wound was oriented vertically.
victim and stabbed the latter at the back. Said testimonies were
corroborated by the Post Mortem Examination (Exhibit "A") and
the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human body of the victim which
showed a stab wound at the back. Furthermore, the nature,
character, location and extent of the wound suffered by the
victim, negates the accused's claim of self-defense. (People v.
Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered
by "he victim are indicative of aggression (People v. Somera, 83
Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).
Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. Among others, he
pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that
his name was not mentioned in the report made by Dionilo Garol
to Patrolman Barrera as to the perpetrators of the crime; that his
name was not included in the entry in the police logbook of the
Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that
he had no participation in the commission ofthe felony except
the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication
of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia, pp. 13-16).
While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban
and Leonilo Villaester did not participate in the stabbing, the
lower court finds them equally liable as principals with the other
accused in this case. They were found to be holding stones
which they threw at the store owned by the victim and his wife;
they participated in kicking and dancing around the dead body
of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo
Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was
holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene
here because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, pp. 710, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same
statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try to interfere you
are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have
been aiming or." (TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).
Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was
delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was telumg people not to
listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay
Captain. It is also to be noted that although he was a compadre
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27191
February 28, 1967
ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, and
the CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General
for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Pressed upon us in this, an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition, is the problem of when prescription of penalty should
start to run. The controlling facts are:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner
appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of First
Instance,1 she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to
indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of
P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and
to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed.2 We declined to
review on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that
execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On
petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12,
1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner
failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on
February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on
March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never
arrested.1wph1.t
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March
23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the
penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected
the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the
issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present
petition.
reads:
Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:
Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte aos.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Las leves, al ao.
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia
en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o
desde el quebrantamiento de la condena si hubiera esta
comenzado a cumplirse. x x x
Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en
que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme",
written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is significant.
What remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code is solely "quebrantamiento de la condena". And,
"quebrantamiento" or evasion means escape.10 Reason dictates
that one can escape only after he has started service of
sentence.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty
consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run
when he escapes from confinement. Says Viada:
El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en
que ha tenido lugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme
al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion
hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el
termino de la prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la
sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena
respectiva. Luego ausente el reo ya no podra prescribir hoy la
pena, pues que la notificacion personal no puede ser suplida
por la notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible
necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que
en las penas que consisten en privacion de libertad solo porda
existir la prescripcion quebrantando el reo la condena pues que
si no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre
procederse a su encerramiento en el acto de serle notifirada
personalmente la sentencia.11
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run,
the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who
[could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." 6
Thus, this Court held that by accepting the terms under which
the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that
the Governor-General's determination (rather than that of the
regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the
conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was
conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In
reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code which empowered the
Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either
plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend
sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of
any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as
he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment
of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or
suspension of sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been
convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little
more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being
that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall
be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." 8 Eight
years after the grant of his conditional pardon, Sales was
convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven
days of arresto mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison
to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Sales
raised before this Court two principal contentions. Firstly, he
argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution (Article
III [1], 1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice
Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected both contentions of
Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few
months later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, the President ordered his recommitment to prison to
serve the unexpired period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect
of Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. This Court,
quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his
day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself
during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he
was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction,
sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance
thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
12
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur. Yap, J., is on leave. Narvasa, J., took no part.